Racism and apartheid in southern Africa

South Africa and Namibia

A book of data based on material prepared by the Anti-Apartheid Movement

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Most people are aware of apartheid from what they read in newspapers or see on television. Thousands are passionately concerned by the suffering it causes, but literally millions are suffering directly under an inhuman and degrading system which deprives them of even the most elementary of human rights.

Horrified beyond measure by what had happened during the Second World War, the community of nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. For a majority of the inhabitants of southern Africa, this might as well never have happened: for them, the Declaration has remained a dead letter.

This book is based on material prepared by the Anti-Apartheid Movement for a teaching kit on southern Africa. A section on Rhodesia, which formed part of this material, will be published separately. The views expressed in this book do not necessarily reflect those of the Secretariat.

As the United Nations Specialized Agency for education, science and culture, Unesco hopes that this book will interest teachers in particular and that it will assist them in making a new generation more conscious than their elders of the intolerable injustices we still tolerate—and more effectively determined to eliminate them.
Some dates in the history of South Africa and Namibia

South Africa

700 onwards Movement of Bantu peoples into southern Africa.
1652 First Dutch settlement at the Cape under Jan van Riebeeck.
1779 First Kaffir war: first major confrontation between settlers and Bantu.
1806 Cape Colony becomes British.
1809 Proclamation restricts movement by Coloureds.
1818 Beginning of career of Shaka the Zulu.
1823 Moshoeshoe becomes king of the Sotho.
1834 Abolition of slavery in Cape Colony.
1836 Great Trek begins.
1860 First indentured labour arrives in Natal from India to work on the sugar crops.
1867 Diamonds found at Kimberley.
1868 Lesotho becomes a British Protectorate (as Basutoland).
1884–85 Treaty of Berlin.
1885 Botswana (Bechuanaland) becomes a British Protectorate.
1886 Gold found at Witwatersrand.
1899–1902 Anglo-Boer war.
1902 Death of Rhodes.
1904 Chinese labourers imported for gold mines.
1906 Zulu poll-tax rising. Indian pass laws in Transvaal.
1907–13 Gandhi organizes civil disobedience campaign among Indian community.
1910 Independence for Union of South Africa, within the British Empire.
1912 African National Congress founded.
1913 Native Land Tenure Act.
1920 African miners in Rand.
1926 Masters and Servants Amendment Act removes African right to strike.

1936 Representation of Natives Act creates Native Representative Council and M.P.s representative of natives.

1946 Strike in Rand by 60,000 African miners—broken by armed police.

1948 General election victory for Nationalists.

1950 Police shoot at protesting crowd in Witzieshoek Reserve; sixteen Africans killed. May Day: work stoppage; skirmishes with police lead to eighteen deaths. 26 June: National Day of Protest and Mourning.

1952 Defiance campaign.

1953 Boycott of schools in response to introduction of 'Bantu education'.

1955 Fifty-eight thousand families removed from Sophiatown.

1955-56 African women protest against extension of pass laws to women. Evaton bus boycott against fare increases lasts over six months.

1955 26 June: Congress of the People adopts Freedom Charter.

1956 One hundred and fifty-six arrests: Treason Trial accuses African National Congress.

1957 26 June: one-day stay-at-home. Call for a basic wage of one pound a day. Alexandria bus boycott lasts four months.

1958 One-day national strike.

1959 Police baton-charge 2,000 women in Cato Manor. Boycott starting with Rembrandt tobacco and certain products leads to call for an international boycott of South Africa.


1961 March: Mandela elected leader of new National Action Council. 29 March: three-day stay-at-home receives huge support despite armed intimidation by Government which leads to Mandela calling it off on second day. June: African leaders discuss tactics for change to violent resistance.

1962 August: Mandela captured and imprisoned for five years. Trial speech: 'I will still be moved...'.

1963 11 July: many leaders of underground resistance movement arrested at Rivonia. Hundreds of documents seized. Eight defendants, including Mandela, on trial for their lives, spark off international protest. Sentenced to life imprisonment.

1966 May: Abram Fischer, outstanding defence counsel in political trials, Afrikaner and communist, sentenced to life imprisonment.

1967 Guerilla incursions into Wankie Valley (Rhodesia) mark launching of guerrilla struggle by ZAPU-ANC military alliance.

1969-71 Case of the Twenty-two.

1969 April: Durban dockworkers strike.

1971 March: Port Elizabeth bus boycott; eleven people shot when police fire on crowd. May: freedom fighter jailed; James April sentenced to fifteen years under Terrorism Act.
Leaflet bombs distribute African National Congress material to rush-hour crowds in many centres.

Many strikes, particularly in Durban area. Emergence of the Black Consciousness movement. Increased student activity.

Namibia

1484 Diego Cao, Portuguese explorer, visits coast and captures some inhabitants.
1792 Europeans from Cape Province visit Dumara iron and copper mines. Ovambos mine copper at Tsumeb.
1820-30s Hottentots and Afrikaner families move north from Cape Province.
1850 Jonker Afrikaner (Nama leader) defeats Hereros.
1862-70 Nama-Herero wars.
1868 British Commissioner sent from Cape Town.
1876 Boers trek to north-east of territory.
1878 Britain annexes Walvis Bay.
1883 Luderitz Bay 'bought' by a German merchant. Annexed by Germany in 1884.
1884-85 Berlin Conference recognizes German sphere of interest.
1888 Maharero, Herero chief, forces Germans to withdraw from his capital.
1889 First German troops arrive.
1890 Germany annexes territory.
1892 German troops massacre Namas.
1894 Another defeat of the Namas; Herero rebellion crushed.
1896 Nama rebellion crushed.
1897 Disease destroys 95 per cent of Hereros' cattle.
1903-07 Namas and Hereros revolt again. More than 70 per cent of Hereros and 60 per cent of Namas killed or die of starvation.
1904 Ovambos defeat Portuguese expedition at Naulila, killing 305 troops.
1908 Discovery of diamonds leads to mineral rush and growth of settlement.
1914 First World War. Ovambos under King Mandume force German expedition to withdraw.
1915 South Africa invades, defeats Germans.
1916 Portuguese attack Mandume.
1917 South Africa attacks Mandume, kills him in battle.
1919 League of Nations mandate of South West Africa granted to South Africa.
1921 South Africa appoints a Consultative Council.
1922 South Africa establishes 'reserves' and starts to distribute land to settlers. Namas and Bondelswarts bombed by South African Air Force for refusing to pay dog tax.
1923 Rehebothers compelled to accept change of status for their community.
1925 Legislative council established—with all-white electorate.
1932 South African Air Force and armoured unit destroy village of Ovambo chief Ipumbu.
1945 South Africa asks United Nations to be allowed to annex Namibia.
1950 International Court of Justice unanimous decision that mandate is still in existence (contrary to South Africa’s claims that it ceased with the League of Nations).
1959 Protest against ‘removals’ in Windhoek: twelve killed, fifty wounded when police open fire.
1960 African countries seek ‘contentious judgement’ from International Court, requiring South Africa to carry out the mandate—and thus end apartheid.
1966 Court decides that it cannot make a ruling. 26 August: SWAPO launches armed struggle. General Assembly terminates mandate.
1968 Thirty-eight SWAPO members, including Ja Toivo put on trial in Pretoria on terrorism charges; twenty-one sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island.
1970 Chief Hosea Kutako dies, aged 103.
1971 International Court declares South Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal.
1972 Secretary-General seeks discussions on Namibia with South African Government. Namibian rejection of any idea of ‘independence’ under South African rule.
Part I

South Africa
Southern Africa is made up of a number of groups of people. Some, as far as we know, were always inhabiting the area, other groups moved in at different periods and under differing circumstances.

It is not an area where groups have ever lived an entirely self-contained existence. As in the rest of Africa, groups split into other groupings, were absorbed into larger groups, intermarried and established trading relationships. Within the area groups of differing technological levels, of different linguistic and physical characteristics coexisted. This is important to state since the archaeological truth runs counter to the propaganda of the South African Government and also to much popular belief.

The main—but not the only—groups inhabiting the area during the first century A.D. were the San and the Khoi. They were later joined by groups who had been moving southwards. These groups intermarried, absorbed or integrated with sections of the San and the Khoi. Some groups of San continued to coexist with the new groups particularly along the east coast. We know little of the history of the southern tip of the continent except that by the time the Europeans came they found the San and the Khoi there.

The black people living in eastern and central South Africa—at the beginning of the Christian era in Europe—spoke Bantu languages. From as early as A.D. 1000 we can distinguish two major, but related, linguistic groups—the Nguni and the Sotho. Iron, copper and gold were mined and worked. Socio-political structures were complex and at times powerful kingships emerged and fell, as for instance those of the Luba and the Mutapa. Major settlements and trading centres existed, such as the still unexplored city of Zimbabwe.

An impressive society which flourished from the eleventh to the fifteenth century was that of the Shona. Shona influence spread widely across the central parts of northern South Africa under the leadership of Mutota (c. 1420–50) and Matope (c. 1450–80) each of whom carried the title of Mwana Mutapa.

This period saw the arrival of the first Europeans, the Portuguese. Around 1500 they made contact on the western coast with the powerful Kongo kingdom. Portuguese trading and influence gradually increased and, in 1665, the Kongo were conquered. The Portuguese then looked south to the neighbouring kingdom
of Mbundu whose king was known as the *ngola* (hence Angola) and this in turn was conquered and colonized in 1683. Until the nineteenth century, however, Portuguese rule was confined to the coast and its immediate hinterland. The interior was merely a source of slaves for the colony in Brazil; hundreds of thousands of Africans were exported.

In the east (Mozambique) the Portuguese encountered Arab traders who had been settled on the Indian Ocean seaboard for generations. The Portuguese attempted to penetrate the interior in search of gold and slaves. They soon came into contact with the Shona empire of Mwana Mutapa, and in 1629 a succession dispute enabled the Portuguese to install their own candidate as ruler, giving allegiance to the King of Portugal. As in Angola, Portuguese rule hardly extended beyond the coast, though there were various attempts to either subdue or convert the inhabitants—mostly in vain.

The Dutch were the next to arrive, settling at the Cape in 1652 on behalf of the Dutch East India Company under the command of Jan van Riebeeck. The company intended the settlement simply as a staging post for India-bound ships, but van Riebeeck needed cattle to supply the ships with meat, and this brought the Dutch into inevitable conflict with the San and with the Khoi, who possessed large herds of cattle and who resisted Dutch intrusion in their lands.

Within a few years, the problem of land, which was to bedevil relations between white and black for many generations, had plainly intruded on the scene.1 In van Riebeeck's own words:

> The reasons advanced by them for making war upon us last year, arising out of the complaints that our people living at a distance and without our knowledge had done them much injury and also perhaps stolen and eaten up some of their sheep and calves, etc., in which there is also some truth, and which it is very difficult to keep the common people from doing, when a little out of sight; so that they think they had cause for revenge and especially, they said, upon people who had come to take and to occupy the land which had been their own in all ages, turning with the plough and cultivating permanently their best land and keeping them off the ground upon which they had been accustomed to depasture their cattle, so that they must consequently now seek their subsistence by depasturing the land of other people, from which nothing could arise but disputes with their neighbours; insisting so strenuously upon the point of restoring to them their own land, that we were at length compelled to say they had entirely forfeited that right, through the war which they had waged against us, and that we were not inclined to restore it, as it now had become the property of the Company by the sword and the laws of the war.

Khoi resistance was quelled and many were enslaved. The offspring of marriages and liaisons between the Dutch and the Khoi were either absorbed in what was to become the Afrikaner community, or were with the descendants of slaves from the East Indies, to form the bulk of the 2 million Coloureds in South Africa today. Many Khoi also died from new diseases or founded new communities.

The San, too, found their way of life drastically threatened by the Dutch. Thousands were simply killed by the Dutch, but children were often taken as slaves and later intermarried with the Coloured servant community. Others fled into the northern deserts.

The settler community increased in size over the years and more immigrants, including some French Huguenots, came from Europe. The desire for more land increased and some moved north from the Cape. The first party of Dutch, led by Jan Coetzee, crossed the Orange River in 1760. There they came into contact with the Xhosa people who had been settled between the Limpopo and Orange rivers for several hundreds of years.

In 1779 what is known as the first Kaffir war broke out; it ended in defeat for the Xhosa, and the River Fish became the boundary of the new Boer territory. Xhosa resistance, however, continued over succeeding decades.

In 1806 the British took over administration at the Cape. The Boers, disliking both official interference and anti-slavery pressures, trekked off again away from the Cape and, in the nineteenth century, across the Drakensberg, the Orange River and the Vaal. In order to hold the whole Cape Colony, Britain imported 5,000 new emigrants—the '1820 settlers'.

This Boer movement followed closely upon the migrations of some southern Bantu-speaking groups and the consolidation of many diverse groups into the Zulu kingdom. This happened under Shaka who is considered a hero by many Africans on the one hand and a despot by the encroaching Europeans on the other. With trading routes disrupted by European settlement, with the emergence of a new powerful African kingdom some groups including the Ndebele and the Ngoni moved northwards again.

The Sotho inhabited the tableland between the Drakensberg and the Kalahari. The consolidation of the Zulu kingdom and the trend towards establishing more centralized kingdoms created among the Sotho a new leader, Moshesh, who established himself in 1823 in a fortress of Thaba Bosiu ('the mountain that grows taller by night'). He entered a diplomatic relationship with the Zulu. After the death of Shaka in 1828 Moshesh began to see that the greatest threat to his independence came, not from the Zulu kingdom, but from the Europeans, particularly the Boers, groups of whom were beginning to move into the Caledon valley.

By 1835 the British had reached the Orange River and Moshesh realized he would have to use all his diplomatic skill to prevent his territory being taken by either or both of these groups. The next thirty years were a difficult time for him; he feared the Boers' avowed expansionism but did not entirely trust the British either. Finally, war broke out between Moshesh and the Orange Free State in 1853; some Sotho territory was annexed by the Boers in 1866 and two years later Moshesh's kingdom became a British protectorate (Basutoland, now Lesotho). Moshesh died in 1870; he had been a courageous and capable leader, had unified his nation and created the central authority of the king over semi-independent chiefs. These chiefs participated in all important decisions, the laws promulgated by the tribe being collective rather than autocratically imposed.

North of the Limpopo, the Ndebele settled in the area adjacent to the territory of the Shona—areas to be called Matabeleland and Mashoualand by the first British settlers and which today make up Rhodesia. In Mozambique the main tribes were all Nguni in origin (Ovambo, Nama, etc.). In Namibia the different African groups were at first protected against invaders by the arid Namib desert on the coast, by the Kunene (Muene) and Orange rivers and by the Kalahari desert to the east, until their land too was threatened, first by the British at the
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Cape, and then by the Germans, who proceeded to acquire it by purchase as well as by force. The expropriation of African land was completed by the South African Government after 1920.

South Africa

When the British finally took over Cape Colony in 1806, many of the Dutch settlers resented this imposition of alien rule, the enforced usage of English as the official language, and the British attitude to Africans and Coloureds. They were horrified, for example, when the British in 1812 set up the 'Black Circuit' court which dealt with complaints by servants and slaves against their white masters. The final blow came in 1834, when slaves in southern Africa, as in the rest of the British Empire, were set free. Slavery was a fundamental part of the Dutch settler society and this law seemed to be an attempt to undermine the life they had built for themselves. It was part of their tradition, however, to make journeys or treks in search of new land, and this is what they did in 1837. This is known as the Great Trek.

The Great Trek

About 4,000 Boers, accompanied by about the same number of 'servants', entered Natal through the Drakensberg Mountains. Some others went north, but at this stage the greatest part of the Voortrekkers went into Natal. They found, however, when they reached there that they were faced with opposition from a Zulu nation that had been reorganized into a powerful force by their leader, Shaka, but were at this time ruled by Dingaan. Several confrontations took place and several new Voortrekker settlements were destroyed; the most important battle took place at Ncome River (Blood River) on 16 December 1838, when the Voortrekker army, led by Andries Pretorius, was able to defeat the Zulu army. This Boer victory had a disastrous effect on Zulu morale and some groups withdrew their allegiance from Dingaan. Later he was killed in battle and Pretorius was able to appoint a new Zulu king, Mpande, who agreed to be a vassal of the Natal Republic.

For the time being, the Voortrekkers seemed to be fairly secure in Natal and they drew up a constitution, placing the sovereignty of their new republic in an elected assembly of twenty-four white men, known as the Volksraad (parliament). They were determined that this should remain a republic in the Voortrekker spirit and so the blacks had no political rights at all; there was never to be any question of equality. White Uitlanders (foreigners) who came into the republic were not allowed to become citizens or own land until they had (a) lived in the republic for a year, and (b) produced a certificate of good conduct signed by three citizens.

Their security was to be short-lived, however, for soon Zulu refugees began to return to their old homelands and, increasingly, to outnumber the Boers. Some could be absorbed into the labour force, but the numbers might become a threat to the new republic. Accordingly, the Volksraad decided to move the Africans out of Natal into the area south of the River Mtamunna.

This decision affected the British, at Cape Colony, since these surplus Afri-
Cape Town: the industrial city.
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cans might become a threat to their boundaries. In Britain itself the Aborigine Protection Society protested about the Boers' treatment of the Africans. As a result, in 1842, the governor of Cape Colony decided, first, to occupy Portal Natal and later, to annex the whole of Natal itself. The following year the Volksraad of Natal accepted British colonization of their republic and most of the Voortrekkers left the colony on the second stage of the Great Trek.

Natal, therefore, developed a quite different character from what were to become the other provinces of South Africa. The departing Boers were replaced by large numbers of British settlers, who in 1860 brought the first indentured Indian labourers to work for them, the Africans proving unresponsive to the demands of permanent employment. It is thus that today most of the South African Indian population either lives in or originates from Natal.

New developments took place in the colonists' policy towards the Africans in Natal. Under the supervision of Theophilus Shepstone several areas or 'locations' were set aside for Africans in Natal and all Africans were encouraged to move into them. This can be seen as a forerunner of the present South African policy of requiring people of different races to live in different areas. Shepstone also made use of the traditional chiefs and headmen, making them responsible for law and order and on occasion creating new chieftainships.

The Voortrekkers moved northwards where several groups of their compatriots had previously settled, across the Orange River. This, however, was a much disputed area during the 1840s. The Ndebele people were forced further north across the Limpopo by the Boers, but the Sotho and the two groups of Griqua (Coloured Khoi) had claims in the area. British missionaries had become involved in Griqua affairs and tried to persuade the British Government to give protection to them. Eventually, in 1848, the new governor in the Cape, Sir Harry Smith, annexed the whole area between the Orange and the Vaal, despite the opposition of most of the whites there, and called it the Orange River Sovereignty. The British were able to defeat a Boer force led by Pretorius but they were unable to defeat the Sotho under Moshoeshoe. Eventually to Smith's dismay, the London government decided, for financial reasons, to disannex the Orange River Sovereignty. This was done at the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854 and secured the independence of the Orange Free State for the time being.

Meanwhile the Boers were creating a new colony of small republics in the Transvaal. An agreement was made between them and the British in 1852, at the Sand River Convention, which established the Voortrekkers' right to African territory. A clause in the agreement stated:

It is agreed that no objection shall be made by any British authority against the emigrant Boers purchasing their supplies of ammunition in any of the British colonies and possessions of South Africa, it being mutually understood that all trade in ammunition with the native tribes is prohibited both by the British Government and the emigrant farmers on both sides of the Vaal River.

1. However, it should be noted here that this was the argument both of the British settlers in South Africa and the plantation-owners in the Caribbean. In the latter case the Caribbean argument is that the issue was not that Africans were unresponsive to work, but that planters were unresponsive to wage demands and preferred unfree labour. This may well have been the case in South Africa as well.
So the Voortrekkers could buy guns and the Africans could not. This enabled the Boers to create their independent states, although it was still not easy to defeat people such as the Pedi and the Venda. And for many years Moshesh profited from inter-Boer dissension until, in 1868, Moshoeshoe's kingdom became the British protectorate of Basutoland (now Lesotho) to prevent it being taken by the Boers, who eight years earlier had agreed on a constitution for their new Transvaal Republic. Racial inequality was an article of faith in this constitution, and the Transvaal was their promised land.

**Diamonds and gold**

Boer independence, however, was short-lived, for the discovery of gold and diamonds within their boundaries during the next few years brought them once again into the sphere of British influence—first economic, then political. The Boers, mainly farmers, were less interested in this mineral potential than the British.

The factor which made the situation in South Africa quite different from that in any other colonies in Africa was the industrialization which followed the discovery of gold and diamonds. New immigrants poured into South Africa from Europe to make their fortunes. A few became millionaires but most became members of the powerful new white labour force. These discoveries occurred at a time when the Europeans had laid claims to great parts of the land in southern Africa and, consequently, many Africans were landless and in search of employment. Many features of South African life today, such as passes and job reservation, originated in this period of upheaval.

Diamonds were found in the Orange and Vaal rivers in Griqualand in 1867–68. The land was at that time under the control of the Orange Free State, but Britain was able to re-possess it in 1871. Europeans, Coloureds and Africans poured into the area, the Africans generally becoming labourers and the Europeans prospectors or 'diggers'. By 1872, £1.5 million worth of diamonds had been found; labourers' average weekly wages were 7s. 6d. plus rations worth 6s. 6d. The Diamond Diggers' Protection Society claimed to be worried about diamond thefts by Africans and competition from African and Coloured diggers. They therefore tried to have legislation introduced which would make it impossible for a 'native' to be granted a licence to dig or to hold claims or diamonds. The British high commissioner of Griqualand West would not accept such overt racism in the law but the proclamation he did eventually make placed similar restrictions on 'servants', who were usually African or Coloured. ‘Servants’ were also required to have a labour contract and to produce a certificate of its registration on demand.

After 1875, when the price of diamonds fell, many small men were forced out of business. Mergers took place and the diamond business began to be increasingly run by large companies. Ultimately, one big corporation, De Beers Consolidated Mine, was formed of all the companies. This reorganization led to many changes that affected the way in which the workers worked and lived. Compounds for the African workers were set up for the first time at Kimberley where they were required to spend the whole of their contract period. They lived in
cabins, twenty to a room, in an area surrounded by a high fence. They were never allowed out of the compound, except when they went into the mines, and could only buy food at the company's stores in the compound. At the end of every working day Africans were required to strip naked and undergo a search for stolen gems. When attempts were made to search white workers in a similar way in 1883 and 1884, strikes and riots followed and, eventually, the employers agreed to hold only surprise searches.

The white miners were quick to form themselves into a powerful group to protect their own interests, both from the mineowners and from the Africans whose cheaper, unorganized labour they saw as a threat. Thus by 1900 white miners were earning £1 2s. 6d. per shift, compared to the non-white miner's 3s. 5d. per day.

Some years after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, another great mineral discovery was made—this time of gold at Witwatersrand in the Transvaal in 1884. As at Kimberley, many prospectors came. The ordinary fortune-hunter, however, had little chance of success since such people as C. J. Rhodes and Barney Barnato, who had become millionaires at Kimberley, invested some of their fortunes at Witwatersrand and very soon their companies were controlling the gold industry as they controlled the diamond industry.

Gold output increased rapidly and by 1898, 3.8 million ounces of gold, worth £16.5 million, was being produced in a year. To safeguard their interests, the mineowners had in 1889 organized themselves into a Chamber of Mines. Most of these men were of British origin, and since they were making their fortunes in a Boer republic, there was considerable resentment against them among the local people. The Volksraad charged high taxes of these Uitlanders but gave them no political rights.

The Chamber of Mines also met with opposition from its white employees who, in 1892, formed the Witwatersrand Mine Employees and Mechanics Union. They were concerned with the usual grievances about working conditions, hours and wages and also with the chamber's attempt to bring in cheap labour. The union's first secretary took the view that 'if any wages had to be reduced, let the wages of black labour be cut down'. The white workers found an ally in the Volksraad which was also concerned about the chamber's attempts to bring in cheap non-white labour. The inequality of white and non-white was written into their constitution, and so when they came to pass labour legislation they had no hesitation in meeting the trade unions' demands that, on the grounds of safety, jobs such as preparing charges or loading drill holes should not be given to non-whites.

The great boom in gold resulted in the rise of Johannesburg to become one of the major centres of the Western world, and in the creation of great personal fortunes. Little benefit, however, accrued to the African workers. The compounds and pass system of Kimberley was introduced in the Rand and, between 1895 and 1897, the average earnings of the African worker fell from £3 3s. 6d. to £2 8s. 7d. There were no medical facilities at the mines. By 1902–03, the death rate was sixty-nine per thousand; among groups of men from tropical regions it ranged from 118 to 164 per thousand. It was 1906 before a hospital was opened. It became difficult to recruit men locally for the mines. Some Sotho chiefs said: 'We do not like our men to go to Johannesburg because they go there to die.' The
Cape Town: African location.
mineowners therefore had to seek labour from farther away. They attempted to bring in Chinese labour but this was opposed by the white trade unions, and they then made an agreement with Mozambique to supply conscripts. The need for labour also led the British administration to impose a hut tax on Africans, forcing thousands of them on to the labour market in order to obtain the cash.

Thus there were four main groups involved in the exploitation of mineral resources in South Africa whose relationships largely determined the future history of the territory.

First, there were the employers—mostly of British origin—many of whom made vast fortunes in a few years. They were and have remained interested always in finding new supplies of cheap labour, from whatever source.

Secondly, there was the white labour force. Many had been lured from Europe by the rumours of gold and diamonds. Trade union activity at home made them conscious of the need for organization, but they did not include black workers whom they regarded as competitors whose cheaper labour would force down wages.

Thirdly, there were the Afrikaners (Boers) who were primarily farmers. Gold brought great wealth to their state, which they intended to keep in their own hands. They were determined that contemporary social and economic upheavals would not result in bringing blacks any nearer equality with whites.

Finally there were the Africans, forbidden by law or implication from digging their own claims, paid considerably less than whites, housed in prison-type conditions, deprived of much of their freedom, lacking trade unions to represent them and to state their grievances, and generally held in subjection by their new masters.

This is the background to the present-day conditions.

**Rhodes: Boer-British rivalry**

British expansionism, the doing of individuals rather than of governments, was a crucial feature of the late nineteenth century. Although anxious to prevent the Boer republics from having access to the sea (hence the annexation of Natal) the London government was lukewarm towards taking responsibility for much more territory (hence the disannexation of the Orange Free State). In 1872, however, Cape Colony was granted ‘responsible self-government’ which its assembly had been requesting since its inception in 1854, and the British colonists’ ambition was allowed free rein. The 1871 annexation of Griqualand was followed in 1877 by the annexation of the Transvaal, made possible by the Boers’ failure to defeat the combined African forces of the Pedi and the Zulu. But the British were unwise enough to take on the Zulus also, and were heavily defeated by them (under Dingaan’s successor Ceterayo) in 1879, before finally subduing them six months later.

The Boers began to agitate for a return to independence in 1880. Under Kruger’s leadership they rebelled against the British, and the first Anglo-Boer war broke out. It lasted ten weeks and ended in the Boer victory at Majuba Hill. Although Britain retained nominal sovereignty, the Transvaal became formally independent once more at the Pretoria Convention the following year.
This briefly halted the colonial expansion, but the discovery of gold revived British interest in the Transvaal. The leading figure was Cecil Rhodes, whose earliest will, made before he had accumulated his wealth, envisaged 'the extension of British rule throughout the world', including the whole of Africa and the 'ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire'. His diamond monopoly included a provision for colonization north of the Limpopo.

Following the German annexation of Namibia in 1884, Rhodes persuaded the British governor to take over Bechuanaland (now Botswana) as a protectorate to prevent possible German encroachment. On the Rand, Rhodes took longer to become as interested in the possibility of gold as he was in diamonds, because he believed that the real El Dorado lay north. His company (Consolidated Goldfields) contained the same provision for northward colonialism as De Beers. In 1888 he established his British South Africa (BSA) Company, with explicit designs on Matabeleland and Mashonaland; two years later, he became prime minister of the Cape.

These events led to growing conflicts in the Transvaal, mainly between Boer farmers and British miners, and exacerbated the antagonisms between rural and urban interests. The Boers tried to discourage the outsiders—or Uitlanders—from settling by imposing very high taxes and refusing the franchise. The Uitlanders then set up an organization called the Transvaal National Union and appealed for help to the British administration in Cape Colony.

Although the British Government was unwilling to try annexation again, Rhodes was sympathetic to the Uitlanders. By establishing itself in Rhodesia, the BSA Company had become a powerful political force on the Transvaal's northern border, and trouble was fomented by its representative in Rhodesia, Starr Jameson, who helped to smuggle arms in to the Uitlanders. The Transvaal Government took steps to strengthen its position. It had talks with the Government of the Orange Free State about the possibility of a federation. Freight rates on the railway between Johannesburg and the border with Cape Colony were trebled so that the Uitlanders who exported gold were now faced with an additional financial burden.

The situation seemed to be deteriorating. But although Rhodes and Jameson were anxious to annex the whole republic, the Uitlanders, much as they hated Boer restrictions on their operation, did not view a British takeover with much enthusiasm.

Jameson was eager to organize an uprising and he wanted one to take place before the end of 1895 despite misgivings on the part of the Uitlanders that it might be premature. However, he overrode objections and decided to make a raid into the Transvaal on 29 December 1895, which was supposed to coincide with an uprising by the Uitlanders in Transvaal.

The rising failed to materialize, however, and Jameson and his men were, fairly ignominiously, captured by the Boers. Rhodes was seen to be involved in the raid and was obliged to resign from his positions as prime minister and director of the BSA Company. The British colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, had unofficially known about the raid and was lucky to avoid being implicated in it himself. At that time, however, Britain was committed to a war in Sudan and was not prepared to become involved in a war in southern Africa. Relations be-
tween the Boers and the British were nevertheless at such a low ebb that it was clearly only a matter of time before open conflict broke out.

Shortly after the Jameson raid, the Ndebele and Shona rose against BSA Company rule and were subdued with much force and brutality. The main reason why Rhodes' star was not completely eclipsed by these two events lay in his pact with Chamberlain and Alfred Milner.

In 1897 Milner was appointed British high commissioner in Cape Colony and Rhodes re-emerged from his political disgrace to lead the Progressive Party. Both were totally committed to the idea of extending British rule and were eager for a decisive end to the question of the Transvaal, then without doubt the wealthiest area in southern Africa. The situation polarized. Inside the Transvaal, the leading English newspaper was suppressed, and Paul Kruger was re-elected as president on a programme diametrically opposed to the aims of Cecil Rhodes. The Boers saw Rhodes as the personification of everything that threatened the way of life that they had fought for hundreds of years to preserve (Kruger called him 'the curse of Africa') and they were not prepared to allow him or any other mining interests to deprive them of their freedom. Negotiations nevertheless took place at Bloemfontein between Milner and the Transvaal Government over the British Uitlander's rights, and Kruger made some concessions. But when the British Government refused to withdraw its nominal sovereignty, he responded by withdrawing the same concessions.

The breakdown of the Bloemfontein Conference provided a situation in which 'intervention' or a confrontation with Kruger's republic would be acceptable to the British public.

In September 1899 Britain broke off negotiations with the Transvaal. All male citizens in the Transvaal over the age of 13 were enlisted. Troops were mobilized, too, in the Orange Free State since, although they had not been involved in this dispute, British troops were concentrated on their border. For a few weeks there was stalemate, but on 11 October war finally broke out and the following day the Boers attacked Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith.

The British sent thousands of troops to South Africa and, after about a year, most of the towns were in British hands. The Boers, however, withdrew to the countryside and guerrilla tactics.

