Racism and apartheid in southern Africa
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Rhodesia

A book of data
by Reginald Austin

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This book on Rhodesia is a companion volume to *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: South Africa and Namibia*, published by Unesco in October 1974. The book is intended for the general public and, more particularly, for teachers. It seeks to give the background to the present situation in Rhodesia and to the newspaper reports on it, and to assist those who wish to inform students and pupils more fully about Rhodesia. Suggestions for further reading are included in the text and in the bibliography.

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Introduction

As any white Rhodesian will inform you—to the amazement of his black countrymen—apartheid has no place in the Rhodesian social, economic or political system and never has been part of it. Indeed apologists and even informed critics frequently urge moderation in judgement upon and dealings with it, to avoid ‘forcing’ white Rhodesia to turn to apartheid.

Depending on their colour, the inhabitants often refer, either proudly or sardonically, to the ‘Rhodesian way of life’; this book attempts to explain why.

Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning separateness. As the political ideology practised in South Africa, it means territorial separation and separate administrative and social structures for whites and the various racial and tribal groups, but all under white control. As white society and its economy depend on black labour, however, separation has to be selectively applied. Racial discrimination and separation are essential features of apartheid but, as the Rhodesian example shows, can be achieved by less formal social and economic structures of domination, and bolstered by social custom and legislation.

The settler-dominated country created largely by the efforts of Cecil Rhodes and his followers is now called Rhodesia, and its present white inhabitants are called Rhodesians. Legally, however, it continues to be ‘Southern Rhodesia’, being still regarded by the United Nations and all its Member States as a colony of the United Kingdom, which is internationally responsible for the territory.

The vast majority of the African population now refer to the territory as Zimbabwe, after one of the political systems which formerly flourished there. Rhodesia and Zimbabwe represent opposing ideals. This book is primarily concerned with the former.
1200–1500 Settlement of various Shona-speaking groups in the area.
1400–1500 Establishment of the Mwene Mutapa dynasty after Korekore conquest of the Tavara, an area of present north-west Mashonaland.
1511 António Fernandes visits Mwene Mutapa.
1500–1600 Growth of the Rozwi confederation in what is now Matabeleland and western Mashonaland, Mwene Mutapa, and based at Zimbabwe. Regular contacts with Portuguese, Arab and Swahili traders.
1561 Portuguese Jesuit missionary Fr Gonzalo da Silveira killed in north-east Mashonaland.
1570 Portuguese punitive expedition sent against Mwene Mutapa.
1600–1700 Decline of Mwene Mutapa, increasing power of Portugal and the Rozwi empire.
1700–1800 Supremacy of the Rozwi and period of prosperity and peace.
1819 Shoshangane leads an Ngoni group to settle in the Limpopo valley.
1830–31 Ngoni invasion under Zwangendaba, sacking of Zimbabwe and death of the Mambo (king) at Taba Zi Ka Mambo. Zwangendaba go north to present-day Tanzania.
1838 Ndebele invasion and settlement under Mzilikazi Kumalo. Tribute imposed on surrounding Shona-speaking groups.
1859 Robert Moffat establishes the first mission station at Inyati by permission of Mzilikazi.
1861 Mzila succeeds Shoshongane as Paramount of the Shangana, and penetrates into Manyikaland, imposing tribute.
1870 Lobengula Kumalo succeeds Mzilikazi as king of the Ndebele.
1888 Moffat negotiates treaty of peace and amity between Lobengula and Britain (ratified April).
1889 Rudd concession agreed with Lobengula (for C.J. Rhodes).
1889 Royal Charter granted to British South African Company (BSAC) to enable it to exploit the concession.
1890 Pioneer column recruited, enters the territory and establishes Fort Salisbury (12 September).
1891 Britain establishes protectorate over Mashonaland.

1893 Invasion of Matabeleland authorized (3 October).
Bulawayo occupied (4 November).
Allan Wilson patrol, pursuing Lobengula, annihilated on Shangani River (4 December).

1894 Probable death of Lobengula.
Establishment of African reserves in north and north-east Matabeleland.
Hut tax imposed.
Matabeleland Order in Council.

1895 Rhodesia so named by proclamation (23 April).
Jameson raid on Transvaal (29 December).

1896 Jameson raiders captured.
Ndebele rebellion starts in Umzingwani district (24 March).
Mashona rebellion starts with the Mangwende attack under Mchemwa on the Mrewa Native Commissioners' camp (20 June).
Storming and capture of Mkwati's stronghold at Taba Zi Ka Mambo (5 July).
Rhodes' first of five indabas with Ndebele leaders in Matopo hills (21 August).
Attacks on Chief Makoni's fortress in caves at Gwindingwi, using dynamite to blow the defenders out (1–3 September).
Makoni surrenders and is shot after a summary trial ordered by Lieut.-Col. Alderson (3 September).

1897 Kunzwi Nyandoro's kraal stormed (June).
Mashiangombi's kraal attacked and Mashiangombi killed (23 July).
Railway reaches Bulawayo from south (November).

1898 Two mediums, Kagubi and Nehenda, tried for murder (2 March).
Nehenda and Kagubi executed together with Chief Mashanganyika.
Kagubi received into the Catholic Church in the death cell, given the name Dismas; Nehenda refuses baptism, insisting she wanted to die in her home in Mazoe.
BSAC promises and starts payment of £360,000 compensation to settlers.
Imperial Order in Council establishes new constitution.
Railway reaches Umtali from Beira.

1899 First meeting of Legislative Council under new constitution.
Railway reaches Salisbury from Beira.
Boer War commences, cutting Rhodesia off from the Cape.

1900 Mapondera rising in Mazoe.
Estimated total of African-owned cattle: 55,000.

1901 Mapondera defeated by Mashonaland native police (March).
Last battle until 1960s: Mapondera continues guerrilla raids, and to support chiefs Makombe and Chioco in their unsuccessful resistance to Portuguese authority.

1902 Rhodes dies.
Railway joins Bulawayo and Salisbury.
All male Africans over 14 required by law to register and carry the *situpa* pass at all times.
Boer War ends.

1904
Mapondera captured, tried, imprisoned, but dies after hunger strike.

1905
Railway completed across Zambezi at Victoria Falls.

1906
Africans in urban areas prohibited by law to live outside 'locations' except as domestic servants.

1911
African Labour (Identification) Act—to control recruitment of African labour—essentially to prevent unskilled labour going to South Africa.

1914
Commission recommends changes in reserves by reducing them in both extent and quality. Long series of protests, especially in Matabeleland, organized by Nyamanda and the Matabele National Home Movement.

1919
Privy Council decisions rejects case for African and Company ownership of the land, and held it belonged to the Crown.

1920
BSAC compensated for assets taken over by the Crown.
Native reserves totalling 21 million acres established.
Legislative Council approves plan for 'responsible government'.

1922
Referendum on closer association with South Africa, or 'responsible government': majority for latter.
A Zulu Anglican teacher, Abraham Twala, wrote: '. . . experience has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing Street . . .'.

1923
Formation by Abraham Twala of the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, the first African organization to urge Africans to depend on themselves rather than on the British Government.
Rhodesia annexed to Britain as a colony (September).
' Responsible government' established (10 October).

1924
First elections for Legislative Assembly, Sir Charles Coghlan first prime minister. Beginning of Rhodesia party government which continued (with a break in 1936–37) until 1962.

1925
Morris Carter Land Commission appointed to consider setting apart defined areas outside reserves for exclusive acquisition by Africans and exclusive acquisitions by Europeans. Forty-five per cent of land still unalienated. Europeans held 31 million acres, including nearly all land over 3,000 feet and within 25 miles of railways.

1926
Carter report recommends land apportionment.

1927
Under Native Affairs Act, administrative, judicial and legislative powers in relation to Africans vested in Native Commissioners.

1929
Land Apportionment Act passed, after approval by Britain.
Divides Rhodesia into African and European areas.
Compulsory education for Europeans under 1930 Education Act.

1934
Industrial Conciliation Act provides structure for industrial bargaining in Rhodesia, excludes Africans by excluding them from the definition of 'employee'.

1936
Native Registration Act requires Africans in town to carry another pass (in addition to his *situpa*).

1938
Compulsory education of Asian and Coloured children.
Bledisloe Commission in principle accepts amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

1939
Second World War commences. Empire Training School brings thousands of Britons into contact with Rhodesia during Royal Air Force training.

1945

1946
Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act requires employers and local government authorities to provide minimum housing for African workers and families. Empowers removal of unemployed from towns. Total control of local government in white hands, 'Advisory Boards' deal with African affairs in towns.

1947
Native Labour Board Act empowers non-representative bodies to settle wages for African workers.

1950
Subversive Activities Act.

1951
Native Land Husbandry Act introduces stringent conservation measures to force African farmers to de-stock and modify land tenure practices. Introduced and implemented without consultation with Africans, it was strongly resisted by African rural population, two-thirds of whom it would have made landless as they sought temporary employment in towns.
British Labour government agrees to re-open discussions on closer association. March conference of officials unanimously recommends closer association by federation.
Following Labour defeat, Lyttelton (Conservative Colonial Secretary) announces British approval of federation in principal.

1952
Federal constitutional conferences boycotted by African delegates from northern territories.

1953
Referendum of Rhodesian voters approved federation by 25,570 to 14,729; only 429 Africans eligible to vote (April).
Federation Act becomes law. Sir Godfrey Huggins became the first prime minister of the federation, succeeded by Garfield Todd as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia (July).

1954
Inter-territorial Movement of Persons Control Act.

1955
Youth League formed by Nyandoro, Chikerema, Chisiza, Edson Sithole.
Public Order Act gives power to detain and restrict without trial.

1956
Youth League organizes successful bus boycott in Salisbury, broken by police. Over 200 detained.
Tredgold Franchise Commission to consider a 'system for just
representation of the people . . . under which government is placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible persons'.

1957
African (Registration and Identification) Act passed by Todd’s government, entitles ‘advanced’ Africans to an identity card in place of a situpu.

Winston Field, president of the Dominion Party (a predecessor of the Rhodesian Front), elected to federal parliament.

Britain allows federation right to join international organizations and receive diplomatic representation.

Native Councils Act passed; introduces ‘community development’ into African local government.

New Franchise Act introduced by the United Federal Party (UFP) to ‘ensure that political power remains in responsible hands’, introduces a lower ‘Special Roll’, which could count for a maximum of 20 per cent of the white roll.

Federal constitutional amendment effectively increases white electoral control.

Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC) (based on an organization started in 1934), founded as an African nationalist party demanding ‘one man, one vote’; President: Joshua Nkomo; Vice-President: J. Chikerema; General Secretary: G. Nyandoro (12 September).

1958
Garfield Todd ousted by cabinet revolt, replaced by Sir Edgar Whitehead, who is defeated by Dominion Party in a ‘safe’ seat.

All meetings of ANC in rural areas banned.

Whitehead and UFP win general election, but Dominion Party receives majority of first preference votes.

Plewman Commission reports only 34.5 per cent of African families in urban areas living above poverty datum line.

1959
Federation-wide emergency declared; Southern Rhodesian African National Congress banned, 500 members arrested, 300 detained.

Devlin Commission reports that federation is main cause of African discontent.

Unlawful Organizations Act passed.

Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act provides for detention without trial.

Public Order Act amended.

Native Affairs Act amended.

New Industrial Conciliation Act gives Africans limited rights in white-dominated unions.

1960
National Democratic Party (NDP) formed by former leaders of ANC.

Southern Rhodesian public service opened to Africans.

British Prime Minister Macmillan makes ‘wind of change’ speech in Cape Town.

Law and Order (Maintenance) Act passed.

Vagrancy Act passed.
Monckton Commission report concludes that there is racial animosity in federation; demands its end or radical franchise changes. Constitutional conference in London: African nationalists led by Nkomo, invited to attend after initial exclusion.
Pass Laws repealed, but Africans still required to carry registration certificates (*situpas*).

1961

Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act (1904) repealed.
Liquor Amendment Act entitles Africans to buy 'European' liquor.
Constitutional conference recommends new constitution.
After rank and file insistence, NDP announces refusal to recognize new constitution.
Further conference meetings boycotted by NDP.
NDP banned, reconstituted as Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

1962

Rhodesian Front Party formed, merging Dominion Party and other white opponents of 1961 constitution (March).
ZAPU banned (September).
Whitehead speaks to United Nations Trusteeship Committee, suggests 1961 constitution would bring majority rule in fifteen years (October).
Political meetings on Sundays or holidays banned (the only times when Africans in urban areas could meet).
Rhodesian Front defeats Whitehead and UFP in general elections held under 1961 constitution.

1963

Former ZAPU executive goes to Dar es Salaam.
Conference on dissolution of the federation (June).
Prime Minister Field discusses Southern Rhodesian independence with Britain.
Nkomo forms Peoples' Caretake Council (PCC) (August).
Britain vetoes United Nations Security Council resolution calling upon her not to transfer Royal Rhodesian Air Force (Federal) aircraft to Rhodesia (September).

1964

Major-General Anderson appointed General Officer Commanding Rhodesian Army after Field promised no attempt at illegal independence would be made (January).
Field, reluctant to consider illegal declaration of independence, forced to resign as prime minister, succeeded by Ian Smith (April).
Smith states: 'If in my lifetime we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in' (May).

Labour government elected in Britain (October).
Major-General Anderson relieved as GOC Rhodesian Army (October).
Smith, under strict security holds indaba of 600 chiefs to obtain approval of ‘independence’ (October).
Referendum among voters: ‘Are you in favour of independence based on the 1961 constitution?’; 58,091 voted Yes, 6,096 voted No (November).
ZANU ‘Crocodile Commando’ kills white farmer (November).
Bottomley, British Commonwealth Secretary, visits Salisbury and detained African leaders. Privately stated to Rhodesian Front the ‘five principles’ on which Britain would consider granting independence (March).
ZANU raiders rounded up (April).
Prime Minister Ian Smith holds general election stating the main issue to be independence. Rhodesian Front wins all fifty A roll (white) seats. Election almost totally boycotted by Africans (May).
ZAPU guerillas enter Rhodesia (May).
British Prime Minister Wilson visits Rhodesia, talks with Smith and detained Africans (October).
Wilson states the ‘demand for Britain to attempt to settle all Rhodesia’s constitutional problems with a military invasion is out’ (31 October).
BSAC police given a pay rise (October).
Emergency declared under Emergency Powers Act; uninterrupted to date. After assuring Southern Rhodesian Governor Gibbs that Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) would not take place (5 November), Rhodesian Front declares independence and promulgates the ‘Constitution of Rhodesia 1965’ to end British rule in Rhodesia. Governor dismisses Smith and his cabinet, Britain passes the Southern Rhodesia Act, reaffirming that Southern Rhodesia is part of British Dominions and empowering the British Government to make any necessary Orders in Council. Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order invalidates Smith’s constitution and prohibits the legislature from making laws. Wilson calls on Rhodesian citizens ‘to refrain from all acts which would further the objects of the illegal authorities. Subject to that, it is the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to the judiciary, the armed services, the police, and the public services’ (November).
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions call on United Nations Member States not to recognize the Smith régime (November).
Security Council resolution 217 (1965) calls United Nations Member States to do utmost to break economic relations with Rhodesia (November).
Security Council resolution 221 (1966) permits the United
Kingdom to use force to blockade illegal unloading of oil for Rhodesia at Beira (blockade never extended to Lourenço Marques or South African ports) (April).
ZANU in intermittent clashes with Rhodesian forces (April).
White farmer and wife killed near Hartley (May).
ZAPU activity discovered in urban areas (May).
Wilson has talks with Smith on HMS *Tiger*. Fails (December).
Security Council resolution 232 (1966) extends sanctions on imports and exports to and from Rhodesia (December).

1967
Rhodesian Front sets up Whaley Commission to advise on a constitution to 'ensure the harmonious development of Rhodesia's plural society, having regard to the social and cultural differences among the peoples of Rhodesia, to the different systems of land tenure . . .' (April).
ZAPU-SAANC military alliance (August).
Heavy clashes between ZAPU-SAANC groups and Rhodesian and South African security forces in Wankie area (August-September).

1968
In a series of engagements, fifty-eight guerrillas (ZAPU-SAANC) claimed killed by Rhodesian and South African forces near Sipoli-lo (March).
Rhodesia Appellate Division (Chief Justice Beadle) decides in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke that Rhodesian Front is the legal government, rejecting Privy Council decision to the contrary (March).
Smith régime hangs several Africans sentenced to death for murder in connexion with guerrilla war (March).
Mandatory economic sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution (May).
ZAPU-SAANC groups enter north-west Rhodesia and clash with security forces. South African police suffer first admitted casualty (July).
Further talks on HMS *Fearless* between Prime Minister Wilson and Smith (October).

1969
Rhodesian Front constitution approved by referendum.
Provides for eventual maximum African representation in Legislature of 50 per cent. Virtually guarantees perpetual white rule (June).
Land Tenure Act replaced Land Apportionment Act dividing land in equal portions between the whites (minority) and Africans (majority) (June).
(No insurgent clashes reported in 1969.)

1970
ZAPU attacks South African police camp near Victoria Falls (January).
Britain and United States veto Security Council resolution seeking to condemn Britain for not using force against the rebellion (March).
Rhodesia proclaimed a republic by Smith (March).
Intermittent clashes between ZAPU and Rhodesian forces (March).
First Rhodesia general election since rebellion. Rhodesian Front wins all fifty white seats (April).
Conservative government elected in Britain (June).
Lord Goodman re-commences secret negotiations with Smith on basis of 1969 constitution (June).

1971

ZAPU and ZANU establish Joint Military Council (March).
Three Rhodesian soldiers killed by land-mine (April).
Proposed settlement agreed by British Government with Smith after Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Foreign Secretary) visits Salisbury (November).
African National Council formed as a movement 'to represent the overwhelming number of people in the country who rejected the proposals', under the chairmanship of Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa (December).

1972

Pearce Commission arrives in Rhodesia to 'test the acceptability of the 1971 proposals'. First attempt by Britain to assess attitude of African masses to its agreements with the minority (January).
Britain vetoes Security Council resolution calling for rejection of 1971 settlement proposals and recall of Pearce Commission (February).
Pearce Commission reports the rejection of the proposals by the African majority (March). ANC manifesto published.
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) formed in exile (October).
ZANU guerrilla attacks re-open with greater intensity in rural north-east Rhodesia (December).

1973

Some 200 ANC officials in north-east arrested.
Smith creates 'no go' areas, and protected villages in north-east.
Guerrilla incursions and attacks increase.
Smith closes Zambian border to stop guerrilla incursions (January).
Demands guarantee from President Kaunda that guerrillas will be stopped. Refused. Smith re-opens border. Zambia refused to do the same, lost S(R)16.1 million annual revenue.

1974

Smith warns of more guerrilla action ahead, launches campaign to attract 1 million white settlers (January).
After coup d'Etat in Lisbon, Portugal announces that Mozambique, under FRELIMO, will become independent in June 1975. Guerrilla activity continues (April). Moto, only African mass-circulation bi-weekly paper, banned. Smith's representatives (E.A.T. Smith and Gaylard) have private discussions with presidents of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and FRELIMO. Smith releases some leading detainees including Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Sithole. After meeting with presidents Machel, Kaunda Khama and Nyerere, a 'unity agreement' is reached. ANC FROLIZI, ZANU and ZAPU merge into the ANC 'as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe' (December 7).
Ceasefire declared (December 11).
South African police and BSAP unit ambushed near Mazoe, five killed (December 23).

1975
Lardner-Burke declared no further releases of detainees until 'a cessation of terrorist activities'.
ANC leaders refused permission by Smith to visit Lusaka to meet British Foreign Secretary.
Incidents continue in north-east province including landmine fatalities. ANC and Smith régime accuse one another of breaches of ceasefire—Smith alleging ANC failure to stop killings, ANC alleging that the régime had wrongly dropped leaflets in the area demanding that guerrillas 'abandon their arms and surrender or return to their bases', and were attempting to disarm guerrillas they made contact with (February). Three guerrillas convicted of terrorism hanged. Rev. Sithole re-detained after Smith alleges he plotted assassination of 'certain opponents he considered to be a challenge in his bid for the leadership of the ANC'—a list of thirty potential victims is mentioned without details, and a hearing in camera arranged (March). Two weeks later additional allegations made that 'he is the President of ZANU... and Commander-in-Chief of ZANLA'.
ANC leaders reject the allegation. Herbert Chitepo (ZANU chairman) assassinated by a bomb in Lusaka (March 18). Zambian authorities arrest members of ZANU supreme council.
Reports of killings arising from internal conflicts within ZANLA (February/March).
In Rhodesia the Special Court to consider the re-detention of Sithole, declines to consider the assassination allegations and deals only with the allegation that as Commander-in-Chief of ZANLA 'he had... been responsible for the death, since the ceasefire... of terrorist victims in the north-east area'. After hearings in public on this charge alone, in which Rev. Sithole refused to participate, the court found his re-detention 'fully warranted'. The court stated that since 1972, 53 members of the Rhodesian security forces, 13 European civilians and 220 African civilians had been killed by guerrillas.
ANC delegation, including the re-released Rev. Sithole, attends the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers, discussion on southern Africa in Dar es Salaam. Bishop Muzorewa attends Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference (Jamaica), obtaining assurances of assistance for Mozambique to enable it to close its railways to Rhodesian sanctions-breaking activities.
June 1, Rhodesian police, breaking up a demonstration outside an ANC National Executive meeting in Salisbury (Highfield), shot and killed thirteen and wounded others.
The white invasion

Like the rest of southern Africa the territory at present known as Rhodesia has experienced successive political systems, and a succession of peoples and cultures. Most of these changes involved the growth and decay of essentially African systems, or the intrusion and absorption (or rejection) of other African groups. European colonial penetration commenced in the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese came into contact with the Shona people of what is now north-eastern Mashonaland in the thriving Mwene Mutapa confederation. The latter’s strength was as much spiritual as economic and military, hence the continuity of its influence well after its subjection to strong Portuguese pressures in the area which is now Mozambique.

