Higher education and social stratification: an international comparative study

Torsten Husén
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Torsten Husén

Also in Fr-e.

Unesco: International Institute for Educational Planning
The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) has provided financial assistance for the publication of this booklet.
The booklets in this series are written primarily for two types of clientele: those engaged in — or preparing for — educational planning and administration, especially in developing countries; and others, less specialized, such as senior government officials and policy-makers who seek a more general understanding of educational planning and of how it is related to overall national development. They are devised to be of use either for private study or in formal training programmes.

Since this series was launched in 1967 the practice as well as the concept of educational planning has undergone substantial change. Many of the assumptions which underlay earlier attempts to put some rationality into the process of educational development have been abandoned or at the very least criticized. At the same time, the scope of educational planning itself has been broadened. In addition to the formal system of schools, it now includes other important educational efforts in non-formal settings and among adults. Attention to the growth and expansion of educational systems is being supplemented and sometimes even replaced by a growing concern for the distribution of educational opportunities and benefits across different regions and across social, ethnic and sex groups. Educational planners and administrators are concerned to take a more systematic attitude towards their social responsibilities. They are learning to act as “conveyor belts” between the classroom (or any other place of learning) and the decision-maker, whether he be found at the local or regional level, at the head of a central department or institution, or in one of its various branches. Their concern is
two-fold: to have a better understanding of the reality of education, in its own specific dimensions, empirically observed; and to ensure better analysis and consideration of this reality so as to improve, where possible, the hypotheses that underlie educational policies and strategies for change.

One of the purposes of these booklets is to reflect this diversity by giving different authors, coming from a wide range of backgrounds and disciplines, the opportunity to express their ideas and to communicate their experience on various aspects of changing theories and practices in educational planning.

Although the series has been carefully planned, no attempt has been made to avoid differences or even contradictions in the views expressed by the authors. The Institute itself does not wish to impose any official doctrine on any planner. Thus, while the views are the responsibility of the authors and may not always be shared by Unesco or the IIEP, they are believed to warrant attention in the international forum of ideas.

Since readers will vary so widely in their backgrounds, the authors have been given the difficult task of introducing their subjects from the beginning, explaining technical terms that may be commonplace to some but a mystery to others, and yet adhering to scholarly standards. This approach will have the advantage, it is hoped, of making the booklets optimally useful to every reader.
Preface

This booklet on higher education and social stratification is based on a combination of the unique experience and reflections of its author, Torsten Husén, one of the most distinguished contemporary educationists and Chairman of the IIEP Governing Board from 1970 to 1980, and the Institute's own original research on higher education and employment, which covered some twenty countries in all the regions of the world over a period of seven years (1978-1984).

Although the IIEP project, directed by Mr. Bikas C. Sanyal, was essentially concerned with the issue of the passage of higher-education graduates to employment structures, the Institute accumulated in the course of its investigation rich and varied information on the social and economic background as well as on the educational and occupational paths of higher-education students and graduates. Such comparable characteristics for the developing world are not easily available, and represent a unique source of knowledge. While it is intended to publish an overview of the findings of the IIEP research project separately, it was felt that the information made available and not fully used could lead to an analysis of the phenomenon of social stratification of education and the world of work in developing countries. The Institute sought and obtained Professor Husén's acceptance of conducting such an analysis, given his outstanding past work on this subject for the industrialized countries. In this publication he analyses the social-stratification process from a theoretical point of view, and checks his assumptions by testing them either with the empirical evidence obtained through the IIEP project in
developing countries or with his own information concerning industrialized countries.

It is hoped that this booklet will show that the problem of social stratification, viewed across the artificial dividing-line drawn between developing and industrialized countries, holds very significant and sometimes negative consequences for the educational and occupational careers of educated youth.

Sylvain Lourié
Director, IIEP
This booklet has been written at the request of the Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning. His reason was my long-standing interest in the problems of equality in education, and how educational attainments are related to the social background and the social destiny of the person educated. In carrying out this task I have tried to deal with these problems in both developing and industrialized countries. I soon realized, however, that there is a much smaller body of relevant research, either analytic or empirical, about education as a social stratifier in developing countries than in industrialized countries. This accounts for the predominance of information on the stratification problem in these latter countries, in spite of the impressive series of national case studies carried out by the IIIEP on the employment of university graduates.

It has been a great pleasure to serve the Institute in a new capacity—as the author of one of its publications—after having served for ten years as Chairman of its Governing Board. I am indebted to the Director and staff of the IIIEP for their support in many ways, and in particular to Mr. Bikas Sanyal, who provided a major portion of the background material and also some of the illustrative statistics cited in the booklet.

Torsten Husén
I. Introduction

A prefatory note

The “meta-analytic” study presented here is a link in a long chain of investigations over some forty years on the social implications of formal education. I began in the 1940s with surveys of what was then referred to as the “reserve of ability” (Husén, 1948; Husén, 1961; Husén & Boalt, 1968). These surveys set out to identify the resources of ability, to a large extent to be found in the lower social strata, which were not “utilized”, i.e., consisted of young people who did not have the opportunity to go on to upper-secondary and higher education. OECD, formed as an organisation to promote economic development, at an early stage of its existence took an interest in the promotion of educated ability. This was at a time when economists began to study the prominent rôle education (and research) seemed to play in economic development. The OECD conference on “Ability and Educational Opportunity” in Kungälv in 1961 (Halsey, ed., 1961) prepared the way in the highly industrial countries for a breakthrough for a policy of promoting more equality in educational opportunity, which in its turn was conceived of as an instrument for achieving more equality in life chances, at least in the wider perspective. The 1970 conference on educational policies for the 1970s took stock of what had been achieved over the decade since the first Policy Conference in Washington, D.C., in 1961. Typically, its proceedings were reported under the title Policy conference on economic growth and investment in education (OECD, 1962). The participants in the 1970 conference were forced to acknowledge that far less had been achieved in bringing
about greater equality between social strata than was expected a decade earlier (OECD, 1971a). In the meantime, programmes of student aid had been launched, not to speak of the enormous expansion during the 1960s of places at institutions of higher learning which in itself was expected to lead—and to some extent did—to greater equalization between strata in participation. To be sure, percentagewise participation of students from lower strata had increased in terms of both the total enrolment and proportion of the relevant age-groups. But the earlier higher participation rate among young people from upper social strata had increased considerably as well. The well-do-do seemed to take advantage of free higher education to such an extent that economists arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that generous public support of higher education tended to benefit the already privileged more than the under-privileged, that is to say, the effects of the steps taken seemed to be retrogressive (Levin, 1982). Thus, in the early 1970s it began to be realized that formal equality of educational opportunity could not be achieved simply by removing economic and geographical barriers. Such measures were not sufficient, either to achieve equality in educational opportunity or to bring about more equality in life chances, that is to say, more equality in working-life careers. It was realized that the issue of equality was enmeshed with a larger issue. It was part and parcel of the entire social matrix, and one could not expect educational policies alone to achieve equity.

Part of the stocktaking that occurred in the early 1970s was the preparation of a state-of-the-art report on empirical studies as well as on attempts to clarify conceptually what should be meant by equality in education. One result was Social background and educational career (Husén, 1972), published by OECD. Apart from trying to review the relevant empirical studies and surveys, an attempt was made to provide an historical and conceptual background for a “meta-analysis” of scholarly studies on equity in the field of education. The conclusion, as was also the case in another monograph Talent, equality and meritocracy (Husén, 1974b), was that education per se could make only modest contributions to equity. After all, education, not least in modern industrial society, is there in order to instil competencies and to select for more advanced education those who at the basic level achieve better. Education is therefore potentially more a Great
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Stratifier, and not so much the Great Equalizer that Horace Mann, pioneer of the democratization of schooling in the State of Massachusetts, thought of (Husén, 1979).

In the mid-1970s the National Commission on Education in Botswana initiated a survey which showed other patterns of relationships between educational opportunity and social background different from those in the industrial countries (Husén et al., 1977). The findings were by and large the same as those of Heyneman (1976, 1979) in Uganda: parental education and occupational status showed a weaker relationship with achievement in key subjects in developing than in developed countries. Secondary-school enrolment was less correlated with social background than in developed countries.

But what about the rôle of formal education in social stratification—or should we rather say social differentiation?—in developing countries? If it is easier for young people to break away from “low” social backgrounds in developing countries and to get access to upper-secondary and higher education, could we expect education _per se_ to play a more prominent rôle for occupational careers in developing countries, that is to say, to have a more powerful influence in the social differentiation process? The IIEP national case studies which have been conducted in a wide variety of countries, most of them developing but also four industrial, can help us to arrive at some tentative generalizations (Sanyal, 1987). With all due respect to tracer studies conducted by other agencies and scholars, the IIEP investigations are the most important ones about the very topic of the rôle of higher education in social differentiation.

In the first part of the present report the problem of education and stratification has been put into a broader historical and socio-economic perspective and the more important scholarly literature on the topic has been reviewed. Inspired by Professor Philip Foster (1977), I am using “social differentiation” synonymously with “social stratification” and, indeed, think that the former expression is more adequate for developing societies. But given the strong tradition of the latter expression in the social-science literature, I have paid tribute to convention in using it both in the title and in the text.
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In spite of misgivings about attempts to draw historical parallels between development in industrial and non-industrial countries, I think that such a perspective can be useful if used with reservations and care. We can get a perspective on education and social stratification in the developing countries of today by looking at the developing societies in Europe from the 16th century on, when the national states began to be established.

The last part of the report addresses the empirical evidence on education and social stratification in several countries. Admittedly, the evidence is largely that brought together by the IIEP studies in a number of countries. It should, however, be pointed out that these studies have in the first place been conducted not to elucidate the impact of higher education on social stratification but to find out what use the national economies made of the university graduates. Thus, the information on social stratification presented here derives from secondary analyses and is a by-product of statistical surveys and analysis of transition from education to working life. The overall purpose of my looking into the evidence from the IIEP studies has been to put these into a wider perspective.

**Linkage between education and employment**

Formal education plays an important rôle as a social stratifier in both developed and developing countries through the linkage between education and employment. But—as will be shown later in this booklet—this linkage takes different forms at different stages of social and economic development.

In feudal Europe, when the nation states were formed and central governments needed trained civil servants, priests, and so on, the new class of professionals was drawn from the homes of merchants, artisans and farmers, not primarily from the nobility. Thus a certain upward social mobility was initiated through grammar-school and/or university education, and was further strengthened at the early stage of industrialization, when basic formal education was required for an increasing number of sub-professional jobs. The emerging class of industrial workers had at best access to only primary education, provided by legislation in many European countries by the mid-nineteenth century.

The next stage in the emerging industrial countries was one in which post-primary education increasingly became the privilege
of the new middle class and the traditional upper class. A very small proportion (some 1-2 per cent) of young people from working-class homes had access to pre-university or university education. There was an ingrained feeling that this category of young people did not "belong" in higher education.

