Private education in sub-Saharan Africa:
A re-examination of theories and concepts related to its development and finance

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Mechanisms and strategies of educational finance

Private education in sub-Saharan Africa: a re-examination of theories and concepts related to its development and finance

Igor Kitaev
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<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of Education in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>‘Coopération française en Afrique’ (French Co-operation in Africa), used for a currency unit – CFA franc</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINEDAF</td>
<td>Conference of Ministers of Education of African Member States of UNESCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent/Teacher Association</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

➢ Rationale for private education development and finance in sub-Saharan Africa

Nowadays, with public funds for education stagnant or shrinking in real terms in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, policies of universalization of primary and basic education are facing serious implementation constraints. Social demand for primary education is particularly strong in these countries but it is neither met in coverage, nor in provision of adequate schooling conditions.

There is, however, recognition of the fact that government efforts alone are insufficient to cope with expansion of primary and basic education in low-income sub-Saharan countries. When public education is insufficient to guarantee access to schooling (no schools available in the neighbourhood or overcrowded classes), or good quality of instruction (untrained teachers, lack of textbooks, etc.), demand-driven private schools of all types normally fill the gap and offer their services to households in return for a certain amount of fees and contributions in kind, or free labour.

The range of private schools in sub-Saharan Africa is wider than for public ones: from very best to very worst. There are various types of private (non-government) primary education in Africa, each serving its purpose and having its specific features: (i) community schools are often set up as self-help initiatives, (ii) religious-affiliated schools (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim etc.) remaining or developed from religious missions, (iii) spontaneous ‘bush’ schools for the rural and nomadic population, which are not even recorded by the state, (iv) profit-making schools for higher-income categories of the population, etc.
Private schools are not completely unregulated, even in a decentralized context. Those recognized and recorded by the state (mostly community-based and religious) often receive grants for teacher salaries and other recurrent expenditure, as well as other benefits such as tax-exemption, and adhere to a degree of government control over curriculum and schooling conditions. All types of private schools are under the direct surveillance of parents and their different associations, as fee-paying consumers of these services. This is often considered an argument in favour of relatively better managerial efficiency of private schools in general, as compared to public education. But since the degree of control largely depends on the share of parents’ contributions, private schools are often criticized for their limited equity and access, due to the absence of ‘equalizing’ state intervention.

➢ **Current trends in private education development and finance, and community/parents’ contributions**

Three important trends, related to policy research, have recently been observed in sub-Saharan Africa, regarding private education development and finance:

- The traditional difference between public and private education – public is free, private is fee-paying – is becoming less evident, with increasing community/family contributions to both public and private primary education, in cash and in kind. Apart from the usual contributions (textbooks, uniforms, school meals, purchase of equipment, maintenance), communities/families are now more involved in capital expenditure and even recruitment of teachers, while the role of public authorities in this area is actually declining;
- If previously governments’ efforts concentrated on primary education, often delegating secondary level to private education, increasingly development of private education (all types) is taking
place at the primary level also. This phenomenon may be explained by ever-increasing and more varied demand, higher priorities given by households to education, and their abilities to contribute to it;
• A related development is the appearance of supply-driven profit-making schools in African cities (including low-income countries), established by retired or unemployed qualified teachers, which offer an advanced quality private education at an economically justified fee. Demand and supply of primary education have become more stratified, and private returns to primary education have also increased.

➤ Information and decision-making on private education finance

Little information and data are available at present on the different types of fees and community/parents’ contributions to private education and their classification and amounts, practised in sub-Saharan Africa. Only fragmented analysis has been made on their effects on enrolment. At present there is no real correlation between government decisions to introduce/abolish fees in public schools, and charges and contributions in private schools, nor abilities of different target groups to contribute to education in a particular form. It was noticed, for example, that official abolition of fees in Kenya in the 1970s did not affect the enrolment of the nomadic population, because it was served by spontaneous ‘bush’ schools, largely funded through contributions in kind.

➤ Implications for policy research on community/ family contributions to private primary education in sub-Saharan Africa

The issue of community/ family contributions to private primary education deserves policy research attention for the following reasons:
• the degree of private education development in a given country can indicate weaknesses in the public system of education and, consequently, explain the reasons why communities/parents opt to establish or choose private schools. The amount of fees and other contributions indicates the ‘purchasing power’ of communities/families, i.e. the level of funding each target group can afford and is willing to spend on education at private schools. Its analysis will be helpful in decision-making on fees and other private contributions to public education: to introduce or abolish fees, to increase or decrease them, what types of other charges and contributions are practised, and how they are regulated (i.e. accountability);

• private schools may be seen as complementary, and not competitive to public schools in the provision of education. All types of private education need a form of record and regulation by the state, if material support is not feasible, then assistance in curriculum development, school-mapping, teacher training, accreditation etc. will be helpful. The actual use of fees and other contributions illustrates priorities in the financial management of private schools, the bulk of community/parents' assistance is spent on teachers and school maintenance. The government regulation and support to private education, as in the case of religious and community schools, should be balanced and adjusted to assistance they receive from communities/families;

• analysis of community/families' contributions to private education is helpful in reviewing disparities in the provision of education (urban/rural, regional by income group etc.). Strong disparities in equity and access to primary education among different categories of population for income reasons should be avoided, thus realistic mechanisms/norms of contributions/donations to private schools may be considered. At the same time, excessive government regulation of private education and its funding has appeared counterproductive in the past, and should be re-examined with a view to improving efficiency at the ground level.
1. INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the global socio-economic context was characterized by an emphasis on increasing the role of the market and reducing that of the state in various sectors of public activities, including education. These market approaches, associated with adjustment programmes and related austerity for public spending, forced many governments in developing countries to consider and introduce such measures of education policy as cost-sharing (tuition and user fees) and cost-recovery (student loans), tolerating or promoting parent/community financing of public education. The cumulative result of declining public resources, increasing charges and the rising opportunities of keeping children at school was either low internal efficiency or worsening quality of public education (Stewart, 1996).

The changing emphasis of the late 1990s on the necessity of the regulatory role of the state for education policy formulation and implementation, was focused on all potential actors and resources in a given country, including productive capacities of private education in the interest of overall expansion of the education system. The summary of several studies on education policy formulation undertaken by the ADEA in different African countries concludes:

“With the worldwide movement towards more active involvement of civil society in governance and policy, along with decentralization, governments are seeking to learn lessons from each other about policy processes as well as content. Approaches to education policy formation vary widely between countries depending on their colonial history and hence their inherited patterns of interaction between civil society and the state. Equally clear is the existence of windows of opportunity which
depend on both internal political and economic conditions and on external patterns of relationships with funding agencies and international economic forces. Running through all the cases are two central themes: the need for publicly stated education policies which are understood and supported by both government and civil society, and the importance of participation by the diverse parts of society that will be affected by the policies.” (Evans et al., 1996)

In many African countries, the existing, and projected, supply of public education provision is insufficient to meet the ever-increasing demand. While there was a general recognition after the Jomtien Conference (1990) that basic education should be a priority for public funding, it is increasingly recognized that public funding alone is insufficient to guarantee the required access and coverage of the school-age population or adequate learning conditions and quality of education.

The policies of universalization of primary education in Africa face serious implementation difficulties unless the efforts of public authorities are complemented by the other actors involved, including local communities, PTAs, religious organizations and, related to them, private schools. Under the circumstances, when public resources for education in the majority of African countries can hardly be expected to increase on par with continuing demographic growth, the phenomenon of private education (non-public, non-government or quasi-public) deserves attention as a natural response to compensate for the gaps left by public education in terms of access, coverage, internal efficiency, curriculum, teaching/learning conditions and quality of education.
The Seventh Conference of Ministers of Education of African Member States (MINEDAF VII), held in Durban, South Africa, in April 1998, concluded:

“Obviously, the Member States are no longer in a position to finance all the educational requirements of their populations. It is therefore necessary that they establish appropriate partnerships, particularly with the grassroots communities and the private sector in order to improve access to quality education.”

It would be a simplification to consider the late 1990s as just another pendulum swing between state intervention and market forces in African education. The qualitative evolution observed in this eternal paradigm is such that public education is no longer just the domain of the government, while private education cannot be associated only with market forces represented by independent management and private contributions by households. There is a complex mix, and many more possible combinations of both public and private features, in what some scholars have begun to call the ‘educational quasi-market’.

The habitual principal difference in funding between public and private education – that public primary and basic education should be free, whereas private education required tuition and user fees – became less evident, with many examples of dramatically increased community/family financing of public education and their contributions in kind and in labour (school construction, maintenance, repairs, school meals, purchase of school equipment etc.) with teachers recruited by the community. Nowadays, the real difference between public and private education in terms of funding is mostly in the actual amount of fees and other community/family contributions.
Private education in sub-Saharan Africa

The ever-increasing number of spontaneous and profit-oriented schools in suburban areas of African cities, charging a variety of fees – higher or lower subject to neighbourhood – shows that households are prepared to spend pro rata more money for education to replace the insufficient state education provision. On one hand, this is a clear indication of the growing private returns to primary education in sub-Saharan Africa; on the other hand, it is a sign of the state’s diminishing role in the provision of essential primary education and training. Private school operators are flexible in charging fees according to the market niche which they occupy – from high fees at expensive schools for wealthy households, to lowest fees, or food, at ‘street’ schools, which may operate in the shadow of a tree.

Relations between the public and private education sectors in the same country may range from competition to complementarity, but the two are linked through the supply of schooling. Dynamics of private education evolution and development in a given country may give useful clues to identify weaknesses in the public education system. In the context of the educational quasi-market, there are more and more voices in favour of policies separating educational funding from actual provision and delivery of education, and, in turn, provision and delivery of education from its management (Gintis, 1996; Caillods, 1997; Colclough, 1997).

However, for accurate comparisons of both sectors it is important to bear in mind that private education is much more heterogeneous than public education and covers the whole spectrum of schools – from the very best to the very worst. Sometimes it is difficult to trace differences between the public and private nature of schools, as in the case of community or municipal schools.

In spite of the rapid development of public education and state support, various types of private education – both in developing and
developed countries – have continued to exist and, moreover, to expand, a fact which is explained, in most cases, by excessive and/or differentiated demand which cannot be met by supply of public education alone (James, 1991).

The most frequent arguments found in research literature in favour of private education development are:

- it may reduce the burden on government expenditure;
- it may improve efficiency in operation of schools (e.g. cost-efficiency);
- it may increase diversity and choice in terms of educational provision;
- it may make schools more accountable to their clients.

*From the point of view of policies of public authorities*, development of private education at primary and secondary levels is considered in modern research literature as a means to lessen the pressure on government funding, while ensuring access to schooling and guaranteeing greater parent/community control over efficient management of their own expenditure for education. It is worth noting that private schools (especially religious and community schools) very often rely on direct or ‘hidden’ support (tax exemption) by central government and other public authorities, such as local government and local communities. Central governments may provide grants (or vouchers) to primary and secondary community/self-help schools, based on the number of students.

At the same time, greater autonomy of private schools does not exclude a certain degree of their regulation and compatibility with agreed national norms, regulations and standards, normally prescribed by national legislation.
From the point of view of parents and students, the existence of private education provides them with a choice of schooling, an alternative to public education which is, however, limited to their family budget. The existence of private education and its continuing evolution are directly linked to the demand for it by the population, which exercises through it its right to choose, sometimes “by heroic efforts to circumvent the heavy hand of the state” (Sahn, 1994).

But this is also the origin of criticism against private education for its regulated nature, restricted access, depending on customers’ income, and related inequity and inequality. Private education competes with public education, using to its advantage inefficiencies and limitations of the latter. It compensates for inadequacies of public education in terms of coverage (i.e. it provides education in the areas where public schools are not available), it may offer specific and also more varied curricula which are closer to the learning needs of students, more convenient teaching hours, flexible instruction, better career expectations etc.

From an economic point of view, the literature describes five situations in which private markets cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide the most efficient and appropriate pattern of services:

- where ‘natural monopolies’ exist;
- where increased production is associated with decreasing costs;
- where substantial externalities exist and are not reflected in the accounts of private suppliers;
- where it is difficult to charge for a service or to exclude those who do not pay;
- where ‘merit’ (public) goods are involved (Roth, 1987).

It would be fair to say that the provision of primary and secondary education in sub-Saharan Africa has all or many of these features but,
as ‘market failure’ helps to explain government interventions, so ‘government failure’, resulting in financial constraints, excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency, may help to illustrate the reasons for private education development. A debate on the equity and efficiency of public versus private education is far from concluded. Although World Bank studies periodically find evidence of better efficiency of private schools, the opposite view also remains valid.

Not only prominent educators and researchers, but even personalities such as J. Stiglitz, chief economist at the World Bank, hesitate on the effects of any process of privatization and modalities of its regulation: “A regulatory structure can be created to ensure that some of the efficiency gains from privatization are shared by consumers and other users and that other social objectives, such as universal service, are enhanced. But we should never confuse the proposition that privatization can, in principle, increase the efficiency of the economy and achieve other social objectives with the proposition that, in the absence of effective regulatory structures, privatization may do neither in practice”.

*Neither economic theory nor historical experience gives us clear guidance in these complicated matters. Theory may tell us that under certain idealized circumstances market economies are efficient. But theory provides us with less clear prescriptions for the second-best situations in which we inevitably find ourselves, in which many of the idealized circumstances underlying the pure theory are not satisfied. And theory gives us even less clear guidance on sequencing: how do we get from here to there? For these decisions we must rely on experience and judgement, perhaps on the guidance that comes from a careful consideration of cross-country experiences.* (Stiglitz, 1998)
An important disclaimer has to be made, that the purpose of this paper is not to justify private education development in Africa, but rather to look into the reasons for its existence and development in different African contexts and environments, to review theories and concepts related to its finance and to examine and update relevant policy approaches to it.

Being outside the public education system, private education in developing countries does not regularly provide data and statistics for official surveys and analysis. Information available on various aspects of private education in Africa may be fragmented, contradictory and controversial, subject to sources, sampling design and expected outcomes. Although in many African countries ministries of education have special divisions or units in charge of private education, these are normally limited to regulations regarding subventions and private teachers’ management.

This paper presents an analysis of relevant literature and most recent research findings regarding private education and its costs and finance, pertinent for sub-Saharan Africa. It deals with issues of private education development at primary, basic and secondary levels, and special emphasis is placed on education systems in African countries. Experiences of other regions and countries may be different from the situation in sub-Saharan Africa, largely for historical reasons, and are mentioned only to illustrate trends and practices relevant for African countries. Issues of private higher education are not reviewed in this paper.

However, for the purpose of this paper, experiences and policies of former metropolitan countries (such as France, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Belgium) with regard to private education are essential, because they largely influenced education development in general, and private education development in particular, in countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. On the other hand, current policies and practices of major donor countries active in sub-Saharan Africa (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Sweden, etc.) equally merit a careful examination for at least two reasons:

- aid-recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in one way or another, tend to copy educational models of former metropolitan countries and, more recently, of other active and influential donor countries;
- in designing and implementing their projects in sub-Saharan Africa, the donor countries follow their own domestic policies and orientations (including those regarding private education development back home) which are then transferred to the recipient countries.

Typology of private education schools is as complex as its definition. For the purpose of this paper a broad definition of private (non-public) education is used to stress the differences between its major categories.

The paper was initially prepared for the Pan-African seminar on ‘Financing and Financial Management of Education in Africa’ and developed on the basis of discussions thereafter for the Commission on Education Policy Research in sub-Saharan Africa at the 10th World Congress of Comparative Education Societies (Cape Town, July 1998). It was enriched through discussions and outcomes of these forums, as well as with insights provided to the author by a number of distinguished scholars and practitioners.

This paper is organized in the following way. A retrospective of private education development in Africa is given in Chapter 2, helping to explain the roots of the present situation and historical reasons for private education development. A definition of private education is suggested and explained in Chapter 3. An attempt to review different types of private education existing in Africa and to classify them by
certain criteria is made in Chapter 4. The available UNESCO and World Bank statistics are used for analysis of the share of private education in total enrolment by levels of instruction and groups of African countries in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a theoretical framework to view private education as an alternative to the provision of public education; it attempts to answer such a question as to why private education still exists and is developing despite the rapid expansion of public education. In Chapter 7, issues of private education funding and its different schemes are reviewed. Comparative cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of private versus public education are often used as an argument for policy choice, and these are analyzed in detail in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, the precedent analysis is used as a basis for the ultimate and critical issue of school choice and parents’ attitudes towards private schooling. In Chapter 10, the previously observed theories are reviewed with a view to their transferability and applicability to the African realities. Finally, a number of conclusions and observations are summarized in Chapter 11 on elements and modalities of public policy towards private education.

In Appendix I an Index to sub-Saharan African countries mentioned in the text is provided. Selected African countries’ examples on private education development and financing are listed in Documentary Appendix II. Then Appendices III-V present available UNESCO statistics on private enrolment as a percentage of total enrolment in primary and secondary education, suggested typology of private (non-public) schools, and a comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages of private and public education. Appendices VI and VII provide data relevant for analysis of purchasing power of population and household consumption of education in sub-Saharan Africa. Appendix VIII lists a set of factors determining the volume of fees in private profit-making schools.
2. PRIVATE EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A RETROSPECTIVE

This chapter recalls the historical dimension of private education development and finance in sub-Saharan Africa. It elaborates on how metropolitan educational models influenced education development in respectively English-, French- and Portuguese-speaking countries, and on how diverse the post-independence policies were. It reviews through the cross-African analysis the evolution of major types of private education: religious and community-based.

For historical and religious reasons, formal private education existed long before the first government schools. In sub-Saharan Africa, the first formal schools came in the sixteenth century from the North with Arab caravans, and, from the Atlantic coast, with the Portuguese. However, it is recorded that formal schools in Africa quantitatively developed under the influence of European missionaries only in the eighteenth century, and appeared mostly in the cities and ports (Le Thanh Khoi, 1971).

“A religious revival, a concern for the social gospel, financial and moral support never before possible combined to make the years from 1880 to 1920 the golden period of missionary effort in Africa. It paralleled the period in which European powers were building, consolidating, and extending those administrative units that were to be foundations for colonial government. For the colonial powers, the expansion of missionary effort was fortuitous, as support of missions gave credence to the ‘civilizing’ objectives of colonialism.

From the time of the earliest Portuguese missionaries of the fifteenth century through the nineteenth century, Christianity and education had been inextricably bound together. Varying in degree from those who believed the most rudimentary
knowledge was necessary for conversion to those who demanded as high an educational level as possible, agents of the church and the literacy movement marched in lockstep. In West, South, and East Africa, missions might forego many luxuries, but education was considered a necessity. Therefore, when the rapid expansion of missionary work in the 1880s began, it was only natural that education should be expanded.” (Scanlon, 1966)

Islamic education, which came to tropical Africa earlier than Western-type education, naturally was a private-sector activity, in the sense that the teaching was not supported by the state, but by fees and the voluntary contributions of the believers (Roth, 1987). Western-type education was introduced to sub-Saharan Africa by Christian missionaries, both foreign and local. Schools for children and Sunday evening classes for adults developed as a natural element to the founding of churches. Although no school fees were charged in the initial period, they were gradually introduced to make the schools self-financing. Teacher salaries were paid from church funds. During the early decades of the twentieth century, the demand for this type of education increased, mainly because these schools were considered stepping-stones to wage-paid jobs with the government and the private sector.

There were historical differences between the zones of colonization, controlled by respective metropolitan countries in Africa. This helps to explain later differences between the traditions of education development in English-speaking, French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking African countries.

As described by Le Thanh Khoi (1971), in the French territories the official policy of assimilation was to transplant the metropolitan model. In the British colonies, the policy of indirect administration tried to take into account the local traditions
and adapt education accordingly. If the British Government followed the general guidance and control over educational establishments, encouraging private initiatives by the missions through subventions, in French-speaking Africa, the separation of the Church and the State led to the predominance of secular (non-religious state) schools with some co-operation with recognized missions.

