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Editorial

An expert working group on Social Prerequisites to Economic Growth convened by Unesco, met in Kyrenia (Cyprus) in April 1963, under the scientific directorship of Professor Raymond Firth. A number of data papers were commissioned in this connexion, both from participants at the meeting, and from scholars who did not attend it. All the main articles in the present issue of the International Social Science Journal were originally submitted as data papers to the expert working group, and are presented here grouped under the theme of 'Leadership and Economic Growth', with the exception of two contributions carried in the 'Current studies' section.

The full report of the Expert Working Group on Social Prerequisites to Economic Growth is available as Unesco document SS/38 directly from ‘Special Requests’, Documents and Publications Service, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, Paris-7e, free of charge. It contains a summary of the proceedings as well as a series of selected proposals.
Introduction:
Leadership and economic growth
Raymond Firth

In the voluminous literature on economic progress, growth or development, interest in factors other than the supply of capital has now become evident, as it has become increasingly clear that more capital alone is not the answer to problems of economic advances. Among the other factors to which attention has been turned are the amount and quality of entrepreneurial, technical and managerial skills and abilities. But though their significance has been recognized, exactly what and how much they contribute to the economic process has not really been clearly estimated, nor have the sources of such dynamic elements been very systematically examined. True, in general theory we have Schumpeter's distinction of entrepreneurial leadership from innovative leadership in the technical sense, and from general economic leadership; we also have his rather superficial characterization of the motives and techniques of the 'entrepreneur type'. The massive enquiries of Max Weber and of Tawney into the value system historically associated with capitalist enterprise in Western Europe are only samples, however impressive, of the work of economic historians in unravelling the antecedents and correlates of entrepreneurship in societies which have attained a high degree of economic viability. These have been supplemented by analyses of modern business élites, mainly in the United States, by Warner and Abegglen, Wright Mills, Lipset and Bendix, and other sociologists and psychologists. In the Oriental field, too, studies of Japanese industry have demonstrated the vital role of entrepreneurial activity in her phenomenal growth.

But some of these analyses raise rather than solve problems. It is significant that even in a case so well documented as that of Japan there are differences of view as to exactly where the social pre-conditions to economic growth should be located. All writers agree that forward-looking leadership was responsible to a great degree for the economic progress since the middle of the nineteenth century. Yet there is disagreement as to whether these leaders came primarily from the upsurging merchants released from fettering restrictions by the new order, from the minor gentry (samurai) made
keen for wealth by long poverty as their rice revenues decreased in value, or from feudal nobles who took their commuted incomes as capital and turned from court affairs to trade. It is perhaps significant that to each of these suggestions corresponds an economic or indeed a quasi-philosophical assumption: that economic stimulus is provided by freedom from restriction, by privation, or by some fortunate accession of capital.

What seems to be true is that for the most part these analyses have been provided by men who have themselves been living in the heart of a developed economy. Perceptive and scholarly though their work has been, it has rather the air of wisdom after the event, from the point of view of someone anxious to identify and perhaps to make use of nascent leadership in an economy which it is hoped to launch on the path to success. Here lies part of the interest of the present essays. All are case studies, some at the national, some at the local or sector, level. All the writers have had personal experience of the types of societies they describe. Some are themselves participants in economic systems still at early stages along the road to economic progress; some have been engaged in practical developmental activities. On the whole, then, they are probably closer to the problems, analytically and personally, than have been most other writers on these topics.

The essays were composed originally to discuss various aspects of problems concerned with social pre-conditions to economic growth; only one, that of Nayacakalou, was specifically oriented towards the problems of leadership as such. But each deals with some issues of leadership, gives background material and illustrates the need for more sensitive and systematic analysis of the social, economic and political situations in which effective leadership may emerge.

We are not concerned here with any precise definition of leadership in relation to economic growth. In the fairly literal etymological sense it refers to those persons who are out in front in the activities of economic planning, entrepreneurship, and exercise of managerial and technical skills. The notion of leadership is commonly associated with that of élites. A distinction can be drawn between them—an élite is a group, set or category of persons of relative excellence in a social, political or economic system; they may and usually do furnish leaders but are not all leaders; essentially they represent a position rather than a type of activity; they may serve as an example rather than a direct stimulus . . . and so on. But much that is said of élites with regard to origins, mobility, standards, status, applies also to leaders in the economic field, as Bauman and Hoselitz, for example, have indicated here. In what follows I attempt to summarize briefly some of the main points made about élites and leaders in these essays, and to follow certain trains of thought which they suggest.

Certain basic assumptions run right through nearly all such work on economic growth. It is assumed that economic growth is a desirable thing and that ideally such growth should be regular and sustained. It is assumed also that the benefits of such growth should be generally distributed and not
primarily restricted to one sector of the community. How far responsibility for the decisions leading to economic growth should also be generally distributed does not appear to be so clearly determined. In some cases it seems to be suggested that knowledge and skill combined with initiative are a full entitlement to decision-making without the necessity of consultation with the general body of citizens; in other cases it is implied that a popular mandate exists for all decisions taken. This difference is perhaps, however, more apparent than real and may be a matter primarily of skill and timing. It does seem to be generally assumed that consensus is ultimately a prerequisite to effective economic action, whatever the degree of broad consultation at any specific level. For long-run results, as Dube indicates, leaders in the economic as in other fields must be prepared to work with the people in whose name they make critical decisions. Essentially, then, leadership is a function of the situation; leaders emerge partly at least in response to the requirements of the situation. One aspect of the problem then is to study the conditions in which a leader will be followed and in which the decisions that he makes will be implemented effectively by others.

Leaders cannot be created to order. The problem, as Belshaw suggests, is rather to identify the principles of co-operation and co-adaptation operating in a society, and to identify those persons who can best mobilize such forces for economic advance. As Ahumada emphasizes, adequate diagnosis of the situation is a most important phase in the promotion of economic growth. The adequacy of such diagnosis depends in part upon the roles which are envisaged for the leaders. These may differ according to the objectives and structure of available resources. Leaders may be needed as creators, definers, interpreters of policy, especially when economic policy is closely linked with political policy. They may be needed, as Nayacakalou points out, in order to promote a reorientation of outlook and the acceptance of new values necessary if the resources of a traditional form of economic organization are to be effectively mobilized for economic progress. Leaders are obviously necessary for decision-making on critical economic issues and for stimulus to see that the appropriate executive action follows. But also an important function of a leader, as Ahumada and Dube point out, may be to serve as an evaluator, to judge where economic action can be applied most effectively and what is likely to be the most efficient combination of resources to achieve the end desired. The significance of the leader depends, then, upon the kind of job to be done.

But there is leadership at all levels. The process of economic growth in itself develops a range of novel spheres of decision and implies that there will be need for decision-making and leadership in tasks of very varying scale. The increasing complexity of the administrative process in itself is part of this whole situation. As Dube points out, leadership must work through the bureaucracy more and more as economic growth proceeds.

But the significance of leadership for economic growth depends upon other factors, too. It depends first of all upon the structure of power in the
society, especially upon the relation between economic power and political power; of this Bauman and Ahumada have given clear examples. The terms of the diagnosis on this point may vary, but in so many of the societies seeking economic growth but not yet highly developed throughout all sectors there is a basic incongruity. This may be a marked contrast between a backward rural peasantry and an advanced industrial sector using the most modern technology; it may be between an indigenous, relatively poor, set of producers of raw materials and a relatively wealthy immigrant set of middlemen and importers of consumer goods; it may be between a small group of traditional-minded, status-conscious wielders of economic and political power, varying in wealth and education but conservative in their outlook, as contrasted with another modernized group whose main resource lies in their acquired knowledge and skill. Whatever be the frame of description used to designate such a situation—whether it be ‘social dualism’ as indicated by Ahumada, ‘traditional leadership’ and ‘modern leadership’ as described by Nayacakalou, or the concept of ‘plural society’ given currency by Furnivall—the implication is of a contrast so great as to constitute a radical dichotomy of economic aims and potentialities. Whether the dichotomy is of such a nature that no solution is possible and no substantial economic growth achievable without a complete alteration of the structure of the society is, of course, a matter on which opinions differ. What does appear clear is that, whether by a process of attrition or evolution or by more violent means, substantial economic development and growth require in the long run the replacement of one kind of leadership by another. Even in the short run, the logic of economic development may need some replacement of leader groups in terms of those better adapted to take advantage of the changing circumstances. As Bauman argues, there would seem to be a lucid trend in the dynamics of élite composition at least at the middle level, as managerial and administrative issues take the place of those of ideological orientation and propaganda.

In much of the discussion about leadership mention is made of types of leaders. Sociologically this seems to be a very difficult field in which to get any precise results. Studies of the origins and personalities of leaders are illuminating descriptive material, but have little explanatory value—the problem still is how and why these people from such backgrounds and with such personality characteristics, and not others of apparently very similar equipment, emerge at the forefront. We may speak of charismatic leaders; but again this is a post hoc identification. The charism is shown in the power over others, but the personal power can hardly be identified before it is manifest by results. The general trend of sociological enquiry is, therefore, to look at leadership in terms rather of social category than of type. Here the essays presented give some very interesting indications. They do not deal to any extent with an informal leadership which, from its very unstructured character, is less easy to identify than formal leadership. But in general they point out how different stages of economic growth may demand different categories of leaders, in particular, the polyvalent
being succeeded by the high specialist. Much has been made in sociological literature of the 'circulation of élites', but these essays devote rather more attention to the substitution or replacement of élites. One point of great relevance here is the speed of replacement, as in rapid industrialization one new technological or sociological generation comes to take the place of another.

In a situation of economic growth, leaders are to a considerable extent a self-recruiting or self-generating group. They also develop vested interests. Incentives to leadership may consist partly in substantial material benefits, but usually include, even more significantly, status attribution and the command of power. Important also may be the attraction of new roles allowing for the exercise of important skills with finesse and providing intellectual and aesthetic satisfactions of a very meaningful order. All of these assets of their role the leaders may wish to defend, often with tenacity. But since in theory, and to a large degree in practice, the criteria for leadership recruits are personal achievement rather than group ascription, if the objectives of economic development are to be fulfilled the less efficient leaders must in the end give way. Here, however, comes a problem. It may be that some types of leadership with a high charismatic component are not in the long run compatible with economic growth. Reliance upon popular acclaim with an attempt to satisfy all popular demands does not necessarily accord with stringent demands for saving, or mobilization of labour, if these are required by the needs of the economy for the time being. Myint has pointed very forcibly in his essay to the observable conflicts between economic equality and economic growth, or, in other terms, between social flexibility and social discipline. It is in this whole field of the recruitment and replacement of economic leadership, of the values and aspirations of leaders, of the bases of their authority and of the sanctions for its proper exercise, that one of the most useful analytical functions of a sociologist can lie. In other words, as economists themselves have been ready to acknowledge, a proper study of leadership for economic growth demands an analysis of the political, social and general institutional framework in which such leadership is exercised, and not only of the economic situation itself.

How far can there be training for leadership in economic growth? If it be true that leaders cannot be created but only stimulated to appear, then the question becomes, rather, what social factors are involved in the emergence of such leaders. The implication of this is that policy should try to create the roles, structures and conditions facilitating the emergence of leaders, or at least not militate against their advance to the forefront. The need for investment in human social capital seems to be taken for granted in economic analysis nowadays. But as Myint points out, some very difficult decisions are involved in this field, if only because of the lack of any established relation between input and output. So many of the components involved are imponderable, even ephemeral, that no sensible formula can be devised to yield a calculable result. A country cannot
invest in economic leadership. All it can do is to invest in those categories of persons which historically have been seen to produce leaders, or from which by experience leaders have been seen to come. One of the prime areas of investment here is obviously education in a broad sense, not merely the provision of facilities for the increase of technical skill. Bauman has argued for the predominant role of the conscious, active, organized social forces in initiating and carrying forward economic growth. Part of the function of education should be to provide for more systematic and more sophisticated analysis of the character and composition of such forces.

Finally, it is clear from all these essays that there is need for much more comparative sociological research in its various branches into the character and social framework of leadership, both in situations where economic growth is well advanced and in those where it has scarcely at all begun.

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Hypothesis for the diagnosis of a situation of social change: the case of Venezuela

Jorge Ahumada

The problems of transitional societies are distinguished from those of traditional or modern ones. They include cultural heterogeneity and power dissociation resulting from a differential rate of change in various social roles, and an imperfect evaluative mechanism all along the social continuum. Slow response to rapid economic development introduces lags which are difficult to correct: the case of Venezuela is a good illustration.

Introduction

The following notes were prepared for the specific purpose of establishing the basis for a research programme on the process of social transformation in Venezuela. The programme is now under way at the Centre for Studies on Development of the Universidad Central de Venezuela and is being carried out with the collaboration of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and with financial support from the Ford Foundation.

The study is essentially operational in that it seeks to contribute to the acquisition of knowledge useful for the design of a policy of social change, including economic development. For this reason the propositions below have not been polished to the extent which would be required were it the purpose to contribute to the development of pure theory. Yet they may have some interest for other research workers preoccupied with policy problems, as the existing theories of social change are not always useful in

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1. This paper is a revised version of a previous one by the writer and J. A. Silva, Julio Cotlen and Luis Lander. The present version could not have been prepared without their collaboration. The author accepts sole responsibility, however, for any errors that may have been made.

2. The programme consists of three projects. One deals with alternative strategies of economic development; another one investigates the attitudes, values and aspirations of individuals at the top of the hierarchy of power, and the third study analyses those same features among twenty-five selected groups of the population. The first project is being prepared with the collaboration of the Simulmatics Corporation of New York and the financial support of the Administration for International Development of the U.S.A. Government.
Social change in Venezuela

this connexion. Indeed, some of them concentrate upon those aspects of the process of social change that take place in the very long run, while other theories are based upon conceptual categories that can hardly be related to instruments of policy and still others place an exaggerated emphasis on only one or two variables of the social system.

An excellent example of the last type is the so-called theory of rising expectations, which maintains that many of the economic, social and political problems of the underdeveloped nations arise from a faster rate of expansion of expectations than of achievements. If the crucial achievements were merely economic ones, the acceptance of the theory would imply that all problems could be solved by accelerating economic growth. It is almost certain that under modern conditions economic growth is a necessary condition for minimizing socio-political conflicts, but it is not sufficient. On this there is ample historical evidence and the Venezuelan example is dramatic.¹

During the last thirty years the rate of economic growth of Venezuela has been one of the highest in the world, to an extent that per capita real income is at present twice the Latin American average, while back in the 1920s Venezuela was among the most underdeveloped countries in the region. However, her internal conflicts are very acute and generally similar to those of other countries of the region, some of which are developing rapidly while others have been stagnant for very many years.

It is our view that, in essence, the social, political and economic problems of Venezuela are typical of those of any nation whose traditional social structure is disintegrating without its having fully acquired and consolidated the key features of a modern society.

In a nutshell, our argument is that the process of modernization generates conflicts different from those normal in both traditional and modern societies. Transitional societies, that is, tend to develop a greater number of conflicts than those located at the extremes of the continuum of transformation, mainly for three reasons. First, because they tend to be culturally more heterogeneous. Second, because power tends to be more dissociated in the transitional than in the traditional society, although not more so than in the modern society. Finally, because they are experimenting with a process of structural change which produces functional maladjustments, the correction of which requires a high degree of consensus. Cultural heterogeneity hampers the formation of consensus and thus contributes to the accumulation of sources of conflicts.

Cultural heterogeneity and dissociation of power

To convey the meaning of these two concepts here it is necessary to make use of the notion of social tasks or functions. All societies, no matter what their degree of development, must carry out certain common tasks. On the

other hand, societies differ among themselves in the way or style of fulfilling these functions. Furthermore, in all societies the tasks or functions are fulfilled by means of organizations, yet the degree of functional specialization of the organizations and their number and complexity increases as the society becomes more modern.

Among the various functions, those confirming the cultural system play an extremely important role in the process of social change. They include the creation and accumulation of knowledge, socialization, communication and evaluation. There is cultural heterogeneity in a society if the individuals placed in a similar strata of the hierarchy of power show appreciable differences in the way they fulfil the functions of the cultural system, mainly the function of evaluation. We understand by evaluation the formulation of judgement with respect to the performance of the society and of generation of solutions designed to correct deficiencies.

The style of evaluation varies from one individual to another depending on: (a) the number of functions they evaluate; (b) the quantity and quality of the information they possess; (c) the method they use to analyse the information; (d) the normative system or system of standards that is used to judge whether the situation is satisfactory or not, and (e) the capacity to generate new solutions, or to innovate.

A cross-section analysis of any society will probably show that the differences among individuals with respect to their style of evaluation and, in general, of the cultural functions, are mainly determined by their respective positions in the hierarchy of power and by their functional specialization. If the comparison is made over time it is likely that the differences are also influenced by the 'average level' of rationality already achieved by the society.

To a varying degree, all adult members of a society play some role as evaluators, since they formulate judgements as to its performance and show varying degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with respect to the fulfilment of some or all of the functions taken together. On the other hand, the judgements of some individuals are of more significance for society than others, depending upon the position of the evaluator in the hierarchy of power. This position, in short, affects the style of individual evaluation.

Individuals located at the bottom of the hierarchy probably evaluate only a few functions and possess little information on the performance of the functions that they evaluate; they analyse the information by means of 'magic' methods and formulate their judgements according to ideological schemas, while their capacity to generate new solutions is meagre. By 'magic' methods we mean non-scientific ones and by 'ideological' we mean on the basis of internalized standards.

As one moves upward along the scale of power one will find individuals who evaluate a larger number of functions with greater and better information; who analyse the information and judge the situation by methods less magical and ideological, and who show a greater capacity to innovate. All this is due, in part, first to the fact that the possession of information and
knowledge is by itself an instrument of power; second, that formal edu­
cation, which is normally more frequent among power holders, tends to reduce magic and ideology, and finally that the very exercise of the roles of power and the preservation of power positions requires an awareness of a large number of functions, the use of extensive information, systematic analysis of information and fewer internalized standards. However, towards the top there is also a predisposition to rationalize those deficiencies the correction of which may unfavourably affect the power status of the evaluator. Thus élites are indeed in a better position to evaluate and to generate certain changes, but not those affecting the power structure itself.

The differences in the style of evaluation between the élites and the masses are probably greater in traditional than in modern societies. Yet it is likely that they increase up to a certain point during the process of modernization. This is important, as it creates difficulties of vertical communication. However, the growing cultural heterogeneity of the élites is of much greater significance.

The heterogeneity of the élites reflects the growing degree of organizational complexity that accompanies the modernization process. As society develops, organizations begin to specialize in the accomplishment of certain functions. For each organization there is a structure of power and power holders specialize in the exercise of power roles corresponding to different functions, political, cultural, economic or military.

The style of evaluation in each of these roles is different because in some functions more information may be required and because the possibility of employing non-magic methods of analysis and more operational—non-internalized—standards of judgement, is not always the same. The style of evaluation of the cultural leader may be quite different from the style of an economic leader of equivalent status. This creates difficulties of communication and gives rise to internal conflicts within the élite, especially in cases where to improve the accomplishment of a function it is necessary to change the manner in which other complementary functions are carried out.

This source of conflict is much less important in the traditional and in the modern society, in the first simply because the degree of role specialization by function is much lower. Those holding economic power are also holders of cultural, political and military power. In the modern context, conflict is decreased because society has succeeded in modifying the manner in which the socialization function is accomplished, so as to compensate for the heterogeneity of evaluation introduced by specialization.

There is, furthermore, another important source of cultural heterogeneity of the élites. We refer to the velocity of transformation. As a society becomes more complex it is necessary to fill a growing number of power roles. If the demand for power holders increases faster than the supply of new members coming from the established élites the difference will have to be made up from among individuals coming from lower power echelons. Consequently, the higher the rate of modernization, the greater the degree
of specialization and of dissociation of power; and the more ample the recruitment base, the faster is upward mobility and the greater the possibility of conflicts within the élite.

The structural maladjustment of transitional societies

From a dynamic point of view the main feature of traditional society is its very low rate of transformation, in the sense that the effects of whatever changes are taking place are almost imperceptible over one generation. Modern societies, in contrast, change rapidly. The rate of change of the transitional society is also high, but contrary to the modern one, the differences among the rates of transformation in the style of each particular function are much greater. Merely by way of illustration it could be postulated that, while in modern society the ratio between the rate of transformation in the style of the function that is changing slowest and the rate of the one that is changing fastest is 1 to 2, in transitional society it is 1 to 6.

The rates of transformation in the styles of individual functions are always unequal, for two main reasons. First because, normally, greater importance is attached by society to the efficient achievement of certain tasks rather than others and, consequently, greater evaluative and innovating effort is devoted to them. The other reason is that some functions are easier to evaluate than others. In fact, the functional specialization of some organization is much greater than that of others. The business enterprise is a clear example. The identification of the abstract notion of a function with an organizational reality lends the function a concrete meaning that stimulates and facilitates evaluation. Further, non-internalized sanctions and remunerations are much more effective in the case of some functions than of others. Where they are inapplicable or very inefficient, internalized norms are the chief governors of behaviour. For instance, private property is an instrument to facilitate the allocation of resources, yet if it is to function as such many individuals must consider it as a value, since otherwise there would be no police mechanism (for the application of non-internalized sanctions) capable of ensuring its operation. As values are not judged by efficiency criteria, it becomes very difficult to evaluate rationally all those functions the instruments for the fulfilment of which are internalized. Finally, there are functions that have very vague standards of efficient performance as compared to those attached to other functions. In the business enterprise for instance, the test is the profit return on invested capital, which can be measured somewhat unequivocally thanks to the development of accounting, a fact which Schumpeter acknowledged as being of such great importance in explaining the success of capitalism. In

1. Societies differ among themselves not only in the style and the degree of specialization of organization but also in the order of priorities allotted to different functions. This depends, in part, upon the prevailing criteria for recruitment to power roles.
the case of the economic function the norm for efficient conduct is also unequivocal: profit maximization.¹

All these considerations are sufficient to explain the greater differentials in the rate of functional transformation of transitional society compared to the modern one, but it is also likely that an important role is played by the fact that certain functions can more easily be influenced by acculturation than others.

The differential rate of transformation of the various functions would not be very significant if social structure were entirely flexible. Although flexibility as to the possible combination of styles for different functions is rather great, there are styles that cannot be combined with others without seriously impairing the efficiency of some or all of the attached functions. In the extreme case, there is for a given function a given style which is absolutely incompatible with a certain style of another function. Two styles are absolutely incompatible if the adoption of both reduces the efficiency than of one function to zero.

The traditional society is interfunctionally well adjusted. If, for any reason, the way one function is performed begins to change, the style of other functions may change very slowly or not at all. The continuation of this process beyond a certain point may bring about a structural disequilibrium which reduces the efficiency of some function. The typical example is the urbanization process, which in a sense can be considered as a transformation in the style of the economic function. The urbanization process may—and usually does—take place at a much faster rate than the socialization function. Beyond a certain point this discrepancy reduces the efficiency of one or both functions. Some members of society will register the loss in efficiency, some will not; some will attribute the process to certain causes, others to different ones; some will propose a given therapy, while others recommend another. The greater the cultural homogeneity of the group, the less will be the discrepancies in the impact of the phenomenon, the causative analysis and the suggested therapy. The greater the heterogeneity, the greater the discrepancies and, consequently, the greater the likelihood and intensity of conflicts.

Conflicts are, in a sense, warning lights, appeals for attention which society uses to indicate that something is wrong. From this point of view they can be considered instrumental. But to solve conflict a certain degree of consensus is required. Cultural heterogeneity hampers the formation of consensus and at the same time stimulates conflicts. This is an ideal combination for the accumulation of structural deficiencies in society. The accumulation of deficiencies contributes to potentially revolutionary situations, that is to say, to situations where the legitimacy of power is weakened to an extent where power holders must rely exclusively on force to maintain their position.

¹ There is more to this. In economics it has been possible to define criteria applying to the norm itself. In fact, the principle of gross national product maximization allows the relevance of the profit maximization principle to be judged.
Economic development and structural maladjustment

How does the process of transformation of a traditional society begin? In general, there are two principal sources of change: those endogenous to the society and those exogenous to it, originating in the physical or societal environment (other societies).

In the present-day underdeveloped societies—with few exceptions—change began in the economic function. The most developed countries, in one way or another, stimulated export production in the underdeveloped areas and thereby affected the style of the economic function.

Exogenous stimuli have great significance since they make endogenous change unnecessary. Students of economic development largely agree that, in a closed society, economic development begins only after certain prerequisites have been met, such as the rise of entrepreneurial attitudes, saving habits and others. This implies, in other words, that the transformation of a given function posits a preceding change of other functions to some extent, and that these changes influence each other through time, after the manner of a feed-back mechanism. In a process of this kind, with small changes in a function conditioning and being conditioned by small changes in other functions, the likelihood of structural maladjustment is minor compared to that arising from a process sparked by exogenous impacts; at the same time the possibility of achieving a rapid rate of transformation of the society as a whole is much smaller.

Exogenous forces may produce an improvement or a deterioration of the economic function. If the effect is positive, and conducive to rapid change, the evaluation of this function may be so favourable that the maladjustments induced in other functions are not brought to evaluative attention and are therefore not corrected in time. Thanks to structural flexibility maladjustment need not necessarily have a great deal of significance. Perhaps if the process of economic growth were maintained over a long period, the normal mechanism of social adjustment would suffice to correct the situation. Unfortunately however, the process of economic growth in underdeveloped societies is not likely to be steadily maintained.

In fact, one of the most typical features of societies now underdeveloped, at least historically, has been the intermittent character of their economic growth. The dynamism of the process has originated from expansion in the production of a few staple exportable commodities, which has dragged the rest of the economy with it. But the fact that the stimulus comes from a few primary commodity sectors and that the economies are otherwise underdeveloped determines the intermittent nature of the process. Indeed, the market for practically every staple commodity reaches a saturation point. All historical analysis of staple commodities shows an asymptotic pattern of growth. In some cases exporters of such commodities cannot even take full advantage of the international market over the entire period of accelerated growth because the law of diminishing returns begins to operate on the supply side before the saturation point is reached.
As is well known, the law of diminishing returns begins to operate when one of the factors of production expands at a lower rate than others. In the underdeveloped countries this factor is the natural resource upon which staple exports are based. The only way to compensate for this effect is technical innovation, but one fundamental difference between developed and underdeveloped areas consists precisely in that the latter lack an independent mechanism of innovation. They do innovate, but they introduce their innovations from abroad. Naturally they can introduce only those already available in the developed countries, which in turn orient their innovational efforts to meet specific internal problems which are not necessarily the problems of the underdeveloped world.

Once production of the exportable staple reaches stagnation, owing to saturation of the market or because of diminishing returns, the economy ceases to grow for a time until a new export staple or set of staples appears. There are quite a few historical examples of this type of growth. Chile is a case in point. At present the rate of transformation of her economy depends upon copper; during the 1920s it depended upon nitrates and in previous periods it was wheat flour and then silver. The graphic representation of this process in time appears as a rapidly rising curve up to a point, followed by slow change, stagnation or decline and then rapid growth again.

The transition from one pattern of economic growth to another may be quite easy or rather difficult, in some cases even requiring a change in the structure of power, with the old élites being displaced by new ones. Naturally, when this is the case, transition engenders much conflict. It appears then that transitional societies are periodically confronted with epochs when social conflicts become intense.

The Venezuelan case

By drawing upon Venezuelan experience we shall try in this section to demonstrate the usefulness of the hypothesis contained in the previous one for the diagnosis of an actual situation of social change.

As already mentioned, at the beginning of the century Venezuela was one of the most underdeveloped countries of Latin America and displayed most of the typical features of a traditional society. During the 1920s petroleum production began one of the fastest and most firmly sustained processes of economic growth recorded in the whole world, which was also accompanied by rapid social disintegration.

In about forty years the simple Venezuelan society became a complex one with almost all the specialized institutions typical of modern societies. The incipient educational system of earlier times expanded into one comparable in size with those of the most developed countries of the region. The earlier diffuse and personal communication system was replaced by a complex apparatus for mass communication. The economic function was transferred from the family to the firm and the political and military systems were profoundly modified.
The greater degree of complexity and of organizational specialization was unavoidable simply because of demographic expansion and urban concentration arising from economic development. The rate of population growth rose from 2 per cent in the twenties to 2.5 per cent in the thirties and to 3.6 per cent in the fifties. Urban population which was nearly 20 per cent of the total in the twenties grew to 64 per cent of the total in the sixties.

Greater complexity and increased functional specialization of organizations almost naturally brought about dissociation of power. Prior to the initiation of the great transformation all forms of power were concentrated in the hands of a small group, access to which was almost exclusively limited to the military since the political, economic and cultural channels were very narrow. Perhaps this homogeneity of the élite explains why one dictator was able to hold power for almost thirty years.

The first symptoms of power dissociation became evident in the middle thirties when the spokesmen for a middle class of growing strength began to express their aspirations to enter the political arena. Nearly all the parties organized during this period represented the interest of the middle class. It is very significant that the economically powerful group had no organized political representation. The process culminated in 1945 with the granting of the direct popular vote.¹

On the other hand, the rapid process of transformation since the 1930s inevitably led to cultural heterogeneity. The traditional élite was not in a position to supply all the entrepreneurs, administrators, political leaders, university professors and cultural leaders that were required to fill the roles being created as a result of growing social complexity. Access to the élite consequently opened up and its members began to be recruited from all power strata and also from abroad. Some of the new members came from the lowest strata of society, many belonged to the emerging middle class. The cultural background of these men was as heterogeneous as might be expected where the pyramid of power was so steep.

As is unavoidable in a spontaneous process of social change, the transformation that took place with reference to some functions did not occur in others. For instance, although the public administration machinery expanded enormously, it largely maintained its old administrative procedures. The judiciary system, well conceived for a rural society, lagged behind and became very ineffective. The educational system still maintained many of the features of such systems in traditional societies. The extended family largely persisted in spite of the high degree of urbanization attained by the country. All these examples illustrate the type of structural malad-

¹. The fact that the first president elected by popular vote lasted only nine months and was succeeded by a dictatorship which lasted ten years does not contradict our statement. What happened was that in 1945 Acción Democrática, the party responsible for the reforms, was able to modify the old electoral system and consolidate its electoral power, but was unable to consolidate the new political system. Only in its second period in power did it take important steps in that direction, at the cost of its own electoral strength.
justments that were being created as a consequence of rapid economic development. In the terms used in previous sections, it can be said that the low rate of transformation of the style of recruitment, socialization, norm-determination and integration functions resulted in a reduction of efficiency in the fulfilment of these and other functions.

Owing to the influence of the rapidly mounting per capita income upon the evaluative orientation and attitudes of the people, Venezuelan society was slow in becoming aware of the resulting maladjustments. It did so only after the world petroleum markets began to deteriorate and to affect the domestic economic situation. The process began early in the 1950s but the Suez crisis postponed its impact upon the Venezuelan economy until the end of 1957. As soon as the economic situation deteriorated all the submerged maladjustments began to appear and led to outbreaks of great violence.\(^1\)

In a socio-political context of cultural heterogeneity and dissociation of power the country is struggling to find new patterns of development and solutions for its structural maladjustments. What is the likelihood of success without paying a high social cost?

The reply to this question stems in part from the previous analysis. If power is dissociated, two alternatives are open: either a coalition is formed or power is reconcentrated. The latter naturally involves the supremacy of one party, or the establishment of a dictatorship. Neither coalition nor reconcentration are of course sufficient conditions to insure the continuation of the modernization process at low social cost. Both are requirements to make feasible the implementation of an efficient programme.

An efficient long-term programme must be conducive to a reduction of cultural heterogeneity and to the creation of new integrative forces less dependent upon the velocity of economic growth and high social mobility. It requires the maintenance of a high rate of economic growth, but also the reduction of economic inequalities, including unemployment, an increase in the level of rationality among the élites, the improvement of the channels of communication within élites and between the élites and the masses, and an improvement of the sanction and remuneration system. All these objectives seem to be technically feasible and it appears that a technically efficient action programme can be designed for their achievement. The real problem is whether a coalition can be formed around such a programme and maintained for the appropriate length of time.

An answer to this query cannot be advanced without much knowledge of the attitudes and aspirations of the élites and the masses, of the structure of power in society and of the foreseeable consequences of alternative

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1. We have not referred here to the influence of international political developments upon the Venezuelan situation. That they have been very important is obvious. What really matters in this connexion is to understand why they operated the way they did in Venezuela in contrast with the way they operated in other countries of the region. We believe that our hypothetical assumptions throw a great deal of light upon this question.
economic policies. This is why research in these fields is so highly important. Nevertheless, if our assumptions and assembly of facts are correct, the formation of coalitions around inefficient programmes is likely to confront the country in the long run with growing tensions and renewed efforts on the part of the extremists to reconcentrate power for the construction of society according to their own image.

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Economic growth, social structure, élite formation: the case of Poland

Zygmunt Bauman

Pre-war Poland, though not a typically underdeveloped country, suffered from an inert economy, a feudal value hierarchy and exploitation by foreign capital. The 1945 political revolution, through its economic and social measures, provided openings for intense upward mobility with which values did not entirely keep step. In the resulting fluid situation, changes in relative value strengths were found suitable categories for stratification analysis. Research shows an increasing proportion of the skilled and educated in the power and local élite, and a trend from ideology to managerial technology as qualifications for élite membership, causing certain frictions.

The concept of two crucial technological revolutions—the neolithic and the industrial—defining two basic turning points in the sociological history of mankind has already gained relatively broad acknowledgement among historians and anthropologists. It is noted that, since the neolithic era, when the art of producing and storing the surplus of goods was discovered, until the industrial revolution, when the machine and big productive organization were introduced, no single new plant or new animal was domesticated, no basically new tools added to the human industrial equipment, no basic changes made in the social relations pattern and in the fundamental set of economic, political and cultural institutions of society. Naturally, no significant changes in the mood of scholarly thinking emerged (according to Levi-Strauss, this period was dominated by one of the two known variations of scientific thinking—the knowledge of the singular and particular, born in neolithic times and sharply different from typically modern knowledge of the general). Both in social reality and in human minds, pre-industrial history had no time dimension; it was ‘flat’, deprived of ‘depth’. Forms of social organization initiated in epochs quite remote from each other co-existed: Plato and Descartes, Aristotle and Bacon addressed each other as if they were contemporaries. The time factor in the modern image of pre-industrial society is a kind of retrospective mental projection of the much later experience of a rapidly expanding and changing society; it was hardly part of the cultural reality of pre-industrial times themselves.

I believe the basic stability and ‘flatness’ (in terms of time dimension) of pre-industrial society was a product of the well developed re-equilibrating...
negative feedback institutions (the only deviation from this predominant model were some parts of the ancient world with relatively vigorous market relations which were, for this reason, fairly close to the threshold of an industrial pattern). These institutions are in turn typical of a society with weak market relations; for a society organized on the basis of the local community satisfying the basic needs of its members by commonly regulated, homogeneous and integral activity comprises all discriminated functions later divided up between family, households, productive, distributive and trade organizations, and many other specialized agencies. The main features of the predominant type of pre-industrial social fabric is the convergence and coalescence of objective, supra-psychical social dependencies and the psychically embraceable sphere of conscious social bonds—so sharply cut off from each other in the industrial type of society with its particularization and segmentation of the need-satisfaction process, and the corresponding dispersion of the human personality into a set of relatively autonomous roles and behaviour patterns.