The Uitlanders, on whose behalf Chamberlain was stirring up public feeling in Britain, were not enthusiastic about the war. They were much too busy making money out of the Rand and cared little for British supremacy. Far from helping them, the war caused a serious economic depression. Nor did British business require that the Union Jack fly over Pretoria; the city of London was perfectly happy to invest vast sums of money in South Africa regardless of whether Kruger accepted or rejected British overlordship. The Rand paid handsome dividends, which was all that mattered. All in all, the war served only to exacerbate Anglo-Boer dissension and, more strongly, to embitter the Boer community for generations to come.

The war dragged on for two years. To isolate the Boer commandos, the British rounded up their women and children and placed them in camps. E. A. Walker, in his classic History of South Africa (p. 498) states that 200,000 women and children died in these camps. Although the war was won by Britain in 1902 there was little sense of triumph. The two Boer republics, Orange Free State and Trans-
vaal, came under British rule but it was quite clear that any attempt to subjugate the Boers was out of the question. And within eight years the Union of South Africa came into being and Boers for the most part were once again ruling what they saw as their own country. Several of the new leaders, including Botha and Smuts, had fought in the war as generals against the British.

**African organization**

In view of the influence of late nineteenth century events on the subsequent history of South Africa, it may be recalled that there was an almost complete disregard during the Anglo-Boer conflicts of the interests or rights of the African majority. Rhodes died in 1902, but the BSA Company went on to colonize Rhodesia and impose conditions similar to those imposed in South Africa and consolidated in subsequent decades.

White parliamentary politics centred largely on country of origin and on two main parties—most Afrikaners supporting the Nationalist Party, English-speakers and industrial employers (led, however, by Afrikaners) supporting the Unionist Party. Both parties were opposed to racial equality, although in Cape Province non-whites had access to the franchise—a legacy of British imperial humanitarianism. The Labour Party was also committed to white privilege as regards skilled employment, and fought hard against black encroachment on jobs.

Parties with no racial barriers were formed from time to time but had virtually no chance of electoral success. In the Cape General Election of 1904, for example, the Political Labour League fought on the basis of equal rights for all civilized men. All the candidates, however, were white, had little experience or money, and their campaign totally failed. The Communist Party of South Africa made attempts to educate and politicize the black population and, eventually, their 1928–29 conference adopted the idea of a black republic with citizenship for all. But they had no mass support and no hope of electoral success.

In fact, although the Anglo-Boer war left deep scars, both white groups collaborated to strengthen their control over the rest of the population. In 1910 South Africa acquired dominion status and complete freedom from British governmental interference.

Black groups began gradually to organize in the cities as the tribal groups were progressively tamed and restricted to particular areas. They were all fairly conservative at first, and attempted to work within the existing system.

One of the first African leaders was John Tengo Jabavu. An election was held in the Cape, where educated Africans then had the vote, and he organized African voters in support of the liberal candidate (who won the seat). He was then given some money to start the first independent African newspaper *Inno Zabantsundu* (African Opinion), which made him influential. In 1887, when Africans in the eastern Cape were being disfranchised, he sent a petition to Queen Victoria—to no avail. His political position can be gauged from an editorial in which he said: ‘We not only preach loyalty, but we preach subordination to superiors.’

In 1902 the African Political Organization (APO) was founded. One of its leaders was Abdul Abdurahman, a Coloured doctor. Although open to all races
Port Elizabeth: the white wealth.
it remained predominantly Coloured. It, too, tried to work within the system and urged people to apply for electoral registration. Abdurahman went, unsuccessfully, to London to protest against the colour bar in the South African parliament. The APO tried to mobilize Coloureds in passive resistance campaigns and political strikes but failed to get support, perhaps because many Coloureds aspired to a role in the European community.

In 1912 the inaugural conference of the African National Congress (ANC) brought together the various native congresses in the provinces. It, too, for long remained conservative. Its meeting was attended by chiefs, the then traditional leaders, and intellectuals. The Reverend J.L. Dube was appointed president. The congress gradually developed a political consciousness among Africans, and when, in 1926, prime minister Hertzog introduced a Bill to eject Africans from the white political system, it was congress which voiced African opposition. Opposition, however, failed to prevent the white parliament from passing this and other measures which severely limited African social, political and legal rights.

Land appropriation by whites had first roused African opposition. Land had been formally divided under the Native Land Act of 1913 (shortly after the Union became independent of British control). In 1936, in the Native Trust and Land Act, the whites gave themselves 86 per cent and the Africans 14 per cent of the total land. Then, as now, whites were a small minority of the population. The Urban Areas Act of 1923, consolidated in 1945, restricted Africans’ right of movement. Indians were prohibited from moving out of the province in which they were born under the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913.

In 1943 the ANC drew up a Charter of Rights, based on the Atlantic Charter drafted by Churchill and Roosevelt.

In addition to what was being done by political organizations largely dominated by intellectuals, African workers attempted industrial action. In the absence of trade unions it was difficult to organize strikes.

However, in 1918, white electrical mechanics in the Rand struck and succeeded in having their wages increased to the equivalent, in real terms, of pre-war rates. Their success encouraged African sanitary service attendants to strike for wage increases of 8d. to 1s. a day. The fifty men who came out on strike were arrested and charged, and over two-thirds were convicted. When other attendants were ordered to do the work of the men imprisoned a further 152 came out on strike. In turn, they were sentenced to two months hard labour for breach of contract and threatened with work without pay, armed guards and flogging.

The contrast between the treatment of these black strikers and the white mechanics who had also been on strike was very marked. The ANC launched a campaign to release the prisoners. This developed into a popular demand for a general strike on 1 July, despite ANC lack of approval for this action.

At this point the South African Industrial Federation (the white trade union movement) decided to create a defence force to protect white women and children in the event of a general strike. The government, however, had decided to avoid a confrontation, and released the imprisoned strikers. The general strike was called off. None the less, on 1 July, 15,000 miners refused to work, and the police were called in to force them to work. The police then decided to prosecute eight men whom they held responsible for the strikes. Three were Europeans, leaders of the International Socialist League, and five were Africans, three of
them leaders of the Industrial Workers’ Union of Africa. This was the first time in the history of South Africa that Europeans and Africans were prosecuted together for political activities. The prosecution case collapsed when it emerged that much of its evidence was perjured.

Industrial action continued. In 1920, white miners won an increase of 8s. a day through strike action. African miners decided to follow suit and ask for increases ranging from 5s. to 10s. a day and also for the opportunity to do more responsible work. The owners offered an increase of 3d. a shift but said that the removal of the colour bar was impractical. This was rejected by the East Rand miners. Their continuing strike encouraged others, and soon over 70,000 men were out. The strike was well organized, with pickets, and non-violent. The government again called in the troops who, forcing the men back to work, killed at least eleven of them. The strike gained none of its immediate objectives but, as the president of the Chamber of Mines realized, it was the first major ‘native strike’.

The African workers had become aware of the necessity for organization. One of the most powerful unions, the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union, was formed in 1919 with Clement Kadalie as its secretary. In 1928, five unions came together to form the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions and, among other things, they demanded equal pay for equal work. In the following year another five unions joined the federation. By 1945 the federation represented 119 unions and 158,000 workers.

The African Mine Workers’ Union (AMWU), affiliated to the federation, organized one of the most important strikes in South African history. The Lansdowne Commission of 1942 had recommended cost-of-living increases but the government refused to grant these to miners. After the war ended, the AMWU tried to negotiate an increase in the daily rate from 2s. 3d. to 10s. but this was refused by the Chamber of Mines.

In the elections of May 1938, the United Party—identified with English-speaking interests—won 111 out of 150 white seats. The nationalists increased their total by seven to twenty-seven. They had fought the election on two issues: restricting the vote which Coloureds still had in the Cape, but not in the rest of South Africa, and an unequivocal declaration on the question of South African sovereignty vis-à-vis the United Kingdom.

Just before the Second World War, the Nationalist Party (in opposition) questioned the use of public funds on ‘native’ education and the influx of Africans to the towns. They favoured the increased taxation of Africans to meet African needs, less public spending on Africans, and regulations which would make it easier to find Africans for farm labour; they argued that the Unionist Party’s attitude to Africans and Coloureds would operate to the detriment of poor whites.

There were splits within the Unionist Party. Some members had liberal views but the more conservative members were in favour of transferring African education from the provinces to the central government’s Department of Native Affairs. This view was eventually endorsed by the Nationalist Party and implemented by them after their victory in 1948.

The smaller opposition groups had particular interests. The small Dominion Party was primarily concerned with strengthening the position of the Union of South Africa within the British Empire—in contrast to the Afrikaners and a
growing number of English-speaking whites who wanted a separate South Africa.

The Labour Party policy was social security and increased wages for the white population—coupled with complete separation of blacks from whites, socially, economically and territorially, although with such financial assistance to blacks as might be required.

Africans were not directly represented in parliament; instead, three Europeans represented 'native' interests. These could obviously be overruled at any time in an assembly of 153 and, in any case, formed part of the system of government. They did protest against the already discernable policy of making the Native Affairs Department entirely dependent on African taxes, and with a growing control over African education, social services and development. But the only alternative that they had to voting with the Unionist Party was to vote with the opposition.

Dominion Party policy could be regarded as a variation of Unionist Party policy and was in any case completely overshadowed by the upsurge of nationalism that followed the Second World War. As far as the Labour Party was concerned, the Nationalist Party now seemed to the white working class the best defender of what they regarded as their interests.

South Africa was divided on the issue of entering the Second World War. German settlers in South West Africa, and Germany itself, seemed sympathetic towards Afrikaner nationalism, and Nazi doctrines heavily influenced Afrikaner thought. The quasi-fascist 'grey shirts' were mostly Afrikaners, so were most members of the Ossewa-Brandaug (Oxwagon Sentinels). Members included the present Prime Minister Vorster and the present Minister of Finance, Diederich. Vorster himself was interned during the war.

Pro-Nazi sympathies thus led many influential nationalists to favour neutrality. It was an emotional issue which further consolidated Afrikaner nationalism; combined with the scale of urban development during the war, and various political issues which the war forced to the surface, it was to have a lasting impact on South Africa.

For the war did not expand African participation in political life but did the opposite. War emergency regulations passed in 1943 made all strikes by all Africans in all circumstances illegal. These regulations were continued each year after the war ended, and then formally codified by the nationalist government after their success in 1948.

Controls on Africans coming to work in urban areas provided the precedent for the subsequent pass laws.

By the end of the war, Africans were demanding greater participation through an extension of the system of voting, they were demanding an end to the pass system and the recognition of their trade unions for bargaining purposes.

Their demands were minimal but they were enough to pose to the white electorate the question as to where South Africa went after the war. The unionist reply was equivocal. They had no intention of extending the vote to Africans or of meeting the demands of African labour. The position was further influenced by the tension which grew up between the Native Representative Council and the government. Hofmeyr had suggested communal electoral roles but with each black group representing itself in parliament rather than through white representatives, but this proposal which attempted to bridge the growing gap between
Africans and some white liberals on the one hand and the bulk of the white electorate on the other, could not be supported by Africans and liberals on the one hand as making communal representation permanent nor by the white electorate on the other as being too liberal.

Smuts (who was then prime minister) agreed that social change must come—but in the future, and he argued that whatever the advances, social discrimination must continue. This satisfied neither liberal nor conservative. The Nationalist Party, however, had a clear answer. It was ‘separate development’: apartheid.

On 12 April 1946, 50,000 African miners (one-sixth of the work force) came out on strike. Armed police were sent in and seven miners were killed or injured. Four thousand Africans marched to Johannesburg from West Springs Mine in support of the strike. The press frightened white readers with articles on the dangers of such demonstrations. The government’s Native Representative Council, which was supposed to keep the government informed on African opinion, was refused permission to go to the Rand to observe the strike. The handling of the strike proved the final straw for the council, which held only one further meeting and suspended itself, unable to operate in the face of intensifying racial discrimination.

Coloured and Indian tobacco workers who came out in sympathy with the miners were baton-charged by the police. The repression of the striking miners continued. Their leaders were arrested, and the strike ended on 17 April 1946, five days after it began. The AMWU leaders were tried. Some were given short sentences and others acquitted.

The strike had not succeeded in its aims, but it did demonstrate the increasing militancy of African workers against their conditions. The attempt to call a general strike in sympathy with the miners also failed, but the fact that the attempt had been made at all showed how non-white workers were realizing the importance of organization and collective action.

A few years earlier, young members of the African National Congress (including Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela) had set up an African Youth League. They were no longer prepared to accept a subordinate, if improved, position in the existing system and advocated non-co-operation in order to bring about the very different kind of society they wished to see in South Africa.

The South African Indians, in 1945, removed some of their more conservative leaders who had been prepared to accept voluntary segregation, and appointed younger men such as Dadoo and Naicker, who planned to organize the Indian community to resist the government. In 1947 Dadoo and Naicker together with Dr Xuma, ANC president at the time, made a joint declaration of unity. It soon became apparent, however, that more than unity and determination was needed when the Nationalist Party won the elections in 1948 and formed a government.
Southern Africa.
Movements of peoples.
Supposed stages in the spread of Bantu-speaking peoples.

- **MAIN PARENT AREA OF BANTU (ANCIENT)** up to about 2,000 years ago
- **FIRST AREA OF BANTU SPREAD**; mainly before AD 500
- **SECOND AREA OF BANTU SPREAD**; mainly before AD 1,000
- **THIRD AREA OF BANTU SPREAD**; mainly after AD 1,000
- **NON-BANTU**
The Great Trek.
Southern Africa: rainfall.

FIGURES SHOW MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL IN MILLIMETRES
Southern Africa: vegetation.
Southern Africa: minerals.
Land allocation in South Africa: Bantustans.
South Africa’s climate, mineral wealth and other natural resources have enabled it to become the most prosperous and heavily industrialized country in Africa.

Geography and climate

In an area of 432,379 square miles live 21.3 million South Africans (15 million Africans, 3.8 million whites, 2 million Coloureds and a half million Asians).

The climate is mostly subtropical, but conditions range from the lush Mediterranean-type southern Cape and east to the arid deserts of the northern Cape. Rainfall decreases progressively from east to west, with the seaward slopes of the Cape Mountains and the Drakensberg (which form the border between Lesotho and South Africa, and extend north-east through Natal) receiving upwards of 60 inches per annum; virtually all the western half of the country receives under 10 inches. Rain falls mainly in summer (November–April), although the southern coast has more evenly distributed rainfall and the Cape Town region has its highest levels in winter. Most of the country is high plateau, behind the coastal ranges which form a virtually continuous escarpment between 5,000 and 11,000 feet high. This escarpment forms a watershed from which the Orange River system flows west to the Atlantic at Alexander Bay. There are four provinces.

CAPE

Largest and most sparsely populated of the four, the Cape has a climate which ranges from subtropical and Mediterranean around the coast to hot and dry in the interior, merging into the Kalahari desert in the north-west. The Cape occupies almost 60 per cent of the total area but contributes only about 30 per cent of the net industrial output. One of its main drawbacks is the long distance between the Cape coast and the major developed areas of the Transvaal and Natal. Nevertheless, it contains three of the four major ports (Port Elizabeth and East London in the east and Cape Town itself in the west), and the major road and rail systems show a distinct north-east–south-west bias.
The Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area contains the motor industry which grew out of imported component assembly and includes Ford and General Motors. The western Cape around Cape Town is industrialized and is also the main centre of fruit farming for export. The province’s main farm product is wool which is also the republic’s most important agricultural export.

The northern Cape depends largely on mining and exploration, although the extension of irrigation through the Orange River project should increase the amount of farming land. Mining still centres on Kimberley (where the first diamond discoveries in South Africa were made). The north-west Cape has vast deposits of copper, manganese, silver, iron, asbestos, limestone, salt, gypsum and tungsten in commercially exploitable quantities. Copper and zinc deposits were valued in 1973 as worth at least 1,000 million Rands. The western coast is only beginning to be developed.

Early in 1973 it was announced that the big iron ore deposits at Sishen are to be more intensively exploited. A freight-only rail link is to be built to the west coast harbour of Saldanha Bay, which will be greatly enlarged, because most of the Sishen ore will be mined for export.

The South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) is aiming at ‘an initial export target of 15 million tons of iron ore annually by the early 1980s’. There has been a growing uncertainty, however, about the potential market. The Japanese Government was uneasy about the prospects of Japanese firms investing in South Africa. The iron ore project, one of the most important industrial ventures, may have overestimated ISCOR’s sales possibilities. There are, however, other potential customers, and France, Portugal, Spain and Italy have been mentioned.

ORANGE FREE STATE

The Orange River forms the boundary between the Cape and the Orange Free State. The economic mix is again mining and farming. The north of the province lies at the south-western end of the Rand-Reef mining area which contains the basic mineral wealth so far exploited. The main towns are Bloemfontein (capital), Welkom, Kroonstad and Ficksburg. Most of the Orange Free State, which is the original Afrikaner state, is ‘white’, with only a small area on the border of Lesotho ‘reserved’ for an African ‘homeland’, but it has the highest proportion of African population except Natal. There are practically no Asians or Coloureds.

TRANSVAAL

This is the most populous (6.2 million) and industrialized province of the four. In addition to the administrative capital (Pretoria), it contains the commercial and industrial capital of Johannesburg (population 1.4 million in 1968, the largest city on the African continent). Over half of South African industry is concentrated in the southern Transvaal (the strip running the 100 miles or so from north of Pretoria to Vereeniging, on the Orange Free State border). A large area of the northern Transvaal has been designated as a ‘homeland’ (see map showing Bantustans).
All the major Transvaal cities developed rapidly, encouraged by preferential freight rates to and from the Rand; and the need for mine labour led to concentrations of Africans in satellite areas around these cities.

The establishment of the Bantustans was, officially at least, to lead to a decentralization of industry. In 1970 the prime minister’s economic adviser, Dr Piet Riekert, explained that the ‘ultimate target’ of the decentralization programme was to stem the flow of Africans from the ‘homelands’ to the cities; and 24 per cent of industrial investment would have to be channelled to the border areas and ‘homelands’ (as compared with 10 per cent in 1968). Even this is probably optimistic: as Dr Riekert said: ‘As far ahead as one can see the bulk of new factories, as well as extensions to existing ones, will continue to be built in the metropolitan areas.’

Despite its industrial strength and continuing growth, however, the Rand economy is based on gold mining, which needs migrant labour, a great deal of which comes from outside South Africa itself. By the 1970s gold production was beginning to decline, and other minerals such as platinum were assuming greater importance. The Transvaal contains South Africa’s major known and worked reserves of gold, iron ore, copper, nickel, manganese and platinum.

NATAL

Natal is sometimes known as the ‘English’ province because of its original colonization. It has proportionately more Africans than either the Orange Free State or the Cape: in the 1960 census a ratio of nine to one (cf. the national average of about four to one). It is one of the ‘traditional’ areas of African settlement and as a result figures largely in the ‘homeland’ policy; by far the greatest part of the land area has been designated as either ‘homeland’ or ‘border area’. As a result, the restrictive provisions of the Physical Planning Act (which largely decides where Africans may live) has weighed less heavily on the province than on, for example, Transvaal or the Orange Free State.

Industrial growth in Natal was and still largely is centred on the capital, Durban, the major port of eastern South Africa; but it has also spread along the coast and along the railway towards the centre of the Rand. A major port for exporting coal and a petro-chemical works were begun in the early 1970s at Richards Bay.

The consequence of the designation of so many ‘border’ areas in Natal was commented on by the Financial Mail:

Now we have the irony of the ‘English’ province qualifying en bloc for government concessions and incentives: tax concessions; relatively high depreciation allowances; moving cost subsidies; lower minimum wages than in non-border areas; interest-free loans; railway rebates.

South African gross domestic product

In 1969 the gross domestic product was provisionally estimated at R.10,542 million, made up as shown in Table 1.

South Africa is coming to resemble the advanced Western economies, and to experience similar problems. Rapid growth in the 1960s was followed by serious
inflation (running at 10 per cent in 1972–73) and balance of payments problems. Mining, although still the basis of prosperity, is declining, and manufacturing overtook mining during the last decade.

However, the vast majority of the population is still employed in farming. Roughly 90,000 whites and 1.5 million blacks are employed in the white, commercial farming areas. Output has increased by an annual average of 4 per cent and has more than kept pace with population growth since the Second World War, so that South Africa is self-supporting in foodstuffs except for items like tea, coffee, cocoa and rice. Almost half the agricultural production is processed by secondary industries which, in 1972, employed some 21 per cent of all industrial workers.

TABLE 1. South African gross domestic product

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<th>Rands (millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Rands (millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry</td>
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<td>Transport</td>
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</tbody>
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Farming in the Cape and Natal was mentioned above, but there is a vast difference between white-owned commercial farming and the subsistence farming of the African reserves.

In South Africa as a whole the main cash crops are maize, sugar, groundnuts, tobacco, citrus and deciduous fruits. Livestock are probably of greater importance than crops. It is estimated that, using present methods, only 15 per cent of the land is suitable for arable farming (which depends largely on rainfall), although irrigation schemes and, in particular, the various branches of the Orange River Project, may considerably extend the productive area. Traditional Afrikaner agriculture took the form of extensive, but rather inefficient, sheep and cattle ranching; wool and fruit production are major industries.

The areas designated as ‘Bantu homelands’ occupy some 58,000 square miles (some 13.5 per cent of the total land area).

African wages paid by white farmers are the lowest in the country, and farm servants are the most impoverished and exploited of all workers. The average income of a white farmer is R.6,000 a year; farm labourers, in cash and kind, average R.144–192.

Further details were provided by the International Defence and Aid Fund, London, in 1973:

There are more than one million black farm labourers. They are not protected by any ordinary labour legislation:
It is illegal for them to strike, or even to break their contract of service.
They have no holiday rights, no pensions, no paid leave, no sick leave, no union to protect them.
Disobedience can be punished by their employer, the farmer. And often is: the lash and the boot maintain a reign of terror on many farms. In such a legal and political climate, it is not surprising that the farms are a closed sector of the country, where reporters are unwelcome, information scanty. But some details do emerge from the feudal realities:

In Naboomspruit, Transvaal, it was discovered that some labourers were paid R.4-8 a month, plus a sack of maize; they worked 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and could take time off only if they found a replacement.

In the northern Orange Free State, it was reported in 1971 that labourers were getting R.3 a month, plus three paraffin tins of maize; and they lived in rusted iron shelters.

In February 1956, two Cape farmers were found guilty of beating a labourer to death with a sjambok. They received short sentences and a small fine—one of many examples of life on the farms.

And, as recently as May 1971, a Hartebeesfontein farmer was found guilty of having put a castration ring (for rams) round the testicles of a 14-year-old African shepherd.

Farming receives privileged treatment—easy to understand because of the predominance of farmers in the Nationalist Party. Farmers receive direct aid totalling some R.300 million a year, but contribute only R.35 million in taxation. There is a government agricultural adviser to every seven farmers, but efficiency has not improved dramatically, and soil erosion in particular is a serious problem in dry areas.

**Industrialization**

Industrialization represents an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in industry as well as in food production and so reduce reliance on the outside world. Angola is a nearby potential source of oil, one major natural resource which South Africa lacks.

The projected industrial development has been largely successful. *The Economist* (29 June 1968) suggests the following reasons:

1. The determination and drive of white South Africans in business and finance: an entrepreneur’s paradise.
2. The high rate of savings (20 per cent of total wealth) which can be used for investment. This is possible because less then one-fifth of the population (i.e. the whites) receives over two-thirds of the total income, and white taxation is relatively low.
3. The abundant supply of cheap, under-utilized labour maintained by apartheid.
4. The natural supply of uranium, asbestos, copper, manganese, iron and other minerals (so far the off-shore search for oil has been unsuccessful).
5. Cheap power from coal kept cheap by low wages. Extra hydroelectric power can be made available both inside the republic and outside (e.g. Cabora Bassa in Mozambique).

**Metal and Engineering**

Metal and engineering are by far the most important industries. Steel produced by the State-owned ISCOR (Iron and Steel Corporation) is among the cheapest in the world because of local raw materials and low wages.
South Africa: Ownership of foreign investment, 1964 and 1969 (estimated)

- Sterling area: 68%
- Western Europe: 16%
- Dollar area: 13%
- International organizations: 4%
- Other countries: 1%

South Africa: economic chart.

Private sector: Foreign ownership by country, 1960

- United Kingdom: 63%
- United States of America: 13%
- France: 6%
- Switzerland: 3%
- Rhodesia: 3%
- Belgium: 2%
- Others: 8%
Direction of South African trade

A. Federal Republic of Germany (5.8%)
B. Belgium (4.1%)
C. Italy (3.9%)
D. France (3.9%)
E. Other Europe (8.3%)
F. Africa (15.2%)
G. Oceania (0.1%)
H. Adjustments (4.3%)
I. South America (0.5%)
J. Other North America (2.8%)
K. United States of America (7.3%)
L. Other Asia (4.5%)
M. Japan (12.9%)
N. United Kingdom (26.4%)

Imports

A. Federal Republic of Germany (14.7%)
B. France (3.6%)
C. Italy (3.4%)
D. Switzerland (2.2%)
E. Netherlands (2.2%)
F. Other Europe (5.8%)
G. United States of America (16.6%)
H. Other North America (1.5%)
I. Oceania (2.7%)
J. Adjustments (0.7%)
K. South America (1.0%)
L. Africa (5.4%)
M. Other Asia (9.8%)
N. Japan (9.5%)
O. United Kingdom (20.9%)

South Africa, Balance of trade and gold production, 1959-72

million Rand

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

Trade and gold balance

Trade deficit

Exports (not gold)

Imports

Gold and trade output

Value of exports

MOTOR INDUSTRY

The enormous motor industry began with vehicle assembly. It hopes to produce a car 66 per cent South African made by 1976, i.e. to be producing, by then, such basic components as engine blocks and body shells; it had achieved a 50 per cent local content by 1969. The motor industry is located mainly at Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and the designation of many of its centres as ‘border areas’ has resulted in tax concessions and lower minimum wage rates. However, the industry is handicapped by its small market (see below).

CHEMICALS

The chemical industry started with the making of explosives for use in the mines. This developed into what was probably the world’s largest privately owned explosives factory until it was recently taken over by the government. In recent years the most important branch has been the nationalized SASOL plant producing oil from coal at Sasolburg, in the Orange Free State, in an attempt to compensate for the lack of oil in South Africa. The unit production cost is very high, but the plant also produces a wide range of oil-based chemicals and plastics.

MINING

The mining of gold and diamonds has for the past seventy years been the mainstay of the economy. Gold mining was adversely affected when the world price of gold was fixed at $35 per ounce in 1934, but nowadays the price is continually rising—in July 1973 for example, as against the official price of $42.22, the free rates fluctuated between $70 and $120. The higher prices were expected to lead to the early opening of new mines. The South African Chamber of Mines estimated in 1967 that gold production would fall off between 1971 and 1996, when the economically usable reserves would be exhausted. Production in South Africa decreased by almost 7 per cent in 1972, although profits increased by 58 per cent and dividends by 24 per cent.

New equipment is being designed, for example an explosive rock cutter which would limit the effects of geological faulting. It is hoped that an improved recovery process will allow more gold to be recovered at negligibly increased cost. The high price fetched by gold also gave a new lease of life to older mines, whose lower grade ores became economic.

The production of other minerals has been increasing in importance. Platinum, for instance, received a great boost in the early 1970s when anti-pollution legislation in the United States required motor manufacturers to install exhaust converters containing platinum-based metals in new cars. General Motors signed a ten-year agreement to buy platinum from South Africa. Other manufacturers no doubt followed. Uranium is available in large enough quantities for the State to go ahead with an extremely costly uranium-enrichment plant, which would produce for export and enable South Africa to contemplate nuclear industries.
Mining is the industry which employs the largest proportion of black workers and pays the highest differential between skilled white and unskilled black wages. In mining, building, and railways white trade unions have always been most insistent on apartheid in the shape of job reservation (at least in principle). Mining needs thousands of migrant workers, many of whom come from outside South Africa. This migration is often cited as evidence that South African conditions are in some way better than in the countries outside. It is true that wages in the mines attract those living at subsistence level or below in neighbouring countries, but migration is not entirely spontaneous. It owes much to the recruiting activities of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, and to government encouragement in these countries. Throughout this century, mineowners in the Rand have had a special agreement with the Portuguese authorities for the supply of up to 100,000 Mozambican workers at so much per man. Conditions for migrant labourers continue to be appalling.

Table 3. Foreign Africans working in South Africa in 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Number in South Africa</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Number in South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>31,960</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>10,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>131,749</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>131,291</td>
<td>Other parts of Africa</td>
<td>7,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>121,708</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trade

South Africa exports approximately one-quarter of its output, and imports a quarter of its consumer goods; its dependence on trade becomes even clearer when the structure of exports and imports is examined.

South Africa is perhaps best known as an exporter of minerals, especially gold, and food, especially fruit. Fruit exports to Western European markets are helped by the fact that when it is winter in Europe it is summer in South Africa. Gold, however, has been declining. In the eleven years from 1959 to 1969, exports...
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa 42

By 1969, total exports (including gold) accounted for only 21 per cent of the gross domestic product (cf. 25 per cent in 1961).

Gold has, however, been of vital importance to the economy in two ways. It provides a reserve which can in the last resort be sold to obtain foreign currency; and it is also a physical export. Until the sharp rise in the free market price of gold in the early 1970s, the surplus created by gold exports had been falling steadily throughout the 1960s. The demand shows no signs of slackening, and gold will no doubt remain a substantial asset as long as stocks last.

However, dependence on gold is felt to be economically unhealthy—hence the drive to industrialize.

During the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa’s rapid industrialization was based on ‘import substitution’, i.e. locally producing much of its consumer goods and semi-processed materials which had hitherto been imported, e.g. domestic durables, textiles, motor vehicles, components, spare parts. As in many other countries, the attempt has not been entirely successful. However, it has definitely changed the import emphasis from consumer goods and processed raw materials to capital goods and unprocessed raw materials. Machinery and equipment now account for some 44 per cent of total imports. Although the latest available figures (1966) are long out of date, the trend is unmistakable: total imports of raw materials rose from 10.7 per cent in 1961 to over 13 per cent in 1966.

While South Africa is a major producer of some raw materials (mainly minerals) it urgently needs to import others. A considerable percentage of the exports consist of gold, diamonds and copper, items for which the home market is limited. Moreover, the home market is small for certain types of manufactured goods. The industry to produce these will necessarily be on too small a scale to compete in low-cost markets elsewhere. Paradoxically enough, while low wages keep down the costs of manufacture, they at the same time prevent the development of a home market among the majority black population to whom those wages are paid, and so constitute an obstacle to full economic expansion in South Africa.

New trade outlets are constantly being sought. Japan is a big potential customer—so much so that visiting Japanese businessmen are classified as ‘honorary whites’ lest they be rudely treated and sales deals fall through.

Britain is still South Africa’s largest single trading partner, taking 26.8 per cent of her exports in 1971 and supplying 23.2 per cent of her imports, but both have been declining (corresponding figures for 1961: 32.9 and 29.2 per cent). However, trade figures do not include return on investments. ‘When assessing Britain’s exports to South Africa’, commented the Financial Times (15 December 1972), ‘it must be remembered that a large slice of South African manufacturing industry is British-owned or controlled... it is probably true to say that what is lost in exports is picked up either in directly remitted profits of British subsidiaries or is reflected in the retained profits of those companies.’

Trade with other countries is growing. By 1970 Japan, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were South Africa’s second, third and fourth best trading partners respectively. Major increases came in the 1960s. In only three years, 1966 to 1968, exports to Japan rose from R.83 million to R.204 mil-
lion: with three products, iron ore, manganese and maize, predominant, while between 1964 and 1968 exports to the Federal Republic of Germany almost doubled, and imports from it increased by over 50 per cent.

The decline in the share of South Africa's trade with Britain reflects two things: the United Kingdom's own falling share of world trade as a whole, and the change of direction from the Commonwealth towards the European Common Market (EEC). The decline would probably have been still faster but for the Commonwealth preference enjoyed in the British market despite South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth in 1961.