In the Portuguese colonies the educational system had the following types: (1) official government schools for the Portuguese and ‘assimilated’ African population, (2) schools under the auspices of the Catholic church, and (3) ‘bush’ schools for native population (Errante, 1998). Catholic missions were headquartered in larger towns or centres, with rudimentary one-room ‘bush’ schools sprinkled across the countryside. Until the late 1950s, ‘bush’ schools functioned like rural schools in Portugal – they could only offer up to the third official elementary grade. Students had to board at mission headquarters if they wished to continue to the fourth grade. But because students were not permitted to enter fourth grade after 13 and African children usually began their studies at eight or nine due to the long distance to the schools, it was virtually impossible for them to continue formal schooling. (Errante, 1998)

The analysis made by Le Thanh Khoi (1971) on the early 1960s, described the situation with private education in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa as follows:

Private education is more widespread at the coastal areas than inside the continent, in countries with Christian religion or animistic belief rather than in Muslim countries. While the status of private education varies from one country to another, all governments which permitted it, decided to provide
subventions of more or less significant size. In return, they established a certain degree of control, pedagogical or also administrative, i.e. the opening of private schools should be regulated and linked to the opening of public schools. This control was not always sufficient, and it did not block its relatively independent management.

In the period of 1956–62, expansion of private education was generally slower than that of public education for many countries except Congo-Brazzaville (at that time) and Gabon. At the level of secondary education, the evolution was more favourable for private education. Despite uneven variations in evolution of both private and public education, one can observe a relatively strong equilibrium between these two types of education at primary and secondary levels likewise.

Le Thanh Khoi (1971) made an important observation about this stage of evolution of education in Africa when he said: “It seemed that the expansion of private education followed the expansion of public education with a certain time-lag at the primary level”. The countries that had a very strong share of private enrolment (between 41 and 70 per cent of the total) at this period of time were Benin, Togo, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar and Cameroon; to less extent (between 21 and 40 per cent): Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Burkina Faso; to less significant extent (in descending order): Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania.

In terms of funding, the metropolitan governments provided substantial grant-in-aid subsidies to expatriate and missionary schools before independence (Kitchen, 1962). Here again, considerable differences were observed between different regions of Africa, subject to the metropolitan model. Tuition fees and contributions by families and communities were more typical for the countries formerly under
British and Belgian influence, than for Francophone African countries.

Comparisons between unit costs in public and private (in this case missionary) schools at that time showed lower unit costs for private education because of lower staff costs as the teaching-force was composed of priests (Le Thanh Khoi, 1971). A study of nine French-speaking countries estimated unit costs at private schools as on average half those of public schools, because of the different system of teacher remuneration.

Secondary schooling was, as a rule, very expensive in English-speaking countries because of the traditions of the boarding system. Foster (1965) observed in Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) that, due to the specifics of sub-Saharan Africa, the metropolitan models were not exactly copied the same way in the case of private education versus public education. “The existence of the private school system paralleling the state or state-aided structure was apparent in the United Kingdom, but at the secondary level this sector constituted a high-prestige set of institutions recruiting from a relatively narrow segment of British society and enjoying a particularly close relationship with the older universities and with the ‘Establishment’. In the Gold Coast, a peculiar reversal of the situation had occurred; the relatively small number of government and government-aided schools constituted the elite sector and provided the most effective access to later professional studies. The private sector remained a low-prestige segment of the secondary system competing on unequal terms with the public schools”.

After obtaining independence, critical policy choices needed to be made by national governments regarding the then-existing expatriate and missionary schools and the future development and funding of education systems. As observed in research literature (Scanlon, 1966),
there were four solutions with regard to the church-public education paradigm in Africa:

- **first, to continue the policy of supporting the missionary (church-managed) schools while expanding government schools.** Formal responsibility for educational standards would, however, be held by the Ministry of Education, whose experts would determine whether or not the school was meeting government requirements. But the general administration and management of the school remained with a representative of the churches, who was responsible to the local board of advisers or trustees. This compromise arrangement allowed the churches to continue their role in education and relieved an often short-handed government of administrative problems.

- **second, to permit church-related schools to continue, but only at their own expense.** When such a decision was put into practice, many churches were forced to close their schools.

- **third, to nationalize the schools and to refuse the church the right to operate schools.** This policy was practised, for example, in Guinea, but the very mechanics of operating the large church-related sector of education appeared complicated.

- **fourth, to give only one religious group state recognition and subsequent financial support.** This occurred, for example, in the then Belgian Congo from 1906 to 1946, although this approach was subject to some consequences.

Among these four solutions, the dual system of keeping government-approved and supported (through grant-in-aid) missionary schools, and expanding purely government schools was the most frequent case in post-independent Africa, although there were also cases of the other approaches. In particular, private schools were nationalized through legislative action in Benin, Guinea, Central African Republic, Congo-
Brazzaville (the People’s Republic of the Congo) in the 1960s, and later in Ethiopia and Nigeria (Le Thanh Khoi, 1971; Jimenez, 1987).

After independence, as mentioned by Foster (1965) on Ghana, the unprecedented demand for education in sub-Saharan Africa led to a highly diverse supply with a whole variety of learning opportunities in both public and private sectors. In Ghana, private schools, subject to a degree of government support or other sources of funding, were called ‘assisted’, ‘encouraged’, ‘educational trust’, and ‘private’ (with the latter group divided into those ultimately hoping to obtain government aid, and those purely profit-making institutions run by individual entrepreneurs). Lillis and Ayot (1988) reported that, while the primary school system was ‘fairly homogeneous’, there were many types of secondary schools (maintained, assisted, unaided harambee and unaided private):

(i) Maintained schools. The government itself provides maintained schools, and finances all capital and recurrent expenditure. Classification is confused by the fact that some maintained schools have harambee classes.

(ii) Assisted schools. Assisted schools are either private institutions, many of them mission or assisted harambee ones. The government provides some or all of their teachers, and pays a percentage of staff salaries. It also provides other grants, but the balance of operating costs is recovered from fees and private or community support. Assisted schools range from those with only one teacher paid by the government to others whose staff are fully government-paid. Some harambee schools have the advantage of highly qualified local teachers, and others have foreign teachers recruited through missionary and volunteer bodies. Many, however, have serious staffing problems.

(iii) Unaided harambee schools. Most harambee secondary schools start with completely private or local funding. Many later gain
government assistance, but there is always a large unaided group.

(iv) Unaided private schools. Unaided private schools vary from low-quality, commercially oriented profit-making organizations to non-commercial former European or Church schools with high reputations. The good schools attract good pupils and highly qualified and motivated staff, and have excellent resources.

Often the policies of the government towards private (non-government) schools were not consistent and were subject to the immediate political and economic orientations. For example, in Tanzania in the early 1960s, private (non-governmental) schools were not restricted, they could continue to operate and receive grants-in-aid as long as they were approved and they abided by the principles of the independent system of education. Other types of private schools existed as non-aided. But after the Arusha Declaration of 1966, private schools were limited in autonomy by the Ministry of National Education, which received vast control over their boards of governors, level of tuition fees, etc. (Kurtz, 1972). In 1973, private primary schools were nationalized but then, later in the 1980s, as a result of structural adjustment policies and unmet and growing demand, there was again a shift from discouraging to encouraging the establishment of private schools (Samoff, 1994). The relaxation of restrictions led to the opening of private institutions on an unprecedented scale, and at secondary level their number exceeded that of public schools and later accounted for more than a half of enrolment (Bray, 1996b).

The case of nationalization in Tanzania was extensively reviewed in research literature. But similar reversed policies were observed in other countries. For example, in Mozambique, at the close of the colonial period, three quarters of secondary schools were owned by the private sector, one third of them by the Catholic church. In 1975, however, a newly independent government nationalized all schools.
The nationalization decree was revoked in 1990, and private schools were again permitted to operate. Within two years, 32 private institutions were operating at all levels. These institutions included some which prior to nationalization had been owned by the Catholic church and which were handed back (Bray, 1996b).

On the basis of the Mozambican experience, Massingue with Matos (1996) gave perhaps the best description of the spirit of the post-independence euphoria which produced a lot of expectations, some of which later appeared unrealistic: “the decisions were taken on the spur of the moment, without consideration of educational planning techniques, the process of adjustment to new curricula, or testing of new teaching materials. The capacity of the education system to implement the decisions was not assessed”.

Immediately after independence, the African governments naturally wished to have as much control over education development as possible, as a means of national unity and identity. The slogan of free, universal and state-controlled primary and basic education was a major priority in the political programmes of many newly independent governments. For this reason, private education was at this time viewed as an exception because of the tuition fees or non-government ownership and management.

Even when private (missionary) schools were approved, they had to comply with strict government regulations and were considered a temporary phenomenon. The most effective means of government control over private schools was through teachers recruited and paid by the government. Regardless of management, the government-approved private schools had certain common standards, followed the same syllabi and prepared students for the same examinations. The example of Ghana in 1950-1959 shows how the number of non-regulated private primary schools declined from 1,312 to 285, and the
number of government-approved private schools increased from 1,081 to 3,428 (Kitchen, 1962).

Heyneman (1983) comments on Uganda, to the effect that the loss of autonomy by missionary schools after independence decreased their cost-efficiency.

Before independence missionary schools (Catholic, Protestant, or Muslim) had a large degree of financial and administrative autonomy. Schools were run by committees that had the power to allocate the funds available for the school and to appoint the headmaster, who was responsible for day-to-day management, including the appointment of other teachers and the purchase of supplies. Schools were subject to inspection by the Catholic, Protestant, or Muslim agencies, which had a strong interest in maintaining school standards because of rivalry.

Following the post-independence reforms, individual schools lost the power to govern their own affairs. The government combined schools into groups of three or four and put a management committee in charge of each group. School fees were made uniform throughout the country, and thus serious burdens were imposed on poor families and poor districts. All teachers were placed on the same salary scale and were appointed and placed by the Ministry of Education, and the local schools had no say about their selection. Furniture was no longer made to order for individual schools, but was standardized and had to be obtained from designated suppliers at double the cost of furniture available locally. Moreover, under the old system, local schools could order their own supplies out of funds for which the school’s management committee was responsible. Under the new system, school fees were collected by the headmasters, but remitted to district education offices. These funds were to have
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been held for the credit of the schools and used to pay the Uganda School Supply Ltd. (a state monopoly) for supplies, but some of these funds were inexplicably diverted so that the schools did not receive their supplies.

The post-independence period was also the time of rapid development of community schools mostly in suburban and rural areas (at that time sometimes called sub-grade schools), for example in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Kenya, Botswana and many other African countries, as a result of strong social demand for education. Unlike the approved missionary schools, these did not necessarily follow the national educational standards, did not have qualified teachers and had to lobby for government recognition and aid. The communities and PTAs who set up these schools expected the governments at a later stage to intervene and take care of the school management, but in most cases the government support, if any, would be limited to teachers and grant-in-aid.

Some governments, for example in Kenya and Botswana and, later, in Zimbabwe, encouraged a greater community role in education development, such as harambee schools in Kenya and community junior-secondary schools in Botswana (Roth, 1987; Bray with Lillis, 1988; Rharade, 1997; Bray, 1997).

It is interesting to observe an evolution of the government policy towards community harambee schools in Kenya and similar schools in Botswana. The 1960s in Kenya saw a dramatic resurgence of independent schools at secondary level, as parents showed their determination to provide educational facilities beyond those which the government could support. Although the establishment of any school without the approval of the Ministry of Education was technically illegal, government control was practically impossible. Adopting the Kiswahili phrase harambee, meaning ‘Let’s all pull
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together’, from the political slogan, these self-help schools became a vital addition to Kenya’s secondary school system. In 1964, 80 *harambee* schools admitted pupils who had finished the primary stage, and 30 new schools were opened in 1965, altogether accounting for one-third of the secondary schools in the country. In 1966, the number of *harambee* schools stood at 266, as compared with 199 state-funded schools (Rharade, 1997).

The rapid expansion of primary schooling led to a decline in the proportion of leavers able to enter government-assisted secondary schools, and to a constant increase in the number of harambee schools. Despite the increasing unemployment of school-leavers at all levels, popular demand for secondary education remained strong. In fact, the 1970–74 Kenya Development Plan expressed the hope that the demand for harambee schools would soon die a natural death because of the expenses involved to local communities and because employment opportunities for the average school-leaver declined sharply. However, as of 1971, the number of harambee secondary schools was increasing sharply: there were 478 unaided schools, out of a total of 809 secondary schools, representing an enrolment of 59,676 out of a secondary school total of 140,719. The growth of harambee schools was greatest in those areas with the largest percentage of primary school enrolment (Sheffield, 1973).

Initially the harambee schools were not covered by government planning and the standard of education provided was very low because of the lack of teaching materials and qualified teachers. The pupils’ poor examination results were a source of concern for the communities that had invested in these schools. In addition, the government wanted to remain in control of the development of the harambee schools but its attempts to restrict...
the opening of such schools faced an immediate reaction of communities because the schools were much appreciated by disadvantaged groups of population whose children were not admitted to government secondary schools (Rharade, 1997).

Gradually the government started changing its position towards harambee schools, made provisions to extend aid to a limited number of these schools, established the government inspection for them and introduced a new examination – the Kenya Junior Secondary Examination – to give harambee students a certificate after two years of secondary education. Moreover, transfer of some of the more able students to government schools was allowed (Sheffield, 1973).

Finally, the government had to give in under popular pressure and introduced measures to provide qualified teachers for harambee schools and integrate some of these schools into the public system of education (Rharade, 1997). The integration of community schools into the public education system has never materialized in Kenya (as well as in other sub-Saharan countries), and in 1987 harambee secondary schools comprised nearly three-quarters of the total. Some of the harambee schools were aided by the government (almost 44 per cent of all secondary schools), but others were unaided (Bray, 1997).

Many researchers have mixed evaluation of the harambee experience in Kenya in terms of quality of instruction and teaching/learning conditions (Roth, 1987; Lillis and Ayot, 1988; Graham-Brown, 1991; Bray, 1997 etc.). Formulated by Lillis and Ayot, “the harambee experience has proved to be a two-edged sword”.

On the one side, the movement has had an enormous quantitative impact. Enrolments in the unaided sector exceed those in maintained schools. However, harambee projects have
often accentuated both regional and social inequalities. The quality of harambee education is often extremely low. Only in exceptional circumstances, related mostly to political patronage, can schools claim to offer more than an educational facade. As such, although the anticipated reward may make them appear to be worthwhile investments, they are actually a burden on communities. Yet it is clear that the sector will retain its momentum for the foreseeable future (Lillis and Ayot, ibid.).

In Botswana, the reasons for community schools were the same as in Kenya, the self-help demand for secondary education was more than the supply of public schooling could satisfy. Private, entirely unaided schools have appeared in many communities, often starting as night schools in borrowed premises. In many communities, households contributed cash, cattle and labour for school construction. Often, teachers privately recruited were refugees from neighbouring Zimbabwe, Zambia and Lesotho. Swartland and Taylor (1988) report that “at first, the government had entirely ignored these schools. Although they were required to be registered by law, their existence was not recorded in the education statistics. When the government could no longer ignore them, it became embarrassed because they dramatized the inadequacy of the government’s provision in relation to demand. Also the fees were so high in these schools and the standards so low in comparison with government schools that the contrast seemed inequitable”.

The number of private schools in Botswana increased between 1980 and 1993 from 12 to 53 at primary level, and at secondary level from 35 to 163 between 1984 and 1993 (Moorad, 1997). Interestingly, the number of mission and other types of non-government aided schools was stagnant at both primary and secondary levels.
As cited by Swartland and Taylor (ibid.), the National Commission on Education recommended in 1977 that “government should immediately review its policy towards the unaided schools and in the short term should be prepared to offer professional help to any school that is neither individually owned nor profit-making, and which puts itself under management of a properly constituted board of governors. As resources permit, government should develop in the medium term a programme of gradually increasing assistance, in the form of money and teachers to the presently unaided secondary schools. In the longer term these schools should be completely absorbed, mainly at the junior secondary level, into the public system”.

This statement is characteristic for two reasons: first, it formulates the preconditions of government support to these community schools, such as their collective ownership and non-profit-making nature and, second, it makes a clear policy forecast for their future integration into the public system of education. As a practical action, the Ministry of Education was authorized to plan partial financial aid and integration of these schools during the 1980s, and a special officer was appointed to be responsible for liaison with them. The Ministry took the lead in determining the location of new community schools and introduced a per capita subsidy. Most teachers since then have been recruited, employed and paid by the government teaching service.

However, the expansion of these schools had, as a result, their enrolment increasing faster than that at public and other aided types of secondary schools. Despite government efforts, these schools had to ensure their own funding of teachers’ accommodation (through free household labour) and recurrent expenditure (through their own user fees). In the 1990s, with the worsening economic climate in the country, it became obvious that the initial government projections to absorb these schools into the public system (as previously in other sub-Saharan countries) were unrealistic. Furthermore, the level of government
support to these schools, given their rapid expansion, was not sustained in real terms (e.g. deficit of qualified teachers). On the other hand, the community response to the government policy was uneven or one-off, sometimes resisted the government officials imposing recurrent costs on communities and created conflicts between the communities on issues of school location and sharing of responsibilities for it.

It is important to note the fact – from the experience of *harambee* and other similar schools – that private (religious and community) education in newly-independent African countries in the 1960s and 1970s continued to exist against the prevalent, at this time, policy approach that primary and secondary education should be totally public, free and universal. Even community (self-help) schools, supported by the government in the form of teachers and grants, were often viewed – both by the communities and the governments, as in the cases of Kenya and Botswana – as a transitional and temporary phenomenon until they would become fully public and integrated into the government system of education. Interesting evidence is brought by Assié-Lumumba (1993) who argues that, although much debate took place around *harambee* secondary schools, the same type of school organization by communities existed also at primary level in Kenya but remained unnoticed at the central level due to the then stance of the official policy.

In rare cases (when provision of other types of schools was desperately insufficient but also recognized by public authorities) private profit-making schools continued to exist after independence, but these were unaided by the government. They either originated from schools for expatriates or were copied from their example, mostly in urban areas, to serve particular categories of the African population with abilities to pay tuition and user fees. Castle (1966) described the situation with unaided private schools in Uganda in the early 1960s as
a booming phenomenon attracting pupils even from the neighbouring countries:

There are in Uganda, a large number of unaided private schools run for private profit which absorb thousands of children unable to enter the aided system. No accurate figures are available, but in 1963 there were over 4,000 pupils in these schools paying anything from 300 shillings to 900 shillings per annum in fees, and there are indications that these numbers are steadily increasing. This is a phenomenon almost wholly confined to Uganda. One surprising aspect of this situation is that in some of these schools over 90 per cent of the pupils come from Tanzania and even Central Africa, where restrictions on private schools are much more severe.

Characteristically, Castle (ibid.) observed that because of their low cost, the teaching and living conditions in these profit-making schools were ‘thoroughly bad’.

In addition to paying fees, students are usually expected to buy books and consumable materials; they are crowded onto benches often without the table section to write on; there are practically no visual aids except here and there an ancient map, and the teachers’ libraries are, as one inspector has remarked, ‘at the maximum, meagre’. Some owners make good profits, but most of them declare that, after paying teachers’ salaries, little money is left to pay for equipment.

Rapid development of private profit-making schools in recent years under conditions of economic liberalization in Africa is analyzed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
3. LOOKING INTO THE DEFINITION OF PRIVATE EDUCATION

This chapter looks into the controversy of the definition of private (non-public) education. First, it may be difficult to clearly demarcate the frontier between public and private education. Then, numerous types of schools, and procedures for registration and funding of private education also complicate the matter. The criteria for defining private schools are reviewed and a formula suggested, which is applied for this analysis.

A general definition of private education is not a simple category to determine due to its numerous types and countries’ specifics. In a broad sense, private education refers to any type of formal school which is outside the public education system (non-public, non-government, quasi-public, parastatal, municipal). ‘The definition of ‘private’ is by no means clear-cut in situations where many ‘private’ schools are heavily funded and regulated by the state. In fact, we really have a continuum of public and private funding and control’ (James, 1991).