There was nothing about pre-industrial society which made its development into an industrial one in any sense inevitable. On the contrary, given efficient re-equilibrating and stabilizing institutions and the basic self-sufficiency of self-sustained local communities, the likelihood of any particular society evolving towards industrialization by the sheer logic of inner change alone was very meagre indeed. The industrial revolution required the convergence of many factors, accidental from the point of view of the inner, self-perpetuating societal process. It occurred once in history and in one relatively small part of the globe. But this particular and almost improbable convergence did happen, and it moulded into the self-invigorating and self-expanding process of industrialization and urbanization the factors of accumulated wealth, an accumulated propertyless mass of the population, a broad and unsatiated market for industrial goods, and the relevant ideology favouring the increase of income by means of the rational organization of the production of market goods. It occurred, let us repeat, just once in time, in striking contrast, for example, to the feudal type of pre-industrial society (in the economic and the political sense of the term as understood by Marx, Fustel de Coulanges, F. Seebohm or G. B. Adams, and not by Rushton Coulborn, Marc Bloch, F. Lot, F. L. Ganshof or C. Stephenson) which emerged spontaneously literally everywhere as a product of the decomposition of tribal or slave society. But by creating new types of social relations and introducing new cultural values in one region only, the industrial revolution rapidly contaminated the rest of the world, introducing everywhere the market type of need satisfaction and the corresponding cultural matrix. As far as this 'rest of the world' is concerned, the industrial pattern of economic growth as a cultural value was born before the appropriate changes in the social institutions were accomplished. It was introduced primarily as a political postulate, the new pattern of economic activity being its result rather than its premise. The industrial pattern of societal organization becoming a conscious political
postulate, the basic social pre-conditions to industrial growth were transferred automatically from the economic and cultural to the political sphere. Adequately organized political forces, achieving their fullest form in centralized economic initiative, now became the chief social pre-requisite to economic growth. The higher the stage of growth already achieved by the industrialized part of the world, the greater and more decisive the role of central political forces in initiating the industrial type of development. That is why it would be rather misleading to analyse the social pre-requisites problem in the modern world by examining exclusively the features of the elemental cultural patterns and the structure of basic economic units, while neglecting politically organized social forces.

These preliminary remarks seem necessary to explain the approach I have taken to describe the Polish case of economic growth. Most of what is described in this article results from the conscious efforts of the organized centres of political and economic decision; and it must be so in the modern world, where the spontaneous birth of an industrial pattern—always in history an event of a very low probability—has become almost logically impossible, but where the same industrial pattern emerging as the result of organized and planned action is practically inevitable.

I

Pre-war Poland could not be classified as a ‘classical’ underdeveloped country in the generally accepted meaning of the term. The total national product as well as the yearly output of some goods often used as reliable indices to measure economic growth were evidently much lower than in the highly industrialized societies, but above the level of many other countries (in 1937 Polish output of electric power was three times higher than Hungarian, Rumanian, Danish, etc.; the output of steel was much higher than in Sweden, Australia, Hungary, Spain, etc.). But in general, particularly from the sociological point of view, pre-war Poland shared many characteristic features with societies usually chosen as examples of pre-industrial economic system.

First of all, Poland was a country based on a predominantly rural economy, two-thirds of its population living in village-type communities and deriving their only incomes from agriculture. Hardly 8 per cent of the population was employed in the non-agricultural occupations. The family enterprise was the most usual and popular unit of the productive system; kinship ties interfered greatly with traditional economic activity thus accounting for the unusual strength of traditionalism, patterned by the institutions sanctioned and controlled by the local community. The traditional mentality was solidly entrenched in and nourished by the system of social relations almost unmodified for many generations and continuously re-created, since inheritance almost exclusively determined social status. The preservation of the traditional set of social relations by all-pervading
community control was facilitated by the universal character of the social bonds located in the community. This was the initial stage in the long process of ramification of the social ties leading gradually to the institutionalization of particular aspects of human activity in specialized formal organizations.

Poland was not a feudal country; on the contrary, it was well advanced on the road to capitalist development. But an inert and non-expansive economy strengthened the domination of the typically feudal hierarchy of values with its main discriminating features: 'orientation to the past' which emphasized the inherited ingredients in the individual's status and seriously weakened the stimuli to personal achievement; the relatively backward economy which provided little scope for many candidates to ascend the social ladder. To these factors must be added one further important obstacle—the lofty scorn for hard work deeply ingrained in the traditional gentry culture. The contempt for hard work, especially manual, was something like the first commandment in the decalogue of the dominating culture. Making one's living at this kind of work was sufficient to exclude one from well-bred society. The other side of the medal of the same cultural system was the extremely high prestige ascribed to all kinds of 'clean' jobs, 'cleanness' being a value in itself, independent of any estimate of the social utility, rationality, and appropriateness of the job and its role in increasing wealth. Pre-war Poland was a country with a considerable surplus of professionals and intellectuals, particularly those with the kind of skills which are irrelevant to industrial activity. There was one more important element in the cultural bequest of gentry rule: attachment to individual sovereignty and independence, called liberty. This particular concept of liberty was rooted historically in the long struggle of the Polish gentry against the rule of the aristocracy. The equality of social and political rights of the gentry won in this struggle was based on land ownership; it was the equality of landowners. The enormous attachment to one's scrap of land or workshop, even the most miserable one constituting no base for successful economic activity, was the direct result of this historically conditioned understanding of 'liberty'. The permanent unemployment of a great part of the population in the few industrial centres offered additional arguments to those who preferred the most pitiful but 'independent' existence to the position of an actual or potential employee and thus clung frantically to artisan or peasant ways of life. According to the prominent Polish economist, Ludwik Landau, the number of artisans in pre-war Poland was equal to those employed in the entire Polish industry. That industry was concentrated in a few big towns meant that nearly all local communities lived under continuous and almost unchallenged pressure of the small ownership culture, and that this culture shaped the dominating goals and patterns of success.

The view of the order of the human world as something unchangeable and almost eternal flourished under the weight of inertia. There were neither bourgeois nor political or industrial revolutions in the Polish past—nothing that could reveal the fundamental flexibility of the framework of
human existence and emphasize the secular potential of social readjustment. The rate of economic growth was too small and slow to be easily observed; in fact there were long periods of recession. In 1929 there were 2.4 million people employed outside agriculture; in 1938 their number hardly reached 2 million.

Much has been reported already on pre-war Poland’s semi-colonial position as a market ruthlessly exploited by foreign capital. Heavy pressure exercised by big land-owning interests on the economic policy of the ruling Polish élite and the subordination of native Polish business circles to foreign financial and industrial companies, are also quite well known. Here perhaps the basic causes of Polish economic backwardness are to be found. But the point I would like to stress particularly is that the result of all these intertwining factors, and at the same time the direct cause of the absence of anything we may reasonably call economic growth, was the lack of a reliable social force capable of leading and organizing the effort to set the country moving along the path of industrial development. This force being absent, or in any event deprived of political power, Poland was not able to free itself from the bonds of a stagnant economy nourishing the pre- and anti-industrial mentality and the pre-industrial culture which reinforced economic inertia.

II

Such a force appeared in 1945, when the social structure of the country was not very different to the one described. The nature of this force was political and its appearance was the result of a political upheaval. The adherents of central economic planning based on centralization of ownership of basic means of production were brought to power. Enormous resources accumulated through the sheer act of nationalization provided the initial basis for rapid economic growth and intensive capital investment. The policy of strict thrift which was possible solely under conditions of centralized ownership and, perhaps, centralized political power since it slackened the rise of living standards, also contributed to the accelerated rate of economic growth. Social changes often singled out as the necessary conditions for an industrial revolution (and what has happened in Poland during the last seventeen years surely deserves the name) were delayed, but they emerged mainly as the result and not as the cause of economic action.

As we are interested in the change in the social structure of Polish society, two measures organized ‘from above’ by forces holding political power must be of primary importance. The first is the nationalization of big business, the second, agrarian reform. During 1945-49, 814,000 new peasant farms were created and the area of many others considerably increased thus providing healthy conditions for normal agricultural activity in formerly declining farms. Altogether, well above 6 million hectares of land were divided among 1,068,000 peasant farms. Thanks to the abolition
of large landed property, the so-called rural proletariat, the most mercilessly exploited section of the pre-war Polish population, disappeared entirely. But agrarian reform influenced not only the social position of those who benefited from it directly: the whole socio-economic stigma on the rural population as the sinister spectre of over-population was removed and thus the bargaining position of the poor peasantry fundamentally improved.

The real social consequences of agrarian reform cannot, however, be correctly appreciated if they are analysed in isolation. Agrarian reform was carried out simultaneously with the beginning of an unprecedented expansion of Polish industry (during the post-war years the number of people employed outside agriculture increased fourfold, the total volume of output eightfold). Agrarian reform by itself was inadequate to cope with the social problems of the Polish village; only in conjunction with the nationalization of big industry and finance which opened the road to rapid economic growth could it bring a real and lasting social change.

Incessant industrial expansion created broad and smoothly functioning channels of social mobility linking the previously overpopulated rural communities and small semi-rural towns with the new industrial centres. It offered the owners of economically senseless and irrelevant tiny shops and workshops an attractive alternative of stable and secure employment in industry or the many auxiliary services. This great exodus of peasants and artisans towards industry which took place in Poland in the middle of the twentieth century differed in many crucial respects from the apparently similar process in Britain since the beginning of the nineteenth century. English, Welsh and Scottish peasants and artisans, thrown forcibly out of their farms and workshops and turned into homeless vagabonds and paupers perceived this change as a real social decline from their former conditions. These, seen and felt by them as decent and relatively 'human' were replaced by the melting-pot of the first factories; they lost their cherished independence and were submitted instead to the greedy pioneers of industrialization and the semi-feudal practices of foremen. The majority of former peasants and artisans in Poland perceived the change in their social status as a real advancement; they exchanged a shabby and shaky living in an apparently independent, but in fact severely exploited 'enterprise' —the kind of living already defined culturally as abhorrent—for a stable and safe existence in civilized and attractive urban conditions. At least by the young people leaving the land of their forefathers and becoming factory workers, this was undoubtedly considered as upward mobility.

One of the foremost results of rapid industrial expansion was the general increase in the number of social positions of relatively high rank available to those from the 'lower strata' (this process as a universal feature of industrialization has been pointed out by Lipset and Bendix in their studies on social mobility in industrial society) and thus the substantial extension of upward social mobility. In Poland, this result was very marked indeed; social mobility of an unprecedented intensity literally turned the traditional social structure upside down. Roughly half of the present Polish population
now lives on incomes drawn from non-agricultural activity. The notorious ‘over-production’ of intellectuals appeared to be merely ‘under-consumption’; there are no unemployed members of the ‘intelligentsia’ nowadays, although the number of students in technical and engineering schools has increased seven times, the total number of students in institutions of higher education being three times greater than before the war.

The intense social mobility heavily influenced the place of the family in the class structure, a phenomenon already mentioned by G. D. H. Cole in his studies of British class structure, but beyond doubt much more advanced under present Polish conditions owing to the extreme rapidity and scope of social change. The family no longer plays the traditional role as the elementary unit of social class: at the birthday table in a peasant’s house an engineer and a miner, a junior or senior executive and an army officer, a peasant and a physician sit together. Instead of being a rough brick in the construction of one particular class, the family becomes often the exchange market for multifarious class and class-like subcultures and behaviour patterns. As a result, the traditionally sharp differences in the way of life of the social classes previously isolated from each other are visibly blurring, though their force is not yet spent and they ought not to be considered as finally blotted out.

Neither differences, nor barriers dividing social classes have disappeared in present Polish society. The tradition of relative separation of the socially differentiated milieu, long established and deeply rooted in the national culture, still heavily influences the dominating customs, style of living, the whole class subcultures. With regard to the structure of the family budget consumption patterns, cherished life goals and the general mode of life there still persist sharp differences between individuals socialized in intellectual, working-class or peasant environments. Though a manual worker and a white-collar worker may earn the same amount of money, this does not mean that their behaviour patterns conform. Serious differences in selection and perception of cultural goods, in educational expectancies and—partly because of this—in the scope of opportunities are still in full force. In respect to opportunities, we face the problem of persistent barriers between classes: the actual equality of educational and thus of status achievement opportunities, the necessary condition for the real abolishment of these barriers, demands not only equality of formal rights, but equality of cultural standards, too. As research done by Stanislaw Widerszpil showed, among schoolboys of working-class origin only 7 per cent, and among schoolgirls of the same origin only 17 per cent, aspire to a university education; at the same time the percentage of brain-workers’ children wishing to enter universities is 30 for boys and 60 for girls. The number of manual workers’ children who do not seek any kind of higher education at all is twice as high as the corresponding number among the children of brain-workers. Widerszpil investigated the distribution of aspirations and turning to the degree of fulfilment of aspirations the discrepancy was found to be even greater. This is an important constraint on
social mobility as a destroyer of the class barriers. As education becomes the chief ladder between social classes and the most important tool of individual achievement and advancement, the persistence of differences in educational opportunities reinforces the natural tendency of each social class to perpetuate itself in the next generations—and so to reproduce the whole class structure of society.

III

The concepts of 'higher' and 'lower' constitute the principal indicators of social stratification. The image of stratification depicts society as consisting of layers; as a hierarchy of aggregated individuals classified together because they possess certain common features. The choice of these, and not of other features, is always justified, and can only be justified, by their being accepted and highly esteemed values in the cultural system of the society under analysis. Thus any stratification is the product of evaluation. The high degree of universality which exemplifies social acceptance of the chosen values is a sine qua non for strata discrimination, if it is to be something more than the mere product of the scientist's research operations and logical divisions.

This very important trait of social stratification is often overlooked; in the United States of America, where the theoretical and empirical studies in this field originated and developed, acceptance of dominant cultural standards is so deep and universal (owing to social continuity in American history) that they can easily and reasonably be taken for granted. The crucial question whether there exist some generally accepted value standards constituting the real foundation of the stratification system can be disregarded. As far as the United States of America is concerned, no false conclusions follow from this omission. Without going too far into the problem of universality of cultural standards, one can be certain that the stratification analysed is a real thing, a part of social reality.

But in certain other societies the problem is not so simple. We can speak sensibly of social stratification in relatively stable societies only, where the same class has dominated in social, political and economic spheres for many generations, the same class shaping for many decades the uniform cultural framework for the processes of socializing individuals. Step by step their values, which are functional to the existing social system and therefore supported by all means the dominating class can utilize, become an integral part of the common culture; they are internalized during and through the process of societally organized education; general consensus concerning the inequality of social positions occupied by the various milieux on the social ladder is an outcome of this process. This general consensus leads to fairly real and 'material' divisions in society: individuals placed on the same level of the social hierarchy maintain reciprocal social relations, socially accept each other, marry their children to each other, enter the same clubs and
social circles, live in the same neighbourhoods, wear similar clothes, fill their dwellings with the same kind of furniture, share similar viewpoints, likewise abstain from intimacy with people from ‘below’ and are filled with reverence toward those from ‘above’. In short, they gradually form a fairly cohesive social group. Thus the final result of the evaluation of social structure is the emergence of large self-accepting and self-perpetuating groups, having an attitude of superiority towards some, and of inferiority towards others.

If there are no sufficiently universal value standards, the question whether social stratification exists at all has to be answered before we pose the next question of how it is constructed. That is the case of Poland (and I suppose of all countries experiencing rapid social and economic change). Ogburn’s ‘cultural lag’ here supplies the main argument: the image of the social structure and its manifestations in human folkways is in general much more conservative than the structure itself and tends to outlive its changes. All available theoretical and empirical data show that the upheavals in Polish class structure undermined the old system of social stratification but the construction of the new system did not keep pace with the rapid metamorphosis in the composition of social classes and in the web of their mutual relations. I doubt if we are at all justified in speaking of social stratification in present-day Poland. Manifold value standards intertwine here in highly unexpected ways. In such conditions any coherent image of social stratification can only be the product of statistical operations and does not correspond to real attitudes and behavioural manifestations of hierarchical appraisal. Two traditional values which had formerly been the main thread in the texture of social stratification—the values of ‘money’ and ‘noble birth’—still compete with the new values, partly popularized by official propaganda and partly gaining acceptance as a result of their great instrumental significance, such as ‘social utility’ or ‘participation in power’. There is no unique and monopolistic value on which a coherent and stable social stratification, based on the consensus of all parts of the nation, could be built.

Investigations of this extremely intricate problem were conducted by Sarapata and Wesolowski, two Polish sociologists. Let us not forget that the image of social stratification emerging from this kind of research owes its apparent focus to statistical method and not to the actual divisions of the reality investigated. Nevertheless, we can discern from the accumulated data the main trends in the process of societal restructurings, and the kind of positional criterion that becomes preponderant in the mixture of cultural influences. Such a cautious interpretation allows us to select level of skill and education as the value most often used to rank an individual on the social ladder. Men of science and teachers, engineers, professionals, and politicians of high rank were most often placed at the top of the social hierarchy. If these different groups have anything in common, it is the very high degree of skill and education they are generally expected to possess. This value considerably outstripped other values, such as income, or the
‘clean’ character of work. Clerks and other auxiliary office workers were ranked well below the position ascribed to skilled manual workers; it is not enough to do ‘brain work’ to be endowed with great social prestige; one must also perform a function to which an image of high skill and educational achievements is attached.

As Robert Presthus has already demonstrated in his study of Middle-Eastern bureaucratic systems, the pattern of prestige distribution in bureaucracies superimposed somewhat artificially on a generally traditional society differs in many respects from the Weberian ideal-type model. Making management rational and efficient (which is according to Weber the primary task and function of modern bureaucracy) demands the meticulous observance of particular institutional and behavioural norms, such as conformity of the level of skill attached to a given position with the actual skill possessed by the individual appointed to this position, and conformity of the prestige with which the person is actually endowed with the amount of prestige attached to the bureaucratic function this person performs. When other criteria of prestige distribution compete with this functional criterion—the only one permissible and acceptable in an ideal bureaucracy—the model of perfect management is distorted, the performance of bureaucratic tasks is in danger, the role of bureaucracy as the tool of rational management cannot be played successfully. Thus the distance between the actual prestige distribution and the ideal one may be considered as a valuable index for the measurement of the level of maturity of particular societal institutions of the industrial type of development (also, the opposite, when the degree of pre-industrial traditionality of societal institutions is the object of measurement). Discrepancy between the ideal type and the actual bureaucratic framework should be considered one of the most important obstacles to be overcome on the way to an industrial pattern of society. Scrutinizing previously presented research data from this angle we can conclude that, changes in the relative strength of values being the basis of stratification, this should be understood as a manifestation of the growing adaptation of Polish society to the requirements functional to the industrial pattern.

IV

A comprehensive study of the Polish power élite still awaits its author. Owing to lack of reliable investigations, detailed data on its composition, internal stratification, prevailing type of career, sources and levels of recruitment, behavioural patterns, degree of inner cohesion and uniformity of attitudes, etc. are not available. The accessible data on the top level of the power élite are particularly meagre; somewhat better known are certain problems of the middle level of power—élites of local communities and of the managerial level of the social system (according to Parson’s conceptualization). Thus we are not yet able to sketch a complete picture of
power élite dynamics; nevertheless, some conclusions important to our purpose can be drawn, as the élite of the middle level more readily reflects general social change in its composition and behavioural patterns than does the top level of power, which is obviously much more conservative.

Let us first examine the changes which took place in the élite at the managerial level. The Sociological Research Bureau of the Higher School of Social Sciences in Warsaw investigated the composition of the party 'activists' and party executives in all great industrial enterprises in Poland. This investigation showed a very remarkable trend: the composition of both party 'activists' and executives changes consistently and continuously, the main characteristics of the change being (a) considerable increase in the number of persons with relatively higher educational achievements; (b) considerable increase in the number of people with relatively greater vocational skill, in particular engineers and technicians (graduates of technical colleges).

We need to explain here why we consider the members of the party executive as representative of the managerial level of the power élite. The power relations in a Polish factory cannot be analysed relevantly without taking into account the role of the party organization and of those who derive their political power from their official functions in the party structure. The party executive is an important element of factory management; party 'activists' are an influential link in the chain of power control over the working personnel and over management itself. No major decision concerning factory problems is conceivable without the participation and perhaps support of the party organization. We cannot here go too deeply into this very intricate problem, but what has been said is probably sufficient to justify our looking upon the party 'activist' as a crucial part of the power élite at the managerial level.

Returning to the trend we have noted already, we would like to support it by some statistical proofs. According to the research results we have obtained, the percentage of party members among factory staff with higher education is thrice that of those with primary education only. This disproportion is further increasing due to the even greater prevalence of the highly educated among those recently recruited. 'Higher education' means here principally training as technical experts and managers. Engineers and technicians constituted 6.82 per cent of the factory staffs investigated, but 13.24 per cent of the party members among these staffs. The relative number of engineers and technicians among party 'activists' is even higher and amounts to roughly 24 per cent. This means that among all employed engineers and technicians one in every fifteen actively belongs to the party, the corresponding index among the manual workers being much lower—one in 75 for skilled workers and one in 198 for the unskilled. At the level of the party executive the proportions are still further in favour of increasing participation of engineers, managers and experts.

Important changes were found also in the institutional and behavioural standards prevailing in the factory party organizations; we can reasonably
relate these changes to the trends just presented. By this I mean, first of all, a remarkable shift from predominantly ideological to mainly technical and managerial preoccupations; the party meetings come gradually to resemble consultative assemblies; the content of individual and collective tasks confided to people in their capacity as party members is, in much greater proportion than before, connected directly with the purely industrial life of the factory. Meetings and everyday activities of party members and especially the party executives take on a more and more ‘expert’ character; speeches and conversations are full of technical terms. Political merit and ideological virtues are no longer a sufficient qualification for the performance of party functions: one must possess vocational education and professional skill to deal with technical and administrative problems at a table with specialists of the highest rank. In this respect the metamorphosis now taking place in the party function of the managerial power élite is no more than a somewhat belated reflection of a similar change which had already taken place in the managerial staff itself. Directors and experts who had advanced rapidly from the ranks on the strength of their political merit alone, a phenomenon very often encountered in the early period of the socialist revolution in Poland, either became themselves graduates of various colleges or gave way to the younger generation of duly educated engineers and technicians.

In our investigation of the power élite in the local communities, carried out in ten small towns in Poland, we have come to identical conclusions. We have found two different types of the local élite, one being replaced gradually by the other, this succession being connected directly with general economic growth in general and, in particular, industrial development. The élite of the first type holds power so long as the community remains outside the general economic development of the country and does not itself experience economic expansion. A decision to locate the construction of an industrial or mining enterprise in a given community usually means the end of this élite; at the same time it means the beginning of a new type of rule, which demands also a new type of person. New men come to the commanding posts in the local hierarchy of power; very often they arrive from outside the community and consider their present position as an episode in their career, their relevant frame of reference being the general hierarchy of power in the country as a whole.

The two types of local élite are made up of two different types of personalities. The first is composed predominantly of persons whose career in politics is based on their skill as propagandists and on their ideological virtues. They were members of the Communist organizations from the clandestine period onward, soldiers or partisan (guerilla) units during the German occupation, pioneers of reconstruction in the times immediately following the war. Most of them never attended secondary schools and were not trained in handling administrative and organizational problems. What they do know, they owe to their own predispositions and to hard experience. Placed in positions of considerable power and influence, some
of them became bureaucrats in the behavioural meaning of the word; still they prefer ideological values when defining and estimating situations which demand decisions involving a choice and candidly use broad humanitarian principles in describing and justifying their behaviour. During our interviews we asked members of the local élite what they would do if there were only one unoccupied dwelling left and two families asking to be accommodated in it: a poor widow with two small children and a young engineer who will not want to stay and work in the town if the opportunity to bring his wife is not soon guaranteed. Most of the older type of élite members decided in favour of the widow, while representatives of the new echelons voted for the engineer (several of them commented: ‘the engineer will build a house for the widow’). Having gradually adapted themselves to the requirements of their power function, members of the old élite achieved a certain level of organizational and administrative skill, quite sufficient in the conditions of a stable and traditional, non-expansive local community; this amount of skill appeared, however, quite inadequate when adaptation to the conditions of a rapidly expanding industrial community became the immediate necessity for all who wished to keep or acquire power positions. The members of the old élite awakened one day to find themselves ‘morally worn out’ and replaced by relatively young men. Accustomed to command, feeling their vitality by no means exhausted, they felt themselves suddenly pushed from the mainstream, the job they loved and were used to, the only job they were still able to do. This explains why many of them behaved in the new situations according to typical frustration patterns, often plotted against newcomers, manifested strongly unco-operative attitudes toward new-style executive power, grudgingly opposed the imminent change, tried to organize ‘old inhabitants’ or ‘old, local activists’ against the newcomers and the politics they symbolized. Thus conflict was inevitable. In some instances it was actually open and manifest, in other cases it took rather a latent form and withered away by itself, no strong measures having been applied.

The type of personality predominant in the new echelons of local power élites may be described by the simple conversion of the former characteristics. Members of the new local élite have in general no picturesque political past; they are highly educated men with formal diplomas and rather high expert skill in technical subjects and economics, trained systematically, often at special courses, in the art of administration and management. They think rationally in terms of expediency and utility, eagerly seek reliable means to prescribed goals, are ready to devote all their energy to the tasks they are entrusted to fulfil. They are expedient, efficient, industrious, full of initiative, and rather ruthless in pushing forward what is to be done. They are able to guarantee conditions indispensable to organizing rapid economic growth; they appear in the local community, not coincidentally, when command to start economic growth has been given.

Thus both our investigations lead to similar conclusions. There is a clear trend in the dynamics of middle-level élite composition, a tendency
away from political-minded, traditional and past-oriented people to managerial, rational and achievement-oriented men. Surely this second kind of élite suits the conditions of economic growth much better. The first type was indispensable to set society moving, to construct the necessary political and ideological basis for the immense industrial revolution of the future. This important task being now fulfilled, the first type had to be replaced by the second type, as administrative and managerial issues took precedence over the tasks of propaganda. The change in the composition of the local power élite is another important index to the growing adaptation of the country to conditions of economic growth.

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The ways in which the anthropological notions of value and of social structure can be related to the process of economic growth are examined. Nine propositions which indicate the manner in which certain characteristics of values and social structure affect economic growth, including statements which imply a neutral effect, are then set out.

I

There will clearly be a variety of contexts in which economic growth can take place successfully. The institutions of Japan, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China differ substantially, yet permit growth to take place, at differing rates and with variations in emphasis. One wonders whether it is possible to go beyond the particularities of specific institutions and cultural patterns to generalize in a useful way about the significance of relationships. Presumably, the analysis will not posit a direct relationship between one or more items of social structure or of values and income growth. The relationships will be indirect, and will influence the component parts of a system of production and distribution.

Among the significant elements in such a system will be authority and decision-taking, the availability and use of material resources and of skills, organization, a distributive mechanism, and an adaptive integration. To some degree, values and social structure influence the nature of each of these elements, and their ability to perform adequately within the system.

II

The experience has often been noted that terminological and semantic confusions, together with differences in the type of analysis for which concepts have been developed, have tended to keep economists and anthropologists apart. The notion of 'value' is a case in point. Rather than argue
for a proper or correct use of the term, I shall distinguish three important
differences in usage and endeavour to relate each of them to the topic of
economic growth.

The first is the group of ways in which the idea of value relates to the
degree to which action will be exchanged for satisfaction or goal-achieve­
ment. A more usual way of stating this would be to say that values are
wants, with the implication that preference schedules, opportunity costs,
and similar frames of reference are related to them. However, I wish to use
the less usual formulation for a number of reasons. One is that I wish to
subsume within this group such ideas as 'the value of money' and 'the value
of leisure', using the common denominator of action. It is then necessary
to draw attention to the cost elements in action, such as the provision of
resources, the sacrifice of time and foregone opportunities, the exercise or
acquisition of skills, and the use of organization, and to assume that the
relationship between value and cost will determine whether or not a partic­
ular want or preference will become prepotent.

To do this in any sense which is acceptable to an anthropologist implies
a serious return to some of the older positions taken in the theory of consump­
tion, and to examine these in a manner which contemporary anthropology
should make possible. For example, there is today a tendency in both
economics and anthropology to treat such behaviour in rational terms, and
to imply that such concepts are not relevant where irrationality rules. To a
large degree, this is because anthropologists have been frightened off by
the apparently *a priori* assumptions of rationality which dominate the logical
abstractions of economic model-building, and partly because economists
assume that market behaviour, when dominated by firms, can be rational
and tend to exclude the strange goals of alien cultures from their models.
The assumption of rationality is not necessary, however, since all we are
stating is that there is an empirical relationship between cost, value and
effective demand.

To give reality to the equations, it is necessary to include non-material
as well as material wants and costs, and to relate them. In some writing,
this is done in a half-hearted way. We speak of the 'preference for leisure',
of 'psychic costs' and of 'immaterial benefits'. In order to create the sticks
and carrots of an economic system, and to predict public reaction to their
application, it is not enough merely to record that such preferences, costs
and benefits exist. It is necessary to know, for example, at what point
members of a society will decide that the preference for leisure is too costly,
and begin to shift towards other goals; or the degree to which a society will
use its consumption income for increased religious or ceremonial expen­
diture; or whether one can expect a greater demand for transistor radios
than for books; or whether villagers, for whom a road and market have
improved income, will spend on village amenities or be awakened to the
delights of the town and migrate.

Clearly, there are difficulties in making this kind of analysis for any
given situation. To deal in futures is always risky, to establish accurate
elastici...
of avoiding the attempt to find, within traditional societies, the dynamic mainsprings of change. But the opposite error is also possible, namely to concentrate so firmly upon the consistent themes of society that the potentiality of the contribution of the non-conformist is overlooked.

A third method of approaching value is to consider it to be the enduring ethos of a culture, expressed primarily in moral judgements or statements of desirability. This approach is of considerable significance in anthropology, since behind it lies the authority of Kluckhohn, and the influence of his work and that of his followers, particularly in the Rimrock project. When the word 'value' is used in anthropology at the present time, this is the sense that immediately comes to mind. Nevertheless, as I have explained in another context, I regard this as an approach which does not readily link with the notion of value in other disciplines. While it constitutes part of the data which might be brought to bear in order to perform the exercises suggested in the paragraphs relating to the first two approaches to the idea of value, it is primarily an analysis of comparative world view and moral philosophy, and relates only indirectly to effective or potential demand as action.

Clearly, there may be highly significant moral issues which may affect the orientation of behaviour towards or away from economic growth. At one level, there is the Protestant ethic. At another, there are duties and proscriptions such as the Muslim approach to interest, or the Hindu respect for cattle. However, as Kurt Samuelsson has shown convincingly, it is not at all clear whether the Protestant ethic followed or preceded the rise of capitalism; it was contained within very different religious systems, and where stated explicitly it was against capitalism rather than for it. On a broad scale, Samuelsson has shown the ethic to be largely neutral in its effects. In addition, even relatively rigid systems such as that of Muslim theology are capable of considerable amendment and modification, and specific taboos of the Hindu type which have an important effect on economic growth are limited both in number and significance. I would argue that, since human beings have a considerable capacity to rationalize, philosophical systems are seldom in themselves an impediment to economic growth, and that it is not necessary to assume a particular kind of philosophy as a prerequisite. Such a position, it seems to me, is consistent with another anthropological view, namely that mythology consists in the manipulation of symbols to justify and legitimize action and interests.

III

To concern oneself with social structure is to analyse relationships between roles, and between institutions, associations, and groups as functioning

entities. In this connexion I wish to draw attention to three sets of problems of general interest to economic growth. These are the structural forms with respect to which economic growth may or may not take place, the degree to which adaptability is possible within relevant social structures, and the instrumental effectiveness of elements of a social structure.

Each society has its own range of principles which govern social relationships. Since many of these are deeply internalized, are habitual and intangible rather than consciously designed, and are not normally directly attacked by Western technicians or reformers who often do not understand their nature, they are relatively enduring. This is particularly the case, for example, in family structure, and in the structural arrangements of small groups which may be concerned with decision making. I am not arguing, of course, that such structural arrangements are unchanging in the face of pressure, but merely that there is a conservative element. I then go on to ask: in so far as traditional social arrangements do retain their older forms, what can be said about their effect on economic growth?

The reason for putting the question in this way is that there still seems to be a considerable body of opinion which would hold that social structure must approximate Western forms before economic growth can be expected. This should be disputed on theoretical and on empirical grounds.

Positively, a social structure represents the framework within which persons act and organize to get things done. To give some examples, when I appealed to individual acquisitiveness in Fiji to persuade villagers to build me a small jeep bridge, they performed a shoddy job because their individual interests were elsewhere. When I was able to relate the same requirement to a contract based on structural relations between my own social unit and theirs, with the appropriate symbolic manipulations of structured ceremonial exchange, a first-class piece of work was done. Again, lineage principles of whatever form can be used for the mobilization of capital and labour; the family structure of China and Japan can be as significant in the formation of enterprises as was that of Europe in the early days of the industrial revolution.

My contention at this point is that social structure does not in itself either inhibit or promote economic growth. It does, however, have an important bearing upon the forms of organization for economic growth which are appropriate in given circumstances. Thus, if economic planners can identify the principles of cooperation and adaptation which are inherent in their society, they should be in a position to mobilize these to provide vehicles for organization. To do otherwise would be to overlook an important creative potential, and perhaps to engage in unnecessary schism and controversy, diverting attention from the real issues. It is not necessary to turn a matrilineage into a patrilineage or to create a nuclear family before economic growth can take place, and to attempt to do so may delay the take-off for a considerable period of time.

In adopting this position, I am emphatically not attempting to argue that traditional social structures in their pristine state contain within
themselves all the forms of organization which are necessary for economic
growth to take place with complexity. This point will be taken up below.
Nor am I denying that changes in social structure will take place as a
result of the forces unleashed during the process of economic growth.
Again, I do not deny that some ‘societies’ are so schismatic and pluralistic
that integrated action is impossible.
Evidence has been consistently accumulating in anthropology that
traditional social structures are highly adaptable and flexible mechanisms.
This evidence has tended to be concealed or misinterpreted for a number of
reasons. Within the time-spans of direct anthropological investigation,
the amount of indigenously stimulated change observed has been minimal,
and there has been a tendency to stress conservatism, tradition and custom
in delineating the characteristics of a society. The very word ‘structure’
implies stress on continuity.
But, clearly, within a continuous system, adaptation between individuals
and groups must be a characteristic feature. More and more, anthropolo­
gists are stressing this. Dorothy Lee\(^1\) for example, in a remarkably imagi
native \textit{tour de force}, has used ethnographies to show the ways in which
individuals can act creatively and freely within apparently limited cultures.
Raymond Firth\(^2\) stresses the scope for preference and choice. Edmund
Leach\(^3\) demonstrates that the ideal description of a social structure can
give too static an impression, for behind the rules lie the interpretations of
them, and their manipulation for personal and group interest.
Field studies of social change have also stressed that a common result
of administrative order and similar pressures has been to reduce rather than
to increase the adaptability of social systems. My own observation in
Fiji, for example, indicates that the system of land registration in that
colony did not take into account sufficiently the competitive and adaptive
principles which underlay the relationships between families and lineages,
and the modifying effects of influences which lay outside the lineage system
but which nevertheless were part of the social order. The new system,
tended to protect and to create order, did so at the cost of flexibilities
which could have contributed to economic growth. Similarly, in many
colonies, the position of chiefs has been stabilized and supported by alien
sanctions, reducing the impact of traditional processes which made chiefs
answerable in terms of results. We must be cautious in implying that
ascription of roles is inconsistent with or contrary to achievement.
Admittedly, it cannot be assumed that the adaptabilities of traditional
societies were oriented towards economic growth. My point is rather that,
given an orientation towards economic growth derived from other aspects
of the cultural reality, adaptability is a necessary prerequisite to success.
It is incumbent on those who guide policy to discover the adaptive forces

in the society before them, and to use these rather than to ossify the society by the application of rules and methods which inhibit them.