Until the 1830s there co-existed, in what is now Matabeleland and western Mashonaland, another centralized system whose influence and strength during the eighteenth century exceeded that of the Mwene Mutapa—the Rozwi confederation, centred on the massive stone edifices of Great Zimbabwe, and stretching almost to the core of the Mutapa realms of the Korekore. The Rozwi Mambos (kings) of Zimbabwe successfully resisted Portuguese pressures, and governed an organized, peaceful and very prosperous people. The Rozwi confederation, at least in its outward political form, was shattered in the 1830s by the invading Ngoni impi (regiments) moving from the south under Zwangendaba, who destroyed the Mambo and his court before moving north.

In 1838 the following wave of the Ndebele, lead by Mzilikazi, quickly established a new military state in the south-west of what was the Rozwi empire, and it was with this community that the precursors of European settlement negotiated their penetration into the territory.

This chapter will be largely concerned with the consequences of the European invasion which here, as elsewhere in Africa and in the world, had profound results; but it is important to remember that it is only an episode in the history of the area. The ‘Rhodesian way of life’ which its present white beneficiaries and champions strive to maintain at almost any cost is only a phase in the continuing chronicle of the peoples who have come, gone or remained
between the Limpopo, the Zambezi, the eastern mountains of Inyanga and the western swamp and desert plains of Makarikari. As Obed Mutezo, the African hero of Ndabaningi Sithole’s novel-come-contemporary political manual says: ‘Foreigners come and go, but they leave us here in Zimbabwe.’

Europeans had to negotiate with, and perhaps conquer, established communities which were often powerful. As early as 1836 Britain, through the Governor of the Cape Colony, had concluded a treaty of friendship with the Ndebele king Mzilikazi who, in 1870, was succeeded by his son Lobengula. The Privy Council, in a famous decision in 1919 (in re Southern Rhodesia) considering the legal basis of the European presence in the territory, took as their starting point Lobengula’s sovereignty, and were of the opinion that ‘after a fashion [his] was a regular government’, which involved his autocratic power assisted by a senate and popular assembly whose ‘consent lent authority to his public acts’. In the management of his external affairs Lobengula is described by Professor Alexandrowicz in The European-African Confrontation as ‘one of the most skilled African rulers’. The Privy Council confirmed that when the British South Africa Company (BSAC) entered and sought to exercise control in the territory in 1891 ‘the source of its actual administration [was] in the governing Sovereign of the country, king Lobengula’. Southern Rhodesia was thus one of the very few cases in Africa of colonial acquisition by undisguised conquest. This gives added significance to the circumstances in which Rhodes, the BSAC and the settlers, granted permission only to exploit minerals by the king, manipulated the situation and the British Government into a violent confrontation in order to take complete control. The fruits of that conflict are still being reaped.

The Berlin Act of 1885 provided a fresh stimulus to the European colonization of Africa. Britain was ready to extend its influence, but reluctant to undertake the effective occupation and jurisdiction needed to establish such influence beyond challenge. In part this explains why Rhodesia is uniquely the creation of the wealthy, ambitious, imperial expansionist Cecil John Rhodes. Having made an immense fortune in the diamond mines, he saw the opportunity of fulfilling his imperialist dream of a British Africa and the prospect of the further mineral wealth which all hoped would be found across the Limpopo.

Britain’s readiness to allow such private initiative to extend her influence was increased by the threatened extension, inherent in an agreement made in 1887 with Lobengula by President Kruger’s emissary Grobler, of Boer influence beyond the Transvaal. The missionary J. S. Moffat, acting on behalf of the British Government, persuaded the king to abrogate the Grobler treaty and enter into a treaty establishing a British sphere of influence, and agreeing not to cede any of his territory without British sanction. An immediate rush of concession hunters to Lobengula followed. Rudd’s success was partly the result of the support given to Rhodes’ agent by the British representative. In return for £100 per month, 1,000 rifles, 100,000 cartridges, plus an armed steamboat promised (but never delivered) by the concessionaries, Lobengula gave them the right to ‘win and procure all metals and minerals in my kingdoms’.

On this basis Rhodes persuaded the British Government to grant a charter to the BSAC—including powers of government and administration—which, as British officials made clear, he would need Lobengula’s permission to execute.
In fact the most significant powers arrogated by the company to itself, especially the right to administer the settlers and their problems and to have a British Resident appointed, were not disclosed to the king, while his opposition to them was kept from the British Government. Equally his efforts to abrogate the concession on the advice of his council (fully within his sovereign rights) were not revealed to the British authorities until after the grant of the charter in October 1889. Deception, collusion and confusion of company and Crown interests thus played a significant part in the establishment of European presence in the territory. It was replaced in time by violence when they felt powerful enough to change their status from guests to overlords.

The occupation of Mashonaland on 12 September 1890 was surrounded by similar hypocrisy. The British Government was aware of Lobengula's objections to it, yet maintained the pretence that the pioneer column was moving with the legally required consent of Lobengula. At Fort Salisbury, as Palley points out, a fraudulent annexation ceremony was enacted by the settlers (it is re-enacted annually by them, and until recently was called ‘Occupation Day’). It was without legal basis in the concession or charter, and was not ratified by the British Government. Thereafter the company proceeded to do precisely what the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, had warned it against—to govern [Lobengula's] country without his permission'. It appointed an ‘Administrator’, a political supervisor (Dr Jameson) and an officer-in-command of the police. It was not until May 1891, to deal with a threatened Boer trek into Mashonaland, and in spite of Lobengula’s opposition, that Britain declared a protectorate over the whole of Mashonaland.

There is an additional point of less legal significance to those above (since Britain recognized Lobengula as the sovereign of the whole of Mashonaland), but important in human terms to the inhabitants of the area. As Lawrence Vambe's book indicates, the Shona people living outside the areas within easy reach of Matabele raiding parties did not consider themselves subject to Lobengula. Consequently their friendly attitude to the small pioneer group, who appeared no different from other purely temporary incursions of white hunters and traders, turned to resentment when they found themselves being evicted from their ancestral homes and forced into labouring for them. This resentment can in part be measured by the events of their violent resistance to settler occupation—usually referred to as the ‘rebellion’ of 1897.

Company administration, which has been correctly described as ‘politically irresponsible’, thus achieved effective control over the whole of Mashonaland by early 1892, largely as a result of a consistent refusal of the British Government to assert authority to prevent it and an equally consistent readiness to agree to the demands of the settlers. The pattern of imperial weakness was thus early established, and the following years served only to emphasize the supremacy of settler interests. Company legislation and administration, apparently beyond the concern or control of Britain, effectively turned local African attitudes from surprise, through resentment, to a determination to resist the uninvited Europeans. The provocation included extraordinary harshness by company officials, often part-timers, in their dealings with the African population, especially the Shonas, who did not have the protection of Lobengula. In addition, the existence of two apparently sovereign authorities (Lobengula de
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa

jure and the company de facto) within the same kingdom made a clash inevitable. European settlers would not tolerate the dislocation caused by raiding impis, and the Matabele resented company seizure of their cattle even if it was mistaken. The settlers, confident then, as now, of their links with the more powerful south, 'presented the implications of colonial rule and of a settler economy to the Africans with no concessions at all'.

As a particularly bad example of this attitude the extraordinary case, in March 1892, of a dawn police attack on Ngome's village (a headman of Chief Mangwende) in Mashonaland may be cited. Maxim guns and a seven-pounder were used by Captain Lendy to punish the kraal for having struck a settler who demanded to search the kraal, having accused men from the kraal of theft. No evidence was produced, nor was arrest and trial considered. Twenty-one men were killed, forty-seven head of cattle taken. This was the new administration of Dr Jameson, which Rhodes commended for 'maintaining the dignity of the law'. An equally striking illustration was the summary punishment by fifty lashes in public and a fine of six goats and three head of cattle, in March 1893, on a headman at Amanda's kraal for rejecting a demand 'to send some of his boys to work' and saying his men were 'not going to work for white men', and that he would 'fire on the police if they came'.

Yet the eventually violent Shona reaction to the occupation surprised the settlers—partly because they misunderstood the people and their culture, and partly because of their self-deception regarding the gratitude they expected the Shona to show for their 'liberation' from the Ndebele. This propensity to believe their own propaganda has repeated itself in the history of Rhodesia—most recently in the total shock suffered by the settlers when the Pearce Commission discovered that Africans did not approve a constitutional plan which they had no part in making, which left power in the hands of an illegal minority government and promised little change in their lot.

The first armed conflict

African rebellion, however, was not the start of violent confrontation between the communities. The contradiction inherent in the status of the company and Lobengula had first to be settled. This became all the more vital when it was realized that Ndebele raids killed Shonas, who had now become essential labour for farms and mines, and thus an asset to be protected. This, of course, was not what the company said in defending its actions, but it laid the stress, rather, on its missionary and humanitarian concern. By September 1893, Dr Jameson was confident that with the aid of a strong group of volunteers his police force could defeat the king. Company doubts over the expense of the operation were assuaged by Rhodes' personal promise of £50,000 to meet the initial costs, and the expectation that the booty of Matabele land, gold claims and cattle would provide sufficient reward for the volunteers.

The Matabele were suddenly represented as a severe threat in the Cape and British press, and an excuse for war was sought. It proved in the event that the Matabele were not prepared for war, and within a month of the invasion, as Selous colourfully proclaimed, 'the fair-haired descendants of the northern
pirates are in possession of the great king's kraal and the calf of the black cow has fled into the wilderness'. The Matabele kingdom was destroyed by a brilliant if ruthless pre-emptive strike, executed by the combined forces of the settlers and the Imperial Bechuanaland Border Police. Britain chose not to annex the territory, but appointed the company to administer it, to avoid expense to Britain and offence to Rhodes and white feelings in South Africa. As Palley points out, 'only where Rhodes' wishes cut across imperial policy was the British Government firm'. Even the extraordinary debacle of the Jameson raid, highlighting the company's lack of responsibility, failed to shake the government out of its neglectful attitude. The bitterness caused by the raid and the treacherous actions while Lobengula was seeking peace provided a Matabele parallel to the feelings of the Shona and led to a mighty effort to end the colonial penetration.

In terms of its agreement with the Victoria volunteers, and despite the legal prohibitions of the Matabele Order in Council, the company encouraged 'a veritable land rush'. Immigration was encouraged and the permanent settlement of the land, which was supposed to await the decision of an imperial-controlled land commission, proceeded with haste. The technique of the settler-managed *fait accompli* (cf. the 'Unilateral' Declaration of Independence in 1965) was already well established. Jameson's 'provisional' acts of government were not challenged, and the Matabele were dispossessed of their lands, to be allocated reserves in areas strange to them and, in the opinion of the British Deputy Commissioner in 1897, 'badly watered, sandy and unfit for settlement'. For the Matabele, the possession of cattle had a spiritual as well as a material value. They were equally ruthlessly deprived of both in the face of equally ineffective safeguards (cf. Mason's *Birth of a Dilemma*). The Matabele lost four-fifths of their cattle, and those remaining were put into the hands of company-favoured individuals instead of being returned to the people. Further losses were caused by an outbreak of rinderpest. As Mason says: 'Matabele society was disrupted by tearing out one of the most binding strands in the whole fabric.' Government in Matabeleland, during the post-1891 war period, amounted to 'frank military despotism by Jameson's white police' (cf. Ranger). This, combined with the licence (especially with regard to labour recruiting) granted to Matabele native police, themselves recruited from former *impi*s and much resented by their fellow Ndebele, produced fertile soil for rebellion.

**Resistance to conquest**

The opportunity to act was provided by the Boer capture of the Jameson raiders, which deprived the settlers of their immediate military protection. Whites were generally convinced that 'the natives are happy', under the same self-delusion which makes the 'Rhodesian way of life' acceptable to otherwise reasonably humane people. So on 24 March 1896, 'the Ndebele abandoned soft words . . . and came to Bulawayo with assegais in their hands'. By the evening of 30 March not a white man was left alive in the outlying districts of Matabeleland, and by mid-April Bulawayo was almost entirely surrounded. Ranger's *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* provides the most complete
explanation and description to date of this rising and the parallel moves by the Shona. It also brings out the full tragedy of the situation—'the rationality from their point of view' of the slaughter of white men and women by the Ndebele, and the consequent violence of white revenge and reaction—concluding that 'there was little to choose between the savagery with which both sides conducted the fighting'. The same work explains the great significance and relevance of the African past to this era of physical resistance (which was by far the strongest and bloodiest in the history of early African resistance to nineteenth-century colonialism).

The Matabele leadership included military leaders (Mkwati, Mtini, Nyamanda, Nkomo, Umlugulu, Sikombo, Mpotshwana and Somabulana) and such spiritual leaders as Siganyamatshe and Mwabani of Matojeni. In Mashonaland the leaders included Chiquaquia, Makoni, Mangwende, Mchemwa, Mashanganyika, Mashiangombi and Nyandoro on the military side and Bonde Tshiwa, Manyanga Wamponga, Nianda (Nehanda) Gumporeshumba (the Kagubi medium, often synonymously referred to as 'Murenga'), the major spiritual leaders and organizers. Particularly important was the organization and coordination of the rebellion by the priests of the Mwari and the Mlimo cults, whose roots lay deep in the former greatness of Zimbabwe and had penetrated Matabele society. The contemporary significance of this feature of resistance is eloquently expressed in Sithole's novel Obed Mutezo.

The company and settlers eventually suppressed the rebellion, with considerable imperial military aid. The Matabele (in part) accepted a negotiated peace with Rhodes at the famous Motopo Indaba, and of ten new Indunas appointed after the peace, six were ex-rebel leaders, including Umlugulu, one of the chief adversaries of the whites. The Shona rebellion took at least a further year to suppress and was by comparison ferociously dealt with, little quarter being given to rebel leaders or their followers. The leadership was either hunted down and killed, or tried (as in the case of Nahenda and the much-feared Kagubi medium) and executed. Political compromise then as now was not seriously contemplated by the settlers.

It is interesting to note the continuing spiritual and cultural aspect of African resistance, so obvious in the 1890s, including the constant references back to ancestral spirits. As a guerrilla fighter on trial in Rhodesia in 1968 explained himself: 'We are going to fulfil the aims of the war we abandoned in 1897.' Although Rhodesian Europeans count themselves as the upholders of Western civilization above all else, it is interesting to note that they have found it acceptable and useful to try to enlist the spirit mediums in their fight against the recent resurgence of African culture and independence.

The establishment of Rhodesia

It is ironic that these rebellions, whose 'challenge to the whites was the most formidable, and the scale of organization the greatest of any of the east, central and southern African resistance' were so unsuccessful in achieving either their major objective (the removal of the settlers) or their subsidiary unstated objectives (the replacement of company with imperial rule, and the improvement of the status of the indigenous population). For despite the uprising and the
An ancient civilization—the Zimbabwe ruins.
serious defects revealed in company administration, Britain retained the BSAC as its delegated government, ensuring the pattern of white settler domination which still characterizes the territory.

By 1897, despite the Jameson raid, the rebellions and the criticism they brought upon him, Rhodes' name was officially adopted and used to describe the imperial venture which still constitutes Rhodesia.

One question is dramatically raised by the events outlined above. How could the company and the settlers, regarding themselves then, as their successors do now, as not only technologically and militarily superior, but morally superior to the African civilization they confronted, indulge in such obvious dishonesty and brutality? African resistance killed almost a tenth of their number, including women and children; and the great mineral wealth which they had been expecting did not materialize—the company failed to pay a dividend until the administration was finally handed over to the settlers. Yet they maintained their grip, and whenever they felt it was threatened took whatever steps seemed necessary to retain it.

Part of the answer may lie in the nineteenth-century spirit of European adventure, part in the very strong feelings of racial supremacy. But equally important may be their extraordinary life style. This was an immediate product of the toughness of their pacification of the African population and the total dislocation wrought by the taking of African land. It gave a sense of relative wealth and security, in contrast to the Africans' poverty and total insecurity. A partial illustration of this are the words of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, speaking at a conference in Oxford in 1972, when he said:

As I speak to you, I wish I had some chains around my hands, because this is how I feel. Whether I am in the best hotel of Oxford or London or New York or anywhere in the world, whether I sit on the desk of a graduate school, whether I have £5,000 in my bank, I feel a slave in the country of my birth.

Throughout the history of the settler occupation it has been possible for whites to impose this humiliation upon blacks, apparently with pride, and certainly without regret.

The sense of the unquestioned right to do this can be demonstrated by some quotations from white leaders at important stages of Rhodesian history. Rhodes admired Anglo-Saxon culture and believed that: 'We are the finest race in the world... and... the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race.' Sir Godfrey Huggins, who led white Rhodesians through their most secure and prosperous years (1933–53), expressed what may be regarded as the classic description of the Rhodesian ideal for the relationship between the races:¹

The Europeans in this country can be likened to an island of white in a sea of black, with the artisan and the tradesmen forming the shores and the professional classes the highlands in the centre. Is the native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually attack the highlands? To permit this would mean that the leaven of civilization would be removed from the country, and the black man would inevitably revert to a barbarian worse than before.

¹. Quotation from Bulawayo Chronicle, p. 15, of 31 March 1938, reproduced by Bowman.
And finally, the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)—the ultimate rationalization of the ‘Rhodesian way of life’—in November 1965 was eulogized by Ian Smith as follows:

To us has been given the privilege of being the first Western nation in the past two decades to have the determination to say ‘so far and no further’ . . . we have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity.

These attitudes are well described in the Rhodesian novels of Doris Lessing and in her introduction to L. Vambe’s book; in books written by white supporters of UDI; and are most unambiguously expressed in the Hansard reports of the Rhodesian legislature over many years.

We have observed the somewhat dubious foundations of Rhodesia. We must now examine the government of the territory in relation to Ian Smith’s description.

Having assisted in the destruction of African political power in the war against Lobengula and the suppression of the revolts in 1896-97, Britain ensured that power was transferred to the company and the settlers. The Constitutional Law and History of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 by Palley sets this out clearly, and explains (p. 155) that

By the end of 1898 therefore the future structure of government had been laid down. The major institutions, instruments of administration, and legislative policies, most of which were to endure until the present day, were already in existence. The representative principle had been introduced by the creation of a Legislative Council with a minority of elected members and, although the Legislative Council had no executive responsibilities, it was acknowledged that this was but the first step towards responsible government. A franchise couched in non-discriminatory language, but with property and monetary qualifications and the additional requirement of literacy that would, in effect, exclude the majority of Africans, was laid down. A Native Affairs Department responsible for governmental relations with Africans was established. In urban areas municipalities had been created and legislation providing for the control of Africans in such areas had been enacted. In so far as land was concerned, the Reserve system had been introduced. All this was done at a time when Britain had complete control of legislation: indeed the major legislative measures providing the framework for future administration and policy had been enacted by Order in Council and High Commissioner’s Proclamation. These provisions had been made since Britain had decided that Southern Rhodesia should follow the general pattern set by the South African colonies and would eventually become part of a white self-governing South African federation.

Every step of Rhodesian history since then has been shaped by the decision mentioned in the last sentence above. For almost sixty years the white settlers have entrenched and strengthened the structure with little regard to the protests of the powerless majority. African opposition was articulate, as is described in Mlambo’s Struggle for a Birthright, Ranger’s The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, Shamuyarira’s Crisis in Rhodesia and Sithole’s African Nationalism. It was based however, on two assumptions which have proved increasingly false, i.e. that the settler government would fairly consider African opinion, and that Britain, the responsible authority, would exercise effective control in the interest of Africans.
Consolidation

The basic themes in the process by which white power was consolidated were as follows:

1. White land control through unequal tenure and allocation of land.
2. White executive and administrative (as opposed to representative) government of the African majority, combined with government responsibility to an exclusively white electorate.
3. White control over the potential economic power of labour. This was ensured by white monopoly of skills by restricting training and education to whites, combined with control and over bargaining power through trade union legislation which discriminated against the organization of black workers.
4. White retention of political power (referred to as 'responsible' by white Rhodesian politicians) to ensure the continuity of (1) to (3).

The benefits this system brings to whites, plus the fact that they inhabit, as they largely do, the highland areas of a country with an almost perfect climate, makes it easier to explain, if not to understand, why their actions deny the Christian ethic they purport to uphold and reject the democratic ideals of government of the civilization they claim to defend. It also explains how they can commit treason against the Crown and country they emotionally admire and whence the majority of them originate. The process of maintaining political power has inevitably produced an additional but now very characteristic feature of the 'Rhodesian way of life'—a system of authoritarian government as inhumane if not as savage as any dictatorship existing.

Rhodesia shares with South Africa, and until recently the Portuguese African territories, the further evil that its oppression is directed almost exclusively against the black majority. This limits and stunts the lives even of the whites who believe they are its beneficiaries and who, like others who have tolerated inhumane government, are apparently blinded and desensitized by the system they help to perpetuate. Since inhumanity inevitably produces an energetic human reaction (no matter how long delayed)—the 'Rhodesian era' has added a new feature to the history of Zimbabwe: the efforts and ideals of those struggling to liberate themselves and the country of a political system whose deliberate perpetuation constitutes a serious twentieth-century relapse from human progress.
The political and economic subservience of the African population is directly linked with their dispossession of the land. Wealth in Rhodesia was not to be found in a mineral bonanza of gold or diamonds, but in land. For some time after the wholesale land-grabbing by the Pioneer Column and the war of 1893, the situation remained unclear. The BSAC hoped to recover its costs, and to profit from the sale of land. Settlers resented being asked to pay for what they believed they had fought for and won from the Africans.