The modern conditions across the world, when education is increasingly considered a quasi-market (Levacic, 1995) requiring families and communities to pay for education – directly or indirectly – as a social service, make it difficult to differentiate between public and private education. To take two extreme cases in a given country: at good-quality public schools, parents are asked to contribute for recurrent costs in cash, in kind or by their labour (without calling them implicitly tuition and user fees); whereas private schools in the same country may be heavily subsidized by public funds. As Lauglo (1996) points out, “those with faith in a government’s good intentions, and the cynics who believe that governments are driven only by self-interest, will have rather different interpretations of such decentralization measures as ‘privatization’ or ‘community participation’”.

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Depending on the context and degree of its decentralization, the differences between public and private schools are often blurred, in particular in international comparisons. In different African countries schools are considered and called private not only for the reasons of private funding by communities, families, church and other sources, but also because of non-government ownership or management. The confusion is very often created for the following reasons:

- **first**, decentralization policies enable local (provincial/regional) authorities to decide on their own how schools should be managed, which schools should be financed and how the funds are allocated.
- **secondly**, whether to consider community and religiously affiliated schools as private ones, due to their quasi-public nature, or not. The main characteristic here is the sense of ownership when the school building and other facilities belong to community or church but teachers are paid by the public authorities.
- **thirdly**, for a related reason, whether ‘state-aided’ non-government schools should be considered private or not. Here the main characteristic (which overlaps with the above) is the issue of government aid or funding to particular schools not owned by the government. This phenomenon exists in English-speaking African countries and refers not only to community schools but also to so-called farm and mine schools.
- **fourthly**, conventional wisdom presumes that at private schools parents should pay heavy tuition fees. But this is not always the case. In the systems where the majority of schools are managed privately (mostly English-speaking countries), the major share, such as school construction and teacher salaries or even total expenditure, can be paid by the government. The most spectacular example is Mauritius, where the government does not only pay for teacher salaries (as often happens with community and religious schools) but all direct expenditure for private schools, and private schools are free.
• **fifthly**, whether to narrow the definition of private schools to only profit-making ones and ignore quasi-public community, religiously-affiliated and all other state-aided schools. In this case schools are ‘totally’ independent from public authorities in all respects (ownership, teachers, facilities, maintenance etc.).

• **sixthly**, how to treat the cases where parents are obliged to pay tuition, user and other types of fees and contributions at public schools. Then, from the parents’ point of view, the difference between public and private schools in terms of funding becomes only the difference in the amount of money spent, but not the basic principle of funding and management.

*Needless to say that confusion often arises also for semantic differences in translation from English to French and vice versa, for example, regarding spontaneous schools in French-speaking African countries which are often called ‘communautes’ in French but are different from community schools in English-speaking African countries.*

For this paper, the most frequent and broad definition of private education is used, i.e. all formal schools that are *not* public, and may be founded, owned, managed and financed by actors other than the state, even in cases when the state provides most funding and has considerable control over these schools (teachers, curriculum, accreditation etc.).

In brief, for this paper schools are called private if one or more of the following criteria applies to them:

• Private in terms of ownership;
• Private in terms of management;
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- Private in terms of major share of funding and expenditure (when teachers are paid from tuition fees and other sources and not paid by public authorities).

This definition is based on the definition of UNESCO (1998) and is applied to the table on enrolment in private schools as a share of total enrolment in primary and secondary education (see Appendix III). The exact definition of private (non-public) education is strongly related to the historical roots of the problem and the type of educational model inherited from the colonial past (British, French, Portuguese etc.). That explains significant differences in major types of private schools, for example, between English-speaking and French-speaking countries in sub-Saharan Africa, described in further detail below. In addition, the heterogeneity of different types of private education in the same country should be taken into account.

The above definition is also applied for the purpose of this paper, i.e. to review various possibilities for the policies of cost-sharing where the state can share its funding responsibilities for education with any other potential non-public source.
4. DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRIVATE EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

There are many different types of private education, which may be explained by the fact that it is less regulated and more context-specific than public education. For this paper the classification is made based on two major criteria: to bring it closer to the realities in sub-Saharan countries, and to focus on features of ownership, management and funding of different categories of private schools. Although community and religious schools were usually the largest categories in terms of numbers in sub-Saharan countries, more recent developments of the 1990s have shown the rapid evolution of spontaneous and low-cost profit-making schools.

Private education is a heterogeneous category. In the same country, the existence of different types of private education is related to their origin and context:

1. Community (also called community-based, municipal or self-help) schools make up in many cases the largest category of private-education schools in English-speaking African countries. Some developed from former missionary schools, but in the majority of cases came into being when communities wished to complement, by their own efforts, insufficient provision of public education (for example, harambee schools in Kenya, community junior secondary schools in Botswana etc.). They are normally registered by public authorities and regulated by government legislation. They often receive government subsidies and other support, such as teachers paid by the central government. Bray (1986; 1987; 1998) and Bray with Lillis (1988) suggest various modifications and combinations of criteria for community schools, depending on their modes of financing and management (i.e. completely unassisted by government, community schools with some government support, government schools with some community support, etc.);
2. Religious (also called religiously-affiliated or denominational) schools make up in many cases the largest category of private education in French-speaking African countries. They either appeared before public education, or developed for historical reasons and through society traditions. The majority of these schools are Catholic, Protestant and Muslim. Together with community schools, they are normally registered by public authorities, regulated by government legislation, and may receive government subsidies and support;

3. Spontaneous (also called ‘bush’ schools in English-speaking countries) appeared in specific learning conditions to meet the demand of particular groups of rural, urban poor or nomadic population which would otherwise have had no access to education (for example, in Chad). In most cases they are not registered or approved by the public authorities. They are independent in funding, management and curriculum, and their quality of education is low in most cases. They also charge fees and accept contributions in kind but at the minimal level, bearable for the local population. But in terms of their number and coverage, depending on circumstances, they may be more numerous than private registered schools. For example, a study done in the 1980s on Zambia showed that in the Copperbelt region there were only four approved private secondary schools against 19 whose status and existence were unknown to the Ministry of Education; in Lusaka the figures were 4 registered, to 11 unregistered private schools (Kaluba, 1986). Schools set up by nomadic tribes and refugees may also fall into this category;

4. Profit-making institutions have arisen as a result of a diversified and/or unmet demand, and are particularly developed in central urban areas (to serve middle- and high-income families) and in suburban areas (for low-income households). They may provide more expensive and better-quality education than public or other types of private schools, or they may provide very low-quality instruction merely to compensate
Different types of private education in sub-Saharan Africa

for the deficit of other learning opportunities in rapidly urbanized areas. Their characteristic feature is tuition and other fees (and/or other non-monetary contributions), which is the main source of their funding and can limit access to them. The actual volume of fees can vary considerably for low-cost profit-making schools, and may even be less than the total expenses borne by parents in free public schools (uniform, textbooks, school meals, ‘voluntary’ contributions etc.). The top-end of profit-making schools may be registered by public authorities, but their actual number, status and operation depend on the context. Some researchers (e.g. Bray, 1998) make an additional effort to differentiate between non-profit institutions financed entirely from fees (such as spontaneous schools) and low-end profit-making schools, but it is evidently a complex ‘grey’ area.

5. Schools for expatriates or specific ethnic groups may be another type of private education, serving learning needs of specific population groups (minorities, different language groups). They may form a part of the profit-making private schools and admit the local population but, in general, their number and share of enrolment are less, compared to other categories of private schools.

Different types of private schools may have different institutional status, staff requirements, means of funding, modalities of co-existence with public authorities, setting-up procedures and organization of instruction, target population etc. Even within a particular category such as religious schools in the same country, there is a division between Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and other schools, whose funding conditions, status, curriculum and language of instruction are different.

The above classification is focused on features of ownership, management and funding and certainly does not exclude other possible classifications of private schools. For example, Bray (1996b) categorizes both public and private schools under ‘elite’, ‘standard’, ‘second-chance’
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(catering for pupils unable to secure places in public schools) and ‘supplementary’. In addition, differences, depending on local context, are sometimes difficult to trace between private and various non-formal, informal and ‘alternative’ institutions.

*Private tuition* by public teachers, complementary to formal public education, is another special category created as a result of inadequate access through examinations to particular levels of education (in the case of Mauritius, for example, it means access to good-standard secondary schools through the best possible Certificate of Primary Examination, Parsuramen, 1997).

Evidently, behind each category of private school there is a certain logic, as well as ‘grey’ areas making it virtually impossible to exactly classify the schools in view of their mixed characteristics at a given moment, or during their evolution. There are many indications of the transformation of initially religious schools into community schools in sub-Saharan Africa after independence, or of mixed management features (Southern Africa). In another group of cases in East Africa, a widely expected government ownership of initially established self-help community schools has never materialized. For example, numerous community schools (e.g. ‘harambee’ in Kenya and their counterparts in other African countries) appeared at the secondary level through self-help initiatives of communities and pressure by PTAs, when it became evident that government efforts were concentrated on primary education and the demand for secondary education exceeded the capacities of public education (see typology of private education in *Appendix IV*).

Unrecognized community-based schools, depending how well they are established, have much in common with spontaneous schools, sometimes leading to a phenomenon called ‘ghost’ schools which appear or disappear together with movements of tribes, cattle
herdsmen or nomads for seasonal or other reasons. Then spontaneous schools in rural areas have many similar features to low-cost profit-making schools in suburban areas, especially when fees are paid in the non-monetary form of food and other donations to the owner and teachers. Both spontaneous and profit-making schools may be on the borderline of the categorization between formal and non-formal schooling, especially in the case of ‘bush’, farm, mine or ‘street’ schools, subject to the degree they follow regular curricula and textbooks.

Different categories of private education naturally serve different clientele. The large number of profit-making private schools, charging high fees, may indicate strong disparities in income between different categories of population.

Private education is denoted in this paper as private schools as establishments (i.e. various types of non-public schools), but private services, such as private catering, private transportation, private tuition, private board and lodging of students and teachers and all other private services are not included in the above definition for the purposes of this paper.
5. SHARE OF PRIVATE EDUCATION IN TOTAL ENROLMENT

This part of the paper is based on various sources of statistical data regarding enrolment in private schools in sub-Saharan Africa. For obvious reasons only registered types of private schools are included in this analysis, and no distinction is made between different types of private schools. Despite these qualifications, it is possible to observe the dynamics and evolution of enrolment in private schools as compared to public schools by time interval, level of education (primary and secondary) and by group of countries (English-speaking or French-speaking). It may be observed that the share of private education in total enrolment has lately been stable in most cases, or with some growth potential even at primary level, which used to be the priority level for public education efforts during the early post-independence period of the 1960s and 1970s.

Official statistics are scarce and often contradictory between the time intervals and sources. In many cases no data on private schools are collected, especially when they are not supported by public authorities. Although regional and country experiences, as well as the cycles of education, may differ between the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (as seen from the table in Appendix III), some observations are possible. Naturally, they should be compared with the empirical reports on specific countries from other sources which are summarized in Appendix I.

In addition, one should remember that only registered private schools (the whole spectrum of possible types) were reported and included in this analysis, and that there are different types of private schools (mostly, religious and community schools) which are grouped together. The official statistics naturally show only the ‘tip of the iceberg’, especially regarding profit-making and spontaneous schools.

The exact data are not available for obvious reasons, but most studies agree, and indirect reports suggest, that at present the majority of registered private schools in sub-Saharan Africa are still non-profit-
making community schools and religious schools, rather than profit-making and other types of private schools. However, there is no doubt that with the diminished role of the state in the provision of education and the ever-growing social demand for it in the late 1990s, the dynamics of growth for private profit-making and spontaneous education will be higher than for conventional types of private education.

In English-speaking countries of East and Southern Africa, community schools make up the largest category of private education establishments. In French-speaking countries of West and Central Africa, religiously-affiliated schools constitute the largest group of private education suppliers at primary level; at secondary level, religious private education is increasingly complemented by burgeoning community and private profit-making institutions (see Documentary Appendix II for selected African country examples).

The share of private education at primary level is substantially lower that at secondary level in all regions of sub-Saharan Africa, due to the commitment of governments to endeavour to guarantee, first and foremost, universal and free primary and basic education for all. Therefore, while government efforts and policies were concentrated on the primary level, secondary education in sub-Saharan Africa was traditionally under-funded, and community demand increasingly exceeded public-education supply at this level, as noted across the continent.

But more recently this pattern has started to change, due to the student flows from primary to secondary levels. This may be one of the reasons why private education has rapidly evolved at primary level also in a number of cases (even though unregistered spontaneous and low-cost profit-making schools are not taken into account in the statistics presented).
In sub-Saharan Africa, the share of private education (all registered types) at primary level decreased from 1965 to 1985, but it was often higher than in other regions of the world, which is mainly explained by the above reasons. For East Africa, its share in primary education enrolment declined from 53 per cent in 1965 to 43 per cent in 1975, and to 20 per cent in 1985. For West Africa, from 26 per cent in 1965 to 18 per cent in 1975 and 16 per cent in 1985 (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995). Because primary education was a major focus of government efforts, the mean statistically-weighted decrease of the share of private (non-government) education in enrolment seems logical.

For secondary education, regional differences in Africa were wider in 1965-1980. In East Africa, the share of private education in enrolment was actually increasing from 36 per cent in 1965 to 45 per cent in 1975 and 48 per cent in 1980. In West Africa, the opposite situation was observed, share of private education declined from 41 per cent in 1965 to 30 per cent in 1975 and 28 per cent in 1980.

These contradictory trends, as well as differing reports from individual countries, reflect different country policies and historical backgrounds. These differences are observed even within the same region and/or within the group of English-speaking and French-speaking countries; for example, a very different situation in Zambia and Zimbabwe, or in Benin and Burkina Faso.

Some African countries had a very high share of private education in the 1990s: Lesotho (100% at primary), Zimbabwe (88% in primary and 85% in secondary), Swaziland (80% in primary, 37% in secondary), Mauritius (79% in secondary), Botswana (74% in secondary), Tanzania (53% in secondary) etc. Among French-speaking countries with a high share of private education are: Madagascar (21% in primary, 45% in secondary), Cameroon (24% in primary, 49% in secondary), Gabon
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(29% in primary, 40% in secondary), Togo (25% in primary, 14% in secondary), Côte d'Ivoire (12% in primary, 36% in secondary).

In terms of the dynamics of private education evolution and development, as seen from comparisons between 1985 and 1995, in most cases in African countries the share of this ‘officially registered’ private education was relatively stable or increasing at levels of both primary and secondary education. This can be explained by more tolerant government policies towards achieving universal primary education or its expansion, with the help of private schools. This was observed in both French-speaking and English-speaking countries. For example, in Madagascar, the share of private schools has increased during the last decade from 13% to 21%; in Malawi, from 6% to 21%. But there were also exceptions, as in Cameroon, where this share dropped from 34% to 24% between 1985 and 1995.

For secondary education, strong increases were observed in Botswana (from 50 to 74%), Côte d'Ivoire (from 29 to 36%), in Chad (from 5 to 13%), in Djibouti (from 3 to 11%), in Zimbabwe (from 67 to 85%). But in some French-speaking countries there were declines: in Burkina Faso (from 48 to 35%) and Senegal (from 29 to 22%). The allure of community-based secondary education in English-speaking African countries can be explained by the expensive nature of secondary boarding schools, which constitute a large share of formal public education at this level. A cheaper community-based version of secondary schooling (such as harambee in Kenya, community junior secondary schools in Botswana, or the Zimbabwean model at both primary and secondary levels) could not achieve the same quality standards as boarding schools, but filled the gap in coverage and competed in cost-efficiency.

These developments are difficult to generalize and interpret only on the basis of one or few statistical indicators. We do not have cross-
national data on the exact number of all private schools and their absolute enrolment. Previous time-series of UNESCO showed that this ‘officially registered’ share of private education in total enrolment may quickly change, both for statistical and changing government policy reasons, as a result of unmet demand for schooling. The analysis may also be affected by the results of economic crisis and structural adjustment, causing a decline in public education and forcing households to seek low-cost non-government alternatives.
6. PRIVATE EDUCATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

The chapter below examines the rationale (raison d’être) for private education existence and development in sub-Saharan Africa. This paradigm passed through different periods and extremes: from nationalization (‘deprivatization’) of private schools in several countries in the 1960s, to acceptance and recognition of certain possible positive effects of private education, such as its complementarity to public education in guaranteeing access to learning opportunities and coverage, its role in satisfying parents’ interest in specific school location and schooling conditions, its contribution to reducing pressure upon public education funding etc. The demand-oriented nature of private education makes it comparatively flexible in management and funding but also more sensitive to specific groups’ needs and overall environment.

Public education appeared and developed much later than private education, and traditionally used to serve as an effective political instrument of government policies. For public authorities, the dilemma of public versus private education is in the degree of control over curriculum, teaching force, quality of education and its standards, learning achievements, degrees etc. More centralized models of educational planning and administration in the past favoured public education which facilitated strict control over its supply. More decentralized educational models assumed co-existence of both public and private education because both become more autonomous, managed by lower levels of administration, and more sensitive to consumer demand.

For African countries, as seen above in Chapter 2, immediately after their independence and in the process of consolidation of their national identities, development of public education was indispensable in achieving the political goal of free and universal education. The share of public education, in particular at primary level, was rapidly expanding, and there were cases of ‘deprivatization’ (nationalization) of private schools in the 1960s (Carron and Châu, 1996).
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This period is characterized by the World Bank as the time when “the usual practice has been to subject education to strict controls, which has tended to stifle private provision and to prevent individual providers from responding to the changing needs of their constituent populations” (World Bank, 1988). Still, pre-independence private education (Catholic and other religion-affiliated) continued to exist because of the importance of historical factors (early founding, reputation for quality instruction, positive image among households etc.). “Once private schools are founded they disappear only with a long lag, even if the initial conditions disappear” (James, 1989).

Gradually, however, as a result of insufficient provision of public education and as an impact of structural adjustment policies and related austerity in public finance, cost-saving considerations acquired more and more value in the policy agendas of the governments across the world. The situation of the 1990s in Africa, and other regions with high demographic growth, is such that development of private education is a natural response to the need to ensure access to basic education for the school-age population when the number of public schools is insufficient, or their location inconvenient for the catchment area. Gross enrolment rates at primary level are below the levels needed to universalize enrolment in many least developed countries in Africa, and are particularly low in Francophone Africa (Lewin, 1996). At secondary level, private education may respond to the pressure of social demand on the part of primary education graduates.

In the sub-Saharan context, in addition to historical reasons, the expansion of private provision of education as an alternative or supplement to public, tended to take place:

1. **For reasons of access and coverage (e.g. unmet demand):** when the number of existing public schools was not enough to guarantee sufficient coverage of the school-age population, especially in
suburban and rural areas (for example, when there was no school in the vicinity).

2. For reasons of schooling conditions and quality (e.g. diversified demand): when parents wished to avoid overcrowding and other insufficient schooling conditions at public schools or guarantee better quality of education.

3. For the reason of a redundant qualified teaching force (e.g. potential specific supply): when limits on the recruitment of civil servants and pay freezes, established under structural adjustment programmes, forced teachers to set up private schools or seek employment at them. This situation is observed in many French-speaking countries experiencing the impact of structural adjustment programmes.

4. As a result of efforts by profit-making school managers focused on specific target groups of population in urban and suburban areas. “One major motive for founding schools is the possibility of disguised profit distribution, and there is a popular belief in many countries that this takes place, particularly in areas characterized by excess demand for education. Although called ‘non-profit’ these organizations are, allegedly, really profit-making entities” (James, 1989).

5. As a result of inadequate public supply or a deliberate government policy to reduce pressure upon the existing schools and to avoid the introduction of tuition fees in public schools (e.g. inadequate or regulated supply). This approach was used, for example, in Zambia in 1976, when government revenues declined as a result of declining prices for copper, and in Nigeria after the drop of oil prices in 1984.

As these five reasons reflect both demand for education (1 and 2) and its supply (3, 4 and 5), a combination of the above is possible. For example, redundant qualified teachers would prefer to set up a private
school in an area where the competition with public schooling is in their favour.

Issues of private education regularly emerge during the never-ending debate on how the role of public education, and public funding of education, should be reviewed and improved (see Appendix V for a comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages of private and public education).