The greatest and clearest defect in traditional social structures is that they do not provide sufficient forms of organization for instrumental effectiveness throughout the complex range of activities necessary for economic growth to take place. In this sense, certain functions, such as those of banking, credit supply or marketing, are either not performed or are inadequately developed. As discrete tribal and similar groups are brought within the bounds of colonies or new national States, such functions continue to be defective, or are concentrated in particular social groups or geographical areas. Some writers, such as Hirschmann¹, would argue that differentiation of economic systems within a rapidly developing country does not in fact hold back total economic growth, provided there is minimal integration so that some form at least of distribution of results takes place. Nevertheless, the absence of essential functions in an economy as a whole can hold it back, and the social structure must expand in scale and complexity by the creation of new institutions.

As we have seen above, the new institutions do not have to be of Western or capitalist form, provided they meet the essential requirement of providing for decision-taking and executive action. It may be simpler to copy Western forms, or to amend traditional forms towards a Western pattern, rather than innovate; but this can only be successful if the structure of new organizations is consistent with the types of social relations, and the nature of decision-making and authority is such that the members of the organizations recognize it to be valid for them.

IV

I wish now to set out a number of propositions which relate to the previous argument but are more specifically relevant to the theme of economic growth.

Any integrated social structure can become a basis for economic growth. Whether in fact it does or does not depends on whether innovation is directed towards expanding it in scale so that new functions can be performed, and whether its component parts are related to goals and objectives which are consistent with economic growth. That is, the keys to economic growth are to be found, not in the forms or principles of the social structure, but in the specifics of organization, and the nature of the value system.

In the field of values and of social structure there are few barriers to economic growth, and these can usually be clearly identified. The problem is not so much to destroy what might stand in the way, but to build on what is there, and to supplement existing arrangements where necessary.

The selection between values for entry into an effective demand schedule is not dependent merely upon their absolute relationship to one another. In the first place, there are, particularly in underdeveloped countries, limits to the range of possible cost variation because of limitations in the use of resources and of technology, and because of the high non-material costs which might be involved in cultural change. Thus there are limitations to the range of potential demand from which new values might be chosen, and this range is dependent upon the existing pattern and practical possibilities of production and supply.

In terms of technology and the ingenuities of trade, underdeveloped countries have access to the total range of material goods, so that it is tempting to rely on the notion of insatiable expanding demand for consumption goods as the carrot for economic growth. This of course would not be valid, because of cost limitations referred to above. Thus selections must be made which can to some degree be influenced by planning policy, as to which preferences will be satisfied.

In so far as these selections are made consciously by responsible authority, they will have varying effects upon economic growth. It is possible, for example, to select goals by reference to some standard of welfare (hospitals), or to an arbitrary concept of acculturated patterns (types of clothing), or to preferences revealed by earlier cash market behaviour. None of these are, in themselves, adequate, since they do not posit an accurate relationship to growth. Each type of reference does, however, provide data about values which can be used in further analysis.

In order to bring the analysis nearer to the relationships we are seeking, I suggest that it is desirable to introduce notions about the way in which values are linked with one another, and particularly to refine ideas about the differences in multiplying effect as between values. Far too frequently, productive effort is directed towards a specific point in demand which has no further ramifying consequences for other aspects of demand. Thus inadequate village schools do not increase the demand for learning or anything else. A change in agricultural practice may improve social conservation and improve leisure, without establishing further unsatiated wants. On the other hand a good school may increase the demand for further education, or a road the demand for city goods. In either case there is a multiplication of demand, with an alteration in the value pattern such that people are more prepared to meet new costs, and hence are motivated to further action. There is thus a case for concentrating supply to encourage such changes.

The point is reinforced by the consideration that disequilibria call forth rectifying action and generate change. This applies both in terms of social organization and values. This does not imply necessarily that there should be conflict, disruption, disorganization, or similar stresses which can inhibit action and discourage creativity. It implies a more or less systematic framework—pattern of values or social structure—by reference to which adjustments can be made.
Nevertheless, it suggests, as Hirschmann has pointed out, that balanced growth as commonly used in developmental circles may not in fact be a prerequisite to economic growth, and that undue stress upon it may in fact inhibit both growth and welfare.

Balanced growth implies that planned action must see to it that each element in a productive system alters immediately and in harmony with others. Thus stresses, bottlenecks, undue emphasis on material things, or profit to the detriment of the culture or welfare will be avoided. In line with Hirschmann’s argument, I would hold that balanced growth can confuse emphasis upon the non-material, and upon welfare, with equilibrium. This is consistent with the previous position taken in this paper that the non-material must be considered as an essential part of the cost-benefit equations leading to relevant valuation and demand schedules. This is a different thing from saying that the system must be in equilibrium, for disequilibrium may appear at any point.

Balanced growth, equilibrium, perfect adjustment, are ideal states and abstractions seldom achieved in reality. One may validly continue to argue that they represent ideals towards which to work. But one may also argue, as I understand Hirschmann to have done, that lack of balance will have a more stimulating effect than balance itself. In other words, if you have not yet achieved your ideal goal in terms of income levels, it is better to be out of balance, thus being self-stimulating and injecting alterations which will lead to further growth. Thus, it might be argued that it is better to create a good school at the village level rather than to use the same resources for a poor school and a poor dispensary, since the good school would engender a demand for a good dispensary.

This kind of example, however, suggests a modification to the position. It will clearly not always be the case that desirable gaps will be filled, however critical they may be. Thus, notions about linkage are essential to the planning of success. The case for the good school receiving priority would depend on whether one could predict the linkage. Predictions of such a nature can sometimes be more accurate when attempted on a national scale. For example, a high educational standard may lead to a demand for medical services, whereas this would not necessarily apply to the activities of microcosmic communities. On the other hand, prediction can be more accurate on other occasions when intimacy of knowledge about local conditions and institutions can reveal the relationships more surely. This suggests that differing sets of propositions will be relevant at different levels of planning or decision-taking, from that of the locality up to the state level.

The systematic exploration of linkages between small constellations of elements in the economic system derives from the importance of tracing the consequences of a proposed institutional or valuational change, so that it can be adjusted in the most appropriate way to bring about a desired objective. On a broader scale, it seems necessary to set out the necessary functional elements in an economic system undergoing the experience of
growth, and to match these with values and institutional arrangement. The following rather random list indicates the kind of functional elements I have in mind.

Effective decision-taking in productive and distributive units.

Patterns of exchange such that the units can obtain the goods and services necessary as factors of production.

Orientation of managers towards economizing and expansion.

Provision for the ‘enskilling’ of the managerial and labour force.

Availability of physical factors of production at suitable prices where increased consumption of them is indicated.

Provision of financial capital and credit facilities.

A system of physical and technical/commercial information communications.

A system of marketing products.

A system of pricing or evaluating transactions.

Elementary though such broad categories may seem to be, they are often lacking in effective form, and they can provide a check list for assessing the adequacy of institutional arrangements. Thus adequate agricultural credit facilities are lacking in Fiji, and I am sure that the system of communications is defective in most parts of Africa. Yet unless all the above prerequisites (and most probably several others) are reflected in a country’s institutions, one cannot expect economic growth to take place with maximum effectiveness.

One further dimension needs to be added. The institutions fulfilling these functions must be interlocking in a mutually adaptive manner. In other words, there must be reaction mechanisms so that institutions can respond to changing conditions.

Economic growth implies a dynamism in society. At various points in the preceding argument I have referred to such matters as ‘orientation towards expansion’ or ‘stimulation of change’. The underlying point of view needs to be brought out into the open more fully. Some societies, particularly traditional ones, seem to have been in a state of static equilibrium, such that adjustments were entirely within a self-perpetuating system, save for cataclysm or critical pressures from outside the system. Many of the innovations introduced from the Western world, including some brought by government, have been incorporated in such a way that they have not produced a permanent dynamic, but have merely changed one form of static into another.

It is no longer possible for such conditions to be characteristic of nation States, except in highly atypical circumstances, for forces of change are now linked on a world-wide scale. Nevertheless, the problem still remains when we consider alternatives of policy, because it is possible for governments to concentrate too high a proportion of their efforts on activities which do not introduce or support a dynamic. This is very clearly the case where intervention is based on the introduction of a physical facility or technical innovation, without consideration of the implications for values and social
organization. Since the analysis of values and social organization is in many respects more difficult than that of technological deficiency, because more technicians are available than social analysts and because false assumptions are too readily made, government intervention in, for example, rural areas, tends to be non-dynamic. It is one thing to introduce a new agricultural method, to build a road, or provide a dispensary. It is a totally different thing to stimulate the values and organization that permit communities and institutions to expand their activities and horizons through their own initiative.

Such a task is a primary objective of such movements as community development. Even in this kind of context, however, the community development organization tends to concentrate on enabling specific tasks to be achieved, rather than on creating dynamism. There are very few recorded examples in which a community development team has withdrawn, leaving behind a securely established organization for growth.

While it is true that economic growth began in European and American countries with very little assistance from persons able to carry out systematic analysis in the social sciences, the situation is quite different today. Under contemporary conditions there is an expectation that the process can be speeded by the application of knowledge about methods. There is recognition that questions to be solved are not merely commercial or technical. It ought to follow that governments would regard socio-economic advice as valuable, and would make provision in their organizational plans for its application as a resource.

That this is not done as a matter of course is partly, though not wholly, a reflection of the lack of success in the social sciences to date in putting together their knowledge in such a way that individual specialist officials can be trained to analyse complex situations from the point of view of growth, bearing in mind that growth is not merely a form of economic adaptation, but involves processes analysed in political science, sociology, and anthropology, and techniques considered in such disciplines as community and regional planning, social work and adult education. I would hold that the provision and use of professionals of this character for association with all levels of government would have an important impact on economic growth in those countries where the public sector looms large.

Because many social structures are oriented towards limited traditional functions and do not make provision for institutions specializing in the total range of functions of the kind listed above, it is necessary to identify a source of authority which will concern itself with the creation and stimulation of relevant institutions. If this central task is not fulfilled, the appropriate amendment of institutions will perforce be left to the slow and painful trial and error methods associated with social evolution. Clearly, under such circumstances the source of authority will be government.

This means that government is a most significant force affecting the foundations upon which economic growth will be built, and that success or failure, particularly in the early stages of growth, can be attributed closely
to the efficacy or ineffectiveness of government in handling the institutional problems involved.

A further implication is that the relationship between organs of government at all levels and economic growth functions ought to be a direct one in many cases where in established economies the relationship is indirect. For example, it may be necessary for central government to stimulate the development of local farms, transport and marketing services, in such a manner that they grow out of the interests and needs of local communities. For many reasons (such as limited supply of suitable managers or the difficulty of relating stock company organization to local methods and initiatives, or the desirability of tapping local ideas in terms of evaluating possible projects) it may be desirable that the analysis, planning and execution of such projects be made a local responsibility and that this be done most appropriately through a governmental institution.

Thus, economic growth can be affected by the types of responsibilities allocated to junior levels of government, such as local authorities. Conversely, an analysis of the institutional requirements of economic growth will suggest amendments in the conception and organization of local government. In many respects, this may prove to be one of the most significant points for creative thought and action in designing more viable economic systems to meet the challenge of growth in newly developing countries.

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Bureaucracy and nation building
in transitional societies

S. C. Dube

This article examines the nature of the transitional society in the developing nations and reviews the role and problems of bureaucracy in the tasks of nation-building. Eight major characteristics of bureaucracy are identified, and its problems in the context of the culture of politics, the emerging ethos and the expanding sphere of State activity and new institutional arrangements are analysed.

Bureaucracy forms an important element of the modernizing élite in many of the economically less developed countries which have attained national independence during the last two decades. Trained in the colonial tradition, this organized and articulate segment of the native society functioned as a bridge between the dependent indigenous people and the ruling power from the West. Although it had to work under the direction of the imperial power and had largely to carry out its policies, it was not without nationalist sentiments and aspirations. Held suspect during the days of the struggle for freedom, both by politically-oriented fellow-countrymen and by the alien rulers, members of this class had, by and large, acquired a progressive orientation and the more sophisticated among them had definite ideas regarding the programmes of economic and social growth to be adopted by their country at the attainment of national independence. In many countries they were the only organized body of natives with considerable training and experience in administration; they naturally found themselves called upon to assume major responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of national plans for economic development and social change.

The general change in political climate, the assumption of power by the political élite, the changing alignments of power and pressure groups, and the emergence of new institutional and administrative patterns raised in their wake a series of complex problems for the bureaucracy. In consequence, it had to make some significant adjustments in its thought-and work-ways and to adapt itself to the new ethos. On the other hand, in many sensitive areas it found itself either openly resisting or accepting some of the new elements only theoretically. Thus, with or without the overt
acceptance of the new patterns, it stood for continuity of some of the established norms. In meeting these intricate problems of adjustment and value-conflict, the character of bureaucracy in transitional societies is undergoing a rapid change. Since it occupies a pivotal position in these societies, and will possibly continue to do so in the foreseeable future, an understanding of the character and culture of bureaucracy is essential for those concerned with the programmes of economic growth and social change in the economically less developed countries.

Planning for economic growth is an extremely complicated business which involves highly specialized knowledge and developed manipulative skills; the implementation of these plans presupposes deep administrative insights and a keen evaluative perspective. In the context of the programmes of community development, it is common these days to emphasize the ideal of planning by the people, but the crucial fact that this stage must necessarily be preceded by the stages of planning for the people and planning with the people is not given sufficient emphasis. The acceptance of these three stages means successively diminishing functions for the bureaucracy in matters of local and regional planning and in developmental administration, but it is essential to bear in mind that the gap between the first and the third stage is very considerable and that the transition to the final stage depends largely upon the manner in which the process is initiated and the first two stages are carried out. Both these stages involve considerable direct participation by the bureaucracy; the second stage particularly—which requires the initiation of a process of withdrawal—has critical significance. Optimism, bordering on wishful thinking, cannot alone diminish the importance of bureaucracy; its role in the process of planning and developmental administration is bound to figure prominently for several decades. The problem of the integration of local, regional and national plans demands knowledge and skills which perhaps only the bureaucracy possesses. Of course, as the process acquires greater complexity the technocrat is drawn into it more deeply, for without the utilization of his specialized knowledge planning for successive stages would become increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, much maligned and distrusted as it is, bureaucracy is not without a vital role to play in the process of planning for economic and social development. Modifications in its structure, values and work-ways are necessary to adapt it to the idiom of the fast changing situation, but the fact remains that it cannot be done away with. An understanding of its character and the initiation of imaginative plans for changing its structure and values so as to make it a more effective instrument for development must therefore be considered an essential prerequisite to planned change in these countries.

Discriminatingly recruited on the basis of specified criteria and carefully trained according to established and time-tested plans, bureaucracies in most of the former colonies and dependencies became efficient instruments of administration. Although they were oriented more to functions of law and order and the collection of revenues, they were also entrusted from time
to time with some nation-building responsibilities. In discharging their responsibilities they showed all the classical characteristics of bureaucracies: they were formally organized with unambiguous demarcation of roles and statuses and were articulated to clearly defined goals; they were efficient and equipped with the required knowledge; they were well-versed in formal rules of procedure and recognized their predominance; and finally they were trained to function in an impersonal manner under conditions of near anonymity.

In addition to the above, bureaucracies in these societies had certain special characteristics. In their respective countries they were perhaps the first large and organized group to enter the transitional phase between tradition and modernity—the twilight zone lying between societal types described variously in continua such as communal-associational, sacred-secular, status-contract, and *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft*. In other words, they were among the pioneers who sought to break away from the traditionally affective and emotion-based communal society and to set in motion the forces that were to contribute towards the emergence of a different type of society—a society characterized by affective neutrality and based on rational ends-means calculations for individual goals. As a distinct sub-cultural entity within the larger framework of their society, they were at least partly absolved from the traditional obligation of having to share communal attitudes, sentiments and repressive authority, and were among the first to constitute a group characterized by specialized division of labour, by different but complementary interests and sentiments, and by restrictive authority. It is not suggested here that they could break away completely from tradition to adopt the ideals and values of modernity; in the critical areas of choice-making they had before them a wide zone of fluid values in which were present the elements of both tradition and modernity. The logic and rationale of selectivity in the process of choice-making has not been analysed in depth, but the fact that, gradually and in an increasing measure, bureaucracy adopted several elements of modernity is not without significance.

It might be useful to describe here some special features of these bureaucracies, as they emerged and crystallized during the colonial phase.

1. Bureaucracy constituted a special sub-cultural segment—the high prestige strata of the society. Entrance to it was theoretically not barred to any section of the community, although in actual practice only the traditionally privileged could provide the necessary general background and the expensive education required for success in the stiff tests prescribed for entry into its higher echelons. In limited numbers others also gained entrance into the relatively closed group of higher civil servants. Middle-level and lower positions in it attracted the less privileged. Bureaucracy had a class bias and it tended to have a stratification of its own; its upper crust functioned as a privileged class. On the whole it symbolized achievement rather than ascription. Over time, it came to have distinct vested interests, and was sensitive to all threats to its position and
privilege which it guarded jealously against encroachment from any quarter.

2. It existed largely in the twilight zone of cultures. Partly traditional and partly modern, it could and did in fact choose from the elements of both. In several ways it was alienated from the masses and uprooted from the native cultural traditions; significant differences in styles of living and in modes of thought separated the two. The Western rulers, on the other hand, never conceded equality to it. In consequence, bureaucracy maintained dual identification and was characterized by a dual ambivalence.

3. Besides offering security of tenure and relatively higher emoluments, bureaucratic positions carried vast powers which made them additionally attractive and important. The powers vested in a minor functionary gave him prestige, perquisites and privileges far beyond those justified by his emoluments and position in the hierarchy. Formally the role and status of functionaries at different levels were defined, but in actual practice the system of expectation and obligation between them tended to be diffused rather than specific.

4. Within the framework of the over-all policy laid down by the imperial power, in day-to-day administration the bureaucratic machine enjoyed considerable freedom from interference. Thus there were few hindrances to its exercise of power, which was often authoritarian in tone and content. Bureaucracy had, in general, a paternalistic attitude to the masses. The masses, on their part, accepted the position and looked to the administration for a wide variety of small favours.

5. Administration was concerned mainly with collection of land revenue and with maintenance of law and order. The general administrator under these conditions enjoyed supremacy. Subject matter specialists of welfare and nation-building departments were relegated to secondary positions and functioned under the guidance and control of the generalist.

6. Bureaucracy was carefully trained in formal administrative procedure and routine. Stereotypes in this sphere were well-developed and were scrupulously observed.

7. In the limited framework of its functions and set procedures bureaucracy found a self-contained system. It resented and resisted innovations.

8. Its attitude to the nationalist forces within was most ambivalent. Few within the bureaucracy were devoid of patriotic sentiments and aspirations, but only in rare exceptions could they openly side with the forces of nationalism. Requirements of their official position made them an instrument for the execution of imperialist policies. This naturally aroused in the nationalist leadership feelings of anger and distrust against them. This rejection by the leaders of the nationalist forces as well as by the politically-conscious masses was largely at the root of their ambivalent attitude towards the nationalist forces.

Bureaucracy welcomed the advent of independence as much as any other
group in the former colonies and dependencies, but the first years of freedom were for it a period of great stress and strain. It had covertly resented Western domination, but in the first decade of independence it remained under the shadow of suspicion because of its former association and identification with the alien power. While its power and prestige were decreasing, its burdens and responsibilities were increasing. Attacked from several sides simultaneously and with mounting pressures, bureaucracy found itself in a difficult and uncomfortable position.

The more important areas in which it had to work for a redefinition and consequent readjustment of its position and responsibilities were (a) the culture of politics, (b) the emerging ethos, and (c) the expanding sphere of State activity and the new institutional arrangements.

*The culture of politics.* In the new order the supremacy of administration was replaced largely by the sovereignty of politics. Politics became the most important activity and the politician came to occupy a position of unquestionable supremacy in matters of decision making. Within the framework of this culture of politics, there was an unmistakable tendency towards the merging of political roles with personal and social roles; the expectations of the politician from his followers and administrative subordinates were diffused. Politics centred round individuals; informal factions or groups formed around key personalities were thus more meaningful units of political organization than the formal structure of political parties. Personal loyalty to politicians, under these conditions, played an important part in the process of political identification and decision-making. Administration under such leadership could not remain wholly impersonal. The political élite was nurtured more in the politics of agitation than in the politics of nation-building, and as a hangover from the past it persisted in its agitational approach. Nucleated around individuals, political processes lacked organic unity; communication was not adequately articulated. In general, political parties represented some kind of a revolutionary world view and philosophy, and on larger international and national issues they stood for an unlimited Utopia. On specific issues, especially of a regional or local character, the position was significantly different; political opinion on them was often narrow, sectarian and parochial. Thus political thinking regarding issues at different levels lacked cohesion and integration. The attitude of the political élite was characterized by ambivalence. They sought to work for modernization, without giving up their love for tradition; attempts to harmonize, synthesize and integrate the elements of the two, even on a conceptual level, were neither systematic nor serious.

In many countries the bureaucracy was trained well enough to accept political direction, and only in a few exceptional cases did it try to gain the upper hand. Adjustment and adaptation to this political culture, however, was not without problems and difficulties. The new order posed a definite threat to bureaucracy's structure, values and interests. While its formal structure remained intact, the definition of roles and statuses within the
hierarchy was disturbed by the emergence of the politician as the focal point of decision-making. The personal nature of political decision-making was another unsettling factor. It not only affected the internal status system of the bureaucracy, but also sometimes bypassed its special knowledge and side-tracked its procedural routine. In many specific contexts administration could not function in an impersonal manner. Interpersonal relations between the politician and the administrator tended to be uneasy. The politician recognized the value and importance of the bureaucracy, but he continued to have a definite antagonism towards it, to exhort and admonish it to change its ways, and to ridicule it for some of its modes of thought and action that were out of tune in the new order. Much of this criticism was valid, but the manner in which it was made was often irritating to the bureaucrats. Many members of the bureaucracy had silently admired the self-sacrificing patriots as heroes, but in close proximity they saw them without the halo that surrounded them during the days of the national struggle. Often, the gap between their profession and their practice particularly annoyed the perceptive members of the bureaucracy. The politician was himself adopting many of the ways which he criticized in the bureaucrat. Some members of the administration were all too willing to adapt, but their over-readiness to do so was viewed by the discerning administrator as a dangerous departure that could in the long run undermine the very character and role of the bureaucracy.

The emerging ethos. The emerging ethos also presented bureaucracy with a series of problems. In the new setting it could not maintain its image of power, nor could it continue to exist as a high-prestige class enjoying exceptional privileges. A closer identification with the masses was called for; the paternalistic and authoritarian tone of administration had also inevitably to change. On a theoretical and emotional level the desirability of this basic change was conceded, but a system of rationalization was developed at the same time to justify the maintenance of the status quo. Today a great contradiction persists between emotional awareness of the desirable and willingness to accept it in practice.

The expanding sphere of State activity and new institutional arrangements. The structure, values, and work-ways of the bureaucracy in almost all former colonies and dependencies were geared to law and order and to revenue administration for which it was efficiently trained. Administration for nation building necessitated a different approach involving a new value attitude orientation and a modified institutional set-up. It is in these spheres that the failures of the bureaucracy are perhaps the most pronounced.

By and large the bureaucracy resists innovations in its structural arrangement. It appears to have a firm faith in the superiority of the pyramidal structure of administration and in the infallibility of the generalist. Efforts to nuclearize the administration for nation building are resented,
and there is great resentment if any attempt is made to dislodge the general administrator from his high pedestal. Concepts of inner-democratization, of administrative decentralization, and of delegation of authority and responsibility at best receive only lip service. Co-ordination becomes difficult because of faulty communication between the general administrator and the technical specialist. Effective utilization of the specialist is blocked by the accepted or assumed supremacy of the general administrator whose self-confidence borders almost on arrogance. The latter perhaps realizes that he is not trained for certain jobs, but he rarely concedes this publicly. Innovations have been made in these spheres, but the marks of bureaucratic resistance are still evident.

Subconsciously the bureaucrat still perhaps believes in the efficacy of the traditional approach to administration. New approaches are discussed and half-heartedly accepted, but only in rare cases do they receive a fair trial. Extension and community development approaches, for instance, have encountered considerable resistance from the bureaucracy. Indeed, many members of the administration would be glad to revert to type, and would willingly reverse the process that has gained partial acceptance for these approaches after years of experimentation and persuasion.

It is generally recognized that the cumbrous administrative routine, good in its time, today practically immobilizes developmental administration. Yet, all attempts to change the rules of procedure result invariably in the formulation of rules that are as complex as those they seek to replace, if not more so.

Efforts at deconcentration of power, such as the experiment of democratic decentralization for development in India, meet with even greater resistance. Doubtless the infant ‘grass-roots democracy’ is not without shortcomings, but its threats to the perpetuation of bureaucratic vested interests have alerted the administrator, whose approach to the experiment is extremely guarded, wooden and unimaginative.

Attempts have been made at reorienting the bureaucracy to the new philosophy of administration, but they have often been viewed as mere short-lived fads and fancies. Indirectly the new approach has made some headway, but there is little evidence to suggest that its utility has been generally accepted.

In the tasks of nation building in transitional societies bureaucracy has a vital role to play. It consists, by and large, of people with progressive motivation, wide administrative experience, and a rich store of pooled knowledge. Far from being written off, it cannot be ignored. It must also be conceded that it has played an important part in the process of economic and social growth and has been willing to go part of the way at least to adjust to the new situation. It has functioned both as a model and as an instrument for modernization. But its effective utilization has been blocked by some of the paradoxes of the new political culture and by the inner contradictions within its own structure and ordering of values. In several respects the hard core of the bureaucratic culture has been unyielding, and
has offered great resistance to innovation. The blame does not lie entirely at its own door, but at the same time the present state of uncertainty cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. Lack of adequate understanding of its culture and values and of a balanced assessment of its past and future roles has been an important factor in the failure to utilize bureaucracy more effectively in programmes of economic growth and planned change.

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Social stratification and economic development

Bert F. Hoselitz

Levels of economic development are characterized by differences in kind and complexity of economic organizations and productive units. Even similar basic needs are met in varying ways, according to the available resources. Class stratification and socio-psychological action patterns form strategic variables linked to development levels. Underdeveloped countries typically display sharp social polarities, steep ranking, low mobility, a disregard for economic performance as status-conferring. Ascription-achievement and diffusion-specificity are key dichotomies. The effect of specificity on productivity reflects back on stratification, while achievement-orientation makes individual mobility across groups possible.

I

One of the most evident differences between economically advanced and underdeveloped countries is the contrast in the kinds and complexity of economic organizations and productive units. In fact, part of the theory of economic development consists in identifying the decisive variables which account for the change in productive organizations and types of economic units as progress is made from the simpler to the more complex patterns of economic action. Yet little stress is placed in the analysis of these economic changes on the fact that the increasing complexity of productive activity must be associated with alterations in other fields of social organization and social structure, and, above all, changes in social stratification. It is possible, and indeed likely, that these changes may have significant effects at certain stages of the economic development process and it is therefore advisable to explore them in somewhat greater detail. The purpose of this article will be to identify a number of characteristics of social stratification in economically little-advanced societies and to describe their functioning and the change to which they are subjected in the economic growth process.

The simplest way of describing alterations in social stratification is to say that for any set or any change of social structures the various roles are characterized by a new pattern in the application of social sanctions. This
definition can be made clearer by providing some further comments on the concepts of 'structure' and 'sanction'. In doing this, I present some common conceptions in contemporary American sociology which may be useful, since these terms are often used quite indiscriminately in the literature.

The concept of social structure designates some characteristic, recurrent form of interaction between two or more persons. If defined in this manner, social structures are related to the directional tendencies existing in social systems and raise the question whether they develop as a consequence of the need to meet the functional requisites of social systems. Though I share the view of those who hold to this interpretation, I shall not defend it here, since a number of satisfactory essays on this problem already exist.1 But the point should be stressed that any social system may be conceived to be structured in such a way as to meet certain exigencies which will permit that social system to preserve some stability. The exigencies which are most fundamental centre around production and allocation of commodities and services, forming the 'material' basis of the society; the creation and maintenance of patterns of interaction and forms of solidarity among persons and groups comprising the social system; the formulation and control of collective action which affects the society as a whole; and the preservation, transmission, and interpretation of the hierarchy of values on which the society is founded. In order to fulfil these exigencies structural relations are established, social resources are devoted to meeting them and activities by individuals or groups of persons are initiated which have the main objective of moving towards these requisites in the various sectors of social action, and of fulfilling the needs of the society in the economic, political, solidarity-oriented, and cultural dimensions. This analysis thus shows in greater detail which major functions need to be met and what structures have developed to permit these functions to be met. Among the variables determining the development and establishment of a given set of structures are not merely the functional requisites which exist in a society, but also the resources over which the society already has control. In other words, different societies may be confronted in certain subsectors of social action with quite similar functional requisites, but since they control very different resources for meeting these needs they will have different structures. For example, in all societies food for its members must be produced. But the social structures, i.e., the forms of interaction between persons concerned with food production, are very different in modern Western societies and in the economically less advanced countries of, say, Central Africa. This contrast is mainly due not to differences in functional requisites, but differences in resources (both human and physical) which the two societies control.

The concept of sanction is much easier to define than the concept of

structure. When talking about sanctions we usually have in mind both rewards and deprivations, and we infer that sanctions are usually employed to control or induce changes in the behaviour of individuals within structures. Sanctions are imposed most often in order to induce persons to behave in conformity with norms established for action in a given structural situation. These norms and the sanctions imposed normally are rooted in social values or are related to them, and the entire complex of structures, collectivities of social action, sanctions, and norms tend to become institutionalized, i.e., to be elevated to a level of understanding at which they provoke clear and distinctive expectations of action patterns through their combination into a single complex. For example, if we speak of the institutionalization of medieval guilds, we refer to a more or less long-lasting set of roles and collectivities (e.g., guild masters and specified associations of artisans), values (e.g., freedom of action within certain prescribed boundaries), norms (e.g., conformity with jointly established price and quality prescriptions, maintenance of contractual relations, voluntary limitation on scale of operations), and sanctions (e.g., profits of business, disciplinary action by special magistrates or guild assemblies). To the extent to which structures become institutionalized, they also acquire a particularly stable role in systems of social stratification and insure more or less the permanence of such stratification systems.

In past research on social change a few studies of social stratification systems in different societies have been made concentrating primarily on more limited aspects of stratification. For example, in some instances, studies of stratification of roles, of organizations, or of individual persons within a society have appeared. An example are the studies on occupational ranking which were quite popular in the last decade. In the older sociological literature the major emphasis in the study of stratification was placed on class stratification. Here we may distinguish between stratification based primarily upon occupational roles, such as the concept of class stratification in Marxian writings, and stratification based upon membership in a social group constituting a specialized collectivity with its own image and its integrated action. The second view of class stratification became more popular in modern sociological literature and the work of W. L. Warner and R. Centers and others is built on it. Whether we interpret...
principles of class stratification as being founded upon occupational distinctions or on the formation of groups of persons with close inter-group relations, the degree of institutionalization is higher, and the significance of sanctions, generalized norms, and more manifest values is greater than in stratification systems limited to a classification of occupational roles, a structuring of organizations, or a distinction between individuals. A social class is, by itself, a composite of structures, and since class stratification normally requires a certain degree of stability within the social system, it presupposes also certain relatively well-defined structural interrelations, at least within a social class, and usually also between classes. But these interrelations acquire stability only to the extent to which the structures themselves and the interaction patterns between them become institutionalized. Hence, when we deal with class stratification, we must recognize that under different conditions of social organization and at widely different levels of economic advancement we shall encounter different patterns of institutionalization.

This means that one of the potentially fruitful approaches to the study of social stratification and its interaction with economic development should concentrate upon class stratification rather than other stratification patterns. In addition we shall attempt to determine those aspects of social behaviour and socio-psychological action patterns which may be said to form the crucial or strategic variables in determining the forms and degree of stability of social stratification systems in societies at different levels of economic advancement. It is hoped that stress on these points may help in evaluating the changes which must occur in social stratification systems in countries which enter into the process of relatively rapid economic development.

II

Among the most important aspects influencing, and in fact determining, stratification patterns in little-industrialized countries are the following:

1. The general structure of classes is based ultimately on a dichotomy between two principal groups: the élite and the mass. Membership in the élite usually implies control of political power, a relatively high degree of education, and direct or indirect control of sizeable portions of a society’s wealth. Membership in the lower class, which is composed of the large mass of the population, entails lack of political power, poverty, low income, and usually little, or more often, no education. Middle classes are rare, small and of relatively little significance in these societies. I shall return later to a somewhat more extended discussion of the more general social implications of this system of stratification and its possible alterations in a process of economic development.

2. Non-industrial or generally underdeveloped societies are characterized normally by the principle of ascription—as against that of achievement—
as the major force assigning social, economic and occupational roles. In other words, a person is assigned a role and acquires a status in society based upon his birth, though there are some cases in which, through the practice of adoption, this principle is somewhat modified. But it appears to be a widespread observation that ascription is a determining force dividing individuals between status groups and, indeed, social classes, and this principle affects not only the relative size and composition of each class within the stratification system, but also determines the lack of facility of mobility within the social system.

3. Non-industrial or pre-industrial societies are also characterized by relatively little advanced division of labour which causes productive tasks to be less sharply distinguished than in economically more advanced societies. But, in addition to this, distinctions between economic roles and roles in other fields of social action are much less emphasized than in economically more advanced societies. This type of social organization is described by Robert Redfield in his work on the folk society. Redfield's description may be, and has been, interpreted as establishing an ideal type of the forms of over-all social organization at one extreme of social systems, i.e., that of a very small, normally kinship-oriented society which consists essentially of one or a small number of groups each held together by kinship ties. In these groups status differentials are small, stratification in a meaningful sense is almost absent, and whatever role allocation does play is based entirely on ascriptive principles. But the main significance of these societies is that quite a few of them are now on the threshold of economic advancement, and are being drawn into a social framework with much more complex and more highly stratified structures.

I shall discuss these three points in greater detail later. But first it may be useful to point to two further general considerations which must be borne in mind in the discussion of stratification and its interaction with levels of economic performance. One is the problem of differentiation, and the other is the problem of the control of sanctions, both those applied to behaviour within a given layer of the stratification system and those applied to relationships between individuals or groups in different layers.

This second problem is of special importance in societies in which differentiation between the various layers of a stratification system is not large in certain spheres of social action. As an example we may consider some African societies, where this situation appears to exist most prominently. A good description of this social situation was presented by Max Gluckman in a recent book. He describes Zulu society from the time of Shaka who was the most powerful and successful ruler this Bantu-speaking people ever had. Shaka's rule was based in the long run on the conquest of

many other peoples and, in a society with greater differentiation in stratification at all levels, the overpowering social and political position of Shaka and those close to him would also have resulted in economic stratification, leading in turn to economic changes. But according to Gluckman's account, the king 'had fields worked by his warriors, and vast herds tended by them; and he drew tribute of cattle and grain from his subjects. This tribute he then mostly redistributed among them... Though there was no fundamental cleavage of the Zulu nation into classes differentiated by economic interests, the nature of social interests changed with each step upward in the hierarchy. This pattern of differentiation in the stratification system, confined to the social and political, but omitting the economic sector, is found in quite a number of African societies. For example, Gluckman describes this situation among the Nyamwezi, a tribe which resided in northern Nigeria, whose king, Msidi, 'would earn day in and day out, a miserable two yards of dirty calico and yet would give away, to the last yard, the bales upon bales of cloth brought into the country by the many caravans from east and west coasts'. Similar egalitarian societies in the sector of economic action, upon which are built quite hierarchical political and social stratification systems are found in other parts of Africa, particularly in West Africa, e.g., among the Tallensi, and elsewhere.