South Africa feared British accession to the Common Market because of the loss of Commonwealth preferences in the British market, and because some products (notably apples) would be subject to quotas under the EEC common agricultural policy. (Indeed, in 1973 South African apples were hit in this way, although the effects were somewhat mitigated by the failure of the Argentine crop.)

South Africa has been trying to negotiate special agreements with the EEC, particularly in regard to fruit and wines. Frequent visits were made to London and Brussels. But no special accommodation was extended to South Africa apart from what general policy changes extended to all 'third countries' (Financial Mail (14 September 1973)). South Africa's agricultural trade with the EEC, therefore, depended on 'compensation' negotiations through GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

The major loss is agricultural, for although fresh Cape fruit sells well in the EEC countries, tinned fruit and wine do not.

The importance of trade to South Africa has led the United Nations to adopt resolutions to boycott all such trade (see below).
When the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, post-war nationalism was preparing the way for independence in most African countries. These currents naturally influenced Africans in South Africa. The groundwork for apartheid had been prepared by a long period of settlement by Europeans which the war years had consolidated, although they also helped to call the whole system in question.

Nationalist Party policy, based on apartheid and the continuation of white domination, appealed to some idealists who could not stomach African equality but hoped for a way out of the impasse that would allow both separation and equality. The party promised the rural white population that more attention would be paid to the problems of agriculture; to the poor whites in towns it promised further restrictions on black competition; and to all Afrikaners, urban and rural alike, it promised the end of British supremacy.

Apartheid is an Afrikan word meaning separateness. The government has recently shown a preference for the term ‘separate development’.

The apartheid policy involved the following:

1. The consolidation and extension of legislation governing the separation of blacks, whites and Coloureds.
2. Bringing indirect rule via the chiefs and traditional special structures up to date in such a way as to inhibit the rise of an African nationalism.
3. Emphasis on Afrikaner economic and social control.
4. Racial separation through the medium of separate social institutions (language, culture, education) controlled directly by the government or through the selective use of State finance.

The aims of apartheid were:

1. To ensure the continuation of white supremacy, while at the same time controlling the pace and direction of African nationalism.
2. To guarantee the expansion and competitiveness of South African business (Afrikaner in particular) by means of a lowly paid, docile and highly mobile reserve of African workers.

In 1948, the following main groups existed:

Africans. The pool of cheap labour on which the economy is built. Mainly—although not completely—unskilled or semi-skilled, working in the mines...
and in industries in the main towns. A few had succeeded in entering law, liberal studies, and journalism. In the rural areas, employed on white farms or living in ‘reserves’.

Coloureds. Mainly semi-skilled or foremen, junior manager jobs in industry, particularly in the Cape area. Some still work in agriculture, but most have shifted to better paid urban jobs.

Asians. Mainly descendants of the indentured Indian labour recruited for the sugar plantations. Some free immigrants (mainly Moslem) had become traders and shopkeepers. Some Chinese and Malayans also.

Afrikaners. Many Afrikaners were still farmers, but many had become urbanized. Urbanization generally had been speeded up by the world economic depression in the 1930s. Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans each controlled a sector of the economy.

English-speaking South Africans. A broad term used to distinguish Afrikaner groups from other whites who had British descent or connexions. They were mostly urbanized. usually more wealthy than the Afrikaners, and professional or managerial by occupation. Separated from the Afrikaners by history, area of settlement, language, religion and tradition.

The victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948 was in part the victory of the Afrikaner nationalism which had been nurtured in two hundred years of fighting against Africans for the control of the land; against the British (marked especially by the Anglo-Boer war); against the humiliations of feeling themselves to be poor whites in a rapidly industrializing economy.

The legalized framework

The first step was to institutionalize clear-cut racial differentiation. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950) outlawed marriage and sexual intercourse between whites and blacks. The Population Registration Act (1950) divided the population into racial categories and, as of August 1966, it became compulsory for all citizens over the age of 16 years to possess identity cards and to produce these at the request of an authorized person. Race is one of the entries on the identity card. The Group Areas Act stipulated that each racial group must live in specifically demarcated areas.


Laws were introduced to control the movement of African workers. Even before 1948, the Nationalist Party and some of the Unionist Party were worried about the influx of Africans to the towns. Africans working in urban areas lived in designated townships outside the actual towns, and even then were subject to specified conditions. The Bantu Urban Areas Act (1945) was amended in 1964. In 1953 Africans were required to carry special identity documents and reference books (usually known as passes) on them at all times (Bantu Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act (1953)).
Labour rights were curtailed. Strikes by Africans are illegal as also are racially mixed trade unions (Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953)). African unions are not illegal but have no formal status and may not participate in collective bargaining. White unions, on the other hand, are registered and officially recognized as workers' representatives in labour law (Industrial Conciliation Act (1956)). Outside the 'reserves' Africans are limited by custom, and sometimes by law, to the lower grades of employment. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) as amended in 1959, the government may reserve certain types of jobs to persons of a 'specified' race. Outside the 'homelands' Africans are by custom almost universally excluded from exercising administrative authority over whites.

All non-white political rights (such as they were) were systematically eroded. The limited franchise promised to Indians was abolished. In 1956 Coloured voters in the Cape were removed from the common roll and permitted instead to elect four whites to represent them in parliament. In 1968 this representation was abolished (Separate Representation of Voters Act (1968)). In 1970 all political and social rights outside the 'homelands' were abolished (Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970)).

This completed the process of removing non-white representation from parliament. Coloured interests are served by the Coloured Peoples' Representative Council, and Indian interests by the National Indian Council (both established in 1964); both are purely advisory.

Since 1968, under the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, political parties have been forbidden to have members belonging to more than one race. As non-whites have no direct representation in parliament, non-white political activity has largely been confined to extra-parliamentary groups (which in other countries would probably be legitimate political parties). To restrict the activities of all such groups, the government has introduced several blanket laws covering actions and publications which promote any form of industrial, political, social or economic change and threaten public safety and order. Any person or organization can be banned at the discretion of the State president. An individual 'ban' prohibits the person concerned from the company of more than one other person and from all political activity; it may include house arrest and daily visits to the local police station. (Cf. Suppression of Communism Act (1950), Unlawful Organizations Act (1960), General Law Amendment Act (1963)). Other 'security' measures are discussed below.

During the 1950s a series of laws introduced 'petty apartheid' racial segregation in public places, i.e. in all buses, trains, taxis, parks, zoos, museums, galleries, cinemas, theatres, public lavatories, beaches, sports grounds, cafés, restaurants and so on (Separate Amenities Acts (1953) and (1960); Motor Transportation Amendment Act (1955); State-aided Institutions Act (1957)). Segregation is also applied to hospitals, where black and white are treated separately by staff of their own racial group, and sport, where mixed teams, mixed competitions and mixed spectators are all forbidden. Factories have to provide separate entrances, clocking-in devices, pay offices, first-aid rooms, crockery and cutlery, washrooms, lavatories, changing-rooms, rest-rooms, dining-rooms and work-rooms (Factories and Machinery Act (1960)).
Child in Johannesburg slums.
South Africa becomes a republic

South Africa became a republic on 31 May 1961. It left the British Commonwealth but remained in the sterling area. The official languages are English and Afrikaans. Of white South Africans 37.3 per cent are registered as English-speaking.

The population (1970 census) by racial group is as follows: Africans, 15,057,952; whites, 3,751,328; Coloureds, 2,018,453; Asians, 620,436.

In the 1970 parliamentary elections the Nationalist Party won 117 seats, the United Party 47 and the Progressive Party 1. The vote percentages were: Nationalist Party, 54.43; United Party, 37.23; Progressive Party, 3.43; Hesligite National Party, 3.56.

The head of the republic is the State president who is empowered to dissolve the Senate and the House of Assembly, to confer honours, to appoint ministers and deputy ministers, to appoint the times for sessions of parliament, to prorogue parliament, and to declare war and make peace. Tenure is seven years from the date of taking the Oath of Office.

The Executive Council is composed of a maximum of eighteen ministers appointed by the president.

Parliament, the legislative power, consists of the president, the House of Assembly and the Senate.

The Senate has fifty-four members of whom ten are nominated by the president. It is mainly a reviewing body.

The House of Assembly has 160 members, directly elected, and six members elected for South West Africa under the terms of the 1949 South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act.

Qualifications for the parliamentary vote are: (a) registration as a voter; (b) residence for five years in the republic; (c) South African citizenship; (d) 18 years of age minimum; (e) white. There is no representation of non-whites in parliament.

There are four provincial councils: Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State. The members are elected and the voting qualifications are the same as for parliamentary elections.

The legislative assemblies of the African 'homelands', and the Coloured Representative Council, are discussed later. The minimum age for exercising the limited right to vote of non-whites is 21.

Apartheid and the economy

During the 1960s the rate of South African economic growth was 6–7 per cent per annum. This rate has since declined. Prices are rising, and inflation is serious. South Africa faces difficult economic problems, some of which derive from apartheid: job reservation, for example.

In order to protect white workers from economic competition, Africans are often specifically denied by law from filling various skilled jobs. From the point of view of the economy this limits their productivity to a much lower level than need be.
It also reduces the number of Africans permitted to take any kind of industrial job at all, thus very often creating artificial manpower shortages. Despite white immigration from other countries, which provides 30,000 workers a year, there are not enough skilled operatives for the expanding requirements of industry. This may lead to a head-on collision between the drive for greater prosperity and apartheid ideology. In fact, clashes have already occurred.

In the early 1970s, the labour shortage became so acute that many firms took to employing Africans in higher positions than they were legally entitled to, and the demand that job reservation be lifted to a higher level was heard throughout industry. The government was adamant, and was supported in this by the white unions; but there were also indications that job reservation would be relaxed—without abandoning the colour bar principle. Many jobs previously done by skilled white workers were done by Africans for lower wages, or were split up in order to avoid the job reservation laws. There have also been demands from employers for improved education and training facilities for Africans.

Job reservation, involving shortages of skilled workers, makes industry less efficient, while low wages inhibit the growth of a potentially enormous black consumer market—and the growth of industry to supply it.

Hence the South African dilemma: to raise the level of African skills, productivity and earnings and create a relatively prosperous proletariat would undermine the whole basis of apartheid; yet if it does not, the whole economy may stagnate.

The Group Areas Act and the internal migratory labour it is intended to produce constitute another instrument of apartheid which affects the economy. So as to regulate the supply and cost of labour required by the white community without endangering its dominance and exclusiveness, other races are restricted from settling in areas designated as white.

The social effects of this are twofold.

First, in all but a few exceptional cases, Africans are restricted to black townships on the outskirts of the large towns, e.g. Soweto, with a population of 500,000 on the outskirts of Johannesburg. Secondly, most people in these townships are temporary residents, entitled to live there only as long as they have work; otherwise they must return to the ‘homelands’. They are not allowed to bring their wives or families to the townships. In 1968, 1,664,000 single migratory Africans were living under these restrictions in white areas. According to apartheid ideology, a black man is allowed into a white area only for the purpose of providing low-paid labour.

The nationalist government has vigorously pursued this policy; Dr Verwoerd stated in 1955:

The migratory system has been in force for generations. Everyone knows that as far as mine labour is concerned, it is the best and probably the only practicable, workable system. My contention is that the strengthening of the system and the expansion of the system to other spheres of labour would be in the interest of the Bantu.

INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION

According to the nationalist policy of separate development, there will be no more large African townships on the edges of white towns when the African
peoples live in their own ‘homelands’. Their economy is to be separate from the economy of the white areas, but they would still supply labour for white firms in adjacent areas. Dr Verwoerd explained this policy in the House of Assembly (June 1959):

White South Africa will have two industrial legs, the one being the white industry deep in the white interior and the second the industries owned by white people and employing the Bantu labour coming from the Bantu areas because those industries are in the border areas of the Bantustans. The majority of the workers can be absorbed there in the service of the white people.

In principle, the government will help to place the Bantustans on a firm economic and industrial foundation in the following ways: loans for African-managed industries in African areas and the training of Africans for management; grants to improve soil conditions in the reserves; medical and educational facilities, housing loans, the building of roads and other such facilities; the encouragement of new industries to go to the border areas surrounding the Bantustans by restricting further employment of Africans in white areas.

A certain amount of industry was to be decentralized, i.e. moved to ‘border areas’ adjoining the Bantustans. Africans would then work in the white sector of the economy, live in black areas and be a long distance away from white towns. Redirected industry would benefit, with wages even lower in border areas than in towns, and labour even more easy to direct and control.

There is no evidence that this policy is working. A few craft centres have been set up in the ‘homelands’, and white industry has shown no desire to move into border areas despite incentives, for simple economic reasons—the lack of communications and the reluctance of white managerial staff to take jobs in the middle of nowhere. The analysis made by *The Economist* (supplement on South Africa, June 1968) explains the dilemma:

Because the Bantu have lagged so far behind white South Africans in economic development, these homelands are very stagnant and depressed areas in the middle of a very rich one. The natural pattern is therefore for the young men in the poor and stagnant area to go and find well-paid jobs in the rich and growing labour-hungry ones. By all means, mitigate this if possible by usual ‘depressed area policies’: which in this case should mean giving special treatment and investment incentives for white capital to go into the Bantustans (though probably on a leasehold system for the land, and subject to some special system of company registration and company law and company taxation in these Bantustans); plus an agricultural policy which should be designed to get away from traditional, small-scale subsistence farming and to bring into being a modern, larger-scale, cash-crop, Bantu professional farmer class.

Unfortunately, however, the dream of the late South African Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd, was that the Bantu in their homelands should relapse into being the nice, tame, contented peasants of his mythology. His agricultural policy was, therefore, that the homelands should base themselves on precisely the traditional subsistence farming which has kept them poor (although with some experts in avoidance of soil erosion helping them); and his industrial policy was that while ‘exploiters’ capital should be forbidden, but that a government-sponsored Bantu Investment Corporation should shuffle out money to help establish some small selected semi-rural crafts.
The results have, of course, been ludicrous. In the rural areas of the Transkei there are no young men to be seen, because they are away working in white South Africa. Bantu women roam around fetching water and looking for wood, rather than cultivating many crops. In the first six years of the development of the Bantustans, even although the Bantu Development Corporation has spent R.11 million (£6,420,000), official figures suggest that only 945 new industrial jobs have been created in the homelands for Africans.

[On white border industries] The policy is succeeding in certain very exceptional cases, mainly in areas where the tribal homelands concerned are not really normal tribal homelands at all. For example there is an area called Rosslyn 12 miles north of the centre of Pretoria, which is nominally on the border of one of these historical black patches on the map. It is entirely convenient for new factories to be set up there, near to markets, fuel, good transport facilities, government, urban flesh pots for white managerial staff. When I was in Johannesburg some very top visiting British businessmen indeed were announcing that they might be about to set up factories in Rosslyn: ‘I am told that there will be no government restrictions on employing African labour there.’

Despite the evident lack of success, the nationalist government is not deterred. In June 1971, it produced a White Paper entitled Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on the Decentralization of Industries, popularly known as the Rickert Committee Report. The aim is to maintain economic growth under apartheid. It was recommended that white-labour-intensive policies should be encouraged in metropolitan areas, black-labour-intensive policies in ‘decentralized’ areas, in or near the Bantustans. A white to African labour ratio was to be determined (Coloured and Indian employers were to be left out), and to be used as one of the factors in deciding the location of industries.

The government gives incentives to encourage border industries, including loans, and income tax rebates, wage concessions, and road transport exemptions. It has discontinued the concessions given to firms moving into Rosslyn and Hammarsdale (see extract from The Economist above), and is attempting to concentrate attention on ‘homelands’ in the remoter areas. There will be no job reservation, or industrial council wage agreements, and separate wage rates differing from those in white areas will be established.

Protests have already been made about textile wages in border areas as compared with rates in white areas in the Transvaal, and about wages paid and profits made in the garment industry in border areas.

The Bantustans have not acquired any semblance of independent self-government, and any (partly elected) black governments have strictly limited powers.

The business world dislikes the border industry policy, partly for the reasons already mentioned, partly because the ‘Bantu education’ policy cannot be expected to qualify Africans for the greater range of jobs which decentralization might introduce into the Bantustans and border areas.

‘A large rubber company, for instance,’ wrote the Financial Times (22 June 1970), ‘requires workers with at least Standard Six education for its machines. But when it investigated it found none in the border area of its choice. Mr Siegfried Kuschke, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation, has time and again pleaded for better education facilities and more trade schools in the border areas.’
'The Bantustan policy', the same article concludes, 'cannot continue much longer without... clearly emerging as a fantasy or a fraud.'

AFRICANS AND TRADE UNIONS

Unions cannot be mixed (apart from the few that were mixed prior to the legislation introduced in the 1950s), and Africans may not form official or 'registered' unions. Official unions may organize, negotiate and, under certain conditions, strike, and are regulated by the Industrial Conciliation Act. The term 'employee' as used in this act specifically excludes Africans, who have no right to organize, represent or negotiate, and are expressly forbidden to strike, on pain of a £550 fine, or up to three years' imprisonment. Severer sanctions can be applied to trade union activity, e.g. picketing, under the Sabotage and Terrorism Acts. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, Indians and Coloureds are recognized as employees and can thus form registered unions. However, where they form joint unions with whites, the whites must be in control of the union, unless there is express government permission to the contrary.

African unions are not illegal, but Africans involved in industrial organization find themselves on the wrong side of the police. They can be told to stop their activities or risk being 'endorsed out' of the area and so lose their jobs.

The Africans' lack of labour rights has worked almost entirely to their white employers' interests, but the strike wave that swept through Natal in 1973 indicated that this policy, too, has its limitations. The prohibition of strikes did not prevent them taking place, and once the workers were out it was almost impossible for management to negotiate terms, or arrange an orderly return to work, because no machinery for this purpose was available.

INVESTMENT

The government encourages South African ownership of industrial capital to counteract the domination of industry by foreign capital.

In May 1973 it decreed that further share issues in banks were to be made only to South African residents until the foreign-held percentage was reduced to ten. A recommendation by the Franzen Commission in 1971 had already recommended that foreign banks reduce their holdings to 50 per cent 'over a reasonable period'.

Until recently, the English-speaking white community dominated the managerial and industrial sectors; the Afrikaans-speaking white community were engaged mainly in agriculture. This has now changed to some extent. While much capital is still controlled by English-speaking whites, Afrikaners are actively involved in pushing forward industrial development. They are now found at every level of management, and Afrikaner investment is spreading right through the economy, from banking to mining and tertiary industry. They have been assisted by governmental policy in regard to investment and the control of foreign capital.

The government is becoming more and more involved in investment, especially in the public sector, and uses investment as a means of promoting policy in regard to, for example, the location of industry. The decentralization of
Public library in Durban.
television assembling, for example, is in line with the border industry policy. The
government has invested some R.460 million in the Sishen-Saldanha project,
R.700 million in the Richards Bay petro-chemical plant, R.1,300 million in
ISCOR (apart from the Saldanha scheme), R.1,850 million in ESCOM. It plans
to invest R.550 million in a uranium enrichment plant. The State armament
industry (ARMSCOR) has large holdings in strategically important industries
(explosives and electronic equipment) and owns the Atlas Aircraft Corporation.
The State virtually owns television (in which it invested R.100 million) and the
railways. Government control extends to the marketing of agricultural products
through export boards, and government subsidies finance certain sectors or
communities. Of gross domestic fixed investment (R.4,112 million) in 1972, the
public sector for the first time accounted for more than half. The 1973 estimate of
public sector investment of R.2,500 million represented an increase of R.440
million over 1972.

Taking advantage of export subsidies on shipping and wool, and import
restrictions designed to encourage ‘import substitution’, private investment has
also been growing. The private sector has become increasingly critical of the
extension of the public sector, of certain import restrictions, and of the effects of
some government policies which affect the efficiency of certain sectors of the
economy.

Under apartheid, wage levels, jobs, land and housing are all instruments in
the effort to ensure that capital ownership remains firmly in white hands. Black
investment depends upon the government-controlled Bantu Investment Corpora-
tion (BIC), which makes loans to Africans wishing to invest in the ‘homelands’. It
would seem from the 1969–70 figures that the loans were made mainly to small-
scale trade and service industries: R.5,940,152 loaned to 959 Africans (cf. R.700
million to the Richards Bay plant alone). Capital investment was accordingly
extremely small.

The importance of foreign investment in building up the South African
industrial structure—investment banking, insurance, mining, manufacturing—
can hardly be overestimated. Since the great mining boom of the nineteenth
century, foreign ownership has been common. In the earlier colonial period,
British capital was more important than any other, but as the economy developed
and industry grew, other Western countries increased their stake. The sterling
area is still responsible for around 60 per cent of South Africa’s total foreign
liabilities, although its share has fallen (from 66 per cent in 1962 to 61.6 per cent
in 1969). In 1970, sterling investment totalled £1,728 million (58 per cent of total
investment). During the 1960s, West European investment has increased more
rapidly than that of any other area, accounting for over 24 per cent of total
represented 15 per cent of total investment.

In the post-war period, foreign capital flowed regularly into South Africa
until 1957, then fell off. In the years following the Sharpeville massacre (1960)
and the resultant political and economic uncertainty, invested money moved out
of South Africa on a substantial scale. In 1961, the government introduced strong
exchange control measures to limit this outflow; resident and non-resident firms
were prohibited from exporting capital, and these measures were, by and large,
successful.
But, since 1964, capital from abroad has once again moved into South Africa on an increasing scale, for three main reasons: (a) the general trend of investment towards advanced rather than developing countries; (b) rapid economic growth in South Africa up to 1969; (c) the instability of European and American monies (as the world’s major gold-producing country South Africa tends to attract funds when other countries have currency problems). In the five years 1965–69, there was a total net inflow of £650 million (£260 million in 1968; in 1970 the figure increased again to £328 million).

The particularly high inflow in 1968 was probably due to the devaluation of sterling, and to the establishment of the two-tier system of gold pricing, which caused an immediate boom both in Johannesburg stock exchange prices and in the free market price of gold. However, this extremely rapid inflow was not an unmixed blessing for the South African economy, and steps were taken to discourage it in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, a staggering R.501 million (£291.67 million) of foreign capital moving into the republic in 1970 mopped up only part of the massive balance of payments deficit.

Direct private investment by foreign holding companies in their South African subsidiaries is the most important element in the investment inflow. The main inducement is the exceptionally high rate of profit. Between 1965 and 1968 the average return on British investments was 12 per cent—higher than that from any other country except Malaysia.

This private direct investment is made up of three main elements: (a) shareholdings (equities and preferences); (b) long- and short-term loans; (c) undistributed profits ploughed back into the South African subsidiary.

Such undistributed profits are probably growing in importance, as South African subsidiaries gain more autonomy from the parent company (which they are almost bound to do as they develop). For example, of a R.428 million rise in total foreign investment in 1969, R.205 million was in ‘the foreign share of accumulated reserves of foreign-controlled South African enterprises’. Although direct figures are not available, it is likely that the proportion of foreign liabilities accounted for by retained profits grew during the 1960s, if only because of the exchange control restrictions then in force.

It is an open question whether such a rapid growth of the ‘retained profits’ element in foreign liabilities leads in practice to greater autonomy for the South African subsidiaries of the British, American, Japanese and European firms involved. Probably, as the scale of a business grows, any one large part of it may become more independent in its day-to-day operations, but this is not necessarily so.

Foreign banks have helped by underwriting South African loans, particularly loans for government projects.

Foreign insurance also invested heavily in government and local authority stocks. And foreign technical help has greatly assisted in building up South African industry.

South Africans know that foreign capital is sometimes vulnerable to pressure or direct intervention by governments to prevent investment in South Africa, generally whole or in particular industries there. It is difficult to estimate the extent or effectiveness of such pressure. The results seem to be marginal. However, the role played by foreign investment in building up the nationalists’
In the slums of Johannesburg.
power to impose apartheid has inspired use of sanctions as a political weapon against it.

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the pattern of wages in South Africa. Certain points may be noted: the importance of African labour to the South African economy, the low and discriminatory pattern of African wages, the cluster of African labour in mining (593,086), construction (276,000), the retail trade (112,100), and the particularly low African representation in finance.

**Table 4. Average wages at the end of 1973 (in Rands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and cork</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and products</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and products</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and products</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber products</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic mineral products</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic metal</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold mines (cash wage only)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal mines (cash wage only)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building societies</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance companies</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed accommodation (hotels, etc.)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excluding ‘homeland’ governments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial administration</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways, harbours, airways</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Average weekly wages of Africans in 'decentralized areas', i.e. 'border industries'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Weekly Wages (Rands)</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Weekly Wages (Rands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brits</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pietersburg</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Potietersrus</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>8–9</td>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Richards Bay</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>King Williams Town</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phalaborwa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Babelegi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterworth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Isitheke</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umtata</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wage rates differ between all the racial groups, the greatest gap being between Africans and whites.

The difference is greatest in gold and coal mining (even after counting rations and accommodations, which are not included in the present figures).

Apart from mining the difference is remarkable in 'decentralized' areas (cf. the stated government policy of encouraging industry in 'border' or 'decentralized' areas as part of its apartheid policy). This point is discussed in some detail later.

During the scandal which broke out in 1973 regarding wages paid by foreign firms operating in South Africa, much was said about the Poverty Datum Line (PDL). This is generally understood to include only the minimum necessary to maintain physical life (mainly food, clothing, rent, transport, light), and not such items as education, which are included in another criterion—the Minimum Effective Level (MEL)—considered to be the line above which, and only above which, a family can be sustained.

Either line is difficult to calculate because of the growing cost of living. This has hit most consumer products, but food and housing have been rising faster than other items, and particularly affect the least well off.

The following is quoted from a Roneoed document prepared by the University of Cape Town entitled ‘An Updated Memorandum presenting Information on Black Wages and Poverty in the Cape Town Area’.

In real terms the Poverty Datum Line is hardly a human standard of living. It has been said to be more remarkable for what it excludes than what it includes. No allowance is made for long-term needs as well as many important short-term ones. To mention only some items, it excludes:

1. Furniture and other hire purchase items.
2. Household goods such as crockery, linen, pots and pans.
3. Chemist’s and dentist’s bills and transport costs to health clinics.
4. Stationery, reading matter and postage costs.
5. Sweets, tobacco, liquor and entertainment.
6. Communication expenses (telephone).
7. Savings and insurance.
8. Money sent to dependent relatives (a major reason for seeking work in the first place).

The above represent items without which it is difficult to subsist. Moreover, in a population group that suffers from the debilitating effects of disease, the minimum budget for health is too low.
Table 6. Minimum Poverty Datum Line (PDL) monthly expenditure as at March 1973 (in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable items</th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Child (16-20 years)</th>
<th>Child (13-15 years)</th>
<th>Child (10-12 years)</th>
<th>Child (7-9 years)</th>
<th>Child (4-6 years)</th>
<th>Child less than 4 years</th>
<th>Total for an 'average family'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Male</td>
<td>* Female</td>
<td>* Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>* Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>12.19</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>11.92</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>13.45</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The asterisk (*) indicates the members of an 'average family'.
2. Variable subtotals.

Fixed items comprise: rent, R.10.47; tax, R.0.44; transport, R.5.86; washing and cleaning, R.2.97; fuel and lighting, R.3.04; health, R.0.69; giving a constant subtotal of R.23.47. Addition of the variable subtotal of R.65.97 gives a grand total of R.89.44 per month (R.20.64 per week) for PDL whilst the Minimum Effective Level per month is R.134.16 (R.30.96 per week).
## Table 7. Composition of the labour force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All mines</td>
<td>593,086</td>
<td>7,914</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>83,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>57,700</td>
<td>23,800</td>
<td>10,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>64,100</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor industry</td>
<td>67,263</td>
<td>15,011</td>
<td>4,096</td>
<td>47,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>88,900</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and cork</td>
<td>46,500</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and products</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>17,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and products</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber products</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>5,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and products</td>
<td>38,400</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>21,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic metal</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td>95,400</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>35,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>33,100</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>27,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport equipment</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>276,800</td>
<td>47,500</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>58,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>46,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building societies</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>9,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance companies</td>
<td>4,179</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>25,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>82,300</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>77,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>112,110</td>
<td>32,800</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>125,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
<td>51,700</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>44,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed accommodation</td>
<td>32,300</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>9,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public authorities (excluding 'homelands')</td>
<td>110,594</td>
<td>35,068</td>
<td>8,387</td>
<td>102,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief sergeants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables</td>
<td>7,427</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>7,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18,843</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>18,843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The PDL and the MEL are slightly lower in rural areas. The PDL has been calculated at R.60–96 and the MEL at R.75–140 for an average household of five persons. It is obvious from the table of average wages at the end of 1973 (see Table 4) that many African, and some Coloured and Asian heads of families are being paid less than the PDL and certainly less than the MEL. Hence there is not only wage discrimination, but some of the wages paid are less than the minimum needed to sustain life.

Table 6 shows minimum PDL monthly expenditure.
Education

The principles which govern the education policy of the nationalist government were laid down by Dr Verwoerd (former prime minister) in parliament in 1953:

Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the State... If the Native in South Africa today... is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake...

In June 1954 he said:

Our school system must not mislead the Bantu by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze.

Until 1953 African schools were of four types: private schools run by religious communities; subsidized mission schools founded by church organizations, subsidized by the State and teaching a syllabus prescribed by the Provincial Education Department; government schools; and community or tribal schools maintained by African communities themselves.

The Bantu Education Act of 1953 was designed to: (a) simplify the administrative control over African schools; (b) bring the control of African education into line with the policy from Africans adopted by the Ministry of Bantu Affairs; (c) provide the type of education which the ministry had decided was best suited to Africans as unskilled labour for white areas, and limited in access to more skilled occupations outside their 'homeland'; (d) make Africans finance their own education.

African education has been under the control of the Bantu Affairs Department since 1955 and is officially referred to as 'Bantu education'. Although partial control of education has been transferred to Bantustan 'governments' the ministry retains the key divisions, e.g. approval of budgets, control of examinations and, to some extent, curricula. African education in white areas and in reserves where a 'government' has not yet been established remains totally under the ministry's control.

It is doubtful therefore whether administrative control is now any less complicated than before, but it is certainly true that the South African Government can use its control of the finances and its control of the examination system to influence African education both in the 'homelands' and in white areas. In August 1972, the Bantu Education Journal indicated that there were 5,093 schools in white areas or reserves without Bantustan governments, and 5,855 schools in the 'homelands'.

The 'homeland' governments have questioned certain aspects of the Bantu Education Act. The Transkeian government has taken over control of community schools, altered the syllabus and reintroduced English or Afrikaans as a medium of instruction rather than those formerly imposed by the government. The Kwa Zulu government introduced its own Education Act, which imposed English in preference to Zulu as the main medium of teaching in the higher classes.

African education is paid for by African taxation, by funds derived from bazaars, concerts and so on (particularly in the Bantu community schools), by
Gold mining in Doornfontein.
'voluntary contributions' by parents, and by school fees. The South African Government makes an annual grant which fluctuates but averages about £8.5 million (in a total budget of about £20 million).

Recent South African Government expenditure per pupil per year was as follows: African (1971-72), R.25.31; Coloured (1972), R.94.41; Indian (1972), R.124.40; white (1971-72), R.461.

In addition to fees and book charges, African heads of families pay a levy of 20 cents a month in urban areas towards the cost of building primary and lower secondary schools. The building of new high schools is discouraged and 'excess' pupils are expected to board at schools in the 'homelands'. Fees in the 'homelands' range from R.64 to R.70 for school and hostel. Most parents cannot afford this, and, in any case, the shortage of hostels limits the numbers that can be admitted.

School attendance is compulsory for whites, compulsory for Coloureds in some areas, and optional for Africans. School places and buildings for Africans are inadequate throughout the country, because the money is not provided to build or extend. Drop-outs are common, because of the general poverty of African homes, the shortage of teachers, the distance from schools, and the inefficiency of double sessions. African secondary-school students, unlike their white counterparts, have to pay for their education and for textbooks and stationery. The effect of this can be judged by a glance at the wages paid to different racial groups.