It was this issue which was at stake in the case brought before the British Privy Council for decision in 1919. The court having held that the land belonged to the Crown, the exclusive, uninhabited and independent control of government, which would ensure control of the land, became the prime aim of the settlers. Indeed Rhodesians still see formal international recognition of their exclusive control of government as their ‘first prize’, despite the fact that they have enjoyed effective settler government since 1923, and unilaterally sought to legalize it in 1965. Africans naturally resented the Privy Council’s confirmation of the expropriation of their lands, as Mlambo explains fully in his chapter on the land question. The reserves, seen by some as a minimal protection of African land rights, merely provided the legitimization of the process of removing Africans forcibly from good to poor land. This appropriation did not end in the nineteenth century. Whenever it became desirable to adjust in the white interest, whether for mineral exploitation or some form of ‘rationalization’, Africans were moved. Indeed a Rhodesian Select Parliamentary Committee on Resettlement revealed in 1960 that between 1936 and 1959, 113,000 Africans had been compulsorily moved from European farming areas, at the cost of ‘millions of pounds of badly needed money being spent for ideological rather than productive purposes’.

Many thousands of landless Africans continue to live on what became white land, providing a basic income in rent, and a cheap labour supply to the white farmer. This is possible because the often huge estates are largely uncultivated by white owners, and the presence of Africans is vital. One of the earliest legislative acts (1894) was to impose a hut tax on Africans, to force them to enter the money economy, to work for whites in home, factory, farm and mine. Yet many Africans were not made aware (as for example by being given compensation) of the fact that they had lost their ancestral land.
The Tangwena case

Since 1964, at Gaeresi Ranch, the Rhodesian Front authorities have been trying to remove the Tangwena people and their chief Rekayi. The Tangwena country, in the mountains of Inyanga, is rich agricultural land, and not surprisingly 250,000 acres of it was 'sold' in 1905 (without the knowledge of the inhabitants) by the BSAC to the Anglo-French Matabeleland Company. The latter ceded part to the Gaeresi Ranch Company. The Tangwena were not made aware of this alienation until 1965, when the manager of the ranch decided in the interests of economic farming to extend his fencing to encompass them. This coincided with the death of the Tangwena chief and the election of Rekayi as his successor. The white farmer wished to 'rationalize' by reducing the African population now included, and offered labour contracts to some Tangwena, expecting the rest to move to whichever 'reserve' the District Commissioner prescribed. Here, however, something exceptional happened: Rekayi and his people would not move. Many Africans have protested at similar moves, none with such dignity and determination.

After legitimate but vigorous protest to the authorities—even as far as the Secretary for Internal Affairs—Rekayi was given the standard treatment afforded to African chiefs who assert their people's rights: he was dismissed. Neither he nor his people accepted this. They physically resisted eviction. They challenged its legality successfully in the law courts on the grounds that, under the Land Apportionment Act, Africans who had lived upon Crown land before its alienation are protected 'squatters', and could be removed only by a governmental decision in the form of a proclamation. The Rhodesian Appelate Division underlined that the Crown's argument on the law 'would lead not only to absurdity but to manifest injustice'. The case had by then (June 1968) become notorious and even the white press (the Rhodesian Herald) pleaded that the authorities (by now the illegal Smith régime) should follow 'the humane course... and accept a suggestion' (made originally by Rekayi) that they buy the land and incorporate it into the adjacent Tribal Trust lands—giving the tribe its land and the company its money.

Following instead the tradition of white governmental dealings with African land, the authorities issued a proclamation in 1969 ordering the Tangwena to leave. Legal action was followed by bulldozers, and eventually by police and soldiers. In a quite extraordinary manner the Tangwena have, however, maintained their stand and, when moved, return. By every peaceful means, Rekayi and his people continue to confront the authorities on this absolutely basic issue. It is a historic episode in the greater process of liberation. This may be confirmed by the unaccustomed degree of restraint exercised by the régime. There is still no compromise on the supremacy of white economic interest, whatever the consequences may be in terms of human misery, but the régime hesitates to use the full panoply of its destructive and restrictive powers. This may be due to its awareness of world attention focused upon it, or partly perhaps to a grudging admiration of the overwhelming moral effect produced by this African leader in rags. Equally, however, it may be attributed to a more Machiavellian and merely tactical move to deal relatively mildly (if the eviction of over 250 families, the destruction of their houses and crops, and the virtual
kidnapping of their children can be so described) with this symbolic yet peripheral opposition, at a time when Rhodesian leaders are seeking a settlement with Britain and international recognition by the Western world at least.

The confrontation is fully described in *The Ousting of the Tangwena*, published by the International Defence and Aid Fund. If the statistics of distribution are the bones of the land problem in Rhodesia, the Tangwena may be seen as illustrating its flesh-and-blood reality.

**The physical division**

The purely statistical picture of land distribution starkly illustrates the relative status of black and white. In 1969, land segregation as between white and black was written into the new constitution and so given the fundamental legal status it had always emotionally enjoyed in Rhodesia as a ‘white man’s country’. The land was divided almost exactly between Africans (44.94 million acres) and Europeans (44.95 million acres). The Rhodesian Front congratulated itself on its absolute fairness, for it had increased the area of the Tribal Trust land allocated to Africans. However, almost 5 million Africans would share the African land (theoretically 67.9 persons per square mile), while less than a quarter of a million Europeans would share the European land (theoretically 3.2 persons per square mile). The new arrangement increased the pre-1969 European share of land, and reduced the global amount of African land by reducing the African Purchase Area (where blacks could own land) and abolishing and redistributing on strictly racial lines the unreserved land formerly open to all races. Even compared with the earliest period of white land hunger, the 1969 distribution is a gross injustice. In 1904, the Land Commission had set aside African reserves which were to be inalienable. The area of these reserves was 38,871 square miles, the African population 268,618, that is 6.8 persons per square mile, ten times as much space per person as was allotted in 1969.

It is possible to argue that although land policies prior to 1969 were intended to protect European vested interests, the purpose was economic rather than racist. When the ‘native reserves’ were first established, the Africans practised subsistence agriculture and did not require access to markets. Especially in Mashonaland, they preferred light soils near their traditional hill refuges, to the heavy loams and clay soils that could be mechanically cultivated. The Native Commissioners who recommended that the reserves be created no doubt miscalculated the rapid increase in the African population, from around 200,000 in 1890 to over 4.5 million in 1969. Kay suggests that by 1925, ‘The lion’s share of the better parts of the country had been secured for Europeans before political criteria assumed a prominent role in land apportionment.’ Even if that be true, and one accepts the myth that Africans did not protest, the harsh truth is that, by the late 1950s (cf. Yudelman’s study in 1964), and even more so by the late 1960s, it was clear that the division was unfair and outdated, and that it was retarding not only African but national progress. Yet the fact that Land Tenure Act was passed in 1969 and defended by the Rhodesian Front partly on the basis the Carter report of 1925 (see below) demonstrates perfectly that it exists to protect white interests.
The reserves were originally intended to protect Africans against the wholesale alienation of their land. When the settlers were given political control in 1923 and instituted what they call ‘responsible government’, the reserves were about 21 million acres. According to the 1923 constitution, alienation of reserved land required British consent. Outside the reserves, Africans theoretically enjoyed the right to hold land on the same terms as whites. Their economic position largely precluded this. By 1925, Europeans had bought 31 million acres, Africans only 45,000 acres—despite their anxiety to increase their holding. But the mere possibility that blacks might buy worried whites. In 1925 the Carter Commission set up by the British Government submitted its report approving the division of the land and stating *inter alia* that ‘it is better that the points of contact in this respect between the races should be reduced’. This view was supported by missionaries who were concerned by the African’s economic weakness, and the combination of arguments persuaded the British Government to allow the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act (1930).

This law may rightly be regarded as the foundation stone of the ‘Rhodesian way of life’. Its retention was basic to the electoral success of the Rhodesian Front Party in 1962, and it is entrenched as the Land Tenure Act in the 1969 constitution. It is ironic to note that, although the initial negotiations had been undertaken with a Conservative government, the final approval of this legislation was given by the Labour colonial secretary, Sidney Webb (or Lord Passfield as he then was), who assured the Rhodesian prime minister of the time that ‘he fully recognizes the sincerity of your aim, namely, to improve the condition of the native’. In *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia*, Ranger shows how in this, as other major decisions affecting them, black views were largely ignored.

The qualitative division

The Land Apportionment Act did not initiate the division of land into black and white (that after all had come with the reserves); what it did do was to consolidate the division and impose a fundamentally inferior status upon the black ‘semi-citizens’ of this free enterprise economy. Under the Act, Africans were allocated part of the land of Rhodesia, but only land in the ‘Purchase Area’ (now about 10 per cent) can be bought. Such purchase provided Africans with the only possibility of competing with whites in the capitalist economy. The remaining land, now referred to as the Tribal Trust lands, is occupied communally. Its only source of funds for development is the Rhodesian Government, whose economic philosophy is free enterprise and whose political future does not depend upon votes of the inhabitants of the Tribal Trust lands. In the ‘white’ area, on the contrary, all land can be purchased and owned individually, sold, and used to raise capital or for any of the other purposes that land can serve. Africans cannot own property or live in white areas, except on special terms, and whites are similarly precluded from living in black areas.1

Inequality is not confined to the legal tenure of land. The country was divided up, not haphazardly, but with care over a long period, to ensure the

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best possible conditions to whites who are born in Rhodesia or are ignorant or selfish enough to immigrate there. On numerous occasions Africans were removed in circumstances similar to those in the Tangwenda case. Mining rights held by Europeans may lead to the displacement of Africans even in what are nominally their own areas.

Apart from tenure and scale, Africans suffer other disadvantages:
1. The main roads and railway lines were planned only in relation to white areas.
2. Urban centres, and hence industry and associated activities are concentrated in white areas.
3. In relation to soil fertility and rainfall, the better agricultural land is predominantly in white areas. By and large whites have almost as much ‘good’ land as ‘bad’ land, while African land is three-quarters ‘bad’ and only a quarter ‘good’.

**Economic subjugation**

The African majority has been placed in an economically weak position from which it is virtually impossible to recover unless fundamental changes are made. It has been cut off from the economic power which goes with land ownership, and its ability to compete and achieve power by other means has been further lessened by a deliberate policy of restricting opportunities for education, training, enterprise and collective bargaining.

The minority pursues this policy not only because of a direct desire to ensure a mass of semi-skilled labour but also because of a real awareness that experience, self-confidence and self-respect in any field is inextricably linked with the danger of a concerted African demand for political power. The corollary of deliberately fostered African inferiority is the perpetuation of white superiority. There is a vicious circle in which white oppression of the African produces a depressed condition among Africans, which in turn is used to justify the majority’s continued oppression. The spiritual depression, mental colonization, mutual suspicion and apathy, which results have not been without their political effect upon the African. The physiological effects have been buttressed by action to prevent any consistent politicization and consolidation of the majority. This explains in part the scale and brutality of the suppression of the 1890s, as well as the destruction of traditional structures, and their replacement by dependent and compliant institutions. It has helped to ensure that African reaction to minority rule has been slower and less vigorous than might be expected. It helps to explain the remarkable fact that a handful of whites maintain control over 5 million Africans. Equally it shows why the themes of self-respect, self-reliance and a harkening back to pre-occupation traditions is increasingly important to both the political and military resistance of the nationalist movement.
African peoples.
Semi-extensive livestock farming

Extensive livestock farming

Unsuitable for farming

Natural farming regions.
Humid and sub-arid
Mild sub-arid
Mild sub-arid, sub-arid
Sub-arid
Sub-arid, arid
Arid
Arid, sub-desert

Bio-climatic regions.
Tsetse fly infested areas (1964).
Education

Discrimination

Education in Rhodesia typifies a combination of deliberate discrimination and subtle management, political ruthlessness and professional diligence, which confuses both the practitioners and the victims of minority government, and outside observers of the phenomenon. White Rhodesians and their apologists will claim that they provide one of the best educational systems in Africa and the developing world. This claim may be defensible if it is limited to Rhodesian African primary education and if the existence of a parallel and completely separated Rhodesian education department for Europeans is ignored. The situation is different if secondary education is considered. It is at this level that a deliberately discriminatory educational system becomes most apparent. It should be remembered that the franchise is linked to educational qualifications which increases the importance of education. The educational system trains Africans to provide efficient service at lower levels while ensuring for Europeans a superiority designed to confirm a racial mythology in which they are cast as a perpetual leadership élite who alone can ensure continued 'standards of civilization'.

The facts are as follows. There are two separate education departments, the African and the European, which includes Asian and coloureds. Government spending on the education of a European child is ten times that on an African child. Over 75 per cent of government spending in the African sector is on primary schooling. (In 1972 about $15.5 million, out of about $20 million.) Secondary schooling only became available to Africans in 1940. Education for Europeans has been compulsory since the 1930 Education Act, but it is still only voluntary for Africans. Only a fraction of teachers in African education (in 1972, 1,137 out of 18,537) have equivalent qualifications to those required for all teachers in European education. For Africans, but not for Europeans, as the 1974 Lewis report on African primary education makes clear 'for many years to come primary education must be terminal for a majority, albeit a decreasing majority of pupils'. Only 50 per cent of the African children who manage to complete primary school will be found places in the secondary sectors, and
most (37.5 per cent) of them will have to make do with only two years of 'vocational' education, which is not the case for European children.

By a more indirect device another basic characteristic of the Rhodesian system supplements this discrimination and plurality in education. The compulsory segregation of the races by the Land Apportionment (now Land Tenure) Act, which has become axiomatic and accepted, by Europeans at least, as the 'natural' Rhodesian order of things, means that African children cannot in any case attend schools in European areas without express government permission. The majority of secondary schools are in the urban areas which are all designated European. The achievements in African education have been made as a result of professionalism and subtle management in an area which never raised the 'bogey' of skilled or highly educated Africans, and which was never seen as clashing with government interests. Ironically it makes the Rhodesian majority more 'educated' than were Africans in the former colonial territories of east and central Africa on the eve of their independence.

Discrimination is more clearly revealed when it is realized that while European education is almost exclusively a government responsibility (in 1967 83 per cent of white children went to government schools), African education by contrast is even now essentially subsidized by government. Although Rhodesian Front policy has been to reduce mission education, which has become politically less acceptable to white government, churches still play a considerable role, and where mission schools have been taken from church they have generally been made the responsibility not of the government, but of the local African rural councils. In 1967, 90 per cent of African children were in mission and non-government schools. The rural areas are poor and the councils not only inexperienced in education but by their nature subordinate and dependent upon the minority government. Thus an African rural community needing a school must first find the money to build the school before they can expect assistance from the State. No similar situation prevails for Europeans. The standard white Rhodesian response and justification for this situation would be to point to the fact that total government spending on African education is as much as, if not more than, that on European schooling, and would add that the Europeans contribute by far the largest share of income-tax revenue. Thus African education problems might be seen as a logical result of the fact that the government is responsible only to the white electorate.

The same attitude must account for the Rhodesian Front's new policy for African education announced in 1966. This 'pegged' government spending arbitrarily at 2 per cent of the GNP. All excess costs, capital and running, must be borne by the Africans or charities directly. No similar policy exists for European education. Placing responsibility for education directly upon the African rural community—where most African children live—is also, of course, a feature of the South African Bantu education system.

To illustrate the fact that the Rhodesian Government is fully aware of the grossly discriminatory nature of education in the country, reference can be made to the answer given by the Rhodesian Front Minister of Education in 1967, to the suggestion that all children should receive equal educational opportunity. To give African children equal compulsory education it was estimated that the immediate capital cost would have been £250 million, with
running costs at £154 million per year. The discrimination and distortion inherent in this system is brought home when it is pointed out that in 1967 the gross domestic product (GDP) was only £366.4 million!

The minister defended his rejection of another call for an equal share of the educational budget in 1969, by pointing out that this would mean that £98 less per year would be spent on each European child, and only £9 extra on each African child. He concluded: 'The benefit to the African would not be great but the effect on the European would be disastrous.' Here again an essential link with policy in other areas must be noted. European education of such a superior nature is regarded as essential if white immigrants are to be attracted and retained. Thus, not only are African children subjected to a distorted system, African workers are also excluded from moving up into skilled jobs reserved for white immigrants.

Some educational statistics

In 1964 only 60 per cent of African children between 7 and 16 were attending school. In 1962, 47 per cent of all African males over 16, and 59 per cent of all African females over 16 had never been to school. In 1967 the figures on school leavers showed that 88.8 per cent of the Europeans had had over ten years of schooling, but only 0.48 per cent of Africans; 97.7 per cent of Africans had between one and seven years of schooling (78.13 per cent between one and five years) while there were no European children in this category. The African educational pyramid, consisting of a considerable base of primary pupils and reducing at the secondary level to a very narrow peak, is almost identical with that in South Africa. This and other parallels are illustrated in the Defence and Aid pamphlet *Rhodesia—South Africa's Sixth Province* by John Sprack. In 1971–72 Ian Smith told the world how happy his Africans were, and his government sought world approval under the proposals agreed upon between him and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Educational expenditure was then as shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rhodesian Pounds sterling</th>
<th>Pounds sterling</th>
<th>Amount spent per student in pounds sterling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>747,537</td>
<td>21,400,000</td>
<td>12,412,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>58,503</td>
<td>18,732,000</td>
<td>10,864,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian and coloured</td>
<td>8,994</td>
<td>18,732,000</td>
<td>10,864,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quality of African education

African education not only receives less money but has always been qualitatively inferior. Expenditure is concentrated on primary and vocational schooling. The very earliest statement of policy (1899) spoke of providing Africans with 'a
systematic training in household work or agriculture'; Rhodesian Front policy is 'to gear the African educational output to the job opportunities which Europeans are willing to offer to Africans'.

Reference was made above to the new policy for education adopted in 1966 as it affected mission schools, and arbitrarily pegged spending on African education at 2 per cent of the GNP. It also explicitly indicated that African education should concentrate on basic education and not on giving opportunities for higher education.

Operated on a non-racial basis, such a policy might well win the approval of many concerned with education in developing countries; indeed, looked at outside its political context, the present programme could offer a great deal. But it cannot be so divorced from its context. The fact is that Africans are offered an inferior system, while Europeans receive educational advantages which few developed countries can boast.

Table 2 shows data for the year ended 30 June 1972 which were submitted in 1973 in separate reports on European and African education. All amounts are expressed in Rhodesian dollars (£1 = $(R)2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>African</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>$21,388,451</td>
<td>$19,912,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita expenditure per child:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average total primary and secondary</td>
<td>$309.25</td>
<td>$27.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>$189.47</td>
<td>$19.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (including technical in case of Europeans)</td>
<td>$398.72</td>
<td>$159.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>69,162</td>
<td>244.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>41,075</td>
<td>695,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/pupil ratio:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1:28.57</td>
<td>1:41.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1:19.21</td>
<td>1:26.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No figures for teacher: pupil ratios are given in the African report. The very inferior qualifications required of teachers, shortage of equipment, and the considerable variations in school administration make the ratio less significant. The figures quoted represent the most generous estimates.

Primary and secondary education

A new policy for an 'extended secondary education for Africans' was planned for 1974, to enable 50 per cent of African primary school leavers to go on to secondary school. But this percentage is based on the numbers who complete primary school, not on the primary-school intake. Furthermore, only 12.5 per cent of these primary-school leavers are provided with academic secondary schooling for four further years, at the academic (F1) schools, and only a fraction of these go on for a further two years and the possibility of university education. Rhodesian Front closure of non-government schools
African teachers protest.
effectively reduced F1 schools from 100 in 1972 to 99 in 1974. The bulk (37.5 per cent) of this 50 per cent which is able to continue at school is offered only two years’ non-academic education in so-called junior secondary (F2) schools. It is here that there has been an expansion of African education, from twenty-one F2 schools in 1971 to forty-one in 1972.

‘Full’ primary education was to have been provided under the 1966 policy. It introduced school fees on a sliding scale, from £2.85 per annum for the first year of primary school to £9 per annum in secondary school. The practical effect was to reduce primary school enrolment as follows: 701,627 in 1968, 699,133 in 1969, 694,875 in 1970. Full education is available only for those whose parents can pay full fees. The major effort in African education has been in the primary sector. The African population is growing at over 3.4 per cent per annum, doubling itself every twenty years (1961, 3,550,000; 1970 (estimated), 4,818,000). In 1963 there were 590,795 primary places; in 1972, only 695,432. Between 1970 and 1972, the number of African primary schools decreased from 3,224 to 3,219.

The contrast between African and European education is highlighted by the fact that compulsory education for the latter ensures that ‘dropouts’ are rare until the final year of secondary school. European school leavers are thus either academically (almost 50 per cent for university) or technically qualified, whereas Africans are forced out by educational bottlenecks at various stages of un-qualification. Thus the cohort which entered African education in 1966 at grade I, 122,590 had been reduced to the 53,018 who entered standard 5 in 1972. In that year the F1 (academic) schools enrolled only 8,099 into form I, while in form V and form XI (where university admission qualification could be achieved) there were only 292 and 221 African pupils respectively.

While European education is almost entirely state, in 1972 African education was still left essentially to charity and self-help. Only 84 of the 3,219 primary schools were government and only 25 of 140 secondary schools (17 of 99 F1 and 8 of 41 F2) were state schools.