A third stage was reached after the second World War, when the "enrolment explosion" occurred at the secondary and tertiary levels. In the course of a few decades the coverage of formal education was considerably increased, by making secondary education available to virtually all young people up to the age of 18. But in a society on the threshold of the post-industrial stage, with an expansion of "intelligence industries" and with growing competitiveness on the employment market, the impact of home background, in terms not so much of physical as of cultural capital, became stronger. A meritocratic society entered the scene.

Thus the linkage between education and employment in the highly industrialized countries was strengthened by the competition on the job and trade market and by the ensuing meritocratic tendencies which have developed over a short period. This is, among other things, reflected in the unemployment statistics. Long-term unemployment tends to be closely associated with level of formal education. In OECD countries, such as the United States of America or the United Kingdom, about 20 to 40 per cent of young people who leave school with the mandatory minimum of ten years' schooling or less are unemployed at the age of 20, as compared to less than 10 per cent among those with upper-secondary and university education.

The pattern of linkage between education and employment has in certain respects evolved differently in the developing countries. Independence has been followed by a period during which a civil service had to be built up and when various public services—health, education, and so on—had to be extensively expanded. Expatriates left and/or had to be replaced. The incum­bents of the new posts had to be properly trained, and this put a heavy strain on the indigenous tertiary institutions. If these lacked the capacity or were nonexistent, governments were forced to send students to institutions abroad.

In many developing countries those recruited for university studies tend to have a rather humble social background. In these
societies there is a higher proportion of young people who move from the farm to the civil servant’s desk by way of university training than in industrial societies. An important reason for this is that once an educated class of professionals and civil servants has become established, this new class tends to “crystallize” a support system for its children that creates an advantage in competition for advanced education. The new class tends to perpetuate itself through education.

Expectations about the benefits to be derived from advanced education are high in both developed and developing countries. For various reasons they are often higher in the latter, where salary differentials are more closely related to levels of formal education. Schooling is perceived by both parents and students as a means of escape from poverty and from toil on the soil. Because of the pressure to get into institutions of higher education, in some instances the consequence after a certain period is that the number of graduates will outgrow the need for highly trained manpower or at least outgrow the financial capacity of the public sector to absorb them. Egypt and India are cases in point (Sanyal, 1987).

The strong linkage between formal education and the employment market has led to what Dore (1976) refers to as “the diploma disease”: a strong emphasis on formal credentials in recruiting employees and setting their salary or wage levels. In most developing countries salary differentials faithfully reflect differences in levels of education. In industrialized countries, where the gap between the highly educated and the rest is usually smaller, there is nevertheless an intensive competition for places, particularly in prestige institutions. The incentive to compete is not only prestige but the breadth and flexibility of the opportunities awaiting those who succeed in reaching the higher levels of formal education. More formal education reduces the likelihood of becoming unemployed.

Thus, in spite of the obvious differences between industrial and non-industrial countries with regard to the linkage between education and employment, both types of society have in our time a common experience. Education is increasingly becoming a major criterion in the selection of people for employment and in their subsequent promotion. The benefits that accrue to the individual from formal credentials are such that he regards it as
worth his while to compete for places in the system of more advanced education even when material incentives are modest.

Egalitarian policies in education—rhetoric and reality

The rôle of education in producing equality—or the opposite, social stratification—has over the last few decades become an object of study by social scientists. Educational reforms in the industrial countries after the second World War were launched under an egalitarian banner. The school system should be “democratized”. Structural changes would bring about broadened opportunities for post-primary education. It was believed that expanded access to education would automatically produce greater equality of educational opportunity and would enhance social and economic equality.

A comprehensive body of research, most of it cross-sectional, tells us that the problem is not that simple. Massive expansion of enrolment and a policy of financial support for post-primary formal education have not yielded the outcomes expected in the 1960s, a decade when both secondary and tertiary education in several industrialized countries expanded enormously. At the 1970 OECD Policy Conference the then Swedish Minister of Education, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, pointed out that it “is possible that we have been too optimistic, perhaps, concerning the time it takes to bring about changes” (OECD, 1971a, p. 68). The statistical surveys that had been conducted in the OECD countries on group disparities in educational participation, on differences in school achievements and educational opportunities and on education and distribution of income, showed that the increased amount of formal education did not of itself have the expected impact. Mr. Carlsson was taking stock of this when he pointed out that the earlier optimistic predictions had not turned out to be true. But on the other hand, not much time had elapsed since the launching of policies of broadening the opportunities. Furthermore, he pointed out that “it is hardly possible to change society only through education. To equalize educational opportunities without influencing working conditions, the setting of wage rates, etc... The reforms of educational policy must go together with reforms in other fields: labour market policy, economic policy, social policy, fiscal policy, etc.” (OECD, 1971a, p. 69)
Thus, in the 1970s after the "euphoria" of the 1960s there was a growing realization of the limits of educational policy. The school cannot "build a new social order" (Emmery, 1974) by itself. The distance between "reality and rhetoric" in egalitarian educational policies began to be mapped out (Husén, 1980). The accumulated empirical evidence showed that expansion of enrollment did not by any means remove selectivity and competition. On the contrary, in spite of the enormously increased number of places competition tended to be tougher than before. The "diploma disease" (Dore, 1976) became aggravated. In the industrial societies, on the threshold of a post-industrial society (Bell, 1973), one could identify a syndrome of "meritocracy" (Husén, 1974b). Even universalizing lower-secondary education, which meant a perfect, one-hundred-per-cent, formal equalization of educational opportunities at that level, and expanding upper-secondary schooling to embrace as in Sweden some 80 per cent or in Japan even 90-95 per cent of the age-cohort, did not mean equalization in a wider social perspective. Selectivity simply moves to the next stage, so that, for instance, as shown by Mählck (1980), opening the institutions of higher learning to increased portions of the age-groups leads to a differentiation between an élite sector and the rest of the system on that level.

"Education for all", as well as "democratization" of educational opportunities, is a major policy objective to which much lip-service at least is paid in most countries. Disparities, asymmetries and inequalities in educational opportunities are still a major source of concern, not least among those who are responsible for framing the educational policies of intergovernmental organizations, such as Unesco. In the Second Medium-Term Plan for Unesco it is pointed out that: "Formal equality of access to education is not always synonymous with effective equality of entry to school or of chances of educational success. Even in those countries where the school-leaving age has been raised and where education is free, the children who have the greatest difficulty in pursuing their studies are often, admittedly to varying degrees, those from modest backgrounds, particularly the families of urban and rural manual workers. In higher education, the majority of students are often from socially and culturally privileged backgrounds, and the growth in the school
population is only slowly altering their situation.” (Unesco, 1983, p. 69).

Thus, the rôle of education, particularly higher education, as a social stratifier has become a growing concern in the light of the previous optimism about the rôle of education as an equalizer. This does not mean that the “euphoric” and highly optimistic mood of the 1960s has shifted to one of complete pessimism in the 1970s and 1980s. But the concept of education as an equalizer and an agent of social change has become much more sophisticated than before, thanks in great measure to the analytical and empirical contributions that social scientists have made to the clarification of the underlying issues (Husén, 1986). Sophistication has been enhanced in the following respects:

1. It is realized that education does not operate in a social vacuum and cannot therefore, as pointed out in the keynote address by the Swedish Minister of Education, on its own serve as a single change agent.

2. Formal education in modern societies has increasingly become imbued by meritocratic tendencies, that is to say, become increasingly competitive and selective. Industries and enterprises at the frontier of economic growth need highly qualified manpower which is trained at increasingly selective and competitive institutions of higher learning. Selective institutions in that sector prepare their students for high-prestige and high-salaried jobs. Educational institutions therefore have become highly complex sorting and sifting institutions.

3. Differentiation in school achievements is to a very large extent determined by the home background of the student. What happens to the child in key subjects in the school, such as the mother tongue, determines differences in achievements to a lesser extent than parental education and occupation and the cultural level of the home. Out-of-school factors have their decisive impact at an early age; this means that when children enter school a considerable degree of individual differences in future achievement and attainment has already been established (Bloom, 1964).

The problems hinted at above have during the last 20 years been thoroughly investigated by statisticians and behavioural scien-
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tists in the industrialized world. There are several attempts to write state-of-the-art reports, for instance Husén (1975), Anderson (1983) and IIEP. It should, however, be pointed out that the literature on the problem of education, equality, employment and social stratification related to less-developed countries is extremely scarce in comparison with that relating to the industrialized countries.

The IIEP studies restrict the analysis of equality to the gender gap. One of the results expected from the expansion in higher education is the reduction of inequalities of opportunity in this field. Although the female share of enrolment increased from 32 per cent in 1960 to 41 per cent in 1982 in the world as a whole, this increase has since stagnated.

The developing countries have done as well as the industrialized countries in increasing the female share of total higher-education enrolment: there are 11 percentage points of increase for both groups during the period 1960-1982. This means that the difference between the female participation rates in developing and industrialized countries has remained the same during this period. The share has increased from 35 per cent in 1960 to 46 per cent in 1982 in the industrialized countries, and from 24 to 35 per cent over the same period in developing countries.

Although the female share in enrolment is still less than the male share in all regions except Asia and Africa, the difference has been reduced in all regions to less than 5 percentage points. Significant achievements have been made in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean and in that of the Arab States, each of which made an increase of 15 percentage points in the female share of enrolment over the 22-year period. Progress in Asia has been slowest, with 8 percentage points (from 23 per cent in 1960 to 31 per cent in 1982). Africa, which still has the lowest female share of total enrolment (28 per cent), increased its score by 11 percentage points during this period.

While the female participation rate measured by gross enrolment ratios (ratio of enrolment w.r.t. total female population in the relevant age-group) increased nearly threefold in the world (from 3.3 percentage points in 1960 to 9.7 in 1982), the developing countries multiplied their score by 4.5 times as against industrialized countries, which tripled theirs. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean scores highest in this respect in rela-
tive terms, having increased female gross enrolment ratio from 1.8 to 14.1 per cent. North America has almost equalized the participation rate by bringing the male-female difference down to 2.2 percentage points. Europe including the USSR, whose overall participation rate in higher education has been half that of North America, has similarly reduced the gap to 2.3 percentage points. The largest difference is in the Arab States (5.9 percentage points), followed by Asia (4.1 percentage points). It should be noted, however, that the Arab States have increased their female participation rate more than eight times (second to Latin America), while the male participation rate has increased four times, and that the female participation rate in 1982 was higher than in Africa and Asia. In 1960 only 0.7 per cent of the relevant age-group was obtaining higher education, and in 1982 this figure had increased to 5.9 per cent (Sanyal, *ibid*).

Before trying to identify the differences some major similarities, or rather parallels, between developing and industrialized societies in a historical perspective should be pointed out.

*A historical perspective*

One way of arriving at a better perspective of the rôle of formal education in Third-World countries is to study them against the background of how formal education at various levels emerged in Europe. Not only has Europe gone through a process of industrialization, whose relationships with formal education are well worth analyzing, but the European models of formal education, universal full-time primary schooling, with entry at a certain age and covering a certain number of years, mass secondary education and—not least—the research-connected university have been emulated all over the world. There are similarities in the process of development of education and how it relates to societal changes, but there are certain important differences which it is important to keep in mind, not least when historical generalizations of research findings from Europe are extended to developing countries.