In 1972 the average cost of the books needed in primary schools was R.9 per annum, in secondary schools R.37 per annum.1 Some 'homeland' authorities include a small grant for textbooks in their annual budgets, but this is never even nearly adequate.

Voluntary appeals or teaching efforts by newspapers, businessmen, or student organizations have only served to underline the enormity of the problem. Voluntary funds are no substitute for stable official financing and the general poverty of Africans exclude any possibility of financing in this way a system of compulsory education.

The pupil-teacher ratio is roughly 60:1 in schools for Africans and 20:1 in schools for whites. Many African schools are forced to operate a double-shift system and most of their teachers are underqualified.

Government statements suggested that the Department of Bantu Education might provide some textbooks in 1974.

In 1965, the minister provided the following information in parliament about the qualifications of teachers in African schools under his department: 1.39 per cent had a degree, 2.35 per cent had a diploma from the department, 31.45 per cent had a higher primary teacher's certificate, 45.47 per cent had a lower primary teacher's certificate, 0.21 per cent had technical qualifications, 19.13 per cent had lesser qualifications. By 1970 the relative percentages had hardly altered.

The government attitude to African teachers' salaries was stated by Dr Verwoerd in 1954: 'The salaries which European teachers enjoy are in no way a fit or permissible criterion for the salaries of Bantu teachers.'

The highest salary for an African teacher is lower than the lowest grade for a white teacher with the same qualifications. Coloured teachers get 72 per cent of white teacher’ salaries and African teachers 52 per cent—about half.

Under these conditions the education of Africans is far inferior to that of whites. African parents are very anxious for their children to attend school, but there are never enough places, and pupils are forced to drop out as they get older because the fees increase and they have to work to supplement the family income.

Seventy per cent of Africans get no farther than the first few school grades, and 95 per cent do not finish primary school. The proportions going on to secondary school and higher education are consequently infinitesimal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>Percentage (1972)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form V</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form IV</td>
<td>7,833</td>
<td>9,909</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form III</td>
<td>29,800</td>
<td>32,074</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form II</td>
<td>42,509</td>
<td>47,256</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form I</td>
<td>53,605</td>
<td>63,733</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 6</td>
<td>148,374</td>
<td>161,472</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 5</td>
<td>160,316</td>
<td>176,109</td>
<td>5.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 4</td>
<td>205,114</td>
<td>222,913</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 3</td>
<td>282,942</td>
<td>301,232</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 2</td>
<td>342,636</td>
<td>359,339</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 1</td>
<td>451,684</td>
<td>475,848</td>
<td>15.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-standard A</td>
<td>511,224</td>
<td>536,818</td>
<td>17.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-standard B</td>
<td>676,317</td>
<td>687,990</td>
<td>22.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words 66.89 per cent of African pupils are attending lower primary and 94.87 per cent are at primary school. Up to and including Standard 6, instruction is in the mother tongue in all African schools except those in the Transkei and in Zululand. Pupils accordingly learn less English and Afrikaans, the two official languages; have great difficulty in studying subjects like mathematics, which have hardly been translated into the vernacular; and are confined exclusively to the only textbooks available—those provided by the Bantu Affairs Department. In the Transkei, mother-tongue instruction has been dropped as from Standard 3; all schools teach in English from that level.

Recent South African Government statements would seem to provide for teaching in English or Afrikaans in the ‘higher classes’—a reversal of the former position in mother-tongue instruction.

According to the South African statistical yearbook, a white child is more
than 100 times more likely to pass matriculation than an African child. Nevertheless, night schools for working Africans which were once run by volunteers in the Cape Peninsula and in the Rand have been declared illegal.

Since 1972, however, adult literacy schemes have been started by various firms and organizations for, in a technological society, illiterates cannot keep proper work records or time sheets—to quote just one example.

The Ministry of Education, Arts and Science deals only with the education of white children. The National Education Policy Act (1967) requires this minister to ensure that education shall have: (a) 'a Christian character' and (b) 'a broad national character'.

During the parliamentary debate on the bill, the minister said:

My interpretation of the 'Christian character of education' is that education shall build on the basis of the traditional Western culture and view of life which recognise the validity of the Biblical principles, norms and values. By 'national' it is understood that education shall build on the ideal of the national development of all citizens in South Africa, so that our own identity and way of life shall be preserved, and in order that the South African nation may constantly appreciate its task as part of Western civilisation.

Figures for 1971 indicated that there were 863 African students at the three African universities (University of the North at Turfloop, Fort Hare and Zululand); and 1,707 Indian students at the University of Durban-Westville.

The number of white students was 56,982.

**Table 9. University enrolment, June 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>8,057</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban-Westville</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hare¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>6,829</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>7,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>5,841</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>13,752</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand Afrikaans</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellenbosch</td>
<td>8,845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25,388</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>3,765</td>
<td>32,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witwatersrand</td>
<td>9,803</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10,235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Attendance decreased very considerably during the year, due to disturbances amongst the students.

If figures for the University of South Africa, which runs correspondence courses only, are omitted, the number of full-time students was as follows: Whites, 64,813 at ten universities; Coloured, 2,091 at four universities; Asian, 3,080 at five universities; African, 3,583 at eight universities (two of which have only one African student).

The Extension of University Education Act (1959) provided for the establishment of university colleges for African, Coloured and Indian students, and five have since been established. Each is run by a white council, with a non-white council serving in an advisory capacity, and white staff in each outnumber black, particularly at senior levels.

Black students are not usually permitted to attend the other universities, with the following exceptions:

1. The Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand are allowed to admit black students who have obtained government permission. They are segregated socially, but integrated academically.
2. The University of Natal had 550 black students in 1971 who were housed and taught in a separate section of the university.
3. Rhodes University has thirty-one Chinese students.

The pass laws

Identity cards are obligatory for all races in South Africa. In the case of Africans, the identity card (with photograph and listing race, sex, identity number, address, age, marital status, etc.) is pasted into a book (the ‘reference book’ or ‘pass’), which also contains ethnic group or tribe, employer’s name and address, length of employment and tax receipts. Every month, an African’s employer has to sign the reference book and insert the date when employment is terminated. In the case of African women, the book contains the name, address and reference book number of her husband, parent or guardian. When the books are issued, fingerprints are recorded for a central bureau.

The identity card of other races must be produced within seven days of demand, but in the case of Africans, the holder must always carry his pass book. If he cannot produce it immediately on demand, he may be arrested on the spot. Every African man or woman over the age of 16 must carry a pass.

Offences under the pass laws account for over 700,000 prosecutions every year, and many more summary arrests. The daily toll of those picked up for pass law questioning is nearly 2,000 and there is evidence that the police use this method to harass innocent citizens. In 1972, ‘aid centres’ were empowered to deal with minor offences rather than taking all cases to the Bantu court. The court can send pass offenders whom it considers ‘idle’ or ‘a nuisance’ to a work colony or youth camp.

The pass laws enable government officials to regulate the flow of Africans into ‘white’ areas. An African needs a permit from the labour bureau to remain in an urban area for more than seventy-two hours, unless: (a) he was born there, and has worked there continuously; or (b) he has worked continuously for one employer for not less than ten years; or (c) he has worked for more than one employer for a total of fifteen years.
Other regulations provide for the expulsion from the urban areas of any Africans surplus to labour requirements. Africans can thus be ‘endorsed out’ or evicted from urban areas when their presence is not considered desirable. In the last year for which government figures were kept of the numbers endorsed out (1965) the Minister of Bantu Administration stated that 86,186 Africans had been evicted this way.

Many of the people endorsed out are placed in transit camps in the ‘homelands’, and the threat of being endorsed out is sometimes made by the police to those who complain of ill-treatment or, for example, those who help to organize African unions.

The pass laws have seriously affected family life.

In 1971, the Anglican Bishop of Zululand, the Right Reverend Alpheys Hamilton Zulu, was arrested at 5 a.m. at a conference centre in the Transvaal where he was attending a seminar. He was held at the police station for five hours before being charged with failing to produce a reference book. He was offered, and refused, the opportunity to pay a R.5 admission-of-guilt fine. The charge was later withdrawn. Of his arrest, Bishop Zulu said it was ‘a great experience to suffer for what the police regard as a pass, when senior men in government assure us that passes for the black man have been abolished and all they need to have is a reference book’.

In the early weeks of 1972 several hundred cases were heard by the Bantu court in Port Elizabeth. Sentences were usually R.15 (or thirty days in prison) for being in the area without a permit, and R.5 (or ten days) for failing to produce a reference book on demand. Many Africans cannot afford the fines and so go to jail.

The following are some examples of the working of the pass laws, here quoted from the South African press.

Monica Malatlhoe of Soweto passed her matric in 1970 and applied to a number of hospitals for a vacancy as a trainee nurse. She was accepted by three training hospitals, but she cannot obtain a reference book in Johannesburg, although she was born and brought up there. Bantu Affairs Department is reluctant to issue reference books in Johannesburg because they confer a right to remain there. *Johannesburg Star* (29 May 1971).

Mrs Duncan of the Black Sash reported complaints from a large number of African servants. Their employers had threatened to destroy their pass books or to falsify information if they didn’t obey their every command. *Johannesburg Star* (3 July 1970.)

Gilbert Gamede, 32, of Soweto, was assaulted and robbed by a group of men. Among the possessions which they took was his reference book. He was so worried about the loss of the book that he hanged himself the following day. *Rand Daily Mail* (6 October 1970.)

S.M., aged 22, was born in Alexandra and lived there with his parents until the family was moved to Diekloof in 1962. In 1965 he applied for a reference book. He was asked where his father was born, and he correctly replied ‘Rustenburg’. He was endorsed out to Rustenburg where he had been only twice in his life—on both occasions he was arrested and taken there under escort. He knows nobody there, and so has walked home on both occasions. He is lawfully entitled to live in Alexandra, but is unable to prove his continual residence there. The authorities will not accept an affidavit from his mother. *South African Press Reports*.

Mr Harlen Meini (59) is a crippled African factory worker who has lived legally in the town of Wellington, in the Western Cape for the past 18 years.
His wife, Lena, was born in the Eastern Cape town of Dordrecht and stayed there, with Harlen’s family until 1958. She then went to join her husband, but the authorities, over the next 12 years, refused her permission to stay with him, and she was several times fined and sent back to Dordrecht. Eventually, it was found that she had no legal right to be in Dordrecht either. Accompanied by her three daughters, she left for Illingi resettlement township in the Eastern Cape. Mr Meini and their son are remaining in Wellington in order to keep their jobs. Cape Times (November 1970.)

‘Separation’ includes the designation by tribal group of areas within an African urban area, and the Department of Bantu Administration and Development has requested municipalities to provide tribally demarcated housing areas for Africans. Daveytown Benoni, for example, has designated areas for (a) Venda; (b) Shengaan and Tonga, (c) Xhosa, Swazi, Zulu and Ndebele; (d) northern and western Sotho of the Transvaal; and (e) southern Sotho. This arrangement helps to reinforce the idea of ‘homeland’ citizenship and reverse the former trend towards forgetting tribal ties in a growing sense of African nationalism.

‘Homelands’

Separate development is primarily based on land: the long conflict between Africans and whites was settled with the military defeat of the Africans. Henceforth land would be unilaterally allocated by a white government representing white interests.

The Botha-Smuts government had laid the foundations of segregation in the Native Land Act of 1913, which restricted the Africans’ right to own land although without specifying where the restrictions would apply. Africans were not permitted to acquire land or any interest in land outside the scheduled ‘Native areas’ except with the consent of the governor-general.

The Native Trust and Land Act (1936) ‘released’ additional land to Africans and set up a South African Trust which could acquire land in ‘African areas’. Apartheid was built on this unequal division of land: 86.3 per cent to remain under the permanent control of whites, and 13.7 per cent which will eventually be passed over to Africans. Blacks are treated as if they were foreigners. ‘Passports’ which will eventually replace passes will be necessary if they wish to move even between different tribal areas. Civil, political and social rights must await the time when the ‘black’ areas in which blacks are to be entitled to self-rule eventually become ‘independent’ states within a white-dominated South Africa.

These areas are the ‘Bantu homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ (see map), and roughly correspond to what used to be called the ‘reserves’. The term ‘Bantu homeland’ is designed to support the myth that whites moved into empty South Africa, and that the present boundaries between black and white are the result, not of white conquest, but of pre-colonial black settlement.

The Bantustans are based on tribal origin—one for the Zulus, two for the Xhosas, one for the Tsunas, and so on. At present, as the map shows, the areas are not geographically consolidated but consist of smaller and larger patches of land scattered over a wide area. Consolidation programmes are progressing, but to a limited degree, and the terms ‘Bantustan’ or ‘homeland’, which suggest large, single territories, are misleading.
The Bantustans, when finally consolidated, are to cover about 58,000 square miles (some 13.5 per cent of the total land area). The government claims that this allocation is just, as only a relatively small part of South Africa is naturally cultivable; hence a nominal 13 per cent is really much more and, being partly in high rainfall areas, potentially of high fertility.

However, heavy rainfall can be as great a problem as drought. In the Transkei, although the average rainfall is over 30 inches, it is unreliable, with frequent drought and occasional torrential rains which increase erosion. Much of Tswana, the least populated Bantustan, is arid. There are virtually no ports, industries or exploitable minerals in any of the Bantustans.

Opponents of apartheid point out that, even if racial division were desirable in South Africa, the division has been decided and made wholly unilaterally by whites.

**Table 10. 'Homelands': area and distribution of land**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Homeland'</th>
<th>Blocks of land</th>
<th>Total area Hectares</th>
<th>Total area Square miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,672,212</td>
<td>14,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>918,547</td>
<td>3,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwa Zulu</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,144,421</td>
<td>12,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa (northern Sotho)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,214,086</td>
<td>8,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>604,355</td>
<td>2,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cazankulu (formerly Machangane)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>667,292</td>
<td>2,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophutha Tswana</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,754,018</td>
<td>14,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Qwagwa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45,742</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>211,807</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,232,480</td>
<td>58,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Land continues to be added to the 'homelands' under the government policy of consolidation, or as compensation for the removal of Africans from 'black spots', or under allocations made in 1936 which are only now being implemented. The areas involved are small, but even so, transfer is complicated by the problem of buying out white farmers already settled on this land. Government spokesmen state continually that only land promised to Africans in 1936 will be ceded.

Africans move not only between black and white areas but between 'homelands'.

Bantu Laws Amendment Act No. 7 (1973) enacted measures for the partial consolidation of the 'homelands'; by a resolution passed by both houses of parliament any area could be added to the present 'released areas' as an area in which Africans might buy land. The total, however, could not exceed 6,209,857 hectares. An amendment of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927 provided that,
Queuing at a Doornfontein mine.
if deemed to be in the public interest, the minister could, without prior notice to any persons concerned order any tribe, portion thereof or individual African to move from one place to another within the republic. The 1973 Act reinforces the powers of removal: its main purpose seems to be to authorize the removal of the large numbers of Tswana, Pedi, Ndebele and Xhosa people who at present live in Bantustans not assigned to their group or in areas bordering other Bantustans.

### Table 11. Population density in ‘homelands’ (1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Homeland'</th>
<th>Density of population per square mile</th>
<th>'Homeland'</th>
<th>Density of population per square mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De facto</td>
<td>De jure</td>
<td>De facto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>(formerly Machangane)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwa Zulu</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>Bophutha Tswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebows (northern Sotho)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>Basotho Qwagwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>Swazi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be consistent, great numbers of whites would have to be shifted to permit consolidation—including those involved in mining corporations, plantations, industries, harbours. The government has conceded that complete consolidation is impossible, and that the ‘homelands’ will consist of scattered areas. For example, even if ownership of the land in question passes to the Bantustan, the ownership of the mineral resources in a mining concession will not. It is difficult to see what ‘independence’ could mean in these conditions. Even communication between different parts of the same ‘homeland’ would depend on the goodwill of the white South African Government.

These problems (consolidation, ‘white patches’, black removals, influx control, retention of effective power by the government) were discussed by a meeting of ‘homeland’ leaders, in 1973, which also considered the growing significance of the liberation movements, the dissatisfaction of African workers, and disquiet among the white population.

The best-known Bantustan, the Transkei, containing 2 million Xhosa, was allowed a limited form of self-government, with a legislative assembly, under the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. The Act was to ‘confer self-government on the Bantu resident in or deriving from the Transkei’ and applies not only to Xhosa-speaking people living in the Transkei, but to ‘every Xhosa-speaking Bantu person in the Republic’, i.e. a Xhosa-speaking person who was born and has lived continuously in Johannesburg, for example, is regarded as a Transkeian citizen by law.

The legislative assembly has 109 members, 64 of whom are chiefs, holding office automatically. The appointment of the chiefs is subject to the approval of the South African Government, which can also dismiss any chief after he has
been appointed. This power has been used in the past to remove troublesome opponents of apartheid, the most famous case being that of ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, in Natal.

The assembly's powers of legislation are limited to the following: direct taxation of Transkei citizens, public works and irrigation, municipal authorities, Bantu education, lower courts, Transkeian civil service, agriculture, sections of the police force (as the South African Minister of Justice sees fit).

Matters pertaining to defence, internal security and foreign affairs are reserved to the South African parliament. Whites resident in the Transkei remain citizens of South Africa, and the Transkeian Government has no power over them.

In addition, the South African parliament can at any time overrule any law passed by the Transkeian assembly.

The chief minister of the Transkei is Chief Kaizer Matanzima, leader of the Transkei National Independence Party. In April 1970, he demanded that the South Africans hand over to the Transkei certain areas at present under white occupation. This was coupled with a demand that all portfolios other than defence should be handed over to his government, and that white civil servants should be phased out more rapidly. A spokesman for the South African Government was reported in the Daily Telegraph (15 April 1971) as saying: 'Such remarks by the Chief Minister are typical of statements meant for internal consumption.' It is certainly true that Matanzima has made similarly militant demands for land on a regular basis over a period of some years, and persistent refusals by the South African Government to grant them have not resulted in any diminution of his enthusiasm for apartheid.

The Transkei has in many respects been the 'model' for Bantustan development. It was cited by South Africa before the International Court of Justice as evidence of what the continuance of the mandate for South West Africa (Namibia) would mean, and Orambo chiefs were brought to see and admire.

The Transkei, however, has been in a state of emergency (declared by the South African Government) since 1960, and nearly 1,000 Africans have been detained without trial under Proclamation 400. The Johannesburg Sunday Times stated (1 March 1970) that malnutrition had increased by 600 per cent over the previous three years, and that every fifth Transkeian had tuberculosis: the government had bought two hotels for Africans for £82,000, and both were empty, presumably because no Africans could afford to stay in them.

It was estimated that, properly farmed, the Transkei area could produce 50 million bags of maize a year. In fact, only 1.25 million bags were produced in 1970, insufficient even for local needs, and over twice as much again had to be imported.

The largest of the projected Bantustans is Zulustan, or Kwa Zulu, in Natal, which could potentially support 3.5 million Zulus. Unlike the reasonably consolidated Transkei, it consists of 188 separate areas amounting to 12,000 square miles. About half the Zulus in South Africa are in the officially designated area, while the remainder live in the white areas.

In June 1972, the Vorster government announced plans to consolidate the separate pieces of Zululand into 'manageable' and 'economically-viable' units. The result would be a Zulustan split into five pieces, each isolated from the
others. Except for a tiny strip of shore south of the new white harbour at Richards Bay Kwa Zulu will have no access to the sea between the white city of Durban and Sardenha Bay, 200 miles away in its far northern corner. The Zulus are also excluded from the coastal area between Sardenha and the Mozambique border, which is a game park.

The chief executive of the Kwa Zulu Territorial Authority is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who has campaigned for a fairer share of South Africa’s total assets for Kwa Zulu and who has become a leading spokesman for a federation of black States. This idea has been widely canvassed by Bantustan spokesmen. Some white groups have supported it in the South African press—also some members of the United Party, although their idea would not seem to be quite the same as Chief Buthelezi’s.

The idea of a South African federation is not new. It reappears over the years, and has even been supported by some members of the Nationalist Party. One version is a federation including Lesotho and Botswana (now independent States) and Namibia. Some believe that this would amount to legitimizing South African economic dominance of the area, and would leave the problem of the imbalance of land division intact. It has the attraction for some Bantustan leaders that it might provide a solution for the present fragmentation of African areas. Moreover, although Bantustan leaders are appointed by the South African Government, they cannot ignore the African desire for unity, the black nationalism that started in the 1970s, and the general unrest which erupted in strikes.

The liberation movements oppose the Bantustan scheme, since they regard South Africa as a single entity. However, some of their members see in the reactions of ‘homeland’ leaders to the ideal of African unity a resurgence of African nationalism despite the limits imposed on it by the present political realities.

The South African economy depends on black labour. The Bantustan system was never intended to remove African labour from white-owned industry. It rather reinforces the continuance of native reserves. As the African population is confined to a subsistence economy, inadequate for its support, its able-bodied men have to come to ‘white’ areas for jobs and enter a cash economy.

Industrialization in South Africa as elsewhere forces people to leave the countryside for the towns. This has affected both whites and blacks. An increasing number of Africans have lost their rural ties. The Bantustan policy attempts to stem the movement of Africans out of the ‘homelands’ without however compromising the supply of cheap African labour needed to maintain economic development.

The policy is contested by some supporters of an ideal apartheid who consider this compromise with economic forces immoral. It is also contested by manufacturers hampered by the multiplicity of regulations governing African labour, and the restriction of a potentially important African consumer market.

Poverty is growing in Bantustan areas as the already overcrowded land is made to support more and more people. The government reply to this is industrial decentralization or ‘border industries’. But this has failed to provide more than a handful of jobs, and unemployment is becoming a serious problem. The ‘development’ aspect of separate development—whatever the encouragement given by the South African Government—has largely failed.
The Bantustan policy raises the issue of Africans living in urban areas and the various 'separate development' schemes for resettlement and removal.

The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development said in a general circular in 1967:

It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour. As soon as they become, for one reason or other, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of their national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born and bred in the homeland... It must be stressed here that no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu at present residing in the European areas.

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, C. M. Botha, made a further statement in 1969:

The policy of the Nationalist Party is based on the very obvious truth... that the whites and Bantu in South Africa differ from one another so radically that they are separate nations and there is absolutely no possibility of considering any process of their becoming equal, and thus no opportunities for this should be created....

For the whites and for each Bantu nation separate development is the course. Bantu persons can be present in the white areas solely for their labour—not for a 'stake' or a 'share' in the Parliament, or for anything else.... Bantu individuals can be present in the white area solely for their labour and in addition... not so that they can compete on an equal basis with the whites, or on a basis which entails potential equality, so that when they attain that equality, they can integrate with the whites into one entity. That is the basis and for that reason we must now state for the umpteenth time in this House that the basis on which we organize our labour policy for the Bantu and allow the Bantu into our white areas is not a basis for economic integration.... There is a wall, a roof, and one cannot get past that. We state this openly, and cannot, nor dare not, conceal it. Nor do we wish to conceal it. The Bantu cannot strive towards the top on an equal footing with the whites in our politics, social matters, labour, economy and education in white South Africa. This is our territory, and here there are only limited opportunities of that nature for them. In their homelands there are measureless and limitless opportunities for them, and there you, Mr Speaker, and I, as whites, are in our turn restricted. That is the morality of our policy.

**Africans in urban areas**

African residence in urban areas is regulated by the Bantu Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act (1952) and its Amendment No. 76 (1963), and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1964) and its Amendment No. 7 (1973).

Africans may remain in urban areas only under very strict regulation, and even then they may not remain in white residential areas after curfew.

According to the 1964 Act Africans may be ‘endorsed out’ of urban districts (a) if the minister has decided that the number of Africans in the area concerned exceeds its reasonable labour requirements; (b) if the African concerned comes from an area from which the minister has decided no more labour is to be recruited in the white area concerned; (c) if the African is deemed to be ‘idle’ or ‘undesirable’; (d) if it is deemed not to be in the interests either of the employer or the employed, or in the public interest, that the contract of service shall continue.

Wives and other dependents of Africans working in the white areas and who had not resided in the area continuously previously require permission to visit husbands or fathers if this visit would be longer than seventy-two hours. Employers are allowed to house ‘key’ African workers and their wives together, but children must remain in the ‘homelands’. Domestic servants are to be recruited on a single basis, and both employer and employee must sign a document agreeing that the service contract will be terminated if children or dependants are introduced into the area.

Unauthorized whites may not visit an African area without permission. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 25 of 1945 as amended provides that all Africans in an urban area, unless exempted, shall live in a location, African village or hostel. The 1963 Amendment expands this, making any unemployed African liable to be required to live in a location—and not necessarily in the urban area concerned, or to take up residence in a reserve (‘homeland’) if there is no place for him within the location.

African residence in urban areas, therefore, is doubly restricted (a) as to permission to reside at all and (b) as to where they may reside.

‘Resettlement’ for Africans in urban areas involves: (a) the clearance of all the smaller African residential areas, or ‘black spots’ from within the white areas; (b) the reduction of the numbers of Africans living in ‘white’ urban areas.

In 1969 the government claimed that there were nearly 4 million ‘superfluous’ Africans left in the urban areas. Speaking in parliament in March 1973, the Minister of Bantu Administration gave the number of Africans removed from white areas as follows: April 1968 to March 1969, 62,459; April 1969 to March 1970, 66,683; April 1970 to March 1971, 57,957; April 1971 to March 1972, 45,397; a total of 232,496.

In 1972 there were over seventy ‘resettlement’ camps and villages. They are sealed off from unauthorized entry and facts about them are hard to obtain. However, some have received publicity, and the names of many of the ‘resettlement’ camps—Limehill, Stinkwater, Dimbaza, Schmidt’s Drift, Weenen, Kuruman, Marseg—became symbols of apartheid throughout the world, as the story of the movement of whole populations began to be told. One priest, Father Cosmas Desmond, who published an account of a journey of inquiry into such camps throughout the country, was banned and placed under twenty-four-hour house arrest to prevent him from further activity.

The rations provided at Dimbaza for indigent African women are inadequate both in quantity and quality according to nutrition experts (Rand Daily Mail, 20 March 1973). The monthly ration consists of: maize meal, 20 lbs; mealies, 8 lbs; beans, 5 lbs; margarine, 1 lb; skim milk, 2 lbs; salt, ½ lb.

The diet, weak in calcium and vitamins, leads to deficiency diseases such as scurvy, anaemia and pellagra.

Visitors to the camps reported that water was scarce and polluted, that there had been deaths from gastro-enteritis (particularly among children), and that at Limehill there had been an outbreak of typhoid. Lavatory and washing facilities were poor. Limehill and Dimbaza are far from any work areas and, with the men away looking for work, ‘resettlement’ has to be done by the womenfolk. Employment was scarce, and with the shortage of water even subsistence farming was difficult.
The Bantu Affairs Administration Act No. 45 (1971) completed the separation of African from other urban areas. A Bantu Affairs Administration Area could be declared in any area outside the 'homelands'. Boundaries could be changed by the Minister of Bantu Administration. The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards would administer the Bantu Affairs Administration Area. The minister 'makes the appointments to these boards, decides the number of members and the duration of appointment, and may remove any member deemed guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty.

A board resembles a local authority except that (a) members are not elected but appointed so that the board lacks the relative independence of a local authority, and (b) the board is empowered to acquire, develop or dispose of land for African occupation and is responsible for the allocation of labour (hence, certain of its members to be appointed have a specialized knowledge of the African labour required for agriculture, commerce or industry).

To the end of 1973, twenty-two boards had been appointed, in the Cape, Natal, East Rand, West Rand (including Johannesburg), Transvaal and the Free State.

One consequential effect was that Johannesburg City Council was no longer allowed to subsidize certain expenditure on Africans, since the boards are required to be 'self-supporting'.

Administration is further complicated by the existence of Bantu councils. The major problem is jurisdiction. According to the government, Africans in urban areas legally belong to their respective 'homelands'. Yet it is obvious that at least some of them are there to stay, and that there must be some sort of local government in the area. Apartheid, with its centralized control of non-white communities, cuts across the strong provincial tradition of white South Africa. The government has attempted to curtail this by setting up the boards, while at the same time allowing the councils to deal with the relatively unimportant sections of local affairs. The councils may or may not be fully elected, and are allowed to have limited funds. The boards have jurisdiction over both urban and rural areas, the councils are confined to urban areas. Boards also group together many local authorities.

In spite of controls, in spite of removals, Africans remain in white areas where they are needed to work, and continue to increase: in 1936 a total of 1,245,682; in 1946, 1,856,029; in 1951, 2,328,534; in 1960, 3,192,130; in 1970, 4,989,371 (this figure may include 'dormitory' towns in 'homelands' servicing industry in white areas).

From 1936 to 1960 the percentage of the population urbanized rose from 68 to 80 among whites and from 18 to 29 among Africans. By 1970 approximately 6.9 million Africans (46 per cent) were living in the 'homelands', 8 million (53.5 per cent) in white areas.

**WHITES, COLOURED, ASIANS IN URBAN AREAS**

The Group Areas Act (1950) provided that each racial group should live in specifically demarcated areas. Proclamation 255 (1960) excluded blacks from 'white' cinemas, places of refreshment, seated accommodation or clubs. Proclama-
tion R. 26 (1965) specified ‘any place of entertainment’. Amendment No. 56 of 1965 placed African areas under the control of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, the Minister of Community Development being responsible for all other areas.

Amendment No. 83 (1972) of the Group Areas Amendment Act (1950) extended urban administrative separation to Coloured and Indian areas, under the control of ministers of Coloured affairs and of Indian affairs who are responsible for establishing local government bodies in their respective areas. Coloureds in the Cape Province lost their municipal vote in the formerly common voters list. Coloured and Indian group areas in towns are governed by (a) consultative committees, nominated by the administrator of the province or (b) management or local affairs committees (made up of both nominated and elected members). There are two fully elected Indian town boards, but elsewhere boards are partly nominated.

**GROUP AREAS ACT: COLOURED AND ASIANS**

In February 1971, the Minister of Community Development notified that the following numbers of families were disqualified to remain in areas where they lived under the terms of the Group Areas Act (this does not include Africans who are disqualified under other legislation): Coloured families, 70,889; Indian, 38,180; white, 1,578; Chinese, 933; a total of 111,580 families. The numbers of families resettled since the original Act passed in 1950 are as follows: Coloured, 37,606; Indian, 24,388; white, 1,246; Chinese, 64—a total of 63,314 families.

During the year 1972 alone 4,097 Coloured families, 1,400 Indian families, 80 white families and 3 Chinese were moved.

Those ‘resettled’ are faced with acute housing problems. Removals also affect employment, shopkeepers for example, having their livelihood completely disrupted.

Each designation of an urban group area intensifies the already serious housing problem; Coloureds, for example, are mainly squatters in certain urban areas.

**Security**

The nationalist government has introduced an ever-growing number of laws it claims to be necessary to preserve security. Many of these replace the rule of law by ministerial decree. They have increased the severity of penal measures, sentencing and the treatment of suspects and prisoners by police and prison staff.

The primary purpose of the first of these Acts, the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), was to give the government various administrative powers for banning organizations and people. The Minister of Justice simply decides that a person or an organization is communist, and bans.

The Communist Party, the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Defence and Aid Fund (whose purpose was to supply legal
advice for prisoners and help maintain their dependants) are among those banned under the Act. Once an organization is banned, it becomes an offence to further its aims, and prison sentences of three years are common for this offence.

A person banned under the Act is usually: (a) restricted to a particular magisterial district; (b) forced to report to the police at fixed times; (c) prohibited from attending a gathering with a common purpose, whether political, educational, or social.