The widespread existence of these stratification systems is important, especially because these societies are found in territories in which new political entities, i.e., new independent nations, are being formed. In addition these new nations have adopted, at least on the level of official programmes, certain economic development goals and thus are forced to introduce new patterns of political control and, added to them, a new emphasis on economic achievement as an objective of social action. All this conflicts with the existing stratification systems, since the sanctions to which the present structure are subjected are completely different from those which must be operative in a society which attempts to achieve national unification and economic advancement.

III

Concentrating on stratification systems which are relevant for societies in the early stages of industrial development or which are about to enter into a period of economic growth, we can observe the following patterns.

In societies such as those in many parts of Africa (and elsewhere, e.g., among Latin American Indians) essentially egalitarian features in the

1. ibid., pp. 34-5.
2. ibid., p. 31.
4. On the absence of a class or status structure based upon economic achievement in Indian
economic (adaptive) sector exist, but social and political relations are based on fairly rigorous hierarchies. These societies, moreover, have extended kinship systems which form the basis for social stratification and allocation of roles in the political sphere. This means that positions of political leadership and social status are determined primarily on the basis of ascriptive norms, and though achievement norms may have some slight significance in the economic sector of action, their over-all importance is limited and stratification rests principally on social and political performance. But the political unit, though it has historically sometimes controlled an extended territory (as among the Zulu, for example), is now confined in most new nations to a comparatively small area and often stands in conflict with the newly arising needs of the emerging political structures. Hence the traditional patterns of stratification are in sharp conflict with the requirements imposed by recent developments, and one of the main problems confronting these societies is the process of change which will possibly result in a complete reversion of existing stratification systems in these societies.1

Apart from these societies we encounter others in which a highly differentiated stratification system was already in existence before the introduction of new economic goals and the beginning of plans for industrialization. These societies are found in the Middle East and in South Asia. They are located in countries where well-organized States have been established long ago, whose rulers exercised extended political power. The number of persons under the rule of kings or emperors was often very large, territories of unified government widely extended, and the political apparatus required to rule these areas considerably larger and more complex than that of the small indigenous ‘States’ of parts of Africa. At one time in history many of these States were the centres of large empires, such as that of the Abbasids, the Mamelukes, the Moghul rulers of India, the various kingdoms of Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and other countries.

In these States, at the height of their power, extensive administrative staffs were needed and well-defined ties between the centre and the provincial and other local headquarters had to be established. Economically these States were dependent primarily upon agriculture, though in the major urban centres in which the political and intellectual élites resided, wealth and income was accumulated which often made possible the development of extensive markets, handicrafts, and even industrial enterprises on a limited scale. Some individuals in mercantile or industrial leadership positions could acquire great incomes, but in terms of social status they were on a low level, in some cases even lower than peasants. For example, in classical Indian culture the Brahmins and Kshatriyas formed the leading


social status groups, below them were the Vaisyas who were principally peasants, and merchants and artisans held status positions even lower than these, though in terms of income and wealth some were substantially superior to almost all peasants and even many members of the two leading castes. The same social differentiation was observed in pre-republican China and even in Japan under the Tokugawa rule. The significance of this stratification system was not that it prevented the accumulation of wealth on the part of some of the ablest merchants and manufacturers but rather that it led them into subservience to the political leaders, and often induced them to use large portions of their wealth to 'appease' or to attract the benevolence of the politically and socially dominant status groups.

Such a stratification system is resistant to changes in the economic objectives and political organization of a society, though, over time, the low status of entrepreneurs in commerce, industry, and related activities tends to be modified and an advancement in a person’s social position may become dependent upon successful economic performance. The traditional emphasis on the low status of persons acting as business entrepreneurs maintains itself for a long time and some of those who are potentially most talented will avoid a business career if they can find suitable occupations elsewhere. In other words, the traditional low status of artisans, merchants and even industrialists slows down the supply of educated and potentially well-endowed persons, many of whom also have access to accumulated wealth and other assets, to enter into economic activity contributing to the economic growth process of their societies.

In Japan, the close association between lower-level samurai and wealthy merchants and farmers even under the Tokugawa rule tended to break down this resistance, in part, before the Meiji restoration. In India, the first entrants into entrepreneurial positions and other leading business activities were members of those ‘communal’ groups which were outside the caste systems (e.g., the Parsees) or whose caste function was in the field of economic activity (e.g., the Marwaris). Only under the great pressures, exercised in more recent years when in certain areas of India the entrance of Brahmins into positions of intellectual or administrative specialization became harder, in some cases almost impossible, did they turn to industrial entrepreneurship in order to preserve their wealth and position in Indian society.

Another example of the change in the basis of stratification under the


impact of new socio-political objectives by a geographically distant but administratively effective new government is provided by the example of Tabanan, reported by Clifford Geertz. Tabanan, a town in Southern Bali, was for a long time under a ruling aristocracy which, in contrast to the peasant masses it dominated, presented one extreme of the bi-polar stratification model mentioned earlier. The Dutch officially changed the legal norms upon which this stratification rested, but by making the nobles into colonial civil servants secured their power position within the village context. But, already in the new situation which came into force in 1906, the local aristocracy had to base its leadership position increasingly on its economic performance as landlords rather than on its earlier quasi-absolutist political prerogatives. Geertz describes more recent changes as follows:

'Since the revolution even this modified pattern of aristocratic pre-eminence has come under attack. Progressive land taxation, laws protecting tenants against displacement and high rents, and the general egalitarian sentiments engendered by nationalist ideology have made landlordism a much less attractive proposition than it was before the war. Further, the opening of administrative posts to talent and to political party patronage has tended to reduce the monopolistic hold of the aristocracy on the civil service. In such a situation trade and industry, insofar as they can be profitably pursued, become an attractive means to maintain one's threatened status, wealth, and power; so it is perhaps not entirely surprising that it is this group of obsolete princelings which is behind Tabanan's recent economic expansion.'

The nobles in Tabanan have taken to industrial and commercial entrepreneurship, and they were ready to do so because for the last fifty years their earlier unquestioned caste-based status tended to become undermined as a stratification principle and their status depended increasingly on their role as landowners and receivers of rent. In other words, their 'conversion' to entrepreneurship was made easier by the fact that this transition could be made in a social environment in which the system of stratification created under Dutch administration had become increasingly dependent upon social action performed in the economic sector of the social system.

The discussion of the case of Tabanan leads to further consideration of a stratification system which resembles that predominant in Bali before the direct imposition of Dutch rule. In this system the dominant social class bases its position on its socio-political pre-eminence and the wealth and economic returns to the members of the predominant class are not a factor causing their superior class position, but a result of their leading position in the political and social stratification system. In brief, these societies are

2. Ibid., p. 389.
concrete exemplifications of the stratification system mentioned earlier. As was pointed out, the general class stratification is bimodal in that a small dominant class is confronted by a large, politically powerless and socially inferior mass. It is the position of power and social status which attracts income and wealth to the upper class and normally deprives the lower class of a portion of the produce it turns out. Though there exists usually a small middle class in these societies, its size and influence is sharply limited and its social status relatively undefined and hence fluctuating. Some of the societies of the Middle East and South Asia, described earlier, presented systems of stratification not dissimilar to this, and may be considered special cases of the more general pattern of essentially bimodal stratification systems. Mobility in these social systems is low, membership in a given social stratum is almost always determined by ascription.

In some instances these societies result from foreign conquest, with the victorious conquerors forming the upper, and the mass of the indigenous population the lower, class. For example, the societies of most Latin American countries under Spanish or Portuguese domination resembled this pattern of social stratification, with European officials and other immigrants forming the small dominant class and the mass of indigenous Indians, later augmented by imported African slaves, the lower class. A similar bi-modal stratification system may be encountered in several societies in the Middle East, though the conquest period there lies much farther back in history. The economic development process in these societies requires a growth of the middle classes, and a gradual acquisition of power of these middle classes. In fact, it has been maintained, at least in one instance, that the growth of a ‘middle sector’ was one of the responsible factors in the growing economic and political maturity of these societies.¹ But, at the same time, it is undeniable that the dominant status group will attempt to prevent the development of a middle sector and will try to draw individuals in the emerging middle class under its influence. For an independent middle class, especially one with independent, self-determined economic sources of social strength, forms a danger to the leading political and status group which has every interest to prevent or counteract this development.

Hence we find that the middle class in these societies may be composed of several sectors. In part, middle-class status is conferred upon the attainment of a certain educational level, the integration of these educated persons into administrative positions, and the rigorous subordination of political organizations under the over-all rule of the centrally organized and tightly knit political élite. In other instances, in which middle-class status is attainable by economic performance, various traditions are upheld which make participation in commercial and industrial activity undesirable for indigenous persons thus leaving these areas entirely, or largely,

to persons coming from outside the society. For although these outsiders may obtain positions in the middle rung of the structure of income distribution, they cannot, in most of these societies, attain positions of political leadership or high social status. The Chinese in many South-East Asian countries, the Lebanese and Syrians in various parts of the world, the Indians in East Africa and parts of South Asia, have occupied such positions in the structure of income distribution without acquiring significant status position in the political or social stratification systems in which they resided.

But in extreme cases the dominant status group tries to prevent economic advancement and associated social change from taking place at all if it can be expected that these developments will affect its relative position in the stratification system. This was apparently the objective of the nobility in many Balinese towns and villages before the Dutch administration took on greater government responsibilities in 1906; this was until recently and remains, under a cloak of more egalitarian propaganda statements, the policy in some Middle Eastern countries. Tendencies to prevent the more rapid penetration of measures of economic advancement into various local areas by the dominant groups in the class structure there are also not uncommon. As the society of an area remains relatively undisturbed owing to the failure to introduce new techniques, new educational facilities, and new contacts with the outside, the dominant position of its ruling local élite is relatively least threatened.

IV

In short, one of the most characteristic aspects of a pre-industrial stratification system is the existence of a sharp polarity of social strata with an extremely steep pyramid of social ranking, a general gap between the élite and the large masses, and a general disregard of economic performance as an important status-conferring variable. These features, to which must be added the almost exclusive predominance of ascriptive norms in assigning social, economic, and political roles, shows that the social structures of pre-industrial societies are in full contrast with those in the more advanced countries. There the middle class has attained a most important, if not a decisive role; the social pyramid though still too steep for some, is much more gently inclined than in pre-industrial societies; one of the major status-providing variables, if not the most important, is economic performance and the level of income earned; and economic, but also many social and political roles are assigned on the basis of achievement.

In the face of this distinction one of the main questions that may be raised is that of discovering the sequence of change of these variables which will facilitate the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial stratification system without requiring a complete disruption of the society undergoing this change. One way of coming closer to an answer to this question is to identify the one or two most strategic variables, the transfor-
mation of which would be principally responsible for a change in the stratification systems from a pre-industrial to a more highly industrialized, economically developed society. I believe that the two most important variables (or rather, contrasts between them) are those mentioned earlier: the ascription-achievement dichotomy and the diffusion-specificity dichotomy. Sufficient evidence to confirm this belief is not yet available, but might be provided by further study. The only support for my belief in the strategic significance of these two dichotomies rests on general reasoning.

The transition from a diffuse to a specific description of economic and social roles is not difficult to understand. As the economy develops, as productivity grows, specialization in economic roles becomes increasingly important and eventually imperative. But specialization in economic roles leads to greater complexity of social structures in the adaptive sector, and hence in the increasing isolation or full separation of economic behaviour from that in other fields of social action. This separation, in turn, leads to greater specificity emerging gradually in all sectors of social action. This means, however, that the number of steps in a stratification system, and the steepness between them, can be modified, since the number and variability of combinations of factors determining the layers or levels of stratification become very much greater in a social system in which roles in the various sectors of action are determined by specific rather than by diffuse norms.

A concrete example may make this clearer. In a simple folk-like society, all or almost all behaviour has meaning in all the sectors of social action, i.e., a person engaging, say, in planting food believes that he is not merely engaging in productive activity, but also that he does something to maintain his role as a member of a kinship group, to obey the commands of a religious belief, to meet certain goals needed for the preservation of the society of which he feels himself to be a member. These actions are therefore highly diffuse, and the roles assigned to individuals, if consciously assigned at all, also tend to be highly diffuse. But such a social system, if there exists a principle of social stratification at all, has only a very limited number of degrees of freedom, and hence only very few, generally highly stable patterns of stratification are possible. The society in which behaviour in any sector of the system is highly specific has many more forms of stratification, and above all, many relatively rapid variations in a given stratification system become not only possible, but may often actually take place. Here the causal nexus between economic change and change in social stratification is one in which the former tends to influence the latter. Economic change implies that productivity increases. Since this increase is normally contingent upon greater specialization of economic roles, a greater degree of specificity takes place first in the economy, and ultimately finds its

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1. I have discussed these two dichotomies on a more general, but less penetrating level in an essay written several years ago. See my paper, 'Social Structure and Economic Growth', which appeared first in Economia Internazionale, Vol. 6, 1953, and was reprinted in my Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960, pp. 23-52, especially pp. 30-5.
reflection in other sectors of social action. Thus economic growth and the introduction of new forms of production tend to affect the stratification system of a society.

The opposite causal nexus appears to hold in the case of the ascription-achievement dichotomy. The most important impact of this difference upon stratification is that, in the case of predominance of ascription, social mobility is essentially possible not for individuals but only for groups, whereas, in the case of achievement-orientation in the assignment of roles, the distinctions and differences that exist between groups may remain unchanged, even though individuals who start as members of one of these groups may move through portions of the stratification system and end up as members of other groups. In other words, social mobility is not possible except through movement of one of the groups constituting the pattern of stratification. Perhaps one of the most convincing examples is provided by the caste system of India and social mobility within this system. As Irawati Karve has maintained, a caste (i.e., a jati) is an endogamous social group, normally residing in a given region, and exercising a traditional behaviour pattern, including usually some specialization in one or a limited number of related productive roles. Membership in a caste is ascriptive, and since it determines much more than occupational specialization, any person who belongs to a given jati is usually readily recognizable in the village or other small community in which he lives. Hence social mobility by the individual is virtually impossible within the region in which his jati is resident, and often even in other parts of the country. Yet as the economy changes, various of the externally determined functions of many jatis undergo change. Some occupations become more, and others less remunerative, and this causes members of different jatis to engage in different forms of behaviour. Though behaviour, as pointed out earlier, is partially traditionally determined in situations of sizeable, relatively rapid change, behaviour patterns may and do become altered. With these changes in income, types of consumption, religious attitudes, and other forms of socially relevant variables, mobility in the social stratification system becomes attractive for quite a few groups and, to the extent to which it becomes possible, it affects the group as a whole rather than any individual in it.

It is quite clear that in such cases as the caste system or other social systems dependent on ascription as a factor determining social roles, mobility is more difficult than in a system in which mobility of an individual rather than of an ascriptively defined group is the rule. In a social system in which rigid structures exist, group mobility is especially difficult and, as

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1. I. Karve, 'The Hindu Society: A New Interpretation'. Part I (mimeographed version of a paper presented in 1959 at the University of California at Berkeley). Mrs. Karve differs in her interpretation of the caste system from that customarily presented, e.g. by J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India*, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1946. Whereas Hutton and others argue that new jatis develop due to the 'fissiparous tendencies in Indian castes', Mrs. Karve thinks that new castes develop through the 'process of continuous accretion'. I believe that for the purposes of this essay this distinction in the interpretation of why and how new jatis arise is of secondary importance.
pointed out earlier, each jati or similar group has ramifications in many sectors of social action. Hence, changes in stratification in societies with a predominance of ascriptive norms of allocating social and economic roles are much slower and less widespread than in societies in which achievement-oriented norms prevail. But considering the functional requisites of a society with expanding and growing economic activities, mobility in the social stratification system becomes imperative. The new requisites of an expanding economic system make necessary the formation of new social structures, and their formation is delayed or made more difficult by the prevalence of ascription as a norm in assigning economic and other roles. Finally, we may be sure that an ascription system tends to rely on different sanctions than a system based on achievement.

Thus economic development relies upon gradual replacement of the principle of ascription by the principle of achievement in the realm of role allocation. This does not mean that ascription must disappear entirely, or that achievement must be the sole principle of assigning all roles at all stages of a person's career. In actual situations some mixture between ascriptive and achievement-oriented principles of role assignment will be developed. For example, in Japan, ascriptive norms are still considerably more powerful than in most Western European countries and they are stronger in Western Europe than in the United States. Yet Japan and also the countries of Western Europe have successfully mastered the transition to a rapidly growing economy. On the other hand, in most Asian and African societies ascription is still too strong to permit the loosening of stratification systems sufficiently to allow genuine rapid economic expansion. This is a strategic area in the realm of social relations which requires relatively rapid and profound modification.

It is not easy to indicate what factors in a social system are likely to bring about this change from ascription to achievement most rapidly and smoothly. Such changes as secularization, the imposition of non-indigenous values especially in the productive sector, the development of new occupational roles, the migration of persons out of their highly culture-bound villages to the culturally more diversified cities, and other related changes may be some of the developments which make possible the decline of ascription and its replacement by achievement principles in the realm of role assignment. But it is impossible to offer a generally valid solution of this problem, since it depends upon the great variations in underlying cultural norms and existing arrangements in different social systems. It may be sufficient if those who have responsibility for social policies are aware of the significance of this variable and attempt to take it into account whenever possible.

In conclusion it may be useful to note that the points raised here have in many instances been presented in a sharper form than would have been

necessary had the attempt been made to present primarily descriptive, rather than analytical, matters on social stratification. It is for the same reason that some differences, which by sheer observation may sometimes appear as relatively mild variations, have been presented as sharp contrasts often tied to underlying principles. The reason for this procedure is that my intention in presenting the points in this paper was to reduce the empirical material to as few underlying variables as possible, and to select, above all, those variables which have wider applicability than the analysis of stratification by itself. A great task, scarcely attempted here, is to test the propositions I have presented by reference to the manifold and varied concrete economic situations, cultures, and societies which modern scholars are studying so assiduously.

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Social flexibility, social discipline and economic growth

Hla. Myint

For many underdeveloped countries, the main problem of economic development is not so much the acceleration of investment in material capital for the ‘take-off’ as the building of the runway for a future take-off. But discussions of ‘pre-investment’ in human capital for this purpose are vague and unsatisfactory. In particular, it is not clear whether investment in education is to supply the ‘missing components’ of skills within a given framework or to supply a dynamic catalyst which will radically change the framework itself. These two different concepts of education illustrate the conflicting requirements of social discipline and social flexibility as a prerequisite of economic growth.

I

There are wide variations in the general level of social and economic development, not only between different underdeveloped countries but also within each underdeveloped country. The anthropologists have concentrated on one end of the scale and have mainly concerned themselves with the countries at the earlier stages of development or with the economically backward sectors within these countries. The economists, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the opposite end of the scale and have mainly concerned themselves with underdeveloped countries at the later stages of development or with the more advanced sectors within these countries. Unfortunately, some of the more important and interesting problems of development arise within the wide no-man’s-land of the intermediate stages of development, those which have passed beyond the purview of the anthropologists but have not come squarely into the purview of the economists.

The economist’s view of the no-man’s-land can be best illustrated in terms of Professor Rostow’s theory of the ‘take-off’ into self-sustained economic growth. Most underdeveloped countries aspire to ‘take off’ in the manner described by Professor Rostow, but only a few are ready for the process in the sense that they are anywhere near fulfilling all three of the related conditions he has laid down for a successful take-off. These are: ‘(a) a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 5 per cent or less
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to over 10 per cent of national income (or net national product); (b) the
development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors, with a
high rate of growth; (c) the existence or quick emergence of a political,
social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion
in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-
off and gives to growth an ongoing character.1

The underdeveloped countries trying to accelerate their economic
growth generally turn their attention to Professor Rostow's conditions (a)
and (b). They tend to ignore the elusive condition (c) which turns out
to be the most important of the three in the sense that unless it is fulfilled
to some degree it is not possible to keep the two other conditions fulfilled
for long. Thus, according to the historical instances given by Professor
Rostow of the countries which have successfully taken off in the past,
condition (a) means not merely raising the rate of capital formation above
10 per cent of the national income as a once-for-all effort, but keeping the
economy at this high level of capital formation for at least two or three
decades before it can hope to attain a self-sustaining momentum of growth.
This requires a capacity not only to mobilize savings but also to ‘absorb’
capital and invest it productively to yield a high enough rate of return to
sustain the continuous process of a high rate of reinvestment, which is
beyond the present capabilities of the institutional and organizational
framework of many underdeveloped countries. Similarly, condition (b)
does not merely mean setting up a few factories which are indifferently run
and managed and have to be maintained by heavy subsidy or protection
from the government. It requires the development of the ‘primary growth
sectors’, based on innovations, new methods of production, discoveries of
new resources and new ways of exploiting existing resources which will
serve as the ‘leading sectors’ to the rest of the economy. Here again the
important role of the institutional framework both in stimulating these vital
points of growth and in transmitting their effects to the rest of the econ-
omy is fairly obvious.

The truth of the matter is that although economic writings on the
underdeveloped countries are full of proposals to launch them into self-
sustained growth, only a few of these countries are ready for it. Many of
them are handicapped by the lack of an effective institutional framework
required for the process. To expand Professor Rostow's metaphor: a few of
the underdeveloped countries, ready for the take-off, are already taxiing
along the runway. For them the final spurt of speed in investment and
general economic activity, if properly carried out and sustained, might
conceivably enable them to become airborne. But many other underde-
veloped countries have not yet got to this stage; they are still in the process
of building their runways. Now, whether we are talking about aeroplanes
or developing economies, we should expect the problems of getting airborne

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to be very different from the problems of building the runway. But unfortunately Professor Rostow does not give us very much help about the second type of problem. He has merely stated that before the underdeveloped countries are ready for the final take-off they have to pass through a long 'pre-take-off' period, which in the case of the Western countries, for instance, took about a century or more. Beyond this, we are left to our own devices to try to identify the various sub-stages of the pre-take-off period at which many of the underdeveloped countries seem to be situated at the present moment, and to try to assess how far economic policies designed to assist the take-off at a later stage of development are relevant for the problems of building the runway at the earlier stages of development.

This tendency to neglect the earlier pre-take-off stages of the underdeveloped countries is of course not peculiar to Professor Rostow but is fairly widespread among economists. We have chosen his theory as our example because it is well known and also because it is explicitly stated in terms of stages of development, thus clearly revealing the gap in our knowledge about the earlier stages of economic development represented by the no-man's-land between anthropology and economics.

From the economist's side of the border, however, two distinct lines of approach have been made to explore the no-man's-land. The first consists in the various studies of the process of the spread of the money economy in the markets for commodities and for factors of production, notably labour, breaking down the self-sufficiency of the subsistence economies of the traditional societies. In this approach, the problem of stimulating economic development is looked upon mainly in terms of the growth of free market institutions and the growth of competitive economic individualism, breaking down the traditional communalism of the village, the tribe or the extended family. The general direction of development is conceived in terms of greater flexibility and adaptability of the social and economic framework, stimulating and responding to further changes. The second line of approach consists in extending the ideas of investment and capital formation originally used in relation to material capital, to 'social and human capital'. In this approach, the problem of economic growth is looked upon mainly in terms of increasing the rate of investment, not only in improving the physical infrastructure such as transport and communications and public utilities, but also in improving what may be called the 'social infrastructure', notably in the level of education, research, technical skills and health. In order to increase the rate of investment, an increasing amount of resources has to be mobilized, and in order effectively to carry out this programme of investment both in material and human capital, the social and institutional framework must be capable of enforcing some degree of consistency and coherence both in the mobilization and in the allocation of resources. Thus the general direction of development is conceived in terms of a greater degree of social discipline and authority to push through the desired pattern of economic planning. We are faced then with the conflicting requirements of social
flexibility and social discipline, a conflict which seems particularly sharp at the earlier, pre-take-off stages of development.

II

Since the broad patterns of the growth of the money economy in the under-developed countries are familiar, we shall concentrate on the second line of approach based on investment in social and human capital. This idea has proved attractive to many people, both economists and non-economists, and there have been attempts to consider how to strike a correct balance between investment in material capital and investment in human capital, between economic development and social development. Unfortunately, however, as currently stated this idea remains rather vague, based upon an analogy which has not been systematically drawn. Thus, as a possible subject for discussion among social scientists of different disciplines, we may begin by drawing attention to some of the conceptual problems as they appear to an economist.

To begin with, even with respect to material capital, there is no simple mechanical relationship between the amount of resources invested and the value of the capital formation which results from it. Although national income statistics automatically equate the two, it can readily be seen that, say, an amount of one million pounds of savings invested may result in capital goods which may be worth many times more or many times less than one million pounds, depending on how and where it is invested and how far the resultant capital goods serve the future productive requirements of the country, and how far people value the products which these capital goods can help to produce. In the extreme case, it has not been unknown that large sums of money have been so wrongly invested as to serve no useful purpose so that the value of capital formation resulting from them is zero. The problems of trying to establish a causal quantitative relation between the expenditure on resources invested and the value of capital formation which results from it are multiplied many times when we move from material capital to human capital. To start with the most general difficulty: in dealing with material capital the economists have a reasonably clear idea of what they mean by the productive structure and how an additional piece of material capital may contribute to it, either by changing and improving its efficiency or by fitting into an identifiable gap. But no such established conceptual framework exists when we move to human capital. By analogy, we must suppose that the value of a given investment in human capital will depend on its contribution to the ‘social infrastructure’, either by improving and changing this infrastructure or by fitting into a gap in it. But what is this ‘social infrastructure’ and in what direction do we wish to change and improve it?

At this point the economist will look askance at the social scientists from other disciplines, many of whom have been using the fashionable
concept of 'social and human capital' as much as some of the economists. If hard pressed to define the 'social infrastructure' further, the economist can only carry the analogy one or two stages further. He would suppose that in the same way as there is an intimate connexion between the material production structure of a country and its natural resources, there would be a similar connexion between the social infrastructure and the social conditions and characteristics of a country. Material production structure represents the adaptation and improvement of natural resources through investment in material capital. Some investment would exploit the special advantages of these natural resources and other investment would make up for the deficiencies in these natural resources. He would then have to ask the other social scientists whether this analogy is meaningful when extended to cover the relationship between the social infrastructure and the social conditions of a country.

Carrying the analogy a stage further, the economist would point out that the consequences of a wrong choice of investment project may be very different between material capital and human capital. Frequently, a wrong investment in material capital and attempts to salvage it have a distorting effect on the whole production structure. For instance, a wrongly sited railway system or a factory which is a 'show piece' but uneconomic may be maintained by government subsidy, grants of exclusive monopolistic privileges or protection against foreign competitors. But as a last resort a wrong investment in material capital can be scrapped when it proves too expensive to salvage. Wrong choice of investment in human capital will presumably have similar distorting effects on the social infrastructure, but wrong pieces of human capital cannot be scrapped; they tend to be self-perpetuating and have the habit not merely of distorting but actually of disrupting the social infrastructure. For instance, the growing problem of graduate unemployment in Asian countries, owing to the production of too much of the wrong type of 'human capital' is a very clear illustration of this danger.¹

In this connexion, it may be noted that for the economist the material production structure of a country is a different thing from the economic institutions which mobilize resources and feed them into the production structure. But when we come to the concept of social infrastructure, the distinction between these two different functions is blurred. As currently used, the idea of social infrastructure seems both to serve as the social equivalent of the production structure which absorbs resources and also to have the more active function of the social and institutional framework which mobilizes and allocates resources. This makes assessment of the productivity of investment in human capital doubly difficult. For instance, increased educational opportunities, say through films, radio and other mass media, may widen the horizons of the people and stimulate the

¹ H. Myint, 'The Universities of South-East Asia and Economic Development', Pacific Affairs, Summer 1962.
growth of new wants (through demonstration effects) and new ideas. This may possibly increase the long-run productivity of the people and thus may be regarded as an improvement in the social infrastructure in the first sense. But on the other hand, the effect of these new educational opportunities may also weaken and disrupt the ability of existing social values and social hierarchies to mobilize resources and thus undermine the social infrastructure in the second sense.

III

We started by saying that the conflicting requirements of social flexibility and social discipline in promoting economic development at the earlier, pre-take-off stages of development can be illustrated by two approaches: the first in terms of the growth of the money economy, and the second in terms of increasing investment in social and human capital. It now appears that this conflict is latent even if we concentrate on the second approach only, although to some extent it is hidden by the vagueness in the concept of the 'social infrastructure'. Certain changes which might widen the educational horizon of a people, and thus increase their longer-run productivity, might at the same time undermine the capacity of the social and institutional framework to mobilize resources for the increase of capital formation, both human and material.

This conflict may be further illustrated by human investment in higher education for economic development where the greatest long-run increases in productivity have been frequently claimed. When people make this claim, they have two distinct ideas at the back of their minds. First, they are thinking of the dynamic effects of higher education in stimulating new discoveries and innovations and in adopting new methods of production. This implies a sort of intellectual yeast which will ferment and change the whole of the production structure and presumably the social infrastructure with it. Here the productivity of investment in human capital is conceived in terms of greater flexibility and adaptability of the social and institutional framework, which will create favourable conditions both in stimulating changes and for receptiveness and adaptability to these changes. Secondly, they are also thinking of shortages of skilled people of particular types who are needed as 'missing components' to be fitted into a desired pattern of economic development. Of course, some flexibility has to be allowed even in the most rigid and comprehensive type of planning. But it is fair to say that the basic reasons for claiming high productivity as a result of investment in education are different in these two types of argument. In popular terms, the first type of argument is thinking in terms of creating square pegs to fit into round holes with the hope that the pattern of holes will be stretched and changed into more productive directions. The second type of argument is thinking in terms of trying to create round pegs to fit into round holes, as though fitting the missing pieces into a jigsaw puzzle within the framework
of a given and fixed pattern of production and planning requirements.

These conflicting considerations become bewildering when we look closely at the skilled manpower problems of any newly independent countries. First, there is an obvious need to fill up the gaps left in the civil service, and those left in all sectors of the economy by departing foreign personnel. The missing components have to be produced to maintain the old economic and administrative structure. But at the same time there is a great desire to change very quickly ‘the old colonial structure’, not only politically but also economically and socially. Logically, one might perhaps expect a great upsurge of a liberal educational policy encouraging individualism, enterprise and innovations to break down the rigidities both of the traditional and of the colonial systems. But given the prevailing intellectual view that such quick change can be forced through only by economic planning, the prevailing bias is against both economic liberalism and ‘liberal education’ in favour of detailed skilled manpower planning integrated with programmes of technical education which ideally should specify the exact type of training and the exact number of trainees. Thus we get back to the problem of manufacturing the ‘missing components’ for the jigsaw puzzle, the only trouble being that the old puzzle has been torn down and the new puzzle has not been constructed.

If the newly independent countries are vague and ambivalent about the general direction in which they wish to change their ‘social infrastructure’, the social forces and the social and institutional framework which they can use to carry out these changes are weak and diffused and in varying stages of disintegration. On the economic side, it is well known that the growth of the money economy, while imparting flexibility, has undermined the coherence of the traditional societies. On the political side, even indirect rule through indigenous authorities has frequently had the same effect. With the new countries which have gone through an intense phase of nationalistic revolt against colonialism, this process itself has further undermined the framework of social authority and discipline. Thus the difficulties which new countries have in trying to implement their plans is not only due to the lack of technical skills and know-how, but also to a disintegration, if not a complete breakdown, of cohesive social values which contribute to social discipline.

The value of a cohesive force of social discipline in promoting economic development is now becoming increasingly recognized. The classical illustration of this is perhaps the role of the Japanese ‘feudal discipline’ which enabled Japan’s ruling classes to carry out a fairly ruthless but effective process of economic development behind a protective shell against disruptive outside influences. It would be an interesting task to find out how far the surviving traditional social institutions in a continent like Africa are capable of serving this role in promoting economic development both at the local or tribal level, such as in co-operative societies and community development schemes, and for larger units which can take advantage of the economies of scale and complementary projects. One obvious difficulty
about using the traditional social forces such as 'feudalism' or the caste system is the prevailing political idea of equality which raises the well known conflict between economic equality and economic growth, not only with respect to income distribution but also with respect to the distribution of economic activities and economic and social roles. To illustrate from our example of investment in education: many people, even when they stress the importance of investment in human capital, look upon the resources to be invested mainly as sums of money or material resources, such as college buildings, laboratories, libraries, hospitals, etc. But as every university teacher knows, the really scarce resource is the 'human input': teachers of suitable ability and qualifications, the supply of whom cannot be expanded quickly in the short run, perhaps not dramatically even in the longer run. On the other hand, the production of further such high-quality human capital requires some restriction of entry to universities and training colleges so that those who are admitted get proper intensive training. But this conflicts with the prevailing ideals of new countries to provide university education for almost everyone, and few of the countries have been able to exercise the necessary social and political discipline to restrict numbers in this really vital process of supplying further human capital goods of suitable quality. That is to say, although most people talk about increasing 'investment in education', few of them are prepared to 'tighten their belts' to save the scarce teaching capacity for the training of further human capital to the minimum degree of 'capital intensity' necessary to make this process a success.¹

IV

Our analysis in this paper is admittedly brief and impressionistic, but it is hoped that it has been sufficient for the purpose of establishing two propositions.

The first and narrower proposition is that there are a number of conceptual problems in speaking about investment in 'social and human capital' which those who use this fashionable approach have not adequately explored. It would be nice if we could say that in a given situation the rate of return on investment, say in technical education, is 20 per cent and that since it is higher than the rate of return on investment in transport and communications, say 15 per cent, a larger proportion of investible funds should be transferred to the former from the latter to obtain a more correct balance between social and economic development. But we are nowhere near this blissful state of quantification. In fact in our present imperfect stage of knowledge, to try to make premature and somewhat pseudo-quantitative statements may distract attention from the important and complex qualitative problems about the relationship between economic

¹ H. Myint, op. cit.
growth and the social and economic framework in the countries at the earlier pre-take-off stages of general social and economic development. We have suggested that one convenient way of sorting out these qualitative problems is the conflicting requirements of social flexibility and social discipline which seem to have relevance for a large number of social situations at different stages of economic development.

The second and broader proposition is the existence of the wide no-man's-land of intermediate stages of social and economic development, of societies in transition, which seem to have passed the purview of conventionally-minded anthropologists and have not come within the purview of conventionally-minded economists even when they are concerned with the underdeveloped countries. We have suggested that some of the interesting and important problems of promoting economic development at this pre-take-off period, notably the problems of building the runway as distinct from the problems of the take-off, fall within this no-man's-land which needs to be jointly explored by economists and other social scientists. No doubt there are laggards on both sides of the borderland. Some economists still think in terms of bulldozing away the traditional social institutions of the underdeveloped countries as so many outmoded obstacles to development, and of substituting in their place their own special brand of mechanistic Utopia either in terms of atomistic perfect competition or completely integrated economic planning. Some anthropologists still think in terms of retreating further and further away from the borders of social and economic change so that they may study the dwindling areas of unspoilt primitive cultures intact. But the social reality facing the majority of the underdeveloped countries in a state of transition, with all its complex and conflicting drives, is somewhat more challenging and interesting than is suggested by the stereotype models of the economists and the anthropologists.