Universities in Europe were established in a highly ascriptive feudal society, where the aristocracy had its own arrangements for educating the younger generation. However, they became the only avenue of such modest social mobility as then existed, since they were educating professionals, clergy, civil servants, secon-
dary-school teachers and medical doctors. The State and the Church were the main employers. Studies which have been made of the social composition of university entrants show that the majority of students came from rather well-to-do farmers', artisans', and entrepreneurs' homes. Their competence made them indispensable as clergy and in civil administration. They could thereby rise to power and influence. Some were elevated to nobility. In Lutheran countries, such as the Scandinavian, the main avenue of upward mobility for a farm boy was the study of theology and subsequent ordination. The clergy were a separate estate in the Parliaments of several European countries, together with the nobility, burghers and farmers.

The rôle of science in 17th- and 18th-century Europe should also be mentioned. During that period various academies, such as the Royal Society in Britain and the Royal Academy of Sciences in Sweden, were founded as instruments for the promotion of research and exchange of scientific information. In mercantile Europe by the early 18th century science was conceived of as an instrument of economic progress and development. The academies were regarded by mercantilists as instrumental in providing the knowledge that would promote the technical inventions and, in the long term, the production and trade that would benefit the national economy. At that time universities did not conduct any research in the modern sense, even though bookish learning was expected to thrive there. Research was conducted by the academies and their members.

The rôle of the university in social mobility can be typified by Charles Linnaeus. His father was a local pastor who was the son of a farmer and had been given the opportunity to go to the university. His son Charles, after completing the regional gymnasium, studied at the University of Uppsala and then settled at the University of Leyden, where he flourished by publishing such revolutionary and innovative works as Systema naturae. At the age of 32 he was one of the founding fathers of the Royal Academy of Sciences.

The developing countries had to go through a different experience, owing mainly to the phenomenon of colonization. Most of these countries had an essentially subsistence agrarian economy before the advent of the Western commercial and industrial civilization. The primary task of the community was to produce
food, which was the most important basic need. Other crafts and occupations supported this primary function. The various kinds of services needed for subsistence were provided by different social groups. The socialization of the individual through training in a given skill, and in the value system of the society, were inseparable elements of a single learning system. The family, the workplace, the formal centres of learning and the religious institutions, all provided education on how to live, work, and follow the rules of the society into which one was born. The social leaders, elders, expert craftsmen and religious teachers set the standards and provided the learning. The world of work could scarcely be separated from the world of education.

During the period when many of the developing countries were under colonial domination this same system prevailed in most of them, particularly in the rural areas, where the majority of the population lived and which remained largely unaffected by the Western civilization brought by foreigners. However, in the urban areas and in the tiny modern sector of the economy, namely the government and commercial sector, the colonial rulers needed local manpower at the subordinate level, and accordingly trained them in institutions set up to meet their own needs. The formal education system which produced these new executives was elitist, and generally the language of instruction was that of the colonizers. Post-preliminary education was restricted in quantity and type to meet the needs of the rulers.

At the same time, the modern organized sector began to insist on completion of an educational programme as a condition for employment—graded, perhaps arbitrarily, according to the type and duration of studies. Education and employment now had a correspondence, but the inherent relationship was lost; the world of education had been separated from the world of work.

With the advent of independence, many of the developing countries had to expand their educational systems. Development efforts, and the departure of expatriates holding high-level decision-making positions, created a heavy demand for higher education in quantitative terms. With demand exceeding supply, and attention focused on the types of higher education in which there was a shortage of graduates, little thought was given to unemployment. The distribution of income and employment were implicitly regarded as problems that would be solved by
rapid economic expansion and by the upward mobility of the poor through increased educational opportunities. At the same time, industrial development was given precedence over agricultural development, because agriculture could apparently survive with unskilled labour, and because the planners and politicians thought that only dynamic industrial growth could absorb the masses of underemployed and lead the economy into "take-off". It was also believed that this would sustain economic growth, increase consumption, and improve the overall economic condition of the people.

Economists were quick to argue that investment in human resources was a powerful factor for economic growth. The rates of return on such investments, though calculated very approximately and sometimes arbitrarily, were shown to be as high as, if not higher than, those on other kinds of investment. Thus more and more money was invested in education, with the institutions of higher education receiving a large share of it; which was thought to be justified by salary differentials, though these in their turn were based on educational differentials.

There were also social and various other reasons for expansion. For example, in many of these countries education has now come to be considered as a basic human right. Also, with improved communication systems, the benefits of higher education were more readily perceived. Once children had received some education they saw the advantages of it and demanded more. Most institutions of higher education charged very low fees, while the special economic incentives, and the prestige and power attached to the job supposed to be waiting for graduates of higher education, attracted more and more students.

Political factors similarly contributed to the expansion of higher education: for all the countries, and for all the regions within a country, an institution of higher education was a symbol of national or regional prestige. Economic criteria received very little attention in the establishment of many of the institutions of higher education, and the question of the future employability of the graduates received none at all.

The rapid expansion of higher education has created as many problems as it has solved. Chief among them is the lack of relevance in the content and structure of the system of higher education with respect to national needs, since in most of these
countries the expansion was not combined with any real considera-
tion of changed needs following political independence. In
addition, the process of transition from a subsistence economy
to some measure of industrialization and trade, that was spread
over several generations in Europe, has taken place in some
developing countries in only one generation.

Another striking difference between European and Third-
World countries has to do with the development of formal
schooling and the development of enrolment at various stages.
The typical pattern of development in a European country was
the following: schooling was introduced by the Church, by the
setting-up of cathedral schools preparing for priesthood and not
primarily for civil service. Universities grew out of such schools.
For centuries there were no primary schools, let alone attempts
to provide universal schooling at that level. In Lutheran coun-
tries the church was interested in making the general populace
able to read the Scriptures. In the Swedish church law of 1686
the clergy was charged with the task of seeing to it that the par-
ishioners could read. The parish pastors examined all the adults
at regular intervals in order to assess their competence in that
respect (Johansson, 1980). Universal primary education in most
European countries was not legislated for until the middle of the
19th century, often with quite a lot of resistance on the part of
the farmers who were expected to carry the costs themselves. But
the representatives of the State regarded universal primary edu-
cation not only as an important element in nation-building, for
instance in promoting a common national language, but also as a
means of indoctrination and control (Isling, 1980). We can see
parallels to this in the emerging nation states in the Third
World.

Another important difference between industrial and Third-
World countries had to do with the development of enrolment
patterns over time. In a typical European country legislation on
universal and/or compulsory primary schooling was imple-
mented during the latter part of the 19th century. This process
was by and large completed by the turn of the century, when
practically all children of primary-school age, say between 6 and
12, attended school, not necessarily on full time. In several coun-
tries they went to school only for a short period each year; this
was the rule in rural areas, where children were needed for farm
work at home. Preparation for secondary-school entry usually took place in private institutions or by private tutoring, which meant that the majority of secondary-school entrants came from well-to-do homes. There were exceptions when transfer could be made from regular primary to secondary school (Husén, 1962).

The enrolment in secondary education by the turn of the century in a typical Western European country amounted to some 5 per cent of the relevant age-group, with some 2-3 per cent reaching the upper-secondary school-leaving examination, which qualified for university entry. The enrolment rate rose very slowly and in a linear fashion over more than half a century, from typically 5 per cent around 1900 to some 10 per cent by 1930 and to about 20-25 per cent by 1950. Thereafter the exponential enrolment increase, referred to sometimes as an "enrolment explosion", took place, with lower secondary becoming universal and upper secondary, later, close to universal. This development in its turn affected university enrolment, which more than quadrupled after 1960, only to level off in the late 1970s or early 1980s.

The enrolment in secondary schools and universities has increased so fast in developing countries that they can be said to have "jumped over" the long, linear process of enrolment increase in the European countries. In quite a few developing countries, still with mainly an agrarian economy, secondary school enrolment has reached the level typical of industrialized Europe by 1950. Given the structure of the population pyramid, with a high proportion of the population being of school age, the large enrolment has, of course, had strong financial repercussions on the economy.

In other words, the "enrolment explosion" in Third-World countries has taken place at the advanced levels of formal education before even primary schooling has become universal. In countries such as Egypt (Sanyal et al., 1982) or Colombia by 1980 only two out of three children of primary-school age ever went to school, while the percentage going to university was above the level of pre-war Europe and absorbing more than one-third of public expenditures on education.

The close fit between the amount of formal schooling and the position on the income scale in many developing countries is striking. This fit is much tighter than has so far been the case in
the industrialized countries. Heyneman (1979) quotes Jencks et al. (1972) estimation, according to which each additional year of schooling boosts the future income of Americans by some 4 per cent. Fägerlind (1975) in a longitudinal study followed the working-life careers up to the age of 45 and found that 10 per cent of the variance of income at that age was accounted for by formal education. This differs enormously from the situation in Third-World countries, where each additional year of schooling in a country such as Tanzania adds nearly 20 per cent to the income (Sanyal and Kinunda, 1977). It should, however, be pointed out that the great majority of higher-education graduates in developing countries expect to be, and are, employed by the State, a state that is deliberately tying salaries to formal educational attainments, as may be seen from Table 1.

Table 1. Starting civil-service monthly salaries, Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Monthly salary (in shillings)</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Monthly salary (in shillings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form I</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>Teacher (arts)</td>
<td>1475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form VI</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Doctor of medicine</td>
<td>2110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IIEP Tanzania study, p. 74.

The general syndrome in these countries is that income in the "modern" sector is several times higher than in the traditional sector, something that cannot fail to impress those in the latter and strengthen their resolve to get their children to climb as high as possible on the formal educational ladder in order to attain better social positions.

Finally, industrial and non-industrial countries differ strikingly with regard to the impact of home background on school attainments. Whereas access to advanced schooling and achieved learning in industrial countries is closely correlated with parental social status and parental education, this relationship is significantly weaker in developing countries.
It may be observed from the IIEP Tanzania study (Sanyal and Kinunda, op. cit.) that neither the region of permanent residence nor the occupation of the guardian has any significant influence on the reasons for pursuing higher education. However, a contradictory result is noted in the IIEP Philippines study, which states:

"An examination of the socio-economic status of those who passed the NCEE gives us an idea of the composition of the collegiate enrolment. A study conducted for the Private Higher Education Development Committee concluded that students coming from upper social classes (parents with higher education, high income, high occupational status) have significantly greater chances of passing the NCEE than those from lower social classes. Thus enrolment at the tertiary level is mostly composed of students from the upper classes." (Sanyal et al., 1981, p. 101.)