“Public intervention in education can reduce inequality, open opportunities for the poor and disadvantaged, compensate for market failures in lending for education, and make information about the benefits of education more generally available. But public spending on education is often inefficient and inequitable. It is inefficient when it is misallocated among competing uses; it is inequitable when qualified potential students are unable to enrol in institutions because educational opportunities are lacking or because of their inability to pay. Present systems for financing and managing education often fail to meet these challenges. Public funding, moreover, is becoming more difficult to provide as enrolments expand” (Burnett, 1996).

By definition, the provision of private education should be demand-oriented. It has to be closer to the customers and their needs, managed more flexibly and bring about competitive achievements and results. In saying that it is demand-oriented, one should add that it serves different types of demand for education, which explains its different types of organization and management. It can be viewed as a ‘parallel’ market to provide educational services which, for various reasons, may complement or substitute public education.
Private education as an alternative to the provision of public education

But these comparative advantages attributed to private education are visible only in a competitive environment such as an urban area where customers (parents) can see the difference between public and private schools. In an environment where the choice does not exist, due to the general lack of schools (rural, remote, low-population areas) any school, be it public or private, becomes a public good, a ‘natural monopoly’ (Kremer, 1995). This explains the quasi-public nature of community, nomadic and spontaneous schools which may also have features of private institutions.

For this reason, any public policy towards private education development should be context-specific to take into account both (i) historical developments and private schools’ origin, and (ii) present educational supply-demand dynamics and specifics.

Private education development in one country or region may not correspond to the situation in the neighbouring country or region, i.e. private education in developed countries is explained most often through differentiated demand; private education in developing countries is justified by insufficient supply of public education (James, 1989). One may observe, for example, radically different cases and approaches to private education in such countries as Zambia and Zimbabwe, or Burkina Faso and Mali.

The presence of private schools in countries with public educational systems also shows that no government can satisfy all educational demands. In developed countries, governments’ failure to provide what is deemed quality education or education in a particular cultural tradition leads to the emergence of elitist private schools and religious schools at all levels. Some private schools offer the discipline and homework parents want. Catholic schools meet the needs for a Catholic education, and ethnic schools provide teachings in their
particularistic cultures. In developing countries, however, limited resources and inadequate facilities – even at the primary level – explain the predominance of private elementary and secondary schools patterned after the public system to absorb the overflow of students and provide an education that the general public can afford.

Aside from Estelle James’s works – which explicitly explain the concepts of ‘differential’ and ‘excess’ demands to explain the presence of private schools to meet the public’s unmet qualitative and quantitative needs – most studies on private schools have focused on their role in nurturing elites or particular cultural groups. The profit motive is often ignored. There may be three reasons for this omission.

First, the literature has focused on private schools in the West, the majority of which are denominational or elitist schools subsidized by special interest groups. Second, education generally is considered a public good, and educators tend to emphasize how attitudes and skills acquired in schools contribute to the economy in general rather than to individual financial gain. Third, to view education as business simply runs against the grain of Western cultural heritage, even proprietors of entrepreneurial schools are reluctant to admit that they are motivated primarily by profit” (Kwong, 1997).

To look at the problem from the opposite perspective, Rangazas (1997) provides several theoretical explanations for why there is still major worldwide support for public schools, and not for private schools. These are theories which explain the existence of public schools even if they are productively inefficient in the provision of private benefits of education:
First, there may be social benefits associated with the indoctrination of a common set of values and knowledge that the majority of households believes is most effectively produced in public schools (Levin, 1991). Second, the majority of parents may be unable or unwilling to accept the responsibility for judging education quality in a diverse private-market system of schools (Krashinsky, 1986). Third, the majority of households may be unwilling to publicly finance education if it is mixed with the minority cultural and religious views (Bryk et al., 1993; James, 1993). Fourth, there may be private educational benefits to students of higher socio-economic background and this may be a cost-efficient way to redistribute educational opportunity (Willms and Echols, 1993). Finally, public education may be used and supported by those powerful actors to control information so as to minimize opposition to basic political philosophy and policy (Lott, 1990).

The evidence suggests that one or more of these explanations is widely accepted and takes place in reality. The fact that public education dominates primary and secondary levels across the world and, in particular, in sub-Saharan Africa, points to the preponderance of the ‘mainstream logic’ considerations rather than mere productive efficiency in providing the private benefits of education (Rangazas, 1997).
7. PRIVATE EDUCATION AS A COMPETITOR FOR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EDUCATION

Funding of private education is both a critical and controversial problem. The advocates of existing government financing of registered private schools say that it is necessary to support them to improve overall coverage and access to education. The critics argue that this money is diverted from public schools in desperate need. The matter becomes ever more complex in cases where private schoolteachers are civil servants paid by the government, or when tuition fees are charged both at public and private schools, bewildering households as to the difference between the two. With evidence of increasing community and household contributions to any type of education in cash, but also in kind and free labour, the funding issue deserves a thorough examination from various angles, i.e. degree of privatization, government regulations and competition for funds between the schools.

Another, if not the major reason for renewed interest in private education lies in the funding of education. The common practice, in both French-speaking and English-speaking countries in Africa, is that many private schools are recognized and registered by the state (in most cases these are community and religious schools) and are entitled to government subsidies (grants, subventions) and other benefits (tax-exemption). These subsidies are provided for:

- teacher salaries;
- non-salary recurrent costs according to the number of pupils enrolled;
- capital expenditure (according to the norms of amortization but in reality it requires lobbying);
- tax relief accorded either directly to private schools or to parents paying tuition fees at these schools.

These subsidies are also often criticized for their uniformity, related inefficiency and lack of incentives (Jimenez, 1987).
At the same time, public and private schools – directly and indirectly – compete for:

1. a ‘piece of the cake’ of total public expenditure in terms of the above-mentioned government subsidies (grants). As a result of structural adjustment and related austerity, these subsidies were ‘frozen’ in a number of French-speaking African countries (for example, since 1993 in Senegal (Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Plan, Senegal, 1996) or are non-existent (Zambia);
2. additional private funds and resources, coming from communities/parents and students in cash, in kind and in labour.

Bray (1988) made the following classification of resource-generation for non-government types of education:

- Resources from within the community
  - Launching ceremonies,
  - Community taxation,
  - PTA collections,
  - Alumni associations,
  - Grants from co-operatives,
  - Provision of services;

- Resources from outside the community
  - Assistance from governments,
  - Assistance from overseas churches,
  - Donations from local businessmen,
  - Aid from foreign governments.

- School economic activities.

The situation with funding of education is becoming, however, more and more dispersed. With public expenditure for education in general
curbed, stagnant or below the rate of increase in enrolment, private funds (parents’, community, NGOs etc.) in cash, in kind and in free labour are expected to play an increasing role in educational finance as a whole. In terms of trends, the competition between public and private schools is moving from public funds (where subventions and grants to private schools are fixed according to the norms) to private funds of families and communities, the area where public schools have to intervene – implicitly or explicitly – due to financial constraints and insufficient public funding.

The estimates of private funding of public education are often approximate and, furthermore, are not technically comparable with private funding of private schools. An extract from a study on Indonesia says that the average public school has a private funding share of 7 per cent, while the average private school has a private funding share of 30 per cent (James et al., 1996). In Thailand, in 1987, on the average private funds accounted for 23 per cent and 76 per cent of the total cost for government schools and private schools respectively (Tsang and Taoklam, 1992). Moreover, “institutional costs do not capture the additional resources devoted to schooling in terms of non-fee direct private costs, indirect private costs, and contributions made to teachers” (ibid.). Kaluba (1988) witnessed on Zambia: “Officially, for example, boarding fees have been reintroduced but other fees are still prohibited. In practice a wide range of fees may be found, but the existence of the policy dampens one mechanism for raising resources”.

A comprehensive study by Oulai and Peano on total costs of education in Benin (1999) reports that for all types of education, parents paid as much as 24.2 per cent of total educational costs in 1996, which was an increase compared to 21.4 per cent in 1993. The parents’ contributions came in the form of fees at public and private schools, purchase of books, school supplies and uniforms. These estimates do not include contributions by NGOs and income-generation by schools.
Moorad (1997) specifies the following types of community and household contributions for community junior secondary schools in Botswana:

- Cash in the form of donations (a synonym for fees or levies) collected at national and local levels. Officially, the government abolished fees for primary and secondary education in 1988-1989, and the ‘fees’ in reality, especially at non-government community schools were replaced by ‘voluntary donations’. Schools normally set at a minimal rate ‘donations’ per pupil which can grow subject to household capacities and generosity to finance the staff accommodation and recurrent non-salary costs.

- Cattle/beasts. Usually households are requested by the Chief to donate a cow per household (in particular at the period of school construction) under the famous slogan ‘one person – one beast’ (‘kgomomotho le motho’). The market value of cattle declined during the drought years in the 1990s, and other animals donated were goats, sheep and poultry.

- Free labour. For those families that could not afford to donate cash or animals, free labour was another alternative. But free labour was also provided by volunteers, mainly for school construction and building of staff houses.

- Transportation. Affluent members of the community helped schools with free transportation for various occasions (to replace the school bus service or to bring goods). It is also a common practice to share vehicles with public schools, especially to bring textbooks and food from urban to rural areas.

- Fund-raising for school-meal programmes. In the same way as for cash donations, minimal rates were set per pupil per term but their real scale can be variable. Officially, school-meal fees were abolished by the government, together with tuition fees.
Another serious issue yet to be thoroughly addressed by research is private supplement to official teacher salaries and private recruitment of teachers by community-based and profit-making schools. “There are numerous examples of situations where parents and communities have raised resources to supplement (or even substitute) the state’s contribution to teacher costs through direct or indirect subsidies to state employed teachers, or through direct employment of privately paid teachers” (Mehrotra and Buckland, 1998). However, apart from reports and examples, no research study was available to the author on this growing phenomenon.

Although growing, private funds, in other words, capacities of households to spend more on education, seem limited to some scholars and are linked to such variables as number of children per family, household income and consumption and amount of fees and other contributions demanded by the school. There is a strong relationship between household welfare and educational attainment (World Bank, 1990).

The decision to send children to private school and pay more than in public school may be justified as an ‘informed choice’ in favour of ‘value for money’ or particular advantages of a given non-public school (proximity, better conditions, etc.). Mehrotra (1998) tends to conclude that “private contributions have seldom enhanced the quality of public schooling but merely substituted for government expenditure”.

In cases where public schools charge tuition, user, building fees etc. or – what is more often the case – ask for parents’ contributions in kind and in labour, the difference between them and officially registered private schools will be only in the actual amount of parents’ contributions. This Cheshire cat-like ‘disappearing’ difference between public and private schools in terms of private funding is used as an argument to introduce and raise fees in public schools (Thobani,
Little price elasticity of demand for education is quoted in support of fees. Jimenez (1987, 1989) on Peru and Mali, and Thobani (1983) on Malawi, found demand to be relatively inelastic to price. However, several other studies found serious adverse demand effects of fees at the lower level of schooling (such as reduced gross enrolment and increased drop-out rates) as in Malawi (Bray, 1987), Nigeria (Hinchliffe, 1989), Ghana (Lavy, 1992) and Mali (Stewart, 1994). In addition, the positive effects of a reduction or abolition of fees on enrolments have been reported for Botswana and Malawi (Colclough, 1996).

With more details on Malawi, Castro-Leal (1996) reported that abolishing fees in 1994, indeed resulted in the number of children at primary level jumping by an average 62 per cent from 1.8 million to nearly 3 million for the 1994/1995 school year. But the positive effect was subject to serious regional disparities, i.e. the highest growth rate in enrolments was noted in the rural Central and the rural Southern regions, which used to be the poorest and previously lagged behind in enrolments. By contrast, for the rest of the country the increase was less than 30 per cent. In addition, the high demand led to the need to construct 38,000 new classrooms and to recruit and train 22,000 new teachers, which was clearly an unbearable task for a developing country.

The debate continues. In a recent study on rural Mali, Birdsall and Orivel (1996) state that “first, fees are not a major cause of non-enrolment or dropping out. The empirical results indicate that the distance to the school is a much more critical factor; the quality of the school also matters. These quantitative results are also backed by the responses to attitudinal questions in the villages – cost was not felt to be a factor that caused non-enrolment”.

In 1971, a presidential decree abolished school fees up to Standard 4 in geographically disadvantaged regions, and in 1973 a further decree extended this measure over much of the country up to Standard 6. The abolition of school fees had disproportionate effects on the development of the school population, which rose from 1.8 million in 1973 to 2.8 million in 1974, after the application of the presidential decree. In some regions, school enrolment doubled, but in areas traditionally inhabited by semi-nomadic populations the number of children enrolled did not change very much. The problem of school wastage was not solved despite the presidential decree, and the persistence of this phenomenon ended up by bringing the enrolment rates back to the 1973 levels. Lastly, the increase in enrolments in 1974 exceeded all planned projections and the primary schools could not accommodate all the pupils. This forced the government to introduce a tax per pupil, paid by parents, to finance the building of classrooms and schools. For many families, the abolition of fees did not mean any extra money, and this tax, which varied from one district to another, was a new source of discontent and frustration. In some regions, this tax was four times higher than previous tuition fees.

To be methodologically correct, not just the fact that fees are introduced or not, but a whole set of factors should be taken into account for an accurate analysis of their effects (see Appendix VIII). Are various fees or taxes charged only in private schools or in public schools also? What is the volume of fees compared to the level of income of the local population? How many various types of tuition and user fees and other ‘voluntary’ contributions by parents are charged in
reality? How are regional and urban/rural disparities taken into account in determining the level of fees?

*The checklist of different monetary contributions, which is not exhaustive, may include direct tuition fees and various user fees and charges (for textbooks, uniforms, schools meals, school-bus service, use of library and sports facilities, building fee, registration/file-keeping fee, examination fee, PTA charges for social, cultural and sports events), other monetary contributions and donations for specific purposes (purchase of expensive equipment, construction of fence etc.).*

What other contributions in kind and in free labour are practised by the school? How are the fees collected and spent – centrally or locally – and is this mechanism fully transparent for teachers and fee-paying parents? Are fees used to pay staff salaries or is this not allowed? Are fees charged at the same level across the board or on a sliding scale, taking into account different incomes of parents and number of their children enrolled, or regional disparities?

The most sensitive issue for households is, of course, how different types of fees and charges are collected and actually used. The lack of transparency increases when the whole amount or part of fees is remitted from the schools to the government. In this sense, fees become a kind of ‘education tax’ with unknown utilization within total government spending. On the contrary, local collection and use of fees guarantees better transparency by the community but deprives the central government from additional funds which, in theory, could be used for centrally-funded teacher salaries and school construction.

In any case, the real rates of fee collection are usually below the expected or planned because of parents’ inability or resistance to pay, lack of accountability or unrealistic projections for families with many
children. By some estimates, the real rate of fee collection in different African countries varies between 30 and 75 per cent from that statistically projected.

*In Tanzania, the lack of clarity in respect of the ‘destination’ of parental fees (supposedly to be kept and spent by the schools themselves) might lead to ‘unplanned’ financial practices. All fees are indicated until present as a part of recurrent expenditure since it may not be easy to find out what exact items were consumed and whether or not such expenditure was rational. This issue is very complex because a part of parental fees is still expected to be remitted to the government. Such a practice obviously may be discouraging parents to pay more since their expectation is to improve the quality of the schools for which they are making payment. If parental fees have to have positive impact on the teaching-learning process, their proper targeting and auditing cannot but be overemphasized (Mukyanuzi et al., 1999).*

The experience of Benin shows how sensitive and context-specific any change in the *status quo* of fees can be. In the light of the conclusions of a study on school attendance among girls, the Ministry of Education announced the elimination of school fees for girls in rural areas for the 1993–1994 school year. But this measure met with mixed reaction. Some school district heads refused to apply it on the grounds that it meant loss of income for local decision-making bodies. Although a positive effect was expected in some regions with low-income population, doubts remained for the regions where girls were kept at home for cultural reasons (Debourou, 1996).

Bray (1988) observed several ‘layers’ of fees which parents have to pay: there may be an official fee payable to the government, but school committees impose fees determined in the light of advice from their
head teachers, the projects they wish to accomplish, government regulations, and the incomes of the people served by their schools. Agency fees (in religious schools) are set by broader bodies as a further additional fee.

Of course, the comparisons between the exact amounts of fees and other contributions requested by public and private schools are essential for decision-making by parents. Here again the differences between the types of private schools in sub-Saharan Africa matter and should be taken into account.

The most sophisticated cost-analysis in determining the volume and mechanisms of fees and their scale is done by owners/managers of private profit-making schools because, for them, it is the major if not the only direct source of funds. Profit-making private schools in urban areas will charge expensive tuition and user fees targeted at a narrow layer of better-off families. With this money, they will ensure adequate teaching/learning conditions and decently paid and motivated staff, which will naturally have a positive effect on pupils’ performance and achievements.

Profit-making schools in poor suburban areas are driven by the demand from the rapidly increasing urbanized population. They also charge fees but, subject to the lower income and purchasing power of the target group, these will be very low, designed mainly to pay teacher remuneration and rent of space, if any. In this case, despite the very fact of fees, the schooling conditions and quality of instruction will be at the lowest extreme.

Operation of spontaneous (‘bush’) schools in rural and nomadic areas of sub-Saharan countries, which are not supported by the government, is technically not very different from profit-making schools. The principal difference is that the target group consists of
non-wage-earner peasants who are accustomed to non-monetary exchanges. School headmaster and teachers in this case may not be paid at all, instead they will be provided with free board and lodging and other material contributions.

Clearly, the last two examples (i.e. profit-making schools in poor suburban areas and spontaneous schools) in the African context can be operated at lower total cost than any other type of private and even public school. Actual expenses engaged by low-income parents in this case can be less than the total amount of private expenditure by parents (uniform, transport, school meals, other ‘voluntary’ contributions and donations etc.) at a ‘free’ public school of good quality and location.

Community and religious schools in French-speaking African countries, supported by the government, often have formal limits for tuition fees set by the Ministries of Education. Whilst these are rarely controlled in practice by public authorities, or are not controlled at all (as in many English-speaking African countries), community and religious schools, supported by the government grant-in-aid, are normally obliged to charge various but reasonable fees corresponding to the expected income of their target groups of parents. But the regulations can be lax and, depending on the local context, these schools may also charge any amount of fees without guaranteeing proper standards. That was the case observed with community junior secondary schools in Botswana (Swartland and Taylor, 1988).

An interesting study was made in Botswana to look at the behaviour of parents who have children in secondary education and have a choice either to pay lower fees at public school or to pay higher fees (at least four times more) in private or foreign schools outside the country (Atta, 1996). This ‘quality-price’ differential apparently was not easy to solve and brought about intriguing results, i.e. the same family in Botswana may have children enrolled at all three categories of schools, in
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particular at junior secondary level which offers in Botswana more choice than senior secondary level.

Basically, three critical questions emerge from the above reasoning:

1. *What should be the degree of private education development if education becomes a quasi-market?*
2. *What state regulations should evolve in relation to the development and financing of private education (subventions, subsidies, tax-exemption)?*
3. *Should there be competition for public funding between public and private schools, for example through educational vouchers?*

Contemporary research provides the following possible responses to these questions:

**Education development and the degree of its privatization under conditions of an educational quasi-market**

Privatization of education development may be seen as a policy delegating certain administrative, managerial and funding responsibilities to religious authorities, communities and individuals for the provision of primary and secondary education in the regions and areas where the government has insufficient means to guarantee access to education for all the school-age population, or to provide adequate learning conditions.

More recently, with the decentralization processes expanding, privatization has been increasingly seen in different forms. From rigid private-authority ownership of educational institutions (as stated by Caillods, 1997), “an extreme form of decentralization takes place when authority is transferred to a private firm or an individual” – to ‘softer’
forms combining public authority with private management, institutional autonomy and mixed funding of schools.