Banned persons have been convicted for such offences as playing bridge, chaperoning a daughter at a New Year’s Eve party, sitting in a kitchen while a party proceeded in the living room, attending a barbecue with two friends.

No one may quote or publish anything which a banned person has ever said or written.

Banning orders are usually imposed for a period of five years.

The number banned at any given date averages 200; frequently bans are re-imposed when they expire, or people are served with strict banning orders on their release from jail and so effectively prevented from returning to normal life.

Whites who have been banned include Father Cosmas Desmond, who wrote in *The Discarded People* about conditions in the ‘resettlement’ areas; the ban prevents the book from being quoted anywhere in South Africa. However, most of those under banning orders are Africans. House arrest is frequently added. In 1971 a number of ex-political prisoners in the eastern Cape were not allowed back to their former homes in Port Elizabeth, but forced to live in ‘resettlement’ areas.

As well as being used to shut people up after they have served prison sentences, banning orders are also used to anticipate future actions that may embarrass the government. There is no right of appeal against bans, and the minister is not obliged to give reasons. People can thus be punished at will without having committed any offence.

The General Laws Amendment (Sabotage) Act (1962) laid down a minimum of five years and a maximum of death for sabotage. The definition of sabotage is extremely wide; a person is deemed guilty of sabotage if, in contravention of any law, he enters or is upon land or building. The onus is then on him to prove himself innocent of any intent to commit sabotage, i.e. to prove that he is innocent.

The Sabotage Act incorporated the principle of indefinite imprisonment without trial into South African law. Section 17 empowered any senior police officer to arrest without warrant any person suspected of having information about offences of a political nature; and to detain him for interrogation in solitary confinement for periods of up to ninety days. The courts interpreted this as meaning that the police could hold prisoners for successive periods of ninety days ad infinitum.

Altogether over 1,000 people were detained under the ninety-day law before it was suspended in 1965.

The 180-day law was introduced under the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (1965): the attorney-general, acting on the advice of the police, can order the detention in solitary confinement of persons who, in his opinion, were likely to give material evidence in certain kinds of trials, especially those of a political character. During the first three years the law was in operation (1965–67). 388 people were detained (statements by the Minister of Justice).
The most commonly used instrument for indefinite detention now appears to be the Terrorism Act (1967). This empowers a senior police officer to order the indefinite detention in solitary confinement of any person suspected of having any information about terrorism. Neither lawyers nor next-of-kin need be informed about any person so detained; accordingly, no reliable figures of numbers of such detainees are available.

The Act is used both to detain suspects without trial for long periods and to convict them for 'terrorist' offences. A typical case is that of 68-year-old Joseph Tshukudu Maleka, who was charged in 1972 with having been connected with members of the African Peoples Democratic Union of South Africa (who were also tried, separately, and convicted, of offences under the Terrorism Act). Maleka was originally detained on 19 February 1970 and kept in custody for 110 days before being released; he was re-arrested on 7 May 1971 and detained for forty-one days before being charged. He was acquitted of all charges laid against him, by which time he had been in jail for a total of 440 days.

Terrorism is defined under the Act so as to include any act calculated to embarrass the administration. The onus is shifted to the accused to prove his innocence in certain important respects. As with the Sabotage Act, the minimum sentence is five years and the maximum is death. The Terrorism Act was made retroactive to 1962, thus providing the death penalty for offences which were not capital offences at the time when they were committed.

Because no names of those detained on suspicion are given, it is impossible to tell what proportion of those arrested are eventually convicted. On 1 January 1972 a total of 463 persons were serving sentences under the four main security laws (see Table 12):

**Table 12. Persons serving sentences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Whites</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Sabotage Act</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Suppression of Communism Act</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Unlawful Organization Act</td>
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<td>Terrorism Act</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>430</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: House of Assembly Debates. (Hansard), Cape Town, South African House of Assembly.*

**PRISON CONDITIONS**


The last figure is made up of 71,190 Africans, 16,238 Coloureds, 3,217 whites and 463 Asians. In 1972 Mr Justice Hiemstra pointed out that the prison population had increased by 76 per cent over the past ten years, whereas the
general increase in population is 24 per cent. Many prisoners are short-term, mainly for offences under the pass laws and non-payment of fines.

Both prisoners and warders are segregated. Different diets are provided, for example whites get more meat than Africans. Conditions of work, recreation, study, privacy and rest are much better for white than for black prisoners.

Political prisoners are automatically classified 'D' (maximum security), irrespective of previous history or character, and have fewer privileges than most ordinary criminals. Remission of sentence of up to one-third can be earned for good behaviour but this does not apply to political prisoners.

DETAINEES

Detainees are held at the absolute discretion of the security police. They are allowed no visits, letters, or access to the outside world. The 180-day detainees must be visited by a magistrate once a week; Terrorism Act detainees once a fortnight ‘if circumstances permit’. The visiting magistrates have been criticized as ‘unobservant’ in the South African House of Assembly.

Allegations of torture are commonplace. These allegations—made by persons accused and by witnesses—are detailed and consistent, and describe treatment ranging from electric shock torture to the driving of nails through the penis. The allegations are denied by the security police, who publicly claim that they treat detainees well, even becoming very friendly with them.

CONVICTED PRISONERS

By the end of 1966, official figures gave the numbers of prisoners convicted under the main security laws as rising to a peak of 1,825. By the end of 1967, after the passing of the Terrorism Act, this was down to 1,335; in 1968 to 1,019; in 1970 to 809; in 1972 to 464.

Prisoners are held in three main prisons: Robben Island (black men), Pretoria Local (white men) and Barberton (black women). There are no longer any white women in prison. Namibian prisoners are also held on Robben Island. Political prisoners are treated like common law prisoners, but with certain additions (see below). The 1959 Prisons Act, prohibiting the publication of false information concerning prisons or prisoners, had the effect of a ban on the publication of any information whatsoever. The government has refused to hold any public inquiries into prison conditions.

In 1965 the Rand Daily Mail published a series of interviews with Harold Strachan, a released political prisoner. Strachan told a story of sadistic warders, filth, obscenity and brutality, African prisoners ‘herded like animals’, of government by caprice and the flouting of regulations by prison authorities. The State subsequently laid charges against Strachan, the journalists and the newspaper, but the disclosures had, in the words of a recently released political prisoner, ‘broken open the whole system’. Several improvements in the physical conditions of the prisoners (not only politicals) followed. Outside concern led, for instance, to the building of a new section in Pretoria for white politicals, with better living quarters and a workshop.
In 1969, the Minister of Prisons said no workshop would be established on Robben Island: black prisoners could continue to break rocks and collect sand and seaweed.

In 1973, black politicals presented a petition to the Commanding Officer of Robben Island. Complaints included: harassment and assaults by certain warders; denial of library, recreational and study facilities; insufficient and unpalatable food; dangerously casual and unhygienic medical attention; prisoners given contradictory instructions, governed by caprice, not informed of their rights. At least one of the prisoners connected with the petition was punished and given six months' solitary confinement. Mr Justice Diemont declared in Cape Town that the punishment was illegal, and he ordered that prisoners be given copies of the Prison Regulations on request, but he also ruled that access to library and recreation facilities, and permission to pursue courses of study, were not rights but privileges granted at the discretion of the prison authorities.

WOMEN

Barberton Prison was largely ignored in the publicity that brought about some reforms for the men. It is a harsh punitive prison in a very hot part of the country. The longest available walk is the ten yards to the matron's office. There are no recreational facilities whatever and the women are not even allowed to look out of their cell windows. Their work consists of washing and cleaning.

SPECIAL TREATMENT OF POLITICALS

Officials deny that there are 'political prisoners' in South Africa and say that no prisoners are discriminated against. But the treatment of the political prisoners clearly differs from that of common law prisoners in a number of important aspects, as follows:

1. No remission, amnesty or parole. This means, for example, that a man with a life sentence faces the prospect of never leaving prison.
2. No news, radio or newspapers, by order of the security police. Additional tensions are created by the censorship of letters and the monitoring of visits.
3. No remuneration for work.
4. The grading of prisoners, and privileges, into categories A to D is used as a weapon against politicals, who invariably begin in Grade D and find 'promotion' slow and difficult. (Grade D prisoners were initially allowed one half-hour visit and one 500-word letter every six months. They are now allowed a letter a month. Category A prisoners are allowed three letters and two half-hour visits a month.)
5. The arbitrary withdrawal of other privileges, such as library and study facilities, is used to ensure 'good behaviour' and as a means of exerting psychological pressure.
6. Regulations for politicals are ultra-strict.
DEATHS UNDER DETENTION

Since detention without trial was first introduced in 1963, no fewer than nineteen detainees are known to have lost their lives while in the hands of interrogators. It has been officially admitted that twenty-two persons have died in detention, causes being given as 'suicide' (eleven), 'natural causes' (three), 'thrombosis' (one), 'broncho-pneumonia following minor head injury' (one), 'slipped on soap' (one), 'accidental fall down stairs' (one), 'unknown' (one). In addition to these, the Minister of Justice stated that in 1972, forty persons, excluding those detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, had died while in detention.

The following are four cases of detainees who died while under interrogation.

Suliman Salojee died after falling seven floors from the security police headquarters in Johannesburg on 9 September 1964, two months after his detention. A security policeman, who refused to answer some of the defence questions, denied that Salojee had been assaulted. The magistrate found that Salojee died of multiple injuries after a fall during interrogation. He could not say whether Salojee committed suicide or was trying to escape but said there was nothing in the evidence to suggest assault or other irregularities.

James Lenkoe, aged 35, a Lesotho railway worker, was found hanging by a belt from the window of his prison cell on 10 March 1969, five days after he had been detained. Traces of copper were found in a wound on his toe. Four pathologists, one of them from the United States, said that the wound could have been caused by an electric burn. Security police witnesses denied that detainees were given electric shock treatment. The coroner found that the apparent cause of death was suicide by hanging, that no one was to blame, and that the allegation that electric shock treatment contributed to his death was not proved.

Imam Abdullah Haron, a prominent Moslem leader and newspaper editor in Cape Town, died in custody on 27 September 1969 after four months in detention. Security police evidence was that the Imam slipped and fell down the last few steps of a flight of stairs after interrogation on 19 September. He did not appear to have been hurt, they said, and they denied any knowledge of assaults on him. But according to the post-mortem report, he had twenty-six separate bruises on his body, a blood swelling on his back and a fractured rib. A pathologist who made the report at the inquest said some of the bruises were older than others, and could not all have been caused by the fall. The magistrate found that the Imam died as a result of injuries partly caused by an accidental fall down a flight of steps. He could not say how the other injuries were caused.

Ahmed Timol was detained under the indefinite detention clause of the Terrorism Act on 22 October 1971. On 27 October, while undergoing interrogation at security police headquarters in Johannesburg, he plunged to his death from the tenth floor. The police claimed that he had committed suicide by jumping out of the window, and that the police sergeant who saw him jump could not prevent him because there was a chair in his way.

According to medical evidence, Timol received injuries four to six days before his death. These consisted of circular bruises on the upper arms. The State pathologist conceded that these were 'possibly the result of numerous blows'. Counsel for the dead man's family suggested that the injuries were consistent with
a man's being kicked while lying on the floor, having put up his arms for protection. The pathologist agreed that this could have been the case, 'but I do not say it did happen'. Counsel pointed out that other injuries, even serious ones, would not show if they were inflicted just before death. Timol's mother gave evidence (unchallenged by the police) that her son was unhurt when he was first detained. No police evidence was called that the injuries referred to were sustained before arrest, for example in a fight. The magistrate returned a verdict of suicide.
African political activity dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century. It was centred mainly in Cape Colony where the disabilities of Africans were not too great and they could hope eventually to get the vote, even to a limited extent.

The first African political organization, Lubumba Yama Afrika, believed that African unity offered the only hope of countering the continuing neglect of African interests by all white parties.

In 1884 John Tengo Jabavu, with white financial support, started *Invo Zabantsundu* (African Opinion). In 1887 he organized opposition to the Parliamentary Voters Registration Bill, which denied tribal Africans the vote by its definition of the franchise. In 1889 Jabavu and others combated proposals to extend pass regulations. In 1894 his newspaper opposed the Glen Grey Act (which foreshadowed later South African 'separate' legislation). Most of the new Christian-educated African élite involved in these protests were wholly loyal to the Crown, and believed in the gradual evolution of a multiracial South African State.

Some Ethiopian sects, though not ostensibly political, were of some political importance. These were exclusively black Christian sects, heavily influenced by the Methodist Episcopalians in the United States. Unlike Jabavu and his friends, the Ethiopians were sceptical about white help and argued that Africans could progress only if they worked through exclusively African organizations and resolutely refused white civilization.

These two trends—co-operation with sympathetic whites or total rejection of white assistance—constantly recur in the history of South African resistance and can co-exist in the same organization.

Black South Africans were, of course, aware of black movements elsewhere; those studying in the United States, for example, were much impressed by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois. Black South African protest was heavily influenced by post-war events in the rest of Africa. They had protested against the invasion of Ethiopia by Italian troops; they immediately saw what fascism had in common with settler rule in South Africa; they were profoundly affected by the implications of the Declaration of Human Rights; and they influenced and were influenced by the demands for freedom and independence elsewhere on the
continent. But the 1948 election victory of the Nationalist Party was the white response to the intensified demand of all Africans for full political participation.

Prior to 1948, African protest had achieved little. Africans in the Transkei had objected to the terms of the original Union. Africans and Coloureds went to London to plead for the removal of the colour bar in the South Africa Act which followed the Boer war and was to establish the Union. They were ignored; the British parliament proceeded with the Act in spite of African protests. Protests were made against the terms of the Native Affairs Bill (1920) and the Native Lands Act (1913) (with petitions in the latter case to King George V, and to the parliament and people of Great Britain).

A curious document, *Native Life in South Africa*, by Solomont Plaatje (1916) stated:

In every crisis of the past four years... the native leaders have taken upon themselves the thankless and expensive task of restraining the natives from resorting to violence

which would seem to indicate that the leaders in question were 'moderates'.

Protests were not restricted to South Africa. The South African Native National Congress petitioned King George V in 1928 on the subject of the German colonies. They asked that the territories in Africa

should not be disposed of or their future destiny determined without the wishes of the inhabitants being known... That both German South West and German South East Africa should never be handed to the Union Government of South Africa unless its system of rule be radically altered so as to dispel colour prejudice.

They suggested that control should pass to the United States.

Opposition to apartheid was also influenced by happenings elsewhere—Mahatma Gandhi’s theories of non-violence, for example, influenced the African National Congress for a long time, and the United Nations lent weight to appeals to the international community.

After its election victory in 1948, the Nationalist Party began to implement apartheid through parliament. Disturbances became more widespread as the Africans saw new laws being enacted against them. In the Witzieshoek Reserve, near Basutoland (now Botswana) land hunger and cattle laws had been the basis for unrest since 1947. When the police intervened during the investigations of a commission of inquiry in November 1950, shots were fired at a crowd of 600 Africans, and sixteen were killed and forty wounded.

Within the African National Congress (ANC) the Youth League was demanding more action; it felt that the time for resolutions, conferences and delegations was over. At the 1949 conference the new executive was charged with the vigorous execution of the Youth League’s programme of action, involving a total boycott of elections and ‘strikes, civil disobedience, non-co-operation’.

Protest first centred around the introduction of the Suppression of Communism Act, with a call from ANC, Indian and trade union leaders for a one-day stoppage to coincide with the international celebration of May Day 1950. Despite a government ban on demonstrations and meetings, and the presence of 2,000 police in the Johannesburg area, more than half the African workers stayed at home, and many people attended meetings. The police broke up all gatherings.
Segregation in South Africa.
In the various skirmishes, eighteen people were killed and thirty (including three children) were injured.

Common sorrow brought the African and Indian congresses more closely together, and a co-ordination committee formed on 14 June called for a national day of protest and mourning on Monday, 26 June 1950. Thousands of Africans in Johannesburg stopped work, and the Indians closed their shops. In Port Elizabeth all cargo work was halted, businesses, shops, hotels, restaurants, garages and even hospitals were closed. Ever since, 26 June has been commemorated, in South Africa and internationally, as South Africa Freedom Day.

**Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign**

On 21 January 1952 the African National Congress sent a letter to Dr Malan, the prime minister, demanding the repeal of the main repressive legislation. It listed the following: the Pass Laws, Group Areas Act, Suppression of Communism Act, Separate Representation of Voters Act, Bantu Authorities Act, Stock Limitation Regulations. The letter announced that if these laws were not repealed by 29 February 1952, a mass protest would be held on 6 April 1952—van Riebeeck Day (celebrating the 300th anniversary of white rule)—and country-wide passive resistance.

On 6 April a vast crowd in Johannesburg heard Moroka, ANC president, and Dadoo of the Indian National Congress, call for 10,000 volunteers. The demonstration remained peaceful throughout.

Over the next few weeks Nelson Mandela was appointed volunteer-in-chief. The volunteers were carefully chosen, accepting the following formula: ‘We solemnly pledge that we shall exert all our moral, physical and financial effort to obtain our objective—the freedom of the oppressed people of South Africa.’ They were to offer themselves for arrest, refuse bail and opt to serve prison sentences.

On 26 June 1952 a group of Africans walked through the ‘Europeans Only’ entrance to the railway station in New Brighton township. They were arrested and given jail sentences of fifteen to thirty days. The Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign had begun.

In the Transvaal, Nana Sita and a group of forty-two Africans and ten Indians walked on to a location without permits. An ANC meeting in Johannesburg dispersed at 11 p.m. without the ‘special’ permits authorizing Africans to be in the town at that time; 106 arrests were made.

Leaders recently banned under the Suppression of Communism Act nevertheless continued to speak at meetings. Moses Kotane was given a four-month jail sentence in July 1952, Njongwe, Matji and Mrs Matomela and other leaders in the eastern Cape, in September 1952, were sentenced under this same Act to nine months’ hard labour, sentence suspended for three years. Moroka, Sisulu, Mandela, Dadoo, the Cachalias, Marks and Bopape and several others were accused of breaking their bans under the Act. For the preliminary hearing the court was crowded with people singing the songs which had become popular during the defiance campaign. The case was adjourned, and the news spurred hundreds more to defy.
During July, August and September 1952, the numbers arrested or jailed were respectively 1,500, 2,000 and 2,358. ANC membership increased as people from all over South Africa joined the defiance campaign.

It was apparently believed that violence could stop the campaign from growing. In New Brighton on 18 October 1952 two Africans alleged to have stolen a pot of paint were shot at by the police. After twenty-one shots, the enraged crowd attacked the police station. Seven Africans and four whites were killed, and twenty-seven people were injured. A one-day strike called by the local ANC branch was 50 per cent observed, and thousands of African workers were dismissed by the railway authorities and the municipality.

Two weeks later, a banned prayer meeting in East London was charged by the police who shot and wounded several people. On 8 November 1952, in riots at Kimberley, fourteen Africans were shot dead and thirty-five were wounded. No government inquiries were held into any of these events, or into a similar riot in the Rand.

In October, 2,254 volunteers went to jail, and in December the first group of whites, led by Patrick Duncan on crutches, walked into Germiston’s African township. There were thirty-eight arrests. Lilian Ngoyi of the ANC Women’s League went into the European section of the post office in Johannesburg and sent a telegram of protest to the Minister of Justice.

New laws enacted by the government made it illegal to defy a law as part of a campaign against the law, and imposed penalties of up to £300 or three years, imprisonment with ten lashes.

At the beginning of December 1952, 280 more went to jail. Moroka and Sisulu, Mandela and others stood trial and called no defence witnesses. Justice Rumpf, in giving sentences of nine months’ hard labour, suspended for two years, on all twenty men, said the charge had ‘nothing to do with communism as it is commonly known’, and ‘I accept the evidence that you have consistently advised your followers to follow a peaceful course of action and to avoid violence in any shape or form...’. The government continued its bans: fifty-two leaders of the campaign were banned; Mandela was confined to Johannesburg and Bopape to Brakpan.

Despite the arrests, bans, imprisonments and shootings, resistance continued to grow and as apartheid policies were introduced in all aspects of life, protests and campaigns were constantly mounted. Over 8,500 people had gone to jail, but confidence and self-respect in the Indian and African communities had risen enormously. Huge numbers had become involved, and ANC leadership spearheaded the movement.

Some white sympathizers had also become involved and at the end of 1952 at a conference called by Oliver Tambo for the ANC and Yusuf Cachalia for the Indian Congress, the Liberal Party and the white Congress of Democrats were formed. The African Peoples Organization, largely supported by Coloureds, reformed itself as the South African Coloured People’s Congress.

In February 1955 there were protests against removals in Sophiatown. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 led to a school strike, parents keeping their children at home in protest. In October 1955 women began a protest against the pass laws which continued for some years and was extended to protest against police raids on housing in the townships and forced, unpaid labour in rural areas.
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa

The Congress of the People

As well as campaigns on specific issues, a general call for action was made in the mid-1950s to all opposed to the policies and practices of apartheid.

Speaking to a rally in the Cape early in 1953, Professor Z. K. Matthews suggested that a ‘national convention representing all the people of this country, irrespective of race or colour’ should be called, ‘to draw up a freedom charter for the democratic South Africa of the future’. This idea was adopted by the ANC in December 1953, and a Congress of the People was called for 25–26 June 1955.

In alliance with the Indian Congress, the (white) Congress of Democrats, the Coloured People’s Congress and the multiracial Congress of Trade Unions, ANC issued invitations to various parties and organizations (including the United Party, and the English-speaking opposition in parliament whose general policy was in favour of apartheid).

Circulars were sent out months beforehand to cities, villages, kraals and locations throughout the country. They asked: ‘If you could make the laws... what would you do? How would you set about making South Africa a happy place for all the people who live in it?’

On 25 June 1955, on a small patch of land in Kliptown, a village near Johannesburg, some 3,000 delegates assembled for the Congress of the People; 2,000 Africans plus 200 to 300 each of Indians, Coloureds and whites. Banners carried slogans: ‘Freedom In Our Lifetime’, ‘Long Live The Struggle’. Watched by the Special Branch, the congress listened as the Freedom Charter drawn up by the National Action Council was read in English, Sesotho and Xhosa. The crowd approved each section with a loud ‘Afrika! Mayibuye!’ Messages came from countries all over the world, and from the leaders of the congress alliance, nearly all of whom were absent because of banning orders.

The Charter was adopted:

We the People of South Africa declare for our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the People.

It demanded:

The People shall govern.
All national groups shall have equal rights.
The People shall share in the country’s wealth.
The land shall be shared among those who work it.
All shall be equal before the law.
All shall enjoy equal human rights.
There shall be work and security.
The doors of learning and culture shall be opened.
There shall be houses, security and comfort.
There shall be peace and friendship.

On the Sunday afternoon 26 June 1955 armed police marched in, took the names and addresses of all the delegates, and removed all papers and documents.

The following September, a co-ordinated raid was made at dawn on 400 homes throughout the country: again papers and documents were removed.
Coloured carnival in Cape Town.
And at sunrise on 5 December 1956, 156 arrests were made. The arrests included the leaders of the movement, and many of its main supporters, black and white, African, Indian and Coloured. They were accused of being members of a conspiracy to overthrow the South African State by violence. Ironically enough, the leaders could speak to each other in jail; outside they could not because of banning orders.

The ‘treason trial’

The preparatory examinations before the ‘treason trial’, as it became known, lasted nearly a year. On the first day, 19 December 1956, crowds gathered from 5 a.m., and the vans bringing the prisoners were driven through the singing crowds. On the second day the crowd was even bigger. From inside the court shots were heard: the police had baton-charged the throng, and twenty-two people were taken to hospital.

The case was centred on ANC policy between 1952 and 1956. The Freedom Charter was the key document produced by the prosecution; others were seized during the Congress of the People, and in some thousand police raids meanwhile. The defence objected to the idea that the charter was treasonable, and declared that it was not 156 individuals who were on trial ‘but the ideas that they and thousands of others in our land have openly espoused and expressed’. The chief prosecution witness, said by the police to be a lawyer, was shown to have no legal qualifications, and to have served four prison sentences for forgery and fraud.

By the time the main trial opened in Johannesburg on 11 August 1958, the charges had been withdrawn against Luthuli, Tambo and fifty-nine others; ninety-one people went to trial on the main charge of high treason with alternative charges under the Suppression of Communism Act.

The trial dragged on until 29 March 1961. Charges against sixty-one of the defendants were quashed in April 1959. The remaining thirty were finally found not guilty and told: ‘You may go’—over four years after they had been arrested.

Meanwhile, the struggle against apartheid continued. In mid-1957, from the Drill Hall, Johannesburg, where the trial was proceeding, Luthuli called for a stay-at-home on 26 June, as a protest against apartheid, and in support of the call for a pound a day basic wage being demanded by ANC and the Congress of Trade Unions. Token demonstrations took place all over South Africa. Support for the strike was particularly strong in the Port Elizabeth area, and in the Rand there was an 80 per cent response. In Alexandria township a new rise in fares caused a bus boycott for the third time; people walked to and from work for four months before a successful conclusion was reached.

Sharpeville

21.3.60. MASSACRE OF AFRICANS AT SHARPEVILLE. MORE THAN FIFTY NATIVES LOST THEIR LIVES WHEN POLICE OPENED FIRE DURING THE NATIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RULE WHICH FORCES THEM TO CARRY PASSES. AT SHARPEVILLE ABOUT THIRTY MILES FROM JOHANNESBURG
JET AIRCRAFT WHICH SCREAMED DOWN ON THE NATIVES IN AN ATTEMPT TO FRIGHTEN THEM ONLY MADE THEM MORE ANGRY. THE SHOOTING OF THE AFRICANS HAS CREATED STRONG PROTESTS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. KEYSTONE.

On 21 March 1960, the news agencies told the world of the massacre at Sharpeville. Some 5,000–10,000 people had assembled at the police station in the African township of Sharpeville. Some were there to protest against the pass laws, others were expecting an announcement to be made at the police station. At first there were only twelve policemen at the station, six white and six black. But as the morning wore on, 300 armed and uniformed men arrived, together with five Saracen armoured cars. Lieutenant-Colonel Pienaar ordered his men to fall in and then to 'load five rounds'. He denied that any further order was given, but as Bishop Ambrose Reeves wrote in his paper for the United Nations Unit on Apartheid:

Whatever doubts there may be of the sequence of events in those fateful minutes, there can be no argument over the devastating consequences of the action of the police ... sixty-nine people were killed, including eight women and ten children, and that of the 180 people who were wounded thirty-one were women and nineteen were children. According to the evidence of medical practitioners it is clear that the police continued firing after the people began to flee, for while thirty shots had entered the wounded or killed from the front of their bodies no less than 155 bullets had entered the bodies of the injured and killed from their backs. All this happened in forty seconds, during which time 705 rounds were fired from revolvers and Sten guns.

The incident provoked further mass protests. At Evaton a crowd of 20,000 people was dispersed when Sabre jets and Harvard planes dived low over them, and in Langa, a crowd of 10,000 were given a three-minute warning by a police officer. Few heard before sixty police baton-charged the crowd, were stoned in return, and the order to fire resulted in the death of two Africans; forty-nine were injured.

The dead were given vast funerals, and a stay-at-home day of mourning called by Chief Luthuli was observed throughout the country. But soon the frustration broke through again with rioting in Johannesburg and in Worcester in the Cape. In Cape Town, the entire population of the African townships went on strike for a period of almost three weeks. On 30 March a state of emergency was declared, and thousands of people were put under detention. Some 2,000 leaders of the congress movement were detained for up to five months; 20,000 more were arrested under another section of the Emergency Regulations, and thousands were sent to prison or work camps after secret trials.

Over the previous years resistance had been hardening. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had been formed in March 1959 as a break-away from the ANC, and had elected Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, lecturer in Zulu studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, as president. He expressed the PAC aim as government 'of the African, by the African, for the African' for everyone who owed his only loyalty to Africa and was 'prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority, being regarded as an African'. In a subsequent interview (Contact, 30 May 1959) Sobukwe said:
We have admitted that there are Europeans who are intellectual converts to the African's cause, but because they benefit materially from the present set-up, they cannot completely identify themselves with that cause.

Indian leadership was drawn from the merchant class, he said, and 'tainted with the view of national arrogance and cultural supremacy'. He wanted 'Indians' to reject this opportunist leadership and produce their own.

At its annual conference in December 1959 the ANC decided for a massive day of action against the pass laws on 31 March 1960. Sobukwe, on behalf of the PAC, announced a campaign for the abolition of the pass laws, to begin on 21 March. Sobukwe urged people to leave passes at home and surrender themselves to the nearest police station. He stated that this was the first step to the achievement of independence by 1963. He invited the ANC to co-operate. The ANC, whose plans for an anti-pass day of action ten days later were already far advanced, replied that they were not prepared to support 'sensational actions that might not succeed'.

**Opposition goes underground**

Governmental action following the Sharpeville shootings forced the opposition movements to re-think their tactics.

On 8 April 1960, ANC and PAC were declared 'unlawful organizations'. Under the Suppression of Communism Act the penalty for furthering the aims of an unlawful organization was imprisonment for up to ten years. On 25 August the Rand Daily Mail declared that the ANC and PAC leadership had 'withered away'. However, on 31 August, the people detained under the Emergency Regulations after Sharpeville were released, and within two weeks an ANC caretaker committee had formed cells to continue their work underground. Only ten days later UHURU slogans (the freedom slogan of East Africa) were daubed throughout the country and leaflets attacking the pass laws were distributed.

The last legal act of the ANC had been to call for a national convention to lay the foundations of a new Union of South Africa. The call was renewed by Mandela when he addressed the 'All in Africa' Conference in Pietermaritzburg in March 1961.

The call was taken up by a multiracial group representing liberal, religious and academic opinion. The government replied by mobilizing police, army, commandos and citizen forces and Saracen armoured cars. White people were sworn in to be special constables, gun shops sold out to whites, and thousands of Africans were arrested. But Mandela had gone underground and eluded capture. He continued to work, organizing, touring, calling for the convention. He wrote to prime minister Dr Verwoerd, and to De Villiers Graaff, the leader of the United Party. There were no replies. On 19 May 1961 all gatherings were banned until 26 June, and on the eve of 29 May strikers were warned that they would lose their jobs and be 'endorsed out', and that police would move into the townships and force residents to work. At night helicopters flew low over the townships, flashing searchlights on the houses.

Yet on Monday 29 May 1961 hundreds of thousands of Africans responded to the call of their leaders. The Indian and Coloured communities stayed at home
as well. In Port Elizabeth the strike was 75 per cent complete. Many schools struck. But the naked display of strength by the government was too much, and on the second day, Mandela called the strike off.

If peaceful demonstrations were to be met with such crushing strength it was futile to use peaceful methods any more—this was the end of non-violence. In June 1961 a number of African leaders came together with whites and Indians to decide what form of counter-violence should be used; they wanted to sabotage selected installations but not harm people. Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) thus came into existence.

On Djigaans Day (16 December 1961) ten explosions took place at electrical installations and municipal offices in Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. Posters distributed by Umkonto we Sizwe declared:

This is a new independent body formed by Africans. It includes in its ranks South Africans of all races . . . Umkonto we Sizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation organizations.

Mandela secretly left the country to attend the Pan-African Freedom Movement Conference in Addis Ababa in 1962, and to visit African heads of State. In August 1962 Mandela was captured and imprisoned for five years for inciting people to stay at home in May 1961 and for leaving the country illegally.

In a speech from the dock at his trial, which restated his belief in the struggle of his people and the necessity for armed struggle, Mandela concluded: ‘When my sentence has been completed, I will still be moved by my conscience to resist race discrimination.’ Many people were forced into exile, but the underground continued.