The variation in the phenomenon could be ascribed to the status of economic stratification of the country concerned. Heyneman, who has done research on this problem, takes this view with regard to his surveys in Uganda (Why impoverished children do well in Ugandan schools, 1979). He ascribes the fact that poor children tend to perform almost as well as children from rich homes to the kind of self-confidence in "new" countries that in industrial countries has required generations of well-to-do people in their environment, with the presence of many supporting relatives. Economic stratification in most developing countries is recent and has not had time enough to establish and "crystallize" the kind of self-confidence belonging to a well-established social class that characterized the European bourgeois class. Among the latter it was self-evident that young people should be given the opportunity to go to higher or advanced schooling, as self-evident as it was in working-class families that they did not "belong" in secondary schools or universities. This kind of difference between industrial and non-industrial countries has been enhanced by the administration of "blind" examinations. The presence of, for instance, the Primary Leaving Examination in countries such as Uganda or Botswana "protects those less economically fortunate" (Heyneman, 1979, p. 181). Contrary to the situation in countries where economic stratification is not recent, examinations as instruments of meritocratic selection serve better the original meritocratic aim of spotting those with "inherited" ability, irrespective of social background. In industrial
countries, or countries where economic stratification is deeply rooted, with their much more crystallized social stratification with the support system and the self-confidence that goes with it, the poor are more handicapped. If they enter into the competition conducted by means of tests and examinations they do so with much less confidence.

What for a Western social scientist appears to be surprising and puzzling, namely that social status has less effect and school-related factors more effect on outcomes of school learning in developing than in industrial countries, has in recent years been subjected to rather convincing analysis, Foster (1977) on the basis of available empirical evidence advancing the following interpretation. In the process of “modernization” the objective stratification in terms of income and status becomes internalized and begins to have an effect upon the self-image and/or self-confidence of the individuals. The pattern of objective stratification may at the beginning not be accompanied by cultural differentiation in terms of attitudes, values and life-styles. But with time there is a movement in the direction of a cultural stratification which basically is the emergence of a class society of the Western type.

This interpretation is supported by empirical evidence. It can be shown from IEA data that in developing countries, contrary to industrialized countries, there are no differences between wealthy and poor families in attitudes to schooling and encouragement of schooling. Bulcock et al. (1974), also using IEA data, found in comparing England and India that the entire verbal culture as expressed in language patterns differs much less between rich and poor in India than in England.

We shall come back to this very interesting difference between developing and developed countries later. In this context it will suffice to note the paradox of the affluent countries, whose high-priority egalitarian educational policy aiming at “democratization” of education tends to fail because of the streak of meritocracy of their societies, where formal education increasingly becomes the first criterion of selection for jobs and where the need for qualified manpower on a high level seems to be almost insatiable.
II. Egalitarian philosophies in education

In a clarifying analysis of the meaning of equality in education James S. Coleman (1968) points out some basic differences between traditional and modern societies in the conception of equity. In the pre-industrial, largely ascriptive society with a minimum of geographical, occupational and social mobility, with its patriarchal kinship system and with the family as the unit of production and centre of social welfare responsibility, it is meaningless to talk about educational equality. It is only in an industrial society, and with the changed rôle of the family, which ceases to be a self-perpetuating economic unit and matrix of education and training, that education becomes a function of the community or society at large. Children become occupationally mobile outside the family. Training and social welfare become community responsibilities and separate institutions called schools are established outside the extended family setting.

In industrialized Europe by the mid-19th century elementary schooling of a compulsory nature was established for the children of the common people. The State needed to tighten its grip on the citizens, and this could more easily be achieved by controlling the schools and what was taught in them. In the urban areas where parents worked long hours there was a need for an institution that could take care of the children, particularly since legislation had been passed prohibiting child labour. The upper class had a system of private preparatory schools for entry into secondary and higher education which prepared for upper-class occupations. As pointed out above, during the industrialization period a dual, class-linked system of education emerged.
The quest for structural school reforms in the direction of a comprehensive and/or unitary school organization espoused by liberals and social democrats in Europe since the end of the 19th century was conceived within the framework of a philosophy of educational equity according to which the overriding aim was to provide equality of exposure to available curricula. It was up to the child and his or her family to take advantage. If the child failed, he had to carry the blame. The liberal ideal in policy terms was to establish a system which provided all children, irrespective of social background, equal and free access to a menu of educational alternatives after having gone through a common core (a *tronc commun* in French educational parlance) during the first years of schooling. Schooling should be of a comprehensive nature with all the programmes and all the children from a certain area under the same roof.

Having all the children in a comprehensive school assigned to different programmes which are expected to suit the needs of each individual is not as easy and straightforward as it may appear in a society with expanding formal education, as was the case in post-war Europe. Coleman (1968) points out that the assumption underlying the idea of comprehensivization is that the future of the child is taken for granted. The very idea of educational guidance is based on this assumption, namely that there is a certain educational alternative and a certain occupation that will best "suit" the child. The real problem is, however, as Coleman points out, that what is taken for granted is the problem. This creates a lot of confusion about whether equality is conceived as a starting-point or as a goal. The growing realization of what the problem is explains the increased concern about equality of results more than equality in opportunities.

The quest for equality in terms of access to education, political power and material means was for a long time after the French revolution spearheaded by liberals and socialists. Access to education, in the first place basic or primary education for all and advanced education for the more able, irrespective of home background, was expected to contribute to the creation of a more just society. Educated intelligence was conceived as a means of social promotion, an instrument that would ensure that inherited ability, and not family background, would determine who would have the resources for going ahead in life.
The roots of the classical liberal conception of equality of educational opportunity are to be found in 18th-century political philosophy as developed by Locke, Hélvetius, and Rousseau. The latter in 1755 published his famous *discours* on the origin of inequalities among men. Thomas Jefferson, who prepared the first draft of the Declaration of Independence which states that “all men are created equal and independent”, in his other writings talked about the “natural aristocracy”. It was composed of those individuals who by virtue of their innate talents and not by family background were entitled to a social status that matched their natural assets.

In *Le contrat social* (which was published in 1762, the same year as the influential book on education *Emile*) Rousseau spells out the idea that in the “natural” state of society all men are born equal and with the same rights. “Natural equality” is transformed into moral and legal equality by means of the “social contract”. He also deals with the problem of innate individual differences. They will not jeopardize equality as long as society rewards actual merits and does not patronize wealth and birth. A “natural aristocracy” automatically emerges in a society which gets rid of the privileges of its “artificial aristocracy.”

The Rousseauan quest for equality had an impact on social thinking during the following two centuries. Freedom and equality became “fundamental principles” in Western educational thought until our days (Sjöstrand, 1973). They influenced constitutional legislation in several countries and gave rise to a movement towards political equality whose goal was “one man, one vote”.

But parallel to that there was also a movement driven by economic motives for equal rights to compete for elevated positions in society. Early 18th-century mercantilism realized the potential of talent not only in politics and public affairs but also in industry and commerce. The idea of a *selectio ingeniorum*, a selection of the highly able, was readily accepted by the upward mobile class of civil servants, industrialists, merchants, and academics in 18th-century Europe. Identification and promotion of talent was conceived of as a means of strengthening the economic and political potential of a nation (Edlund, 1947).

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 in Germany talks about a reorganization of German society according to individual capac-
ity. A new social order would supersede the old one based on inherited social privileges. One of the articles of the Constitution stated that educational careers should be determined by “innate aptitude” (*Anlage*) and “inclination”, not by social background. Promotion should occur on the basis of “ability” and “will” within the framework of an interplay between free competition and equal opportunity, the latter being achieved by financial aid to the able. Evidently, the Constitution was framed in the spirit of the classical liberal philosophy of equality of opportunity.

In 1931 the British socialist R.H. Tawney published his by now classic book *Equality*, in which he dealt with all aspects of the concept, including education. He expresses misgivings about British education at that time:

“The hereditary curse upon British education is its organization upon lines of social class... Children are apt to think of themselves as their elders show that they think of them. The public-school boy is encouraged to regard himself as one of the ruling class—to acquire, in short, the aristocratic virtues of initiative and self-reliance, as well as frequently the aristocratic vices of arrogance, intellectual laziness and self-satisfaction.” (Tawney, 1951, p. 154 f.).

As pointed out above, the debate elicited by the Coleman survey commissioned by the United States’ Congress in 1966 on equality of educational opportunity gave rise to a more sophisticated, philosophical analysis of the meaning of equality, a debate to which Coleman himself constructively contributed. He drew, as was also pointed out above, the attention to the distinction between equality of *opportunity* and equality of *results*. John Rawls (1971) in his book *A theory of justice* elaborated on this distinction. He added another distinction to the debate, namely the one between “corrective equality” and “redemptive equality”, although the terms were invented by one of his critics, Charles Frankel (1973). The fact that some are born with more favourable genes than others is due to a “natural lottery” and therefore “arbitrary from a moral point of view”. The liberals have limited themselves by requesting corrective measures of an economic nature to be taken in order to promote those of good natural ability but of underprivileged background. But the main task which is also the core moral problem according to Rawls is
to "redeem" those who are born with unfavourable genes and/or into less favourable social circumstances.

It was not until the 1950s that social scientists began to conduct large-scale empirical studies with the purpose of elucidating to what extent equality of educational opportunity had been achieved. Floud et al. (1956) studied the effect of the British 1944 Education Act on the system of "11+ selection" for grammar schools. Coleman et al. (1966) conducted a big national sample survey commissioned by the United States' Congress. Surveys aiming at assessments of the "reserve of ability" were conducted in Sweden in the late 1940s and mid-1950s (Husén, 1948; Härnqvist, 1958; Halsey, ed., 1961). The 1960s and 1970s saw a great number of studies relevant to the equality problem. In addition, both national governments and intergovernmental agencies regularly conducted participation studies.

Aspects of the equality problem relevant to developing countries

Schiefelbein and Farrell (1982) have in an 8-year follow-up of a sample of 8-graders in Chile developed a "model of educational inequality". They start from the realization that "schooling operates as a selective social screening" (p. 11) and distinguish four main aspects of this screening process in which background factors play an important rôle:

(1) inequality of access as defined by criteria of admission, financial support, geographical location, etc.;
(2) inequality of "survival" as defined by rate of grade-repeating, drop-out and final graduation;
(3) inequality of output—or rather immediate results—as defined by competencies documented by examinations and test results; and
(4) inequality of outcomes—or rather inequality of utility of outcomes—defined by positions and social status after completion of formal education.

The first three aspects refer to the screening that takes place in the formal school system. The fourth refers to the connection between schooling and working life.

What background factors are related to the four inequality aspects? And how strong are these relationships? As was pointed out earlier, there is an overwhelmingly massive empirical evidence gathered in industrial countries (see, e.g., Husén, 1975, and
Anderson, 1983) that tells us that in these countries the main dimensions of inequality are parental occupational status and parental education. These two variables account for a large portion of the variance in access, “survival”, and output, the latter defined by scholastic achievements.

A follow-up study carried out by the IIEP in the Philippines over four years on students in the higher-education system yielded information on working careers. An initial study on higher education and the labour market in the Philippines, carried out by the IIEP in 1976, was based on a survey of over 9,000 students, over 4,500 graduates and 777 employers (Sanyal, Perfecto and Arcelo, 1981). A follow-up survey was carried out in 1980 to trace a representative sample of 1,284 students in order to identify who among the students drop out, and why; who delay completing their education, and why; who obtains a job on graduation, and how; what problems the graduates encountered in the process of obtaining employment; who remained unemployed, etc (Arcelo and Sanyal, 1986).