Granting a fair amount of administrative and financial autonomy to individuals, institutions, privatizing the management of the schools while maintaining the support of public funds, entering into partnership with other education providers (churches and non-governmental organizations, enterprises, etc.) is increasingly the way a modernized state intervenes in education. Several experiences exist of central governments passing contracts with a region, with local authorities, with NGOs, with private providers, with enterprises, whereby the latter will deliver education or training to students or trainees according to given specifications, with partial or complete government financing. In some cases, the regional or local authorities themselves sub-contract to other units or institutions the responsibility of carrying out an educational or training activity. The state, thus, is no longer a direct operator of schools and training centres; it becomes a promoter, an animator and a regulator, fixing standards, distributing funds according to different criteria including performance, and promoting equality of opportunities and results (Caillods, 1997).

At the same time, even under severe funding constraints, any straightforward public policy towards the privatization of existing public schools is not considered an option due to complex implications for equity, and the position of the majority of households and teachers of public education in favour of the latter. Experience shows that any change in government regulations regarding private education, in particular subsidies to private schools, is an extremely delicate issue which causes an instant reaction from the most concerned groups, such as parents and teachers of public education.
The critique against the extreme position on privatization of public education in Africa has been strongly pronounced, for example, by M. Ndoye, Minister of State for basic education and languages, Senegal:

“The goal nowadays is to privatize everything, including education. State education is reckoned not to encompass all the potentialities of education and, above all, not to meet the needs of families in the fullest possible way. And since countries have difficulties in operating state education, it is concluded that the solution is to privatize education. The state is thus gradually stripped of its responsibilities for determining curricula and hence for educational goals. The effect of this is to impair the image and actual situation of state education. This trend is particularly dangerous for the advancement of African society...” (Ndoye, 1997).

The degree of privatization of education should be regulated by the state and public authorities, even in a decentralized context, depending on such variables as coverage, access, quality of instruction and learning conditions. The World Bank is cautious in this regard that its recommendations should not be interpreted as “a call to abolish or privatize public schools” (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995).

M. Bray (1996b, 1998) looks at the privatization of education as a scenario for process rather than a final result. To him this process may display a wide range of starting points and a wide array of models. In some systems, privatization of education may come as a result of deliberate policy, in others as a result of unplanned changes. He identifies four major models of privatization of education:

- Transfer of ownership of public schools.
  
  Deliberate transfer of ownership (and, by implication, control) of existing public schools to private owners is perhaps the most striking...
form of privatization. Such a move is especially radical when it involves a shift from not-for-profit to commercial operation, though this type of change is rare.

- Shifting sectoral balance without re-designating existing institutions. This form of privatization occurs through a more evolutionary shift in the balance of types of institutions. Thus, the number and size of government schools might be held constant, but the number and size of parallel private schools might be permitted or encouraged to increase. Alternatively, the number of government schools might expand, but that of private ones might expand more. Or the number of public schools might contract, but that of the private schools might not contract so much, might remain constant, or might expand.

- Increased government funding and support for private schools. Governments may strengthen the private schools by giving them financial and other support. Some governments are experimenting with systems of vouchers, in which families can choose to send children to private schools but meet some or all the costs from a financial allocation earmarked by the government.

- Increased private financing and /or control of government schools. In this form of privatization inside and within the public system of education, schools remain nominally under government ownership but the proportion of finance and /or control by non-government sources is increased. Governments in some countries have experienced severe fiscal crisis, and parents and communities have had to increase financial contributions to the schools. In other countries, it was for ideological and other reasons that public authorities requested school principals to be more responsive to the market.

Bray (ibid.) also suggests to review such expected outcomes of privatization policies as efficiency, accountability, diversity, access and equity. As implications for government policies, after a careful classification of existing schools, definition of terms, and identification
of goals (as preconditions), three specific strategies were identified: (i) privatization of existing public schools, (ii) encouragement of parallel private schools, and (iii) promotion of privatization within public schools.

Being formulated as a policy option to test public opinion, privatization *has never been put into practice as a consistent process* (i.e. a more specific issue of educational vouchers is reviewed below). An attempt was made by Colclough with Lewin (1993), who simulated a cost-saving model of regulated growth of private education which would remove a proportion of enrolments from the public system and release places for new students, thus shifting costs from the state to households. They assumed, for example, that an increase in enrolments in privately financed institutions from zero to 10 per cent at primary level, and from 5 to 15 per cent in secondary, technical and vocational schools, depending on the level of state subsidies to private education, would be sufficient to capture savings for the public funding. The principal outcome of this model was a set of implementation difficulties which immediately became evident, as the authors had to recognize the imminent equity risks, together with other dangers:

*The encouragement of private schools may thwart national redistributive policies and diminish equitable access, as in Tanzania. Depending on how it is implemented it could result in flight from the public school system by children of relatively wealthy parents, and possibly also by better teachers. If this were so on a large scale it would impoverish public schools. It would also prove regressive if significant public subsidy were to be given to selective, effectively private, elite schools, notwithstanding the capacity of their clientele to support them as has happened in Zimbabwe. It could exacerbate differences in provision of educational opportunity, based purely on the*
ability to pay, or on the accident of which community students were born into. (Colclough with Lewin, 1993)

Basically, their simulation showed that deliberate policies to fluctuate public expenditure in order to affect private contributions to education are doubtful, because of the fact that private demand for education is an independent variable which is difficult to estimate or predict. “There is no automatic link between the levels of publicly and privately incurred unit costs of schooling. Nevertheless, unless deliberately designed otherwise, policies to reduce public expenditure per pupil are likely to leave privately incurred unit costs either unchanged or higher than they were previously” (Colclough with Lewin, 1993).

The case of Tanzania is often mentioned in research literature because it is helpful to see the inconsistencies of educational nationalization/privatization as a policy and its inevitable consequences for equity and regional disparities.

As reviewed earlier, the government changed its policy from tolerating to nationalizing private primary schools in 1973 together with abolishing primary school fees under the pretext of equity at all schools. However, as described by Samoff (1994), to generate additional funding to accelerate universal primary education, a contribution per primary-school pupil (often called a voluntary ‘development levy’) was introduced in 1984. This was a beginning of reversing the policies that had been followed since the early sixties. Then on the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, secondary-school fees were also re-introduced. Other policy changes also shifted more of the direct expenditure for education from the public sector to students and their families. Previously discouraged but tolerated at the secondary level, establishing private schools began to be encouraged again
after 1986, a watershed year in that regard. To be clear, it is worth reminding that even after 1986 formal regulations and prevailing community sentiment actually continued to prohibit profit-making and individually-run private schools. Those allowed were private secondary schools owned and managed by approved voluntary parties, including church, community organizations and local governments. These private secondary schools are required to be formally registered and are permitted to charge fees at officially approved rates.

By the mid-1980s in Tanzania, private secondary schools outnumbered the public ones in terms of enrolment. Private secondary schools which numbered 84 in 1984, compared with 85 public schools, suddenly increased to 124 in 1986 and by 1990 there were 213 private schools, and 135 public secondary schools. Pupils in private schools who represented under 5 per cent of total secondary enrolment in 1965, accounted for more than half of all secondary pupils – 57 per cent – by 1990.

But, according to Samoff (1994), the privatization of education in Tanzania predictably exacerbated disparities: “it was the most affluent areas that took advantage of this privatization, thus increasing regional disparities. For example, by 1984 one-quarter of all the secondary schools and 42 per cent of all the private secondary schools in the country were in the Kilimanjaro region, whose population constituted only 5.3 per cent of the total mainland Tanzanian population.

Finally, Bray (1996b) observed that “much privatization occurs by default rather than as a deliberate strategy. Indeed, in some countries, privatization happens despite rather than because of government intentions. This is especially common where there is excess demand for secondary education, but may also occur where minorities exert
strong pressure for curricula with religious, cultural or other emphases”.

**State regulations for the financing of private education (subventions, subsidies, tax-exemption)**

The usual practice is that the state, considering education a ‘public good’, provides support in terms of subsidies, subventions and tax-exemption to private schools in return for a certain degree of regulation and control over their curricula, teaching and learning conditions. In other words, the degree of government regulation over private schools is linked to the extent to which these are funded by the state.

*While the roles and responsibilities of each level vary, and vary at times quite dramatically among countries, the central or regional levels often attempt to reserve to themselves dominance over policy, broadly defined, and through policy, over standards and practice. Theoretically, at least, this is achieved by a combination of financial incentives and regulations or mandates. The actual level of central or regional funding, of course, may vary from full state funding to multi-level funding partnerships but one thing is for certain: ‘authority does tend to gravitate toward the source of financing – paying the piper does appear to give one at least the right to suggest the tune’. In short, governmental willingness to financially support schooling is closely related to its de facto if not de jure right to guide educational development. (Kemmerer, 1997)*

For example, in France in 1959 the Debré Act solved the dilemma posed by the separation of church and state by sub-contracting secular instruction to private schools and offering them four options:
1. They could maintain the status quo, refusing aid and remaining unregulated.
2. Some or all of their teachers of ‘secular’ courses could sign simple contracts with the government. The government would pay their salaries, and the teachers and the school would be moderately regulated.
3. Some or all of their teachers of ‘secular’ courses could sign contracts of association with the government. The government would pay not only the teachers’ salaries but school operating expenses as well; in return the school would be heavily regulated.
4. Private schools could choose to enter the public school system. (Fowler, 1992)

In most developed countries, non-profit-making private schools (mainly, community and religious) are heavily subsidized (up to 80 per cent of recurrent expenditure). It is normal in many regions of the world that teachers in these private schools are paid by the state (like France in Europe, Chile in Latin America, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Chad, Togo and most French-speaking countries in Africa). In these cases in theory state regulation and involvement in funding and management are strong (although in practice this may be reduced, ‘frozen’ or stopped altogether). For example, in Senegal under the contract between Catholic schools and the government, the latter should pay 80 per cent of teacher salaries; in Côte-d’Ivoire, 60-70 per cent of teacher salaries at these schools (Kone, 1996).

A wide variety of countries provides indirect incentives through tax breaks or partial subsidies (less than 25 per cent of costs) to private schools, such as Japan, the USA, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Kenya and several Latin-American countries. In these cases the governments exercise only a moderate degree of control over management of private schools.
However, given the trends towards decentralization, there is room for updating these regulations.

“Government control over private education ranges from outright prohibition in a few countries to, in most countries, regulations that cover such things as the level of fees, the qualifications of teachers, and the content of curricula. It is argued, on the one hand, that such regulations are necessary to protect families from unwittingly choosing an inferior private alternative to public schools and, on the other hand, that they are needed to prevent the development of a high-priced educational alternative of superior quality that only the rich can afford.” (World Bank, 1988)

State regulations for private education can be reviewed to elevate over-restrictive measures, including outright prohibition in some cases (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995). Obviously, a differentiated approach is necessary to better classify different private schools which should benefit from government subsidies and tax-exemption, for example, community schools; while progressive taxation and other charges may be expected in case of profit-making elite schools.

Some countries (Cameroon, Madagascar, Senegal, Zaire etc.) face financial constraints in providing or continuing support for religious private schools; others are in such a precarious situation that any subsidies to private education are out of the question (Zambia). The fact whether the church is local or Western does not change the declining trend in government funding: “since local churches there (in Cameroon) have taken over schools previously funded by Northern church organizations, they too are often short of money, and the economic crisis has made it increasingly difficult to maintain schools” (Graham-Brown, 1991). Selected country experiences are given in Documentary Appendix II.
Private education in sub-Saharan Africa

**Practical competition for educational funding: educational vouchers**

Educational vouchers have not yet been put into practice in sub-Saharan Africa. But the ongoing debate on them in the developed countries, especially in the USA, may soon bring this issue on to the agenda of African governments, through the education development projects with Western donors.

The conceptual basis for educational vouchers, which permit students to go to either public or private school, is that competition for students (and the associated resources for their education) could force schools to be more responsive to student achievement and more efficient.

*The concept of an education system in which at least some of the payment would be made directly from the parent to the school was proposed as early as 1776 by Adam Smith in The wealth of nations. The argument by Smith was that if the state paid all the costs, the teacher “would soon learn to neglect his business. (Smith, 1937)*

*Articulated by M. Friedman (1955), the voucher schemes are based on the premise that the combination of the public financing of schooling and public governance of schooling destroys incentives for efficiency while doing little to promote equity. Under a voucher scheme, schools would be regulated by government but operated by private individuals/firms. Students would carry vouchers (to be redeemed by the state) to the school of their choice, thus creating a substantial student/parent interest in school effectiveness. Since families could ‘vote with their feet’, schools would be subjected to a market-like discipline. While the voucher approach remains debated in the USA, it has never been fully tested, both because of the fear it would not*
meet the church/state separation requirements, and because of entrenched resistance from public school advocates (Kemmerer, 1997).

The voucher approach treats schools as enterprises which should compete for the share of the educational market and affect consumer choice by offering better and more cost-efficient services. As suggested by M. Friedman (1962),

“Denationalizing schooling would widen the range of choice available to parents. If present public expenditures on schooling were made available to parents regardless of where they send their children, a wide variety of schools would spring up to meet the demand. Parents could express their views about schools directly by withdrawing their children from one school and sending them to another. As in other fields, competitive enterprises are likely to be far more efficient in meeting consumer demand than either nationalized enterprises or enterprises run to serve other purposes”.

In spite of much debate, there were only few attempts in the USA and Australia to introduce these schemes, with questionable results. As stated by Cohn (1997), “although numerous voucher plans have been proposed in the United States, most proposals did not manage to win legislative support, and those that were implemented fell short of a comprehensive voucher plan that allows children to choose either public or private schools”.

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8. COMPARATIVE COST-EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS

The principal argument in favour of private education development and finance is often its cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The eternal debate on what type of education – public or private – is better in this contest is continuing because any clear-cut direct conclusion would mean serious implications for policy and funding. This chapter presents results of numerous studies with contradictory outcomes and shows the methodological deficiency of comparisons in this extremely context-specific debate. It is not easy to relate cost-efficiency directly with performance, or to compare really ‘comparable’ types of schools in a statistically representative survey in a developing country. The key to meaningful comparisons may be in analysis of teacher status and remuneration as it often absorbs, in the African context, more than 90 per cent of total recurrent costs.

There is an eternal debate whether private schools are more cost-efficient and cost-effective than public ones. Many studies on different regions and countries present, as a rule, conflicting conclusions on this matter, with arguments of biased approaches and inaccurate comparisons (for example, Carnoy, 1997 vs. West, 1997; or Burnett and Patrinos, 1996 vs. Samoff, 1996; Hanushek, 1995 vs. Kremer, 1995).

When public schools provide for better quality and achievements than private ones, this is explained by discriminative treatment and insufficient government subsidies at the latter. When private schools outperform public ones, it is explained by greater school-level decision-making and less bureaucracy at the former (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995).

When the efficiency of private schools is debated in relation to public schools, problems of measurement and interpretation arise. Are private schools more efficient because they may spend less per pupil than comparable public schools? Is the fact that they may spend less with more favourable outcomes the critical fact? Critics of such comparisons charge that private schools have
many hidden input costs and that their student bodies are less difficult to educate than those in public schools.

Advocates for private schools make their claims both on grounds of technical and allocative efficiency. Private schools demonstrate technical efficiency when they can demonstrate better cost/benefit ratios than the public schools. To the extent that a different mix of public and private schools would reduce total societal costs for elementary and secondary education, changing the financing and governance arrangements would prove allocatively efficient for the nation as a whole (Boyd and Cibulka, 1989).

The World Bank experts typically tend to conclude that private schools have ‘a small edge’ or are ‘slightly more’ cost-effective than public schools (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995; Winkler and Rounds, 1996).

The opposite view is also well documented. “Equity and efficiency losses are, in practice, endemic to the introduction of compulsory fees – particularly when such reforms are applied to primary and secondary schooling/care. Although privately financed schooling and health services can broaden the range of services available, and need not imply greater inequity of provision, the evidence that is often claimed to demonstrate an efficiency advantage in favour of private provision is shown, on close examination, to be inconclusive for both sectors” (Colclough, 1997).

An obvious inaccuracy of the above comparisons lies in methodology which compares and generalizes ‘all’ or ‘many’ public schools in one group to compare them with ‘all’ or ‘many’ private schools which may possess different features and characteristics. This inaccuracy is further exaggerated by cross-country or cross-regional
comparisons and by lack or only hypothetical knowledge of private education costs.

“Even in published studies of comparative education costs, the cost data employed can be quite crude: for example, they are not disaggregated into costs for different types of government schools and private schools. This deficiency can lead to misleading results about the relative costs of government schools and private schools. Moreover, previous studies of educational costs tend to report institutional expenditures only, without also considering private resources to education; they thus underestimate the total social resources devoted to schooling. Finally, no published cost studies exist which compare the cost of government schools and private schools over time. Cost data over time can reflect changes in internal resources utilization and/or conditions external to schools. When costs fluctuate significantly over time, cost comparison based on data for a given year can be misleading” (Tsang and Taoklam, op.cit.).

The difference also has to be made between different types of private schools.

“There are different types of government schools and different types of private schools. Not only can costs differ significantly between government schools and private schools, they can also differ significantly among government schools, and among private schools. Variations in costs imply variations in cost-effectiveness, cost requirements, and financial feasibility. Treating government schools and private schools as homogeneous systems will miss the large variation in costs among different types of government schools and among private schools; and cost estimates of the two systems are not useful for evaluating the financial impacts of alternative policy options
on different types of schools. Analysis of costs (as well as outcomes) should take account of different types of government and private schools and should use disaggregated cost data.” (Tsang and Taoklam, op.cit.)

Low-quality private schools – especially, unregistered spontaneous schools – cannot be compared with religious and community private schools, heavily subsidized by the government. “Lower costs are particularly found in developing countries, where subsidies are limited. Indeed, these lower costs are a major factor enabling them to survive and constitute a possible rationale for the government to delegate production responsibilities to private educational organizations. Should the lower cost incurred by private institutions be interpreted as evidence of lower quality or higher efficiency as compared with public institutions? This is one of the questions we would most like answered and it is most difficult to ascertain” (James, 1989).

The former interpretation assumes that efficiency is the same in the two sectors, so lower valued inputs must mean less value added. If public schools have a higher cost per student they are assumed to have a higher net output. The latter interpretation assumes that value added by the two sectors is the same (for example, the same course credits and degrees are issued), so lower costs imply greater efficiency in processing inputs, usually ascribed to more skilful management and better incentives in the private system. A definitive examination of this question requires an accurate measure of value added, a task which is greatly complicated by differences among schools in their student inputs as well as ambiguities concerning the appropriate measure of output (James, ibid.).

At secondary level, where the comparisons are made most frequently, especially in English-speaking sub-Saharan countries, the
confusion in comparisons is caused by taking boarding public schools, on the one hand, and low-cost day-time community-based schools, on the other hand. By some estimates on Ugandan secondary public boarding schools, expenses related to accommodation and board, including school meals, may account for up to 90 per cent of total recurrent expenditure (ADEA, 1998).

The problem is complicated by the fact that efficiency (or managerial) function of school cannot be easily separated from funding function, i.e. how to interpret the effects of public funding on private schools, and, on the contrary, the effects of private funding on public schools?

Some research studies suggest that schools that rely heavily on parental or other private sources of finance are more likely to operate efficiently (Jimenez and Paqueo, 1996). It was also found that private funding of education enhances efficiency in both public and private schools. However, this relationship is non-linear. Cost per student decreases as the private share of funding increases, but at a diminishing rate. Given this non-linearity, public schools gain more than private schools from an increase in private funding, because this share is smaller than in private schools (James et al., 1996).

Bashir (1997) found on the State of Tamil Nadu in India, taking into account various categories of costs (including private) in urban as well as rural settings, that government-aided schools are “unambiguously more cost-effective than public schools because costs are lower while predicted achievement is either higher than or the same as in public schools. For unaided schools, modest gains in achievement are linked with substantial cost increases of about 45 per cent”. Bashir (ibid.) made a qualification that “had institutional costs alone been used as the basis of comparisons in this study, private unaided schools might have been considered more cost-effective”.

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The ambiguity and indecisiveness of these studies can be explained by the sensitivity of the subject. Any definite conclusion would imply important policy decisions that may change the existing balance between funding of public schools and subsidies for private schools, and may affect such issues as degree of control by the central government and decentralization, introduction of school vouchers, tuition fees, taxation, accreditation and equivalence of diplomas etc.