Rivonia

On 11 July 1963 a Special Branch task force surrounded Lilliesleaf Farm—a house in extensive grounds in the outlying Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia. A detainee had broken during police interrogation and described the hideout that was being used by Walter Sisulu and others in the political underground. After months of searching the police had their coup. Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and others (some in disguise) were arrested and 250 documents were seized, including many relating to the manufacture of explosives and a draft memorandum called ‘Operation Mayibuye’.

A month later, on 12 August 1963, four of the men arrested escaped from prison. Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, both white, escaped from South Africa. The other two, Mosie Moolla and Abdullah Jassat, slipped quietly into Botswana and went on to Dar es Salaam some time later.

Mandela was brought from Robben Island to stand trial with the remaining eight, after they had been held for eighty-eight days in solitary confinement while the State prepared its case.

The initial indictment, alleging 222 acts of sabotage by Umkonto we Sizwe, was quashed at the request of the defence—led by Abram Fischer, Q.C. The final
indictment alleged that the accused had recruited men for training with the object of causing a violent revolution, and had committed 154 acts of sabotage.

International interest was aroused because the Rivonia Trial (as it came to be called) revealed for the first time the extent and importance of the change from non-violent resistance.

Mandela's address to the court from the dock made a historic impact in South Africa and abroad. He traced the history of the ANC up to its ultimate decision to turn to violence only after 'long and anxious assessment' of the political situation. By June 1961, he said: 'It could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial State by non-violence had achieved nothing...'. He agreed that he had helped to form Umkonto we Sizwe, and quoted its manifesto:

We of Umkonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to the realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war.

With a reference to the very real fear that he and the other accused might be sentenced to death, Mandela concluded his speech with a fresh declaration of the confidence in his beliefs:

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

After hearing the speeches and explanations of the accused the judge gave his verdict. The crime of which he found all but one guilty was, he said, essentially high treason, but he would not impose the death sentence. Six Africans, one white man and one Indian were sentenced to life imprisonment.

The prisoners started their sentences—the non-whites on Robben Island. As Category D prisoners they were allowed only one letter and one half-hour visit every six months and, on the grossly inadequate food, would have to do hard labour. As soon as the verdict was announced another spate of explosions damaged post offices and pylons, and an attack was made on the walls of Johannesburg jail—sabotage, relaxed during the period of the trial, was to continue.

On 19 August 1967, O. R. Tambo, deputy president of ANC and J. R. D. Chikerema, vice-president of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) announced a military alliance between the two organizations. The fighting of which they spoke heralded the new armed phase of the struggle for which the ANC had been preparing since 1960. Resistance had not been crushed.
Xhosa school in the Transkei.
The Case of the Twenty-two

From May 1969 to December 1970, a marathon case involved twenty-two people accused of offences under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts and others arrested with them, held and interrogated by the security police. This is sometimes called ‘The Case of the Twenty-two’. Among those arrested was Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela. Three detainees were released, nineteen acquitted. But acquittal is not necessarily the end in South Africa. Winnie Mandela, for example, was subsequently kept under house arrest.

Port Elizabeth strike

In March 1971 a meeting of thousands of Coloureds in Port Elizabeth protested at threatened fare increases of up to 30 cents on the buses which carried them the six miles to and from work. There also were other grievances about housing shortages and conditions, and wage levels. Police opened fire on the crowd and shot eleven people. One of the injured was a pregnant woman, shot through the stomach.

The people of Port Elizabeth boycotted the buses, walking to and from work every day for three months in response to the fare increases.

Trial of the ‘Pretoria six’

In Pretoria Supreme Court on 20 June 1973 four South Africans and two white foreigners were sentenced to a total of seventy-seven years’ imprisonment for offences under the Terrorism Act. Theophilus Cholo (aged 24), Gardner Kitchener Sejaka (30), Justus Mpanza (34) and Petrus Aaron Mtammbu (37) were each sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment; Alexandre Moumbaris (34), a naturalized Australian, to twelve years; and Sean Hosey (23), an Irish citizen, to five years.

The indictment contained a total of nineteen charges, in each of which one or more of the accused were named. All, except Hosey, were alleged to have conspired with one another, with the ANC and with twenty-nine other named people to instigate violent revolution in South Africa. They were alleged to have secretly agreed to bring arms, ammunition and explosives into South Africa and to train people in South Africa in ‘warfare and subversion’.

In count two Theophilus Cholo, Justus Mpanza, Petrus Mtammbu and Gardner Sejaka were alleged to have had military and political training in African countries and in the Soviet Union between 1962 and June 1972.

In counts three to six Alexandre Moumbaris was alleged to have harboured, concealed or helped terrorists, or alternatively to have taken part in terrorist activities. He was said to have assisted people to enter South Africa from Swaziland and Botswana in June and July 1972.

Moumbaris was accused on five further counts, including having pamphlets published by the ANC distributed in Durban, on 26–27 June 1968, and reconnoitring the Transkei to find places suitable for seaborne landings.

Cholo, Mpanza, Mtammbu and Sejaka were alleged to have boarded a motor yacht, Avventura, with arms, ammunition and explosives in Somalia with intent
to land secretly on the Transkei coast (the yacht had developed engine trouble and did not complete the journey); to have secretly entered South Africa from Swaziland and to have brought into South Africa false reference books and materials for establishing secret communications.

Gardner Sejaka was also accused of having explained to people in the Transkei how to make incendiary bombs in August 1972.

Sean Hosey was accused of having had ANC pamphlets distributed in Cape Town in August 1971 and of trying to give Justus Mpanza and Petrus Mtentu false reference books, tax receipts and R.540 in cash.

Theophilus Cholo, Justus Mpanza, Petrus Mtentu and Gardner Sejaka were found guilty on all counts on which they were charged. Moumbaris was found guilty on nine counts, but acquitted on the grounds of a technicality on count one, and Sean Hosey was found guilty of possessing forged passes but acquitted on the charge of distributing ANC pamphlets.

Fifty-three State witnesses were called during the ninety-eight-day trial, the longest since the Rivonia trial in 1963. The six accused all gave evidence in their own defence. Only one other defence witness was called.

Several of the accused made allegations of torture. Theophilus Cholo said that he had been struck repeatedly by security police and this assault had caused him to have weakened sight, painful ears and a blocked nose for three months. Security police had stepped on his feet, crushing the nails of both big toes.

Counsel for Alexandre Moumbaris said that he had attempted to commit suicide as a result of the way in which he had been treated. Counsel for Sean Hosey said that he had been questioned almost continuously for seventy-two hours and was kicked, given a drugged cigar and threatened with a gun.

Leaving the court after the passing of sentence, the four Africans accused gave clenched fist salutes to a crowded public gallery.

Student protest

Student opposition to apartheid inside South Africa flared up in the summer of 1972. Students at the African Turfloop University made a bonfire of diaries which had been returned to them by the university authorities after they had removed the policy manifesto of the all-black South African Student Organization (SASO) and a SASO-inspired declaration of students’ rights, which the diaries had originally contained. They demanded that the white rector of the university resign. At the graduation ceremony soon after, a student leader, Ramobithi Tiro, was expelled after a speech he made on receiving his certificate.

His speech, which the rector described as ‘disgraceful’ contained the following passages:

Our parents have been locked outside, but white people who cannot even cheer us have the front seats. My dear people, shall we ever get a fair deal in this land, the land of our fathers?

The system is failing. We Black graduates are being called upon to greater responsibilities in the liberation of our people. Of what use will be our education if we cannot help our people in their hour of need?

There is one thing the Minister cannot do; he cannot ban ideas from men’s minds. The day shall come when all shall be free to breathe the air of freedom.
STUDENT STRIKE

On receiving the news that one of their leaders had been expelled, the entire body of students staged a sit-in at their college. The police moved in and the 1,146 students who participated in the sit-in were expelled.

Reaction to this was swift. The Western Cape Coloured students came out on strike in sympathy with the Turfloop students. The Durban Westville Indian University students' council resigned because they were refused the right to join SASO, and also took action to support the students at Turfloop. The Fort Hare African students' union called a general strike of all black students in South Africa.

The support from Coloured students was reported by the Johannesburg Star (13 May 1972):

A mass student boycott of lectures at the University of the Western Cape to protest against the expulsion of all students at the University of the North (Turfloop) brought campus activity at the Coloured University to almost a standstill.

The move was a result of a decision taken at a mass meeting of the students where a motion calling for a boycott of lectures was unanimously adopted.

More than two-thirds of the students stayed away from lectures.

And the Rand Daily Mail (16 May 1972) reported:

PARENTS SUPPORT STUDENTS

More than two thousand Soweto residents yesterday called for an unconditional reinstatement of all 1,146 expelled University of the North students.

They also demanded that Mr Abraham Tiro, a student who was expelled from the university after an attack on Bantu education, be reinstated with the rest of the students...

There were sharp attacks by students and parents on all aspects of Black university administration and apartheid.

INDIAN UNIVERSITY JOINS BOYCOTT

Durban. While Security Branch detectives listened at the windows of the Vedic Hall in Durban yesterday, more than 1,000 Indian students from the University of Durban-Westville voted to stay away from all lectures from today until the demands of Black students throughout South Africa were met.

Amid wild cheers speakers at the meeting lashed out against the authoritarian Black education system.

'Ve are not voting as Indians, but as Blacks. We need solidarity to eradicate the repugnant system that is oppressing us,' said one student, summing up the mood of the 10 other speakers.

Yesterday's meeting was the latest move in the escalating Black student unrest since the recent expulsion of the entire student body from the University of the North, Turfloop.

Fort Hare students have already been on strike for a week. The Springfield Teachers Training College in Durban goes on total strike on June 1.

African students at the University of Zululand will meet on Wednesday to consider the issue.
‘STRIKE’

By Thursday most of South Africa’s 10,000 Black university and college students could be joined in a nationwide strike against university conditions.

The following week, white students demonstrated their support, and the police response hit the world headlines (The Times, London, 3 June 1972):

POLICE CLUB WHITE STUDENTS

Johannesburg. Police wielding rubber batons attacked about 100 white students demonstrating peaceably against apartheid on the steps of St George’s Cathedral in Cape Town today.

Students who attempted to take refuge inside the cathedral were dragged out—some by their hair.

Students at the University of the Western Cape (a Coloured university) were angered in October 1972 when regulations governing the students there were declared law by the Minister of Coloured Affairs, thus giving the force of law to internal disciplinary rules.

There are seventy-three regulations in all, including the following:

Any person applying for admission as a student shall submit together with his application, testimonials of good conduct acceptable to the advisory council.

Students shall be neatly and suitably dressed when attending classes, when visiting the administration buildings and the library and when participating in sport or appearing in public.

A student shall refrain from any conduct which is aimed at harming instruction and discipline in the various departments, lectures, classes and examinations of the university and discipline in general.

Only student organizations approved by the council may be established at the university.

Approved student organizations may conduct meetings of registered students in accordance with the constitution of the organizations concerned. No other meetings shall be held on the campus without the permission of the rector.

Student periodicals, student publications or any pamphlets shall be distributed only with the permission of the rector, and notices or placards may be displayed with the permission of the rector.

Press statements or press interviews which involve the bodies and persons in control of the university, or which may harm the good name of the university, shall not be issued or granted by a student or a student organization.

Students protested at the beginning of June 1973 by a demonstration calling upon the rector to resign, and by occupying lecture rooms. The rector, C. H. Kriel, immediately closed the university for a month and announced that students wishing to return would be obliged to complete a re-admission form which would include a promise to comply with all university regulations. The students listed eight complaints, demanding less oppressive rules and regulations, better treatment by staff, and an explanation of the expulsion of four students earlier in the academic year. They demanded unconditional re-admission, and many pledged not to sign or return the re-admission forms.

The Black Staff Association supported the students’ stand on the grounds that the university, intended exclusively for Coloureds, was still controlled by 106 whites thirteen years after it had opened.
The students returned to the university on 25 July 1972, pending the establishment of an inquiry, but unrest erupted once again the next day when the suspension of thirteen leaders resulted in another mass walk-out.

**New strike wave**

During the last months of 1972 and the first few of 1973, South Africa witnessed a massive strike wave by African workers which, with 30,000 workers a day out on strike in mid-February, was the largest, most militant and most dramatic mass action since the May 1961 stay-at-home.

Press reports (often very scanty) indicated that between 200,000 and 250,000 workers were involved in strikes between October 1972 and April 1973. In the three months January–March 1973, press reports detail no fewer than 159 strikes and stoppages, lasting between ten minutes and seven days.

Many of the strikes achieved instant wage increases; in others the strikers were discharged, since such action is illegal in South Africa. Durban and the adjacent industrial areas contained about half of the strikes, but all the main industrial centres were hit—Johannesburg and the Reef, Cape Town, East London, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. Nearly all sectors were hit (textiles with twenty strikes, iron, steel and engineering with twenty-two being the most affected); municipalities, transport, construction and the distributive trades also suffered, for example 16,000 black municipal workers striking against Durban Corporation.

Only mining and agriculture escaped—for fairly obvious reasons: both rely heavily on unskilled, non-South African and migrant labour. Industrial organization is difficult because workers are housed in prison-like compounds, and in farming the labourers are dispersed over large areas.

The fact that it is illegal for Africans to strike, and that they have no effective union organization made the strikes particularly significant. There were no negotiating procedures through which to arrange a return to work, and the strikers refused to elect representatives—who would inevitably be intimidated, or imprisoned as organizers or ‘agitators’. Mass political action of this nature, with no official or formal organization, reflects not only the extent of African grievances in South Africa, but also the extent to which underlying political awareness remains a real force for change.

**Black Consciousness**

In 1970 African students split off from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to form the all-black South African Student Organization (SASO) which argued that blacks should build up their own position independently of whites, and make and formulate their own demands.

In practice co-operation with NUSAS continued, but SASO expressly rejected ‘white liberals’ and, while accepting loyalty to Western traditions, felt that African values should also be explored and expressed.
Black theology made its appearance in 1971. It was described by one black theologian as a theology of disinheritance and liberation seen from the perspective of those who were oppressed because of their colour.

Throughout 1972 and 1973 the Black Consciousness movement grew. It was made up of various strands, the constant factor being the emphasis placed on self-help and on a redefinition of the South African situation. At first the government saw this as a victory for apartheid. But as the movement became increasingly militant and critical of the structure of South African society (including in some cases in this the Bantustan leaders), the government moved. In 1973 most of the leaders of the movement, including the SASO leadership, were banned or restricted; in fact the young black leadership that had sprung up in the seventies was put out of operation or forced to flee and take refuge in neighbouring territories.

In 1973–74 there had thus been four main categories of protest: (a) the urban working class protest against low wages and poor working conditions; (b) the Black Consciousness movement, increasingly drawing into its orbit Indians and Coloureds; (c) white protest, mainly centred around the white student movements; (d) the liberation movements, now mostly underground.
The United Nations

The United Nations, of which South Africa was a founder member, helped to focus international attention on apartheid. India drew attention to the treatment of South Africa's Indian population, and condemned the régime for its racial policies in general. As a succession of colonial countries achieved independence, the demand for action against apartheid increased. Discussions in the United Nations became a constant source of irritation to the South African Government. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo in 1964 which is still in force.

However, certain countries have argued that the embargo does not affect the sale of weapons which are not intended for use for internal repression. The latter term is open to various interpretations, and there is no indication that the embargo has been effective. South Africa seems to have little difficulty in purchasing any arms it wants, and is in any case nearing the point where, with the technical help of certain technologically advanced countries, it can produce most of the armaments it needs.

Despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in June 1971 that South Africa's continued rule in Namibia is illegal, the United Nations has not succeeded in ending its control of the territory (See Part II of this book).

South Africa's racial policies have been under discussion at the United Nations since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. After vain attempts to reach a negotiated solution, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1761(XVII) on 6 November 1962 requesting Member States to impose diplomatic sanctions against South Africa: it asked them to take the following measures ... to bring about the abandonment of the policies of apartheid:

(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations.
(b) Closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag.
(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports.
(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa.
(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa, and all companies registered under the laws of South Africa.

On 2 December 1968 the General Assembly requested all States 'to discourage the flow of immigrants, particularly skilled and technical personnel, to South Africa . . .' and requested 'all States and organizations to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist régime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid'.

Africa

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, adopted a comprehensive set of resolutions concerning South Africa, including recommendations that its members should deny South African Airways landing rights at their airports and transit rights across their territory; and that African States should stop exporting to the republic and importing from it. It set up a Liberation Committee to finance and support liberation movements in guerrilla warfare against all white minority régimes in the continent. Most of the Member States agreed to implement these resolutions.

South Africa has so far been able to withstand world criticism and, more to the point, to thwart specific international actions, such as those mentioned above. Neither economic sanctions nor the arms embargo, nor as yet, guerrilla incursions have made a great deal of difference. Indeed, the economy continues to flourish, although not without attendant problems, and South Africa's greatest expenditure on armaments has taken place since the arms embargo was imposed. The government nevertheless began, during the late 1960s, to adopt a more outward-going policy towards the rest of Africa, and attempted to promote formal and informal international exchanges on the grounds that, despite differences of opinion, dialogue was possible.

There are two main reasons for this change, one political, the other economic. Politically, South Africa would have much to gain if African States were friendlier. This could signal the start of a wider acceptance throughout the world. The apartheid State would become legitimized; for if black governments establish ties there would be little reason for European and American countries, themselves remote from the continent, to continue to oppose apartheid. The way would be opened for a change of relations with the rest of the world.

South Africa would take care to ensure that the African countries remained 'friendly'—possibly with dire consequences for any guerrillas who might have sought sanctuary in them. White supremacy in southern Africa would be further entrenched.

The economic reasons are even more potent. South Africa has failed to find adequate trade outlets in Europe and North America, hampered as it is by distance, higher unit costs and adverse technological factors. In the first six months of 1969, only 4 per cent of its exports to the United Kingdom were manufactures—as compared with 87.5 per cent of its exports to Zambia in 1967. Africa provides a natural market for such goods.
Increased trade with black African States is only a first objective. Ultimately, a huge free trade area and customs union in central and east Africa would provide an enormous market for South African goods, and offer a solution for balance of payments difficulties.

Some African States responded to the South African invitation but soon found that the two conceptions of 'dialogue' were very different. Some of the leading African spokesmen for 'dialogue' were careful to explain that this was a last attempt to try to persuade South Africa to change its internal policies, and that the idea had been only reluctantly accepted because sanctions had failed. South African insistence that 'dialogue' precluded any discussion of the principle of apartheid, the determined opposition of the liberation movements, and the real fear that African unity might be threatened, put an end to the discussions. A large number of African States were in any case opposed from the outset to any 'dialogue' with South Africa.

In June 1971, African States issued the following declaration at the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa:

DECLARATION ON THE QUESTION OF DIALOGUE

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Seventeenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 19 June 1971, discussed in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and frankness the question of a proposal for a dialogue with the minority racist régime of South Africa.

The discussions afforded all Members of the Council an opportunity to fully express the views of their respective Governments on this important question.

The Council reaffirmed:

1. Their total commitment to the principles and purposes contained in Articles II and III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, especially in regard to the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, and the absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.

2. That the Manifesto on southern Africa (Lusaka Manifesto) unanimously adopted by the Organization of African Unity and endorsed by the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Aligned States, but rejected by the racist régimes of southern Africa, is the only objective basis for any meaningful solution to the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in Africa.

3. The legitimacy of the struggle being waged by the peoples of Africa to obtain their legitimate rights to independence, freedom, human dignity and equality, and that all Member States of the Organization of African Unity remain totally and unconditionally committed to their struggle.

Moreover, it was agreed that no Member State of the Organization of African Unity would initiate or engage in any type of action that would undermine or abrogate the solemn obligations and undertakings to the commitments contained in the Charter.

It was also agreed that any action to be taken by Member States in regard to the solution of the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa, must be undertaken within the framework of the Organization of African Unity and in full consultations with the liberation movements of the territories concerned.

The Council rejected the idea of any dialogue with the minority racist régime of South Africa which is not designed solely to obtain for the enslaved people of South Africa their legitimate and inherent rights and the elimination of apartheid in accordance with the Lusaka Manifesto.
An African girl in the Transkei.
The Council of Ministers also considered and agreed that in any case any form of dialogue should appropriately be commenced only between the minority racist régime of South Africa and the people they are oppressing, exploiting and suppressing.

The Council of Ministers also agreed that the proposal for a dialogue between the independent African States and the racist minority régime of South Africa is a manœuvre by that régime and its allies to divide African States, confuse world public opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in southern Africa.

In view of the above considerations the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity emphatically declares that there exists no basis for a meaningful dialogue with the minority racist régime of South Africa. Under these circumstances, the Council reaffirms its determination to continue to render and increase its assistance to the liberation movements until victory is achieved.

**Strategic considerations**

South African policy makers have always had a grandiose conception of their strategic and political importance. The country is a ‘bastion of the free world’, and a ‘protector of Western civilization’ in Africa against the threat of communism (as defined by South Africa).

Anti-communism was and remains central to government policy, serving to justify demands for more sophisticated armaments from the West, and as a pretext for suppressing opposition at home. It found expression in a contribution to the Berlin airlift in 1948, and the dispatch of a fighter squadron to Korea in 1950 in answer to the United Nations call for military assistance. Internal legislation included the Suppression of Communism Act, which also dates from 1950. This was also the start of a programme to expand and modernize the armed forces which was accelerated during the sixties. Diplomatic links with the Soviet Union were severed in the early 1950s, and the Soviet representative was asked to leave.

South Africa’s leaders increasingly saw its security as dependent on the West. As early as 1951, an African defence facilities conference in Nairobi was attended by representatives from Britain, South Africa, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Ethiopia, Southern Rhodesia and the United States (in an observer capacity). Very little came of this, mainly because of South Africa’s absolute refusal to countenance the idea of Africans bearing arms. Nor did anything of substance emerge from another round of talks on Pan-African strategy for the West, held in Dakar in 1954.

The new direction taken by British colonial policy in Africa and Asia in the middle fifties was a new source of alarm. Independence in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Mau Mau activity in Kenya, the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal area, together with British inconsistencies over the High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland), were all seen as contributing to the spread of communism in Africa.

As a result, the then Minister of Defence, F. C. Erasmus, proposed that the naval base at Simonstown in the Cape Peninsula be subjected to five-power control in order to discourage Soviet and Indian ambitions in Africa. He also
called for the creation of a Western Indian Ocean Treaty. Although these suggestions were not taken up, there was an exchange of letters, in July 1955, between the British and South African governments on the future of Simonstown. South Africa agreed to expand its naval forces by purchasing from British shipyards six anti-submarine frigates, ten coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats. Britain agreed to hand over control of the base by 31 March 1957, and South Africa agreed to expand the facilities of the base. Britain was to have use of Simonstown in both peace and war, whether or not South Africa was involved as a co-belligerent. Provision was made for the exchange of officers and ratings between the two navies, and British training facilities were made available to the South African navy.

These agreements make no mention of any guarantees. They are solely concerned with naval co-operation and the use of Simonstown by Britain in times of peace or war, and bind neither party to come to the aid of the other in the event of hostilities. This point is worth mentioning since there seems to be some confusion about the respective responsibilities of the two parties.

In the view of the South African Government, Simonstown ‘protected’ the Indian Ocean from Soviet incursions and guaranteed to the ‘West’ the use of the Cape route, particularly when the Suez Canal was closed. This point has been repeatedly made by South African statesmen.

Dr Vorster, celebrating twenty-five years of Nationalist Party rule, insisted that it was in the interest of the Western world that South Africa should remain strong, since the Cape route was the ‘lifeline to Europe’ (South African Digest, 13 July 1973). The Defence Minister, P. W. Botha, stated that South Africa maintained ‘cordial military relations with at least twenty countries in the free world’ (South African Digest, 13 July 1973). The names of these countries were not disclosed.

The South African assumption regarding its key position in ‘defending the free world’ is not universally shared. Racial policies make it vulnerable as a potential military ally, and the importance of its strategic position alters with changes that are constantly occurring in international relations, trade routes and defence strategies. Even the Simonstown agreement, as we have seen, is pretty limited.

At this point, South Africa’s defence strategy and spending can be considered. Defence expenditure is escalating. Sharpeville (1960) had widespread political repercussions—almost unanimous world condemnation, and economic sanctions against the régime. Internally it led to the declaration of a state of emergency, the banning of the African liberation movements. There was a radical reappraisal of the defence position. As the nature of the weapons purchased shows, South Africa now began to think seriously about military attacks from other countries.

It is difficult to see from where attacks might come. None of the independent neighbouring countries has anything like the military strength needed to mount a conventional attack. There are as yet no signs that any other country or group of countries intends to declare war. Nevertheless this fear appears to permeate military thinking in South Africa. It is clear, at the same time, that nearly all armaments available can be used in dealing with internal unrest. They would appear to serve three main purposes:
1. Their sophistication and modernity would facilitate South Africa's inclusion in a Western alliance; that, if it could be achieved, would imply a general acceptance of apartheid by the new allies.

2. Nearly all the weapons available can also be used for internal security purposes (even the submarines can be used to track the movements of guerrillas along the coast).

3. Military resources and manpower can be effectively used to assist colonial governments in fighting black resistance, and maintaining a buffer zone between South Africa and the north. South African forces help in patrolling the Rhodesia-Zambia border, and protecting the Cabora Bassa dam.

South Africa: budget estimates for defence 1960-74
The military situation became increasingly worrying in 1973, with FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) successes in Mozambique and increasing resistance in Rhodesia. White manpower, already limited, was further strained by an increase in the defence forces to 110,000. The first serious steps were taken to recruit Africans into the South African army, and to increase the number of Africans available for policing African areas.

South Africa now produces all its own small arms and aims at self-sufficiency in military aircraft production. Planes assembled at the Atlas factory (Financial Mail, 27 April 1973) include Mirage F.1 fighter planes (South African Digest, 28 September 1973). South Africa manufactures the Impala fighter and the Impala reconnaissance aircraft. Some 200 new aircraft were to be supplied to the air force in 1974.

In The Military Balance 1972–73 the Institute of Strategic Studies (London) gives a breakdown for the South African armed forces, their equipment, and suppliers. The army, navy and air force are all partly equipped from abroad.

**Bans and boycotts**

During the late 1950s boycotts were used many times by the Africans, Indians and Coloureds in campaigns against the injustices of apartheid. A potato boycott, calling attention to the conditions of farm labourers, and the blacking of all goods produced by the Rembrandt tobacco company (Carreras-Rothmans) were highly successful examples. In 1959 people and nations throughout the world were asked to use the same tactic to bring about the complete isolation of South Africa, not only boycotting goods but evading all contacts with the apartheid State.

The international response led to the banning of South African imports in some countries and the formation of anti-apartheid movements in many. This has affected South African exports (notably 'Outspan' and 'Cape' fruit), sport and cultural, academic and professional relations. Attempts to end contacts continue, for example the 1971–72 campaign to get the Royal Institute of British Architects to end its links with its South African counterpart, and constant battles to exclude South Africa from international football, tennis and sport associations.

**ECONOMIC**

The United Nations Unit on Apartheid explained the case for an economic boycott as follows.

The South African economy is an integral part of the world economy. It has important markets in Europe, North America and Asia. It buys large and critically important quantities of manufactured goods abroad. Most of its major trading partners allow South Africa to accumulate the debts which its trade deficit sometimes entails. South Africa would seem, therefore, to be particularly vulnerable to economic pressure from other countries.

However, a trade boycott has never been implemented by the partners on whom South African trade depends.
Many countries continue to trade openly with South Africa. In these countries, however, certain consumer boycotts have some success, and are often supported by local councils, trade unions and student and other organizations. The South African economy is highly dependent on imports of oil and capital equipment—in the case of oil almost completely so. A ban on gold purchases from South Africa would also be extremely damaging to its economy. In April 1964 an international conference on economic sanctions against South Africa in London was attended by representatives of over forty nations, including governmental delegations from thirty countries. The conference considered papers from experts on the economic, racial, political, legal and strategic aspects of sanctions, and on this evidence considered it had established the necessity, the legality and the practicability of internationally organised economic sanctions against South Africa, whose racial policies were seen to have become a direct threat to peace and security in Africa and the world.1

When Arab countries were threatening to diminish oil supplies to the West in 1973, they threatened a total ban in the case of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.

Foreign investment plays a vital part in South African industry and as such has become a prime target for anti-apartheid campaigners; amongst the other things, they have called on investors to boycott South African companies and foreign companies with interests there, and made protests at company annual general meetings. Churches, trade unions, student unions, universities and numerous organizations have been called upon to disinvest. In February 1973 the United Kingdom Anti-Apartheid Movement listed some successes, including the following sales of shares: the Church of England Commissioners, £1.5 million in RTZ shares; the World Council of Churches, £1.25 million in firms with South African interests; the Trade Union Congress of shares in firms with interests in South Africa and in the Trade Union Unit Trust because of their investment in these firms. It also listed four trade unions which had withdrawn investments, a number of universities, a local constituency labour party, the withdrawal of investments worth £150,000 in firms with South African interests, and the closure of an account with Barclays Bank by the London Borough of Camden.

Similar action has been taken in the United States by some Churches, and protests have been made at annual general meetings of companies.

Protests from its 1,000 black workers resulted in the American Polaroid Corporation suspending sales of its products to South Africa in October 1970. A committee of two white and two black employees visited South Africa. As a result of its report, the company announced in January 1971 that it felt it should remain in South Africa and encourage change by improving educational and employment opportunities for blacks. It offered a programme of reforms including: improved salaries and benefits for black employees of its South African distributors; the training of blacks for important jobs; the allocation of a proportion of company profits from South Africa to black education schemes.

Wages were increased. R.35,000 was vested in a trust for African education and, after a year's trial, Polaroid announced in December 1971 that the programme would continue.

A massive campaign was launched in America against the use of a Polaroid process to produce the ‘passes’ which are a basic feature of the apartheid system. With the support of leaders of the South African liberation movement, a call was made for the complete withdrawal of Polaroid from South Africa and a boycott of Polaroid products. The boycott had a considerable impact on sales in America.

In the Netherlands a campaign against coffee imports from Angola led to a temporary suspension of this trade in 1972. A boycott of ‘Outspan’ oranges and a campaign against Philips for allegedly using cheap black labour in its subsidiaries was organized in 1973. During a solidarity week in May 1973, 500,000 publications carrying information about South Africa were distributed.

The World Council of Churches published a booklet listing foreign firms with investments in South Africa, and called on affiliated Churches and individual Christians to withdraw their investments from South Africa.

In 1973 the Guardian newspaper published data on wages paid to African employees of British companies in South Africa which raised a scandal. A parliamentary committee was asked to investigate. Its report, published in March 1974, did not deal with the call from the liberation movements for a complete withdrawal of investment, but recommended a code of practice for British firms operating in South Africa, in view of the detailed evidence provided of exploitation of cheap labour.

CULTURAL

The campaign for a cultural boycott was introduced in response to a call from South Africans trying to end apartheid in culture and entertainment. It was centred largely on the question of segregated audiences, but of course also involved the wider issues of apartheid generally.

Almost all theatres and concert halls are reserved for whites only. There are some segregated cinemas for Coloureds and Indians. Blacks have virtually no access at all, and anything that is allowed is strictly censored.

In 1969 a professor of law estimated that there were 13,000 banned publications. Banned authors include James Baldwin, Bertholt Brecht, Jules Feiffer, Aldous Huxley, Norman Mailer, Henry Miller, Alan Sillitoe. All books by liberation leaders are banned. The Publications and Entertainments Act prohibits the publication or manufacture of ‘undesirable’ material in South Africa, and the Customs and Excise Act prohibits the import of ‘objectional’ goods. The interpretation of these Acts lies with the government’s Publications Control Board. Not all banned books are banned because they oppose apartheid, but the list includes many that could not have been banned for any other reason.

All films are also seen by the board. The 1963 Publications and Entertainments Act entitles it to,

... approve a certain cinematographic film subject to a condition that such a film shall be allowed only to a particular race or class. ...