Teachers’ qualifications are also significantly worse in the African sector. In 1972 of 18,538 teachers in that sector, 11,874 had no more than the T4 (2 years’ infant teacher training) qualification. Whereas all teachers in European education are qualified and certificated, only 1,108 African education teachers were qualified (but not certificated), and almost half (481) of these were employed in mission schools. Indeed in the same year there were still 264 untrained teachers in African education. Further contrasts arise from the fact that while European education is a uniform, standardized system, there were seven different recognized kinds of school for Africans plus 297 unaided farm schools.

**Technical education and apprenticeship**

There is a long-standing policy and practice of restricting technical education, whether through direct training in schools or through indenture as apprentices. Government labour policy has consistently discouraged the entry of Africans into skilled trades, despite recurring shortages. The standard Rhodesian response to a shortage of skilled labour being a campaign for white immigrants. This is most recently exampled by the announcement in January 1974 of a massive
1 million immigrants promotion drive, partly in response to a manpower shortage in the manufacturing industry during 1973.

The 1959 Apprenticeship Act made it legally possible for Africans to be apprenticed. Progress however has been slow, due to a combination of reluctance on the part of employers, and resistance by the white dominated skilled trade unions. Since 1969 there has been no breakdown on a racial basis of indentured apprentices but prior figures showing the number of registered apprentices for 1962-69 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total registered</th>
<th>Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since apprentices are expected to have had ten years of education the vast majority of Africans are automatically excluded. Indeed post-1966 government policy on ‘vocational’ education may be explained in terms of a rationalization of a system based upon the acceptance of a very large semi-skilled labour reservoir. This may be quite sensible and fair for a developing country, in Rhodesia its fault lies in the fact that semi-skilled status is reserved for Africans. The establishment in 1968 of a special Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority to meet the shortfall in apprentices which was noted by a Rhodesian Front Parliamentary Select Committee in 1964 has achieved very little. In part this is due to employers’ reluctance to meet the cost of training, and preference for either ready-trained immigrants, brought in at government expense or job fragmentation whereby the semi-skilled can be employed at lower rates. White skilled trade unions adopt a contradictory approach, which can only be explained by their racial attitudes. They encourage immigration, but oppose direct training or energetic apprenticeship programmes for Africans in the same breath as they reject job fragmentation.

A classic example of the destructiveness of racial fears on the national economy is the fate of the Luveve College, which was established in 1961 to provide direct training for blacks, rather patronisingly, its objectives were to demonstrate Africans’ capacity for training in modern technical occupation, and, more practically, to train apprentices by giving them a two-year full-time course. Despite remarkable results, the college was closed in 1964, on the basis that apprenticeship training had become non-racial, rendering it unnecessary. Despite clear evidence that this was not so, and that apprentices are urgently needed, the government refuses to re-establish the college.

In the field of administrative training the same pattern prevails. The tentative scheme to recruit Africans into the civil service, introduced by Whitehead was deliberately reversed by the Rhodesian Front.
Arrest.
Again the links between policy in education and other areas, in this case industrial relations are significant. The structure of the Rhodesian trade union movement as established by law, is upon essentially racial lines—thinly disguised as skilled (whites) and unskilled (blacks). The result is a privileged white artisan class who place their interest in privilege above the long-term interest of unity of labour.


**University education**

University education is unique in Rhodesia in being non-racial. But the educational background vitiates any beneficial effects this might be expected to have. In 1972, 978 students were registered at the University of Rhodesia: 510 Europeans, 400 Africans and 78 ‘other races’. In that year almost 2,000 Rhodesians were reported to have gone to university, while 5,140 appropriately qualified Europeans left school. The privileged quality of education for white Rhodesians emerges clearly from the fact apart from those attending university in Rhodesia, there were 1,908 Rhodesians receiving government assistance for study at seven South African white universities. Thus, discounting any white students not receiving grants, about 50 per cent of qualified white school leavers can expect a university education, a privilege enjoyed by few societies.
Contrary to the impressions given by the Rhodesian Front the country's economy is tragically weak. As Arrighi and Sutcliffe have brought out in their studies, as a result of the deliberate underdevelopment of the African population and their areas, stagnation has been reached and it is worsening. One of the most significant factors is the rapid decline in the productivity of the peasant sector, that is the Tribal Trust lands. In these areas over 60 per cent (3.2 million in 1972) of the population live, yet they consistently contributed only 8 per cent to the national income between 1960 and 1967. The racialist pattern of society, depressing African development, has meant the whole economy must suffer in the long run. Industrialization has been discouraged, and there seems little prospect of change—especially since past racial policies have not only been confirmed but strengthened by Rhodesia Front legislation such as the Land Tenure Act. Only by making the large areas of unused, potentially arable land in European areas available to the rapidly-growing African rural population can the main problems be tackled. These include the development of viable secondary industry, the withdrawal of pressure on ecologically deteriorating soils to rehabilitate them, the re-location of a large proportion of African land into viable holdings. The position in African agriculture is not only stagnant but dangerous—in 1972 a very small safety margin of food supplies was noted—in 1969 only 8 per cent surplus (a good year), in 1968 (a bad year) reduced to 1.5 per cent. A profile of estimated productivity in the African rural areas between 1946 and 1970 is shown in Table 3.

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–55</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–60</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–65</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–70</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The period 1946–50 was taken as a base.

Attempts have been made to explain away African unemployment in Rhodesia in terms of the fact that many are ‘economically inactive’ (probably supported by the rural subsistence economy) rather than unemployed. In fact over 3 million Africans have to exist in the rural household sector. On the ‘economically inactive’ thesis it has been suggested that if, as was the case in 1969, there were 592,000 adult males inactive when only 731,000 Africans were employed, it was a situation which ‘merits very much closer investigation’. Hawkins, ‘How much African Employment?’ in Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 1972, notes that the increase of the African rural household sector between 1965 and 1970 was over 600,000 whereas the number of Africans employed increased by only 89,000. The GNP during this period averaged 5 per cent per annum growth. The actual per capita growth has been referred to as no more than 0.4 per cent because the economic expansion by-passed the majority of the people. In fact, as Table 5, based on Hawkins, derived from the August 1972 Digest of Statistics shows clearly, there was a decline in the proportion of the African population in the money economy since 1958.

### Table 5. Africans in the money economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Percentage employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3,390,000</td>
<td>652,000</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,260,000</td>
<td>654,000</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,310,000</td>
<td>781,000</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The picture is a repetition of that found in other sectors of the Rhodesian situation, the Africans forming the large numbers at the bottom of the distribution pyramid—this time of the standard of living.

The shortage of African labour in European agriculture persists despite the large number of unemployed. Between 1964 and 1971 jobs for Africans in European agriculture increased by 3.5 per cent, elsewhere by 35.4 per cent. The average wage on the farms was $(R)124 (£62) which, working on the assumption that each adult worker has three dependants and a per capita income in the

### Table 4. Working population

| Year | Non-African | | African |
|------|-------------| |          |
|      | Total population | Employed as percentage of total | Total population | Employed as percentage of total |
| 1962-64 | 240,500 | 36.5 | 3,750,000 | 16.3 |
| 1965    | 239,700 | 37.3 | 4,000,000 | 15.6 |
| 1966    | 245,000 | 36.5 | 4,130,000 | 14.9 |
| 1967    | 250,400 | 36.3 | 4,260,000 | 14.2 |
| 1968    | 260,300 | 36.3 | 4,400,000 | 13.9 |

*Source: G. Kay, in Rhodesia: a Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, points out that, at the 1962-64 level of African employment, 718,800 jobs were needed in 1968: the actual numbers available were 100,000 short.*
subsistence economy at $(R)25 per annum, makes the $(R)125 subsistence income superior to the agricultural wage, especially in the light of the relative unpleasantness of employment on a white farm. It should also be noted that figures for 1965 showed average annual earnings for African employees on farms at approximately $(R)140 (£70), indicating a decline over the years. At the same time the average earnings of a European farm worker were £1,364.

The wage gap between the groups has in fact grown consistently.

The 10:1 ratio of European to African income is in fact not consistent throughout the economy, being much greater in some sectors (agriculture and mining) than others. According to figures quoted by Nhandara in the *Rhodesia Herald* in March 1973 domestic servants and African agricultural workers (449,259 of the 765,250 total in 1969) were paid in 1971 an average annual wage of $(R)260 and $(R)131 respectively.

The total number employed in the different sectors of the economy on the basis of the 1969 census figures is as shown in Table 6.

**Table 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and forestry</td>
<td>271,246</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>275,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>47,821</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>87,161</td>
<td>15,405</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>104,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>4,199</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>41,264</td>
<td>6,556</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance and real estate</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>6,523</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail, trade, restaurants</td>
<td>45,727</td>
<td>17,234</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>64,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and hotels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, storage and communications</td>
<td>15,254</td>
<td>9,941</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>178,013</td>
<td>28,116</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>207,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>72,692</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>73,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>765,950</td>
<td>93,197</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>865,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus of 865,095 people employed in 1969, 765,950 were Africans. Their share of the income ‘taken home’ is nothing near the large percentage they constitute of the whole. Sutcliffe shows this in his *Stagnation and Inequality* which is the source of Table 7.

**Table 7. White proportion of population and personal income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
<th>Percentage share of total personal income</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
<th>Percentage share of total personal income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8, based on Mswaka, indicates what percentage of the total wages earned went to the African employed, and what percentage they were of the total employed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africans employed (% of total)</th>
<th>African share of wages (%)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africans employed (% of total)</th>
<th>African share of wages (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1973 the poverty datum line was estimated at $(R)60 per month, i.e. $(R)720 per annum. In June 1972 the estimated distribution of cash wages to Africans was as follows:

- 245,410 received under $(R)10 per month ($(R)120 per annum);
- 172,610 received from $(R)10-20 per month ($(R)120-240 per annum);
- 251,270 received from $(R)20-50 per month ($(R)240-600 per annum);
- 63,170 received from $(R)50-90 per month ($(R)600-1,080 per annum);
- 9,270 received from $(R)90-150 per month ($(R)1,080-1,800 per annum);
- 3,800 received over $(R)150 per month ($(R)1,800 per annum).

The contribution of industrial sectors to GDP (in millions of pounds) is shown in Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African agriculture and rural</th>
<th>European agriculture</th>
<th>Mining and quarrying</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Others (including domestic service)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-61</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>139.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>157.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>175.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>172.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>182.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>201.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The year 1968 was a drought year.

TABLE 10. Employment in various sectors 1962–68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and level</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Domestic service</th>
<th>Other services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Africans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962–64</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>15,010</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>60,490</td>
<td>15,010</td>
<td>97,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>61,050</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>97,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,440</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>15,770</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>60,960</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>96,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,030</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>16,330</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>62,150</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>17,350</td>
<td>5,920</td>
<td>64,190</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>94,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africans (thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962–64</td>
<td>258.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>612.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>262.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>122.3</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>239.9</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


sanctions. It has often been said and it is undoubtedly true that the major impact of this (as indeed of any economic problem arising in Rhodesia) is made to fall upon the African majority. It is also of course possible to analyse the increased pressure and the erosion of the air of affluence as a means either to force the minority to realize change is necessary, or alternatively to bring the majority to a point where they seek to overthrow the system in lieu of reform.
Having taken the land, the settlers required labour to work it, extract the minerals and man industry. (Logic was sacrificed to self-interest in that all mineral rights in the reserves, which were set up for 'the sole and exclusive use and occupation of natives' could be legally exploited only by Europeans.) Initial African refusal to enter the white economy led to some of the earliest conflicts. The hut tax, copied from the Cape Province, was imposed (at four times the rate) together with a tax on polygamous marriage. Africans had to find money to pay these taxes, and so were forced to enter a money economy. Once involved, however, the white governments have made every effort to restrict the power which could come with labour.

**Agriculture**

Here again one finds a dual system operating. On the one hand the African rural areas, where traditional peasant, essentially subsistence, farming is typical, and on the other the highly developed European controlled industrial sector (which includes large-scale ranching and plantations). African peasants must engage, at least intermittently in the industrial sector to survive. European farmers operate on an entirely different scale, as indicated by the fact that in 1965 there were 5,700 white farmers holding 36.8 million acres, while in the African Tribal Trust lands and Purchase Areas there were 608,000 black farmers working 43.6 million acres (1970). In the Tribal Trust lands the average annual gross output per family is about £50; hence 40 to 50 per cent of the men must seek employment in towns to supplement family income.

Average African earnings are about one-tenth of those of Europeans. The figures given in Table 11 were published in the Johannesburg Financial Mail in 1973.

**Table 11. Average earnings in Rhodesian dollars in Rhodesia 1965–71**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,112</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>2,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>3,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>2,564</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratio of African to non-African earnings varies from sector to sector, but is worst in agriculture, where about 40 per cent of Africans are employed. In 1971 their average annual earnings (of which 35 per cent was paid in kind) were S(R)124, representing an 8.9 per cent reduction in real earnings since 1962. The ratio of African to European earnings in the different sectors was as shown in Table 12.

### Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1:12.3</td>
<td>1:13.6</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1:5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1:7.4</td>
<td>1:7.8</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1:20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1:8.7</td>
<td>1:7.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1967, the 605,000 Africans employed in the industrial sector earned an annual average of £138, whilst the 90,900 Europeans, Asians and Coloureds earned an average of £1,361.

Thus, living standards are very different, with Europeans in a dominant position. Since 1958, moreover, the number of Africans employed in industry has decreased while the total African population increased. Between 1969 and 1973, the total number of Africans in employment rose by 197,000 (cf. over 330,000 male Africans left school during the same period). The annual per capita rise in GNP, 0.4 per cent, is amongst the lowest in the world, but the implications are hidden from most whites because, in a very real sense, they inhabit an entirely different economic world from the Africans.

Why are Africans, who provide the overwhelming proportion of labour to the system, in so deprived a condition? The white Rhodesian’s short answer would probably be to contrast his inherent superiority and industriousness with the inferiority and laziness of the African. This thesis is worth investigating. See George Kay’s *Rhodesia: a Human Geography*, Mlambo’s *Rhodesia: the British Dilemma* (1971), F.M. Nehwati’s *The Effect of Racial Discrimination on the African Worker in Southern Rhodesia* (1967), D.G. Clarke’s *Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: the Economics of Master and Servant and Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia* (Mambo Occasional Papers) (1974), G. Arrighi’s *Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective and The Political Economy of Rhodesia*, W.J. Barber’s *The Economy of British Central Africa*, R. B. Sutcliffe’s *Stagnation and Inequality in Rhodesia* (1971) and P.S. Harris’ *Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia*.

**Africans forced into a money economy**

In *Rhodesia: a Human Geography*, George Kay states that it was widely believed by Europeans that excessive physical exertion in the tropics might be harmful to their health, and South African experience and the slave trade had demonstrated possibilities of using Africans as labourers.
The really exploitable wealth, once whites had taken the land, was thus African labour. But it took many years of economic pressure combined with a constantly growing body of laws (including a Compulsory Labour Act during the Second World War) to force African labour to serve the white economy at the rates, in the places and on the conditions determined by the whites (cf. D.G. Clarke, ‘Settler Ideology and African Underdevelopment in Post-war Rhodesia’, *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 8, 1974).

Africans did not at first desire money. Apart from those tempted to stay by the rare, generous and considerate employer, they worked only long enough to obtain the minimum to pay taxes and buy a few necessities. Wages were nevertheless kept low by a combination of deliberate policy, low productivity, paternalism (food and housing provided by employers) and the assumption that Africans should rely on the reserves for their living. As the African population grew, a labour surplus formed. The low wage policy continued. African labour could not organize, it lacked education and training to develop skills, and its unity was undermined as in South Africa by the vast importation of Africans from elsewhere in Africa. Migrant (contract) labour has thus been a basic element of the African labour situation in Rhodesia. The duality must again be noted, blacks in the white system are there only temporarily and for specific purposes. They are not a permanent, integral part of it, because when they are no longer needed must return to their own system. There they and their problems are dealt with by the separate government imposed upon them (in the form of the Internal (formerly Native) Affairs Department)—by the minority elected administration. African realities are in this way excluded from the experience of most whites enjoying the fantasy of the fantastic Rhodesian ‘way of life’. How successfully deceptive this dual system is can be measured by the confident assertions of white Rhodesian politicians, that ‘our Africans are the happiest’.

**Racialism and labour unity**

The policies outlined have tended to provide confirmation of the typical European view of the African worker as unskilled and unreliable. This is precisely what must be expected when training is deliberately restricted, and migration (from foreign country or reserve) is encouraged. In spite of this, in 1972, the Rhodesian Railways (a large and comparatively good employer with the strongest African trade union) revealed that only 30 per cent of its 13,149 strong African work force had been employed for less than ten years. The situation reinforces prejudice, obstructs the rational development of organized labour and indeed perverts normal trade union practices, such as the ‘closed-shop’, into racially based ‘job-reservation’. The white artisan is automatically elevated by his colour, into a managerial role, over Africans. Thus the prospect of ‘working-class’ unity overriding the exploitation of labour is virtually nil. In fact white artisan pressure, (in the wake of the 1929 depression revelation of the prospect of whites being ‘reduced’ to manual labour) pressed for legal protection to be added to the social and economic barriers, which kept blacks from economic power. (See D.G. Clarke’s ‘Settler Ideology and African Under-
Living quarters of African agricultural workers.
development in Postwar Rhodesia', and P.S. Harris' 'Ten Popular Myths Concerning the Employment of Labour in Rhodesia', both in the March 1974 Rhodesian Journal of Economics.)

**Industrial Conciliation Act (1934)**

An Industrial Conciliation Act was passed in 1934. Gray, in The Two Nations, summed it up as follows:

Its effect was to introduce a modern and progressive method of industrial conciliation for European wage-earners and employees, while leaving the mass of the labour force under the Master and Servants Act, which resembled the legislation of Elizabethan England.

This had two results, as Kay points out. There was little possibility of an African middle class emerging. Secondly, there has been relatively little conflict between white artisans, clerical workers (whose good salaries make them major beneficiaries of the system) and employers. The identity of white interests has meanwhile survived all opposition and held intact. White unity is well illustrated by the ability to survive the traumatic expulsion the Lord Malvern, Whitehead, United Federal Party style of professional, patrician leadership, and the takeover by the populist Rhodesian Front leadership supported by a combination of white artisans, the inflated bureaucracy of the powerful civil service and wealthy tobacco farmers. Established commerce and professionals labelled it the 'Cowboy Cabinet', but in the final analysis judged it best to join them rather than upset the privilege which is their common bond. Many proposals for reform have foundered on this solidarity.

The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act (which has the same title as its South African predecessor of 1924) establishes a dual system in labour relations by the simple device of defining an 'employee' as 'any person engaged by an employer to perform work... but shall not include a native'—surely the perfect example of turning a person into a non-person. White trade unions then formed industrial councils with white employers and made bargains for their mutual benefit which of course excluded 'non-employees', that is Africans.

**Labour relations between Africans and whites**

The labour relations of unskilled African workers—who constitute the vast majority of African workers—are thus regulated primarily by the Master and Servants Act (1901) passed to cover 'bodily labour' in domestic service, mining, agriculture, husbandry, trade, manufacture and handicrafts. The 'servant' who 'absents himself without leave from his master's house or premises... is intoxicated, refuses to obey any command of his master... is abusive or insulting, either by language or conduct to his master or his master's wife or children' is liable to criminal prosecution. The Africans (Registration and Identification) Act (1957) penalizes any African who enters the service of another employer while under an existing contract while, under the African Labour Regulations
Act, 'any African labourer who without lawful cause deserts or absents himself from his place of employment or fails to carry out the terms of his contract' is also liable to criminal prosecution. Punishments under the African Juveniles Employment Act include whipping for defaulting juveniles.

Between 1962 and 1965, 1,047 Africans were prosecuted under the Labour Regulations Act; between 1960 and 1965, 13,166 Africans, 4 Europeans, 1 Asian and 1 Coloured were prosecuted under the 'Master and Servants' rules; and between 1965 and 1969, 3,506 Africans were convicted for desertion or insubordination. The statute, like so many others in Rhodesia, is couched in largely non-racial terms, but is used to maintain a discriminatory economic reality. This can be illustrated by contrasting these statistics with those for the crime of non-payment of wages, an equally 'non-racial' offence, for which between 1960 and 1965; 508 Europeans, 88 Coloureds and Asians and 61 Africans were prosecuted. Incidentally, the identity of white employer has found its way into colloquial language, where the word baas (meaning overseer or employer) is now used to refer to any white man.

**Negotiating structures**

The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act was amended in 1959, ostensibly to enable African participation in negotiations on labour relations. An earlier amendment of 1945 had made the application of agreements made by the Industrial Councils to certain African workers optional, but, in practice, white trade unionists did not do much about such application. Following a strike of African railway workers in 1945, Labour Boards were established in 1947. On these boards in place of direct negotiations white civil servants or other ‘native experts’ (including white housewives) would discuss with employers their recommendations for minimum conditions to apply to African workers in all industries except agriculture and domestic service, where significantly, the majority of Africans were employed (see Table 13). Advisory Industrial Boards still negotiate conditions for a large proportion of black workers, 'represented' by employees appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in his discretion.