A more recent debate has centred on the methodology of making valid comparisons of public and private-sector performance using quantitative indicators of educational inputs and outcomes. Bashir (1997) reviews three main methodological issues of research on the public/private differential:

- The first revolves around the appropriate definition and measurement of school outputs. Schools produce multiple outcomes in both the cognitive and non-cognitive domains. The real concern in making school comparisons is not about pupil performance at school but about future performance in the labour market (e.g. external efficiency and rates of return to education).
- The second set of methodological issues arises from the fact that comparisons of public and private schools in non-experimental settings (that is when pupils cannot be randomly assigned to schools within sectors) necessitate effective statistical controls over the intake characteristics of pupils and other factors that may affect pupil outcomes but cannot be attributed to the policies of the schools themselves.

*Randomized experiments would assist in making stronger causal inferences, but even in such cases, it may not be possible to control for all factors experimentally. Since randomized experiments can play only a limited role in educational settings, the main conceptual and methodological question is how to characterize the private-sector effect when data are collected.*
from schools as they exist, and to elaborate on the inferences that can be made about observed relationships. Although there is a broad consensus that pupil background factors, including variables related to home environment, individual motivation, and community characteristics, should be ‘controlled', there is little agreement on the precise delineation of these variables and how they should be measured. Without an explicit model of how learning outcomes are produced, a great deal of caution must be exercised in making causal inferences from observed behavioural relationships in non-experimental settings.

• The third set of methodological questions relates to the appropriate statistical method for estimating sector effects which is also linked to the more fundamental issue of how school effects are conceptualized.

Initial studies on school effects used single-level regression models, where pupil and school variables are regressed on a measure of achievement and the coefficients of these variables are estimated using ordinary least squares. One line of criticism stressed the pitfalls of using this technique specifically in the context of public/private comparisons because of bias resulting from self-selection. The estimates of the private-school effect will be biased if there are other excluded variables that are related to both achievement and attendance in private schools.

A more fundamental criticism is linked to the very conceptualization of school effects underlying the use of ordinary least squares and its basic assumption that pupil factors and educational inputs exert the same effect on pupil outcomes irrespective of the particular school that the pupil attends. But the literature on school effects showed that individual schools do have a powerful effect on pupil performance.
The unmeasured component of the ‘school effect’ need not arise only from factors depending on school organization. Intra-school correlation in residuals can also arise because of the way in which pupils choose the school. In a rural African setting, for example, the catchment area of a village school will typically comprise people who are relatively homogeneous in such characteristics as social, ethnic and educational background. The variation in these characteristics will tend to be more pronounced between villages and within villages.

Finally, the proportion of the total variation in test scores which is due to variation between schools and that which is due to variation between pupils within schools should be taken into account. The variation in scores is the only component that can be explained by school-level factors. Where the proportion of between-school variation is small, the model will typically explain a relatively small part of the total variation, although it may explain a large proportion of the variation that can be explained by various school-level factors (Bashir, 1997).

While, obviously, the question can only be considered subject to the contextual and other education system characteristics, the most recent research findings are extra careful in their assessments and make a cautious general observation that privately managed schools have a slight edge over public schools with respect to value added and even more with respect to efficiency, but the relative efficiency of public vs. private funding in producing educational outputs is not clear a priori (James et al., 1996).

The following arguments are most frequently used in favour of cost-effectiveness of private education:
• *first*, private education would reduce the pressures on governmental budgets and help thereby to attain and maintain fiscal balance;

• *second*, private schools *a priori* would seem more efficient because administrators and teachers in them would seem to need to be more responsive to the students and their parents and to input cost (Behrman, 1996).

Additionally, private schools are claimed to be more accountable for their funds because the principal of a private school is face-to-face with the providers of money, unlike public schools where reporting, auditing, ‘ghost-teacher hunting’ and other necessary procedures require lengthy paperwork even in a decentralized context.

A case for review is when private schools are subsidized by governments and other public authorities (cf. registered community and religious schools).

The subsidized provider is not necessarily less efficient than one that is not subsidized. It is the disposition of the proceeds that is important in determining efficiency. A sector that does not provide incentives for its owners and managers to minimize costs will be less efficient than another that does. A private system has such incentives imbedded in its structure because the returns flow to the owners, who can keep or sell their investment. A public system may not have such incentives since the owners and managers (cf. public authorities) cannot capitalize on any of the gains. Thus, subsidies to a private school system may still result in cost-minimization if the incentives are built, and not necessarily in terms of profit-making (Jimenez, 1987).

Still, for any meaningful and fair comparison, it is not enough to possess data on enrolment and number of teachers for both categories,
it is necessary to achieve an adequate degree of accuracy in this comparative analysis, i.e. to compare comparable institutions and working/learning conditions. Modern research is very careful in qualifying which is the superior category of education because it is difficult to relate cost-efficiency directly with performance. Better cost-efficiency of one category of school over another may be explained by reasons other than just its public or private nature, for example, higher qualifications of teachers and parents' background.

The most important characteristics of such a comparison should be status of teachers (whether they are civil servants or not, terms and conditions of their recruitment and service), teacher wages and salaries and various other allowances, benefits and ‘hidden’ subsidies (free housing, meals, transportation etc.) that they receive in addition to their official income, and how these factors are related to their qualifications and performance.

A study made by Jimenez and Cox (1989) on comparisons between secondary public and private schools in Tanzania showed that school and teacher characteristics are powerful determinants of student performance. “Private school advantage is highest among schools that have more highly-paid teachers. Higher teacher's salary clearly improves student performance in Tanzanian private schools”.

The above-mentioned studies by the World Bank were criticized by Bashir (1997) for the fact that they pertained to institutional costs only. No estimate was made of direct private expenditure on books, supplies, uniforms and transportation, or of the indirect costs associated with schooling (e.g. opportunity costs of students’ time). At the secondary level, on which the above studies were focused, private costs are likely to be substantial and, in particular, opportunity costs are likely to be the biggest component of non-fee costs. Direct private costs tend to be relatively high in private schools, while indirect costs can also be
considerable if the private schools cater for poor students who face opportunity costs. Conclusions regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of private schools can be radically altered from the standpoint of families or society, if higher total private costs in these schools outweigh the effect of lower institutional costs (Bashir, 1997).

Any comparative savings and economies in unit cost per pupil in case of private education for provision of instruction comparable with public education may logically take place only due to differences in working conditions of teachers and/or learning conditions of pupils. In a number of education systems, such as France in Europe, or Zimbabwe in sub-Saharan Africa, teachers of registered private education are paid from the funds of public education authorities.

Finally, Bray (1998) reviews an argument that the existence of private schools helps to improve the efficiency of public institutions, by concluding that “such an outcome is far from generalizable or certain”.

Much depends on whether private and public schools really do compete, and on the ways in which managers of public schools respond to such competition. In most settings, private and public schools serve different markets. Elite private schools do not compete even with ordinary public schools, because most people cannot afford the fees; alternative-curriculum private schools do not compete with mainstream-curriculum public schools, because most people do not want the alternative curriculum; and second-chance private schools do not compete with the public sector, because the students in those private schools would rather be in public ones (Bray, 1998).

In this sense, the dynamics of unit cost evolution over a number of years at private and public schools are more important than a still
‘photograph’ of the situation usually picked by the majority of available studies. In their recent comprehensive study on costs of education in Benin, Peano and Oulai (1999b) observed that, having started from the very different initial amount, unit costs of both public and private education at primary level increased at a comparable rate between 1993 and 1996. For example, unit cost for public primary education increased from 16,656 CFA francs in 1993 to 24,541 CFA francs in 1996 (or 47 per cent of increase), while at private primary schools it grew from 25,796 CFA francs to 37,222 CFA francs (or 44 per cent of increase).

At secondary level during the same time interval, the difference was more pronounced: it was respectively only 8 per cent growth for public schools and 47 per cent growth for private schools. Clearly related, on the one hand, to supply of education and, on the other hand, to the income and purchasing power of households, these issues are reviewed with more focus on sub-Saharan countries in Chapter 10.
9. SCHOOL CHOICE AND PARENTS’ ATTITUDES

School choice is a normal requirement for private education existence, development and finance. But the absence of choice is also possible and it makes a given school – be it public or private – ‘a natural monopoly’. This situation is very common for many rural and suburban areas in sub-Saharan Africa, when the absence of any school in the neighbourhood caused the setting up of either spontaneous or low-cost profit-making educational institutions. When school choice exists, it becomes a matter of parents’ choice based on ‘value for money’ reasoning (in the case of fees and other contributions required), and various combinations of supply factors (proximity, school conditions, quality of instruction etc.) and demand factors (income and status of parents, expected benefits of schooling in the future etc.). Recent research is in favour of regulation of school choice to avoid direct unhealthy competition between schools and to make them complementary, subject to supply/demand characteristics.

Apart from cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness, another critical issue related to private education is equity, the degree of which is shown by an ability to have a school choice and by parents’ attitudes to it. This chapter would ideally require a technical annex to examine the problem of choice and household behaviour through econometric means.

The nature of private versus public education – competitive or complementary – largely depends on issues which cannot be measured only in quantitative terms (such as rates of return to education) due to numerous inputs and decisive factors whose weight is hard to estimate (power of family traditions, religious affiliation, ethnic links etc.).

Very often, there is no choice of school for children, especially in rural and remote areas or densely populated suburban areas in developing countries. Under these circumstances, they will probably attend the school which is the nearest and the most affordable. The absence of choice in this respect will mean the absence of competition between public and private education. The available schools may be of
any type (public, private, community or spontaneous) corresponding to the characteristics of the neighbourhood.

This situation occurs often in rural areas inhabited by a low-income population, for example in Chad, and explains the development of spontaneous schools (Esquieu and Peano, 1994). The total costs, especially the overall unit cost, for such ‘natural monopoly’ schools may be quite high compared to similar schools in other settings. The available research shows that in this case the ‘quality-price’ differential may be distorted in the same way as in the ‘one public school per area’ monopoly, because “the private school may be the only school available in a poor area, offering relatively expansive education of poor quality” (Mehrotra, 1998).

When the choice exists, in particular in urban areas, the likelihood of attending either the public or private-sector school is positively correlated with various measures of school quality. According to the theory of rates of return to education, parents will choose the school which guarantees higher private rates of return in relation to expenses borne by them, in other words, the one with a better ‘quality-price’ ratio. Parents are found to be sensitive to the social characteristics of teaching-force and enrolment. Not surprisingly, school tuition and other types of family expenditure are also found statistically significant, especially for profit-making private schools.

Gintis (1996) summarizes several preconditions for the existence of an effective system of school choice:

- First, competition is effective only if there are several alternative suppliers available to a significant proportion of families;
- Second, competition is effective only if consumers can accurately assess the quality of the goods and services they purchase;
• Third, competition is effective only if consumers are the best judge of their needs and these needs are reflected in their preferences and choices.

“Many educators doubt that parents possess the required expertise, and are unhappy at the prospect of schools being run by profit-making institutions, of educational entrepreneurs plying an uncritical and indifferent public with ‘get educated quick’ schemes, and offering modish blandishments incompatible with educational excellence” (Gintis, ibid.).

• Fourth, a competitive system is socially efficient only if the good or service involved is a ‘private good’, the positive and negative effects of which fall exclusively on the consumers. If there are positive external effects of consuming a good, private markets will systematically undersupply the good, and if there are negative external effects, private markets will systematically oversupply the good. In the case of education, there are several plausible external effects of a student’s consumption of educational services.

This reasoning brings Gintis (op. cit.) to favour state regulation of a system of school choice to foster competition between schools. Such regulation seems essential because of the apparent conflict between different interest groups involved in the public school versus private school debate, such as teachers’ unions and parents.

“It is well known that teachers’ unions are virtually unanimous in opposing school choice. How might a private educational delivery system injure teachers? Teachers’ unions are likely to be harmed, since the per-member costs of union organization decline as the size of the bargaining unit increases. Under school choice, the average size of private educational providers may
well be smaller than currently. Thus, unless labour legislation is initiated, for instance obliging accredited schools to form regional associations for the purpose of bargaining with teachers, the current union structure would likely decline.

Furthermore, in a competitive system, teachers may be obliged to work longer hours, and their job security would certainly be compromised. It is unclear whether wages would rise or fall. Many consider a move towards school choice that excessively weakens the status of teachers to be unfair. To prevent this, a set of ‘teachers’ rights’ could be implemented as part of a comprehensive school choice system capable of adjudicating between the needs of teachers and the consumers of education” (Gintis, op.cit.).

There are numerous studies, both in developed and developing countries, which show that income and level of education of parents turn out to be significant determinants of education spending propensity (Behrman, 1996; Kanellopoulos and Psacharopoulos, 1997). The World Bank experts equally confirm that private schools “tend to draw their students from more advantaged socio-economic backgrounds” but, in their view it is balanced by the fact that “they promote diversity and provide useful competition for public institutions” (Burnett et al., 1995). “One of the arguments against privatization is that the rich and middle classes would vote for low-cost, low-quality schools, thereby saving on taxes, and would send their own children to high-quality private schools. We would therefore get a segmentation of education along class lines and perpetuation of class differentials” (James, 1997).

Another critical issue is to see how school quality, tuition and other characteristics are linked with a student and his/her family background
variables, such as demography (number of children per family), income, urban/rural and local specifics.

“Why do the private schools apparently perform better? The evidence is quite limited, but estimates indicate that important factors include better access to textbooks and recruiting teachers with lower formal qualifications, giving them more in-service training, and promoting better teaching practices regarding homework, testing and order in the classroom. However, such observed school characteristics account for only part of the difference. An important policy implication may be to mimic the incentive structures of the private schools, including decentralization and the introduction of mechanisms (such as the vouchers in Chile and the community oversight in Pakistan) that encourage schools to be more responsive to the needs of students and parents.

There are a number of methodological questions concerning existing studies of school production relations. First, most existing studies are not sensitive to making inferences from behavioural data in the presence of unobserved variables. The private-public comparison summarized above, for example, attempts to control for the schooling choice by using family background characteristics such as household head’s income, mother’s schooling, and father’s occupation for the private-public choice. But this controls completely for the choice only if all relevant family background characteristics are perfectly correlated with these characteristics, which probably is a strong assumption. Therefore, if ability and motivation affect both the public-private schooling choice and success in schools, the estimates of the effectiveness of the two types of schools are likely to be biased.” (Behrman, 1996).
For the purpose of cross-regional comparisons, it is interesting to observe that in-depth research on public, private (subsidized) and private (profit-making) schools made by the World Bank in Chile concluded that: (1) characteristics of public and subsidized private schools appear to be more alike than those of subsidized private and private profit-making ones; (2) household income, education and socio-economic status are all higher in private than public schools; and (3) school peers in private schools are of higher socio-economic status and higher educational achievement levels than peers in public schools (Winkler and Rounds, 1996).

As regards learning achievements, the results of a recent study on the USA “do not show private schools to outperform public schools, but do show sectoral achievement differentials affect choice of school sector” (Goldhaber, 1996). The relative homogeneity of educational supply – be it public or private – with no great gap between the two, are critical for guaranteeing an adequate degree of equity in access to all. The comparison of situations of school choice in the USA and France, made by Fowler (1992), referred to homogeneity/heterogeneity of educational supply:

“In the United States, private schools are perceived as superior to public ones, and public schools vary greatly in their resources, offerings, and academic quality. Teachers, public and private are paid on very different salary scales. In such an environment it is all too likely that even carefully regulated choice plans will lead to increasing elitism and social stratification. The reason is clear. When given a choice between obviously unequal schools, parents who have the resources to do so will select the ‘better’ schools for their children. But some parents lack the resources to choose; hence their children will remain in ‘inferior’ schools. In contrast, French parents are offered choices between schools
that are relatively equal. Therefore, increased stratification on the basis of social class has not occurred.”
10. FROM THEORIES TO PRESENT AFRICAN REALITIES

How were theories and concepts of private education development confronted with African realities and how did they take into account the specifics of sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of the population has low incomes and lives in poor rural and suburban areas? This chapter reviews experiences of African countries in implementation of education reforms and privatization at system level, and then devotes particular attention to the purchasing power of households which is essential for real demand for private education. The compensatory role of community and related types of education: community-based, spontaneous and low-cost profit making are analyzed in detail with a number of examples.

The economic theories and concepts reviewed above originated from developed countries where the systems of taxation and allocation of public funds are functioning, albeit with known constraints and limitations. The intention of the IMF, the World Bank and other donor agencies was to apply these theories and concepts in sub-Saharan Africa where the underlying and prevailing conditions are very much different. The intention of many independent African governments was to preserve or copy – in adapted ‘africanized’ version – Western educational models and their modes of financing, including private contributions to education and private education development. That meant that their adjustment and adaptation to the African realities, as well as the whole issue of their transferability and applicability to the African context, became critical.

Former metropolitan countries certainly influenced education development in sub-Saharan Africa, which was seen by the division of the continent into English-speaking, French-speaking, and Portuguese-speaking countries and the presence of respective educational models. More recently multilateral and bilateral donor agencies from other developed countries (the USA, Germany, Nordic countries, Japan, Canada, etc.) brought their own agendas to sub-Saharan countries through consultants and donor-driven projects.
This trend for ‘copying’ became particularly obvious in the 1980s and 1990s after the collapse of authentic African models based on self-reliance (cf. Tanzania, Zambia etc.) and as a consequence of structural adjustment programmes ‘recommended’ by the IMF, the World Bank and other foreign donors. The ‘conditionality’ attached to their loans squeezed public-sector funding and employment and indirectly contributed to the massive spread of spontaneous and low-cost profit-making schools in the 1990s, discussed in more detail below.

The historical record, reviewed above, and the diagnosis of current economic and educational policies and trends can be useful tools for an in-depth analysis of differences in the sub-Saharan situations between countries and groups of countries with specific regard to private education development and finance. The historical retrospective presented in Chapter 2 covered mostly the initial post-independence period. A broad categorization of subsequent educational reforms in Africa, made by Obanya (1998), differentiates between four approaches: radical-revolutionary; realistic revolutionary; ad hoc; and evolutionary.

According to Obanya (ibid.), the group of ‘radical-revolutionary’ approaches was used by such countries as Tanzania, Benin, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. The common feature was that “all these sought a complete break with the past”, which we earlier saw inter alia from the examples of nationalization of private schools in many of these countries.

The greatest proportion of African countries seemed to have attempted a ‘realistic-revolutionary’ approach to educational reform. This involved moderating the revolutionary zeal to break with the past and evolving genuinely national education systems, without forgetting the need to be cautious and to show greater awareness of the realities and constraints of the societies concerned. This group included such countries as Nigeria, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone,
From theories to present African realities

Gambia and, later, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The latter two, which achieved independence much later than other African countries, benefited from immense previous experience and lessons drawn from their neighbours. “Every specific aspect of educational reform was subjected to systematic study and analysis, choices were made from a variety of possible options” (Obanya, *ibid*).

The ‘ad hoc’ approaches were the type of educational reforms that “tended to address just one issue at a time, without an organic link with related problems, and often without carrying all possible stakeholders along with the reform process”. Depending on the time interval, these approaches concerned various countries in Africa, including those mentioned above (Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Uganda, Senegal, Cameroon etc.). They took place when new education policies were announced or decreed to the population, often without due study, analysis or consultation, i.e. changes in timing of school year, in length of school cycle, in language as medium of instruction etc. Controversial polices on the introduction or elimination of tuition fees may also come under this approach. “In all these projects very little account was taken of people’s expectations of an education system, the condition of technical infrastructures and the extremely poor state of Africa’s rural areas” (Obanya, *ibid*.). With this approach, in many cases the reforms were not all-embracing. This led to certain reforms creating further problems rather than serving the purpose.