Thus, certain films are shown only to whites, certain films only to whites, Coloureds and Indians, and some to whites, Coloureds, Indians and children
under 12. All scenes showing any form of social relationship between black and white, other than situations where black characters play a subservient role, are automatically cut. Despite the extent of the board’s powers government spokesmen have advocated their further extension.

Protests against the censorship on publications have been made by opponents of apartheid and by those who fear the effect that the threat of banning has on all South African literature.

All performing artists were invited to refuse to go to South Africa under apartheid conditions, playwrights and film directors not to allow their work to be presented or screened in segregated theatres or cinemas, film actors not to allow films in which they appear to be screened in segregated cinemas.

In 1957, the British Musicians Union totally banned all appearances by its members in South Africa. The London Symphony Orchestra, the Beatles, and the Rolling Stones are among the many who have turned down requests to tour South Africa.

Also in 1957, the British Actors Equity Council instructed its members to work in South Africa only if a stated proportion of the performances were open to non-whites.

A similar ban by the British Film and Television Technicians Union hindered South African plans to start television services in 1975.

In 1963 and again in 1967, leading playwrights in the United Kingdom issued public declarations of their opposition to apartheid, and instructed their agents to insert a clause in their contracts forbidding the performance of their plays before segregated audiences.

It is difficult to see how creativity can be fostered in literature, music, dance, theatre and film in South Africa today, with its repressive apparatus and an official culture whose only function is to rationalize a separation based not on rational experience, but on chauvinistic myths and symbols. The questioning of society and of its structures is not only discouraged, but will more likely than not be considered treasonous. Artificial barriers between people inhibit any understanding of the South African experience and its transformation into literature and art.

Most important South African writers are either in exile or banned. Journalism is practically barred to them because of restrictions on material and publication. Even the relatively privileged Afrikaner writer, protected by subsidies and by a traditional status, is free only to write, not to question.

**SPORT**

South Africa is very sensitive to anything which affects sport, which is akin to a national religion in the country. With increasing political and cultural isolation, other international links assume an added importance. It is very important for whites to see their teams accepted on the sports fields of the world where, in addition, victory can seem a kind of vindication of the system under which they live. Mr Braun, South African representative at the 1967 International Olympic Committee said:
Expulsion from the Olympic Games has deprived us of the very reason for our existence. Despair, frustration and disillusionment have been deeply felt at all levels of sport in South Africa and among all sections of the population. The stigma of being looked upon as an outcast has not been an easy cross to bear.

Sport can only artificially be considered in isolation from other human activities. Even if whites and non-whites could legally play together, or even watch sports in unsegregated accommodation, bad nutrition and poor health place the non-white, and especially the African, at a disadvantage. The average white has far more leisure for sport, and money for equipment and so on. Facilities for non-whites are poor or non-existent. Whites have swimming pools, private sports clubs and public facilities, the African often has a bare patch of earth. Limited finances and the travel permit system severely restrict competition between non-whites. In other words the racial inequality officially institutionalized applies to sport as much as to any other aspect of life.

Hence, international sports boycott campaigns are concerned with more than simply getting the government to accept the principle of having multiracial teams. For example, it would have made little practical difference to the non-white South African sportsman if D'Oliveira (see below) had been allowed to tour South Africa in 1969: at home, nothing would have changed. Would it really matter if South Africa sent a few non-whites to compete in the Olympics? The experience of the last decade suggests that, while apartheid lasts, there can never be equality of sporting opportunity.

The MCC (Marylebone Cricket Club) tour to South Africa was cancelled in September 1968 when the South African Government refused to accept Basil D'Oliveira, a 'non-white', as a member of the team. A South African cricket team was due to tour Britain in 1970. By that time an international campaign to isolate South Africa in sport already existed, and rugby and cricket, the two major sports in South Africa, were to become the focus of the campaign in Britain.

In the summer of 1969, a tour by South African cricketers was arranged by Wilf Isaacs, a wealthy Johannesburg businessman. A month previously, organizations like the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the South African Non-racial Olympic Committee and the Young Liberals had announced their intention of opposing the 1970 tour, and they saw the Wilf Isaacs tour as an opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions. At nearly every match there were protests; many matches were disrupted, and play was held up as demonstrators sat on the pitch. These relatively small demonstrations (the largest was only about 100 strong) were bitterly resented by white South Africans.

After the Isaacs tour, a demonstration took place at the Davis Cup lawn tennis match at Bristol between England and South Africa, which was partially disrupted.

The demonstrations received wide publicity and gave the anti-apartheid supporters some idea of the support they would get for their campaign to stop the 1970 cricket tour.

In September 1969 a number of organizations formed the Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST). Its purpose was not to organize demonstrations, but to get the tour called off, by non-violent direct action.

Meanwhile, a rugby tour by the South Africans, due to start in November 1969, became a target for a campaign which developed into more than just a trial
run for the cricket tour. It became a massive campaign in its own right against the system which sent all-white sports teams to represent a country with an 80 per cent non-white population.

The first match, due to be played at Oxford, was called off by the Oxford University Rugby Club after massive protests and threats of direct action. The match was rearranged at the last minute for Twickenham, the headquarters of the Rugby Union, but in spite of the short notice (less than twenty-four hours) over 1,000 demonstrators turned up.

These demonstrations continued at every match.

As the tour progressed, the emphasis switched from stopping the rugby tour back to giving the cricket authorities a clear indication of things to come.

Just before the end of the rugby tour, the MCC committee decided unanimously that the cricket tour should go ahead. But the South African Cricket Association had just turned down an offer of a tour by the International Cavaliers Club on the grounds that the team would be multiracial, and about the same time, the South African Government refused to allow the black American tennis star, Arthur Ashe, to enter South Africa to play in an international tournament.

International pressure was brought to bear on Britain to have the tour called off. Thirteen African countries threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games, due to be held in July at Edinburgh. Forthcoming cricket tours by India and Pakistan were also threatened. Pakistani cricketers in England announced that they would refuse to play against the South Africans.

Many organizations in Britain were coming out publicly against the tour. They included the Community Relations Committee, the Labour, Liberal and Communist Parties, the National Union of Students, the British Council of Churches and over twenty trade unions, representing millions of members. The Fair Cricket Campaign was launched by the Bishop of Woolwich as chairman and Conservative and Labour M.P.s as vice-chairmen.

On 19 May 1970, the Cricket Council announced that the tour, due to start on 6 June, would take place as planned. It had already been cut from twenty-four matches to twelve. However, it was stated that

no further tours between South Africa and this country will take place until South African cricket is played and teams selected on a multiracial basis in South Africa.

Designed as a move to appease public opinion, this only succeeded in rousing it still further against the tour. If they were not going to play against a racially selected team in the future, why play against this one? Against a background of tremendous pressure from all sorts of organizations and people, the government was forced to intervene, and the Cricket Council called off the tour on 22 May. The main aim of the anti-tour campaign had been achieved.

Another campaign took place over South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games.

Article 1 of the Olympic Code states:

No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation.
After imprisonment.
This would seem to exclude South Africa automatically from membership. Indeed, from 1946 onwards, organizations of black South African sportsmen had protested to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) about the membership of the all-white South African Olympic Committee. The IOC did nothing, and the matter was apparently not even discussed until 1959. By this time sportsmen from newly independent African States were becoming prominent, and were less and less willing to take part in Olympic competitions with South Africa.

In 1963 the IOC adopted the following resolution:

The National Olympic Committee of South Africa must declare formally that it understands and submits to the spirit of the Olympic Charter and particularly Articles 1 and 24. It must also obtain from its government, before December 31, 1963, modification of its policy of racial discrimination in sport and competitions in its territory, failing which the South African NOC will be forced to withdraw from the Olympic Games.

These declarations and assurances were not given, and South Africa did not compete in the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo. In the next few years South Africa tried to get the resolution rescinded. In 1967 it presented a list of ‘concessions’ to the IOC as follows:

1. Whereas participation in the Olympic Games previously were to have been on the basis of non-whites and whites representing whites, blacks and whites will in future form one team to represent South Africa.
2. Whereas white and non-white participants, previously, were to have travelled separately to the Olympic Games, they will, in future, travel together.
3. Whereas white and non-white participants previously had to be dressed differently, had to be accommodated separately and could not march under the same flag in opening ceremonies, they will now wear the same uniform, stay together and march as an integrated team under the South African flag.
4. Whereas, previously, South African whites and non-whites could not compete against one another at the Olympic Games or other international meetings, this will now be standard practice.
5. Whereas in previous Olympic Games white officials only were responsible for the selection of participants, an equal number of white and non-white officials under the chairmanship of the president of the South African National Olympic Committee will now be responsible for the selection of participants in all those Olympic Sports in which different population or racial groups take part.

These ‘concessions’ were accepted by the IOC, although they did not comply with the 1963 resolution stipulation of a ‘modification of its policy of racial discrimination in sport and competitions in its territory’. They show how desperate South Africa was to compete in the Olympics, short however of doing what was demanded, namely, conforming to the Olympic Code.

The black South Africans’ view of the ‘concessions’ was given by I.S. Cassoojee, vice-president of the Border Soccer Union, and council member of the non-racial South African Lawn Tennis Union:

As a true South African who believes that only merit counts in sport, irrespective of race, colour and creed, I see nothing to be elated about in the new move. Due to the white South African policy of apartheid in sport, the country has found itself almost totally ostracised.
from the international scene. To save itself from being kicked out completely it had hit upon this gag... When I, a South African of copper colour, can participate with white South Africans in local, provincial and national championships at home without stigma, I will have something to be happy about.

The views of other black Africans were equally clear when the IOC decided to admit South Africa to the Mexico Games in 1968: the whole of Africa, represented by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, decided to withdraw from the Games. The Soviet Union, France and Italy called for a special meeting to reconsider the matter, and the Mexican organizing committee refused to send the invitation.

As a result of this international pressure, the IOC withdrew the invitation to South Africa.

In 1970 the IOC decided (by thirty-five votes to twenty-eight with three abstentions) to expel South Africa altogether from the Olympic movement.

PROPOSED RUGBY TOUR OF NEW ZEALAND

A New Zealand tour by a racially selected, all-white South African rugby team planned for June 1973 was called off by the New Zealand Government in April.

Early in January, the prime minister of New Zealand, Norman Kirk, promised to dissuade the New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) from inviting the South African team. His opposition to the tour was supported by the following: The Federation of Labour, which threatened to withdraw its members from transport, hotel and delivery services to the tourists.

Gough Whitlam, Australian prime minister, who said transit through Australia would be refused to the South African team.

The New Zealand Seamen's Union, which held a twenty-four-hour strike against apartheid.

The Catholic National Association of Priests.

The Presbyterian Church of New Zealand.

The Christchurch Commonwealth Games Committee, which feared a boycott of the games should the tour go ahead.

The National Union of South African Students, who called on the New Zealand Government and people to stop the tour.

Two anti-tour organizations in New Zealand (the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), and Halt All Racist Tours (HART)) who promised to disrupt the matches if they took place.

In February 1973, in spite of warnings by Norman Kirk, the NZRU stated that the tour would go ahead. Parliament debated the issue in March. Norman Kirk failed to persuade the NZRU to withdraw the invitation. The South African Rugby Board (SARB) would not decline the invitation to save their hosts' embarrassment. On 10 April 1973, Norman Kirk accordingly issued a directive to the NZRU indicating that the invitation must be deferred. This was accepted under protest.

The prime minister gave four reasons for cancelling the tour: (a) the strains it would place on New Zealand society by exacerbating differences of attitude on
racial matters; (b) the disorder and violence to which it would give rise; (c) the effect on New Zealand’s international relations; (d) the virtual certainty that the 1974 Commonwealth Games to be held in New Zealand would be a failure, or have to be cancelled.

The cancellation was greeted with relief by all parties, including NZRU and SARB. It was generally regarded as a victory for anti-apartheid moderates in New Zealand who, in a rugby-loving country, had persuaded the government and the public to put principles before pleasure. Following the cancellation, SARB announced that ‘mixed trials’ would be held, for touring rugby teams only, to select Springbok teams as from 1974.

There have been some modifications of apartheid sports policy in response to international opposition. In 1973, for the first time, a black (American) boxer fought a white (South African) boxer. Sport in South Africa has been declared ‘multinational’, i.e. teams from each racial group may now compete against each other in international events. The South African Games were staged in 1973 on this basis, and those overseas competitors who accepted the all-expenses-paid invitation were led to believe that they were ‘multiracial’ games because all races took part. However, there were no mixed trials, no mixed teams and no mixed spectators. At club and provincial level, sport remains rigidly segregated.

THE SEGREGATION OF APARTHEID

South Africans passionately want to be accepted as belonging to a European tradition. English-speaking whites look to London, Afrikaners to Paris and Amsterdam. They want contacts with Europe in order to break the geographical and moral isolation of white South Africa. This is understandable in human terms, and necessary to the ideology of apartheid itself; its claims to be the outpost of Europe in Africa needs to be justified by European recognition of its place in the mainstream of European culture.
Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela was born near Umtata in the Transkei in 1918, the eldest son of a Tembu chief. He was reared by the paramount chief when his father died and Mandela was 12, but he ran away to Johannesburg soon after to avoid a tribal marriage. At 16 he began studying at Fort Hare University College for an arts degree by correspondence from Witwatersrand University, befriended by Walter Sisulu, who urged him to study law. He was articled to a firm of white attorneys in Johannesburg and qualified as an attorney-at-law, entering practice with Oliver Tambo, who later became acting president-general of the ANC.

Mandela helped to found the ANC Youth League and pressed for more militant policies from 1949 onwards. He played an important part in the defiance campaign in 1952 and was one of the defendants in the 'treason trial'.

Mandela's role, always working amongst his people, organizing ANC volunteers on a street basis, became especially important when ANC was banned in 1960 and had to go underground. Mandela left his home, office, wife and children, to live as a political outlaw, and become known as the 'Black Pimpernel'. In 1961 the call for a strike to protest against the declaration of the republic was issued in the name of Nelson Mandela, who also became secretary of the new National Action Council.

In 1961 Mandela went to the Addis Ababa conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. He was received by prominent African leaders, and visited military training camps in Algeria and elsewhere.

From its inception in 1961, Mandela was appointed commander-in-chief of Umkonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC.

Seventeen months after he had gone underground, Mandela was betrayed by an informer and sentenced to five years' imprisonment for his leadership of the 1961 strike and for leaving the country illegally. In October 1963 he was taken from his cell to the dock in the Rivonia trial on further charges of sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. His powerful statement from the dock opened the defence on that occasion and serves as a remarkable testament of the African cause. Six of the nine accused, including Mandela, were sentenced to life imprisonment.
Abram Fischer

In May 1966 Abram Fischer was sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge of sabotage. A few white people had been outspoken in their opposition to apartheid, and Fischer was to epitomize their dilemma and to rock the sensibilities of the Afrikaner nation to whom he had turned ‘traitor’. Born of a family which had been in South Africa since the eighteenth century, his forebears had fought in the Boer Wars of Independence in 1881 and 1899–1901. Son of a judge president and grandson of a former prime minister of the Orange Free State, Rhodes scholar, Oxford graduate and eminent Queen’s Counsel, Fischer had seen the evolutions of laws in South Africa from the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act at the beginning of nationalist rule, to the Sabotage Act in the sixties. Fischer was one of the defence counsel in the ‘treason trial’, and led the defence team during the Rivonia trial. These were only two of many similar cases; shortly before his arrest Fischer became the longest-serving member of the Johannesburg Bar Council.

Throughout his career Fischer had belonged to the Communist Party, which he had rejoined when it was banned in 1950, seeing it as the only party consistently opposed to white rule. In September 1964 he was arrested and, with twelve other white men and women, charged with belonging to the illegal Communist Party. The others received sentences of between one and five years. Fischer was granted bail to appear as counsel in a long-standing case in Southern Rhodesia when it was taken to the Privy Council. In his application to the court for bail he said:

I am an Afrikaner. My home is South Africa. I will not leave my country because my political beliefs conflict with those of the Government.

He won his case, and returned to South Africa. A few months later, on 25 January 1965, he disappeared from his home and explained, through a letter read to the court by his counsel, that he was going underground to continue his work against apartheid:

If in my fight I can encourage even some people to understand and to abandon policies they now so blindly follow, I shall not regret any punishment I may incur.

Unless this whole intolerable system is changed radically and rapidly, disaster must follow and appalling bloodshed and civil war become inevitable. As there is oppression of the majority such oppression will be fought with increasing hatred. I can no longer serve justice in the way I have attempted to do during the past 30 years—I can do it only in the way I have now chosen.

He eluded the police for ten months, with a price of £3,000 on his head, working alone, disguised, separated from his children (his wife had been killed in a car crash soon after the Rivonia trial in 1964), before being captured on the night of 11 November 1965.

Fischer said little in the way of legal defence at his trial. Addressing the court from the dock, he explained why he had taken the course he did. He devoted much of his speech to an eloquent indictment of apartheid, and a defence of the conduct of the national liberation movement.
Albert Luthuli

Chief Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli—teacher, chief and leader of the South African people—was born in 1898 near Bulawayo in Rhodesia where his father had gone as an evangelist.

After completing the higher teacher's training course, he taught at the Training College for Teachers at Adams College from 1921 to 1935. During this period, he became secretary of the Natal African Teachers’ Association and the non-racial South African Football Association, and founded the Zulu Language and Cultural Society.

In 1935 he accepted the chieftainship of the Umvoti Mission Reserve in Groutville, following repeated appeals by the elders of the tribe. Soon he was elected chairman of the Natal and Zululand Association and the Mission Reserve Association. He became a member of the Durban Joint Council of Europeans and Africans and the Institute of Race Relations. He was elected to the executive of the South African Christian Council and, in 1938, he attended the International Missionary Conference in Madras.

His initiation into politics may be traced to 1945 when he joined the Natal ANC. Elected to the Native Representative Council in 1946, he joined the other African members in moving the indefinite adjournment of the council in protest against discriminatory laws.

He was drawn into active participation in the struggle against apartheid in 1951 when he was elected president of the Natal ANC. When he led Natal in the Campaign of Defiance against Unjust Laws in 1952, the government gave him an ultimatum: to resign either from the ANC or from the chieftainship. He refused to resign from either and the government deposed him in November 1962. Next month, he was elected president-general of the ANC, a position he held until his tragic death on 21 July 1967.

During his fifteen years as president-general, Chief Luthuli led many peaceful and non-violent campaigns. He endeavoured to unite all opponents of apartheid—Africans, Indians, Coloureds and Europeans—in a common struggle for a non-racial democratic society.

The government, however, subjected him to constant bans and arrests. In 1963, when he undertook a tour of the country as the new president-general, he was banned for a year from all large cities and from attending gatherings. In mid-1954 when he went to Johannesburg to lead a protest against the forcible removal of 75,000 Africans from Sophiatown and other African townships, he was served with more severe orders, confining him to the Groutville area for two years. On 5 December 1956, he was arrested with over 150 other opponents of apartheid on the charge of high treason. Acquitted by the court, he undertook a tour of South Africa, speaking to many white audiences to promote a peaceful solution. The government again served banning orders in 1959, confining him to Groutville for five years. Detained during the state of emergency in 1960 for five months, he returned to confinement in Groutville. In 1964, the government served more stringent banning orders for a further five years. Under these banning orders, no writings or statements of Chief Luthuli could be published in South Africa.

The government, however, could neither undermine the influence of Chief Luthuli in South Africa nor silence him. Moreover, his appeals to the world were
instrumental in promoting the movement for the boycott of South African goods, and for South Africa's exit from the Commonwealth.

He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1960 and chosen in 1964 for the award of the Society for the Family of Man in New York. He was elected rector of the University of Glasgow.

In his statement on being deposed from the chieftainship, he recalled that 'thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a closed and barred door'. He decided to remain in the struggle 'for extending democratic rights and responsibilities to all sections of the South African community'.

After the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, and the banning of ANC and PAC, resistance was obliged to go underground and it gave up its strict adherence to non-violent means. In his last public statement, on the conclusion of the Rivonia trial, Chief Luthuli said:

The African National Congress never abandoned its method of a militant, non-violent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in the people. However, in the face of the uncompromising white refusal to abandon a policy which denies the African and other oppressed South Africans their rightful heritage—freedom—no one can blame brave just men for seeking justice by the use of violent methods; nor could they be blamed if they tried to create an organized force in order to ultimately establish peace and racial harmony.

He appealed to the world to take decisive action to help end the hateful system of apartheid.

Chief Luthuli died in a train crash in South Africa in 1967.

In an 'Appeal sent to the people of the United Kingdom' in May 1963, Chief Luthuli welcomed the recent United Nations resolution and went on:

I would ask you to unite in demanding that your governments should honour the resolutions taken at the United Nations. I would urge that you and your government be not deterred from any action by the excuse often advanced by our oppressors—that boycotts and sanctions will bring to us blacks more suffering than to the whites. We have been victims of suffering long before our boycott and sanctions call to the nations of the world. We are committed to suffering that will lead us to freedom—as it has been the lot of all oppressed people before us from time immemorial. What we are determined not to do, cost what it may, is to acquiesce in a status quo that makes us semi-slaves in our country.

... the time must surely come when South Africa must emerge from the dark night of racial fanaticism to take its place among the free nations of the world. You all—people and governments—can, to your honour, hasten this day.

... To the nations and governments of the world... I say: Cast aside your hypocrisy and deceit... Do not think we will be deceived by your pious protestations as long as you are prepared to condone, assist and actively support the tyranny in our land... The test is action—action against oppression.

In his autobiography Let My People Go, Luthuli said:

The indignation of other countries can have a practical bearing on the course of events [to] follow in South Africa.... We are not anti-South African. We are anti-white-supremacist. We do not enter into dark conspiracies with foreign powers. But we are acutely aware that the disapproval and ostracism of other countries will have the effect, if properly directed, of shortening the days of bloodshed and bondage.
Part II

Namibia
Land allocation in Namibia.
Background

Namibia is the name given to the former territory of South West Africa by the General Assembly when the United Nations terminated the South African mandate for it in 1966.

The population of Namibia is 610,000 (South African estimate; Namibians claim that this has been estimated far too low to reduce the apparent importance of the territory). The area is 318,261 square miles, including Walvis Bay (434 square miles) which is part of South Africa but is administered as part of Namibia.

It is divided into three distinct physical regions: (a) central plateau (over 50 per cent of the land area: annual rainfall under 2 inches); (b) Namib (desert central belt, 40–80 miles wide; annual rainfall under 2 inches); (c) Kalahari (eastern strip, no surface water).

Two political divisions have been made: (a) the 'police zone' (European settler area, with small, scattered African reserves; comprises two-thirds of the land area, and contains the main towns, industries and mining areas); (b) northern area (reserves containing more than 50 per cent of the African population; three areas recently designated as 'self-governing homelands').

Namibia suffers from low rainfall: the Kunene, Okavango and Orange are the only perennial rivers. Inland rivers run only intermittently, after heavy rain.

There are two harbours, Walvis Bay and Lüderitz (which is relatively shallow). The major towns are Windhoek (administrative centre, population 47,000), Lüderitz, Walvis Bay (population 16,500) and Tsumeb, Orangemund, Keetmanshoop, Okahandja, Otjiwarongo (all under 10,000 in population). All these towns are in the police zone and contain the bulk of the settler population (stated to total 96,000).

The Africans live in segregated 'locations' or compounds which must be at least 500 yards away from white towns. The Caprivi Strip (see map) is a corridor linking Namibia to where the Zambezi River provides a common frontier between Botswana, Zambia and Rhodesia. It is arid and only 20 miles wide for most of its length. Its populated eastern sector contains the major air and military base at Katime Mulilo, which is part of South Africa's northern defences, and the target of numerous guerrilla attacks.
The gross domestic product is about £145 million but the national income is only about £25 million. The discrepancy is explained by the amount of wealth siphoned off by South African and other foreign companies.

Over 30 per cent of the foreign trade derives from the mining sector and Namibia is the world’s second largest producer of diamonds (South Africa being the first).

**Minerals**

De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa Limited, which has a concession in the coastal region 60 miles wide and 220 miles long, makes a net profit of about £25 million a year and controls 90 per cent of diamond production. Diamonds account for over half the value of all minerals mined, and bring the government about £15 million in taxes and duties (more than twice what it spends on all services for Africans, including education). It has been estimated that the diamond reserves may be exhausted by 1980 at the present rate of mining. Some 80 per cent of all the copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, silver, tin, vanadium, beryllium and lithium mined are produced by the Tsumeb Corporation, in which foreign companies are important shareholders. From 1947 to 1966 the gross value of metals mined by Tsumeb was nearly £250 million.

Prospecting continues at an unprecedented rate. By 1969, the eighty-five concessions granted covered 4 million hectares and included the entire 800 mile coastline. Uranium mining at Rossing near Walvis Bay represents a major development. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority will take £45 million worth in the 1970s.

Almost all mineral development lies outside the black ‘reserves’. Even the iron ore in the Kaokoveld ‘homeland’ will be exploited by white authorities, with black Namibians doing the unskilled work at low rates of pay.
Farming

Namibia produces nearly half the world’s supply of Karakul (‘Persian lamb’ used in luxury fur coats) and exports over £12 million worth annually to the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, the United States and the Nordic countries. The pelts are marketed mainly through auctions in London. The dry conditions suit the Karakul sheep, which are farmed on white-owned farms south of Windhoek (the Namibians rarely taking a more lucrative role than that of shepherds or farm labourers).

Frozen and tinned beef and mutton are sold to South Africa, as well as cattle, hides and wool. Livestock sales in the ‘reserves’ where stock disease is prevalent, make up less than 1 per cent of the total.

Fishing

About £25 million worth of fish products—tinned fish, fish meal and fish oil—are exported annually from Walvis Bay and Lüderitz. Over a million tons of fish are caught every year (mainly sardines, crayfish, snoek and cod). Many nations fish outside the twelve-mile territorial limit. Only about 3,000 people are employed in fishing, and the bulk of the profit flows out of the territory.

Tourism

So many white South Africans visit Namibia’s many scenic attractions, from the Fish River canyon in the south to the Etosha Pan game reserve in the north, that tourism may overtake fishing as a revenue earner for the South African Government. Black Namibian participation consists of menial labour.

Wages

In 1967 the South African Institute of Race Relations found a ‘large gap’ between white and black wages, and stated that the majority of Africans must find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to buy an adequate diet. For example, African contract miners get 9p to 20p a day, plus food and accommodation. Farm contract workers, rightly classified by fitness and length of service, get R.6 to R.8.50 per month plus rations. Statutory minimum wages for recruited building workers are 7½p to 9p a day, though in practice they receive a slightly higher weekly wage, without food and accommodation. Workers are expected to save and send money home on these wages. A 1971 press report states that ‘contract workers employed in and around Windhoek [earn] roughly £5 per month’, plus accommodation, food and clothing. Permanent residents (the minority), ‘normally earn about £25 per month’. Even these figures, however, should not be taken at their face value, in view of the evidence of carefully falsified pay sheets being prepared at the Ruakana Falls dam construction site, for the United Nations inquiry team (see Georg von Konrat, Passport to Truth, 1972).
Welfare

Pensions are as in South Africa, where African old-age pensioners receive 75p per month. There are no welfare services outside the white areas. The Odendaal Commission recommended that aged Africans and other welfare cases should be returned to the ‘homeland’ whenever possible.
The education of Africans in Namibia is governed by the Bantu Education Act. We have already seen in Part I how this works inside South Africa.

In Namibia (1972 figures), few schools are controlled by 'homeland' authorities (only 7 out of 423 as against 1 in 10 in South Africa). For farm schools (established by white farmers for their employees) the figure is less (4 out of 473 as against 1 in 4 in South Africa).

Most schools are community schools. The following (1973) figures are taken from the *Bantu Education Journal* of March 1974, published by the Republic of South Africa:

- Type of school: lower primary, 243; higher primary, 30; primary, 207; secondary, 8; technical, 0; teacher training, 6; trade training, 4; special schools, 1; continuation classes, 0.
- Control: government or territorial, 12; community, 443; farm, 4; mine, 0; factory, 0; Roman Catholic, 0; other church and private, 32.

Only one-third of the amount spent on white pupils is spent on African pupils (who are seven times more numerous). This follows the South African pattern.

Table 1. Enrolment figures

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-standard A</td>
<td>32,300</td>
<td>30.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1972 enrolment figures (excluding technical and trade schools and teacher training) are shown in Table 1.

Thus 98.18 per cent of all African pupils were in primary schools, with 75.68 per cent in the first four years.

African students in grades Sub-standard A to grade 2 represented 75.68 per cent (as against 66.89 in South Africa); 22.5 per cent in grades 3 to 5 (against 27.98 per cent); 1.67 per cent in secondary grades I–III (against 4.65 per cent); and 0.15 per cent in secondary grades IV and V (against 0.48 per cent).

As regards teacher training, the enrolment was: lower primary teachers’ course, 88.54 per cent in Namibia (against 83.06 per cent in South Africa); primary teachers’ course, 11.46 per cent in Namibia (against 16.94 per cent in South Africa).

The same pattern applies to the trade schools (all situated in the ‘homelands’). Namibia does not have even the limited access to continuation classes and night schools available for Africans in some urban areas of the republic.
Natural frontiers mark off Namibia as a distinct region of southern Africa.

The Kunene River which forms part of its northern frontier with Angola divided peoples who nevertheless were culturally very similar. The Portuguese held the harbours and main trade centres of Angola since the fifteenth century, but there was little white penetration into Namibia.

The Orange River forms the southern border. It flows through a belt of dry land which helped to cut Namibia off from southern influences. After the river was recognized as a frontier in the eighteenth century, African refugees and migrants, displaced by the Dutch settlers at the Cape, continued to move up into Namibia.

The three straight lines forming the eastern border (along the 20 E. meridian or east of it) run through dry Namaqualand, the Kalahari desert and west of the Okawango swamps, which again formed natural frontiers.

West is the Atlantic. This did not protect Angola from Portuguese landings and slavers. But the Namibian coastline is reinforced along most of its length and to a width in places of 100 miles by the Namib desert which—containing only dry sand in mountainous dunes, with almost no rainfall and negligible plant and animal life—discouraged early explorers.

Little was known in Europe about Namibia until well into the nineteenth century, when traders and hunters told of its varied landscape in the interior, and its widely settled communities. When American independence obliged Britain to find other places to which convicts could be transported, South West Africa was first thought ideal for convicts—as well as for ‘loyal Americans’ and other settlers. A naval sloop was sent out and reported that the entire coast, from 15° to 33° S. was barren and sandy—this was, of course, the Namib desert. The scheme collapsed, and Botany Bay was chosen instead.

In fact, Namibia, originally the home of the San people (‘bushmen’), had for centuries been receiving Bantu-speaking peoples from central and east Africa (from perhaps the fifteenth century or earlier) and Khoi-Khoi from the south.

The communities who migrated (along a route somewhat similar to that taken by the guerrillas fighting white South Africans today) found tolerably well-
watered savannah and woodland south of the Kunene River and west in the
drier Kaokoveld. Most stayed here, while more venturesome groups moved
south in search of new grazing for their vast and treasured herds.

Those who settled remained peacefully in the central areas of Namibia until
groups moving north from Dutch Cape Colony rule began to compete for pas-
ture lands and water supplies. A long series of skirmishes in the 1830s (mainly
between Bantu-speaking Hereros from the north and (Khoi-Khoi) Nama and
mixed groups from the south) gave early European writers entering Africa from
Walvis Bay the impression of internecine native conflicts.

In fact, the various communities in Namibia had enjoyed centuries of
peace, and developed a culture and way of life that suited their varied environ-
ments. Because of wild animals, and very uncertain rainfall, their settlements
were impermanent but were handsomely laid out. The stronger groups (Ordon-
ga, Ukwanyama, Ovatjimba, Herero, Nama) developed distinctive clothing.
Their religious and social systems were incomprehensible to the adventurers
from Europe who first came among them, and were usually misunderstood and
disliked by Christian missionaries who wanted to convert them to their own
alien religion and social customs.