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Traditional and modern types of leadership and economic development among the Fijians

R. R. Nayacakalou

This article deals with a colonial type of situation where attempts at economic advancement have taken place within a wider institutional framework designed to preserve the traditional social order as a basis for administrative control. The traditional chiefs, who enjoy advantages under this arrangement, have a vested interest in its continuation. But the arrangement involves a bureaucratic direction which is not conducive to sustained individual effort. The rise of an educated middle class has drawn attention to the feasibility and desirability of long-needed change.

The British Crown Colony of Fiji is currently faced with economic problems of considerable urgency. The rapidly increasing population is exerting pressure on the available resources. The country is primarily agricultural, and must depend on what its 7,000 square miles of land can produce. The native Fijians own some 83 per cent of this land, and although a large proportion of it is not at present cultivable, there is a call upon them to use what is usable in the interests of the country as a whole. This call is given a sense of urgency because of the internal political situation. The Indian component of the population, originally imported to work the cane plantations under an indenture scheme between 1879 and 1916, now outnumbers the Fijian and is increasing faster. The Indians are claiming a right to a greater share of the land as well as of political representation on the legislature. They produce about 95 per cent of the sugar cane grown, and sugar accounts for up to a half of the colony's exports. The other major items of export are gold, and copra and other coconut products in the pro-

1. The material for this paper was gathered in a field study of leadership in Fiji, financed by a grant from the Colonial Social Science Research Council in London. The paper was written while I was studying for a doctorate in the University of London under an Emslie Horniman Scholarship from the Royal Anthropological Institute. Additional grants were also given by the Government of Fiji. For this financial support I am deeply indebted to these sources. I am also indebted to Professors Raymond Firth and B. S. Yamey for their criticisms of an earlier draft of the paper. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Government of Fiji nor of any of the other supporting institutions, and responsibility for them remains entirely mine.
duction of which the Fijians play a major role. Tourism is rapidly developing as another major source of overseas exchange, but basically the country has to depend a great deal on other agricultural products. Here the Fijians must play a greater role. It is in the drive to diversify and expand production in these other lines that they are called upon to increase their economic activity. As a result they are faced with problems of reorganization to cope with the new demand. In this reorganization leaders are needed not only to direct the new endeavours, but also (perhaps more important) to direct the changes necessary to achieve the new goals.

The Fijians, who number more than 171,000 in a total population of over 410,000, live mainly in small village communities averaging about 150 persons, scattered over about 100 of the 320 islands in the colony. Their main livelihood is secured by subsistence shifting cultivation combined with fishing and some hunting and gathering. Large numbers also participate in some form of cash crop production, and many are moving to the developing urban centres in search of work. At the 1956 census 25 per cent of them were described as living outside their own provinces where they are registered as landowners, so that perhaps 80 per cent of them are still living under village conditions.

Traditionally the Fijian village economy was more or less self-sufficient, except for a little barter involving articles such as earthenware pots, tapa cloth, salt, mats and canoes, the production of which was restricted to certain areas where the requisite raw materials were more easily obtained. There was some specialization of a professional character, such as by carpenters and fishermen, whose services were rewarded in special ways. As there was no money, exchange was of limited scope. Accumulation of wealth, too, was limited because ‘wealth’ consisted mainly of non-durable goods such as mats and tapa cloth which, in any case, depended for their value upon being passed on in expression of established social relations. Indeed, such relations formed a kind of store of assistance upon which one could draw in times of need. In a sense, they can be regarded as representing the ‘liquidity’ on which the economy operated; i.e., in the absence of money, liquidity was stored in the form of readily convertible social relationships which enabled one to draw on the assistance of relatives in times of need. The economic system had, therefore, to depend to a very great extent on the social relationships of the people which, at the same time, formed the basis for organizing their activities in other spheres of life. The economic process was part and parcel of the whole social process; economic transactions took place to express and validate relationships existing on other grounds.

One major problem for modern economic development is, therefore, to extricate the economic process from these social relationships and establish it on new foundations; but the wider institutional framework under which Fijian endeavours are directed—itsel based on a policy of preserving the traditional order—hardly conduces to this end.

Fijian society is organized for the most part on patrilineal principles.
In its fullest expressions the system is one of patrilineal clans which, in a great many instances, are fragmented with their branches living in different villages. The usual picture is that the village comprises a number of major divisions (perhaps three or four), each of them comprising a similar number of minor divisions. The major divisions may be part of the same clan or of different clans. Similarly for the minor divisions. In each case, however, the minor division, at least, will comprise members who are closely related in the male line. In the contexts of village life, they form units of assessment in village affairs, whether for the entertainment of visitors, or for community work. They also own land in common. While the members have equal rights to the use of the land for cultivation or for the collection of wild produce, none of them has a right to dispose of it in any way, without consulting the other members. Usually these social units will have special ritual and/or ceremonial functions in the life of the village, and much of their significance in the village organization will result from their position in this regard. In the process of village life, therefore, these major and minor divisions of the village are consistently co-operating social groups whose identity is strongly emphasized because of their special position in the organization of the village as a whole.

This is the basic framework on which the structure of Fijian society and, therefore, the structure of traditional Fijian leadership, are built. From it one can follow its elaborations on two distinct planes. On the level of kinship, there are ties radiating out from the local kin-groups of the village, embracing all other kin-groups from which women have come who have married into it, or into which women have married from it. On a territorial plane, villages are linked with one another in wider associations known as vanua. These may be based on kinship affinity between the dominant clans in the different villages, or they may have arisen as a matter of political expediency. Vanua may again combine to form the political units known as matanitu, which have been rendered ‘States’, and of which there were about eight in the whole of Fiji during the earlier part of the nineteenth century.

These groupings—from the smallest local kin-groups of the village to the widest political units—are the units of co-operation in the major activities of life, social, economic and political. They are also the units in terms of which the traditional system of leadership is organized.

The most widely acknowledged principle for the selection of leaders is seniority of descent in the male line. A man who has vacated the position of leader of a minor division of the village, or of a major division, or even of the whole village, is supposed to be succeeded by his eldest son, failing whom his next eldest son should succeed, and so on down to the youngest son, after whom the position ought to revert to the eldest male heir of the eldest son. This is the officially accepted position in regard to at least the higher levels of leadership. But it does not appear to explain the system in full. At the higher levels, there are often intense rivalries between the members of the leading clan or lineage. Different candidates may be
supported by different factions, and the followers may be deeply divided. At the level of the vanua, there are usually elaborate ceremonies by which only one candidate comes to be ritually bestowed with the office of head of the vanua. Only then can the disagreements be ironed out. In such circumstances, it is clear that seniority of descent alone is inadequate to determine who shall be leader. As long as the candidate belongs to the lineage of the last holder of office, it is open to him to try to secure the office for himself, provided he has personal qualities which his supporters consider to be worth the trouble of fighting for. There are, in addition to seniority of descent, also considerations of personal ability and of the political ability of supporters to achieve dominance for their favoured candidate.

It is at the level of the vanua that the institution of chieftainship really begins to emerge clearly. The head of the vanua occupies a named office, and on accession to it is given a title usually beginning with Tui (‘king’) followed by the name of the vanua. He may be addressed respectfully by his title, or by his personal name which, in most cases, is likely to be preceded by the title Ratu which is accorded to chiefs only. His position is hedged about with marks of respect. People cower in his presence; they address him in the second person plural; his person and his belongings are taboo to touch; he presides at kava ceremonies and is served the first bowl of every round as a symbol of his precedence (this is one of the most jealously guarded privileges of Fijian chieftainship). He has a matanivanua who acts as his spokesman in ceremonial and other contexts, but in regard to his people he is the recognized leader—the supreme decision-maker and policy-maker who may also act as their representative and spokesman in their relations with other political units. He may be entitled to call on the labour of all his people for the building of his house or the planting of his gardens; and he may have special rights to call on the specialist services of master fishermen or of carpenters within his domains. Such are the responsibilities and rewards of chieftainship.

Chiefs are graded in hierarchical order in exactly the same way as the entire society is. At the village level the leading member of the dominant lineage or clan will be regarded as the traditional leader or village chief. If his village is the dominant village in a vanua, he may also hold the title of chief of the vanua. If his vanua is the dominant vanua in the matanitu, he will be the head of the matanitu also. Thus there is a hierarchy of higher and higher chiefs corresponding to more and more inclusive levels of political segmentation. The society is fairly closely-knit under this arrangement. The hierarchical order of groups ensures the effective subordination of the lesser groups to the larger groups which include them; this is the strength of the chiefs who wield power and authority at the various levels. When Fiji was ceded to Great Britain, therefore, it was only the highest chiefs who assembled at Levuka in 1874 to sign the Deed of Cession by which they gave their country unconditionally to be ruled by Britain. This is one of the most dramatic demonstrations of their authority.

One of the major undertakings of the British administration of Fiji was
that the Fijians would be governed justly and in accordance with their ancient customs and traditions. A system of native administration was instituted and with it were laid the foundations for the preservation of the Fijian social order. The colony was divided into provinces, and these into districts, and each was placed under the administrative charge of an official styled Roko in the case of the province, Buli in the case of the district, below whom were the village headmen. The divisions approximated fairly closely to the traditional political units, but they were dictated by different considerations and had therefore to be arbitrary at some points. With standardization under a single governmental machinery, the traditional configurations of differential political power and relative influence or dominance largely disappeared. But the scheme had the effect of preserving the identity of the different levels of groupings, from the province down to the village. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the traditional chiefs of the various units were appointed officials in charge, although this did not apply to the village where the headman was appointed by the Buli in consultation with the elders of the village concerned. The officials were given new functions, new authority and new sanctions, and they received a salary. Thus the chief’s position as leader among his people to whom he was responsible was turned into a bureaucratic role with attendant conflicts and confusions. A new code of laws (now known as the Fijian Regulations) was enacted, based on Fijian custom and binding on Fijians only. They defined the authority of the native officials and were administered by Fijian courts presided over by Fijian magistrates. There was also a series of councils from the village to the province to assist the official in charge in the formulation of local policy as well as in determining local public opinion. At the village level such a council embodied all the adult males of the village. At the higher levels it depended upon representation from the lower councils. From the Provincial Council, representatives were sent to the Council of Chiefs which, today, meets biennially to advise the Governor on all matters affecting Fijians including the selection of their representatives at the Legislative Council.¹

This is the wider institutional framework within which Fijian endeavours for economic advancement have operated. The original pledge given to the Fijian chiefs that Britain would rule the country in accordance with Fijian customs and traditions has, over the years, come to be interpreted to mean that the aim must be to preserve the Fijian social order and Fijian culture. In the reorganization of 1944, the policy was clearly accepted that any move to break up the village must be resisted, the basic philosophy being that Fijian social, political and economic development can and must

¹. The procedure formerly used was for the Council of Chiefs to select ten Fijians by secret ballot, and for the Governor to nominate five of these (usually the first five) as representatives of the Fijian people at the Legislative Council. This arrangement has now been changed. The Fijian representation on the Legislative Council has been increased from five to six members (as was also done in the case of Europeans and Indians); four of these are popularly elected, while the remaining two continue to be elected by the Council of Chiefs. The Fijians had their first popular elections in April, 1963.
take place within the framework of traditional culture. Economic policies were therefore designed with this end in view. The communal holding of land—one of the backbones of the policy—had early been threatened by a growing population, particularly the Indian population which now exceeds the Fijian by more than 35,000. To take account of this, a Native Land Trust Board was set up in 1940 to administer Fijian lands in the interests of Fijians. On recommendations made to it by the Native Lands Commission (a government-appointed body), it set aside portions of Fijian communally-owned land to be reserved for the exclusive use of the Fijian owners, and made the remainder available for leasing from the owning groups. In this way the identity of the land-owning units was preserved through their community of interest in the land.

The movement sponsored by the Department of Agriculture to encourage Fijians to move out of the village as ‘independent farmers’ on their own or other people’s land was for many years opposed by the Fijian Administration, mainly because it was seen as a threat to the established order. On the other hand, the co-operative movement, also sponsored by the Department of Agriculture, was welcomed and hailed as the modern counterpart of the traditional Fijian ‘communal’ organization. But in its later stages, conflicts of authority and ideology appeared between the societies and the traditional leaders, and sometimes with officials of the Fijian Administration also. It is now clear that the two forms of co-operative activity are guided by quite different principles.

The hope was, of course, that the Fijians would be able to expand production within the framework of the village social system. But apart from exhorting them to use their land, there was, for a considerable time, little more the Fijian Administration could do in the way of economic development, for which it had neither the money nor the technical know-how. The money it collected in taxes\(^1\) was almost fully committed to running the machine and providing some assistance in education and medical welfare. Occasionally it was ordered that the Fijians should plant so much of their crops by a certain date. It fell on the *Buli* to check this and to prosecute defaulters. This procedure met with little success and was strengthened by being elevated to a Programmes of Work policy. Programmes of Work were drawn up in the village and taken to the District Council for approval, thus acquiring the force of law. Such a programme would lay down what the village must do week by week for six months ahead at a time—the number of food crops to be planted, of the houses to be built in the village, and so on. After approval by the District Council, it was presumably assumed that the ‘communal spirit’ of the Fijians would unite them under their village leaders in carrying out the programme. But of course there were always unforeseen contingencies of a private or social

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1. The Fijian Regulations impose a levy known as a Provincial Rate on all male Fijians between the ages of 18 and 60 years who are registered landowners. The amount varies from one province to another, but on the average it is about five pounds a year, with a reduced rate for men with five or more dependents.
nature, and in many cases the programmes were never completed.

Another policy organized on the same principles concerned income from copra. After the Second World War copra prices soared on the world markets, and to ensure that the Fijians saved some of this money, a law was brought into effect requiring them to pay a cess at the rate of ten pounds on every ton of copra sold, into a fund to be supervised by a body created for the purpose and known as the Fijian Development Fund Board. Payments into the fund were credited to the name of the individual, village or other group selling the copra, until enough had accumulated in the account to enable the contributor to buy a capital item. For this purpose, housing in the villages came high on the priority list, and many a wood and iron house has been built in the villages in the main copra-producing areas from cess money. Professor Spate has rightly criticized this policy for the low priority given to capital equipment such as copra driers, but it was argued against this that the primary intention of the fund was to improve village housing, and the policy has continued.

Although the Fijian desire for 'freedom' from the requirements of the system has been growing, there has been little provision for its effective expression. The policies of the Fijian Administration receive support mainly because the whole machinery of public opinion formation—the system of councils from the village to the Council of Chiefs—is dominated by the influence of the chiefs who have a vested interest in preserving the traditional order. While commoners probably dominate the councils numerically, chiefs usually hold the key positions in the councils as well as in the official ranks of the Fijian Administration. It is also important to remember that the procedure of the councils is strongly traditionally-oriented. Each meeting is usually preceded by traditional kava ceremonies which invariably set the pattern for the whole of the proceedings. These ceremonies are the customary means for re-emphasizing the traditional relations of groups, their rights and obligations, the position of chiefs, and the importance to be attached to these relations in the deliberations. The chiefs and the commoners are at once put in their own elements, the former occupying seats in the high places given them by time-honoured tradition. What insolent commoner would, in these circumstances, dare question the traditional arrangements? And yet, it is opinions and policies formed in these circumstances which emerge in top circles as Fijian public opinion.

So far this article has dealt only with the most influential forms of Fijian leadership in public affairs; but there are others. It would appear that because of the apparent failure of the Fijian Administration policies to produce any really spectacular and sustained individual or village success in the economic sphere, some Fijians have been trying out other ideas and experimenting with other forms of organization and leadership. The 'independent farmer' to whom reference has been made suffered

setbacks in earlier years in the face of lack of official support; but in the last few years this approach to economic development has been recognized as valuable and is being encouraged by the Administration. The principle was sometimes applied to whole villages, apparently with noticeable success; but one of the most important limits to it has always been that not all, nor even the majority, of the villages in a district can be allowed to 'go independent' without disturbing the administrative arrangements in the district. The 'independent village', if that name may be applied, has had to depend to a considerable extent on its ability to find a good leader as well as someone to succeed him.\(^1\) But although some villages have been able to solve the problem of finding the leader, the problem of succession remains a big obstacle. In the case of Daku village, perhaps the most notable in this connexion, the village has been led by an outstanding member who has many modern qualifications as well as traditional standing in the village.\(^2\) He has recently solved the problem of succession by handing over the organization to the Co-operative Societies Department. In Dravuni, Kadavu, the whole village organization has been taken over by a former army sergeant who has organized it on little less than straight militarism. The village labour force is divided into sections which have appointed tasks such as agriculture or housebuilding. In yet another case, that of Tubalevu village in Tailevu, the whole village has been broken up and its members are now living with their families on small blocks of their own communally-owned land, cultivating their crops as though they were independent farmers. But here a definite link is provided between the families by their leader, who is of senior descent and, apart from having worked for the Department of Agriculture for some years, has had considerable experience of farming himself.

These cases and others show a break with tradition in some way, certainly a break with the Fijian Administration. Their crucial departure from the generality of Fijian villages lies in their elimination of the upward extensions of bureaucratic control through the Fijian Administration, in which the responsibility of the 'leader' is directed upward to those who appoint and pay him rather than down to the people under him. The leader in the independent village may or may not be also the traditional village chief, but his certain qualification is that he is competent in modern ways. It would appear that here lie the two basic requirements for modern Fijian leaders: that they be leaders and not bureaucrats; and that their primary qualification be modern competence and not birth.

The most important alternative forms of leadership developing among Fijians, however, are those emerging from the urban centres. While even

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1. In this case the village rather than the individual becomes the 'unit of independence'. Such independence is granted only to villages which have a firm project in mind to which it is desired to devote full attention. In these circumstances the need for a competent leader who can lead and also hold the village to its task is obvious.

2. This village has attracted considerable attention in Fiji and in the literature. See in particular O. H. K. Spate, op. cit., and his article 'Under Two Laws: The Fijian Dilemma', *Meanjin* (University of Melbourne), Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1960.
here we find bodies of people who are still organized on the basis of their traditional connexions, using a more or less true version of the traditional form of leadership and its procedures, other types of leaders are growing in importance. These include the trade union leaders, the leaders of social and sporting clubs and societies, of credit unions and co-operative societies, middle-strata civil servants, and people with a little more education and perhaps a few more means than others, who hold relatively sound opinions and can make their presence felt among their fellows. These are the middle-class intelligentsia of the towns, who have established an alternative way of life from the traditional and therefore have some independence to speak their minds freely without fear of intimidation at the village council. They are the people who are in touch with the influential, and have studied and discussed national Fijian problems in perhaps more stimulating surroundings than the village. They are the new challenge to the traditional leadership, not only because they have directly challenged the established principles of national policy, but also because they are so in terms of structural form. For the most part they are not of chiefly descent. They have made their appearance largely because of their education, but also because of the jobs they hold and perhaps because of their income. Their position rests not on ascribed status but on personal achievement in modern terms. They have arisen through democratically-based associations, and having achieved their position through election, are responsible to their followers who may indeed fire them as they please. Their success and their continuance in office depend on their efficiency as office-bearers. It is perhaps to their advantage that the urban situation furnishes them with material with which to work—jobs, wages, conditions of work, housing, social welfare and so on. There is much in the urban situation with which they can occupy themselves. In these ways they exhibit fundamental differences from the structural form of traditional leadership.

But in regard to national policy, they have done much to make themselves deserve attention as a potential force for future change. Quite early they attempted to secure a voice for urban Fijians in the selection of Fijian representatives to the Legislative Council. Although this attempt did not succeed, they later obtained representation for urban Fijians on the Provincial Councils in the rural areas. At a later date they tried to secure exemption for urban Fijians from payment of the Provincial and Commutation Rates. The argument was that because they were living in the urban

1. There are very few Fijians in business in the towns. In Suva there is one fairly substantial taxi proprietor and a number of smaller ones, and there is also a small storekeeper who is himself employed otherwise (his family runs the store while he is at work), and who has recently been registered as a money-lender. Otherwise, the only notable Fijian business people are relatively humble rural folk whose activities have grown primarily from their expanding farming operations. Most educated Fijians are in white-collar employment with the Government or with private firms.

2. The Provincial Rate has been described above; in addition to it, a Commutation Rate is also payable by Fijian men living away from their villages 'permanently'. It amounts to one pound a year and is credited to the payer's village to be used to assist in the upkeep of the village by those left behind.
centres, they did not receive any direct benefit from these taxes. Their request was turned down. But in 1959 they pressed for the representation of urban Fijians on the Council of Chiefs, and as a result urban Fijians were represented on that Council for the first time in 1960. All four representatives were trade unionists. These successes may not be entirely impressive, but they are important not only in gaining recognition for new forms of organization and thus facilitating the acceptance of change, but also even more directly in gaining the infiltration of new blood into the ranks of the national policy-makers.

It must be emphasized that these developments are, at the most, embryonic. The villages which have become independent are relatively few, and the emergent political leaders of the urban areas are still struggling to secure respect for themselves and their views. Other forms of organization such as co-operative societies and credit unions are gaining ground, and to assist them there are well-developed systems of leadership and supervision at the national level. In one way or another, these developments constitute attempts to develop other forms of organization from those directly sponsored within the framework of Fijian Administration policy, and in this sense they are consistent with the desire, commonly expressed by rural folk, for greater freedom to pursue their economic activities independently of Programmes of Work as well as of the direction of officials.

As is very well demonstrated by Spate in his report on the Fijian people, the two main obstacles to economic development among the Fijians, as seen by the people, are lack of financial assistance (capital) and the 'burden of obligations', which include not only traditional obligations but also those required by the Fijian Regulations. The Fijian Administration did attempt to foster capital formation through the Fijian Development Fund, but, as was indicated earlier, much of this money has been used for improving village conditions, relegating to a minor role the need to establish a firm foundation for greater productivity in the future. It may be added here that a very great proportion of the balance of the fund not currently required, amounting in 1958 to about £600,000, was at that time invested in Australia.

Considering that a very great part of the Fijian potential for economic development is bound up with agricultural production, it is obvious that conditions must be created which encourage them to use the land. Opportunities vary greatly from one village to another according to the configurations of the local terrain, and different crops—whether sugar cane, coconuts or bananas—require different skills. In these circumstances it is of the utmost importance to give wide scope for the development of local

1 The major lines of current policy, which stress the importance of preserving the village and the 'communal system' as the basis of Fijian social, political and economic development, were enunciated by the late Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna. As far as I am aware, no further statements of policy have been promulgated which attempt to modify or to reform the principles he laid down.

2 op. cit., 1959.
talent for leadership and organization, for the local village is likely to have a keener appreciation of its problems and possibilities than have the makers of national policy. Although this is being realized, there is still some feeling that those in authority know best.

The importance of the new leaders, both rural and urban, lies not merely in securing alternative forms of leadership for the direction of Fijian economic activity, although this is an important consideration. It lies at least as much in securing a reorientation of outlook which, at the very least, is prepared to recognize and accept new forms of organization and new forms of behaviour. This is extremely important in a situation where there has been a conscious government policy to preserve the traditional social forms. These traditional forms are too restrictive for success in an exchange economy. The communal holding of land, for one thing, is unsuited to the need for individual production designed to give a surplus for sale. Furthermore, the personal obligations of traditional society may not only constrict individual freedom to pursue production to maximum advantage, but may even wipe out the surplus achieved if such a surplus is used to discharge those obligations. Under these conditions, there is great need for the greatest possible freedom for units of labour as well as those of land to seek maximum reward unfettered by the imperfections of a traditional economy which rests for its success on social considerations.

Traditional leadership, no doubt, still has its force and its uses; but, resting as it does on particular types of social groups, it is structurally unsuited to an exchange market economy where the ideal is great individual freedom to choose one's partners, as it were, as well as the principles upon which relations are to be built. Some have thought that it can be 'adapted' to suit modern needs, but it seems that this is a questionable view. In cases such as Daku and Tubalevu already mentioned, it does provide a useful link with modern endeavour; but what is usually overlooked is that the traditional leader must be, first and foremost, a leader in modern ways. The two types of leadership are structurally different and geared to different types of situation, and their different jurisdictions must be recognized. Unless the traditional leader is also a competent modern leader, he is liable to lose his effect under the pressure of modern advance.

The modern leaders have shown that change is not only possible but necessary, and they have reinforced this position by exerting positive influence in national decision-making. Even though their direct contribution may be small, their emergence has had a salutary effect on the pace with which change is accepted. Already a great deal is being done by the government to facilitate economic development. Crops are being diversified, transport facilities improved, markets developed, capital funds accumulated, and schemes are even being put into effect to sub-divide communally-owned land so that individuals may increase agricultural production under more secure tenure. It is to be hoped that, commensurate with these developments, the people may be encouraged to re-arrange
their social relations in whatever ways they consider to be most advan-
tageous, to enable them to cope successfully with the new situation. Eco-
nomic development entails not only increasing production, but also increasing
facility to engage in production.

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The world of the social sciences
Social pre-conditions and effects of moving over the threshold of economic development

Rudolf Bicanic

The increase of the capital coefficient in the course of economic development and its subsequent decrease is called ‘moving over the threshold’. Three industrial revolutions are identified: each passes through a stage of increased capital coefficient, followed by a decline. Changes in capital coefficient are due to variations in the longevity of capital, the capital mix, and principally technical progress. Important social pre-conditions affecting changes in the capital coefficient: population increase; inability of the governing classes to maintain effective control; outside pressures; increase of the investment quota, followed by voluntary and compulsory saving. Technological progress also implies a change from old to new elites using new techniques of social control and requiring new methods of education. During the climb to and the descent from the threshold of development, turning points are usually reached in economic policy depending on trends of economic development.

I

By the ‘threshold of economic development’ we mean the increase of the capital to output ratio or capital coefficient in the process of economic development. In a stagnating or slowly growing economy there is a 2 : 1 ratio of capital used per unit of output, since capital is scarce but labour abundant. Labour has to carry the main burden of production; only a small amount of capital can be used per unit of product. During the initial stage of the development process the aggregate capital coefficient moves up to 6 : 1 or more. There is a subsequent stage when the infrastructure has been built and the capital coefficient begins to decrease, down to say 3 : 1, thus easing the process of development. This means that in the initial stage a much greater burden is put on saving as a source of investment. In the stagnating stage, 4 per cent of the national income saved was sufficient

1. This capital coefficient $m = K / Y$ is the inverse of the coefficient of productivity of capital $Y/K$ showing how many units of product (Y) a unit of capital (K) can produce. Of course this very simple single-factor production function gives only a first approximation to the problem of development, as capital also represents changes in labour that activate it and all other factors of production. See R. Bicanic, ‘The Threshold of Economic Growth’, Kyklos, No. 1, 1962, pp. 7-28.
to increase the national income by 2 per cent, but in the second stage 12 per cent is required for the same additional increase. For this reason the process of economic development places such a heavy burden on the whole economy that we have found it more appropriate to describe it as ‘creeping over the threshold’ rather than to use another, more fashionable label.

There is not only one single threshold in the course of economic development. Already there have occurred three distinguishable thresholds which coincide with different industrial revolutions. The first industrial revolution was based on coal, steam, steel and railways and took place in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth and up to the middle of the nineteenth centuries. The second was based on the internal combustion engine, oil and electricity, and in most advanced countries began to take place in the seventies of the last century. The third industrial revolution is now taking place, in mid-twentieth century, based on automation, electronics, nuclear energy and the chemical industry.

In its initial stage each of these industrial revolutions implied an upward movement of the capital coefficient, making investments a heavier burden on the national economy. It also meant that expenditure on producer goods increased faster than consumption of consumer goods. In the subsequent stage of development, when the infrastructure has been built, the reverse tendency arises: a faster increase in the production of consumer goods than in that of producer goods. The fruits of the ‘hard’ period are thereby reaped. This is prolonged into a third stage, that of a comparatively stable capital coefficient.

Various countries, and even various regions within one country, move over the thresholds at different times. Therefore, the speed of changes has different effects. Although the changes are very uneven and complex there is a general tendency for the period between the peaks of the various revolutions to become shorter and shorter. The late-comers are stimulated to faster growth by competition on the world market, by national defence requirements, by the demonstration effect and the spread of technical knowledge. The later they come, the higher the thresholds, until finally two of the three revolutions may be compressed into one, making the periods of respite shorter.

There is sufficient empirical data from different sources to support this theory. Let us take the United Kingdom as the most significant example. Its capital coefficient rose from the beginning of the nineteenth century and reached 7.5 in the middle of it, then declined to the third stage of development by the end, and in the middle of the twentieth century was at 2.6. Belgium reached the second stage by the middle of the nineteenth century and moved over the threshold towards the end of it. The United States of America, Germany and Norway also moved over the threshold in the

1. While in the first industrial revolution some $500 to $1,000 were required to employ one man, in the second some $3,000 to $5,000 were needed per worker and in the third capital intensity moves to several tens of thousands of dollars or more per person employed.
second half of the nineteenth century, Japan in the first and second decades of the twentieth century, India and Mexico reached it deep in the twentieth century, Argentina crept over the threshold in the thirties and during the Second World War, and Yugoslavia reached the peak round 1953. Great Britain had almost a century to pass from the capital coefficient peak of the first revolution to the capital coefficient peak of the second. In the meantime, when the capital coefficient decreased she had a period of almost sixty years to relax from the strain of the initial climb. The span was much shorter for Germany where it lasted some twenty years (1880-1900); thus there was little time to enjoy the period of relaxation. The U.S.A. moved fast from the first to the second peak (1890-1910).\textsuperscript{1} Italy (1880-1920) shows a much slower pace, approximately half that of Germany, since it was continuously under the pressure of the low productivity of capital (gradual construction of the infrastructure). Sweden and Norway were faster and had some twenty years between the two peaks. All these changes took place round the turn of the twentieth century. Japan also experienced rather fast movement (twenty years) from peak to peak. Australia developed in such a way that the two peaks fell close together (1930). In Argentina (1920-50) and South Africa (1930-50) the peaks are so blurred that they cannot be clearly distinguished.

It seems that the climb over the threshold of a third industrial revolution is taking place now. Heavy capital spending and the increase in the capital coefficient in the most advanced countries are signs of this. The particular difficulty being faced by underdeveloped countries is that they have to compress all three revolutions over one time period, hurried by world economic and political competition.

II

Until recently predominant opinion held that the capital coefficient was constant. Further research has shown that it is not so.

Changes in the capital coefficient are due to three main causes. One is the change in the durability of the goods produced. Even the national wealth of developed countries is very shortlived. In the U.S.A., for example, 60 per cent of the national income has a very short life span, only 10 to 15 per cent of consumers' durables and producers' equipment lasts over ten years, and buildings last fifty years, the over-all average being not more than seven years (a capital coefficient corresponding to 3.5). This is much shorter in the less developed countries where life 'from hand to mouth' is frequently the general rule.\textsuperscript{2} An increase in the durability of national wealth is the first cause of an increase in the capital coefficient.

1. The peaks do not show great amplitude here because of the geographical differences in economic development. When the East was already comfortably over the first threshold the Western States were still climbing uphill.
The second factor causing changes in the capital coefficient—and the most important in the short run—is the change in the capital mix. Different industries have very varied partial capital-to-product ratios. Some do not require more than one unit of capital per unit of product. These are mainly the light industries such as textiles and apparel, leather and rubber, food-processing and tobacco, but also mechanical and transport vehicle industries, shipbuilding, etc. The industries with a heavy capital coefficient are mining and fuel, particularly sea, river and rail transport (railways up to 20), iron and steel, but also the paper industry, agriculture (especially land reclamation, irrigation, forest clearance) and, above all, housing. Emphasis must be laid here, too, on the building of roads and railways, the electric grid, harbours, canals and airports. The switch to these activities means at the same time a sudden increase in the capital coefficient, which is out of proportion to the propensity to save or the investment quota of the national income. On the contrary the move from such heavy partial coefficients makes the aggregate capital coefficient lighter.

The third source of changes in the capital coefficient is technical progress. It has a long-term effect, although not a very long one. This is particularly likely to be so in countries where the imitative technique prevails over the creative, and technical progress can be imported. Some recent studies by American (F. S. Fabricant, R. Solow), German (G. Bombach) and Soviet (G. Strumilin) economists have shown that, in the long run, technical progress is responsible for some two-thirds to more than nine-tenths of the increase in productivity, and this change has a growing effect on the process of development (e.g., in the first Soviet plan it amounted to 51 per cent, and in the last one to 66 per cent). Thus technological progress, which means also an increase in the quality of capital or a decrease of the capital coefficient, is the most important factor in economic growth in the long run.

The time dimension is very important. The change in the capital mix occurs much faster and has a more direct effect than the change caused by technological progress. Therefore, though in the long run the capital


Current studies

Since here we are dealing with the specific effect of social preconditions to changes in the capital coefficient during the process of economic development, there are several important points to stress.

**What kinds of change in a stagnating economy trigger a movement towards the threshold of development?** There are three main causes:

(a) An increase of population, not as such alone, but in relation to the use of natural resources available at customary and established levels of consumption, and exploited with traditional techniques. The condition is one where labour exists in abundance, which means rural overpopulation. For a large proportion (usually one-third) of those occupied in agriculture the marginal productivity of labour is zero, and they can be taken out of the production process without lowering its level. Since the average income of the agricultural population is lower than that of any other group, a rural exodus takes place as soon as opportunity offers. Obviously we are dealing here not exactly with the agricultural, technological or occupational problem but with the problem of a complex peasant sector where primary, secondary and tertiary activities are all carried out within one and the same institutional framework. Upsetting of the balance, be it on the demographic side, on the resources side, or on the production side can open up a movement, or create preconditions for a movement towards a developmental threshold.

The impulses may come from a sudden change (consecutive bad harvests, famine, flood, war, etc.) or from some more long-term causes such as exhaustion of natural resources deforestation, repeated floods, soil erosion, fertile land shortage, products confiscated, uneven increase of population, changed consumption habits and levels, induced changes in technique of production.

(b) The inability of the established local governing classes to control the society by old methods in the stagnating economy. This may manifest itself in the necessity for new techniques: for modern armaments to keep law and order (communications and transport systems), and maintain established consumption on the previous prestige level. New techniques may

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1. So even if the assumption were valid that increase in the capital coefficient is compensated for by technical progress over time, the span required would be several decades or generations.
2. It makes matters more optimistic, but does not justify the theory of a constant capital coefficient.
require fresh personnel with new skills who compete with the old ones (e.g., new military leaders). The competition makes itself felt in commerce, in administrative power, at the consumption level (conspicuous consumption) as well as on the production side (conspicuous production).

(c) If a threat comes from abroad to exploit resources with improved techniques (penetration of foreign capital, military aggression, some national and international integration movements, export of revolutions).

It is important to stress that all these factors are brought to bear within an established institutional framework, thus creating tensions which the usual macroeconomic analysis does not show.

The increased investment quota. Changes in the capital coefficient mean in the first stage of development an increase in the investment quota of the national income. What social machinery is necessary so that (a) the investment quota can be increased, (b) capital can be concentrated, and (c) capital can be diverted from traditional to novel purposes?

(a) To increase voluntary savings in population groups which can afford it means at the same time establishing an efficient modern banking or co-operative credit system which will be able to compete with and divert funds from, the traditional local moneylenders, dealing mainly in consumer credits, and to direct the flow of credit to productive purposes. Compulsory saving by taxation implies the existence of an effective administrative system for tax collection with as little administrative waste, arbitrariness, and corruption as possible. A third source of investment funds consists of tapping available natural resources, exploiting them with local labour and traditional techniques and making the accumulated proceeds available for further productive investment. Export of capital controlled by the ruling élite, so frequent in politically and economically unstable countries despite patriotic professions, is another source that can be exploited. This, and the decrease of luxurious or conspicuous consumption and transfer of savings achieved to the production sector is another source of investment, which also implies the existence of an administration governing against the interests of the established élite.