**TABLE 13. Employment of Africans by economic sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>249,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>624,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By forbidding the registration of trade unions 'which are formed or exist for purposes of furthering the interests of its members on a basis of race or colour'
the law excluded the registration of unions which could represent unskilled workers—who were almost exclusively African. A trade union must satisfy the registrar that it is ‘representative’, that it does not exist to further the interests of its members on a basis of race or colour, and that no existing trade union has been registered to represent the industrial interests of the same industrial area. Far from being a bar to racialism in industrial relations, this ‘anti-racial’ wording operating in the context of Rhodesian realities is designed, and succeeds, as a means to protect the entrenched power of the white skilled worker. In practice long-standing European unions were operating when the 1959 Act was introduced. Their privileges were preserved by the voting provisions in favour of skilled labour (see below), and their exclusive right to negotiate was preserved by the provisions excluding new unions in the area (inevitably African and unskilled) from registration. Once registered the union bargains exclusively for all workers in the industry, whether members or not. An Industrial Council is formed with the relevant registered employers’ organization, and their agreements bind all parties. Industrial boards operate in industries where there is no representative employee organization (satisfactory to the registrar), or where the registered trade union chooses to negotiate this way. Their recommendations, if acceptable to the minister, are published as ‘Employment Regulations’ and are then binding. The Industrial Conciliation Act consolidated in 1959 was accurately described by Francis Nehwati as ‘the main bastion of industrial apartheid’.

**First- and second-class trade unionists**

Unions which are not registered can play no effective part in industrial negotiations. Unskilled Africans can choose inferior status in a white-dominated union or become members of one which is non-registered and so ineffective. Members of the registered unions have voting rights graded in proportion to skill, and an unskilled (black) vote counts a maximum of one-third of a skilled (white) vote. Any union attempting to give equal voting rights can be ordered to amend its constitution under pain of de-registration. The trade unions were forced to organize on an industry-by-industry basis, and the skilled ‘top’ of each industry controlled most of the voting power. No general union of unskilled workers organized horizontally was allowed. Once again the significance of the intricate link-up between education, land, labour, wealth and political power is obvious. Europeans hold a monopoly of skills and manipulate education, apprenticeship, trade unions and the legislature to maintain their position.

The powers of the Registrar under the Industrial Conciliation Act in regard to trade union affairs (see below) are as arbitrary as those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He has sole discretion to register unions or not, and power to cancel registration on the grounds that a union is not representative (the relative criteria being nowhere defined) or that it is involved in ‘political activities’. Thus in 1968, the Registrar de-registered four Industrial Councils that included a large African representation, so effectively denying collective bargaining machinery to some 17,000 Africans. T.E. Mswaka estimates that, because they were employed in agriculture, forestry, domestic service, government service,
education and health, 62 per cent of Africans were excluded altogether in 1968 from bargaining machinery provided under the Industrial Conciliation Act.

The act was amended in 1964 to prohibit the use of trade union funds, services or facilities for political purposes or any political organization. In 1967 African unions were forbidden to accept financial assistance from international trade union organizations or from national trade unions in other countries, and their members were forbidden to travel abroad. Trade unionists inevitably became involved in political activity, and many were consequently affected by various laws which inhibit criticism, especially by African nationalists. The right to strike being the final measure of the power of labour, is closely controlled in Rhodesia. The Industrial Conciliation Act restricts it for registered and unregistered unions alike, to a last resort after a long and complex process of negotiation and conciliation. Strikes are illegal in all 'essential' services, and whenever an existing industrial agreement is unexpired. Amendment of the act in 1971 subjected the whole matter to direct presidential discretion, enabling him to declare any strike (including a legal strike) to be 'contrary to the public interest'. By further amendments he may also interfere and rewrite agreements made by the Industrial Councils, when he deems it 'in the public interest'. This level of political sensitivity and reaction to industrial action is not new to Rhodesia. The law controlling trade unions is to be found as much in the field of security legislation—the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act—as in industrial law. The prohibition of Sunday meetings from which registered trade unions are immune, has been a severe restriction on unregistered unions' activities. Strikes in essential services, and any attempt to organize them could constitute 'sabotage' under this act, attracting severe penalties including death, made worse by provisions transferring the burden of proof to the accused, once the police in their discretion took a serious view of a strike.

**Employment and freedom of movement**

The African Affairs Act and the African (Registration and Identification) Act of 1957 restrict freedom of movement and entry to (white) industrial areas. Under African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration laws unemployed Africans are allowed only a limited period to seek work, and risk prosecution for contravening the pass laws if they attempt to seek work wherever they wish.

It has been seen, above, how executive government has grown increasingly authoritarian. Control in this, as in other areas of government, is the response to the challenge to exclusively white privilege. The 1973 amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act were opposed by employers and trade unions, yet its purpose is control to the 'Rhodesian way of life', and was unambiguously brought out by a Rhodesian Front member of parliament supporting the law—on the basis that it was 'to protect the present and the future of the working man (in terms of the party) [sic] on which we fought the election and that is the permanent establishment of the European in this country'. Remembering that man in this context means 'white man', this typifies the objective of minority government management of labour relations—the protection of the economic superiority of the European.
6 White political power at any price

Non-representative rule

The basis of government in Rhodesia is as dualistic as those elements seen above. For the European there is democratic, parliamentary government, based on the British model. Again, in form it is non-racial, the franchise being based on criteria of education and wealth. In fact, the economic destitution of the African majority effectively excludes it from the system. African participation in the Assembly being limited to a fixed minority of black members of parliament (16 of 60). Eight of these are elected by an electoral college of chiefs, headmen and councillors. Eight are elected by the tiny proportion who qualify for the separate, African voters Roll (2,980 voted in the July 1974 election.) Africans are not however without a government; they are administered separately by a special government department, entirely controlled by whites, responsible only to the white elected government, and making no pretence at being representative of the African majority.

The white minority government rules Africans through its Ministry of Internal Affairs (formerly Native Affairs), through the agency of District Commissioners and chiefs and headmen. It operates on the assumption that Africans are non-urban, and that the urban black proletariat is a transitory phenomenon. Consequently Africans in towns inhabit a form of administrative limbo (enjoying, at the most, an advisory relationship with the white municipalities which ‘manage’ the black townships) because they are away from the area where the system assumes them to be for purposes of government. In fact as seen above, Africans are vital to the European economy in both the urban areas and on white farms. Weinrich demonstrates in Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia the significance of the contemporary reality of demographic distribution to this system. Separation has so far been pursued less rigidly and less consistently than in South Africa, but with similar consequences.

In the 1930s 50 per cent of Europeans lived in rural areas, this percentage has now fallen to less than 25. There is now only one white per square mile in European rural areas, that is they are outnumbered eighty to one. Most of the population in ‘white’ towns is black: the urban ratio between the groups, in
An African beer hall.
1964 was three Africans to one white. In the rural areas, however, the African male population mainly consists of the very young and the very old, since most of the men between 20 and 45 have to work in towns to make a living. This has of course diminished the possibility of the countryside producing local African leaders, and so further facilitated European dominance.

Apart from some attempts at multiracialism during the late 1950s, white Rhodesia has always been governed in accordance with the racialist philosophy formally incorporated by the Rhodesian Front in its 1969 constitution.

**Virtual exclusion of blacks from the vote**

The voters' roll was kept almost exclusively white between 1898 and 1969 by using various devices to restrict the vote to whites rather than by direct racial exclusion. The qualifications for having a vote in 1898 were literacy plus an income of £50 per annum and the ownership of £75 worth of property or a mining claim. These qualifications were enjoyed by very few Africans. Yet there has been an almost paranoid fear of ‘floods of African voters’, and the qualifications were repeatedly raised.

In 1908, for example, only about fifty voters were ‘natives’. But in 1912 the income and property qualifications were doubled, and the literacy test was made more difficult—primarily to exclude Afrikaners rather than Africans who were already excluded by the financial qualifications. In 1919 the white electorate was doubled when women obtained the vote and a wife could qualify on the basis of her husband’s financial status.

In 1928 there were 62 African and 22,000 European voters.

When it was proposed, under the Land Apportionment Act, that Africans should be enabled to own farms, an attempt was made to raise the property qualification to £500. This was stopped by the British Government. Under a new rule introduced in 1937, property or communally held land was excluded in assessing qualification for voting rights. This excluded many Africans who hired property from Europeans in ‘urban locations’. Old age pensioners were exempted from the property condition in 1939 but there were (and still are) no African old age pensioners.

In 1939, there were 24,626 voters, of whom 39 were African.

Various proposals to limit or exclude African voters were put forward, including one which proposed to adopt the Hertzog scheme operating in South Africa under which, instead of having African voters at all, two whites would represent African interests in parliament.

The prime minister of what was then Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins (Lord Malvern) reverted to this proposal after the Second World War and tried to press it on the British Government, although recalling that such moves must now be taken carefully ‘without creating a further uproar in the United Nations organization’. At the 1948 election there were 136 registered African voters. In order to help induce Britain to accept the proposed Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which it did in 1953) the prime minister dropped his proposal regarding African voters and the common voters’ roll. But in the 1951 Electoral Act, he increased the qualifica-
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa

Income from £100 to £240, property from £150 to £500, plus an ability to read and write English. This effectively reduced the number of African voters in 1951 from 453 to 380. Yet his alleged 'determination to maintain... [the] common voters' roll' was a quality which commended him and his plan for federation to many.

Britain was pledged to ensure the survival of the common voters’ roll. When Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front abolished it in 1969, they were merely doing what their predecessors had often tried for, but failed to achieve. In European Politics in Southern Rhodesia Leys is particularly instructive on this point. By November 1956 there were 560 African and 52,184 European voters. In spite of this, the Tredgold Commission was set up to make recommendations on the franchise in order to ensure that ‘government is placed and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible people’.

In common with a number of Rhodesian parliamentary commissions, this commission produced a critical assessment and ideas for reform. It noted that representation was racial in fact though not in name, and that ‘the qualifications for the franchise are fixed so high that, in effect, the African is virtually excluded’, and suggested arrangements for a qualified franchise that would have allowed some African influence on the legislature. The commission’s recommendations were largely ignored. Instead, the 1957 Electoral Act increased the number of African voters, but ensured that they could never exceed 20 per cent of the vote; it was hoped in this way to preclude any threat to minority white voters for many years, and perhaps permanently.

By November 1961 there were 5,127 African voters in a electorate of 88,820.

The Federation (1953-63)

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed on 3 September 1953. Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland hoped to gain national independence, and feared the power, in the Federation, of the 220,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. In 1960, an inquiry into the federal constitution, set up under Lord Monckton, concluded that the Federation could not survive unless it was modified sufficiently to make it acceptable to the people of the constituent territories. In 1961, Nyasaland obtained representative government. In 1962 a predominantly African government was formed in Northern Rhodesia. Finally, the Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963. Nyasaland became Malawi and Northern Rhodesia became Zambia.

It is difficult to assess the exact significance for Rhodesian politics of the period of the Federation (1953-63). Generally, relations between blacks and whites, which is still the heart of the Rhodesian problem, were unchanged despite the new liberalism called ‘Partnership’. However, the period made its own specific contribution to the colonial mentality. It led to a sense of resentment at the ‘ingratitude’ of the African for white magnanimity. This theme reappears time and again, not merely in the chatter of white society, but at the highest political level, as successive ‘reforms’ are questioned or rejected by African opinion.
‘Federated brethren’

‘Partnership’ symbolized the new era, and both Rhodesian whites and many outside observers believed it involved a real change. In fact, in both the private and the public level, white Federal liberalism was largely a façade.

Before Federation it would have been uncommon for any white, apart from missionaries or the uncommonly genteel, to address or refer to Africans in other than essentially unfriendly terms: ‘kaffir’, ‘munt’ (a corruption of the Bantu word for person), ‘native’, ‘boy’ (juvenile or adult) or ‘girl’ (the feminine equivalent). Federation, however, was to bring basic political and economic advantages, but at the price of adopting more liberal social and personal attitudes towards Africans. Politicians learned the necessary patter, but the average white Rhodesian made it sardonically clear that his use of the term ‘African’ was no betrayal of the common conviction that all Africans are ‘kaffirs’, illustrated by exaggerated phrases such as ‘our beloved Federated African brethren’. But once the Federation ended, all could return to the relaxed jargon of racialism and superiority to match the return to overt racial politics. This helps to explain black and white responses to the much-talked-of liberalism and changes that were supposed to characterize the period of the Federation.

The symbolic admission of African representatives, first to the Federal Assembly and, under the 1961 constitution, to the Rhodesian Assembly provided a façade of multiracialism. It did not satisfy the increasingly conscious African masses but did help in enlisting some outside support for contemporary Rhodesia as being at least somewhat less reactionary than South Africa. African leaders became more and more suspicious of what were alleged to be schemes for peaceful change and improvement, seeing in them a thinly disguised determination to maintain the status quo; and this African rejection led in turn to white disillusionment and reaction in a vicious circle of increasingly violent confrontation (cf. Leys’ European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Gray’s Two Nations and Mlambo’s Struggle for a Birthright).

The idea of Federation had been unpopular with Africans in all of the three territories involved. The discovery of copper in Northern Rhodesia in 1928 was one of the factors which led whites to press for a union of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The British Government refused to sanction union but eventually accepted Federation. This caution at least made it easier to dismantle the Federation when this became inevitable. A Labour government made the first move in 1951 and the Federation was set up by a Conservative government in 1953. There is an interesting parallel here. Huggins and Welensky (the white leaders of Southern and Northern Rhodesia respectively) warned the British Government of the increasingly racist influence on Southern Rhodesia of South Africa, which had elected a racist Afrikaner Government in 1948 and, to counteract this, urged British acceptance of a liberal Federation. Ian Smith’s supporters have often tried similar arguments. The 1953 arrangement, as Bowman points out, gave Rhodesia ‘complete control over its internal affairs (including African administration), while gaining effective economic control of the north’. The African presence in the Assembly was limited to six out of the
thirty-five members, Huggins saying that it would be difficult to find six Africans in the Federation sufficiently competent for the task.

Partnership was to be a feature of the new political arrangements. White Rhodesians approved them by 25,570 to 14,750 in a referendum; the 2.4 million Africans, apart from the 429 who had votes, were not consulted. Partnership was defined by Huggins in terms of junior and senior partners, and as a junior in this case the native gradually works himself up in the business’ or more graphically in terms of ‘the rider and the horse’.

White political and economic dominance remained unchanged in the Federation. Minor concessions made in 1953 were soon undermined. The Federal Assembly was increased without a pro rata increase of black members. The African Affairs Board that was to have been the watchdog of black interests became a rubber stamp for decisions made by white political parties.

The territorial government of Southern Rhodesia retained the main responsibility for Africans living in the territory, but its revenue was much reduced under the federal system. Federal spending, on the other hand, meant a large increase in funds for schemes that mainly benefited whites. The gibe bamba zonke (snatch everything) was the ironic term used by whites who did not live in Salisbury, for the capital and its bureaucrats—capital of both Southern Rhodesia and the Federation, monopolizing anything that was worth having.

White prosperity continued. Between 1938 and 1956, after taking account of inflation the average increase in the real incomes of Europeans was estimated at 30 per cent. Between 1954 and 1963, federal revenue from Southern Rhodesia was substantially less than federal expenditure in the territory (cf. Bowman). Nyasaland was also a beneficiary, but to a lesser degree. Northern Rhodesian copper was exploited, and the former British colonial policy insisting on the primacy of African interests was sacrificed to pay for white Rhodesia’s prosperity (cf. Hazelwood’s study of the economic background to Federation).

**Symbolic desegregation**

Some nominal concessions were made to multiracialism during the period of Federation. They did little to change the structure, or give any real promise of further change. Symbolic multiracialism, merely reinforced white prejudice and awareness of their privileges, without achieving any substantial change in the balance of power. Few Africans were appointed to the civil service; when the Rhodesian Front came to power, there was no problem in eliminating them without causing any dislocation. Desegregation in education applied only to the élite fringes—the university, and some expensive private schools. Special exemptions allowed important African visitors to use hotels (which were exclusively white), or allowed African advocates into chambers near the law courts. The average white Rhodesian, his wife and children continued to be segregated from contact with ordinary black people except in master and servant relationships.

The Southern Rhodesian wing of the Federal Party did suggest one really significant change: the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act. However, this was after certain liberal amendments had given Africans some openings in the
Separateness.
economy and in society. The trend was rapidly checked and the hypocrisy of the whole exercise revealed. The experiment in flexible government which consisted in granting concessions to Africans while reassuring whites that control would be preserved by increasing authoritarian measures if necessary, was pushed to its logical conclusion, and inevitable failure. White voters had been persuaded to accept reform, an improved status for Africans, and the possibility that some day the 1961 constitution might enable Africans to dominate parliament. On the other hand, the United Federal Party demonstrated to the same voters that black petitions for equality should be dealt with by gagging the petitioners. Whites realized what was really at stake—the good life under perpetual minority government. In 1962, they therefore elected the Rhodesian Front, pledged to maintain this position at whatever cost. The Rhodesian Front represented a coalition of the former Dominion Party and elements of the former United Federal Party.

**Intransigence or transition**

The Federation (in common with contemporary Rhodesia) had to face a basic question. Did the economic advantage of the enfranchised few make it worth while to face the growing dissatisfaction of the unfranchised many? The majority were forced to rely progressively upon extra-parliamentary organization and demonstration, unconstitutional action, and finally violence. Fortunately for the people of Zambia and Malawi, the final decision lay with Britain—which through the Devlin and the Monckton commissions defined the terms of the problem, and then warned that the threatening racial explosion could be prevented only by force, or else by the admission of the majority to government. Britain was confident enough of its own power and African support to ensure majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Tragically for Rhodesia, it had no such confidence in its ability in Southern Rhodesia, and the scene was set for the white settlers to find their own solution in their own stronghold.
The possibility of allowing change from minority to majority rule, to progress by a pre-established, mechanical constitutional process (no matter how slow) was offered in 1961, when a new constitution was arranged between Britain and the white Rhodesian Government. On the face of it, the new constitution offered a great deal as an objective, gradual solution to the racial conflict. It was, however, rejected by the African nationalist party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which had burgeoned in proportion to the growing number of unkept white promises of reform which accompanied increased authoritarian government, including the banning of its predecessor, the African National Congress (ANC).

The soft constitution

Why was this rejected? The immediate political context of the 1961 constitution was the Federation, then being propelled by white hopes towards total independence, on the basis, as we have seen, of 'multiracialism' which was essentially minority rule. The 1961 integral constitutional restraints, especially the Declaration of Human Rights, however, promised to provide a more efficient and objective control of settler rule than the unpredictable reliance on imperial intervention. Thus whites began to stress the idea of sovereign independence as the answer to ensure their freedom of action. It is obvious that the white concession to multiracialism were intended to create the situation in which Britain would, in Huggins' earlier words, come to 'trusting the Europeans... sufficiently to hand over 6,000,000 primitive people to a Parliament dominated by local Europeans'. The 1961 constitution was indeed sold to white Rhodesians as the minimum cost of total independence.

Independence means freedom to do what they will, and their will with the interests of Africans (after seventy years' experience of the sort we have traced) was unlikely to attract African support. In 1961 as indeed in 1971, Rhodesian Africans could not see the desirability of consenting to what would amount to their transfer to exclusive sovereign settler control, whether the settlers were led by 'liberal' Whitehead or 'illiberal' Smith. Of course, once again African
opinion was ignored, though a massive and impressively organized ‘referendum’
was held by the NDP among the unenfranchised. Closely watched by police and
police reservists, it managed this massive peaceful demonstration. The result
was 372,546 against the 1961 constitution, 471 in favour. The total number of
enfranchised votes was 63,795: 21,846 against 41,949 in favour.

This judgement of African leaders, reflecting the views of their rank and file
has been proved highly responsible to the majority constituency they represent-
ed. First the constitution itself kept political power where it had always been, in
European hands. It reduced the prospect of change by increasing franchise
requirements, requiring higher educational or economic qualifications. These
qualifications, as we have seen, are still zones of guarded privilege, which a
white elected government would extend to Africans at its peril. The gesture of
granting immediately fifteen African seats in an assembly of sixty-five was only
a welcome surprise because Africans had not entered the Southern Rhodesian
legislative at all before. Their presence, however, was symbolic, they could
expect to be allowed to debate white power, not share it.

Rhodesia in 1961 was a country characterized by racial discrimination and,
as will be explained below, the most authoritarian laws directed primarily
against African aspirations. The 1961 constitution, although it included a Bill of
Rights as a gesture towards future equality and the rule of law, contained an
extraordinary provision that left all existing repressive and discriminatory legis-
lation intact. It in fact set the seal of approval upon the system of minority
government which precludes any change for the better for the overwhelming
majority of Africans. Equally it offered no change from the dual system of
government. Finally any change which might come would have to come not
from the operation of the law, but from the goodwill of white people seeking to
make progressive change.

Africans did not believe that the Europeans would make such changes.
Their fathers had taken African land and cattle without compensation. Their
kith and kin and made settling ‘excursions’ to Rhodesia to grow wealthy, while
they denied the right of economic competition to the indigenous people and had
then retired to the comfort of their alternative homes. Any doubt that they
could not be relied upon to initiate progressive change was dispelled when in
1965 they destroyed the very constitution which offered even tentative change,
and under which they had solemnly sought power by election.

**Hard government**

Apart from specific inadequacies of the 1961 constitution, we should note some
details of the machinery of arbitrary government, which was created during the
‘liberal’ era of prime ministers Todd and Whitehead, both as a reassurance to
whites, and more specifically as the immediate response to the growing African
nationalist organization. The latter could not be accomodated within the white
system, therefore it would be repressed. In 1948, to the great surprise of whites,
a widespread and peaceful strike of African workers took place; the response
was the Subversive Activities Act of 1950, introducing the power to ban meet-
ings, establish a secret police and ban any dissemination of ideas, undermining
Rhodesia constitutional democratic government. In 1955 the Public Order Act was introduced by Todd and in 1956 its powers to detain and restrict without trial were used by him to ban meetings and detain, without trial, over 200 members of the ANC Youth League, who had organized a bus boycott.