The analytical approach was cross-classification, regression analysis and discriminant analysis. It was found that female students had a higher probability of dropping out or delaying completion of their studies. The parents of the majority of the drop-outs had lower educational backgrounds and lower incomes. It was also noted that children of high-income parents are the most likely to graduate and secure employment. Graduates who obtained a job quickly had a higher mean score in the national college entrance examination than those who dropped out or delayed completion of their studies. A substantial intergenerational mobility had occurred, a process which had been facilitated by an increase in the number of highly qualified jobs.

The IIEP surveys of students and graduates demonstrate the relationship between “survival” and home background. It was observed that the percentage from rural and lower socio-economic groups is higher among students than among graduates. For example, in Sudan 22 per cent of graduates came from peasant families, as compared with 32 per cent of students (Sanyal and Yacoub, 1975). In Zambia, no less than 71 per cent of the student sample came from rural areas (Sanyal et al., 1976).

In the developing countries the following social background dimensions of inequality can be identified:
Higher education and social stratification: an international comparative study

(1) rural/urban residence
(2) income
(3) gender
(4) ethnicity (tribal belongingness).

As mentioned above, social status, rather than social class, accounts for a considerable amount of the variance of student achievements in industrial countries which has been shown in large-scale surveys, such as the one by Coleman et al. (1966), the Plowden Commission in Britain (1967) and the IEA studies, for example Comber and Keeves (1973). Less comprehensive evidence, although quite convincing, shows that in developing countries school-related variables are relatively more important than home-background variables than in industrial countries in accounting for variance between students and schools (see, e.g., Schiefelbein, 1973; Heyneman, 1976). This does not mean, however, that parental education or occupation is of less absolute impact in a developing than in a developed society. The evidence that has been cited comes from studies where multivariate techniques have been employed in order to measure the relative importance of various independent variables in bringing about variability in the dependent variable, in this case in student achievement. This means that a system of schooling which is not only equipped with high-level resources but is rather homogeneous (equal) in the distribution of these resources as well, shows a relatively limited “influence” of school factors to the extent that—as was the case in the United States after the Coleman survey was published—the question was raised whether “schooling makes any difference”.

The debate on equity in education and how it should be achieved was for a long time conducted on the conditions and premises of the industrialized countries with their rapidly growing economies and seemingly unsatisfiable need for highly trained manpower. There are, however, certain lessons which developing countries can learn from this debate.

1. The historical aspect. In spite of the reservations, not to say misgivings, about trying to draw parallels between the development of education in European societies and that in Third-World countries, there is much to be said for drawing such
historical parallels, once one is aware of the limitations of such exercises. Third-World societies in the process of "modernization", which does not mean simply that they in all respects repeat the processes that we historically could observe in Europe, could widen their perspective on certain problems by taking stock of the historical lessons.

2. The "revolution of rising expectations". As mentioned earlier in this booklet, there are differences between what happened in the industrial societies at the time of their "development" or "modernization" and what happens today in the developing countries. One main difference is that in the developing countries there has been no delay in the rapid expansion, or even "explosion", of enrolment at the secondary and tertiary levels. While primary education is far from universal and a considerable percentage of children of school age have never set foot in any school, secondary-school and university enrolment soars and reaches a level comparable to that in industrial Europe at the middle of this century. In spite of quite a lot of lip-service being paid to the idea that primary education should have first priority, secondary and university education expands by leaps and bounds; this occurs in societies still with mainly subsistence agriculture and where the "modern" sector is very modest in size. This means that primary education and its clientèle is neglected.

3. The emergence of a "new intelligentsia". It is a common experience in most countries which go through a period of rapid development, sometimes due to radical or even revolutionary changes in the social order, that a considerable number of the new leaders come from lower-class background, particularly in cases when the previous order has been overthrown by revolutionary measures. This was the case in the Soviet Union, where the first generation of professionals after the revolution, as well as leading administrators and politicians, the new category or class of functionaries and intelligentsia, were first-generation in their positions. This new class tend to preserve their prerogatives by having their children enter institutions of higher learning. It is, as Sauvy (1973) puts it, "as if the socialist societies were creating a new middle class, jealous of its only privilege, which is that of higher education." (p. 49).
There are indications that a similar process of "crystallizing" privileges occurs in many developing societies. In spite of the substantial amount of intergenerational mobility, the IIEP studies demonstrate that the larger share of higher-education opportunities is still enjoyed by the élites (see particularly the study on Employment experience of weaker caste graduates (Marathwada Region, India) — Bokar and Kurulkar, 1986).
III. The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier

The rôle of education in social mobility and in the status-stratification process in a society can be studied from two main aspects:
(1) One can look at the relationships between social antecedents, such as parental education and/or occupational position, on the one hand, and the level and quality of attained formal education on the other.
(2) One can look at the relationships between attained formal education, on the one hand, and achieved status in society on the other.

Most of the empirical research conducted on education as a social stratifier has been devoted to the first of these two aspects. There are obvious reasons for this lack of balance.

In the first place, it has often been more or less tacitly assumed that once a person has had the opportunity to obtain more advanced education he or she has “made it”, that is to say, an occupational career matching his or her education will more or less automatically follow. In other words, the problem of “getting ahead in life” is to become sufficiently educated. To take one example which strongly supports the notion of education as opening the gate to a successful social career: young people in Japan who have finished upper-secondary school and plan to go on to university try desperately to prepare themselves for entry into one of the prestigious national universities. The competition for entry into these, referred to in the Japanese educational debate as the “examination hell”, is fierce (see, e.g., *First report on educational reform*, submitted to the Prime Minister on June
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26, 1985 by the Provisional Council on Educational Reform, Government of Japan). But once admitted, the young person can take it easier because he or she can be assured of a first employment which is the first step in a promising career in the civil service or in one of the big commercial or industrial companies.

The IIEP studies demonstrate some interesting differences between industrialized and developing countries and between centrally-planned and market economies. In the centrally-planned economies (USSR and Poland) academic performance is the most important criterion for recruitment, but membership of the Party also plays an indirect rôle (Chuprunov et al., 1982: Sanyal and Józefowicz, 1978). In the Federal Republic of Germany, according to a survey conducted in 1978/79 in the south-western area, it was observed that grade points in higher-education credentials played a smaller rôle than personal impression, occupational experience gained during education, and proficiency in foreign languages (Teichler and Sanyal, 1982).

In the developing countries, however, the situation is different. In a survey made in the Philippines, according to the employers work experience and academic record were ranked as the most important, with personal impression playing a very insignificant rôle (Sanyal et al., 1981). In West Bengal, according to the graduates, academic record and performance in aptitude tests or interview are the most important criteria for recruitment; work experience ranked fifth in a list of seven criteria (Bose et al., 1983). In Peru, likewise, academic performance is the most important criterion for recruitment among the ESEP graduates (Sanyal et al., 1983). In Zambia interview results, work experience and academic record rank first, second and third in order of importance, according to the employers, in a list of seven criteria (Sanyal et al., 1976). In Egypt, according to the graduates, the most important criterion in obtaining a job was "academic record", followed, far behind, by aptitude test and interview performance. The employers, however, indicated that "aptitude test" was the most important, followed by practical experience and interview performance. By calculating a "standardized difference" score, the responses for graduates and employers can be arranged as in Table 2 (Sanyal et al., 1982).

In Tanzania, although the ranking of the different criteria var-
The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier

Table 2. Egypt: comparison of criteria for obtaining a job and selecting employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Graduates (G)</th>
<th>Employers (E)</th>
<th>Standardized differences (G-E)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic record</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aptitude test</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical experience</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters of recommendation</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical appearance</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Calculated as mean using code "Unimportant": 1, "Important": 2, "Very important": 3.
2. Figures under this heading are differences between mean responses for graduates and mean responses for employers, each set of means standardized so as to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Source: Sanyal et al., 1982.

The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier

The job competition, particularly in industrialized countries, explains the paradox that many young people who dislike school nevertheless go on far beyond the minimum compulsory level in order to secure themselves a place as close to the top of the line of job-seekers as possible (Husén, 1979).

The "diploma disease" (Dore, 1976) is a more or less universal phenomenon, although it takes different forms in present-day societies, depending on differences both in economic development and cultural background. By and large, one can say that it has become a problem in developing countries with their "revolution of rising expectations" with regard to what education can do for the individual from a poor and rural background. This differs from the situation in Europe at an early stage of industrialization where other criteria, such as social background and/or practical experiences, plus willingness to "go ahead", played a more prominent rôle.

It is methodologically and administratively much more complicated, as well as more time- and fund-consuming, to conduct
empirical studies of the relationship between formal education and subsequent career. In order to yield interesting results, such studies require a longitudinal approach. The 8-year follow-up study in Chile by Schiefelbein and Farrell (1982) is a case in point. Such studies will by definition have to last a considerable number of years. Furthermore, the difficulties of following up and collecting information about occupational careers are, once the young people have left school and entered working life, enormous.

Most of the available research on education and social stratification has been conducted in industrial societies and has focused on how social background and education attainment are related (see, e.g., Husén, 1975; Anderson, 1983). Most of the relatively scarce research conducted in the developing countries in the same problem area has dealt with the same aspect. Arnold Anderson (1983) has prepared a state-of-the-art report for the World Bank in which he has collated and analyzed virtually all the information we have about how social background (in his review defined by parental education, parental occupational status, and parental income) is related to enrolment in secondary and higher education. The overriding purpose in his report is to relate selectivity in educational systems to the level of economic development. For that purpose Anderson uses two indices, an index of selectivity (IS) and, since the twin problem of equality is to be elucidated, an index of “dissimilarity” (ID).

Agencies interested in the rôle of formal education in economic and social development, such as the World Bank and Unesco, have initiated studies of what happens to young people in working life after the completion of secondary and higher education. The World Bank has conducted several so-called tracer studies, which over some time have been corner-stones in the evaluation of many of its loan projects in education. IIEP studies in a number of countries on university graduates and their employment (Sanyal, 1987) deal principally with the issue of what happens to young people in working life after completing higher education.

Since access to post-primary education is the first step in social mobility in most large and complex societies at the post-feudal (post-traditional) and “developing” stage, it is quite natural to focus mainly on the social and other mechanisms which
The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier
determine access and on equality with regard to it, which is
another explanation why most research on education and social
mobility has been concentrated on participation in secondary
and higher education as related to social background. But to
what extent is society in a given country ready to "absorb" its
university graduates and to grant them positions in the status
hierarchy corresponding to the level of education they have
reached? In many developing countries the salary scales in pub­
lic employment, mostly in the civil service, are closely attuned to
formal credentials, i.e., to the level and quality of the degree
achieved, as mentioned above. One year of additional formal
education can mean placement on a significantly higher level on
the salary scale and in the long run mean quite a lot for career
promotion. Other factors can, of course, also have influence, not
least in the private part of the "modern" sector, such as ethnic­
ity, family background and political affiliation. However, the
IIIEP studies demonstrate that in so far as earnings are con­
cerned, such influence is not significant. According to these stu­
dies, "it was noted that earnings differentials are not significant
in most of our studies for differences in region of home, parental
occupation and parental income. However, in some cases (Sri
Lanka and Philippines, for example) the institution attended by
the graduate has an influence on the salary structure of the grad­
uate." The study further adds "the most significant source of
salary differences among those with a third-level education is
age. Other major differences stem from the gender gap, still very
pronounced in many countries, and the fact that in all except the
centrally-planned economies the private sector pays more than
the public sector" (Sanyal, 1987).