Avoiding waste of what is already being produced is a source of investment funds often overlooked. To exploit this source it is necessary to have an efficient administrative machinery from top to bottom, as centralized administration is not always the most efficient mobilizer of funds for national investment purposes.

Proper use of foreign aid is not only linked with an efficient administration in the recipient state, but depends also on the donor having adequate technical services at the top and efficient operative organization on the local level.

(b) In order for them to be used for climbing over the threshold, it is not enough for investment funds to attain a certain magnitude; they must also be concentrated so as to correspond to the indivisibility, both technical and economic, of the necessary means of production in major developmental
projects. This concentration can be achieved through banking machinery for private savings, or through a taxation system which in a way performs a transfer service by moving capital from the taxpayers' small pockets to the treasury. Bulk exports of divisible but homogeneous agricultural products and raw materials, exchanged for indivisible and specific imports of productive equipment, is another mode of transformation. Foreign aid and credits are normally already available in adequately concentrated magnitudes.

(c) The available concentrated funds must be diverted from their traditional use. Development implies restriction of traditional capital use and expansion of novel capital uses for the initial building of the infrastructure. A new investment policy pattern must therefore be created, in which those responsible, the targets, the instruments and the milieu are modified.

Change also implies much greater risk-taking with centrally allocated funds than with small doses of capital application. Centralization of decisions is linked to centralization of risks, where the law of great numbers ceases to operate. As the responsibility of the central administration for its decisions increases, there is a tendency for central bureaucracy (including top managers and apparatchiks) to avoid social control or prevent it from being effective in this period. The infallibility of government by the expert, technocrat or politocrat is used as an excuse for such a policy.

The diversion of funds also opens up the problem of the interrelationship between investments in physical and in financial terms. In other words, an increase of investments at the expense of consumption posits channels through which consumer goods can be used to increase the stock of producer goods. For this purpose the transfer of labour, fed and kept by peasants (voluntarily or compulsorily) and used in productive sectors other than agriculture, is often resorted to. Exports of consumer goods to pay for imports of producer goods is another instrument of this policy, and so also are inter-regional shifts from agricultural to industrial areas, or from villages to towns and from provinces and colonies to the metropolitan centres.

*The capital coefficient proper.* A greater (heavier) capital coefficient means that more capital is required for the production of less income, macroeconomically speaking. The main reason for this is the change in the capital mix, which moves faster than technological progress. This lag is often also followed by a fall in the average rate of profit, and means that developmental activities cannot be carried out by existing machinery on the basis of 'business as usual'. In the past, special privileges, concessions or guarantees were given to the promoters of the first industrial revolution in foreign countries, by the receiving or by the donor countries and their financial establishments. It is particularly to be stressed that most European countries had their infrastructures, built at government expense, particularly railways, harbours, water supply and roads. The foreign capital exported before the First World War was mainly allocated to railway building (e.g., two-thirds of British capital abroad before the First World War was invested in railways).
Today, most capital investment by the World Bank is allocated to finance the building of the infrastructure for the first and second industrial revolutions (metalled roads, railways, electric power stations, national electric grid, etc.). Private capital investment now plays a role of subsidiary investment in developing countries, waiting for the average capital coefficient to fall. Therefore government machinery, or rather, to broaden the issue, public developmental activity, is a necessary requirement for development at least during the period of moving over the threshold. It is another question, when this stage is over, why those who have not carried the burden in difficult times should enjoy, at the expense of the consumers, the benefits of the subsequent period of a lighter average capital coefficient and of increased rates of profit.

Technological progress. Technological progress is an independent developmental variable which reduces the capital coefficient. It requires, without delay, complex imports of imitative technology from more advanced countries. Nevertheless there are examples (Italy) where creative techniques based on local traditions have managed to compete successfully with countries of a higher level of development. Technological progress demands increased facilities at all educational levels as a most vital 'economic' investment. The training of skilled labour of the lowest educational standard takes two to five years, that of technicians and professional people twelve to sixteen years, and that of highly qualified experts for the creative technology of the future some twenty-four years (bearing in mind that a highly qualified expert cannot be trained in less than eight years of university attendance). But the crux of the matter, as Mahalanobis rightly pointed out, is that one must start at once if one wants to have adequate experts in twenty years time.

Here there lies the danger of the old élite frustrating the education or aspirations of the new, and trying to repair its leadership, based on traditional techniques. Less evident is the tendency of the new élite, more or less overtly, to appropriate a privileged position by using educational attainments for the control of society in their own interest, allegedly in the name of technical progress, while in fact preventing it by their monopoly. 'La trahison des clercs' is not a phenomenon reserved to developed countries only, and the damage done by the sergeant mentality of the half-educated is matched only by the intolerant arrogance of the economic staff officers.

The technical progress during the first industrial revolution favoured the concentration of population, of capital and of enterprises in large urban agglomerations. The second industrial revolution acts in reverse, enabling the population, the capital and the products to disperse. The effect of the two revolutions occurring simultaneously depends very much on whether a clear economic policy exists, taking both counteracting and compensatory effects into account.
Social changes during movement over the threshold. During this period there is a faster movement away from agriculture than from other occupations. This means that increases in income levels work to the advantage of those outside agriculture. Even the poorly paid industrial worker in this first period of industrialization has a higher income than most of the peasants. Therefore there is a steady rural exodus, encouraged by economic policy. In this respect one must distinguish two periods: the construction period when the infrastructure is being set up, and the operational period when this structure is mainly established, and the industries begin to operate. In the first period the bulk of the labour force is unskilled, employed in building, on roads, railways and similar work. In the second period, unskilled labour becomes redundant and skilled factory labour is in ever-increasing demand. As many of the unskilled cannot acquire the necessary skills, and have broken their links with the village, the problem arises of an urban sub-proletariat, suspended in an economic no-man's-land, following the rule: last into town, last out of town. They resist being pushed back to villages by a new economic policy. The exodus from agricultural occupations has as its effect changes in the internal structure of the peasant family. The burden of productive labour falls more and more on the shoulders of the women just at a time when intensification of agricultural production is required, because of increased demand for agricultural products.

New social relationships are created in the family; there is a shifting of responsibility and the establishment of new rights of the family members. A large joint family can more easily afford to dispense with some labour, but the problem of income distribution plays a more disruptive role within a family embracing several earners. On the other hand, off-farm activities occasion the rise of a tendency towards separating the productive from the consumption functions in the family, thus making it less of a productive unit, under the father's authority, and more of a consumptive unit, with the mother as the main organizer of the family consumption. This switch from one authority to the other is followed by complaints about 'demoralization' of youth, which finds fresh opportunities for work in newly created industries.

These changes in the trends of development demand another set of measures in economic policy, since those which produced good results in the first stage of development, seem to be ineffective in the second stage. Such turning points in economic development as the change in the capital coefficient must therefore be watched very carefully by all policy makers.

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Social progress is closely interlinked with economic development. Many aspects of social progress are prerequisites to economic development. Alternatively, the level of economic growth defines to a large extent the character of the social problems which arise. The article studies the interrelation between social and economic aspects of development as they are reflected in programmes and plans of national development in different countries. Special reference is made to the different indices by which social processes are measured in such programmes.

Planning is a powerful instrument of social and economic advancement and of national development. Therefore, programmes of national economic development should incorporate not only economic indices but also social ones. Both types are to be found in the national economic programmes of socialist countries for the accounting, mobilization and purposeful utilization of all the resources of a country. To a certain degree, both types of indices may also be observed in the programmes of economic advancement of many young sovereign States, although these programmes do not cover all sectors of the national economy equally.

The range of indices defining social development is most varied, and a closer study of the existing national economic plans or programmes for economic development reflect the various social indices differently.

One group of social indices defines the social structure of society, the correlation between various sectors of the national economy, and also the basic stimulus which determines the trend and nature of the socioeconomic advancement of the country. In this connexion, much importance is attached to the indices describing the share of different sectors (the correlation between the State and the private sector, in particular) in new capital investment, in the output of goods, etc. Planning in the Soviet Union and in other socialist States has the objective of consolidating the State-owned and the co-operatives sectors. This policy has been adequately reflected in the indices of the national economic programme.

The programmes of economic advancement of the young sovereign States also incorporate, in greater or less detail, indices for the State and
the private sectors. At times these indices appear in the national economic programmes only as the charted spheres of investment or production. However, the scope and the nature of these indices reflect the main socio-economic concepts of the ruling circles of a given country and, in any case, predetermine certain shifts in the social structure of the country.

A number of social processes (urbanization, for example) are as a rule partially reflected in the programmes of economic development and figure as specific indices (for instance, new housing construction).

Other social processes are discussed in great detail, e.g., social and economic targets which the Government sets itself. As a priority task of social redevelopment the Soviet Union has planned the liquidation of economic and culturalbackwardness in a number of formerly enslaved regions. The national programme thus includes a specific provision for rapid development of industry and agriculture in the areas concerned, and, at the same time, specific indices for the advancement of culture, education, health services, etc. In some cases, provision was made for the creation of national written languages for those nationalities which did not have their own alphabet. Thus, the detailed elaboration of plans for specific areas, presupposing intensified development in backward provinces, might be an important index of the struggle for real national equality.

Particularly prominent in the programmes of economic advancement are the indices describing the welfare of the people and various social expenditures. This group of indices also includes data reflecting the general cultural standards of the population. Unlike the previously mentioned social indices which, as a rule, are scattered over different parts of the plan, this group most frequently forms an independent part or parts of the plan. Thus, the plans of socialist countries incorporate specific departments devoted to cultural advancement, public health, etc. Similar departments, though of a more general nature, may be found in the development programmes of a number of young sovereign States.

Depending on the socio-economic structure of a country, the character and the scale of planning, the actual content and the methods of estimating various social indices, are far from identical. However, experience shows that social indices (included in the national economic programmes) can be scientifically sound and of practical value only if they are closely linked with analysis of the prospects of economic advancement of a country. This method is indispensable because in actual life economic and social development are always closely interdependent. Certain social problems arise and are settled only subject to the attainment by a country of a definite level of economic development. Thus the problems of urbanization arise not by themselves but in connexion with the general economic development of a country, the development of commodity relations and the development of industry, in particular. General secondary education and medical services call for preliminary capital investment, premises, equipment and qualified specialists, which can be provided only at a definite level of economic advancement. On the other hand, the degree to which social
problems are settled determines in great measure the rate and possibilities of economic advancement. Thus, the development of industry is possible only if a certain contingent of qualified manpower is available, hence, upon the general standard of education in the country. The same is true of the introduction of modern scientific achievements into agriculture. The general standard of health is an important factor determining productivity. A well-arranged system of public health services enhances the general working capacity of the population. In addition, it may ensure a rapid eradication of certain diseases in areas which are being opened up, thereby directly assisting fuller economic development of natural resources.

One can easily see, however, that the relationships between social and economic development and, correspondingly, the role of different social indices in the national programme are not the same. On the one hand, there are social developments which are more closely dependent on production and to a great degree predetermine the scope, rate, and direction of economic development. Among these are the growth of qualified manpower, the scope and standard of specialized education, the level of advancement of applied sciences, the process of urbanization, etc. On the other hand, there are phenomena of a social nature which primarily characterize the standard of welfare. Among them, we find the medical services, the increase in the number of theatres, libraries, etc.

This type of distinction is, of course, a conditional one. A certain level of medical services, for instance, is necessary for the successful development of the national economy. But housing conditions for the working people and their standard of education are also indices of the general welfare of the population. The distinction made here helps to give a better idea of the complexity of the methods of estimating separate indices of social development.

When national economic programmes are drawn up, different social indices have to be considered not only as measures of the welfare of the population, but also as indices describing different aspects of the national economy, and which constitute major prerequisites for further economic advancement. Of course, social indices are only one of the measures of people's welfare and only one of the factors necessary for further economic progress. These considerations are of constant importance during the preparation of national economic plans. It will be shown below that they determine, to a considerable extent, the scope and the nature of social developments set forth in the plans.

Experience of national economic planning in a number of countries shows that the most rational method is to determine the social indices by means of several mutually complementary analyses and estimates.

The initial data for these studies are provided by the over-all evaluation of the pace of economic development of a country for the span of the plan's operation. It is particularly important to ensure the most harmonious balance between accumulation and consumption (component parts of which are education, medicine and other social expenditure). Only with
an optimal balance is it possible to ensure the general and continuous growth of national well-being, the maximum satisfaction of spiritual and material requirements.

The analysis of the pace of general development of a national economy is a basic initial factor in the calculation of the indices for the plan in different spheres of social life. The amount of the new funds that may be allocated for social needs depends directly upon the pace of the country's economic advancement. Thus, the total volume of the funds that could be allocated for social needs is determined as a component of the more general calculation—that determining the optimum proportions and balance of accumulation and consumption.

At the same time, great importance is attached to the scientific analysis of the pattern of material and spiritual needs of the population by the end of the planned period. This analysis bears not only on the pattern of demand for consumer goods, but also for various social services.

Concrete estimates of the indices in question require the most comprehensive analysis. Estimates made in terms of cash would unavoidably give an incomplete and even distorted picture, since they fail to take into account many important circumstances. A number of social measures are implemented by State subsidies or are fully State-financed (school education, medical services, etc.). Accordingly, the question arises in what terms a particular social measure should be evaluated. Many social phenomena cannot be expressed in terms of money (for instance, the reduction of working hours). In this light, it becomes clear that in order to work out social indices for the national programmes (including separate indices in the plan), it is not sufficient to discuss the financial indices alone. Data which are adequate for a State budget are insufficient for programmes of economic development. Therefore, attempts to determine the structure of social requirements on the basis of thorough methods of 'demand analysis' founded on the structure of cash expenditure of different groups in society are liable to produce a severely distorted picture. It is important to emphasize this, since a trend has developed in many young States towards a growing disproportion in the level of personal incomes. In these conditions, the requirements of those drawing big incomes are often favoured (this is reflected in higher prices) as against the needs of the masses. The objective of basic social measures, by general agreement, should be reduction, not increase, in the disproportion of personal income distribution.

The experience of many countries shows that much attention should be paid in programmes of economic development to physical indices, the estimates in absolute figures. In determining the scope of school education, for instance, the first importance should be given to such indices as the number of children of school age, the percentage of school-age children attending schools, the number of instructors, the number of school buildings, etc. In estimating the volume of work in public health, such indices as the number of physicians and hospital beds per thousand of population, the scope of production of drugs, etc., are of great importance. The require-
ments estimated in absolute figures make it possible to assess accurately the real needs.

Furthermore, it has been found that the nature of indices included in the national programmes varies, depending on the economic state of the country. At present, many Afro-Asian countries include in their programmes of economic advancement, as a priority social objective, the liquidation of unemployment. In future, the problem of employment in these countries might take a quite different form. The Soviet Union, during its first five-year plan, also faced the problem of unemployment, the problem of finding jobs for millions of people. As a result of the rapid industrialization of the country, the problem was settled in a short period. Now, the problem of employment appears in the national programmes basically in the form of indices of the number of qualified workers and specialists, and also the requirements for training of the necessary number of specialists for various industries or parts of the country.

Thus, depending on specific conditions, the national programmes might include different tasks of social advancement. The experience of a number of countries shows that it is most expedient to reflect in the programme not only the volume of funds allocated for certain measures but the nature of the social objectives planned for a definite period of time, describing these by appropriate indices in absolute (physical) terms. Likewise this approach helps to reveal the most rational forms of using the allocations, or, to be more exact, the essence of the social problems that have to be solved and the best ways of doing so.

As in the case of economic indices included in national programmes, the indices of social phenomena and also the methods of estimating them, vary according to whether the programmes are long-term ones (five years or ten years) or short-term annual programmes. The biggest difficulties arise in the elaboration of long-term plans. The reason, among other things, is that far-reaching changes in the structure of the national economy as a whole and in the correlation among its different spheres are possible over a long period. The objective of the plan is to choose the best balance between the pace of development for certain spheres, to promote the earliest economic and social development of the country and to ensure the best possible growth of the people’s welfare.

A comprehensive analysis of the national economy reveals that the scope and the distribution of social expenditure among various industries and spheres of consumption can fluctuate within rather narrow limits, but that deviation beyond these limits retards economic growth and the possibilities of increasing social services. The limits are determined in every country by the initial level of development and the practical methods of further economic development. It would thus be pointless to try to determine universal proportions or establish a fixed priority for settling specific social problems. Obviously, the priority and scope of various social undertakings must be determined against a background of comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the national economy, due account being taken of
future prospects. The special study of consumer demand and the policy of the trade unions and other organizations may be of particular importance in determining the nature of social expenditure.

In determining the scope of various social expenditures, their correlation with economic development should not be overlooked. It would seem to be expedient, in allocating funds for social needs, to ensure that the main indices of social progress (education, public health, housing conditions) cease to be a limitation upon economic development. Failing this, social factors may handicap economic development and this, in turn, may curtail the possibility of an increase in social expenditure.

As to short-term plans, the possibilities for profound changes in the social structure are not so great and the scope of planned measures is increasingly restricted by the facilities available: number of schools, hospitals, teachers, doctors, etc. Therefore, great attention should be given to preliminary measures on which an increase of social expenditure in the future is conditioned. Plans are made for the construction of new buildings for schools, hospitals, theatres, libraries, printshops, etc., and for the training of specialists. Accordingly, the short-term plans reflect social processes in more specific and more detailed indices. These indices may be expressed either in absolute figures (number of new schools, hospitals, teachers, doctors, theatres, libraries, graduates, etc.), or in relative figures (the percentage increment against the base period, etc.).

One of the main propositions set forth in this paper is that the inclusion of social indices in national programmes should be based on the integrated study of economic and social problems. Particularly important for the settlement of most of the problems, social problems included, is a high pace of economic advance.

The study of developments in a number of young sovereign States indicates that attempts at settling certain social questions at the expense of the requirements of speedy economic development and, in the final analysis, at the expense of solving other social problems, are fraught with grave complications. Merely to increase employment in a number of young sovereign States, enterprises are being founded and encouraged which are known to operate at a loss (for example, small and handicraft industry). Such a policy fails to ensure a rapid growth of production, engenders the need for future re-equipment of enterprises and heavy additional expenditure which will unavoidably retard economic and social progress. At the same time, emphasis upon the development of economically profitable enterprises, construction of a great many large enterprises and development of new industries, can constitute an important means of settling the problem of employment and certain other social problems.

The experience of national policy in the Soviet Union also proves the importance of a correct balance of economic and social progress. The objective of liquidating cultural backwardness in formerly oppressed areas has been viewed in our country in close relation with the detailed analysis of the economic potential of these areas. The aim was not an
The world of the social sciences

artificial development of the economy in these areas, but the tapping of real economically-founded possibilities of development. This helped greatly in the over-all development of the Soviet economy. At the same time, economic advancement promoted rapid cultural progress in those areas, the development of education, local culture, etc.

Thus, the fullest consideration of all the available potentialities and the closest co-ordination in the national economic programmes of the indices of social advancement with the indices for economic advancement, may play a prominent part in ensuring the social advancement of a country.

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G. I. Mirsky has published books and articles on socio-economic problems of developing countries, and specifically on Middle Eastern countries. At present he is working on problems of social structure in the newly independent states of Asia and Africa.
Research and teaching centres
and professional bodies

New centres
and changes of address

New institutions

India
Gokhale Institute of Public Affairs, Bangalore.

Senegal
Institut de Psychologie Sociale (Institute of Social Psychology), c/o Institut d'Études Pédagogiques de l'Université de Dakar, Dakar-Fann (provisional address).

United States of America
Disaster Research Center, University of Ohio, 404B West 17th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Changes of address

International
[Former address: c/o Professor I. Zajtay, 31, rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris-7e.]
(As from 1 January 1964 Professor Lawson has succeeded Professor Zajtay as Secretary-General of IALS. The above address is however valid only until July-August 1964, at which time IALS will acquire new premises in England.)

France
Commissariat général du Plan d'Equipement et de la Productivité (Central Bureau of Equipment and Productivity Planning), 9, rue Croix-des-Petits-Champs, Paris-1er.
[Former address: 103, rue de l'Université, Paris-7e.]
Institut Français d'Action Coopérative (French Institute for Co-operative Action), 14, rue Armand Moisant, Paris-15e.
[Former address: c/o Centre National de la Coopération Agricole, 129, boulevard St. Germain, Paris-7e.]

Federal Republic of Germany
IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Institute of Economic Research), Pienzenauer Strasse 44, Munich 27.
[Former address: Poschingerstrasse 5, Munich 27.]

1. For a complete index to this section, see Vol. XVI, No 1, 1964.
Republic of South Africa

National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, Aquila Building, 157 Schoeman St., Pretoria.

[Former address: Department of Education, Arts and Science, Pretoria.]

International centre

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Stureplan 19, Stockholm

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, created in 1962, represents a new concept in the field of technical assistance; it is an exceptional agency in so far as it is both international and non-official. Being international, it has the advantage that the assistance it gives does not come from any particular country and is thus entirely free from 'strings', and being non-official it can operate with a maximum of flexibility since it does not have to submit its projects and its budget to time-consuming discussions by representatives of Governments. It is true that the greater part of the modest assets of the foundation, at present about $ (U.S.) 1.5 million, has been raised in a single country, neutral and non-colonial Sweden, where the man in the street wished to honour the memory of his compatriot, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, by contributing to a fund intended to benefit the developing countries which were so close to the heart of Dag Hammarskjöld. These assets are administered by trustees from Europe, Africa, Asia and America, and among them are three past presidents of the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Foreign Minister Mongi Slim and Governor Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit; other trustees include Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, and also, ex officio, the present Secretary-General. The President ad interim of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation is Ambassador Alva Myrdal of Sweden and the Executive Director is Mr. Bengt Rösiö. This international board is responsible for the projects launched by the foundation, and is assisted in its work by national committees in various countries.

The purpose of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation is to provide specialized facilities for training people from developing countries to take up responsible positions in international and national service. The foundation thus tries to help the newly independent countries to play their increasingly important role in world affairs. This objective has first been pursued by organizing seminars on various themes connected with international co-operation. The first seminar was held in June and July, 1963, under the auspices of the Academy of International Law at The Hague, and was attended by fifteen senior officials from as many countries. It was led by the Norwegian Professor, Edvard Hambro, assisted by Professor B. Boutros-Ghali of Cairo University and Dr. P. J. Nkambo Mugerwa of University College, Dar-es-Salaam. At this seminar the participants were able to discuss the practical approach to current problems of international law which affect the newly independent nations, and to study and analyse the application of legal doctrine to a
rapidly changing scene with the aid of material available in the Peace Palace Library.

The next Dag Hammarskjöld Seminar, arranged by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, considered 'Some International Organizations, their Policies and Activities in Africa'. It was held in Addis Ababa, in April 1964, and was aimed particularly at medium-grade officials serving in ministries for foreign affairs, or in other ministries if their duties involve contacts with international organizations, etc. The seminar was directed by Mr. Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary of ECA, and by Mr. Ronald Neath of the Public Administration Division of the ECA.

In late May or early June 1964 a short seminar will be held in Lagos on 'International Financing and Development Planning', to be attended by senior West African officials of planning commissions, ministries of finance, central and development banks, etc., and also by guest participants from various financial organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The director of the seminar will be Dr. Sune Carlson, Professor of Business Administration at the University of Uppsala and Deputy Chairman of the Agency for Swedish Technical Assistance. The co-chairman will be His Excellency Mr. P. N. C. Okigbo, Economic Adviser to the Federal Government of Nigeria and Nigerian Ambassador to the European Economic Community. Dr. H. M. A. Onitiri of Ibadan University will act as academic secretary. This ten-day seminar is intended to be a confidential and high-level meeting of minds, and the participants will have access to persons who have done considerable research in the problems to be discussed.

The fourth Dag Hammarskjöld Seminar is scheduled for July, 1964, and will be held at Tunis on 'International Co-operation in Africa'. Its practical approach is underlined by the fact that it is proposed to follow it up with study tours and in-service training in international agencies. The fifth seminar will again be on International Law and is to be held in August 1964 at the Academy of International Law at The Hague. The director will again be Professor Edvard Hambro, but the subjects studied will naturally be different from those analysed at the 1963 seminar.

As can be seen from the foregoing, all Dag Hammarskjöld seminars are international both in theme and participation, and the ultimate purpose is to strengthen the existing international organization by training both international civil servants and their opposite numbers in national administration. Participation in a Dag Hammarskjöld seminar therefore presupposes a rather substantial prior training, since the foundation believes that it should not duplicate the work being done by the rapidly expanding universities in the developing countries. The seminars are intended chiefly for officials who are already qualified for national service but may need to add international aspects to the background already gained. By concentrating on international co-operation the foundation avoids favouring any particular country. Owing to the prevailing shortage of suitable trained officials, however, it is not possible to require participants to absent themselves for too long from their ordinary work. All the seminars are therefore of fairly short duration. The foundation also strives for decentralization, since it is important to maintain contact with the particular problems of various developing areas and since the limited assets of the foundation should not be spent unnecessarily on expensive air travel. The foundation plans, however, to create a Dag Hammarskjöld Centre which will serve as administrative headquarters, as a conference centre and as a natural meeting place for alumni, for 'Dag Hammarskjöld Fellows'.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation is now planning its continued seminar programme. For the year 1964-65 it envisages several seminars at universities and other training institutions, particularly in Africa. These will deal with such matters of international interest as the new forms of diplomacy, comparative public administration, and the guidance that developing countries can give to aid-administering officials of donor countries. The foundation is also continuing its efforts to provide past participants in Dag Hammarskjöld seminars with in-service training in other
countries or in international agencies. Certain other activities are being contemplated for the long-range programme which can, according to the statutes, only become effective as of 1 July 1964. During its first year the foundation has been fortunate in establishing contacts with many similar institutions and agencies, and also with a large number of experts and specialists, particularly in Africa. In all its work, therefore, it can draw on the experience of knowledgeable persons whose advice and comments have already been of the greatest value. These contacts are now being formalized through the setting up of national committees and/or national correspondents, so that all future activities of the foundation can be planned in consultation with people who have a thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the training needs which the foundation aims at helping to meet. Already, after only one year's work, it has achieved considerable results, and it will continue to play its part in training people who are working for international co-operation, understanding and peace, the people whom Dag Hammarskjöld had in mind when he said: 'Fundamentally, man is the key to our problems, not money. Funds are valuable only when used by trained, experienced, and devoted men and women. Such people, on the other hand, can work miracles even with small resources, and draw wealth out of barren land.'

Greece

The Athenian Institute of Anthopos

8 Dem. Soutsou Street, Athens

The institute is a scientific centre (non-profit organization) for research and postgraduate training in the behavioural sciences. The importance of this centre is underlined by the fact that in Greek universities there are still no departments of psychology, sociology or anthropology. An independent department of psychiatry is just now being established at the University of Athens. It was founded in 1962 by a group of young scholars with extensive backgrounds, including many years of study in the United States of America or Europe. At present, the staff includes one psychiatrist, six psychologists, one sociologist and one social statistician. The director is Dr. George Vassiliou.


The institute shares with the affiliated Institute for Research in Communication a fully operating statistical laboratory equipped with an IBM101.

Training is provided in three weekly seminars, two for projective techniques, in which thirteen psychologists (more than 50 per cent of those practising in Athens), participate, and one introduction to psychotherapy whose members are psychiatrists, psychologists and psychological social workers. A number of seminars and lectures are given by staff members of other institutions.

On-going research includes pilot studies on the 'Image of Authority Figures', a comparative study of motivational patterns as revealed by TAT Sequence Analysis (Greek patterns versus American), a first normative estimate of Rorschach
records, sociological surveys in Athens concerning leisure time, reading habits, trends of public opinion, etc. The Institute undertook, for Greece, a long-term research project of the Centre for Comparative Psycholinguistics of the University of Illinois, and is also attempting to begin standardization of Raven's Progressive Matrices—the first test to be standardized in Greece.

Among the other activities of the AIA in 1962 was the organization of the first Symposium on TAT Sequence Analysis (6-7 April 1962, Alexandra Hospital, Athens). Dr. Arnold, the originator of the technique, presided. Clinical research done at the psychological laboratory of the AIA using the technique, was presented. This was the first scientific convention on clinical psychology in Greece.

The Athenian Institute of Anthropos welcomes exchange with individual scholars and other centres.

Italy

Institute of Sociology

University of Rome

The Institute of Sociology at the University of Rome is attached to the Chair of Sociology at the same university, held by Professor Franco Ferrarotti. The institute employs six full-time research workers and conducts both research and field work and theoretical studies.

The institute is at present engaged on a large-scale project dealing with the role of sociology in modern Italian society, with particular reference to the process of industrialization in Italy and to the applications of social science. This research is part of a continuing project aiming at the construction of a typology of industrialization processes in different countries. A specific research project undertaken by the institute and nearly completed after two years deals with the problem of technical innovation and workers' attitudes within the framework of the present stage of development of the Italian political and economic system. Special attention has been given in this research to the type of entrepreneurship and business leadership prevailing in Italy. The institute is now entering a new phase of the same research project focusing its attention on the role, structure, and functioning of Italian trade unions within the broader perspective of the history and traditional orientation of the Italian labour movement.

Research on youth has been recently completed and a study of the relationship between school and industry in southern Italy, based on intensive case studies, is about to be undertaken. Furthermore, a large-scale research project dealing with the administration of justice in Italy, with special reference to correlating social and family backgrounds of magistrates to their value orientation, as derived from sentences and opinions stated, will be conducted by the institute in collaboration with the 'Centro Nazionale per la Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale' of Milan.

In all the researches already undertaken or being considered, it is the aim of the institute to integrate theory and research and to take into account the historical background in an attempt to conduct a critical re-examination of the once important Italian sociological tradition.
Meetings

Conference on the economics of education
Menthon St. Bernard, September 1963

M. Debeauvais.

The symposium organized by the International Economic Association at Annecy from 24 August to 3 September brought together economists and specialists in the recently developed discipline of the economics of education, the participants including economists, educators and manpower specialists. It is a moot point, indeed, whether the economics of education is in fact a single discipline for it is developing in a number of directions which still show few signs of convergence—measurement of education in terms of cost, evaluation of its contribution to economic growth, educational planning, forecasting of manpower requirements, increasing the effectiveness of education.

This range of divergence was reflected in the working papers and in the discussion, the interests of the practitioners to some extent taking precedence over those of the theoreticians—understandably enough, in a field in which the pressure of needs has outstripped the development of theory.

Measurement of education

The calculation can be based on the number of pupils in each school cycle in a given country but the traditional divisions—primary, secondary and higher education—do not correspond to any age criterion (since the cycles overlap) or to the criterion of compulsory education (since the compulsory education period is being increasingly extended beyond the end of the primary cycle); there is a time variation in the cycles from one country to another. Because of the need for international comparability, it is preferable to consider the educational pyramid by year of study, and to calculate enrolment rates by age (M. Debeauvais).

The lack of information concerning private education and the various forms of out-of-school education (vocational training and adult education) makes it difficult to measure the cost of education accurately. All that can be done is to take the figures for public expenditure on education or, even more restrictive, the budgets of the ministries of education.

Taking the figures collected by F. Edding, international comparisons can be made between the ratio of public expenditure on education in different countries to their total budgetary expenditure or, more significantly, to their gross national product. The movement of that ratio over a period of time provides an approximate yardstick of the increase in governmental support of education.

No attempt seems to have been made to measure that movement in constant prices with the aid of appropriate deflation indices.

Edding's comparative series show clearly that expenditure on education has risen considerably in recent years—more so, in all cases, than the gross national product.
Technical and vocational education is of particular importance for economic growth, but because of the wide variety of fields covered and the difference in length of courses it is difficult to give figures for it, and statistical data concerning it are available in only a very few countries (K. Abraham).

The accountancy concept of costs is counterposed by the economic concept of costs. M. J. Bowman stressed the need to calculate opportunity costs, but pointed out how complex such calculations are. Opportunity costs have often been identified with the loss of potential earnings on the part of the pupils, but this is an unsatisfactory approximation, for it does not necessarily reflect the social cost, nor does it take account of the concrete possibilities of substitution; individual calculations are based only on the cost of education for the individual (which is well below the total cost, in view of the volume of public money spent on teaching) and on wages rather than on social productivity. F. Machlup suggested that opportunity costs of in-service training should be evaluated by distinguishing between systematic training, training not institutionalized but resulting in lower productivity during the apprenticeship period, and even training resulting from working experience where it is reflected in loss of potential earnings either for the individual, if such training is transferable, or for the firm, if it is not.

As A. Robinson and J. Vaizey emphasized, a distinction must be made between the cost and benefits of education from the standpoint of the individual and the standpoint of society. Moreover, as E. Lundberg suggested, some yardstick is needed for measuring how effectively society uses the available human resources. E. Denison, too, pointed out the importance of examining the contribution education makes to the advancement of knowledge and techniques, and not only to economic growth at a given technical level.

Education and economic growth

Even assuming that a satisfactory way is found of measuring education inputs, in terms either of physical units (the number of years' study incorporated in the labour force) or of value (monetary costs plus opportunity costs), it will still be necessary to measure their contribution to growth. The 'Cobb-Douglas' type of production functions do not, of course, take full account of growth as statistically indicated. T. Schultz and E. Denison have tried to minimize the residual factor left unexplained by increases either in capital or in manpower by combining education inputs and differentiated salaries according to levels of education, the presumption being that differences in salary are due to differences in education, and that these differential salaries reflect variations in labour productivity. These marginalist hypotheses are also the basis of the research carried out by Strumilin in the U.S.S.R., an account of which was given at the symposium by N. P. Fedorenko. These studies, however, are only in their infancy, and the time factor has not been taken into account in them, even by making allowance for future income.

Research on the profitability of education has not yet produced a satisfactory method of calculating an 'interest rate' which would enable us to assess the optimum amount of resources to be devoted to education and to material investment. For this reason, the main trend in planning techniques is in the direction of striking a balance between the aims of economic development and the need for education. A. Robinson's view was that, in underdeveloped countries, the demand for education (by the economy) should be regarded as the essential factor, economic demand taking priority over the supply aspect. It is now accepted that the targets of an economic plan can be converted into manpower demand at the various levels of qualification, and that the latter can then be expressed in terms of training programmes which determine the objectives of the education plan. These techniques, which are used by the national groups of the OECD Mediterranean Regional Project (R. Lyons) and in an increasing number of countries, are more or less comparable to production functions with complementary factors. The important
point, however, is to determine what proportion of the school-age population should be enrolled at the different levels of the education system, rather than to make a hasty calculation of the number of jobs to be provided in each profession (F. Harbison). Educational planning is strictly a long-term matter, and it is impossible to forecast the development of the occupational structure in detail. A linear programming model (prepared by H. Correa, in conjunction with J. Tinbergen) aims at expressing conditions of equilibrium between the number of pupils to be enrolled in secondary and higher education and economic development in accordance with a fixed rate of increase, and is based on the hypothesis that there is a significant connexion between the over-all level of production and the number of workers who have had a secondary or higher education. Other economists prefer a method based on consecutive approximations, permitting the use of all available information and allowance for non-quantifiable factors. All these functions, which are based on the demand for qualified manpower, may be related to functions of manpower supply according to levels of education; the latter functions being obtained from education flows evaluated in accordance with educational statistics (M. Debeaувais).