It is ironic and perhaps a cause for optimism, and a celebration of man's ability to learn and change, to note that in 1971 under laws directly deriving from the same powers, Mr Todd and his daughter, now convinced opponents of minority government, were themselves arbitrarily detained. For a personal account of this experience see Judith Todd's *The Right to say No.*

The banning power was resorted to in 1958 against nationalist attempts to spread their ideas from urban to rural areas. (The sensitivity of the minority government to rural political activity is a recurrent and increasingly dominant theme in the history of African opposition.) In 1959 there was an emergency throughout the Federation and a concerted effort to destroy the growing nationalist criticism. Widespread detention created a virtual nationalist political symposium in Khami prison outside Bulawayo and enduring links between African nationalists, many of whom in Rhodesia spent the succeeding decade in detention, while their Zambian and Malawian colleagues have been struggling with the new problems of creating nations out of the colonial past.

Repressive legislation came to a peak in 1959-60. Whitehead sought to destroy the ANC, which he described as the 'canker in our body politic', and took wide powers of arbitrary government. The Unlawful Organizations Act, the Preventive Detention Act were passed in 1959, together with amendments to the Native Affairs Act. In 1960 came the Emergency Powers Act and that basic instrument of the Rhodesian Government, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Its effect has been to produce at times a virtually comatose condition in Rhodesian African politics, with detention, restrictions, long-term imprisonment and execution being the white answer to the call for the transfer of power.

The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act is a classic example of portmanteau persecution. It interferes with almost every civil right in the book. In addition it destroys the procedural guarantees of the rule of law which support them (such as the presumption of the innocence of the accused).

Perhaps the only thing that can be said in its favour is that it was at the time of its introduction so shocking that it led the Chief Justice of the Federation, Sir Robert Tredgold, a white Rhodesian of pioneer stock to condemn it openly. In his book *Rhodesia that was My Life* he describes it as 'an anthology of horrors', which made emergency government 'the ordinary law of the land', turning Rhodesia into a police state. This he defined as 'a state in which the police and the executive are given or assume complete control over all political activity'. The condemnation was shared by the predominantly white legal profession. More significant, however, is the fact that Tredgold alone acted logically, given his opinion that the act effectively made political puppets of all officers of the court, and resigned his position in protest.

The act has also been described aptly as '34 pages descriptive of what Africans cannot do, and what will happen to them if they do'. It empowers the executive to ban meetings and attendance at meetings, to ban publications, to order up to five years of restriction of liberty without trial. It allows and prescribes arrest and search without warrant, minimum sentences for vague and
Salisbury—capital of Rhodesia.
widely defined offences such as 'intimidation' (three years), possession of any 'offensive weapon or material' (twenty years), or of any 'arms of war with intent to endanger the maintenance of law in Rhodesia' (compulsory death sentence until 1969, now thirty years). Capital punishment (or thirty years) and a five-year minimum sentence is prescribed for 'any act of terrorism or sabotage ... done with intent to endanger the maintenance of Law and Order in Rhodesia ... or in a neighbouring territory' (the latter to catch guerrillas operating against South Africa or Portugal).

We should note that the possession of arms of war or 'offensive weapons' (which could include a stone) is an offence if a certain intention exists: but the laws presume such does exist unless the accused proves the contrary—beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the heavy burden of proof normally on the prosecution is placed upon the accused. This means in effect that any African caught in circumstances which the security forces consider suspicious is very likely to be found guilty if prosecuted. It introduced terrorist government into Rhodesia well in advance of guerrilla war which is condemned by the régime for employing terrorism.

The act is used almost exclusively against Africans despite its non-discriminatory language. Also, in relation to 'terrorism and sabotage' the definition of the latter is so wide that again, combined with the placing of a presumption of intention upon the accused, the decision of guilt or innocence has been taken from the judge almost entirely, and given to those who decide to prosecute.

It is clear that Africans are precluded from influencing government by participation in the legislature. Under various laws they are equally discouraged from adopting even modest non-violent or industrial action to influence government. Protest by the African masses, of whatever variety, is dangerous to minority rule and is dealt with under what is essentially emergency law, so boycotts and strikes would clearly constitute 'sabotage' under the act, and could be met with the death sentence or thirty years.

Thus a pattern of repressive laws emerges.

First, normal political opposition in the legislature is altogether precluded. Secondly, the extra-parliamentary process of political discussion and debate are either totally banned (as in the rural areas it has been almost without interruption since 1959), or made precarious, as in the urban areas where 'regulating officers' have unfettered discretion to disallow political gatherings, between long periods of total ban. Emergency government in which political freedom is the exception rather than the rule is the norm for Rhodesia—and it has the approval of the white minority.

Thirdly, political organizations are not merely harassed by prosecution of their officers for political statements, and restriction or detention without reason, but are totally banned. The African National Congress (ANC), the NDP, ZAPU and ZANU were all banned totally and their assets seized. The present African National Council—in many ways to be regarded as something of a political mutation in Rhodesia politics—is under constant threat of a similar fate. Its history of loss of officers into detention, restriction and prison (despite its overt, non-violent stand much criticized by more radical opponents within and especially beyond Rhodesia's borders) is identical to the experience of previous movements.
Fourthly, having closed every other avenue of political pressure for change, the authorities have provided a panoply of laws designed only to suppress the violent opposition that they have thus created. Communal punishment and enforced concentration of rural people in 'defended villages' are devices only needed by armies of occupation and in fact used by the pioneers. Militarily, this is exactly the position in parts of Rhodesia, and politically it has always been the general condition.

Nor is there today the same simulation of normality. The African has long known the taste of forceful government. The whites were given a strong, but to them, palatable taste of it, with the vigourous censorship of their press for months after UDI. For them it merely created the exciting reality of the emergency, for they were not much concerned that criticism of UDI was suppressed. Rhodesia has in fact had government by emergency powers since shortly before UDI in November 1965. It is significant that it has hardly touched whites, and perhaps equally significant that for Africans the difference has been one of degree only—and that limited to extreme situations.

The real change, which has occurred since 1971 particularly, is that in some parts of Rhodesia the state of violence has turned to a state of war—which has become two-sided. So freedom to move at will has now begun to be limited by violence for white men, women and children, as it has always been for African men, women and children.

The development of security laws to provide a negative answer to the African demand for change is traced in detail in Palley's article on 'Law and the Unequal Society' in Volume 12 of Race, in 1970-71 in Chapter 3 of Bowman's Politics in Rhodesia, Mlambo's Struggle for a Birthright, Chapters XIII and IX. South African legislative parallels are indicated in Sprack's South Africa's Sixth Province.

Government and African leadership

We have read above of an emerging African leadership during the federal years, and since the break-up of the Federation. The nationalists who made and ran the ANC have, despite the harassment of the past twenty years, survived many of their oppressors, especially whites, many of whom played their oppressive roles and moved on to new places, or went back to their own countries.

People and names are important in a political process such as that which has been going on in Rhodesia. Contemporary official histories in the country exclude the names of all nationalist leaders, partly as a matter of policy, partly because under the laws providing for their detention without trial, it is unlawful to publish their names. Nevertheless the names of Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, and their past and present fellow detainees (some detained for a decade or more) such as Dan Madzimbamuto, Willie Musarurwa, Morton Malianga, Michael Mawema, Josiah Chinamano, Clem Muchadi, Robert Mugabe, Enos and Lazarus Nkala, Edson Sithole are now (despite their differing status, loyalties and approaches to the problem) established, undying members in the growing glow of the nationalist movement. Their successors or compatriots, pursuing the cause of majority rule, whether by peaceful means inside the
country, such as Abel Muzorewa, Canaan Banana, Elliot Gabellah, Henry Kachidza; militarily in exile such as the late Herbert Chitepo, Jason Moyo, James Chikerema, Joseph Msika, Nathan Shamuyarira, George Silundika or many others pursuing the same goal by rational argument and publication before the forum of the United Nations or the wider audience of world opinion, have likewise carved that cause and a place into the future of Zimbabwe. The majority of the leaders named are teachers, priests or lawyers. All, and many other nationalist personalities, hold university degrees—often the result of enforced study in the isolation of detention, or in exile. Yet most of them, qualified though they are for a professional comfortable life, are involved in political struggle for change, which is now a war of liberation.

Military might has never been far below the surface of the relationship between the races in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, while the Rhodesian situation described above suggests that it would be difficult to achieve peaceful change, a further examination of the reasons for force as a major feature is desirable.

**Clarification of the conflict**

The 1961 constitution was designed to provide a neutral and if necessary irresistible machine to achieve majority rule.

Its main defects were as follows:

1. **Timing.** It was too late. Blacks knew white government was mutable. Whites were losing faith in their ability to control decisions in Britain concerning the local black populace by sweet words and strong action, and sought refuge in sovereignty and absolute independence.

2. **Content.** It asserted the value and legitimacy of equal rights and non-discrimination for all, but left the actual granting of the rights to the majority to the discretion of the privileged minority. It allowed insufficient parliamentary responsibility to the majority to evoke a response. It gave insufficient power to the law courts or the Constitutional Council, which could have played educational and persuasive roles in refereeing peripheral but crucial disputes in a transfer process. In fact for a while the courts became the single legitimate and almost-equal arena for open battle between the minority government and black nationalists, and sharpened the issues (see Reg. Austin, ‘Politics in the Courts’, *Venture*, October 1965). Whatever its inherent qualities, the fact that it was dependent on white management made it unworkable. The exercise could be compared with appointing the manager and major shareholder of a perfectly healthy firm to the task of liquidating it.

3. **Method of production.** African acceptance of the 1961 constitution was the key to the small chance it may have had of success. The fact that the NDP was only called in at the final stages to sanction it, and not to negotiate it, reduced this chance to virtually nil. The terms of the constitution are set out in abbreviated form in Appendix 6. They have been definitively analysed in Palley, and dealt with more briefly but adequately in several works written since 1961, including Bowman, Mlambo, Sithole and Shamuyarira.
Landmarks

AFRICAN REJECTION OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION AND MINORITY RULE

Shortly after the African rejection of the 1961 constitution came the decision to initiate chimurenga (the war of liberation) (1963), although armed conflict on any scale followed only after a ‘phoney’ war period of almost seven years. The 1961 rejection is not, in this writer’s view, given sufficient recognition as the first positive, mass assertion of African opinion in Southern Rhodesia since the 1890s. It is open to speculation that, had the United Federal Party under Whitehead been elected, liberalization might have prevented armed confrontation. This is possible, but the combination of Whitehead’s record of authoritarian legislation and the minority instinct for privilege preservation make it debatable. The flexibility of individual African leaders, and their remarkable humanity, patience and willingness to seek solutions, are not denied. However, the significance of the rejection, it is suggested, lies in the fact that it represents a deep and widely, if not explicitly, felt state of fundamental national awakening. The rift in the nationalist movement (between ZAPU and ZANU), which followed in 1963–64 has been variously attributed to personalities, tribalism and differences over tactics. Its bitterness and violence, which shocked nationalist supporters and opponents alike, is possibly the consequence of a clarifying of this 1961 awakening and determination to bring oppression to an end once and for all.

THE MINORITY ELECT THE RHODESIAN FRONT TO PERPETUATE MINORITY GOVERNMENT

The second element in bringing about confrontation was the election of the Rhodesian Front. Its party principles (Appendix 1) were diametrically opposed to those of the 1961 constitution, and the 1962 result was to all intents and
purposes the clearing of the decks for the action which commenced on 11 November 1965. Here again, this analysis may be criticized for being too simplistic. After all, there were still the post-1962 white-black nationalist clashes in the courts, the removal of Winston Field (the first Rhodesian Front prime minister), the interminable negotiations with the British Government to find a constitutional path to independence. Again, however, it is submitted that this activity (where it was not a conscious tactical exercise to eliminate the uncommitted, or to fool the British Government), was more a matter of the whites coming to terms with the contradictions of their own deeply emotional decision.

Rebellion involved several changes in their image of themselves (which federation had in any case confused), though not of the essentials of their value structure.

First, they had to return to the overt image of themselves as racially superior, though many of them had never come to terms with 'partnership' and this was a minor problem. Second, and perhaps most difficult, was their need to accept that the white 'patricians'—the wealthy and the professional leaders of the United Federal Party who had guided them since at least 1923—were dispensable and must be displaced. The establishment's mistake had been to pay more than lip-service to the subtle racial slogan 'advancement on merit', when their voters had an old-established 'gut feeling' that 'white is right'. The Rhodesian Front cabinet was (see above) described derisively by some of its critics as a group of 'cowboys'. Yet that is exactly where its attraction for the white electorate lies. They speak (preferably in a few nineteenth-century phrases pronounced in 'that vowel-pinched accent'), the same language, political and colloquial, as their supporters.

EMOTIONAL CONDITIONING FOR REBELLION

In their sentimentality for British Royalty, especially its most Victorian image, Rhodesians are without equal. This helps to explain the rebels' insistence, for five years that they remained loyal. An interesting aspect of their treason was the way in which the term 'UDI' (to describe the impending rebellion) was broadcast, printed, discussed and re-discussed until it became literally a household word, and no longer a description for a dubious activity. Perhaps the greatest tribute to Rhodesian Front psychological conditioning is to be found in the virtually world-wide acceptance of the description 'Unilateral' (as opposed to 'Illegal') Declaration of Independence, even by those who formally regard its illegality as unquestionable. (See, for a humorous but accurate description of white rebel society, *Punch*, 17 November 1970.)

BRITAIN'S NON-ASSERTION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY

The build-up to rebellion provided several classical examples of that self-deception which makes possible for white Rhodesians what seems extraordinary shortsightedness to others. One of these was the 1964 UDI referendum amongst whites, in which the Rhodesian Front sought support for independence, but promised not to treat a 'Yes' decision as a mandate for illegal action. In fact it
declared independence almost exactly one year later with, significantly, no real protest from the minority.

On 3 November 1965, Ian Smith apparently tricked the Rhodesian governor into signing a document declaring an emergency. After holding it for two days he gazetted it, and restricted or detained a number of African nationalist politicians and one white (one of their legal advisers Leo Baron).

Litigation was to continue thereafter, but since that date Rhodesia has been governed under Emergency Regulations, additional to those existing in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, and the relevance of courts was reduced even further.

The declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 was described by Ian Smith as 'an opportunity to strike a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity'. Brigadier Skeen, speaking as the Rhodesian Front appointed high commissioner in London shortly before the rebellion, gave a clearer indication of their objectives and their determination . . . to control the rate of African political advancement to power till time and education have made it a safe possibility. Moreover we wished to have the power to retard it, should that advancement outstrip the capability of the African to govern wisely and fairly. We could not say five, ten, fifty or even a thousand years. It could not be forced, it had to develop in accordance with the character and nature of the African and his hitherto unproved qualities of democratic behaviour.

For these reasons the 1961 constitution lost its place as the basis of government. Its displacement was sudden and clear, but the response of the legal sovereign (Britain) was complex, highly sophisticated and physically non-existent. Consequently opposition to this effort to achieve the permanent re-establishment of the Rhodesian way of life was minimal. In particular the fact of the British Labour government's advance public notice to Smith that the rebellion would not be suppressed by force seemed to clear yet another potentially active participant and opponent (Britain) from the combat zone.

CONFRONTATION CLARIFIED

The importance of this opting out of the never present but legal sovereign has been to maintain the relevant simplicity and clarity, internationally speaking, of the confrontation. Apart from the overt military and economic support of South Africa and (until recently) Portugal; the indirect commercial support of some sectors of international business; and occasional, but important, lapses such as the breach of sanctions which permitted chrome exports from Rhodesia to the United States under the Byrd Amendment, the conflict has been isolated to the real contestants: the African majority and the white minority.

Sanctions have not defeated the illegal authorities, but they have proved that to seek to establish a new sovereign State in the mid-twentieth century based on the practices and ideas of racial supremacy will not be accepted by the world community. That truth, where it has sunk in, has proved to be a new and bitter one for many Rhodesian whites, and its lessons are of wider significance. This is provided that the international community's commitments to international economic sanctions are seen for the muted and limited experiment with enforcement machinery.
THE 'KITH AND KIN' SETTLEMENTS, 1966–71

Significant non-events, in terms of the basic problem of Rhodesia, are the attempts by various British governments to reach a 'settlement' on Rhodesia exclusively with the rebels. They may be seen as a resurgence of the British habit of trusting the good faith and basic decency of the minority—despite seventy years of settler rule, and the rebellion! In this sense they increased the resolve of the military wings of the liberation movements to ignore British involvement as an irrelevancy. Perhaps their greatest importance lies in the criticism they evoked outside of the British context in the United Nations, and especially in Africa, renewing international consciousness and awareness of the continuing problem. Together with the Rhodesian Front's constant extension of authoritarian government, such as its determination in 1968 to execute captured guerrilla fighters, it helped to escalate mandatory sanctions to the status of virtual universality. One of these efforts, however (the last to date in 1971), can be singled out as a separate landmark.

WAR AND PEARCE

If Africans, as argued above, had decided in 1961 not to tolerate any further Anglo-Rhodesian efforts made without consulting them, it took a further ten years of resistance, and restrained but determined demonstration, to prove this was a reality to Britain. It is possible that this truth has even begun to dawn upon the minority government.

The agreement and constitution proposed by Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary, in 1971, after discussions between Smith and the British negotiator Lord Goodman (see Appendix 2) involved the same basic ideas as the 1961 constitution: (a) the initial retention of exclusive power in the hands of the white minority; (b) the 'review' (not removal) of the extraordinary stock of security and discriminatory laws; (c) a virtual guarantee that (if matters ever developed so far and power was handed over to the majority) whites would always enjoy, at least, disproportionate political representation in the legislature. Furthermore, given the economic and social position they have created for themselves, combined with the protection of the established rights which the Declaration of Rights would give against future (but not existing or past) governments acts, which might selectively (because they are exclusively white) reduce these privileges, whites could look forward to permanent constitutionally protected privileges.

More significantly, it was a product of the thesis that a new order for the territory can be created for the people, and not by the people or their representatives.

Rhodesian negotiations with Britain, in spite of rebellion, should be seen against a background of continuing sanctions and international pressures. Successful negotiation would achieve their 'first prize'—recognized independence.

The exercise of the Pearce Commission involved no less than a total reversal of several basic tenets of Rhodesian Front policy both before and after UDI, including the fundamental one that sovereignty had been taken in 1965, and Britain had no further place within Rhodesia's boundaries. The Pearce
Commission was instructed to discover, by an unusual process of meetings and consultations, whether 'the Rhodesian people as a whole' (including, for the first time, the whole African population and not only an educationally or economically qualified fraction of it) accepted the settlement proposed. Apart from being a new exercise for Britain (though it must be remembered that the African masses were asked in 1961 by their own nationalist leaders whom generations of Rhodesians had declared non-representative and thugs) the Pearce Commission also created an historical oddity in the political life of the country. It brought African political, as opposed to military, activity back to the surface. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act had (as Palley has shown in her articles in Race) been almost totally successful in supressing normal political activity, including discussion among Africans. Politics between the races had been reduced to sporadic, unspectacular and largely unsuccessful African guerrilla incursions and counter-insurgency operations between 1966 and 1971. This had created a vacuum, conveniently filled by the Internal Affairs Department and the chiefs, which dutifully convinced whites and anyone else who would listen that Africans were happy, and would be delighted with minority rule for ever. During the Pearce exercise, political meetings were allowed, people could talk politics—albeit still cautiously—and they were encouraged to do the impossible, to openly criticize the white proposals. 'Open' politics have continued to grow.

None of the security laws, however, were suspended, prosecutions proceeded, and detentions and restrictions reappeared as the instruments of white-black politics. But the new nationalists in the African National Council (ANC) (see Appendix 3) took the opportunity despite having learnt that the risks (many were ex-detainees) of political opposition were, with obvious differences, akin to those of military opposition. Not only did they articulate a resounding 'No' to the proposals, they re-opened a new front in the struggle by lifting the morale of the majority to great heights, from the depths of a period of depression. They offered the prospect of continued and open defiance of the degradation of minority rule to almost the whole African population not only by war in remote areas, but by daily peaceful confrontation in the urban areas. Like other nationalist organizations, the ANC is banned from the Tribal Trust land. At the same time (indeed the coincidence led to allegations of ANC collusion) a renewed military onslaught took place by ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, shocking the minority, as it swept guerrilla war into the north-east province of Rhodesia.

This escalation from sporadic to concerted guerrilla war, based upon the ideal of a people's war, marks the most dramatic fruition to date of the African decision in 1961 to find their own solution to colonialism. Its basis appears from the policies of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI (see Appendixes 4, 5 and 6) and its development is well described in Wilkinson’s study and the other material referred to in the bibliography.

The full circle

In spite of white Rhodesian inability or unwillingness to appreciate the real dangers inherent in a full scale racial confrontation, by the end of 1974 their
neighbours, black and white, were determined, for various reasons to ensure that change should be brought about by less violent means. The leaders of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were concerned to avoid the human and economic dislocation of a prolonged conflict. They were also aware (in the light of recent experiences in Angola) that the transfer of power might be delayed by disunity within the African majority, and were impressed by the apparent unity of the African majority expressed through the ANC, within the country. South Africa expressed equal horror at the possibility of intensified conflict, and must have been additionally aware that the achievement of majority rule by a military victory over a settler government by means of an African armed revolution, would create special problems for itself. The combination produced a series of historic events in December 1974. Smith, clearly influenced by South Africa, released the detained ZANU and ZAPU leaders, and permitted the president of the ANC to travel with them to Lusaka. There talks with leaders of adjacent African States resulted in an agreement to unify the four existing nationalist parties (ANC, FROLIZI, ZANU and ZAPU) into a single, new African National Council. Its basic policy was clearly outlined by its president, Abel Muzorewa, at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in April 1975.