Not unexpectedly, formal education presents different prob­
lems of relationships to social differentiation in developing
countries than in the highly industrialized Western countries,
where most studies of education and social stratification have
been conducted. It is therefore important to try to identify the
major differences between the two types of societies with regard
to the impact of formal education on stratification. Since the
IIIEP studies on graduate employment are by far the most impor­
tant ones, both as regards the diversity of countries and the
scope of the inquiry, it is natural to take a "meta-analytic" look
at them and try to derive some generalizations.
A comparative perspective on education and social stratification in developing societies

Social stratification is pervasive in all large-scale and complex societies. Education as provided in schools is instrumental in bringing about such stratification. In various modern social philosophies education has been connected with stratification by relating it to either social class or social status. The distinction between the two concepts was once made by Max Weber. For sociologists status is usually defined by possession of cultural resources, whereas class is seen as an index of economic and political power. Foster (1977) rejects the term stratification and prefers instead to talk about “differentiation” as more adequate for developing societies. He is also critical about using the concepts of “class” or “stratum” in analyzing the rôle of education in developing countries, because they “may not exist as meaningful categories of social thought or action for most individuals” in these countries (op. cit., p. 215).

In any case, formal education of the type that first emerged in Western societies and then spread to the rest of the world has been one of the major determinants of social differentiation and of social mobility in all societies under quite a variety of social conditions.

In Western societies secondary and higher education was for a long time a main avenue for upward social mobility among two categories of people, those with a background in farming and those from urban artisan and entrepreneur families. The French Revolution brought the so-called Third Estate to the forefront, which soon began to dominate institutions of higher learning and did so over many generations. A typical example is les grandes écoles in France which provided the State with top professionals in administration and technology. There was a very limited “inflow” from below to the upper echelons, in some instances mediated by higher education, but practically no “outflow” to lower echelons.

In the USSR the first post-revolution generation of functionaries and intelligentsia, many of whom were first-generation professionals, tended to pass on their status to the next generation. This was alluded to by Premier Khrushchev in his presentation of the 1958 Education Act to the Supreme Soviet. He pointed out that the great majority of students at top universities came
from the homes of the functionaries and the intelligentsia, whereas the great majority of people (the manual workers and peasants) were represented by a minority at these universities. Subsequent studies have confirmed this tendency for young people from that kind of supporting background to have higher expectations, and to enter institutions of higher learning in greater numbers than those whose families are in the category of peasants or manual workers (as shown in the cases of Poland and the USSR, Tables 3 and 4).

Japan is a special case among the highly industrialized countries. But given the intensive competition for entry particularly into prestige universities and in spite of the breadth of enrolment in secondary education, there is a considerable social bias in participation (OECD, 1971a).

The IIEP studies have shown that in the developing countries differences in socio-economic status influence the demand for higher education. In the Philippines and in West Bengal females are at least as career-oriented as males (Sanyal et al., 1981: Bose et al., 1983). In Zambia (Sanyal et al., 1976) males are more career-oriented than females (72 per cent as against 26 per cent), but in Tanzania female students gave employment-related factors greater importance than did male students. Here too, the higher the income of the guardian, the greater the importance of employment-related factors (Sanyal and Kinunda, 1977).

In the Sudan male students (72 per cent) and wards of government employees (73 per cent) give more importance to employment-related factors in the pursuit of higher education. Another striking feature in Sudan is that the higher the income of the guardian, the less motivation there is to study for career reasons (Sanyal and Yacoub, 1975). In Sri Lanka also male students attach more importance to employment-related factors (Sanyal et al., 1983).

These findings show that while socio-economic characteristics influence the demand for higher education, all countries do not follow the same pattern.

Third-World countries have systems of formal education which in most cases have been modelled on Western systems. They recently started from scratch, particularly in terms of enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels. As has been spelled out earlier, the development of enrolment patterns has been quite
### Table 3. Poland: first-year students and graduates by socio-economic status of their parents, 1983/84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total in thousands</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Member of agricultural co-operatives</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>blue-collar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>white collar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students at first year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- day students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(full-time)</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- evening</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- extramural</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduates of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- day studies</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- evening</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- extramural</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Employees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>blue-collar</th>
<th>white collar</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
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<td>84.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Self-employed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>farmers, peasants</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**

The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier

TABLE 4. Orientation of secondary-school leavers to full-time higher education according to social origins, USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social origin</th>
<th>Percentage of corresponding social group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers' families</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhoz families</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants' and specialists' families</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chuprunov et al., 1982.

different from that of industrial countries. The LDCs have in a way been skipping the stage of slow enrolment growth in secondary and tertiary institutions which characterized most of the Western countries, and have had an almost instant "enrolment explosion" directly after the establishment of mass primary education. In these societies higher education differs from that in industrial societies in, among others, the following respects:

(a) the close relationship between formal education and salary structure (Psacharopoulos and Sanyal, 1981, p. 32 ff.),

(b) the relatively high unit costs (ibid., p. 16 and pp. 24-25), and

(c) the differences between higher and lower education with regard to private and public rate of return (ibid., p. 35 et seq.).

We shall develop further what has been said above about the differences between developed and developing societies with regard to the rôle of higher education in social differentiation.

European society well into the 20th century was by and large an ascriptive one with two "parallel" systems of education, one for the social élite and one for the masses. The latter did not have access to any basic formal education until it was provided by law in most West and North European countries by the middle of the 19th century. Among outstanding examples of this parallelism or division are the so-called public schools in Britain which served the upper-class young boys, and the girls' "finishing" schools in Switzerland to which upper-class families on the continent sent their daughters. At the level of higher education les grandes écoles established during the Napoleonic era prepared an
administrative and technical élite which in a remarkable way has been able to preserve itself over generations (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970).

From the late 19th century an increasing—but still modest—flow from below succeeded in penetrating the barriers to higher education and becoming co-opted into the élite. In principle liberals pledged allegiance to the philosophy of “free way for the able” (freie Bahn den Tüchtigen), which later became the backbone of the liberal version of the philosophy of equality of opportunity (Husén, 1975). Liberals, but in particular political parties in Western and Northern Europe, associated with the labour movements, put “democratization” of education, that is to say, broadening the opportunities for the mass of students to have access to advanced education without regard to family and geographical background, high on the list of political priorities. The quest for more equality was also inspired by the emerging social research which provided results from large-scale surveys on higher education and social background and the “reserve of ability” (Halsey, ed., 1961; Dahrendorf, 1965; Husén & Boalt, 1968; see the state-of-the-art report by Husén, 1975). For example, Dahrendorf in 1965 published a book on working-class children at German universities which showed that the professional and managerial classes provided about half the students in spite of making up only one per cent of the German workforce, whereas manual workers and farmers contributed one per cent of the students in spite of making up about fifty per cent of the workforce. The equality issue was in the forefront of the political debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not least because of the attention paid to the issue by the OECD secretariat (Halsey, ed., 1961; OECD, 1971b). In the Federal Republic of Germany in the election campaign of 1969 which brought the Brandt social-democratic party to power, the abolition of the parallelism between the Volkschule-Hauptschule on the one hand and the Gymnasium-Realschule on the other hand was a major issue.

But in spite of misgivings about egalitarian policies over the last few decades education has become an instrument for breaking up the ties between social origin by birth and social destination. It has been able to generate quite a considerable upward mobility in, for instance, Britain (Halsey et al., 1980). Halsey has pointed out that there are at present in the industrial societies
two movements, one which he calls “classless equality of opportunity” and the other “allocation by merit”. These societies are increasingly becoming meritocratic but they are societies where merit is considerably modified by class (Halsey et al., 1980). Since in these societies everybody gets more formal education than in earlier times there is a strong flow from below into qualified positions. Only a few decades ago, a small élite in Europe had access to secondary education. Now lower-secondary schooling belongs to the compulsory stage. Upper-secondary school, although voluntary, has in several countries become almost universal and is in most industrial countries attended by a majority of the relevant age-groups. In the era of extended stay in formal education it has been said about schooling that it is a “positional” rather than a consumption good. The amount of formal education an individual has been able to absorb determines, as pointed out earlier, his or her place in the line of job-seekers. This tendency has over the last couple of decades become stronger, given the fact that the employment system more and more tends to use the amount of formal schooling as the first criterion of selection among applicants for jobs (Teichler et al., 1974). The consequence is that stratification in the educational system has moved “upstairs”. Since secondary schooling in an era of universal attendance is no longer the prerogative of a social élite (in Europe by 1940 the typical portion of an age-group entering secondary school was less than 20 per cent), higher education has become more crucial as a stratifier; but its rôle has been weakened when 20-25 per cent or more of the age-groups enter tertiary institutions, or even more so when close to 50 per cent enter, as is the case in the United States (Trow, 1973). But there is a tendency for the élite sector to be preserved within the university system, since more prestigious—and attractive—programmes or faculties can be selective and add further requirements and credentials for entry (Mählck, 1980).

Of special interest, particularly with reference to the study of social antecedents and educational achievements and subsequent social positions, is the theory of cultural capital advanced by Bourdieu and Passeron (1977). It is crucial when it comes to explain why social background seems to play a less prominent rôle for educational achievements in developing than in industrial countries. We shall come back to this later.
A fundamental problem is to what extent education *per se* can bring about social change. In the years of "educational euphoria" of the 1960s there was quite a lot of optimism about education as an instrument of changing the structure of power and advantage. Education would "spearhead" the development towards a more democratic and just society. One only needs to read the Faure report *Learning to be* (1972), which was a product of the spirit of the 1960s, or the OECD documents that were prepared for its policy conference in 1970 (OECD, 1971) to realize that education was conceived as a major instrument of social change. But already by 1970 there were misgivings about what education would be able to achieve. More was becoming known about the interactive nature of relationships between formal education and society at large. Education, which earlier was expected to "spearhead" social and economic development in the industrial countries, was itself a product of a welfare society that was able to provide more and more formal education to an increasing number of young people.

*Differences between developed and developing countries with regard to social stratification (differentiation)*

Philip Foster (1977) in a pioneering "state-of-the-art" paper on education and social differentiation (as pointed out earlier, he prefers that expression to stratification) makes a case for analysing the relationship between social antecedents, formal education and status in the world of work in the developing countries on their own conditions. For a long time the tendency has prevailed to study the problem of social differentiation in LDCs with the concepts and empirical traditions derived from the impressive body of investigations conducted in the industrial societies. Foster points out three important limitations pertaining to developing countries of the conceptual instruments used in conducting studies of education and social differentiation in industrial countries.