The effectiveness of educational systems

From the point of view of the economist, it is not sufficient to measure or forecast school enrolment and education costs, or even the economic returns from education — it is also important to find criteria which will enable the most effective use to be made of the resources allocated for education.

The dangers of a general education which places too much stress on book learning were analysed by Rashid in reference to the educated unemployed of Pakistan. When the education system is ill-suited to the needs of the economy, and particularly when it is imported or modelled on a foreign system, human resources may be inadequately utilized or even not utilized at all.

Are we to conclude from this that technical and specialized education should be developed to the detriment of general culture? The problem is not so simple as that; and H. Ripman pointed out that the International Bank, which has begun to make loans for education investments, is trying to establish criteria to assess the efficiency of the educational system as a whole.

The problem of the desirable balance between general education and technical and vocational training, which was discussed by A. Page, and the problem of the development of specialized training (apprenticeship, or training by vocational associations or technical schools) were dealt with in relation to the case studies presented by Abraham (Germany) and Jamin (U.S.S.R.). All countries apparently agree that general training (which is difficult to define) should be undertaken to an increasingly high level, so as to facilitate the vocational training and subsequent re-adaptation which technical progress necessitates. The fear was expressed by F. Harbison that the economic considerations which led to the increase in the number of technical schools, especially in underdeveloped countries, will cause a rise in the cost of education, which may be less efficient than a high-standard general secondary education, followed by systematic vocational training in the factory.

B. Suchodolsky put forward the argument that a modern economy calls for more workers capable of undertaking creative work than the number of naturally gifted persons, and that this leads to the systematic prolongation of general education.

The economists, however, are still searching for criteria for assessing the degree to which an education system is adapted to the needs of the economy, just as educators have not yet succeeded in evaluating the effectiveness of education. Would it be possible, as F. Harbison suggested, to establish an index of human resources which would include the different measurements of educational levels and the number of scientists, doctors and engineers? There is still a long way to go, it would seem, before the human (i.e. qualitative) factor can be brought into economic calculations.
Meetings

Despite gaps in statistics and theory, the work already done justifies the belief that research on these subjects has now been launched, and that consideration of the concept of education will enrich the theory of economic growth, provided—as U. Papi reminded us—that we do not narrow down the concept of education to purely economic dimensions, and that we remember that the true aim of education is to give human beings the kind of training which will enable them to control the economic world instead of being its slaves.

London-Cornell project for social research in South-East Asia

Kuala Lumpur, September 1963

In 1962, Cornell University, with the London School of Economics and Political Science and the School of Oriental and African Studies (both of the University of London), decided to pool their resources for social research in South-East Asia. Their joint five-year programme was supported by the Carnegie Corporation in the United States of America and the Nuffield Foundation in Great Britain.

Members of the London-Cornell project took part with other colleagues in a seminar of 'Discussions on Work in Progress' in Kuala Lumpur, Malasia, during September 1963. Local co-operation was sought and obtained from the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and a number of the staff members of the university attended the conference in their personal capacities. Participants were: London-Cornell project—Benedict R. Anderson, Donald H. Pond, Kaha Bador, Raymond Firth, Rosemary Firth, Valerie Gilmour; University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur), Department of Economics—Ungku A. Aziz, A. R. Mokhzani, Department of History—Wang Gung-Wu, Department of Malay Studies—S. Takdir Alisjabahana, Yunus Maris, S. Husin Ali, Tjoa Soei Hock, Mohammed Taib; University of Malaya (Singapore)—Ann Wee; University of Indonesia—R. M. Koentjaraningrat; University of Sydney—M. G. Swift; Yale University—P. Goethals; East-West Centre, Honolulu—Mary Monsen. In addition, L. H. Palmier, Unesco Research Centre, Delhi, A. T. Carey, Commissioner for Aboriginal Affairs, Federation of Malaya, and Baharon-Azhar, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, were present as observers.

Raymond Firth was chairman of the seminar, Donald Pond and Kahar Bador acted as rapporteurs and the general arrangements were made by A. R. Mokhzani.

The seminar was concerned with aspects of current research in the social sciences, with particular reference to social, economic and political changes in Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia. Material was presented on the following topics: the concept of 'household' in an urban area such as Singapore (Wee); the concept of 'village' in Indonesia (Koentjaraningrat); the guided economy of Indonesia (Pond); the political history of modern Indonesian leaders (Anderson); the formation of the modern Malay élite (Bador); changes in adat in Minangkabau society (Swift); a survey of economic and social relations in the Malayan rice-growing area of Tanjong Karang (Mokhzani); a survey of the fishing economy in a Kelantan Malay village (Raymond Firth); consumption patterns and welfare of Kelantan peasantry (Rosemary Firth); transmission of land rights in a Trengganu rural
community (Goethals); social stratification in a Malay rural community (S. Husin).

The inter-disciplinary character of the seminar promoted wide-ranging discussion, with considerable attention to methodological problems of field-work as well as to theoretical issues. Economic and political questions were especially keenly debated because of their obvious prime importance in South-East Asia today. Attention was given to processes of decision-making, e.g., in capital investment, and in considering the so-called 'revolution of rising expectations' markedly evident among the modern peasantry of South-East Asia, an attempt was made to define as closely as possible the choices made by consumers. Here, problems of the relation of economic values to values of other kinds were explored and the frequent ambivalence manifest among the peasantry themselves was noted. Evidence of prudent calculation in peasant transactions was given to show that the stereotype of peasant thriftlessness was often inaccurate. But it was agreed that this did not necessarily imply a substantial basis for economic growth because of the range of ends to which such thrift might be put. Relations between economic power and political power were discussed in several contexts, including those of owner/tenant dependence, political patronage and clientalism. The difficulties of examining the process of the formation of political élites were examined and it was pointed out that similarities in family structure and other social influences such as education might be more significant as forces of group action than a similar ideology. As one preliminary step in the study of such élites, it was suggested that empirical inquiry might focus on such objectively ascertainable data as kin and marriage relationships.

In considering processes of economic growth, attention was given to land problems. It was agreed that a series of comparative studies of land-holding and transmission of land rights in South-East Asian communities would be very useful. It was noted that the accumulation of parcels of land under single ownership might not contribute effectively to advance if no substantial change in the technology or organization of production occurred simultaneously. In the field of incentive, it was argued that solidarity of family and kin relations is not necessarily a hindrance to development of individual initiative in economic spheres. A concern with non-competitive personal relationships and mechanisms of social assistance may indeed retard the growth of Western 'economic' attitudes, but such stereotypes may easily be over-emphasized. In field conditions sibling and other kin rivalries are found, together with competition and bargaining among kin. The existence of an elaborate structure of kin obligations is not incompatible with economic growth.

Several methodological problems with field-work implications were examined: the reasons and conditions involved in the initial selection of research topics; the need for careful scrutiny of generalizations by reference to the precise empirical evidence on which they are based; the precautions and difficulties involved in the definition and classification of apparently simple units such as household and village, and in the use of such concepts as per capita income, especially in the study of peasant conditions. The relative contribution of intensive small-scale village studies and extensive large-scale studies of a regional or national order was examined and the values, drawbacks and supplementary nature of each type of study were clearly brought out. It was argued forcefully that for adequate definition of significant elements in a large-scale questionnaire inquiry, depth study on a small scale should precede the sampling stage and full-scale collection of data. It was agreed that as a basis for many kinds of quantitative statement on peasant social and economic conditions, there was no substitute for day-to-day empirical records of observation. A special modern problem of difficulty was noted in the sensitivity of some new nations to objective social science study, and the growing need to handle this problem in a way which, while being as tactful as possible, would not compromise the integrity of the research worker.

The general impression seemed to be that these presentations of field data in a theoretical frame and the ensuing critical discussions had been a constructive exercise.
Announcements

‘Peace Research Abstracts’

Peace Research Abstracts, co-edited by Drs. A. and H. Newcombe, is published under the auspices of the Canadian Peace Research Institute. It proposes to cover all relevant material, wherever published, and in all languages, from 1945 on. By October 1963, 8,000 references had been collected, of which 5,500 had been abstracted. The abstracting is done on a voluntary basis through the cooperation of scientists in a number of countries; more volunteer abstractors are, however, urgently needed.

The field of interest has been divided into ten major categories and further subdivided into 1,000 fine classifications: this scheme is set out in the Peace Research Abstracts Coding Manual which can be obtained from the editors at the cost of $(U.S.) 1.

A search and abstracting service is available at a cost of $(U.S.) 10 per searching hour, and 9 cents per photostated abstract supplied. Duplicate sets of the abstracts are being printed and punched. Both hand-sorted and machine-sorted punched-cards are to be printed, to sell at 3 cents and 6 cents per card, respectively; they will be issued at the rate of 1,000 per month.

Those interested in acting as abstractors, using the searching service or ordering printed copies of the abstracts are requested to get in touch with the editors at 25 Dundana Avenue, Dundas, Ontario (Canada).

Research approaches to potential threats to peace

Essay contest

The Council Sub-committee on Problems of Peace and War of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues announces a prize of $1,000 for the best essay on a researchable problem relating to a specific threat to peace likely to arise during approximately the next two decades.

The prize will be awarded for the essay which, in the opinion of the judges, best meets the following criteria: (a) systematically formulates the nature of a specific problem likely to arise; (b) delineates the social-psychological components of the

problem; (c) specifies the kinds of social-psychological research that could advance our understanding of this problem, that could contribute to the prevention of its occurrence, and that could suggest ways of dealing with it should it occur.

The essay may consider, as a major threat to peace, the lack of essential social-psychological information due to a lack of adequate social-psychological methodology. Thus, the essay may focus on the development of such research methods provided it does so with due attention to the above criteria.

The contest is open to all, whether or not they are SPSSI members. Members of the sub-committee are ineligible.

Deadline for submission of essays is 1 January 1965. Papers will be judged before the September 1965 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association takes place. Announcement of the award will be made at the meeting.

Essays must be written in English and the suggested length is fifty double-spaced pages or less. Submissions must be unpublished, and the SPSSI reserves publication rights.

Judges will be the members of the sub-committee: Donald T. Campbell, Northwestern University; Morton Deutsch, Columbia University; Jerome D. Frank, Johns Hopkins University; Eugene H. Jacobson, Michigan State University; Herbert C. Kelman, University of Michigan; Donald N. Michael, Institute for Policy Studies; Gardner Murphy, Menninger Foundation; and Muzafer Sherif, University of Oklahoma. Decisions of the judges will be final. In the event that the judges decide that no essay merits the award, the contest will be carried over for another year.

Essays should be submitted anonymously to Donald N. Michael, Institute for Policy Studies, 1900 Florida Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. They should be identified only by a code. The code and author's name and address should also be sent separately to Mrs. Caroline Weichlein, Administrative Secretary, SPSSI, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Authorship of the manuscripts will be identified by reference to the code only after completion of the judging.

Seventh Latin American Congress of Sociology

The Seventh Latin American Congress of Sociology will be held in Bogotá, Colombia, from 14 to 19 July 1964, in collaboration with the Latin American Sociological Association (ALAS).

The central theme of the congress will be 'Sociology and the present Latin American transformations'. Sub-themes to be treated are as follows. Commission I: 'Sociology and national planning'; Commission II: 'Sociology of agrarian transformations'; Commission III: 'Sociology of the urban and industrial transformations'; Commission IV: 'Sociology of education'.

Commission II will include a number of specially invited economists. Commission IV is constituted by a round table under the auspices of the International Association of Sociology.

Further information from: Secretaría, Asociación Colombiana de Sociología, Facultad de Sociología, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia, S.A.
A clearinghouse for social and humanistic research in the Jewish field

The YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (1048 Fifth Avenue, New York 28, N.Y.) announces the establishment of a clearinghouse and index to Jewish subjects in current American humanistic and social research. All scholars engaged in research (including doctoral dissertations and M.A. theses) in which Jewish topics or materials are separately identifiable are invited to fill out a brief questionnaire which will be supplied upon request. Co-operating scholars will receive an annual list of studies registered with the clearinghouse, either completed or in progress.

Publication
of the *Journal of Applied Probability*

The Applied Probability Trust, in association with the London Mathematical Society, is to publish a new international journal devoted to the applications of probability theory to the biological, physical, social and technological sciences.

The journal will be issued in two half-yearly numbers forming a volume of about 300 pages per annum, starting in May-June 1964. It will include: (a) review papers surveying a field of applied probability; (b) research papers; and (c) short communications.

Subscriptions for the annual volume of the journal are: for libraries and institutions: $(U.S.)12, £4.45 (stg.), £(A)5.58, for individuals belonging to a recognized scientific society: $(U.S.)8, £2.16s (stg.), £(A)3.12s.

Members of the London Mathematical Society should order their copies of the journal through the society, from which they will be available at special rates.

Further information can be obtained from the editor-in-chief, Dr. J. Gani, Department of Statistics, The Australian National University, P.O. Box 4, Canberra, Australia.
Reviews of books and documents

Book reviews

BLITSTEN, Dorothy R. The world of the family. A comparative study of family organizations in their social and cultural settings. New York, Random House, 1963, xiv + 306 pp. The family is a universal social organization, for it meets fundamental human needs; but the forms of family organization vary considerably from continent to continent; between the type of family which existed in Confucian China—which may be termed a family-corporation and is sometimes identified with the clan—and the type of the so-called 'nuclear' family, generally found in the United States of America, consisting only of the father, mother and children, there is a great variety of different types, one intermediate variant being represented by the 'extended bilateral' family, generally predominant in European Catholic countries, in which, besides the ties between parents and children, there are ties with the paternal and maternal grandparents, and with uncles, aunts and cousins.

In the corporative type of family, an extreme example of which is provided by Confucian China, husband and wife, as such, have only a very limited independence; marriage is a clan affair, children are brought up in the family community (the boys in particular being, for all practical purposes, withdrawn at a very early stage from parental control), and the choice of a career for the boys or of an 'establishment' for the girls is subject to approval by the elders. In such an organization, the individual has little freedom of choice in what he does but, on the other hand, he is protected by a strong and extensively ramified institution; this is particularly advantageous to the elderly, whose authority and prestige steadily increase.

At the other extreme, American society offers the example of families in which only conjugal and parental relations are of importance. Under this system, the individual enjoys the maximum independence and probably has very great opportunities of personal achievement; on the other hand, the security which such a limited family circle can provide is extremely precarious; the stability of the family, which depends essentially on the health and emotional balance of the father and mother, is often threatened. Furthermore, once the children are married and settled, the parents find themselves left to fend for themselves and provide for their old age.

Between these two contrasting types, there is the French, Italian and Spanish 'extended bilateral' type of family. Family relations and, at the same time, the obligations of the various members, are more complex and exacting, but the 'family nucleus'—father, mother and children—retains a very large degree of independence and can also be afforded real protection, both psychological and material.

1. From the beginning of 1965 the book reviews and shorter notices in this Journal will be discontinued. Books sent to the editor will, however, still be listed under 'Books received'.

These are standard types; in actual fact, there is obviously greater variation in the forms of family organization, especially as such organization depends to a large extent on the economic and political context of the society to which it belongs; for instance, in the Scandinavian countries, where the nuclear family predominates, individuals have a great measure of personal independence, as in the United States of America, but they also enjoy a degree of security unknown to the Americans, as fairly advanced social legislation makes good the shortcomings of a narrow family organization (this applies particularly to the position of the aged). Likewise, in the Moslem countries of the Middle East, the family is of the 'corporate' type, as in Confucian China, but inter-family relations are rather different.

There is no doubt that the present trend of development throughout the world towards a technological form of society on Western lines is one of the factors contributing to the disruption of the latter type of family. The nuclear family is increasingly becoming the standard family pattern. However, the 'extended bilateral' family seems likely to survive, for it seems to be the type which best meets the needs of individuals in our societies, unless social legislation is generally adopted, as in Scandinavia, to enable nuclear families to afford their members both independence and security. In any case, the examples of post-revolutionary Russia and of Israel show that it is impossible to eliminate the family from society. The needs for which it caters are fundamental and no other form of social organization can satisfy them.


In 1962, the Center for Agriculture and Economic Adjustment organized an international conference on the problem of the world food shortage and on the action which the developed countries, particularly the United States of America, could take to deal with it. The idea of holding this conference came from the suggestion, often put forward, that American universities living on the income from lands granted to them after the War of Secession should be more closely associated with the provision of assistance to the underdeveloped countries. For the past century, these 'land-grant universities' have given special attention to agricultural research and many would like their activities to extend into the 'international' field. The papers collected in the volume here reviewed are based on the reports submitted to the conference and deal with various aspects of the problem of hunger in the world.

Some reports (West) first draw attention to the disparity in food conditions in the different regions of the world and draw up a kind of hunger map, the regions in the worst position being South Asia and the Far East. Others (Allen) tabulate the essential food products of which these regions are in need, particularly proteins and fats, in order to provide guidance for any food assistance measures which may be taken. Phipart and Sheppard compare the efforts being made in certain undernourished countries to find substitutes for the proteins they lack. Several writers, however, share the view that assistance to the underdeveloped countries by way of providing them with agricultural surpluses from the developed countries is not enough to solve the problem of nutritional underdevelopment, which is bound up with a number of circumstances peculiar to the underdeveloped countries: very swift expansion of the population, which it should be possible to remedy, though only to a certain extent, by the extension of birth-control (Bourgeois-Pichat, Hose-litz); lack of an industrial infrastructure capable of providing work for a super-abundant labour force (Johnson); difficulty of planning the economy while leaving free scope for individual efforts (Kellog); absence of organized markets for satisfactory distribution of agricultural produce (Bachman); etc. All the writers emphasize the complexity and overlapping of the problems and expose the 'vicious circle' of underdevelopment: poverty, which results in too low a level of consumption and thereby frustrates the development of production, which is the only remedy for
poverty. In this connexion, Mellor gives a table of all the changes which would be necessary in order to increase agricultural productivity in backward societies.

The developed countries can assist in the economic launching of the poor countries by contributing to the local training of supervisory staff and research workers and by intensifying their own research efforts in the field of tropical agriculture. Christensen and Stevens emphasize the importance of the role of research and education in economic development; Jones draws attention to certain gaps in research; and Ezechiel discusses the FAO's research activities and points out that many questions still remain uninvestigated. All declare that the United States should help the developing countries to organize their agriculture. Fisher considers that American private enterprise should take a special interest in such work. Berg, Soth, James and Tolley describe more particularly what the 'land-grant universities' should do.

It is clear from these studies that the problem of nutritional underdevelopment concerns all countries alike, since the richer countries should help the poorer, but that the assistance given by the industrialized countries should not consist exclusively of gifts; it is necessary to consider the problems as they confront the under-fed countries and to help the latter to solve them without, however, doing the job for them.


The essential part of this volume is to be found in the three studies contained in Part I: Brazil's action to strengthen the economic position of its drought-ridden north-eastern provinces, attempts in Colombia to improve patterns of land use and land tenure, and Chile's experience with recurring inflation. In Part II, the author raises certain questions concerning the problem-solving capabilities of public authorities in Latin America and the reader is led to ask whether there is a specific Latin American 'style' or 'strategy' of problem solving. Instead of attempting to discover some 'prerequisite' to development, the author tries to show how a society can begin to move forward as it is, in spite and because of what it is, though this approach may prove to be unduly tolerant of existing failings. In Latin American countries, the principal method open to 'problem victims' for commanding the attention of policy makers is violent protest, but other ways have been found—namely, ideology—to link the neglected problems to those which are given priority. The prevailing style of problem solving is that of 'motivation—outruns—understanding', but these elements are overshadowed by a third condition for advance: the ability to carry through reforms in spite of the resistance they evoke. The traditional dichotomy between reform and revolution proves quite inappropriate for catching the reality of social and economic change in the above three studies. There are many situations in which change short of revolution has become possible, although change is still being visualized in terms of violent revolution. But to qualify as revolutionary, violence must be centralized. Decentralized, temporarily unrequited violence may nevertheless prove to be an element of reform, and also a direct problem-solving activity—as in Colombia and Brazil's north-east. Concomitant means of achieving reform are crisis and the utilization of the mechanisms of log rolling and shifting alliances. The effective reform-monger must gain allies in the centre and on the right, while delaying as long as possible any break with his radical followers. He may have to play to quite different galleries, a highly risky assignment.


In this book, which sets out to be both theoretical and practical, the author attempts to look beyond the concept of the 'ruling class', which is losing much of its validity in modern, differentiated society, and to put in its place that of a 'strategic élite'.

The world of the social sciences
What distinguishes the strategic élites of a society from what would be its ruling
class is their functional or specialized character and their plurality; what distin­
guishes them from the other élites is their importance, or the consequences of their
action for the society as a whole.

The book is divided into four parts, corresponding to four questions. The first
part, which aims at defining the structure of the strategic élites, answers the ques­
tion: 'How many strategic élites are there, and how and why did they come into
existence?' The second part, which deals with the functions of these élites, answers
the question: 'What are their specific social responsibilities?' The answer is based on
the theories of Talcott Parsons; the author distinguishes: (a) élites connected with
goal attainment, i.e., the political élites; (b) élites concerned with adaptation—the
means to be used for the attainment of these goals—i.e., the economic, military,
diplomatic and scientific élites; (c) élites associated with integration, i.e., those exer­
cising some sort of moral authority: priests, philosophers, educators, reigning or
ruling families, etc.; (d) lastly, 'pattern maintenance élites', keeping the society
knit together or reflecting its psychological climate, who consist of outstanding
figures ranging from famous artists and writers, through theatre and film 'stars', to
sports record holders.

The third part deals with the recruitment of the strategic élites and with the
rewards and obligations awaiting those who become members of them. The fourth
part answers the question: 'How and why do strategic élites survive or perish?' Nine
appendixes are provided furnishing factual and bibliographical data to support and
supplement the answers to all these questions given in the book.

Literatur über Entwicklungsländer, I and II. Hannover, Verlag für Literatur und

Although this is not an original contribution to knowledge, but a bibliography,
its seems worth bringing to the attention of readers of this journal, for it shows
not only how very many publications have been devoted over the past ten years
to the problems of the developing countries, but also that scientific circles in the
Federal Republic of Germany are taking an increasing interest in these problems.

This bibliography is, in the main, the work of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation
(Bonn), which secured the collaboration of a scientific institute in Cologne and of
several foreign institutions. It mentions more than 13,000 titles of works and articles
published, between 1950 and 1959, in the world's most widely used languages.
The first and largest volume contains the titles of publications issued in English,
French or German. The second volume is devoted to publications issued in Russian
and a few other Slav languages.

In each volume, the titles are grouped in accordance with a uniform plan com­
prising four parts: general, Africa as a whole, Asia as a whole, individual countries
and territories (in alphabetical order). In each of these parts, and for each of the
countries included in the fourth part, the headings are arranged in systematic order
with the works in chronological order of publication under each heading and, for
each year, in alphabetical order of the authors' names.

This rather complicated arrangement is likely to make consultation difficult,
and it is not assisted by the fact that the titles are not numbered and that there
are no running titles at the tops of the pages.

However, the abundance and variety of the contents make up for these short­
comings and also give food for thought. At first glance, the reader is struck by the
fact that, for almost all the headings, the number of titles mentioned rises appreciably
from 1954 or 1955 onwards. This fact may be due to variation in the bibliographical
coverage but it may also be attributable to increasing interest in these countries
from that time. It would, in any case, be useful to go more deeply into this question
and to make a careful analysis of the chronological distribution of the titles listed, by
subjects and by countries.

The subjects treated are extremely diverse; many of the publications have
nothing in common except the fact that they deal with some aspect of a country usually considered to be 'developing'. This fact draws attention to the still very uncertain character of this category; despite what is said in certain quarters, there is as yet no science of development; there are problems which seem to be common to a number of countries and which are being studied in various branches of the social sciences.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that each of the two volumes of this bibliography is to be brought up to date annually, beginning with publications issued in 1960.


Professor T. H. Marshall has brought together in this volume a number of his writings over the thirty years which he has devoted to the study and teaching of sociology.

These are arranged under three main headings. The first part of the collection deals with the present and future situation of sociology, with particular reference to its aims, method, strong points and weak points. The general theme of the second part, which takes up by far the largest portion of the work, is social class, and this part reflects the constant concern of an author who regards the problems of social stratification as the essential subject matter of sociology. Stress is placed on the gradual disappearance of social barriers during the last hundred years and the efforts—powerfully seconded by the development of education and social services—made to establish true social equality. It is from this equalitarian standpoint that Professor Marshall emphasizes, in the third part of the book, the importance of the 'welfare State' and of the 'affluent society'. He gives these notions new precision by considering their implications for the future development of modern societies. His analyses are probably influenced by his direct view of English society, and this brings out the extent to which a sociologist depends on his own society; but they are nevertheless of general use with respect to Western societies. Their chief merit is that they seize upon social changes while they are actually in progress and may prompt sociologists to adopt a dynamic approach to stratification studies, which are too often static. Sociology will have proved its worth as the science of societies only when it is able to give an account of the latter as they develop. In this respect, social stratification studies are of decisive importance for the whole future of this branch of knowledge. Professor Marshall was particularly well placed, owing to the positions he occupied in Unesco’s Department of Social Sciences and in the International Sociological Association, to form an opinion on the future of sociological studies; it is significant that his book points out to sociologists the path they should follow.

**MEYNAUD, Jean. La révolte paysanne.** Paris, Payot, 1963, 308 pp. (Études et documents.)

The peasants' revolt is certainly a question of the greatest interest at the present day. In most of the economically developed countries there is now a serious agricultural problem. The peasant who, in the past, was perhaps more inclined to bear adversity, has acquired the habit of rebelling and protesting against the injustices from which he suffers. He shows his dissatisfaction either by leaving the countryside for the town or by taking part in demonstrations which are often violent.

The author first seeks to analyse the nature of this agricultural crisis and the various factors involved in it. Townspeople are often ill-informed about this question and it is essential that every citizen should become alive to the problem.

The author then goes on to consider the underlying economic causes of the 'peasants' unrest'. Why is it that, in an economy where the national income is increasing, the effect of the operation of the market is most often detrimental to the peasant? The diversity of agrarian structures, the intrinsic weakness of the peasants' position, the lack of elasticity in respect of nutritional needs, and the dependence of
farmers on the mechanisms of the market are the most obvious causes of the peasants’
economic inferiority.

What remedies can be found for dealing with all these grounds of dissatisfaction? What measures would help to diminish the intensity of the peasants’ claims? Jean Meynaud sets out to draw up a list of them and devotes several chapters to a description of the fundamental data of agricultural policy, with special reference to France. He thus emphasizes efforts towards efficiency and the development of land holding systems, the extension of trade channels, the improvement of distribution, and the achievement of equality.

Experience shows, however, that, despite the efforts of the authorities, the results have had little impact. The labour put forth by the peasant still has to contend with the freaks of nature or slumps on the market at times of glut. It is essential, however, that the farmer should cease to regard himself as an outcast. The situation of the peasants as a class could be improved by energetic, systematic action, mainly directed towards structural reform. It seems essential to enlighten public opinions on this vital problem, and the author’s main aim is to get everyone interested in it.

MOORE, Wilbert E. Man, time and society. New York, London, Wiley, 1963, x + 163 pp. Basic to any social system, and conditioning its structure and evolution, are the three factors of number, space and time. Although many studies have already been made on the first two, and demography and ecology have been established sciences for some time past, time and its influence on man have so far been the subject of philosophical reflections rather than of scientific studies proper. W. E. Moore’s book, which investigates this third dimension of social life and seeks to bring out its significance, represents an essay in this last line of study.

A characteristic feature of modern life is the shortage of time, which constantly imposes limits and necessitates choices, thus leading to an increasing specialization of social roles. While time is first felt to be a limitation and a constraint, it is also the indispensable measure of any human activity: it gives it its rhythm, provides it with points of reference and enables it to be organized. Although time is precisely defined by the clock, with its intervals and its duration, it, as it were, eludes this definition, its value depending principally on the way in which it is employed. With respect to labour, it has thus become a unit of reference: payment by the day, by the week or by the month has replaced, in very wide sectors of economic life, payment for piecework or for a given job. The tendency in industrial societies is towards a steady reduction of working hours, but it is again in relation to time that leisure is defined—as what time remains available outside working hours, which can be freely used and which permits a choice between different possible forms of relaxation.

All human activity, whether in the form of work or leisure, is thus organized around this concept of time. This emerges, in the first place, from individual experience, but it is also to be observed at the group level. The family, i.e., the most elementary group, is thus profoundly influenced in its behaviour and in its evolution by the time which is specially devoted to family life, apart from work or any other external activity; the very manner in which the family structure develops through time—the frequency of births, the age at which children leave home, etc.—has important implications, both material and psychological.

But, although time remains fluid and variable in the family context, it becomes a matter of imperative necessity in an administrative, bureaucratic organization; for any form of administration presupposes the adoption of rational procedure for the attainment of precise aims, and the essential aspect of such rationalization is the way in which the various tasks are distributed, succeed one another, and are synchronized; in short, the way in which they are arranged in time.

Voluntary associations represent a third type of group, with a somewhat different problem, closer to that of the family, for it lies essentially in the shortage of free time and in the fact that, in the eyes of society, such time is of secondary im-
portance; it is blameworthy to devote one’s efforts to an association to the detriment of one’s work or of one’s family. This is a considerable factor in the life of these associations, and in their decline or disappearance.

If we shift our attention from groups to the social system as a whole, we find that urban life, economic life and international life illustrate all these aspects of time still more amply.

Shorter notices

The ethical and social problem raised by the existence of ‘stars’.

**ALEXANDER-FRUTSCHI, Marian Crites,** (ed.). *Human resources and economic growth. An international annotated bibliography on the role of education and training in economic and social development.* Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, 1963. 25 cm., xvi + 398 pp., index. $3.50.
This bibliography deals with the part played by human resources in social and economic development. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the underdeveloped countries, in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. Nearly twelve hundred titles are mentioned, each entry being accompanied by an abstract running from five lines to a page.

**Anales de la Academia nacional de derecho y ciencias sociales.** Ano V, segunda época, no. 5. Buenos Aires, 1960. 26 cm., 319 pp., bibliogr.
Proceedings of the Argentine National Academy of Law and Social Sciences for the year 1959: studies on the May Revolution and the birth of the nation, on the work of Clodomiro Zavalia, on Argentine mining laws, on law and the acceleration of history, etc.

Soviet legislation encourages workers to improve their qualifications by granting certain advantages and privileges to ‘worker-students’.

The author analyses the currency situation of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, and studies payment problems in Western Europe.

Factors starting off development, the economic mechanisms of development, economic obstacles to the first stages of advance in underdeveloped countries. The last hundred and fifty pages constitute an ‘historical annex’, in which the author gives a comparative account of economic development in England and France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Reviews of books and documents

Bibliographie des comptes rendus des réunions internationales tenues en 1957. Brussels, 1963. 21 cm., 388 pp., index. 32 F. (Union of International Associations, publication 183.)

Covers the official reports and working papers of all the congresses, symposia, conferences, etc., of international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and of international meetings convened by national organizations. The bibliographical descriptions are given, as far as possible, in the language in which the work is published; the description of the contents is nearly always in English or French. Particulars of the number of persons attending each meeting and the number of countries represented are also given.


List of documents relating to trade unionism in France between 1871 and 1921, particularly the official records of the National Congresses and trade union journals.

CALLAHAN, Raymond E. Education and the cult of efficiency. A study of the social forces that have shaped the administration of the public schools. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 23 cm., x + 273 pp., index, $5.50.

The author asserts that, since the beginning of the century, the administration of schools in the United States of America has been gradually assimilated more and more to the management of industrial and commercial undertakings with consequent wrong emphasis in the educational work of the school.

CAMERON, Norman. Personality development and psychopathology. A dynamic approach. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963. 24 cm., xxi + 793 pp., index. Personality development through childhood and adolescence and the influence of the subconscious on behaviour, as observed in normal and in psychopathic individuals.


Origin and demographic characteristics of the coloured population of South Africa, their social and economic living conditions, state of cultural development, position in the country's political organization. In conclusion, the author wonders how effective the policy of strict segregation applied by the South African Government will be in the long run.


The purpose of this study is to fill in certain gaps in the demographic data of the United States of America. It first gives estimated figures, for each year, of the number of births and the fertility rate of the white population since 1850. It then evaluates the errors contained in the ten-yearly censuses of the same population, by age and by sex, from 1880 to 1950. The description of the methods used by the authors is of special interest.


This collection of studies on the main problems in social psychology also describes the state of research in this field and the methods of work. For the use of students, the
authors have prefaced the texts grouped in each of the sections by a short introductory commentary.


Essays based on the reports and discussions of a symposium held in 1962 by the American Political Science Association on the theme of nation building. The first contributions—particularly the chapters by Deutsch, Friedrich and Weilennann—consider, from a general point of view, certain problems relating to the building and consolidation of national units; the other essays study, from an historical point of view, the emergence of nations in the United States of America, Latin America and Africa.


After an historical introduction, the author discusses the French social security system proper, as defined by the law in force in 1963; the scope of the general provisions (social insurance, compensation for industrial injuries, family allowances, etc.) and the organization of the general system so established; other systems (special wage arrangements, independent old age insurance systems, agricultural social security); complementary efforts (voluntary insurance, public assistance, unemployment benefits).


Explanation of the special importance of cottage industries in Umbria, their social role, and the factors determining their development. A systematic study of the social category concerned, from the standpoints of law (status), sociology (distribution, age) and geography (location). Many statistical data are provided.


General account of a survey carried out in France on the various ideas held regarding the social role of women. The authors consider this problem from the sociological standpoint (how group images and ideas are formed in different social milieux), from the ethnological standpoint (what dialectical interaction is there between the image and the pattern in a particular culture and what part does the image play in the development of social life), and, lastly, from the psychological standpoint (what relations are there between the forming of the images and individual motivations and modes of rationalization). The image of the role of women in the family, as wives, as workers and as students, and awareness of a change in that role, are all factors determining the general conception of the society of the future.


Employment of married women in Sweden and the effects of their work on their family life and political and religious attitudes.

Gini, Corrado. Sul problema dell'artigianato. Constatazioni e suggerimenti tratti dall'indagine pilota. Roma, Tip. F. Failli, 1962. 29 cm., 61 pp., tabl. (Ministero dell'In-
Reviews of books and documents


A detailed account of the revolutionary movement in Germany from 1914 to 1918, based on very full documentation.


Problems connected with nationalization; extent and development of the public sector in production in the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Austria and Sweden.


Every civilization approaches the problem of good and evil in accordance with the requirements of its time. In the modern era, scientific and technical progress must to some extent take into account our moral principles and our sense of values.


This booklet is designed to acquaint the non-specialist with the problems arising in connexion with monetary policy. It considers, among other things, the part played by banking institutions.


A history of credit through the ages, from Babylon to the present day; half of the book, however, deals with present-day interest-rate problems. The author's analysis covers about forty countries and is illustrated with a number of tables and graphs.

Houtart, Francisco. La Iglesia latino-americana en la hora del Concilio. Friburg, Bogotá, Oficina internacional de investigaciones sociales de FERES, 1963. 22 cm., 62 pp., fig., maps, tabl. (América Latina.)

The Catholic Church and the social changes in Latin America: problems of pastoral work and of the apostolate; social and cultural influence of Christians.


A comparative study of three civilizations—Chinese, Hindu and American—from the standpoint of the relations between man, society and culture. Clan, caste and club, which are, for each of these civilizations, a characteristic form of social and cultural relations, are studied both from the institutional and psychological standpoints.