Committed, without reservation to the achievement of (the) principle (of immediate self-determination on the basis of majority rule), the A.N.C. . . . has dedicated itself to make every effort to attain its end by peaceful negotiation. In doing so the A.N.C. is equally committed, aware and conscious that failure to achieve self-determination by negotiation inevitably involves a re-intensified armed struggle as the only alternative.

Detente [he insisted] must be understood as the sole alternative to a prolonged armed struggle. It has been brought about by the emergence of the increasingly effective military struggle for liberation.

Thus the essence of these developments in the African majority’s attempt to achieve power is a realization that unity is vital to the task, and though peaceful negotiation is desired it is realized that continued readiness for armed confrontations is essential.

White skill, experience and ruthlessness in managing the majority cannot, however, be overcome by declarations. The division and disorganization of the African majority and their leaders has been and continues to be the basic instrument of minority government. Its capability for attempted exploitation of disunity at this stage may be exampled by the assassination of Herbert Chitepo and the allegations that Rev. Sithole had plotted to assassinate his ANC colleagues. Rumour, lies and half-truths, combined with the other ruthless methods of a police state are likely to remain a prime weapon for the maintenance of white rule and privilege.

The situation has now been reached where, for the first time since Lobengula’s reign, a white authority recognizes (no matter how reluctantly, hesitantly and in bad faith one may suspect it is) that negotiations for the future must be with Africans, and agreements must be made with Africans. Equally, and clearly connected, is the fact that (again for the first time since 1896-97) the same whites have been forced to realize the military threat of the majority.
Political violence is mistakenly thought by many to be a recent phenomenon in Rhodesia. As we have seen it has always been the basis of white domination. The minority always resisted seeking the legitimization of their rule by either the electoral consent of the majority or the integration of the majority into their system. The period of 'pacification', after the Ndebele and Shona resistance of the 1890s had been crushed, depended essentially on the fact that for various reasons the majority sought to come to terms with white rule. The end of that period came in 1961, and gradually political violence has grown, and has become more clear in its objectives.

This phase may more properly be regarded as appropriate to a study of 'Zimbabwe' than 'Rhodesia'.

A general point which may be made is that political nationalist armed resistance, in common with non-violent nationalist politics has had to face the particularly intractable problem in opposing 'Rhodesia' of finding its real enemy and clarifying its real aim. It is understandable that in Rhodesia the rebellious settler system is the oppressor, and the task is to assist or persuade the imperial power, Britain, to control and re-establish a path to freedom. Thus both nationalist politics and political violence (and as Mlambo's book shows there was a great deal of political rioting in the days when African nationalist parties were operating at a 'political' level in the early 1960s) was and still is aimed at achieving change by British intervention. On practical grounds this assumes that in spite of her surrender of military control to the whites in 1923 Britain is capable of physical control in Rhodesia. Until 1965 Britain pointed out that the 'legitimacy' of Rhodesia and its post-1923 self-government would make intervention 'unconventional' in the British constitutional sense.

In 1965 Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front destroyed 'legitimacy', and provided the perfect scenario for an end to minority rule, in 'the nicest possible way', that is the resumption of physical control by Britain. Until the rebellion, legitimacy and 'normality' had been the settlers' greatest asset, hence the frustrated furor of the Rhodesian economic-patrician establishment at Smith's blunder.

Why did Britain not intervene? Among other explanations, the most charitable is that Britain was thus providing a period of time to enable whites to
grasp the realities of a changed world. Once Rhodesian whites realized their isolation, reforms would follow and black aspirations satisfied with a minimum of dislocation. Peaceful change through the newly created United Nations machinery would claim its first victory and Britain the credit for employing it to solve her most difficult African colonial problem. The rebirth of open nationalist politics in Rhodesia in the continued post-Pearce activity of the African National Council should be seen within this framework. Racial confrontation would give way to negotiations, compromise and a liberal consensus society. This pattern, if it were successful, would in many ways repeat the British decolonization of its two white minority territories, Kenya and Zambia. The assumption is that in the final analysis Rhodesian settler colonialism is no different, and that whites can be made to believe that without power their lives, their privileges will still be essentially 'Rhodesian'. Little has happened to suggest that this is possible or that Leys' 1959 analysis of the situation ('a solution of the country's major problems is fundamentally impossible within the system. To solve them is to change it'), is no longer correct. The chances of this type of negotiated settlement were reduced by the type of white government Ian Smith represents. It is not the liberal patrician government of earlier times, but a white populist government gaining much of its support from the white artisans and lower middle class. It is they who fear most an arrangement which they feel would 'sell out' their interest in an artificially high status and standard of living.

The situation could however be analysed differently: that the conflict of the 1970s was a continuation of a war against conquest and that therefore British responses were irrelevant since the legitimacy of both settler rule and British colonial rule were rejected. This analysis led ZANU to reject the concept of 'British responsibility' or the restricted aim of ending racial discrimination. The goal then becomes national liberation. Inherent in this approach is the idea that 'Zimbabwe' can only be achieved by a people's war, resulting in a total collapse of the existing system, and of the political doctrine which is seen as a part of it.

The policy of the other major nationalist group ZAPU was similar in its analysis regarding revolution as 'not only inevitable but necessary' to the achievement of socialism in the future Zimbabwe. Likewise the aims and objects of FROLIZI referred to the establishment of a 'people's army', 'to overthrow British colonial capitalism' and the establishment of 'an independent socialist economy'.

Nationalist political violence commenced as early as 1961 and was directed as much, if not more, against blacks identified with the settler system as whites themselves, often taking the form of petrol bomb attacks. Obvious targets were African police reserve volunteers and African members of parliament. The Rhodesian Front’s extension of the law and order legislation in 1962 was largely justified as intended to stem this violence. After the establishment of ZANU, considerable violence occurred between it and ZAPU in 1963. In 1964 plans for establishing ‘fighting zones’ were laid by both parties, and a period of contest between the nationalists and the Rhodesian Special Branch developed. In the same year the ZANU ‘Crocodile Commando’ attacked the police camp at Nyanyadzi, and made a road-block attack, killing a white farmer. ZANU groups, trained mainly in Ghana, attempted without success to infiltrate during 1965. ZAPU groups suffered much the same fate, generally being arrested shortly after entering the country. The years 1964 and 1965 show how vital in the suppression of this activity was the role of the new laws. There were 6,754 convictions under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act during this period. The idea that either white morale would be broken by these disturbances, or that Britain would intervene proved to be unfounded.

The illegal declaration of independence was well prepared for in security terms, and little organized response occurred. Tactics following the rebellion appear to have been based upon Britain’s confusing indication that it would only ‘intervene militarily’ if ‘law and order’ broke down in Rhodesia. This concentrated upon demonstrative action more likely to be news-worthy than to seriously involve the local population against the régime. Recruitment and infiltration continued, however, and some attacks achieved considerable publicity. Amongst these was the killing of another white farmer and his wife in the Hartley district in May 1966. In August 1967 ZAPU and the South African National Congress (SAANC) announced a military alliance, and later that year a series of heavy engagements occurred between ANC-ZAPU groups and Rhodesian forces. One consequence of these was South African paramilitary reinforcement for Smith, which has been a significant contribution not only in military terms but also in the boost it provided to white morale.
Throughout 1968 sporadic fighting and infiltration continued at a level which clearly worried the minority government, but it was contained. Ambitious claims on behalf of the liberation forces were frequently proved to be no more than claims. But security action tended to produce a remarkable confidence among the whites, and no noticeable optimism among Africans. This was despite the obvious and novel development—that civil war was open, and that whites and blacks in the security forces were being killed, including a noticeable number of South Africans.

The year of the new Smith constitution (1969) saw no insurgent conflict. During 1970, a severe crisis of leadership interrupted ZAPU’s activities, which had opened in January with a successful attack on a South African Police camp. Nevertheless infiltration continued; as was later shown, especially in the north-eastern border areas, the involvement and integration of the rural people had become a continuous process.

Smith’s new republic and the reassertion of basic racialist government no doubt helped to keep African dissatisfaction alive, but the events of 1971 saw a stimulation of African political morale from an unusual source. A mistake by Ian Smith, combined with a British initiative, produced a revival of activity and a readiness to stand up and be counted amongst Africans which might otherwise have been delayed for some years.

The Pearce Commission’s ‘Test of Acceptability’ was at first much criticised by African nationalists. In part this was an objection on principle to the idea of an alien constitution, created without African participation and considered as a possible basis for settlement by Britain. In part it was a reflection of well-founded distrust of the British and the Rhodesians, compounded by the fact that the chairman of the commission, Lord Pearce, had been a member of the Privy Council which had heard the case of Daniel Madzimbamuto against the Rhodesian Government, brought essentially to test the constitutionality of the rebel régime. The court had found the rebels to be illegal. Lord Pearce had taken an opposite view and dissented from the majority. (His status as something of a hero among Rhodesians was rapidly terminated by his later judgement that the settlement was unacceptable to Africans.) The commission’s task was historic since only African leaders had previously consulted African opinion. Its finding is less so, though a sovereign minority-ruled Rhodesia, recognized by the major Western States (which an ‘acceptable’ settlement may have achieved), would be a militarily and economically stronger opponent than the present régime.

The exercise did, however, recharge African political enthusiasm, and morale was boosted by this but unexpected political victory. The year 1972 thus marked a turning point in morale and was subsequently seen as the start of a new guerilla offensive. ZAPU introduced the widespread use of land-mines in 1973 rather than indulge in confrontational battles, causing a number of casualties to military and civilian personnel and inhibiting movement considerably. Meanwhile, operating in co-operation with FRELIMO in Mozambique, ZANU succeeded in establishing bases of operation deep inside the north-east province. In December 1972 a series of hit-and-run raids were aimed particularly at unpopular local white farmers. These attacks have caused widespread alarm and have led to counteraction by the authorities more severe than any since 1897.
Attacks have also been directed against government agents, district commissioners, land inspectors (one of whom was taken prisoner of war and released in Dar es Salaam much later), headmen and their messengers. The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) likewise organized raids into Rhodesia, causing casualties and penetrating right into Salisbury. Urban action has not, however, been undertaken.

The régime has responded to these attacks by attempting to isolate the local population from the guerrillas. Emphasis has, however, been on negative measures, such as the imposition of communal punishment of local communities ‘suspected’ of not reporting guerrillas. This has taken the form of fines and cattle seizures. In addition some areas have been totally isolated in a massive attempt to create greater terror of official reprisals among a population whites believe are motivated primarily by fear of heavily armed guerrillas. Thus churches, schools and businesses in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust were forced to close. People were interrogated and resettled in other areas. ‘Protected villages’, photographs of which show buildings resembling the concentration camps the liberation movements claim they are, have been hastily built and people settled in them. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act has provided its contribution in the form of an amendment making the ‘harbouring, assisting or failing to report the presence’ of guerrillas an offence, punishable by death.

Attempts to reform the system or to abolish inequality are nowhere in evidence. In the meanwhile the civil war has reached significant proportions in terms of killing, the numbers since December 1972 being in the region of 300. The majority are guerrillas, the other main casualties being African civilians, white and black security forces and white civilians, in that order.

On the one hand the régime has not yet made real concessions as a result of these actions. On the other an air of insecurity and unaccustomed nervousness has apparently crept into the régime’s behaviour.

Though Smith’s constant restriction and detention of Bishop Muzorewa’s officials in the ANC suggests he lacks any real intention to change, nevertheless his talking, even if only to buy time, is a contradiction of the basic tenets of Rhodesian Front thinking and would seem to indicate that the fighting has at least posed some dilemmas for the white population.

More significant are Smith’s miscalculations, for example the closing of the border with Zambia in January 1973 to force that country to prevent guerrillas operating from its territory. Zambia, despite further cost and inconvenience (and next to the Africans of Rhodesia the illegal rebellion has cost Zambia more than any other State), refused either to promise to curb the insurgent operations or, when Smith climbed down, to re-open the border.

The military conflict in Rhodesia has been quite extensively written on. A very full account of the scale of early stages, up to late 1973, is to be found in Kees Maxey’s *The Fight for Zimbabwe*. Mlambo in *Struggle for a Birthright* provides a particularly useful account and explanation of the skirmishes before 1966, including the internal problems of the nationalist movements, as does Shamuyarira in his *Crisis in Rhodesia*. Wilkinson’s *Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957-73* is a very thorough and concise account and assessment. Ndabaningi Sithole’s

1. A self-publication available from 48 St Thomas’ Road, Brentwood, Essex (United Kingdom).
1968 edition of *African Nationalism* sets out a complete political explanation of the movement, including the use of force. Issues of the ZAPU and ZANU information offices, *Zimbabwe Review* and *Zimbabwe News*, and the parties' programmes, set out their objectives and activities from time to time. The settlers' attitudes and explanations are well documented especially in various publications of the Rhodesian Ministry of Information. Like most such works they tend to emphasize the horrors of the war—exclusively those caused by guerrillas—and assume the reasons for the conflict are 'communism' and intimidation of the majority by a few hooligans; they dismiss or do not consider the possibility of discontent with the system. Other studies of this sort include Shay and Vermaak's *The Silent War*; A. J. A. Peck's *Rhodesia Accuses* and Michael Morris's *Terrorism: Southern Africa*. 
The mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, at the invitation of the United Kingdom, were a part of a long political process concerning the relationship between Europe, especially Western Europe, and Africa. Until the emergence of independent States in most of Africa the Rhodesian problem was not seen as being unique but as part of a wider colonial problem which included such future States as Ghana. Joshua Nkomo in 1958 was an active member of the All-African Peoples' Movement, and was indeed engaged in internationalizing the problem when the African National Congress was banned in 1959.

These early efforts aroused considerable outside interest in the African case in Rhodesia, making the later process of organizing international opinion much easier.

In the United Nations, Chapter XI of the Charter was interpreted as empowering the General Assembly to supervise and to criticize colonial administering powers. Rhodesia was a matter of United Nations concern long before the white rebellion. Britain's main concern had been to emphasize the fact of established self-government in Southern Rhodesia to show her own lack of authority and consequently to explain that her inability to improve the situation reduced her responsibility for the people and for the territory. The issue was one of considerable controversy in British politics, and indeed British (Conservative government) policy in the United Nations led to the resignation of Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon) as the British permanent representative.

Awareness of the problem at the United Nations was therefore considerable by the time Smith made his illegal bid for independence. Britain has insisted that independence could be granted to the minority on the basis of the 'five principles' agreed between the Conservative government and the Rhodesians, namely:
1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2. Guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution.
3. An immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. Progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. Britain's need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
The seizure of independence and the continuity of policy guaranteed by the Rhodesian Front clearly breached all of these principles. Yet it must be remembered that the purpose of the sanctions policy, as enunciated and practised by Britain (and endorsed by most members of the United Nations) was to do what Britain had failed to do during over seventy years of imperial control—to persuade Rhodesians to transfer power to Africans by a peaceful reformist process. Britain's abjuration of the use of force against Smith was not restricted to the positive intervention of British armies. It included the negative protection against 'international' force by the use of the veto which Britain possessed at the Security Council. That specific power to veto the use of United Nations force has in fact been used by Britain on Rhodesia's behalf on a number of occasions.

Sanctions were imposed in the hope that enough white people would rally behind a 'liberal' or 'moderate' leader, who would then negotiate a settlement providing for unimpeded progress towards majority rule. In terms of white Rhodesian realities the emergence of this moderation was unlikely and has not happened to date. In fact elections held since UDI have confirmed white support for the policies of the Rhodesian Front. Sanctions in any case never came near to being total.

In November 1965 Britain itself imposed a total economic break with the Rhodesians, but sought no more than a recommendation from the United Nations that Member States do likewise—as many did (Security Council resolutions 216 and 217, 1965). Only in December 1966, over a year later, were mandatory sanctions imposed, and then only on selected products, the most important of which was oil. In April 1966 it appeared that oil was getting through to the Umtali refinery via the Mozambique port of Beira, so creating a situation constituting a 'threat to peace' (Security Council resolution 221, 1966). In December 1966 after Ian Smith had rejected Britain's proposed settlement, Britain sought and obtained the authority to use force on the high seas to prevent the delivery of oil to Beira where such delivery was suspected to be in breach of sanctions. A minor landmark in international peace-keeping by the United Nations was made, though the effect was minimal on Rhodesia (Security Council resolution 232, 1966). Adequate supplies of oil were by then coming into Rhodesia via Lourenço Marques in Mozambique, and South African ports, in respect of which no such authority to police sanctions breaches was sought or given. The mandatory sanctions covered most Rhodesian exports, which United Nations Member States were required not to import.

A report of the 'Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/9623, Part V) describes how sanctions were evaded:

Since 1965, foreign economic interests have provided the illegal régime with the mechanism to evade United Nations sanctions. First, through their interlocking interests, companies in Europe and the United States can invest in Southern Rhodesia through their subsidiaries in South Africa. Since South Africa co-operates with Southern Rhodesia in many ways, it is difficult to detect foreign investments channelled through South Africa. Through this complex process, Southern Rhodesia has been able to evade United Nations sanctions.

Second, the prevalence of foreign economic interests in the economy of Southern Rhodesia enables the illegal régime to pass to the companies the burden of sustaining the economy and employment levels. Through a series of actions taken under the Emergency
Powers Regulations (1969), the illegal régime has been able to insist that profits, except for certain South African subsidiaries, cannot be repatriated. This has compelled foreign companies to reinvest their profits in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, the companies are not allowed to dismiss employees without the permission of the Minister of Labour, thus enabling employees, especially Europeans, to continue to be employed by the foreign companies even if they are not making any contribution to the productive process of the company. Through a process of preventing their unemployment, the illegal régime has therefore been able to shield the European population from feeling the burden of sanctions. Although such compulsory employment should reduce the profits of the companies, the companies have minimized the loss of profit by dismissing African employees and by refusing to increase the salaries of working Africans.

In 1973 the illegal régime turned to foreign economic interests to increase public revenue. In order to avoid alienating the Europeans by increasing income and property taxes, a non-resident shareholders tax at the rate of 15 per cent on taxable profits was imposed on subsidiary companies in Southern Rhodesia. The régime expected to raise $$(R)6.5 million in revenue from this tax in 1975.

In May 1968, soon after the British Privy Council had confirmed the continued existence of Britain’s legal authority in the territory, Ian Smith demonstrated his sovereignty and power. He threatened his own judges, through his Attorney-General, and warned them that their acceptance of the Privy Council judgement would be ignored. Accordingly, despite the fact that royal pardons had been granted to certain Africans sentenced to death, and despite the legal pretence that Rhodesia (and her judges) were still loyal to the Crown, the appeal based on the pardons was refused. Following this Ian Smith asserted his authority and executed five Africans, sentenced after the rebellion. The gesture angered United Nations members and occasioned Security Council resolution 253 of 1968 which imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions, requiring United Nations Member States to cease importing any goods from Rhodesia. The attempt to introduce force against the régime was pressed by African States but successfully resisted by Britain.

Thus it took two and a half years for a blanket prohibition upon trade with Rhodesia to be introduced.

The impositions of sanctions did create severe difficulties for Rhodesia, borne as we have seen, primarily by Africans, but sufficient to reduce the profits of ‘legitimate’ Rhodesian traders severely while creating new profiteers. The argument is sometimes heard that sanctions have thus harmed those they were meant to help. Nationalist leaders have all made it clear that they regard sanctions as a small price to pay for hastening majority rule. Though living standards in Rhodesia have in fact been maintained since 1965—average earnings having risen for Africans from $$R246 to $$R359 and for Europeans from $$R2,576 to $$R3,901 (1973)—real growth has been stunted compared with neighbouring States. This is clearly illustrated by T. Curtin in his analysis of the economy in his *South of the Sahara* (Europa Publications, 1975, p. 662) from which the following figures are taken:
Comparative growth (1964/65 = 100).

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<th>Kenya</th>
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<tr>
<td>School enrolments (all races, 1971)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing production (1973)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>184</td>
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<th>Rhodesia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing employment (1971)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education budget (1971) (1968 = 100)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
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Perhaps the most important effect of sanctions has been to deny to the Southern Rhodesian minority the claims of legitimacy. Not a single State has recognized the illegal régime.
Appendices
The legislative Assembly

A Legislative Assembly consisting of sixty-five members, of whom fifty-one were European, thirteen African and one Asian. The whole of Rhodesia was divided into fifty constituencies and also into fifteen electoral districts, each of which elected one member to the Assembly.

The franchise

All persons 21 years of age and over were eligible for the vote. Two registers were compiled for each constituency and electoral district, namely an ‘A’ roll and a ‘B’ roll. The qualifications for these rolls were as follows:

‘A’ ROLL

1. Income of at least £795 for each of the two previous years, or ownership of immovable property worth not less than £1,650; or
2. A Standard VI education and either (a) an income of at least £528 for each of the two previous years or (b) ownership of immovable property worth not less than £1,000; or
3. A Form IV education and either (a) an income of not less than £330 for each of the two previous years or (b) ownership of immovable property worth not less than £550; or
4. Appointment to the office of Chief or Headman.

‘B’ ROLL

1. Income at the rate of not less than £264 per annum (£22 per month) during the six months prior to enrolment or ownership of immovable property worth not less than £495; or
2. A Form II education and either (a) an income at the rate of not less than £132 per annum (£11 per month) during the six months prior to enrolment or (b) ownership of immovable property worth at least £275.

Persons over the age of 30 were also eligible for registration on the ‘B’ roll, subject to the following qualifications:
1. A Standard VI education and either (a) an income at the rate of at least £132 per annum (£11 per month) during the six months prior to enrolment; or (b) ownership of immovable property worth not less than £275; or

2. An income at the rate of £198 per annum (£16 10s. 0d. per month) during the six months prior to enrolment or ownership of property worth at least £385.