1. Developing countries have a different ecology for their educational systems, which is reflected in a much more marked disparity in the provision of schooling between urban and rural areas (Heyneman, 1977), even though as late as in the 1950s such disparities were a source of concern among educators in Western Europe. It is in the very nature of industrialization
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that urban areas become centres of "modernization" including provision of schooling (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). Bogni-court has shown that in sub-Saharan Africa intranational differences in provisions of schooling are larger than the international ones (see Foster, op. cit., p. 217). Regional factors, more than "social class" or ethnicity, contribute to such disparities. Vinayagum Chinapah (1983) conducted a sample survey on equality of educational provisions and achievements in an eth­nically "highly stratified" society, Mauritius. He found con­siderable disparity between urban and rural areas. In the IEA Six-Subject Survey the between-school variance, which re­flected between-regional differences in India, amounted to 80 per cent of the between-student variance among 14-year-olds in that country (Walker, 1976). The same ratio was only 10-25 per cent in the industrial countries, in Sweden less than 10 per cent.

2. In developing countries social differentiation has another type of base than in industrial societies. Both in industrial and non-industrial societies that base is complex with a multiplicity of factors entering into it, such as income, parental education, parental occupation, lineage, caste, etc. In the industrial coun­tries these factors are more crystallized into what could be called a socio-economic status (SES) index. This is not the case—at least not to the same extent—in developing countries. The crucial observation made by Foster is that "emergent pat­terns of social differentiation in the less developed world represent a close interweaving between traditional and emer­gent conceptions of status." (op. cit., p. 219). Modernization in these societies does not simply displace traditionality and the resilience of traditional conceptions of status. This has often been ignored in research on education and social transmission in developing countries. When researchers try to apply the conceptual framework and the quantitative methodology of industrial societies in studying such problems "precision of measurement is achieved at the expense of ignoring some funda­mental realities of the social structures of less developed countries." (Foster, op. cit., p. 219).

Chinapah (1983) found in Mauritius that "distance between the home culture and the school culture as seen from regional, ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic perspectives, tended to
maintain and reproduce an overall process of social stratification and social inequality.” (op. cit., p. 166).

3. In most developing societies school is a transferred institution, initially imported by colonial rulers, missionaries and indigenous élites. Thus, emerging patterns of social differentiation which depend on new criteria of Western education easily come in conflict with traditional criteria, such as lineage and descent. This is something which must be taken into account in studying social differentiation and social mobility in Third-World countries. One cannot simply replicate investigations on education, background, and social status conducted in developed societies.

The considerations spelled out above have important implications for research on social background, education, and social differentiation in both developed and developing societies. Conventional SES indices, derived from certain quantitative variables, such as income and level of formal education, can only be regarded as “proxy measures of different patterns of child-rearing among different socio-economic groups” (Foster, op. cit., p. 222). They reflect something far beyond income or formal education, namely differences in family interaction, values, achievement motivation, aspirations, etc. Therefore, better predictions of academic performance can be made on the basis of more directly trying to assess the “cultural capital” the child brings to school in terms of motivation, psychological support, aspirations, etc. In the debate on equality of opportunity in Western Europe as conducted within the framework of OECD (see, e.g., Halsey, ed., 1961) it was for some time believed that a policy rectifying disparities would consist mainly of providing economic support and spreading schools better geographically. But it was soon discovered that the psychological support system of the home played a much more crucial rôle than anticipated. In a study in Stockholm conducted in the 1950s it was found that children of working-class background, who according to school marks and IQ were well qualified to enter academic secondary education, did not take advantage and proceeded instead to the upper section of the 8-year primary school, in spite of the fact that economically a transfer to the academic secondary schools in the same city did not make any difference. Both types of schooling were free (Husén & Boalt, 1968).
There is a considerable variation among developing countries with regard to the number of people from "lower strata" moving "upstairs". Foster points out that in Latin America children from poor peasants' and workers' homes do not have the slightest chance of getting into secondary schools or universities, whereas in tropical Africa a "substantial minority of secondary and university students come from illiterate, rural peasant families." (op. cit., p. 223). The presence or absence of a high culture also makes quite a lot of difference in terms of the "permeability" of the educational system for those who come from lower social echelons.

So far there have been rather few empirical studies of the relationships between social antecedents and educational attainments/achievements in developing countries. In the IEA Six-Subject Survey four developing countries, Chile, India, Iran and Thailand, participated (Walker, 1976). A considerably increased number have participated in the Second International Surveys of mathematics and science, respectively. The international comparisons from the latter investigations have not yet been published. Heyneman (1976) has conducted studies by means of administering standardized achievement tests in Uganda. He has also done some secondary analyses of the IEA data (Heyneman and Loxley, 1982). His findings suggest, as do those of IEA, that social background as measured by traditional instruments is more weakly correlated with school achievements in developing than in developed countries. This, again, raises fundamental questions about education and social mobility in Third-World countries, questions that cannot be answered by relying on conventional methods and concepts. It leads us to the following conclusions.

**Conclusions about education and social stratification**

Findings, such as those quoted above, suggest that we would have to revise our traditional thinking as advanced by social scientists a few decades ago on how social antecedents are related to educational attainments as well as about how the latter are related to social mobility. In the first place, there are clear indications that these relationships differ between less developed
and industrial societies. In the latter, with a large private sector absorbing a considerable proportion of the highly educated, formal education *per se* accounts for a smaller portion of the variance of social status than in the former. In the latter the aggregate rate of social mobility is high simply because of the big initial expansion of secondary and higher education, while in the former the aggregate rate is low—in spite of the fact that access to élite rôles is relatively more open.

The "over-supply" of educated manpower in relation to the effective demand is a problem shared by both developed and developing societies. In the United States Freeman (1974) has depicted a situation of "over-education" which he thinks results in a depression in the personal rate-of-return of investment in education. In countries such as West Bengal and Egypt universities have for some time now been turning out many more graduates than the main public employer, the state, can absorb (Bose *et al.*, 1983: Sanyal *et al.*, 1982). This means that under certain conditions at an *intermediate* stage what has been referred to as an "achievement suppression phenomenon" can occur (Lin & Yauger, 1975; cf. Foster, 1977, p. 227). During the first stage, in a society at a low level of economic development with very limited access to post-primary formal education, the influence of the latter on occupational status, i.e., on social mobility, tends to be rather strong. But when opportunities for such education increase and an "over-supply" emerges, there is, Lin & Yauger (1975) argue, a third stage, which could be called the "meritocratic" one, when again educational credentials become the most important factor in the occupational career. Typically, in the highly industrialized countries today we find high unemployment among those with a minimum of formal education and drop-outs from secondary school, but at the same time a competition for highly trained manpower, particularly in the "intelligence industries".

The stages in this model of the relationships between education and occupational status or career can be illustrated by the following. Foreign-trained professionals tend to occupy most leading positions in a developing country in the years immediately following upon independence from colonial rule. Many of these university graduates have a rather modest background similar to that of their counterparts in pre-industrial Europe. Many
The rôle of formal education as a social stratifier

of them have not come from the traditional élite. But the very fact of possessing certain competencies, which were not socially "inherited", gave them an advantage which elevated them to élite positions. As hinted at above, a similar process could be observed in Western Europe of the 17th and 18th century. The majority of university students in, for instance, Germany or Scandinavia, came from homes of farmers, artisans and small entrepreneurs, whereas the nobility was sparsely represented. Most of the graduates became priests and civil servants in government administration. Some of them moved to high-status positions by being raised to the nobility.

One could describe what has just been said by a curvilinear relationship between educational attainments and degree of modernization. At the beginning the correlation between the two is high. Education is an indispensable prerequisite for social mobility. Then, at an intermediate stage, it becomes lower, owing to increased impact of social background. Finally, in highly industrial countries with the emergence of "intelligence industries" and the ensuing strengthening of meritocratic tendencies, the correlation between level of education and social mobility rises again. This occurs in a society where the general level of formal education has been considerably elevated but where an élite sector preparing for prestigious and economically important positions comes into existence.
IV. University graduates in developing countries: social background and social destination

The phrase "revolution of rising expectations" (Husén, 1979) was coined in order to characterize the dynamics of expansion of enrolment in formal schooling since the middle of this century in both industrialized and Third-World countries. Behind this phenomenon is the growing awareness that formal credentials have increasingly come to influence occupational careers in societies where status, owing to socio-economic changes, is becoming more achieved than ascriptive. Formal education paves the way for upward social mobility and accounts for the "diploma disease" studied by Dore (1976) particularly in non-industrialized and by Teichler et al. (1974) in Western, industrialized societies.

The expectations behind the enrolment explosion, particularly in developing countries, have been succinctly characterized by Stephen Heyneman (1977) as follows:

"Schooling has always been perceived by parents as providing occupational life chances; and in the post-independence period school attainment has in fact provided some unprecedented examples of individual mobility from impoverished background. This has been widely noticed. Parental demand for such opportunity, coupled with the moral obligation on central authority to supply it, can account for the expansion of formal schooling." (op. cit., p. 1).

What has been said so far does not imply that the process of rising aspirations coupled with the enrolment explosion has been more or less identical in industrialized and non-industrialized societies. As pointed out earlier, the course of the enrolment curves over time at the various levels of the formal system
shows certain striking differences between the two types of societies. Most conspicuous of these is the relatively slow expansion of secondary-school enrolment as a percentage of the relevant age-groups in the European industrialized countries from the turn of the century until well after the second World War. Before the first World War primary education had been universal, while a small social élite went on to secondary education; school reforms in various countries by the middle of the century made secondary education universal at the lower stage. In the countries which by mid-century gained independence and where at least rhetorical commitment was given to making primary education a first priority, secondary education began to expand rapidly long before primary education had become universal. Thus, as has been pointed out earlier, in African countries secondary-school enrolment (in terms of the proportion of the relevant age-group) has now reached the level of the industrialized countries in Western Europe shortly before 1950. In most of the former countries the cost of post-primary education is carried mainly by public funds, which of course contributes to enhancing its attractiveness and boosting the expectations about the rôle of education in social promotion.

The other main difference between newly established, non-industrialized countries in the South and the industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere has been that social background defined by parental education, occupational status, and income tends to play a less prominent rôle in access to and selection for higher education in developing countries. The conditions accounting for this difference have been discussed earlier. We found the main explanation to be the degree of "crystallization" of the social structures accounting for differences between various social categories with regard to educational aspirations and social differentiation.

The university system in the Federal Republic of Germany can be used as a typical—although in some ways a rather extreme—illustration of the social structure of the university enrolment in the highly industrialized Western countries. There are indications that the situation was not much different in the East European Socialist countries.

In the 1950s German social scientists became interested in studying the social background of university students at a time
when less than 10 per cent of an age-cohort completed the full *Gymnasium* which was a prerequisite for admission to university (see Dahrendorf, 1965; Peisert, 1967). An overview of the research on social background and educational attainment in the OECD countries has been made by Husén (1975). Dahrendorf in a series of articles elucidated the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in the early 1950s by summarizing it in the following way. As has been mentioned before, about 50 per cent of the university students came from the homes of civil servants and high-level professionals, who represented about one per cent of the workforce, whereas one per cent of the students came from working-class homes which represented about 50 per cent of the workforce. Later the *Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft* put together some statistics which showed the changes over time from early 1950s to mid-1970s (Teichler & Sanyal, 1982, p. 57, see Table 5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home background</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the differences in participation are less striking than in earlier surveys with regard to the early 1950s depending upon the use of somewhat different categorization of the occupations, but the gap between those belonging to the established class, educated professionals, and the workers is still very big.