The various essays contained in this booklet are based on the lectures organized by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva on the question whether international law meets the needs of the maintenance of world security at the present time. Various subjects are discussed. The booklet also contains the text of a speech by Dag Hammarskjöld on ‘Liberty and Law in International Life’ and an article by O. Schachter on ‘Dag Hammarskjöld and the Relation of Law to Politics’.


Development and present state of Soviet legislation concerning inventions and their authors.


Developments in the structure, operation and functions of the Sovnarkhozes (Councils of National Economy) since they were set up.

JENKS, C. Wilfred. Law, freedom and welfare. London, Stevens and Sons, 1963. 24 cm., xii + 162 pp., index. £1.17s.6d.

A plea for the development of international law as an instrument for the promotion of peace and justice in a divided world which is constantly changing.


Emergence and development of social democracy in Russia; part played by the social democratic party in the great crisis of 1904-7.


The theories of Keynes are incapable of preventing economic crises, which are inherent in capitalism.


Both private investment and government loans from Western countries are instruments of imperialist expansion in the underdeveloped countries.


Basing his work on extensive source material and, in particular, on the public records in Vienna, the author shows that Metternich's foreign policy, and notably his policy with regard to Prussia, was dominated not only by the wish to check Napoleon's advance in Europe, but also by the desire to prevent Russia from establishing a hegemony over its European neighbours.
LANNOY, Juan Luis de. *Los niveles de vida en América latina. Vivienda, alimentación y salud*. Friburgo, Bogotá, Oficina internacional de investigaciones sociales de FERES; Bogotá, Centro de investigaciones sociales, departamento socio económico, 1963. 22 cm., 235 pp., fig., maps, tabl., throw-out, bibliogr. (Estudios sociológicos latino-americanos, 6.)

Housing, food and health facilities in Latin America: the problem of shanty towns and town planning programmes, possibilities of increasing food production, death rate and health policy.


After an introductory discussion of the methods used in the general survey carried out in 1960 on Italian handicraft industries, the author gives the statistical data collected (relating only to Umbria, Lombardy and Basilicata).


Electoral behaviour of a group of American printing-trade workers during the presidential elections of 1952. In the first part of this book, the author studies the causes of the diversity of voting patterns within this group (social and economic, ideological, and other); he then tries to determine the reasons why the individuals questioned showed such great instability in their voting intentions between the beginning and the end of the electoral campaign.


A very full social and cultural anthropology study: the village and its institutions, the population and the daily round. Several chapters deal with the organization of the village economy; the land-holding system, agricultural techniques, local handicrafts and trade.


A former president of the American Atomic Energy Commission gives us, after a lapse of thirteen years, the results of his thinking on disarmament, the role of the 'atom' in modern life, the place of scientists in American society, and the role of the commission itself. In conclusion, he says he is optimistic about the future of mankind; in his view, the guarantees of man's survival are to be found not in more or less illusory negotiations but in human wisdom and, more particularly, in the awareness which Americans must have of their role as leaders.


A regional monograph on the economic situation of Basilicata and the special character of this region in Italy as a whole. Characteristic features of handicraft industries in this region. Credit facilities instituted for their benefit. Many statistical data are provided.


Despite the profound changes in monetary theory and practice since the beginning of the century, the traditional terms and concepts have not been altered and no longer match the facts. The author, after discussing the classic monetary theories, emphasizes this growing confusion in terminology and proposes a new, practical concept of the monetary standard.


A history of scientific progress from prehistoric to modern times, and of its relations with successive civilizations. The last quarter of the book deals with the twentieth century, studying the emergence of technology and the development of new human sciences (relations between technology and society, between science and philosophy, twentieth-century anthropology).

NAFZIGER, Ralph O.; WHITE, David Manning (eds.). Introduction to mass communications research. 2nd ed. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1963. 23 cm., x + 281 pp., fig., bibliogr., index. $6. (Council on Communications Research, Journalism monographs, 6.)

Second edition of a work published in 1958, dealing with the principles and methods of communications research. The progress achieved in this field in the space of five years has made it necessary to bring the work up to date in some respects and to add a new chapter dealing with content analysis.

O'LEARY, Timothy J. Ethnographic bibliography of South America. New Haven, Human relations area files, 1963. 28 cm., xxiv + 387 pp., insert maps, index. $6.75. (Behavior science bibliographies.)

This unannotated bibliography lists more than 20,000 titles of ethnographical works dealing with continental South America and published from early times (some date back to the seventeenth century) to the present day. The works are classified by geographical area and, within each area, by tribal groups.


Basic principles and study, by branches of production, of the division of labour among the socialist countries.

PAGANI, Angelo. (ed.). Antologia di scienze sociali a cura di Angelo Pagani. II. Campi di applicazione della sociologia. Bologna, Società editrice Il Mulino, 1963. 22 cm., x + 693 pp., bibliogr., index. 6,000 lire. (Collezione di testi e di studi scienze sociali, 8.)

A selection of texts—Italian and foreign—relating to the different branches of sociology (industrial, rural, urban, political, religious).

PIGULEVSKAJA, E. A. Obnovenie osnovnogo kapitala japonskoj promyshlennosti i razvitie poslevoennogo cikla. Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R., 1960. 20 cm,
256 pp., tabl., 9 roubles. (Akademija Nauk S.S.S.R., Institut Mirovoj Ekonomiki i Meždunarodnykh Otnošenij.)

The way in which periodical over-production crises come about in the conditions of rapid development prevailing in the various branches of Japanese industry.

PIN, Emile S. J. Elementos para una sociología del catolicismo latino-americano. Friburgo Bogotá, Oficina internacional de investigaciones sociales de FERES, 1963. 21 cm., 120 pp., tabl. (Estudios socio-religiosos latino-americanos, 20.)

This study forms part of a wider survey on social and religious changes in Latin America. The author discusses ritual behaviour, religious motivations, beliefs and attitudes, syncretisms and superstitions. There is also a chapter dealing with the religious behaviour of the Indian populations.


This exceptionally interesting collection of texts gives a general picture of research on the theory of political behaviour, emphasizes the variety of problems raised by a 'behaviourist' approach to politics, and includes a number of case studies drawn from the political life of the United States of America and other countries.


A descriptive analysis of the referendum approving the 'decolonization' of Algeria: circumstances in which the referendum was held, electoral campaign (attitude of the various parties, the part played by the press, radio and television), analysis of the results. Many annexes (speeches by General de Gaulle and his ministers, party manifestoes, broadcast and televised statements, official documents and results by departments). An attached pocket contains seven maps showing the results by cantons and a map of the results, by communes, for the Paris area.


The contributions contained in this volume present a picture of the attitudes of young Americans attending high schools and universities towards problems common to all citizens: government, education, social justice, economic system, cultural aspirations. These studies as a whole seem to show that the 'authoritarian' attitudes displayed by young Americans are attitudes which have been 'learnt' and which can therefore be 'unlearnt'.


Specialists of eight different nationalities collaborated in compiling this collection of official documents; it constitutes a rough preliminary outline of the history of the First International.

The world of the social sciences

The purpose of the first part of this book is to determine the methods of action available to international trade-unionism. It shows the background to the influence of the trade-unions, the factors in that influence, and its limitations. The second part describes trade-union 'behaviour' by reference to the occasions on which the influence of the trade unions in ILO has made itself specially felt (with respect to questions concerning freedom of association, communism and decolonization).

SCHLESINGER, Benjamin. *The multi-problem family. A review and annotated bibliography*


In an introductory chapter, John C. Spencer tries to define the main features of the 'problem family' concept, i.e., the family which is a burden to society as a whole, since the relations between its members are difficult and prevent them from becoming integrated in the community and active members of it. This is followed by a table of the programmes adopted by towns in the United States with more than 100,000 inhabitants, for dealing with their 'problem families'. The second half of the book consists of an annotated bibliography of more than three hundred titles relating to this question.


Having interviewed two thousand persons who had immigrated to Israel from some twenty countries, the author describes, from the psychological and sociological standpoints, the attitude of these new citizens during the first year spent by them in their adopted country.


The author seeks to bring out the fundamental features of the development of the British ferrous metal industry.

TOULAT, Jean. *Juifs, mes frères.* Paris, G. Victor, 1963. 22 cm., 275 pp., pl. 12.35 F. The author, a priest, takes up the question of the relations between the Church and the Jews. He gives a general outline of the 'Jewish question' through the centuries, discusses the present situation of the Jews in France, reports talks he has had with a number of leading Jews, and inquires into the grounds on which anti-Semitism is based. Makes an important contribution to friendly relations between Jews and Christians.


The author describes the European institutions and the legal instruments available to them; he then discusses the social problems tackled by these organizations and the lines of action followed.


Post-war development of the Netherlands' economic situation and of its domestic and foreign policy.

The history of Indonesia in the colonial period, and present developments in this country after its attainment of political independence. Its efforts to secure its economic independence.

Vernon, Raymond. *The dilemma of Mexico’s development. The roles of the private and public sectors.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. 21 cm., xviii + 226 pp., tabl., index. $4.95. (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.)

The obstacles to Mexican economic development, whether due to the system of organization or to economic circumstances, from the time of Juárez to the Revolution of 1911 and the return to liberalism (1940).


The author shows what factors must enter into the establishment of an economic development plan for an under-equipped country; he goes on to analyse the conditions in which any such plan will have to be carried out, and suggests certain solutions calculated to improve the operation of the main sectors of economic activity. Annexed are statistics and graphs relating, in particular, to the various forms of aid received by the underdeveloped countries up to the end of 1961.

Weiner, Myron. *The politics of scarcity. Public pressure and political response in India.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 24 cm., xx + 251 pp., index. $5. The author studies the problem of pressure groups (religious, linguistic, social and economic) in India; this problem is of particular interest because poverty and the needs of development make it particularly difficult to apply democratic principles in this country. In conclusion, he suggests certain means of resisting the undue pressure exerted by these very large groups, and of developing awareness of a national interest, shared by all, in the Indian population.


A study of the origin and historical development of scientific knowledge. The author rejects the theory of the ‘unity of science’. He explains the difference between the ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ sciences.

Books received

Avison, Margaret; Rose, Albert. *The research compendium.* University of Toronto Press, 1964.


Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco)

SOCIAL SCIENCES

*Activités en matière de sciences sociales de certaines académies des sciences d’Europe orientale
(Social science activities of some academies of science in Eastern Europe). 1963. 66 pp. $1. (Reports and papers in the social sciences, no. 18.)

In Eastern Europe, the academies of sciences are responsible for promoting and co-ordinating research in all branches, including the social sciences. In general, they carry out a number of the functions which, in other countries, fall to national scientific research centres and to foundations (including the making of grants for research, the award of fellowships, etc.). The present publication does not claim to give a complete picture but is designed to illustrate these aspects of the work of the academies referred to. It comprises a general introduction by Adam Schaff, outlining the system, and national monographs on Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia.

MASS COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY

Social education through television: An All-India Radio/Unesco pilot project. 1963. 44 pp. $0.50. (Reports and papers on mass communication, no. 38.)

From December 1960 to May 1961, All-India Radio broadcast educational television programmes on some aspects of modern life (traffic problems, community health, etc.). The programmes were designed for viewers belonging to Tele-clubs, and were followed by discussions. The effects of the broadcasts (acquisition of

1. Generally speaking, no mention is made of publications and documents issued more or less automatically—regular administrative reports, proceedings of meetings, etc. Free translations have been made of the titles of certain publications and documents for which the English title could not be secured in time. The titles thus translated are indicated by an asterisk (*).

2. For an explanation of abbreviations, see p. 333.
knowledge, changing of certain attitudes) were evaluated by studies on experimental lines, involving comparison with a control group. The present publication deals in turn with the programmes, the evaluation study, and the findings and conclusions.

*Space communication and the mass media*. 1963. 24 pp. $0.50. (Reports and papers on mass communication, no. 41.)

[Pr. Ej.] This report attempts to assess the prospects offered by space communication for enhancing the range and scope of the press, radio broadcasting and television. After dealing in turn with space communication, its present uses, future uses for mass information and education purposes, and the technical questions involved, it offers conclusions and suggestions.

**EDUCATION**


[Dp. St. Ej. Sc. Bl.] This volume provides a picture of secondary education systems throughout the world, i.e., all the types of schools (general, vocational, technical, etc.) available to adolescents between approximately 12 and 18 years of age. The series of almost 200 national monographs is preceded by a world survey of educational trends and, more particularly, of trends in secondary education since 1930, and of the problems to which they give rise. Each national monograph gives a brief general description of the whole educational system of the country (or territory) in question, with diagrams and glossaries, followed by a detailed account of the secondary education establishments (types of education, finance, administration, auxiliary services, teaching staff, diplomas, statistics, etc.). The monographs have been prepared in such a way as to facilitate comparisons. An index is provided.


[Pr. Dp. Bl.] This guide indicates the main sources of information and documentation on the educational systems of the various countries (basic works of reference, journals, collections, etc., and the offices and institutions which may be consulted). Sufficient commentary is given to provide a context for the document or organization in question. The guide starts with a number of sections on international sources of information and documentation on education, and continues with monographs on individual countries, which usually include the following sections: national documentation centre on education or similar body, encyclopaedias of education and similar reference works, legislative and policy documentation, administration, structure and organization, educational studies and research, textbooks, education associations, educational journals, statistics, biographies of educationists, education libraries and museums, possibilities of exchange. The guide is limited to data intended to serve the user as a key and to put him on the track of any more detailed documentation he may need.


(Joint publication no. 256 of the International Bureau of Education and Unesco.)

[Pr. Ej. Dp.] The shortage of primary teachers was one of the items on the agenda of the twenty-sixth International Conference on Public Education, held in Geneva in 1963. This publication was prepared for that conference on the basis of information supplied to the International Bureau of Education by the various countries in response to a questionnaire. It comprises an introduction, giving a general picture of the problem throughout the world, followed by monographs on each of the eighty-three countries which replied, giving, in respect of each, information about the number of primary teachers and pupils, the shortage of teaching staff, the way the problem has developed, its causes and the measures taken to deal with it.
AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES

The development of higher education in Africa. 1963. 339 pp. $7.35.
[Pr. Ej. Dp. St.] Report of the conference held in Tananarive from 3 to 12 September 1962, at the invitation of the Government of the Malagasy Republic: programme, proceedings and conclusions. A selection of papers constitutes the larger part of the book, including studies on the following subjects: the staffing of higher education in Africa (Sir Alexander Carr Saunders), the financing of higher education in Africa (Dr. Jan Tinbergen), inter-African co-operation for the development of higher education in Africa (Dr. Rocheforte L. Weeks). Statistics (trends and prospects), and a list of institutions of higher education in Africa, are also provided.

ARID ZONE

Environmental physiology and psychology in arid conditions: reviews of research. 1963. 345 pp. $11.50.
[Sc. Pr. Bl.] This is volume XXII in the 'Arid Zone Research' series. Unesco commissioned specialists to review the present state of knowledge about various problems of environmental physiology and psychology in arid conditions, and the papers so prepared make up this volume. These papers were communicated to those taking part in the Symposium on Environmental Physiology and Psychology in Arid Conditions, held at Lucknow, India, in December 1962. The proceedings of the symposium are to be published later. The problems dealt with include: physiology and the arid zone; physiological anthropology and climatic variations; nutrition and nutritional diseases in the arid zone; modification of the action of drugs by heat; work, sleep, comfort, in the arid zone; tropical neurasthenia; etc.

United Nations

LEGAL QUESTIONS

Comments received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding the technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination, and wider appreciation of international law. July, 1963. 65 pp. (A/5455.)
[Ej. Pr. Org.] Replies of eighteen countries and six international organizations to a questionnaire from the Secretary-General asking, inter alia, the opinion of governments on a suggestion that a United Nations International Law Decade be proclaimed by the General Assembly. A supplementary document (A/5455/ADD. 1, August 1963, 40 pp.) contains the observations of eleven other governments and two international organizations, one of which was Unesco.

Digest of decisions of national courts relating to succession of States and governments. April 1963. 137 pp. (A/CN.4/157.)
[Ej. Pr. Sc.] The digest attempts to cover all available documentation on the subject since the end of the First World War, but with special reference to the period from 1945 to date. It comprises the following sections: general problems of State succession; State succession in relation to: treaties; the legal system; private rights and concessions; the status of public servants; public property and debts. The last chapter deals with the succession of governments.
Reviews of books and documents

Report by Mr. Manfred Lachs on the work of the sub-committee on succession of States and governments. June 1963. 133 pp. (A/cN.4/160.)

This sub-committee met at the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, from 17 to 25 January 1963. It considered the scope of the problem of the succession of States and governments and the approach to its study, together with the general instructions that it might give to a special rapporteur. A summary of the discussions on the substance of the problem, and the text of the memoranda and working papers submitted to the sub-committee, are annexed.

HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF WOMEN, DISCRIMINATION, PREJUDICE

Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. August 1963. 77 pp. (A/5473.)

Action taken by forty-one Member States, two Specialized Agencies, and five non-governmental organizations with a view to eradicating racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance prevalent in certain sectors of public opinion.

Constitutions, electoral laws and other legal instruments relating to the political rights of women. July 1963. 47 pp., including annex. (A/5456.)

Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations: constitutional and legislative texts governing the right to vote and the eligibility of women, as at 1 June 1963.

Implementation of the supplementary convention of 1956 on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. June 1963. 12 pp. (E/3796.)

A list of the forty-nine States which have acceded to this convention. Information supplied by certain States about measures they have taken.


The commission reviewed the existing position on certain points including: the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile; the right of arrested persons to communicate with those whom it is necessary for them to consult in order to ensure their defence or to protect their essential interests; prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. A list of documents submitted to the commission at its nineteenth session is annexed.

Role of the police in the protection of human rights. 1963. 59 pp. (ST/TAO/HR/16.)

Report on a seminar held from 29 April to 13 May 1963 at Canberra, Australia. Questions dealt with: human rights and preventive and repressive action by police; police discipline; police training; police public relations.

Economic and social consequences of racial discriminatory practices. May 1963. 84 pp. (E/CN.14/132/REV.1.)

This study by the Economic Commission for Africa covers the countries or territories of: Republic of South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Angola and Mozambique. It examines official discriminatory practices connected with various regulations, and their incidence on economic and social development.


This document of the International Labour Office, circulated to Member States of the United Nations by the International Labour Organisation, explains how the question of the participation of the Republic of South Africa in the activities of the International Labour Organisation was brought up and dealt with
at the forty-seventh session of the International Labour Conference and the one hundred and fifty-sixth session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office.


[Ej. Pr. Org.] Brief background account of the work done so far by the special committee in pursuance of its terms of reference. Detailed examination of the main events that have marked the development of the racial policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa since November 1962. Conclusions of the special committee with regard to means of dissuading that Government from continuing its apartheid policy.

ACCESSION TO INDEPENDENCE

Special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Report for 1963. A series of documents.

[Ej. Pr.] These documents all follow the same model. They analyse the present situation with regard to government institutions and political parties and other political forces in the territory considered, draw attention to the current political problems, and summarize any recent measures taken by the committee with respect to the territory in question. The latest reports in the series concern the following territories: Malta (A/AC.109/L.77, August 1963, 39 pp.); Fiji (A/AC.109/L.78, August 1963, 50 pp.); Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya and Zanzibar (A/AC.109/L.80, August 1963, 47 pp.); Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (A/AC.109/L.81, September 1963, 39 pp.); Aden (A/AC.109/L.82, September 1963, 153 pp.); British Guiana (A/AC.109/L.83, September 1963, 55 pp.).

Report of the special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. South-West Africa. July 1963. 72 pp. (A/5446/ADD. 2.)

[Ej. Pr. Org.] After an introduction which sets out the measures taken by the special committee in 1962 and by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, the report provides further information about the most recent development in South-West Africa.

Report of the special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Southern Rhodesia. July 1963. 114 pp. (A/5446/ADD.3.)


EDUCATION, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS (NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES)

Question of South-West Africa. Special educational and training programmes for South-West Africa. September 1963. 19 pp. (A/5526.)

[Ej. Pr. Dp.] Information about the special educational and training programme for the native population in South-West Africa, and the scholarships offered by various Member States.

Special training programmes for territories under Portuguese administration. September 1963. 23 pp. (A/5531.)

*Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. September 1963. 12 pp. (A/5543.)*

[Dp. Ej. Pr. Org.] Problems arising in connexion with the use of scholarships and grants offered by Member States. Progress to date. Tables showing the facilities offered to students in the Non-Self-Governing Territories are annexed.

**CHILDREN**

The needs of children. A survey of the needs of children in the developing countries. Reports prepared by Unicef, WHO, FAO, Unesco, the Bureau of Social Affairs and ILO for the guidance of the Unicef Executive Board. 1963. 175 pp. $3.95. Condensed and consolidated version of documents previously issued in mimeographed form, including: *Survey on the needs of children: preliminary review.* May 1961. 122 pp. (E/ICEF/410.)


[Ej. Pr.] Economic and social aspects of the problems of children; social welfare needs; gaps and weaknesses in existing services; prospects.


[Ej. Pr.] Scope of the problem of the relations between conditions of work and the position of children. Protection of children from economic exploitation. Guidance and training of the young with a view to their future employment. Protection of young workers.


[Ej. Pr. Org.] Main needs of children with regard to matters covered by Unesco programmes. The Organization’s efforts to study and analyse what is required for the full development of children. Practical services offered to countries. Matters in regard to which collaboration between Unicef and Unesco is particularly to be desired.

**STATISTICS**


[Ej. Pr. Org.] There were three main items on the conference agenda: improvement of river transport statistics; report of the seminar on the basic statistics necessary for economic and social development; plans for improving statistical services during the Development Decade.

**POPULATION: GENERAL**


[Ej. Pr. Dp. St.] The special topic of this issue is population census statistics and problems relating thereto. It contains official data from almost 250 countries and
territories. Besides the usual population data, there are tables for the main arrival and departure categories of international travellers, and for long-term immigrants and emigrants.


[Ej. Pr. Dp. St. Bl.] This edition makes special reference to the situation and recent trends of mortality in the world, and concludes with a factor analysis of mortality rates, thus making an important contribution to knowledge of the variables of mortality. It draws attention to the effects of the improvement of health conditions, notes regional variations, and provides a detailed bibliography.

Preparatory committee for the 1965 world population conference. August 1963. 9 pp. (E/CONF.41/PC/2.)

[Ej. Pr. Org.] Report on the second session of the committee, held in New York from 16 to 20 August 1963: proposed programme, documentation to be assembled.


[Ej. Pr. Org.] At this session, the commission dealt mainly with the world demographic situation, from the points of view of fertility and economics. The report also discusses regional demographic activities and the world population census programme.

POPULATION: REGIONAL AND NATIONAL PROBLEMS


[Ej. Dp. Pr. Bl.] Census methods (complete or sampling). Special problems arising in Africa, including those due to overlapping between national and tribal groups and between geographical regions and political units. Procedures to be followed before, during and after the census. Bibliography.

Geographic distribution of the population of Latin America and regional development priorities. February 1963. 42 pp. (E/CN.12/643.)


[Ej. Pr. St. Sc.] This study, made by the Economic Commission for Latin America, describes present population trends in Colombia and makes projections for the period up to 1981 (urban and rural population). It also deals with the incidence of various factors (education, work, housing, etc.).

ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE SOCIAL FIELD


[Org.] Progress report by the Secretary-General on the activities undertaken by the United Nations in the social field: basic policy, and proposals for the period up to 1965.
URBANIZATION, HOUSING, PHYSICAL PLANNING

Provisional report of the Latin American seminar on housing statistics and programmes. February 1963. 241 pp. (E/CN.12/647.)

[Ej. Pr. Dp.] This seminar was held in Copenhagen from 2 to 22 September 1962. The report deals with housing requirements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, makes a comparative study of programmes and of statistical methods and discusses questions of method and the administrative problems involved in improving housing statistics in Latin America.


Activities of the United Nations in the field of housing, physical planning and building in Africa. April 1963. 37 pp. (E/CN.14/HOU/3.)


PLANNING

Questionnaire on industrial planning and development.

May 1963. 62 pp. (E/C.5/24/ADD.34.)


[Ej. Pr. St.] Mention has already been made of the survey being carried out by the United Nations secretariat on present trends in the industrial development policies of various countries and their programming and planning methods. The first of the two above-mentioned documents is the reply from France. It describes the system of planning in that country. The second document is similar, containing the reply from Portugal.

A study of industrial growth. 1963. 55 pp. $0.75. (ST/ECO/74.)

[Ej. Pr. Dp. St.] The purpose of this study is to consider to what extent industrial development obeys systematic laws implying that, at every stage of its growth, the manufacturing industry of a particular country has typical quantitative relations with a certain number of that country's other economic features. It describes the methods used and sets forth the results obtained.

African institute for economic development and planning. April 1963. 24 pp. (E/CN.14/IDEP/6.)


[Ej. Pr.] An account of the work of this meeting, which was held at Santiago, Chile, from 19 to 24 February 1962. Its purpose was to study and discuss the various experiments carried out to date in the field of economic and social planning, with a view to giving new impetus to the activities that the governments of Latin America have decided to undertake in implementation of the Charter of Punta del Este. The seminar gave special attention to the formulation, preparation and execution of short-term plans, and also to some of the technical aspects of such plans.

Provisional report of the seminar on industrial programming. April 1963. 172 pp. (E/CN.12/663.)

[Ej. Pr. Dp.] This seminar of the Economic Commission for Latin America was held
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at São Paulo, from 4 to 15 March 1963. The discussions bore on national programming of industrial development in Latin America, for each of the major industries (steel, chemical, etc.). The participants studied the methods used in this type of programming and reviewed the experiments already carried out in this field.

The use of national accounts for economic analysis and development planning. April 1963. 58 pp. (E/CN.12/671.)

This technical study on the types of tables required for a planning policy, and on the base series that make it possible to construct and analyse such tables, was carried out by the Economic Commission for Latin America.

ECONOMIC SITUATION, ECONOMIC STATISTICS, MISCELLANEOUS ECONOMIC QUESTIONS: GENERAL PROBLEMS


These documents relate to different parts of the survey: Current economic developments in Western Europe, Asia, the Far East and the Americas (E/3761, June 1963, 14 pp.); Recent trends in the centrally planned economies (E/3761/ADD. 3, June 1963, 71 pp.); Recent trends in the primary exporting countries (E/3761/ADD. 2, June 1963, 77 pp.); The developing countries in world trade (E/3774, June 1963, 120 pp.).

Economic and social consequences of disarmament, 1963. (E/3736/various addenda.)

Member States were asked to state their attitude towards this problem and to report on any measures that they have taken or intend to take in this connection. The addenda recently published to supplement the basic document (E/3736) which has already been mentioned contain the replies of the Governments of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. (E/3736/ADD. 5, 23 pp.), Ceylon and Sweden (E/3736/ADD. 6, 10 pp.), France (E/3736/ADD. 7, 1 p.) and Yugoslavia (E/3736/ADD. 8, 3 pp.).

Recent commodity developments. April 1963. 13 pp. (E/CN.13/SER.A/46.)

Memorandum no. 46 of the Commission on International Commodity Trade. Information about inter-governmental consultations and agreements, and also about discussions within United Nations bodies.

Prospective production of and demand for primary commodities. Prospective supply of non-agricultural commodities. April 1963. 47 pp. (E/CN.13/L.74.)

Pilot study undertaken by the Commission on International Commodity Trade (middle- and long-term prospective production and consumption of certain commodities; international trade trends with regard to these commodities). A more general survey will be made later.

Measures to deal with fluctuations in primary commodity markets: the role of study groups. Inter-governmental commodity study groups. April 1963. 35 pp. (E/CN.13/L.77.)

This document forms Chapter I of the 1963 Report of the Commission on International Commodity Trade. Wherever there is an official agreement in force, it is administered by a board made up of the parties to the agreement. In other cases, problems relating to particular products are examined by inter-governmental study groups. The document stresses the growing importance of these groups and the part they play in international relations.


The following topics were discussed at the second session: the expan-
sion of international trade and economic development; international problems concerning primary commodities; long-term economic prospects of commodity-exporting countries; measures to stabilize the commodity market; trade in manufactured articles; influence of regional economic groupings; investments designed to promote the expansion of international trade; institutional machinery.

ECONOMIC SITUATION, ECONOMIC STATISTICS, MISCELLANEOUS ECONOMIC QUESTIONS: REGIONAL OR NATIONAL PROBLEMS

Foreign trade statistics of Africa.
(E/CN.14/STAT/SER.A/various issues)
(E/CN.14/STAT/SER.B/various issues)
[St. Dp.] These trade statistics are published in two separate bulletins (series A and series B). Together they make it possible to follow trends in African trade, by country of origin and country of destination, for different types of commodities. Prices are quoted in U.S. dollars to facilitate comparison.

Some problems of estimating capital formation, with special reference to African countries.
July 1963. 56 pp. (E/CN.14/CAS.4/CF.3.)
[Ej. Pr.] A study made by the Economic Commission for Africa. Methods of evaluation whereby the African countries may obtain relatively accurate analyses of capital formation. Difficulties to which the use of these methods is liable to give rise. The study was particularly concerned with gross domestic fixed asset formation.

[Ej. Dp. St. Pr. Sc.] Development of the Latin American economy considered as a whole (structure of production, demand, trade and distribution of income; problems connected with foreign investments and Latin American trade with the rest of the world). Economic development of the various countries grouped by region (south, centre and north of Latin America).

[Ej. Pr. St. Dp.] The object of this study is to consider how far economic growth has been maintained over the last two years. It deals with production, investments, income and trade.

Agriculture in Latin America; problems and prospects. April 1963. 133 pp. (E/CN.12/686.)

[Ej. Pr. Dp. St.] A study based on material collected in the capital cities of nineteen Latin American countries and in two cities of the United States of America (Los Angeles and Houston). Survey methods used in gathering this information. Data obtained.

Latin America. Flow of public and private capital from the United States to Latin America. Role of international economic organizations.


[Ej. Pr.] An account of the work of the conference held at Santiago, Chile, from 5 to 14 December 1962. The discussions bore particularly on the role of taxation, as an economic development factor in Latin America.


[Ej. Pr.] Basic data and matters of concern deriving from the establishment of the Common Market and other European agreements.


[Ej. Pr. Dp.] This note by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America reviews the programme in question (progress achieved, advantages of integration, obstacles encountered). There are separate chapters dealing with the various sectors affected by integration (free trade, tariff equalization, electrification, transportation, co-ordination of housing construction programmes).


ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA


[Ej. Pr. Dp. St.] The conference was held at Santiago, Chile, from 5 to 19 March 1962. The report reviews the problems of education, studies their relation to the problems involved in economic and social development, and deals with the integration of educational planning with economic and social planning, and international co-operation as a means of accelerating educational development and linking it up more satisfactorily with economic and social progress. It contains a considerable amount of factual data.

Social trends and programmes in Latin America. February 1963. 65 pp. (E/CN.12/645.)

[Ej. Pr.] Problems that social programmes in Latin America are attempting to solve. Questions connected with population growth and changes in social structures. Rural and urban programmes. Integration of social and economic development. Social pathology.


[Ej. Pr. Sc.] This study by José Medina Echavarria attempts to shed light upon the inter-dependence of social and economic factors in Latin America. It discusses questions of method, the revolutionary character of the situation, the decline of the old structures, the disintegration of liberal society, the ideology of development and the new parties.


[Ej. Pr.] Structural measures that would be necessary in order to overcome the
obstacles to a dynamic development of this region, including the redistribution of income as a means of enabling the entire population, from the masses upwards, to benefit from the resources of increasing production, as is required for a true economic democracy. Need for planning. Means of increasing capital formation. Land reform. Financial and commercial relations with other regions of the world.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technical assistance committee: Question of the provision of operational personnel under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. May 1963. 11 pp. (E/TAC/126.)

In this report, the Technical Assistance Board makes observations and recommendations on the legal, administrative and financial aspects of the use of the funds of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for the provision of operational personnel.

Specialized Agencies

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO)

RIGHT TO WORK


Legislative and other measures taken by the various signatory countries from 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1962 to give effect to ILO conventions.

PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

An international survey of part-time employment. (Off-prints from the International Labour Review.)


Part I gives a comparative analysis of the frequency of this type of employment in the various countries, its organization, and the features that characterize part-time workers in general. Part II deals with the situation of part-time workers from the point of view of social security, the reasons behind the opportunities or demand for part-time employment, and the attitude of employers’ and workers’ associations to this question.

MOBILITY OF LABOUR


This study is divided into two parts. The first deals with the nature of adjustment problems (causes and extent of structural change, analysis of the repercussions of such change on the situation of workers, procedures for structural adjustments, unemployment). Part II is concerned with the measures taken by the State, workers’ organizations and employers’ associations (influence on the system of collective agreements, problems raised by the adaptation of workers).

1. Other than Unesco.
MISCELLANEOUS STUDIES

[Ej. Pr.] The purpose of this article is to show how Indian organized labour is associated with the preparation of economic development plans. After discussing the machinery for official and unofficial consultations, parliamentary debates and public discussions, the article concludes with an appraisal of the practical effects of these arrangements.

[Ej. Pr.] Problems arising in this country in connexion with the rules governing conditions of employment. Wage-fixing machinery. Relations between employers' and workers' organizations in collective bargaining. Action by the public authorities to ensure the stability of labour relations.

[Ej. Pr.] Training, conditions of employment and duties of home helps.

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO)

[Ej. Pr. Sc.] This manual, which deals with the preparation of surveys, items to be taken into consideration, sampling and the analysis of results, gives particular attention to the methods applicable to rural regions. The object of such surveys is to determine the amounts of food consumed over a given period, one method being by sample weighings.

[Dp. Ej. Pr.] This is a bulletin, issued twice a year, containing current information on the activities of FAO and other organizations with regard to land reform, and on the development of this type of reform in various countries.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

STATISTICS

Expert committee on health statistics. 1963. 34 pp. $0.60. (Technical report series, no. 261.)

[Ej. Pr.] The eighth report of this committee is concerned with hospital statistics. It discusses the WHO programme of statistical publications in this field and the preparation of the eighth revision of the international classification of illnesses.

Epidemiological and vital statistics report. 1963. No. 5-6, 89 pp., $2.25. No. 7-8, 89 pp., $2.25. No. 9, 51 pp., $1.75. No. 10, 33 pp., $1.25.

[Ej. Dp. Pr. St.] This permanent collection of statistics on population movements and the incidences of various diseases and causes of death is issued by sections and covers the whole world. In addition to the basic series, each section contains certain detailed studies on particular points. Among these special studies, mention may be made of the following: helminthic infections, the results of surveys (1950-62, nos. 5-6); malignant tumours (1950-60) and morbidity from zoonosis (1957-62, nos. 7-8); diphtheria (1921-60, no. 9); deaths from anaemia (1921-60); and peri-natal mortality (1956-61, no. 10).

DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE


[Ej. Pr. Sc.] A collection of articles supplementing the monograph by Bowlby, on 'Maternal care and mental health', which appeared previously. Among the subjects dealt with are: 'masked deprivation' in infants and young children; paternal and maternal roles and delinquency; a social scientist's approach to maternal deprivation; a review of research on the concept of maternal deprivation; the effects of maternal deprivation (a review of findings and controversy).

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

Bl. = Contains an extensive bibliography.
Dp. = Presents facts country by country (or region by region).
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St. = Contains statistics.
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The importance of these conventional signs, is, of course, purely relative, and we do not wish their use to be taken as implying a system of classification. We use them merely in order to give as brief an abstract as is consistent with indicating, in the easiest way possible, that part of the contents of the publications and documents under review which relates to some particular branch of social science.
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