All kraal heads with followings of twenty or more heads of families, and ministers of religion who could not fulfil the above qualifications were automatically entitled to enrolment on the 'B' roll.

Each voter had two votes, one in his constituency and one in an electoral district. Under a system of cross-voting the total number of 'B' roll votes cast in any constituency could not exceed 25 per cent of the 'A' roll votes in that constituency. By means of a special formula, 'B' roll votes could be devalued to maintain the 25 per cent limit.

Similarly, in the electoral districts, 'A' roll votes could not exceed 25 per cent of the 'B' roll votes.

The purpose of this system was to ensure that 'A' roll voters dominate the fifty constituencies and 'B' roll voters dominate the fifteen electoral districts.

The Declaration of Rights

The Declaration of Rights, embodied in the constitution, prescribed the fundamental rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by the people of Southern Rhodesia. Several rights are limited by various saving clauses, especially the following:

1. The Declaration did not apply to laws in force before 1 November 1962.

2. The provision that 'no written law shall contain any documentary provision' which prejudices 'persons of a particular description by race, tribe, colour or creed' is qualified by reference to 'special circumstances appertaining to persons of that or any other description', 'the stage of social or economic development reached by the various persons affected' and 'the state for the time being of the economy of Southern Rhodesia'.

3. The Declaration could be overridden on grounds of public safety, interest or order, morality or health.

4. Laws applied during a state of emergency could not be held to be inconsistent with the Declaration.

The Constitutional Council

A Constitutional Council consisting of eleven members elected by an electoral college and a chairman appointed by the Governor to examine Bills before the Legislative Assembly and report whether any proposed legislation would be inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. Draft regulations under Acts of parliament were also subject to scrutiny of the council. It also had the right to recommend changes to existing laws.

All these functions were advisory and recommendations could be overruled by the Legislative Assembly.
2. **1971 settlement proposals**

The 1971 settlement proposals involved:

1. Retaining the 1969 constitution.

2. Appointing a commission to make recommendations regarding discriminatory legislation and a Declaration of Rights whose terms could be enforced in law. However, under the proposals, attempts to remove racial discrimination were to be subject to veto if the government considered that there were 'overriding considerations', and the Declaration of Rights (already subject to numerous exceptions and provisos) could be rendered largely ineffectual simply by the suspension of rights after the declaration of a state of emergency.

3. The possibility of eventual political parity.

4. Making the amendment of the constitution subject to:
   
   (a) a two-thirds majority of all the members of the House of Assembly and the Senate, voting separately, and

   (b) the affirmative votes of a majority of the white representatives and a majority of the black representatives in the House of Assembly.

   While being intended to guard against possible future retrogressive measures, these procedures could also be used to block progressive legislation.

Palley suggests that, under these proposals, majority rule would not be attained until the year 2053 at the earliest.
Principles

1. The Party affirms its loyalty to the Independent Country of Rhodesia.
2. The Party views the National Flag as the only and exclusive symbol of our Independent Rhodesian Nation.
3. The Party will ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in responsible hands.
4. English will remain the official language of the Country.
5. The Party will preserve a strong and prosperous State based upon the fundamental principles which affect a sound society, including:
   (i) recognition of the family as the basis of society;
   (ii) the right of all individuals, within the framework of the law, to private ownership, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of association and opportunity to develop their abilities to the full and to receive reward and recognition entirely on merit;
   (iii) total opposition to Communism and Communistic Ideologies.
6. The Party will ensure the permanent establishment of the European in Rhodesia and to this end will encourage to the utmost European immigration.
7. The Party will uphold the principle of the Land Tenure Act.
8. The Party will uphold the principle of the preservation of the Tribal Trust lands and will promote their development.
9. The Party opposes compulsory integration and believes that the peaceful co-existence of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and opportunity to preserve their own identities, traditions and customs, and therefore recognises the obligation of Government and respective communities where necessary to ensure the provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible.
10. The Party will ensure that law and order are maintained.
11. The Party will promote the full economic development of Rhodesia and to this end will seek the co-operation of all her people.
12. The Party will encourage and stimulate private enterprise, subject to the right of the State to intervene when necessary in the interests of the Country.
13. The Party will strive to create conditions in which all inhabitants of Rhodesia may attain reasonable standards of housing, health, social services and employment.
14. The Party will ensure the Government honours its obligations in the payment of pensions.
15. The Party will protect the standards of skilled workers against exploitation by cheap labour.
16. The Party recognises the desirability of consultation and co-operation with other States in the solution of common problems.

Rhodesian Front Headquarters,
Salisbury.
23 October 1969.
1. Proceeding from historical and contemporary evidence, the Party is convinced that the present system of life in Zimbabwe is capitalist in practice and orientation. The sole motive for the penetration and settlement of the British settlers from 1890 on was to survey, seize and exploit the resources of Zimbabwe—the land, minerals, other natural resources and the labour of its people—for the benefit of just a few, in accordance with the system.

The militarist method of the so-called pioneer column in 1890, the Chartered British South African Company, the enactment of the land seizure laws—the Land Apportionment Act in 1930 (now the Land Tenure Act), the privileged wage structure for the whites, the negligence and later throttling of African education, the imposition of the so-called Law and Order Act and minority rule itself, are all devices of a single machinery to establish and maintain a capitalist way of life by the British settlers in Zimbabwe.

2. The Party is equally convinced that what came as British racism has become white racism for the conditions of Zimbabwe. White racism is a compound device to protect the capitalist privilege of the white community as well as an attitude for degrading and undermining the human dignity of the black man.

3. The Party is convinced beyond doubt that capitalism and the white racism of the European settlers are the two basic evils facing the people of Zimbabwe today. They are the root causes of the order of dishonesty prevalent today, and therefore of the lack of harmonious relations among the Zimbabwe people.

4. A revolution is not only inevitable in Zimbabwe, but necessary. To destroy capitalism, racism and all their devices or apparatuses it must be an armed revolution. To prevent their resurgence at any other future stage it must be a people’s armed revolution. The revolution must mean and result in a complete and thorough change of the system of life.

5. The Party is convinced that socialism is the better system of life and must therefore prevail and be the order of life in Zimbabwe. The Party conceives socialism as the seizure and retention by the people through their State of the basic means of production—the land and all its natural resources, all industry, transport and communications, financial institutions (banks), external and internal trade and social services.

6. Within its socialist concept, the Party maintains that land, water, air and other natural resources are natural gifts to all people and therefore must be retained and shared by them all. As such, these means of livelihood cannot be sold for a price nor be bargained for in these terms but for the services in their improvement or distribution.
7. It is the standpoint of the Party in its socialist concept that profit is the mainstay of all exchange, bargains or trade and is not per se a contradiction to socialism. Profit must neither be exploitative nor used for the benefit of a few; it must serve all the people who put their labour into production.

8. The retention and use of all the means of production by and for the people through their State should not imply the negation of private ownership of property. Ownership of private property and ownership of the means of production are two different meanings. There will be personal private ownership of property as the just earnings of one's labour.

9. The Party regards a sense of duty, hard work, diligence and honesty as the foundations of socialism and, in the same sense, it regards laziness as the arch enemy of socialism.

10. Alongside land, water and air as the natural gifts to all the people, the Party maintains that knowledge, through education, and power, through government, cannot be the monopoly of individuals or a few people. Every Zimbabwean has the right to these and they must be shared by all as well.

On the constitution and government

1. The Constitution of the State of the Zimbabwe people shall declare socialism as the system of life, or the prevailing order in the country. For an appropriate reflection of this, the State should be called: The People's Democratic Republic of Zimbabwe.

2. The Constitution shall lay down that it is treasonable for anyone or any group of individuals to indulge in activities, direct or indirect, calculated to undermine or defeat the people's socialist system of life.

3. The Constitution shall enshrine the universally accepted human rights, with particular regard for the safeguarding of the socialist life of the Zimbabwe people.
   
   Political rights shall include: the right of every member of the State to participate in all activities for the welfare of the State, in accordance with one's ability, freedom of the press and writing, freedom to elect one's government.

   Economic rights shall include: the right to work; freedom from exploitation, the right of living according to one's work, protection of one's private property;

   Social rights: the right to education and the development of one's talent, the right to medical services, the right to old-age and disablement pensions, the right to culture, the right to marry according to the mutual choice of the individuals, concerned polygamy shall be discouraged, the right to one's life.

4. Government must rest on the three pillars of power: the legislature to make laws; the executive to administer; the judiciary to interpret and enforce the law.

   The constitution shall provide, within the aims of the system of the State, for no interference of one branch in another within their respective fields, but with an emphasis on the fact that the legislature is the supreme organ of the State.

5. The legislature shall result from the election machinery of the Party, from the branch right up to its congress. In short, the legislature must be an enlargement of the People's Council elected by the Party's congress.

   The president of the Party shall be the president of the State and he shall appoint his ministers from the legislature, but present their names to the legislature for approval. The People's Council and Secretariat of the Party shall maintain the Party.

6. The constitution shall lay down the obligation for everyone but the disabled to defend the country and the socialist system of life.
On the programme of economic revolution

The Party notes:
(a) that the Zimbabwe people lack the necessary technical know-how to bring about their economic prosperity;
(b) that Zimbabwe lacks sufficient capital to set up all required industry or to exploit all the resources;
(c) that Zimbabwe lacks basic industries for the complete manufacture of all its requirements;
(d) that economic life in Zimbabwe, as well as industry, commerce and marketing, are all tied to foreign capital and trade;
(e) that for its exports and imports, Zimbabwe is at the mercy of the capitalist monopolists for transportation and communication;
(f) that for whatever products it might market, Zimbabwe should take into cognizance the threat of substitute products offsetting conventional products.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned difficulties, the Party equally notes that the greatest danger to an independent people, their economy and country, is importation of foreign capital goods or investments, because through them lies the trappings of terms which harness the economy to the dictates of foreign trade and interests.

The first principle of the Zimbabwe people in their economic revolution towards socialism is strict self-reliance, on the basis of locally available resources (both human and material), in the creation of self-generating capital for the foundation of capital-producing industries.
Constitution of ZANU

Preamble

Proud of our Zimbabwe culture, traditions and our African personality;
Remembering that since the coming of the white man into this country we, the African
people, have been deprived of our God-given rights of freedom and independence;
Condemning the undemocratic state the alien white-minority settlers have created in Zim-
babwe which has resulted in the oppression and suppression of our people;
Desiring to live in liberty and equality as a Zimbabwe people in a society organized under
democratic law and justice and dedicated to the promotion of the general welfare;
We the representatives of the people of Zimbabwe in Congress here at Gwelo assembled on
the 22nd May, 1964, do hereby in the silent presence of our dead and before our living
citizens and those yet to be born inaugurate the Zimbabwe African National Union and grant
unto ourselves this constitution for the liberation of our country from bondage and for the
establishment of a Nationalist, Socialist, Pan-Africanist, Democratic Republic in Zimbabwe.

Part I. Name

The name of this Nationalist Party shall be ‘The Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU)’ herein after referred to as ‘the Party’.

Part II. Aims and objectives

1. To wage a relentless struggle against the undemocratic settler régime in Zimbabwe.
2. To establish a democratic state in Zimbabwe in which the government shall be created
   through One man—One vote and remain at all times responsible to the people.
3. To promote national consciousness and the unity of all our people in pursuance of our
   aims and objectives.
4. To strive for the promotion of the social, educational and cultural welfare of the African
   people.
5. To reconstruct Zimbabwe’s economy and evolve a socialistic pattern in which the
   country’s resources are fully tapped for the common benefit of all the people of
   Zimbabwe in close collaboration with the rest of the African continent.
6. To co-operate with other progressive organizations within Zimbabwe whose policies, aims and objectives are not in conflict with those of the Party.

7. To engage fully in the Pan-African struggle for the complete liquidation of Settlerism, Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism in Africa and to realize the complete unification of the African continent.

8. To co-operate with all nationalist liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere whose aims, objects and policies are not in conflict with those of the Party.

9. To pursue the policy of positive non-alignment in our external relations.
Salutation!

ARE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS PEOPLE?

Brothers and sisters, we welcome you here on this occasion. Although we are the ones who should be really welcomed by you for it is because of your cry, petitions and demands that we responded by setting the African National Council in a viable structure. This new organization, like the old ones, will be referred to, by outsiders, as an African Nationalist Organization. The term ‘African Nationalist’ has unpleasant connotations to many people with closed minds.

We want to affirm that we are nothing but normal human beings who have an innate desire for freedom and justice to all people. We have organized ourselves so that with a common voice our cry can be heard and our aspirations can be reached.

This cry, to many, will have an undesirable sound. They will regard us as ‘dangerous creatures’ who should be watched and prevented from acting freely. We here declare that we are simply creatures made in the image of God and, therefore, His children who need to be liberated, nothing more—nothing less.

Only as we are fully liberated can we fulfil the purpose for which we were created.

Dedication

On this tenth day of March 1972, at Highfield, Salisbury, We here assembled, claiming no more than to be heirs to the People’s Struggle which has ceaselessly been waged since the imposition of alien rule in 1890, in the name of Almighty God, who, in His love and mercy, created all people and races in His image, do hereby proclaim, constitute and declare the AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL to be the one sole voice and instrument of the African masses of Zimbabwe and all people of goodwill, in their just and normal struggle for national emancipation from the yoke of a racist and oppressive minority rule.

Accordingly, the African National Council is born today as a result of the need and demands of primarily the African people and other racial groups of this country. And we
here and now summon every African in this land, young or old, rich or poor, educated or uneducated, chief or subject, and those members of other races dedicated to the establishment of human brotherhood, to recognize the trumpet we here sound and to rally around us, so that together, we continue our arduous journey to Zimbabwe in a Christian and non-violent manner.

**Beliefs**

1. This Council believes in the power of the unity of the African masses in the imperative need for the opposition of those elements or forces which seek to sow the seeds of division among our people. Divided we will remain slaves and strangers in the land of our birth. United though we may suffer, we shall toil, but with dignity, until we are free. We should, therefore, be warned that our worst enemies are those who seek to divide us and those who labour to keep us in perpetual oppression, be they black or white.

2. We believe in the invincibility of numbers of the masses of men and women of goodwill in Rhodesia and that the African National Council is truly a grass-roots organization in its very scope, membership and spirit.

3. We believe in a government that will establish and promote the sanctity and practice of the essential human freedoms of conscience, of expression, association, religion, assembly and movement of all people irrespective of colour, race or creed.

4. We believe in non-racialism, the universal brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. This means forced segregation and forced integration violate the principle of free choice of association.

5. We believe in a non-violent, peaceful, orderly but permanent and continuing struggle to be waged within the Law and for the establishment of a constitutional government.

6. We believe that true peace and harmony among all people and economic stability of this country can only be assured for all time by the establishment of 'the government of the people, by the people and for the people'.

7. We believe that the rights and property of the minority should be protected; we do not, however, believe in the minority's amassing of social, political and economic privileges at the expense of the freedom of the majority.

**Declaration**

The African National Council solemnly dedicates itself to strive for the realization of those universal human rights conceded to the citizens in all democratic and just societies. This being so,

1. We shall not waver or prevaricate in our demand for the creation, in this country, of a just social order; but shall strive to achieve this justice which is long overdue.

2. We shall not deviate from our just demand for universal adult suffrage.

3. We shall never concede to the fallacy that there is any justification for racial and other forms of discrimination as between one human being against another. Thus, we shall continue to oppose racial bigotry, religious intolerance, class arrogance, the idiocy of tribalism and undeserved economic privileges. And we shall strive to create a nation where black and white can live as children of the One Almighty God.

4. We shall never compromise with the sin of greed which is the main characteristic of a minority-controlled economy; but will continue to promote a fair and free participation of each and every citizen of this our mother land—rich in natural resources.

5. We shall forever abhor the continued denial, under the pretext of 'preservation of Western Christian civilization', of the masses' demand for legitimate self-determination.
6. *We* shall never support nor respect a system which lays emphasis on Law and Order at the expense of charity, justice and human dignity; but will continue to call upon the conscience of this country to influence the establishment of law and order with justice.

7. *We* shall require and desire nothing less than self determination.

**External relations**

*We* declare our solidarity with those international organizations dedicated to the peaceful creation and preservation of the basic universal human rights and the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God.

**Challenge to the nation**

Having stated our beliefs and declarations we now challenge all people of this country—Africans, Asians, Coloureds and Europeans—who sincerely and honestly seek a genuine peace and mutual understanding to join us.

Only as we work together can we bring our country out of its present political deadlock.

We challenge the people of this country to come out of the current political dream-world by realizing that what has been called ‘peace’ and ‘happiness’ and ‘good race relations’ are, in fact, repressed fear, restless silence, forced tolerance and hidden hatred of one another.

We call and call again to make people aware that our race relations are deteriorating and that they will continue to do so until all discriminatory legislation in this land has been removed.

We challenge our Rhodesian whites to realize the simple socio-psychological fact that no one should expect love from a person he hates; or expect respect from a person he disrespects; or expect admiration from a person he despises, nor loyalty from a person whom he does not love.

We finally and particularly direct this challenge to the Europeans of Rhodesia that now is the day to sit down with us and, in peaceful negotiations, try and find a mutually agreeable formula for achieving racial harmony. This is absolutely necessary for social stability, economic growth and a secure future for all of us and our children.

Time for such negotiations is fast running out. Believe it! This is the day that circumstance and fate or, as we want to express it, God has led us all.

If we want to be blessed and not cursed by our children and children’s children we have no time to lose.

We challengingly remind our African people that whatever position we hold, or status we enjoy we are all condemned as BLACK PEOPLE in this country. All are treated as second if not third class citizens. We therefore feel very sad when we see some of our people and hear about their behaviour which points out to the fact that they have lost the purpose and goal and are living and fighting for their own stomachs and self interests instead of liberation for all which should be every sane person’s goal.

We have seen signs of these kinds of people who are bought to work out division, to work out frustration, to work out embarrassment and to work out perpetual slavery of the Africans. Shame!

We challenge our African people to stop fulfilling the accusation that ‘the worst enemy of Africans are Africans themselves’ and instead become our own liberators, by stopping all sorts of traitorous actions against the African United Fronts for liberation and labour for the common goal of independence.
We call our African people to praise, and congratulate our fathers—the chiefs—for their courageous stand and true representation of their people which they displayed during the test of Acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposals. We trust this is the beginning of a new day in Rhodesia for Africans.

We challenge the clergy of this country to stop preaching the useless and archaic doctrine of ‘pie in the sky’ and start vigorously to preach a ‘whole gospel for the whole man’. To teach our people that politics is not a ‘dirty game’, but that what makes politics dirty is the kind of people who play politics and how they participate in it. That the definition of politics is ‘the science and art of governing people’ and that there can never be any evil in that kind of science or art. There is no virtue in participating or not participating in politics, but Christians must be involved when the political system disturbs people and churches such as in the case of the Land Tenure Act.

We challenge our African people to be purpose-centred rather than personality-centred.

We challenge our African people to realize that, while we have chosen a peaceful and loving method of approach, in UNITY we have more than a bomb can achieve. Therefore, be UNITED, be United until UNITY is strength and strength becomes POWER.
Preamble

The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) is the Zimbabwe people’s political and military instrument for national liberation, born of the imperative for national unity among all Zimbabweans and dedicated to a protracted armed revolutionary struggle against the true enemy of the people of Zimbabwe, i.e. the capitalist imperialist and colonial settlers in Zimbabwe.

Section I

AIMS AND OBJECTS

1. To unite all the people of Zimbabwe in order to resolutely struggle to overthrow British colonial capitalism in our country.
2. To establish and develop an independent socialist economy based upon the ownership and control of land, capital, and all the means of production and distribution of wealth by the masses.
3. To establish and guarantee Universal Adult Suffrage, one man one vote, as the basis of government in a free Zimbabwe.
4. To establish a common, free and compulsory educational system for all, and free health services.
5. To establish a revolutionary people’s army.
6. To build and develop our national culture and heritage, i.e. languages, norms, etc.—and to ensure the equality, unity and fraternity of all Zimbabweans.
7. To establish and guarantee the people’s constitutional and human rights through a people’s legal system.
8. To develop and strengthen solidarity with revolutionary movements, organizations and governments in Africa, Asia, South and North America, the Caribbean Islands and elsewhere.
Zimbabwe declaration of unity, Lusaka, Republic of Zambia, 7 December 1974

1. ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC hereby agree to unite in the ANC.
2. The parties recognise the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe.
3. (a) They agreed to consolidate the leadership of the ANC by the inclusion into it of the presidents of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI under the chairmanship of the president of the ANC;
   (b) ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI shall each appoint three other persons to join the enlarged ANC executive.
4. The enlarged ANC executive shall have the following functions:
   (a) to prepare for any conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might be called;
   (b) to prepare for the holding of a congress within 4 months at which:
      (i) a revised ANC Constitution shall be adopted;
      (ii) the leadership of the united people of Zimbabwe shall be elected;
      (iii) a Statement of Policy for the ANC shall be considered;
   (c) To organise the people for such conference and congress.
5. The leaders of the ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI call upon their supporters and all Zimbabweans to rally behind the ANC under its enlarged executive.
6. ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI will take steps to merge their respective organs and structures into the ANC before the congress to be held within 4 months.
7. The leaders recognise the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe.

ABEL TENDEKAYI MUZOREWA  NDABANINGI SITHOLE
President of ANC  President of ZANU

JOSHUA MQABUKO NKOMO  JAMES ROBERT DAMBAZA CHIKEREMA
President of ZAPU  President of FROLIZI

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