By and large, the situation was the same in other highly industrialized countries, for instance Sweden. By the mid-1940s when the first studies began to be conducted on the "reserve of ability" (Husén, 1948), surveys showed that only 1-2 per cent of children from working-class families reached the university, whereas the corresponding figure for those whose parents were professionals, middle or upper civil servants was 60 to 70 per cent.

The changes in the social structure of the enrolment that took place in all Western countries from the early 1950s to the 1970s
University graduates in developing countries: social background and social destination

were partly due to what was referred to as the "enrolment explosion". Between 1960 and 1966 there was an increase of university enrolment by one hundred per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany (Teichler & Sanyal, 1982). Even though the expansion was less dramatic in other countries, it was enormous. Enrolment quadrupled over less than two decades. One effect of this development was, as could be expected, a certain equalization between social strata in their representation in university enrolment. Thus, for instance in Sweden, young people from working-class homes by 1969 had at least a 10 per cent chance of entering higher education, as compared to less than two per cent some 25 years earlier (Husén, 1980; Svensson, 1980).

The sudden expansion of the university system in the highly industrialized countries after a long period of slow growth was due mainly to two forces: steady and more rapid economic growth, which according to the economists was due to education and research; and the political quest for social justice.

In the IIEP study of graduates and employment in Poland, Sanyal and Józefowicz (1978) refer to data on the flow of students from secondary to tertiary education and relate the flow to social background. They are here dealing with an educational system operating in a planned economy in which the problem of reconciling national goals with individual expectations and aspirations would appear to be more difficult than in a market economy.

However, Sanyal and Józefowicz by and large get the same picture as the one showed by surveys in Western industrial societies. "In families of white-collar employees the usual pattern is to send children to secondary general (school) which will prepare them for the university, while putting off the choice of a future occupation to a later stage, when children are more mature." (op. cit., p. 151). Only a small minority with this background go to secondary professional or junior vocational schools. "It is mainly the children of working and peasant families who attend the latter (schools)." Behind the thrust for post-primary academic and/or general education lies parental education more than parental social status. "The lower the level of parental education, the stronger the tendency to send their children to junior vocational schools." (op. cit., p. 151-2). Social stratification and
post-primary education is summarized in Table 6 (op. cit., p. 153):

**TABLE 6. Poland: social origin of secondary-school pupils (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>White-collar</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary general</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary professional</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior vocational</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar picture is obtained from statistical surveys in countries as different with regard to political and economic order as the USSR (Dobson, 1977), Sweden (Svensson, 1980) and England (Halsey et al., 1980).

Although in Poland, as in other developed countries, legal and formal provisions have been made for equality of educational opportunity, implementation of the principle of equality meets with several pervasive obstacles. The main obstacle is that young people from different social classes do not to the same extent take advantage of the factual opportunities. There were in Poland striking disparities between the social classes in terms of the percentage of young people applying for admission to institutions of higher education.

Education in Poland is tuition-free all the way up, as is, for instance, the case in Sweden. In spite of attempts to give preferential treatment in admitting young people whose parents are workers and peasants, they are highly under-represented in the universities in comparison with children from more educated families. Educationally minded parents, who themselves have enjoyed post-primary formal schooling, tend to pass on their aspirations and attitudes to their children: "[It] is in the cultural and educational environment of the family that the child's personality is formed, as are his interests and ambitions, his outlook on the value of learning, his own ideas on the value of learning, his own ideas on education and his future career." (op. cit., p. 155).
Admission to institutions of higher education, which depends on performance in entrance examinations, is closely related to the home background of young people, particularly to parental education. In Poland 46 per cent of general-secondary school-leavers apply for admission to higher education, in comparison with only 26 per cent of leavers from vocational secondary schools. The failure rates in entrance examinations are 46 and 62 per cent in the respective groups. Given the social structure of the enrolment in different types of secondary schools, application and failure rates tend to accentuate already existing disparities between social strata. More than half of those admitted to higher education, more exactly 56 per cent, come from the "intelligentsia". Subsequently, the failure rate during the course of higher studies varies between students from different strata, which means that social stratification is further enhanced among graduates (as has been noted also in the IIEP follow-up study in the Philippines cited earlier).

Arnold Anderson (1983) in an attempt to collate available information originating from national surveys has set out to elucidate the problem of whether, and to what extent, schooling becomes more equitably distributed as societies become more developed. He operates with what he calls a selectivity index which is derived from a base-population of fathers and the percentage of certain age-cohorts enrolled in post-primary education. He regards as "dubious" the assumption that differences in selectivity (as assessed by his index) with regard to background between earlier and present generations in industrial countries are "heralding what will happen in Third-World countries". (op. cit., p. 3). Another generalization that he derives from his material is that in high-income Western countries children of farmers tend to be better represented in institutions than children of manual workers. In Third-World countries the children of manual workers tend to be better represented than those of farmers or peasants, which he interprets as a reflection of early stages of urbanization and modern-sector employment.

In his state-of-the-art report Anderson (1982) points out that there are practically no surveys conducted in developing countries on that problem. The exceptions are the ones by Heyneman (1976) in Uganda, the IEA Six-Subject surveys in Chile, India, Iran and Thailand (Walker, 1976), the survey in Botswana by the
Higher education and social stratification: an international comparative study

National Commission on Education (Husén, 1977), the one on participation and performance in primary schooling in Mauritius by Chinapah (1983), the longitudinal study by Schiefelbein and Farrell (1982) in Chile and the IIEP series of studies. The study of the relationship between social background and educational attainment was, however, in most of these investigations a byproduct of attempts to conduct assessments of educational outcomes in key subject areas.

In a methodologically sophisticated survey Vinayagum Chinapah (1983) set out to study the rôle of formal education, in this case primary education, as a social stratifier in an ethnically pluralistic society, that of Mauritius. Chinapah has used path analysis with latent variables, an approach by means of which he could overcome some of the methodological weaknesses of previous analytical approaches in which school and home were dealt with separately. Data for a representative national sample were collected on home background, home processes, school environment and teacher-pupil interaction, as well as on scores on standardized achievement tests developed by IEA in key subject areas. A conceptual model of school learning was developed and empirically tested. Four subgroups were obtained by dividing the sample of schools according to urban v rural and aided (private) v government.

Social class differences were more pronounced within than between the four categories of schools. Since an overriding aim was to elucidate the rôle of the school as a stratifier, the analytical efforts were devoted to studying each school sector separately. Within each of these the variance in educational performance as measured by standardized achievement tests was analyzed. Chinapah found that only in the aided (private) sector did the school account for more of the variation in performance than the home, which was a reflection of the rather homogenous home background of the students in these schools. In the other three school sectors the home accounted for more of the variance than the school.

Typically, home literacy and home processes had the strongest direct influence on performance in the government rural schools, where most students came from lower-class homes with a minimum of literacy or none at all. Other studies have shown that there is a strong indirect influence of home status on school
achievements through home literacy and home processes.

The bigger the distance between home culture and school culture the stronger the likelihood of reproducing or enhancing an already existing social stratification. When this process covers generations, as has been the case in many industrial countries, it contributes to the formation of a kind of "hereditary aristocracy" of educated people who pass on their privileges to the next generation. The already privileged benefit from a small distance between home and school cultures, whereas the underprivileged tend to suffer from a large distance. The former have the resources to choose schools (often private) which fit their culture, in particular by their enrolment, whereas the latter are usually confined to publicly provided education. This contributes to enhance stratification, which is further promoted by competition and academic selectivity, as we have already seen.
V. Conclusions

1. In studying the rôle of higher education in social stratification in Third-World countries one should keep in mind that the school in these countries is a transferred institution. These countries have taken over the European-North-American model at all three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. The model developed originally under particular historical and socio-cultural conditions. Its adequacy in its new socio-cultural setting has increasingly been questioned.

2. Institutions of higher education in developing countries serve what in many cases are still subsistence economies with a very limited "modern" sector. The way formal schooling has been introduced in most developing countries has resulted in an enrolment pattern over time that has no historical parallel in the developed economies. Thus, post-primary enrolment in many Third-World countries began to expand rapidly long before primary schooling had become universal, whereas in Europe secondary and university enrolment from the late 19th century increased slowly and in a linear fashion until the "explosion" after the 1950s.

3. Home background tends in Third-World countries to have less impact on access, survival and outcomes of secondary and higher education than in industrialized countries. Surveys have provided evidence that there is less dependence on home background for success in being admitted and in surviving the courses than in the European industrial countries.

4. The overall explanation for the weaker dependence on home background in many Third-World countries has to do with the
Conclusions

degree of social “crystallization”. The step from peasant illiteracy to post-primary formal education is easier to take in a society where social and educational prerogatives have not been handed down over several generations, as has been the case in Europe since the early 19th century. In agrarian, pre-industrial Europe participation in post-primary education among young people from rural and/or lower-class homes was more frequent than after industrialization, when participation among the urban working class was miniscule.

5. The “curvilinear” relationship between social background (as measured by parental education and parental occupational status) and educational attainment which can be observed in societies at various levels of development is accounted for by several conditions. In the first place one has the degree of “crystallization” of the support system which surrounds a young person, such as study traditions, ambitions, and aspirations. The latter are to a large extent conditioned by experiences over generations. It is taken for self-evident that the child should or should not aspire to a certain level of education leading up to a certain social position. The crystallization process has occurred over a much shorter period in developing countries and has therefore a lesser impact. In developing countries social differentiation has a more diversified basis than in industrial countries, which also contributes to a higher degree of mobility in getting access to advanced education and subsequent high-status positions.

6. Social stratification in all types of societies is boosted by competition and selectivity and by a meritocratic reward system. Advanced education by definition is reserved for a selected few, but is defined differently in highly industrialized than in non-industrialized societies. In the former societies mass higher education has led to the establishment of an élite sector (e.g. Japan) preparing for prestigious and specially rewarded positions. In the latter types of societies the very fact of attaining higher education leads to élite positions that ensure material and other rewards. The exceptions, such as India, tend to confirm the rule.


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The book

This booklet on higher education and social stratification is based on a combination of the unique experience and reflections of its author, and the Institute's own original research on higher education and employment, which covered some twenty countries in all the regions of the world over a period of seven years (1978-1984).

In this publication Professor Husén analyses the social-stratification process from a theoretical point of view, and checks his assumptions by testing them either with the empirical evidence obtained through the IIEP project in developing countries or with his own information concerning industrialized countries.

It is hoped that this booklet will show that the problem of social stratification, viewed across the artificial dividing-line drawn between developing and industrialized countries, holds very significant and sometimes negative consequences for the educational and occupational careers of educated youth.

The author

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