Namibia thus consisted of coherent communities of grazers who also grew
crops, and (especially in the north) were smiths and traders, their chiefs usually
recognizing a suzerain, who might himself have treaties with leaders of groups
who spoke a different language, or were of different ethnic origins, for example
the Ovambos (in the north) and the ‘red nation’ (in the central area). Desert on
three sides, and irregular rainfall elsewhere, formed a hardy mobile people, but
also delayed the advent of modern ideas and education.

Set against the centuries that preceded it, the thirty years of German colon-
ization seem short indeed. The alien German culture, modern efficiency and au-
thoritarian ideas came into conflict with the developing Namibian social order,
and very nearly resulted in wiping out sections of the varied community.

When German missionaries came in the 1840s, Namibian trade was already
considerable—cattle, ivory, guano (from the islands) and copper.

The struggle between Nama groups, led by Jonker Afrikander and Hendrik
Witbooi, and the Hereros under Maharero threatened trade and encouraged the
Germans to intervene. The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, which carved up Afri-
ca among the European powers, recognized the coastline from the Orange River
to the Kunene River as a German interest. New colonial enthusiasm (especially
by Bismarck’s successor Chancellor von Caprivi) and missionary and trading in-
terest led to South West Africa becoming a German crown colony in 1890.

The Germans built roads, railways, towns and forts. German settlers urged
Berlin to exert greater control over the Namibians, who quickly learned the bit-
ter cost of unwillingness to accept German ‘protection’.

German colonization was felt most heavily by the Hereros and Namas,
who realized that the settlement was to be permanent, and that their future pro-
mised nothing but subservience to Germans whom they judged by the actual
behaviour of the average settler rather than the protestations of missionaries
and administrators.

A terrible cattle disease (rinderpest) came in from South Africa and de-
stroyed 95 per cent of the Hereros’ cattle in 1897. From then on the Hereros’ sit-
uation grew increasingly desperate; Samuel Maharero sought an alliance with his old enemy Witbooi and also with distant chiefs in Ovamboland.

For six months the Hereros held their own, reclaimed lost territory, and induced other groups to revolt against the now intolerable occupation. By July-August 1904 fresh troops arrived from Germany under General Von Trotha, and the African revolt was smashed.

A series of decrees dissolved tribal organizations, forbade the wearing of tribal insignia, forbade the Herero and Nama from rearing cattle and dispossessed the rebellious tribes of their land. These punitive measures further aimed at securing an African labour force for the German settlers. Helmut Bley reports:¹

The integration of the individual members of the African tribes into the European labour market, a policy which was consciously pursued by the German authorities, was successfully carried out. Ninety per cent of all African men became the hired workers of European masters. By 1912 only 200 men of the Herero and Nama tribes were without paid employment. The law of the territory differentiated at every level between native and non-native citizens. Mixed marriages were forbidden and this provision applied to civil and church ceremonies alike. The disintegration of the Herero and Nama was absolute. The social anthropologist, Wagner, has shown that, following this catastrophe, the social structure of the Herero tribe was shattered and their traditional customs and standards were rendered largely inoperative. . . . The overall picture is one of itinerant workers moving from farm to farm, off into the bush, to the building sites and the mass settlements of the townships.

German colonization had apparently not foreseen an African revolt against the idea of European dominance. German colonization and a subservient African labour force. But the alienation of land to German settlers automatically impoverished the Herero and Nama, who depended on cattle-grazing. Colonization and Christianity compromised native political institutions and the basis of their ancestor worship, and social and economic discrimination added to the grievances of colonial conquest.

After the uprising, the military, and not the civil authorities, were in command. Von Trotha had taken part in suppressing the Boxer uprising, and considered the war in Namibia a racial war in which the only answer was extermination. Not all Germans agreed with him. The Kaiser relieved him of his command in November 1903, and the German Chancellor declared that Von Trotha’s proclamations violated every principle of Christian and human conduct. The settlers themselves had at first sympathized with Von Trotha, but as the war proceeded there was a growing fear that his policy of extermination would rid them of the basis of their own prosperity: cheap and plentiful African labour. All the settlers wanted was a society in which their supremacy and their wealth would be guaranteed. They did not want Von Trotha’s ‘white’ State, and were uneasy about some proposals in Germany for a separate African State—either would have destroyed the settler-native social system. They favoured a mitigation of Von Trotha’s proposals on humane grounds, and the re-establishment of settler rule for political reasons.

There was good reason for their fears. A majority in the German Reichstag were in favour of leaving the Herero their own territory, but this proposal was thwarted by legal objections raised by the German Colonial Office. Both the German Government and the settlers approved the decrees which guaranteed European supremacy and native dependency. With the ‘pacification’ of the Herero and dwindling settler fears of another major African revolt, differences between the settlers and the Colonial Office increased. Following the destruction of African tribal society, the settlers believed that a semi-feudal system should be based upon European-owned farms. There the Africans would be unfree labour, with little right to change employers, be fed badly so that they would not get too ‘high-spirited’, and absolute power of punishment, including whipping, would be in the hands of the European farmer (cf. Bley): 1

The subjugation of the Africans as the labouring class remained the basis of German policy in South West Africa. Its primary objective was to enable the German settlers to consolidate their position. This policy was determined by the agrarian structure of the colonial territory and remained unchanged even when the income from the diamond and copper industries covered the whole budget... the act of self-government, the educational policy and the land policy were all subordinated to the primary objective of consolidating the German settlers.

With the final defeat of the Herero army in the Waterberg, Von Trotha had almost all the Herero in his power, but a few thousand escaped his encirclement and crossed the Omaheke Sandveld into Botswana (then a British protectorate). Only 20 per cent of the Hereros survived the war, and perhaps 60 per cent of the Namas who rose fully in revolt only after the Waterberg defeat. German losses exceeded 2,000. Von Trotha declared his policy:

Inside German territory every Herero tribesman, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle will be shot. No women and children will be allowed in the territory: they will be driven back to their people or fired on. These are the last words to the Herero nation from me, the great General of the mighty German Emperor.

He stayed on as military governor for a year and, though Berlin countermanded his orders, forced labour and starvation killed thousands of the Hereros who had filtered back from Botswana or out of the Omaheke. Only 1,200 Herero survived in Namibia and losses through famine and slaughter were heavy throughout the country.

The final decade of German rule is dealt with in The Natives of South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (HMSO, 1918), which the British Government compiled during the First World War in order to prepare its case for taking over the colony after the defeat of Germany. It alleged neglect of the social interest of the Namibians, deprivation of economic opportunities, denial of schooling, labour recruitment even among the people of Ovamboland (hitherto largely undisturbed by German colonization), and killings and hideous cruelties inflicted on Namibian labour by the German settler farmers. Some of these were brought to trial.

On the defeat of Germany in 1918, her colonies were confiscated by the other powers. It was the ultimate tragedy of the Namibians that their ‘liberation’ from German rule came from a quarter from which they could expect only oppression, different in kind perhaps, but not in degree.

1. Bley, op. cit.
The British and South African governments had long resented the German presence on the Orange River. The reasons for this were complex.

Rhodes had dreamed of an Africa ruled by the English 'race'. Botha had planned the conquest of South West Africa some years before 1914; and Smuts referred to it as 'part of our Afrikaner heritage'. English-speaking South Africans felt that the German settlers in Namibia sympathized with the Afrikaners, and so threatened the security of the State still recovering from the Boer war. Britain feared that Germany might disrupt the Cape route to India.

On the other hand, some liberals in England hoped that joint British-German colonization in Africa would improve the chances for peace in Europe, and eliminate the Portuguese and Belgians (tainted with the Congo massacres). Until the defeat of Germany the Herero massacres were ignored.

In 1915 South African troops overran Namibia, and both South Africa and Britain looked forward to the removal of the German presence after the war, and the annexation of Namibia. South Africa also looked forward to the annexation of East Africa. It was to be part of General Smuts' 'great white community in southern Africa'. One newspaper summed up the South African position:

As in South West Africa so in East Africa, our fellow citizens of the Union of South Africa will very soon expel the German flag from the territory over which it has too long been suffered to fly. Wherever Germany rules there is tyranny and brutality, and no greater boon could be conferred upon the native races of Africa than to relieve them from the abomination of German misgovernment.

The Birmingham Daily Post wrote:

... Anybody who has the slightest acquaintance with affairs in South Africa knows that the late German South West Africa colony will never be returned to its former owners, and that German East Africa will also not be disposed of without some reference to the wishes of Union statesmen.

There were various approaches to the colonial question after the war. President Wilson of the United States had suggested a peace without territorial annexation. Smuts proposed that South Africa annex the colonies of the victors, including Mozambique and the Belgian Congo, to which would be added the defeated German colony of South West Africa. British opinion was divided. There were some who agreed with South Africa’s annexation claims. Others led by Lloyd George agreed with the United States view: non-annexation, and that ‘the desire and the wishes of the people must be the dominant factor’. The Labour Party advocated the ending of European colonialism and administration by a supra-national body (presumably the League of Nations). The British Government agreed with American opinion regarding self-determination—understood as a desire to live under British rule rather than to choose independence. In fact, the wishes of the Namibian people were never consulted. The British Blue Book on German atrocities was held as sufficient evidence of British and South African good faith, of German brutality and—although this hardly followed—of the acceptance by Namibians of South African suzerainty. Smuts had proposed a mandated territories plan. The mandate idea became an important component of the League of Nations system.

At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 the German colonies were mandated to neighbouring or to European powers under varying conditions. A class ‘C’ mandate was given to ‘His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa’ (then still part of the British Empire). The territory was to be administered as an ‘integral portion’ of the mandatory power, which pledged itself to ‘promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants’. The mandate system was described in the League of Nations Covenant (Article 22) as ‘a sacred trust of civilization’.

The League repeatedly arraigned South Africa for its failure to uphold this ‘sacred trust’ over the next twenty years.

The old German ‘native’ laws were largely retained or expanded. Discriminatory education was retained, as was the pass system, enforced labour and the German practice of using convict labour. Africans continued to be arrested for such crimes as insolence. White employers could arrest Africans. Some members of the Mandate Commission who had considered such practices as simply part of German misrule were shocked: they now found that Africans still existed merely to provide cheap labour for white mines or farms.

Land continued to be alienated, this time to an influx of South African settlers. The northern peoples were kept in Ovamboland, outside what had been the ‘police zone’ in German days, with no care for their social progress. The League noted that twelve times as much money was spent on educating white children (one-tenth of the total) as on the Namibian ninetenths.

In 1922 the Bondelswart people in the south were bombed by South African military aircraft after their refusal to pay a dog tax. Defiance by the Rehoboth community three years later was more quietly handled. Bombs were also dropped on the capital of the Ukwanyama Chief Ipumbu in Ovamboland, but this received little publicity and was not brought to the notice of the League.

South African citizenship was granted to German settlers who, with the newcomers from South Africa, helped to form an all-white electorate for the
territory’s legislature. In view of German demands for the return of their colonies and the growth of the Nazi movement, South Africa proposed the annexation of Namibia as a ‘fifth province’ in 1934, but this the League rejected. Nevertheless, South Africa gradually increased to grip its Namibia with a view to making incorporation inevitable.

The spirit of resistance was kept alive by one Namibian above all others: the teacher and pastor Hosea Kutako, whom Maharero had nominated to lead the Herero people in his absence. Maharero’s exile in Botswana ended only when his dead body was carried back to Okahandja to the Herero chiefs’ burial ground in 1923—on 26 August, the day on which the guerrilla struggle was launched in 1966 and that is kept by Namibians as their National Day.

Kutako had fought Germans in 1904 and had been wounded. He gave the Herero and the other groups a continuing sense of Namibian nationhood and typified the ‘no surrender’ spirit of South Africa’s unwilling and maltreated wards. Until his death in 1970 at the age of 103, South Africa recognized him not as Herero chief but only as ‘senior headman’. Yet he was known throughout the territory, from the far north where he spent his boyhood, to the southern lands of his later ally Simon Witbooi, as a man entirely dedicated to the saving of his people and their ultimate liberation.

Hosea Kutako, more than any other, prevented a final and irrevocable South African takeover when the League of Nations, which signally failed in its peace-keeping role and in cases of aggression between Member States during the thirties, was wound up at the end of the Second World War.
The United Nations replaced mandates by trusteeship, and set up a Trusteeship Council to guide the former mandated territories to independence.

South Africa refused to allow Namibia to become a trustee territory, and tried to prepare the ground for incorporation by holding a 'plebiscite' and claiming a majority for incorporation. The result was not accepted by the United Nations: Namibians had voted through their chiefs—all government appointees; the question had been put in a misleading way in many cases; one observer even noted that the number of votes recorded was greater than the figure for total population.

Kutako and other leaders sent word to the exiled Herero king in Botswana that 'the heritage of your father's orphans is to be taken from them'. A young English clergyman called Michael Scott was eventually sent to the United Nations with a petition from the Namibians, and this opened a new period of struggle which, in its first twenty-five years, has seen a consolidation of South Africa's de facto power in the territory and the total removal of its de jure authority to administer it.

The right of South Africa to administer Namibia has been debated at every session of the United Nations General Assembly since 1946, and has been the subject of no less than ten decisions by the International Court of Justice (set up by the United Nations at The Hague).

South Africa dropped its proposal for incorporation, declined to accept trusteeship, but announced that it would 'uphold the spirit of the mandate'. Successive United Nations commissions tried to secure trusteeship. The International Court unanimously decided in 1950 that the mandate was still in existence. In 1960, the African countries which had been members of the League sought a 'contentious judgement' (i.e. one that could be enforced by the Security Council); they asked the court to require South Africa to carry out the mandate, end apartheid, and report to the United Nations on its administration. Six years later the court reversed its own earlier decision and said that it could not give a ruling, as the petitioners 'had not established any right or interest in the matter'.
The issue of apartheid had become crucial and both the Namibian leaders and the General Assembly felt bound to take action despite the court’s refusal to pass judgement.

The General Assembly resolved in 1966 to ‘terminate the mandate’. Subsequent resolutions set up a council for Namibia to bring about Namibian independence, and requested the Security Council ‘to take effective measures to ensure the removal of South Africa’s presence from the territory’.

In June 1971 the International Court of Justice declared the South African presence in the territory illegal, and prescribed Member State obligations towards securing expulsion. The legal position is thus unequivocal but few practical measures have been taken to bring the real situation into line.

Following a Security Council resolution in 1972, the new Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, visited Namibia and met representatives of all groups. Several black political groups and also several of the Churches gave him details of oppression, and called for the creation of a ‘unitary Namibian State’. The Secretary-General recommended that a mediator be appointed to negotiate independence. Alfred Escher, a Swiss diplomat, was duly appointed, and visited Namibia in October 1972.

Despite attempts by the South African Government to stage-manage the visit, Dr Escher held seventy-four meetings with various groups and gained the general impression that the people wanted a united and independent Namibia. The South African prime minister refused any solution on these lines but suggested the creation of an advisory council of representatives of the various regions, this council to be under his special responsibility. This would, in fact, mean a federal approach to the ‘homelands’ policy in Namibia, but would not guarantee them any power or in any way reduce the power of the whites in mineral-rich areas outside the Namibian ‘homelands’.

The prime minister tried for a time to give the impression to the press that a compromise had been reached, but this was refuted by the Secretary-General. The Security Council agreed to extend the deadline for the talks to April 1973; the Secretary-General was to press the South African Government to define more specifically its attitude to Namibian self-determination.

The talks were finally called off by a resolution adopted on 11 December 1973.
The old Boer dictum of 'no equality in Church or State' became law with the advent to power of the Afrikaner nationalist government in 1948. The apartheid policy, which sought to separate black and white in every sphere of life and to entrench for ever the power of white over black, duly made its way into legislation affecting Namibia. The administration of the territory came more firmly under the South African Government, and the Ministry of Bantu Affairs brought Namibia under the centralized control exercised over Africans in the republic.

Apartheid laws were implemented despite the claim to be upholding a United Nations mandate: 'group areas', Bantu education, 'influx control', the Suppression of Communism Act and the abrogation of the rule of law. The 'homelands' policy excludes Africans from wealth, prosperity or political control in South Africa in compulsory exchange for that one-seventh of the country most devoid of wealth or resources. Namibia has its own 'Native Nations' Act, setting up no less than nine 'homelands', mostly outside the zones of good arable and grazing land.

Thousands of Namibians have already lost their homes and have been removed to distant places.

The black people of Windhoek, for example, were robbed of their freehold rights and moved to a rigorously controlled location some miles from the city. A protest against the move in 1959 was met at Windhoek with police gunfire: twelve killed and fifty wounded. This was a key event in the crowded years 1959–61 which saw the birth of a new, militant, liberation movement, a national movement across those tribal barriers which South African policy is designed to reinforce.

Apartheid has been enforced against a background of accelerated exploitation. Namibia had been a useful refuge for landless Boer farmers during the pre-war depression. New civil service and railway jobs brought a further influx. This was before the authorities realized the tremendous mineral potential. Namibia today is not only considered essential for strategic reasons, but is also a source of great wealth—all of it extracted at the expense of its native population.

Diamonds, copper, uranium, a variety of other minerals, fishing along the
850 mile coastline, Karakul ('Persian lamb') pelts, and cattle bring great wealth to South African and foreign investors—many of the latter from Member States of the United Nations which are accordingly reluctant to take the steps which may be necessary to prevent South Africa from flouting the authority of the United Nations.

Under the South West Africa Affairs Act (1969) the South African Government increased its control over Namibia: justice, prisons, arms, explosives, labour, water, posts, telegraphs, telephones, radio, mining, agriculture, fishing, publications, entertainments and race relations. An all-white legislative assembly is responsible for some aspects of the administration of justice; education, social welfare and health services for whites; local authorities, and roads and works in white areas. Company taxes, diamond royalties and revenue from mining are now payable direct to the South African Government.

This Act virtually incorporated Namibia into South Africa.

Under the Development of Self-government for Native Nations of South West Africa Act, separate 'nations' were to be established, each with its own legislative council. The first of these was Ovamboland, established in 1969.

Both Acts followed from Odendaal Commission recommendations that 'homelands' be provided for each population group and that the South African Government take over some of the functions of the all-white legislative council. The commission recommended that ten 'homelands' be set up and given some measure of political independence. The economic structure should be maintained, however, and the South African Government should remain the final authority in all areas. Because of the number of groups which had no reserve of their own and the number of Herero and Nama living outside their reserves additional land should be set aside for African occupation. The commission proposed that the African 'homelands' should eventually occupy 39.6 per cent of the territory, while the white area should be reduced to 44.1 per cent. In 1964, when the commission reported, there were 73,464 whites (to be allocated 44.1 per cent), and 452,540 Africans (to be allocated 39.6 per cent).

The recommendations implied large transfers of peoples. If completely applied, 74 per cent of the Herero would have to move, 87 per cent of the Nama, 94 per cent of the Damara, and 95 per cent of the Bushmen.

Table 2 gives the number of Africans by population group and the number living in the 'homelands' as calculated by the South African Department of Statistics in May 1970.

**Table 2. Africans by population group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Total in 'homelands'</th>
<th>Number in 'homelands' (not necessarily their own)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number in 'homelands' (not necessarily their own)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ovambo</td>
<td>342,455</td>
<td>292,210</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okavango</td>
<td>49,577</td>
<td>47,605</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Caprivian</td>
<td>25,009</td>
<td>24,967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaokovelderr</td>
<td>6,467</td>
<td>6,285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>64,973</td>
<td>7,736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>746,328</strong></td>
<td><strong>420,279</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 'Coloured' communities were to be given partly elected councils, some with, and some without, a territorial base. The 12,000 nomadic 'bushman' are to be concentrated at Tsumkwe, and put to work.

In line with the Odendaal Commission's report, the Development of Self-government for Native Nations in South West Africa Amendment Act (1973) provided that, when the time was deemed ripe, the State President, after consultation with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and with the legislative council concerned, might declare a 'native area' self-governing and permit it to have its own flag and national anthem. However, 'independence' will not be complete. The legislative council of the 'self-governing' native area will not be permitted to deal with military organization, arms, foreign affairs, internal security, the control of members of the South African police who will remain in the 'self-governing' territories, railways, harbours, natural roads, aviation, currency, banking, customs and excise, the control of universities, and the entry of persons who are not members of the particular 'native nation.' 'Self-government' is thus severely circumscribed, excluding many powers normally considered essential to independence.

But it is even further restricted. Any Bills which legislative councils may introduce to amend or repeal Acts of the South African parliament which affect their peoples must first be submitted to the State President, who retains the right to refer them back to the particular council for further consideration. The provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa can rule on the validity of any enactment of the legislative council, and the State President retains his rights in regard to the High Court. Appeals will continue to be heard by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa.

On 27 April 1973, Ovambo was declared a self-governing area, with its 'capital' at Ongwediva.

The legislative council had fifty-six members: five designated by each of the seven tribal authorities (thirty-five non-elected), three elected from each of the seven tribal areas (twenty-one elected). Adults over 18 years in possession of registration cards were permitted to vote.

Prior to the elections which were to select the twenty-one members, all meetings in Ovambo (with the exception of church services, entertainments and meetings called by officials and chiefs) were prohibited unless they had prior authorization in writing from the native commissioner appointed by the South African Government. It was made an offence to say or to do anything likely to undermine the authority of the State, officials of the State, the present Ovambo government, or officials of that government, chiefs or headmen. It was also made an offence to make an 'intimidating' statement, to fail to obey a lawful order given by a chief, or to treat him without due respect.

The chiefs owe their position to the South African Government, which relies on having a docile 'traditional' structure. These provisions thus made any criticism of fundamental political issues illegal. The government backed 'Ovambo government' by the Ovamboland Independence Party, the only party it recognized and permitted to hold meetings without prior approval.

The percentage poll was 2.5 per cent: 97.5 per cent of the Ovambos either abstained or boycotted the elections.

On 4 May 1973, Kvango became a self-governing area, with Rundu as
capital. The constitution provided that half of the legislative council would be elected, and half nominated. Kvango is an area in which the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and other opposition parties are poorly represented and in which there are no political parties of any type. The poll was 66.2 per cent.

As a concession to the United Nations the South African Government has promised to establish an advisory council (see above), and began to establish it in 1973. Representatives were to be nominated by the African legislative councils, the Bantu authorities, and the whites and Coloureds.

As already indicated, African representation is limited on its legislative councils and the Bantu ‘authorities’ are in fact controlled by government. Further to ensure a subservient ‘advisory council’, the Herero representatives were chosen from the politically conservative east. But the Namas sent no representatives, the Kaokoland did not nominate, the chief of the Mbanderos walked out, and the Coloureds withdrew their two representatives.
Traditional leaders like Hosea Kutako and Samuel Witbooi carried on the internal struggle after the Second World War. After the First World War, when the League of Nations appeared powerless to check South Africa, the tribal structures and the Churches, especially in the Herero and Ovambo lands, had canalized resentment.

New, post-colonial governments in Africa and Asia; a strong Afro-Asian block at the United Nations; and a new consciousness of Africa as a coherent entity led to a search for new methods of political struggle in Namibia.

Local movements that came into being at the end of the fifties quickly linked up with national parties. The organizational groundwork was done outside Namibia by migrant workers in the Cape when security police surveillance (especially after the Windhoek shootings in 1959) hampered local organizers, who were often house-arrested, exiled or gaoled on specious charges.

Namibians who had escaped to seek education abroad joined up with political fugitives and, despite political differences, combined to petition the United Nations after the International Court had agreed to hear oral petitions by individuals.

Delegations from the new parties pressed the Namibian cause at meetings of the Organization of African Unity from its inception in 1963, and at many world conferences. With the failure of the International Court to make a ruling in 1966, one of the parties, the South West African Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO), from its headquarters in exile in Tanzania, announced that it would no longer await the deliberations of the world community. In August 1966 it launched a guerrilla attack in northern Namibia which has been maintained despite early setbacks and South African counter-offensives.

Herman Toivo ja Toivo, one of the founders of SWAPO, was among the thirty-eight Namibians, all SWAPO men, put on trial in Pretoria in 1968 on charges of terrorism. His final address to the court is a classic statement of his people’s claim to self-determination:

We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now and will not in the future recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we have no say; to treat our
country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country.

Ja Toivo confirmed his people’s right to take up arms and said:

I know that the struggle will be long and bitter. I also know that my people will wage that struggle, whatever the cost. Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us as equals of the whites will there be peace between us.

World pressure was brought to bear on South Africa and no death penalties were demanded, but twenty-one of the men were sent to Robben Island ‘for the term of their natural lives’. Ja Toivo, who had not taken part in any offensive action, being under house arrest in his home during the 1966 campaign, was sentenced to fifteen years’ hard labour.

Winning Namibian independence involves both military and diplomatic action—guerrilla warfare in northern Namibia, and political work from offices in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cairo, Algiers, London, Stockholm, Helsinki and New York; contact is maintained with the growing number of students who have managed to get out of Namibia to obtain an education elsewhere.

More than 500 delegates from churches, trade unions, political parties and groups all over the world attended a Namibia International Conference convened by SWAPO in Brussels on 26–28 May 1972. The conference adopted an eleven-point programme which aims at the complete economic, political, diplomatic, sporting and cultural isolation of South Africa.

Little news comes out of Namibia about SWAPO’s guerrilla activities. South Africa claims that they are almost non-existent yet keeps a large body of troops in the Caprivi Strip, and has several times announced casualties, sometimes said to be from land-mine explosions. The pro-government newspaper, Die Vaderland, wrote, after the killing of two policemen in 1971, of the

shocking realisation that the Republic is involved in a titanic struggle. The next few years may prove decisive for our country’s future and the survival of whites in southern Africa.

The scale of operations may not warrant such alarm. One view is that the authorities in South Africa themselves exaggerate what they call ‘terrorism’ in Namibia to frighten the white community into cohesion and support for authoritarian measures. Physically the land does not favour guerrilla warfare, entry is extremely difficult, and the number of guerrilla fighters is small. Yet they persist, and South Africa’s failure to crush them completely after easy early victories makes them a continual focus of national resistance.

The South African authorities regard them as a serious threat. Large numbers of police and troops now patrol the northern sector, and guard the large military airfield at Katima Mulilo, the administrative centre of Rundu, and the incipient hydroelectric scheme around the Ruacana Falls on the Kunene River.

The northern frontier involves Portugal (through Angola), and (through the Caprivi Strip) Zambia and Botswana (independent, and sympathetic to the liberation movement but inhibited by its relationship with South Africa).
It is in the eastern part of the Caprivi Strip and the Okavango portion of Ovamboland that most of the clashes between SWAPO guerrillas and South African security forces have taken place. The guerrillas recovered from an early reverse when the SWAPO camp at Omgulumbashe was surprised and key personnel killed or captured, but a further severe blow followed in 1967 when Tobias Hainyeko, the SWAPO commander, was shot dead in a gun battle on a launch in the Zambesi. Hainyeko died covering the escape of twenty comrades he was to lead into the Caprivi Strip.

Guerrilla clashes continued at a fairly steady level of intensity over the next few years. During the first six months of 1973, in nine separate incidents (including ambushes of patrols, the capture of a South African arms depot, the use of land mines and the shooting down of a South African helicopter), sixteen South African policemen or servicemen were injured and five killed.

The smaller parties in Namibia (the first two have small external missions) include the South West African National Union (SWANU), one of whose leaders, Gerson Weii, is also imprisoned on Robben Island; the South West African National United Front (SWANUF); the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) which collaborates with the council of the Herero chiefs and supports Kutako's successor, Clemens Kapuuo, who is not recognized by the South African authorities.

There are also regional groupings. The 'Red Nation' Name Committee is resisting displacement due to take place in the new carve-up of Namibia. The Rehoboth People's Party leads vigorous local opposition to South African constitutional and economic policies. There is also resistance in the churches, in workers' compounds in the main mining centres and ports, and even secretly within the existing 'homeland legislatures'. To the regret of many Namibian leaders, there is practically no liberal or left-wing opposition among the white community; a few may work secretly against the administration but they must perform work in secret.

Radical change thus seems possible only through world intervention or guerrilla action.

Many, including government-paid chiefs and Bantustan councillors, believe that South Africa will hold on and that the only solution is to come to terms with South African rule and apartheid. But this attitude to apartheid is less common in Namibia than it is in South Africa. It is widely known that virtually every nation in the world has condemned South Africa's occupation. Namibians say: 'How can South Africa forever prevent the whole world from giving us our country back?' On the other hand there is also scepticism because of United Nations failure to effect change. But the International Court advisory opinion in 1971 declaring South Africa's occupation illegal has made a very deep impression, and South Africa has been unable to suppress news of student protest and petitions to tribal and Bantustan leaders.

Towards the end of 1971 there was a widespread surge of resentment against the contract labour system, one of the fundamental features of apartheid in Namibia. Any Namibian wishing to leave his 'homeland' to work in the mines or in industry in white areas must first apply to the South West African Native Labour Association (SWANLA) which grades him according to age, health and so on, and then allocates him to an employer. He has no choice, and
must sign a contract binding him for a period of twelve to eighteen months. He is not allowed to take his family with him, and is housed in a compound during his period of employment. A Grade ‘A’ worker would be likely to earn just over £4 a month, and a miner just over £5.

Following the International Court decision in 1971 resentment surfaced. A strike which seems to have begun among the Windhoek municipal workers on 13 December spread quickly to the mines. By mid-January 1972, 20,000 workers had come out on strike, effectively bringing the economy to a standstill. Most of the strikers were from Ovamboland but this was because most of the contract labourers are Ovambos; support also came from other parts of the country.

The South African Minister of Bantu Administration attempted to get the strikers back to work by proposing discussions with the Ovamboland legislative council on the future of the contract labour system. When this had no effect harsher methods were applied. Twelve suspected leaders were charged with using violence to prevent others from working. This succeeded only in making the strikers and their supporters more determined. No new recruits could be found to take over the jobs of the dismissed strikers who were transported back to their ‘homelands’, and there were widespread demonstrations and meetings in favour of the strike.

Eventually a state of emergency was declared in northern Namibia, with a complete embargo on news. Such reports as did leak out suggested that there was a great deal of extremely bitter fighting, involving several deaths on both sides. Although many were forced back to work the labour situation had still not returned to ‘normal’ a year later, and there continued go-slows. As a result, profit margins fell drastically for the firms involved. The authorities can claim a technical victory but were left in no doubt about the seething African discontent.

Nine opposition groups including SWAPO, the Rehoboths, and SWANU formed a national convention which held the first political rally in Namibia’s history at the Katatura Compound, Windhoek, on 18 March 1973, just prior to Dr Vorster’s visit to take the chair at the first meeting of the government’s ‘Advisory Council for South West Africa’. This council is actively opposed by SWAPO. In August 1973, a protest was organized in Katatura against a visit by Dr Vorster to attend the South West Africa Nationalist Party congress. Tanks sealed off the area concerned, and one protester was killed.

In November 1973, a new form of repression reflected the increased level of political activity in Namibia. More than 100 people, after being detained by the South African police, were handed over to the tribal authorities and flogged in public. The South African Government justified this on the grounds that it was the revival of an old tribal tradition.

On 16 November 1973, three members of the SWAPO Youth League, including its chairman and vice-chairman, were found guilty of charges under the Sabotage Act and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. In December 1973, SWAPO held a three-day conference in Namibia. In 1974 government reprisals were intensified. Those arrested included SWAPO chairman Meroro, the assistant secretary, the acting chairman of the Youth League, and several others. As intense political activity continues throughout Namibia, increased numbers of arrests reflect the concern of the South African authorities.
It must be underlined, in conclusion, that one of the main aims of the liberation movements and of most of the opposition is the independence of Namibia as a territorial whole, and not the ‘independence’ of separate native ‘nations’.
Appendix
Further reading


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