Finally, there were approaches, notably in French-speaking African countries, that, while acknowledging the inappropriateness of the ‘inherited colonial education system’, did not seek to engineer change in any radical and systematic manner. Instead, reforms have been allowed to take a sort of natural course. “The habit of waiting for educational changes in the ‘former colonial power’ to dictate reforms in Africa still has its strong adherents” (Obanya, *ibid*).
From this cross-country analysis and classification, Obanya (ibid.) made a relevant observation: “a great deal was achieved but even more was not achieved, while some of the most pressing questions relating to educational reform were not even addressed”. The prevalent model of reform implementation was ‘trickling down’. “This meant that popular participation was rarely encouraged and explains in part the huge gap that existed between reform ideas and their implementation”.

Privatization as a government policy in Africa: system level

As mentioned before, the initial post-independence policies of African governments in the 1960s and 1970s stressed the strong government role in all economic and social sectors. The 1980s and 1990s showed inefficiency of government bureaucracy in African countries and caused a number of reforms and experiments aimed at reversal towards privatization – defined here as full or partial transfer of either ownership rights or management control to the private sector – with a view to streamlining the government expenditure where possible. Privatization became one of the central elements of so-called structural adjustment programmes implemented in African countries by the IMF, the World Bank and related agencies during this period.

The historical retrospective at the beginning of this paper presented the ‘natural’ evolution of different types of private education in Africa at the institutional and grass-root levels, although sometimes distorted by the government interventions implemented for political reasons. Another more up-to-date scenario for the coming years is that African governments would be forced to introduce a certain ‘top-down’ policy regarding private-sector development in education, re-examining the dual paradigm between the state and market forces within the package of adjustment and cost-sharing reforms ‘recommended’ by the IMF and the World Bank. Development of private education is a policy issue
which strongly depends on the political and economic environment in Africa as a continent, and individual countries in particular.

For the purpose of this paper, the experience with the overall government policies of privatization in Africa may provide some useful insights for the potential policies of privatization of education, if it should occur. If privatization of education ever appears on the development agenda of the African countries, it is logical to look closer at the past and present experience of the government policies aimed at overall economic privatization and to anticipate similar constraints and obstacles. With this in view:

- the main conclusion of research that has been undertaken to date is that the progress in implementation of economic privatization of state-owned enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa has been very limited;
- there is a generally much higher level of privatization activity than indicated by existing data sources;
- there is a very considerable range of country experiences with privatization;
- there is a marked increase in the number and overall value of privatization transactions since the early 1990s;
- while serious economic and political constraints continue to hamper the implementation of privatization programmes in Africa, there is a strong likelihood that the intensity of the privatization efforts will continue to accelerate in the future (Bennell, 1997).

According to Bennell (idem), three groups of countries can be delineated: (i) major privatizers (most notably Benin, Guinea, and Mali) where the majority of public enterprises have been divested to the private sector; (ii) modest privatizers where typically less than 10 per cent of the total value of public assets has been divested (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo in West Africa, and Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and...
Zambia in East and Central Africa); and (iii) minimal and non-privatizers, totalling some 25 other African countries.

Bennell (idem) also categorized the sub-Saharan African countries according to when their privatization programmes effectively began. Five Francophone West African countries (Benin, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo) were the first group to start such programmes from the late seventies up to the mid-eighties. In the case of the path breaker, Senegal, however, this early start did not materialize in any significant progress being made. In fact, there were more state-owned enterprises in Senegal in the late eighties than there had been a decade earlier.

A second, larger group of countries did not formally embark on privatization programmes until the late eighties (Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Uganda). Most of these programmes were largely the outcome of pressure from the World Bank and the IMF. But with the exception of Nigeria and possibly Mali, no substantial progress was made in any of these countries until at least the early nineties when some governments began to undertake the delayed public sector reforms. Another group of ‘late starters’ did not formally start privatization programmes until well into the nineties. Three of these countries, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and Zambia, have shown fairly strong political commitment to privatization whereas in the other three, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, only minimal action had been made by late 1995.

Despite the quite impressive increase in the privatization process in recent years, advances as measured against the privatization programme country targets have been qualified as poor in most countries. In part this is explained by the typically three-four year delay before privatization programmes have begun to be
seriously implemented. Moreover, in other countries (cf. Cameroon, Tanzania), political commitment remained consistently weak throughout this time period. In some other countries (cf. Nigeria, Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi), the privatization programmes started reasonably well but then stalled. As in the case of Madagascar, the privatization programme was suspended due to serious mismanagement and its unpopularity with local population. Deferred privatizations have been particularly common in Ghana and Zambia mainly in order to encourage greater involvement of indigenous (i.e. African) population. A fairly limited privatization process in Kenya was criticized for its inherent lack of transparency, and widespread concerns about corruption.

If the past privatization record in sub-Saharan Africa was unimpressive, an interesting prediction was made by Bennell (idem) on the basis of the latest developments. He insists that from the early 1990s onwards, there has been a very marked increase in the number, size and geographical scope of privatization in sub-Saharan Africa. And whereas most African countries resisted anything more than token privatization during the 1980s, there are currently only a handful of countries where privatization programmes have either seriously stalled or where there is little likelihood that major privatization programmes will not be introduced in the near future.

What then are the reasons for this acceleration in privatization activity in the continent? In a preliminary and tentative manner, a number of possible explanatory factors can be given.

• Whereas ten years ago the key deliberation for most governments was why they should privatize, now they are primarily concerned with how privatization programmes can be designed and implemented more effectively. A rapidly growing number of
governments are undertaking far-reaching economic and public-sector reforms which entail the setting up of the necessary political and bureaucratic structures empowering the privatization process.

_The previous slow progress in privatization was largely attributed to a pervasive and deep-seated lack of commitment at political levels. In many countries this has been further compounded by the limited political feasibility of actually introducing major privatization programmes due mainly to strong opposition from vested interests, most notably senior bureaucrats in ministries as well as from public-sector personnel who have expressed understandable concern about the possibility of retrenchments. The key political problem was the argument that ‘the costs of privatization are borne fairly immediately by relatively small but powerful groups whereas the benefits for the population as a whole are only likely to become apparent in the longer term’. Thus, collective action is easier to organize against the reform than for it._

• Unlike early post-independent years with their slogans of self-sufficiency, nowadays the governments in sub-Saharan countries are becoming ever more dependent on donor funding and more open to donor agendas. There is a widespread recognition at all levels of African societies that these countries cannot succeed without significant foreign investment, aid and policy advice. At the same time local populations have been ‘softened up’ with respect to the need for a strong private sector in a liberalized economy, and there is now much greater acceptance of the need for effective privatization as part and parcel of economic reform and integration into an internationally competitive economy.

• Significant political liberalization has created additional political space (or ‘room for manoeuvre’) in order to inaugurate or revamp privatization programmes. Recent elections in a number of countries
have allowed newly installed governments to distance themselves from the policies of their predecessors who had strong vested interests in protecting the public sector. Lifelong tight corporatist links with key stakeholders such as trade unions, one-party bureaucracies, and civil servants have been seriously weakened as governments have become more dependent on the electorate as a whole.

• The already dire financial plight of the public sector and its administration has continued to deteriorate at a time when the fiscal crisis of the governments in almost all sub-Saharan countries is more acute than ever. In general, attempts to simply restructure government bureaucracies with a view to better performance and efficiency were not considered successful until now. Hence, the challenge to create a kind of competition with the growing private activities in all sectors.

• Finally, there is considerable and increasing pressure by the IMF and the World Bank upon the governments to introduce private mechanisms, where appropriate, to stimulate cost-sharing and cost-reduction for public funding. Accepting and meeting privatization policies is becoming a major conditionality for the donor support and its level to the recipient countries.

Private education, purchasing power at household level and compensatory role of the community

As suggested by econometric models, the underlying economic assumption for private education development is that households will be able to replace and to complement public educational funding with their own resources (financial, in kind, or labour), and the rest becomes a matter of their information, demand and behaviour.

What are the specifics of sub-Saharan Africa and how do they affect private education development and finance? In developed countries
private schools are, as a rule, both subsidized – directly or indirectly – and tightly regulated, and are comparable with public schools in their input and output characteristics. In sub-Saharan Africa, the degree of variation is much more noticeable, and is linked to variations in demand and supply of education in these countries.

Compared to the developed countries where demand is balanced with supply, and private education focuses more on specific differentiated demand, private schools in the developing countries (where any supply is often insufficient) appear more for the reasons of unmet demand for any type of education (rather than for any of the other reasons reviewed above).

Some key assumptions should be made regarding recent private education development and finance in sub-Saharan Africa:

• that overlapping between different types of private education, and diversity within them are increasing. In particular, previously identifiable types of private education, such as community-based, spontaneous and profit-making can be mixed in low-cost profit-making hybrid type common for urban and suburban areas;
• that its quality of instruction and conditions vary between different types of private institutions, and can often be poor and below that of public schools, despite fees and other contributions by households;
• that, depending on the type of private institution, fees and contributions paid by households in private schools can be comparable with the total amount of direct and indirect contributions and other private expenditure at public schools.

These assumptions made are based on the effects of three related trends, discussed below: rapid urbanization, a growing informal sector and increasing stratification of sub-Saharan households by income. All
these should be considered together with other traditional features of African societies – rural subsistence lifestyle and non-monetary operations of the persisting majority of households.

On the demand side, the highest population growth in the world in this region – average annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent in 1980–1996 and 2.5 per cent projected for 1996–2010, guarantees the stable increase of the school-age population (World Bank, 1998). While many studies and reports show strong demand for education in sub-Saharan Africa, the research on the effects of urbanization implies that existing schools can accommodate only a small proportion of the school-age population and will reduce formal enrolments at both primary and secondary levels (Onyeiwu et al., 1997).

Access to education in sub-Saharan Africa improved significantly as annual primary school enrolments grew at a rate of 6.5 percent between 1960 and 1970 and at a rate of 8.9 between 1970 and 1980. In the 80s, enrolment gains slowed seriously as the rate of growth fell to 4.2 per cent. This decline is ever more dramatic taking into account that during the 80s primary school age population was increasing on average by 3.3 per cent annually in these countries. By 1995, sub-Saharan Africa was the only continent in the world where average gross enrolment rate for primary education persisted far below 100 per cent (African Development Bank, 1998). Moreover, school enrolments in these countries are characterized by many regional, intra-country and gender disparities.

In quantitative terms, the challenge for achieving universal primary education varies greatly across sub-Saharan Africa, and some countries are near to it. Another batch of countries appears to be within a relatively easy reach, requiring enrolment growth of no more than 3 to 4 per cent per year. On the other hand, in more than 20 countries, annual enrolment growth in excess of 6 per cent would
be required to attain this goal within a decade, and in a dozen of
countries, growth rate in excess of 10 per cent annually would be
required (African Development Bank, ibid.).

As regards public expenditure for education (all levels), a 1994
sample of 22 African countries where data exist showed a range of
education expenditure to GNP from 1.9 per cent for Uganda to 8.5 per
cent for Botswana. Average public expenditure on education (all levels)
amounted to 5.2 per cent of GNP and the median was 4.9 per cent
(African Development Bank, ibid.). The regression analysis
demonstrated a significant and positive relationship between education
expenditure and combined enrolments for all levels. A one percentage
point increase in the ratio of education expenditure to GNP would
lead to about 8.4 percentage points increase in the combined enrolment
rates. On average an expenditure of some 11.5 per cent of GNP will be
needed to achieve a 100 per cent combined enrolment rate.

This regression analysis also suggested very different patterns of
public spending for education and its efficiency between African
countries. For instance, with an expenditure for education of 3.6 per
cent of GNP in Burkina Faso, the regression predicted an enrolment
rate of 39 per cent compared with an actual enrolment rate of 19 per
cent. Similar cases were observed for Mali, Burundi, Senegal, Kenya,
Togo, Côte d’Ivoire etc. (African Development Bank, ibid.).

In the 1990s many sub-Saharan countries were confronted with the
painful effects of structural adjustment programmes on education, i.e.
‘freeze’ on recruitment of civil servants including that of teachers, long
delays in payment of teacher salaries, decrease in real terms of teacher
remuneration and even official cuts in teacher wages and salaries (for
example 50 per cent cut in Cameroon in 1997). In an increasing number
of cases in sub-Saharan Africa, a particular model of educational finance
under austerity and adjustment has emerged: the role of the government
is limited to payment of teacher wages and salaries (to the extent possible), while capital expenditure is delegated to foreign donors and local communities, and non-salary recurrent expenditure to communities and households. In the context of obvious decline of public education provision, various types of private education naturally filled the gap according to the real demand of the population and its income.

It is a regular conclusion of many meetings and studies that public education in Africa is under-funded, but the real dimensions and patterns of public and private spending for education have not been fully investigated. Although public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP increased in sub-Saharan Africa from 4.1 to 5.3 per cent from 1980 to 1995, expenditure per student at primary level (expressed as a percentage of GNP per capita) actually dropped from 15.6 to 12.7 per cent within the same period. While that shows the inadequacy of public funds for education, it also hints at the relevance of private contributions to education in both public and private schools. These may be monetary savings not registered by official accounts and taxation, and non-monetary contributions in kind and in labour.

How can potential private contributions to education be estimated? Indirectly, we can analyze them through the patterns of private consumption. Appendix VI presents available data on private consumption in sub-Saharan Africa, including household consumption of education (World Bank, 1998).

Private consumption is the market value of all goods and services, purchased or received as income in kind by households. The available data show that, first, the level of private consumption in sub-Saharan Africa is much lower than in other regions; second, it is stagnating. The level of private consumption in sub-Saharan Africa increased from some US$160 billion in 1980 to about US$203 billion in 1996, and its
average annual rate of growth was 1.4 per cent in 1980–1990 and 1.6 per cent in 1990–1996 (World Bank, 1998). In terms of private consumption per capita, again in contrast with other regions, there was a decline of 1.6 per cent per year in 1980-1990, and then 1 per cent per year in 1990–1996. For individual African countries the 1990s coincided with a serious relative drop in private consumption per capita, *i.e.* on an average annual basis: –6.7 per cent in Angola, –5.7 per cent in Burkina Faso, –5.4 per cent in Burundi, –5.6 per cent in Cameroon, –9.9 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, –4.9 per cent in Gabon, –5 per cent in Lesotho, –4.6 per cent in Rwanda, –7.1 per cent in Zambia. Consumption spending grew 2.9 per cent in 1997 – broadly in line with population growth so that per capita consumption was effectively unchanged. According to the African Development Bank, ‘one of the key challenges facing Africa today is that of boosting per capita consumption thereby reversing the sharp deterioration in living standards witnessed in the past two decades’ (African Development Bank, 1998).

The household income and related purchasing power of households in sub-Saharan Africa are heterogeneous between the countries and within the countries. Household consumption of education expressed in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms include government as well as private outlays. The Wold Bank statistics (see Appendix VI) focus on who consumes goods and services rather than on who pays for them, and provides some data on share of education in total household consumption. For some African countries (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe) education was the second largest consumption item after food, exceeding 20 per cent of the total consumer ‘basket’. For other countries on which these data were available (Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria) the share of education was very low (less than 10 per cent of the total), suggesting that large amounts are spent on private education not shown in official accounts (World Bank, 1998).
Another relevant issue is the relative price of education in PPP terms for private consumption (see Appendix VII). A figure above 100 indicates that the price of that component is higher than the average price level of GDP (which is usually the case for developed countries). On the contrary, for the sub-Saharan countries, this indicator is below 100 (except Gabon), which confirms that the price of education for households is lower than the general price level prevailing in these countries. In some countries (Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia), it was below 50, indicating low cost/price of education for average households.

The fact that sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most impoverished regions of the world does not automatically reject the rationale and potential for any type of fee-paying private education there. The empirical evidence and cross-country experiences show the opposite. The World Bank statistics on private consumption suggest that private education can be provided at any acceptable cost – higher or lower – subject to the volume of real demand for it and the current level of prices. The UNESCO statistics on private education development in sub-Saharan Africa, reviewed above, also suggest that it is accessible to households due to its reasonable or low costs (often linked to poor quality of instruction and difficult teaching and learning conditions).

However, it should be remembered that the majority of householders in sub-Saharan Africa are not wage earners. For example, only about 20 per cent of the active population in Nigeria and Ghana are wage earners, and in Togo only up to 11 per cent (World Bank, 1995). Therefore, to make assumptions about household income and expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of just this group would be to limit the scope and scale of the existing and potential market for private education. This points to another characteristic of private education development and finance, i.e. in sub-Saharan Africa, more than in other regions, private education can be funded and supported
from non-monetary sources, such as contributions in kind and free labour.

Jolliffe (1998) points out that there are various possible sources of income for households, not just the wage earners’ contributions. The largest component of the workforce in sub-Saharan Africa is engaged in self-employed farm work and other informal-sector activities. The percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture decreased in sub-Saharan Africa from 80 per cent in 1970 to 68 per cent in 1990, but still remains high by world standards (World Bank, 1998).

By estimating total income and its components, rather than focusing on just one source such as wage or farm income, this analysis estimates both the overall benefits of cognitive skills to households in Ghana and the sources of income that are most affected by skills. The research results of Jolliffe (1998) show that the returns to cognitive skills, as found in the total income estimate, are positive and statistically significant.

According to Jolliffe, tests of robustness of these results, using different household-level measures of skills and different estimation techniques, found that they are robust to the different measures of skills and over a wide class of non-normal error distributions.

Jolliffe’s decision not to select farmers, wage earners, or self-employed family enterprises meant that the analysis would avoid explicitly modelling the sample selection process, but would handle the resulting problem of numerous zero values when estimating farm and off-farm income. The presence of sample-selection bias or censored dependent variables is a known problem faced by many studies, but most of them addressed
these problems by assuming that the underlying residuals are normally distributed. Yet, it was also observed that the standard maximum-likelihood estimators for a censored model and for correcting sample-selection bias were inconsistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity as well as other violations of normality.

Jolliffe’s estimates of farm and off-farm income suggest that none of the returns to skills are found in farm income and that only the off-farm income estimates provide evidence of positive and statistically significant returns to skills. This result was robust to the different measures of skills and over a wide class of non-normal error distributions.

For the farm income, the returns to skills were positive but not significant. But even in this case higher mathematics skills seemed to improve farm productivity. Although the benefits of cognitive skills to Ghanaian households were not immediately found upon farm income, that did not mean that these households were not benefiting from improved cognitive skills. The non-profitability of farming forced them into other income-generating activities in addition to the stable and traditional subsistence received from farming.

To interpret Jolliffe’s study for the purpose of this paper, it confirmed that demand for education in the Ghanaian context is strongly supported by demand for skills in the urban (i.e. off-farm) environment, where returns to education and related income of households are especially high. But even in the rural (i.e. village, farm) environment, based on traditional native skills and habits, the positive effect of education on household income is being increasingly felt, thus creating a real demand for it and a desire to invest in it, if not in monetary terms, then in spare time expressed in community support in kind and free labour.
Boyle (1996) brings evidence from Cameroon how rapid urbanization spurred household demand for profit-making private education under conditions of insufficient provision of any other type of schools. The emergence of private schools occurred with a fiscal crisis in state-supported education, greater parental involvement in the finance and management of most schools, and reduction and delay in subsidies for state-supported religious schools.

The state has been responsible for only four of the 14 new schools established in a district called Yaounde II since 1980, the others being profit-making ventures offering either preparatory and/or primary education. By the late 1980s the cost of tuition in private primary schools was 10 times more than the fees charged in state-supported schools, and in private preparatory schools could be as high as 60 times more. The premium on private pre-primary education, and its dramatic 27 per cent growth in enrolments in Cameroon between 1980 and 1984, can be explained in part by the fact that a good preparatory programme helps pupils to gain admission to the best primary schools.

Boyle (ibid.) observed that “since new schools are being opened in response to local initiatives and funding, and not according to any plan or design of the Ministry of National Education, they follow in rough manner the flow of population and resources”. For example, many private schools are located in those neighbourhoods where urbanization is gradually transforming villages into cement-block suburban areas. Boyle (ibid.) stresses that “in areas such as these, neither the state, nor the churches, nor even the private schools are able to keep up with the demand for education”.

The same phenomenon was observed both in French-speaking and English-speaking sub-Saharan countries. Graham-Brown (1991) reported on low-cost urban schools in Zambia after economic
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liberalization: “for the wealthiest strata there is always the option of sending their children to elite private schools, while other urban parents make sacrifices to send their children to the fee-paying schools which have sprung up since 1977 especially to meet the unfulfilled demand for secondary education. However, these are for the most part of very low quality and certainly cannot meet the needs of the poorest sectors”.

The case of Zambia may be seen as extreme (because of the economic hardships of the population), but at the same time is illustrative of how far demand for education may extend, even under conditions of scarcity of funds, and the possible limits of the real demand: “community demand for education is still strong, and puts further pressures on government resources. For example, communities are still building schools, but the government cannot afford to pay salaries of teachers to staff these schools. It is clear that people are still eager to send their children to school. They are also willing, within reason, to pay towards this schooling. More than half the parents questioned appeared willing to provide funds for school needs, materials and maintenance. Only 20 per cent, however, were willing to assume any responsibility for payment of teachers' salaries” (Graham-Brown, idem).

However, a more recent study by Mehrotra and Buckland (1998) pointed to increasing contributions by households to supplement teacher salaries and even to steps to recruit their own community and private teachers, owing to the government ‘freeze’ on recruitment and the obvious inadequacy of the public education supply.

The predictable consequence of this development was the familiar problem of equity and increasing differentiation in access to education along the expected divides: level of income, ethnicity, language, region and religion. Characteristically, private profit-making
education under these conditions appeared to exist both as a very expensive type for wealthier communities, and an affordable low-cost version for the poorer neighbourhoods:

*On the one hand, the creation by wealthier elements of the population of their own system of private education offers one socio-economic group autonomous control over their own institutions. These emerging middle classes, frustrated by state ownership, regulations and corruption, are using their resources to provide themselves with services that correspond to their lifestyle and needs.*

*On the other hand, the rest of the population scrambles to find places for their children in schools of increasingly dubious quality. Small, typically ethnic associations known as ‘tontines’ raise funds that can be used for school fees, but function more to enable each member to survive under difficult circumstances than to help the group construct new institutions for society. The disappearance of ‘free’ primary education combined with only scattered openings of costly private schools makes the task of finding affordable tuition much more daunting for parents in Yaounde today, not least since an ever larger number of children are competing for enrolment (Boyle, ibid.).*

*The same situation was reported by Graham-Brown (ibid.) on Zambia: “In the sphere of parental contributions, regional inequalities are marked: in 1985 in Lusaka annual parental expenditure per child was 206 kwacha a year, while in the poorest regions, for example, Western, Luapulu and North-Western, the amounts were 67, 87 and 51 kwacha respectively. With government, central or regional, unable to make up the difference between parents’ ability to pay and the needs of schools, sharp differences in quality of education are inevitable.”*
As the most widespread, the *community-based* model is the one usually covered in the research literature on private education in sub-Saharan Africa (Bray, 1986; Bray, 1987; Bray with Lillis, 1988; Bray, 1997). Unfortunately, much less is written on the analysis of religious and profit-making schools, and only a few studies address the issue of spontaneous (‘bush’) schools (Esquieu and Peano, 1994 on Chad; Esquieu and Peano, 1996 on Mali; Peano and Rahaririaka, 1997 on Madagascar).

Communities have traditionally provided non-monetary support (in kind and in free labour), for example, for school construction in sub-Saharan Africa to a greater extent than in other regions. *Harambee* schools in Kenya are probably the best-known example of this practice (Lillis and Ayot, 1988; Mehrotra, 1998).

However, communities cannot be expected to increase their support when government support for education is declining, and when the ‘out-of-pocket’ costs of their members are already very high (Mehrotra, 1998).

*Community participation normally occurs through parent-teacher associations and parent-school community organizations. Enhanced community participation will only be forthcoming if communities gain a stronger role in the organization and management of primary schools, and if the perceived quality of education increases in the early stages of cost-sharing. Decision-making by the communities can comprise: hiring of school teachers or assistants (preferably from within the community); providing inputs into the school curricula; governing the school finance; participating in setting timetables and calendars; and monitoring achievements. There is little possibility that with the decline in incomes, villages will be willing and able to build houses for teachers or additional*
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classrooms, without the community having a greater say than before in the running of the school (Mehrotra, 1998).

There are various views on the potential of communities to provide increased funds for education, including private education. “The capacity of parents, communities and pupils to further increase their contributions to primary education is limited – though school effectiveness would certainly be improved by the participation of the community in certain aspects of school governance, which in turn may bring forth greater community contribution” (Mehrotra, 1998). A similar pessimistic view is expressed by Graham-Brown (1991), “community involvement in the creation of new schools can have very different outcomes according to context”.

Where communities build schools which are intended to be part of the state system, they can only be effective if the state can then afford to sustain the running costs. If external funding cannot be provided, the school will either fall into disuse, or will be of very low quality. Discrepancies of provision can also arise where the state is not in a position to make up the difference between what a wealthy community can put into a school and what a poor community can afford. Therefore, if equity of provision in basic education is to be an important consideration, community financing cannot be regarded as a simple panacea for the problems of funding education (Graham-Brown, ibid.).

The most obvious example of the community-based model (apart from Kenya and Botswana) is Zimbabwe. Colclough with Lewin (1993) examined in detail the funding of non-government primary schools in Zimbabwe (comprising over 90 per cent of the total number of primary schools in this country, known for its expansion of and access to primary and secondary education).
The task of school management is delegated to a ‘responsible authority’ – usually, though not always, the individual or organization under which auspices the school was originally established. The parents or local community have to construct the schools themselves, including provision of building materials, to provide the furniture, equipment, and textbooks in the schools, to pay the salaries of non-teaching staff, if any, to maintain the buildings and to cover the running costs of the schools. Central government pays the salaries of the teaching staff.

These expenses are met in two main ways. First, the parents pay fees to the responsible authorities for these purposes. Most non-government primary schools maintain a ‘building fund’, into which parents are expected to pay fees every year. Their level varies from school to school. In addition, parents usually were required to pay a ‘sports fee’. The second main source of funds for the responsible authorities is a grant to each non-government primary school, linked to the number of pupils enrolled in each year of study. The rates for this ‘per capita grant’ were lower for younger children and higher in the upper grades – of which the responsible authorities kept 10 per cent as a contribution to their own administrative expenses. The per capita grant was intended to supply pupils with textbooks and exercise books, and buy all other teaching materials needed to run the school but it proved inadequate for these purposes.

In the secondary non-government schools financial arrangements are somewhat different. As at primary level, a strong degree of community support is expected for construction of school building and non-salary recurrent costs, as well as non-teaching staff. Also, as at the primary level, the government pays teacher salaries and provides a
per capita grant for textbooks and teaching materials. However, in addition to these sources of funds, the non-government secondary schools charge tuition fees, the levels of which varied: to take them as a base, the lowest were district council day-schools, at mission boarding schools fees were 5-10 times higher, at the ‘trust’ day-schools – 5-20 times higher, and at the ‘trust’ boarding schools – 10-50 times higher.

Colclough with Lewin (1993) observed that in the case of Zimbabwe this heavy across-the-board dependence upon individuals, families and communities for the provision of facilities, equipment, and materials, through fees and voluntary contributions at both primary and secondary levels, “has led to a highly differentiated structure of schooling which is itself strongly correlated with the income of parents”. The situation was further complicated by the fact that many families in poor rural areas were unable to pay the non-tuition fees and contributions even at primary level. Many rural non-government schools managed to collect only about half of the amount in fees that parents were expected to pay.

At secondary level, the pressure on the poor families was even more intense. On the one hand, the main reason for drop-outs, representing 20 per cent of respective age-group, was the fact that their parents could not pay the school fees. On the other hand, the schools were faced with a difficult choice: either to charge high fees yet not be able to enrol many of the eligible students in their catchment area, or to charge fees that were affordable for most families, but which would be insufficient to generate enough funds for adequate running of the school.

The case of Zimbabwe, as presented by Colclough with Lewin (1993), illustrates that even when non-government (private) schools are heavily subsidized in terms of teacher salaries and recurrent costs,
equity in access to education and in schooling conditions is a cause for concern and is subject to the income level of households.

Still, in the absence of other viable alternatives, the community-based model of private (non-government) education development proved its relevance for sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the rural non-monetary context. This was confirmed in particular by the ‘Consensus on principles of cost-sharing in education and health in sub-Saharan Africa’, approved at the international forum in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (June 1997):

“Responsibilities delegated to school and community level should be maximized (including establishment and location of schools, administrative management, maintenance, resource utilization). Community participation in management should involve responsibility for management of resources, collection of revenue, and a say in the establishment and location of schools. Community participation should not be dependent on contribution to costs. Decentralization of authority should be supported by and conform to laws, regulations and administrative procedures. Government management structures and procedures should be revised to link with and effectively support community management systems. Community management should promote the identification and utilization of all opportunities within the community and not simply the identification of problems. Governments have responsibility for ensuring that school management committees have the opportunity to develop the capacity for school management. Teachers and heads of schools should be equipped to serve as the front line liaison with community management structure. Governments should assist communities to develop transparent and accountable systems for raising and controlling
local resources which take into account the total cost burden borne by parents and communities”.

As summarized by Bray (1988), community resources can provide a valuable supplement to government inputs, but community endeavours are often badly organized, lead to poor-quality schools, and sometimes defeat official attempts to reduce geographic and social inequalities. Nevertheless, community support will remain important, if only for the negative reason that most governments will remain too hard-pressed to meet all the demands on them (Bray, *ibid.*). Bray (1997) concludes that in most cases community financing should be treated as a stop-gap measure, ameliorating the impact of deficiencies in government provision.
11. WHAT IS THE PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS PRIVATE EDUCATION IN AFRICA? IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH ON THE FINANCING OF PRIVATE EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

This is the concluding part of the study which recalls and summarizes the main issues raised and observations made through previous analysis. The purpose of the study was not only to review the past record of private education development and finance in sub-Saharan Africa from different sources, but to examine its recent evolution in the 1990s and its specific features. Seemingly autonomous or independent from public authorities, in reality private education is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to any changes in policies and environment. Because of its complementary or competing position vis-à-vis public education, it fills the gaps left by public schools in terms of access, coverage etc. Together with ‘classical’ government-aided types of private education (religious and community-based), the rapid emergence in the late 1990s of numerous spontaneous and low-cost profit-making schools, deserves serious policy research and analysis.

As previously observed, private education may complement and substitute public education development for various demand/supply reasons:

(1) for historical reasons (James, 1989), which led to the emergence of various religious schools as the most ancient type of non-public school in sub-Saharan Africa;

(2) due to insufficient capacities of public education to cover the catchment area, creating unmet demand (James, 1989; 1991), which explains the setting up of numerous community-based and spontaneous (‘bush’) schools, as well as, more recently, low-cost profit-making schools;

(3) to serve particular clientele with more differentiated demand for education (James, 1989; 1991; 1996), resulting in top-end profit-making private schools;
(4) as a matter of potential specific supply (with retired or unemployed teachers), which has multiplied the diversity of low-cost profit-making schools;

(5) as a result of well-targeted matching strategies by profit-making school managers, especially in urban and suburban areas (James, 1989; Kwong, 1997), which became another reason for the diversity of profit-making schools;

(6) as a result of inadequate public provision or a deliberate government policy to lessen the burden of public education expenditure and to shift it to the households through private provision, which increases competition between various types of public and private schools in terms of cost-efficiency.

In most cases a combination of several or all of these takes place.

Public education is normally considered by central governments as an essential instrument of policy implementation which is important for a country’s unity, promotion of official language and proper attitudes towards the country’s history, culture and traditions. In the late 1990s there is more recognition at the level of decision-making in African countries that, given the obvious constraints to expanding public education at post-compulsory levels and even to universalizing primary and basic education, private education can be viewed as complementary and not necessarily competitive to public education, having the same objectives of coverage and better access to education.

What can be delegated to the private sector in the chain of ownership-funding-management of schools? There is no argument traced in the research literature in favour of a completely private education system. On the contrary, for equity reasons “it would tend to provide less education than would be optimal” (Jimenez, 1987). As observed by Rosen and Weinberg (1998), “the main advantage claimed for privatization and voucher programmes in public education is that
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greater choice by parents will provide a better oversight than the current system. It is not surprising that many of the most successful privatizations (for example, airlines and the telephone service) have been in industries whose products have strong elements of private goods. In the case of public goods the incentives for individual oversight are weaker, the costs are certainly higher, and the oversight gains from competition among providers are usually much smaller”. However, at a time when public funding faces constraints, the coexistence of public and private education systems would allow more flexibility in expanding available resources, especially when there are political and other warnings against introducing or raising tuition and user fees at public schools.

According to Hallak (1990), “whether the provision should be left in the hands of the private sector to a greater or lesser degree is a matter to be considered on a case-by-case basis, after having assessed its cost-effectiveness in the private as compared to public sector. And even if these analyses indicate that one sector would be more efficient than the other, there may be advantages in keeping both sectors involved”.

*Competitiveness, regard to cultural factors, synergism, and spill-over may all constitute reasons for a government to split the responsibilities for delivery of the service. And there is still no ‘correct’ demarcation line between the public and private sectors. In themselves they are fairly loose conceptions, and when deciding where to send the bill for a given educational service, or where the responsibility for the provision of the service should reside, distinctions can become even fuzzier. For instance, when a government establishes a school in an area of low population density and scarcity of teachers, in which all primary grades are taught at the same time in the same place, and regards this education as public goods, and all secondary grades are taught together and regarded as private goods (the same teachers being...*
involved at both levels), a partnership between the public and private sectors in the provision of services may well be the most cost-effective solution. The weight assigned to each will vary from case to case. (Hallak, ibid.)

It would be wrong to look at private education as a ‘monolith block’ confronting public education as another ‘monolith block’, due to considerable internal variations in both of them. As we observed, there are numerous links between the two through the families’ choice and funding, and private education may fill the gaps and inadequacies left after public education within the same education system. As seen in Botswana (Atta et al., 1996), within one family there may be some children attending a public school and other children attending a private school. Children graduating from public primary education may enter community (or other private type) secondary school, and vice versa. The public/private combinations of ownership-funding-management functions and their degrees are multiple and create many ‘grey’ and mixed types of educational quasi-market.

The prime purpose of this paper was to look into the specifics of the late 1990s with regard to the development and finance of private education in sub-Saharan Africa, and the specific features of the region itself leading to this development.

In the 1990s many sub-Saharan countries were confronted with the painful effects on education of structural adjustment programmes, i.e. a ‘freeze’ on the recruitment of civil servants, including teachers, long delays in payment of teacher salaries, a decrease in real terms of teacher remuneration and even official cuts in teacher wages and salaries (e.g. 50 per cent cut in Cameroon in 1997). In an increasing number of cases in sub-Saharan Africa, a particular model of educational finance under austerity and adjustment has emerged: the role of government is limited to the payment of teacher wages and salaries (to the extent possible),
while capital expenditure is delegated to foreign donors and local communities, and non-salary recurrent expenditure to communities and households. In the context of obvious decline of public education provision, various types of private education naturally filled the gap according to the real demand and income of the population.

The 1990s also saw the liberalization of economic policies in many African countries which weakened the role of the state in many sectors and respects, enhanced the role of communities, households and other actors in a more decentralized context, and opened avenues for private initiatives in education to cater for the increasingly diverse demand for it, resulting from the increasingly disparate income of households.

The regional specifics of sub-Saharan Africa are that it is one of the poorest regions of the world, with strong disparities in distribution of wealth between the top and bottom income groups. Private education development offered a whole spectrum of learning opportunities – from very expensive boarding schools to low-cost suburban schools – although both may be of a profit-making nature.

The historical features of sub-Saharan Africa are such that the development of private education was very different between English-speaking countries (where the majority of private (non-government) schools are community-based), and French-speaking countries (where these schools are often religiously affiliated). In addition, distinction should be made between urban areas of the African countries where the thriving informal sector gave rise to profit-making private schools, and impoverished rural areas in the same countries where ‘bush’ (spontaneous) schools are a common phenomenon based on the non-monetary contributions, in kind and in labour, of families.

Within the debate on the educational quasi-market, there are suggestions for partnerships and sharing of responsibilities/functions.
between public and private education systems so that they share responsibilities for the overall provision of education. According to Caillods (1997), “the promotion of partnership constitutes an intermediary stage between a totally state-managed and controlled system and a totally market-regulated system: it allows combining the efficiency and flexibility that the private system can offer with the maintenance of certain collective values and goals, such as equity, that only the state can ensure”. Caillods (ibid.) also concluded that while actual provision of education and training is increasingly being delegated, the state continues to finance, partly or entirely, and to play a major role in curriculum development, in teacher training, in the certification and in the definition of standards.

At the same time, regulation of private education provision by public authorities, communities or collective action seems desirable, i.e. development of private education should not violate policies, norms, standards and regulations, established in education for all formal institutions. The report of the Delors Commission says: ”The formal institutions at the heart of the education system, whether public or private, must clearly proceed in concerted fashion and in accordance with a long-term view. It is therefore the task of public policy to ensure coherence in space and time; in other words, to set guidelines and to regulate” (UNESCO, 1998). Widely practised norms are those regarding tuition fees, recruitment, qualifications and wages of teachers, curriculum development and student selection. Ishumi (1994) stressed that “in the interests of uniformity and quality control, the government can retain the right of inspection and supervision of private schools, as it has always done for public schools”.

There is room for harmonization of educational policies between public and private education, for example, the government which concentrates its efforts at primary level may allow for more private schools at secondary level. This trend has been observed in many
African countries in the 1990s but at present there are signs that at primary level also the role of private education may increase in countries experiencing financial constraints, to universalize primary and basic education. There is a certain retreat from the status quo which has existed since the 1960s until the present time, when private education has often been considered as a temporary phenomenon, only waiting for continuing expansion of public education.

There are further examples where governments search for appropriate modalities to share provision of education with two principal categories of private education: community and religious. In French-speaking African countries (Congo, Burkina Faso, Mali), the Catholic church is approached by the governments to help facilitate the provision of primary and secondary education (Kone, 1996).

However, there were always warning signals that private schooling should not be seen as a panacea, and it may become a potential funding burden: where private schools may suffer financial problems there may be sooner or later strong calls for government help” (Penrose, 1993). Any measure subsidizing, or even tolerating, private education expansion and funding can bring controversial reaction on the part of key stakeholders, i.e. decision-makers, households and teachers favouring public education for the reason of equity. This explains why the eternal debate on educational vouchers has not yet produced any meaningful outcome.

Some researchers are strongly against private education development in sub-Saharan context for the reasons of equity, discrimination in access based on tuition fees, and profit-making interest on behalf of school owners. Diambomba (1992) argued that ‘both auto-financing and the finance system based on sales of services are not feasible in the present African situation. Even if both of these systems are more and more used in some African countries because of
the emergence of an important private education sector, they are not feasible because they serve special groups’.

“In fact, the private education sector is at both ends of the quality scale. On the other hand, a number of high quality primary and secondary education institutions, financed principally through student fees, have been created. However, to maintain this high quality, such schools have to charge relatively high fees, which means that they are accessible only to a small minority of the student population. The majority of the private institutions are therefore of low quality; they are created principally as businesses, meaning that much of their interest is focussed on profits rather than on schooling. A system of finance based on auto-financing or on sale of services would therefore not be socially predictive.” (Diambomba, 1992)

But, especially in more centralized education systems in African countries, state regulation of private education is sometimes viewed as excessive, i.e. subventions and subsidies are accompanied with heavy procedures of registration, authorization, learning conditions, qualifications of teaching staff, conformity with official programmes and diplomas etc. Although ostensibly less binding than outright prohibition of private education, such regulations may have a stifling effect on private schools. “The extent to which private education is discouraged depends upon the degree of regulation” (Jimenez, 1987). These procedures may need review and up-dating, in particular in certain cases when the government does not keep its own promises to support private schools, and reduces or cancels its support for non-profit-making private institutions (Arnaud, 1996; Kone, 1996).

In this regard, the 1995 World Bank comparative study on public and private schools in five countries from different regions of the world (Tanzania, Colombia, Philippines, Thailand and Dominican Republic)
observed that easier regulations may even be more helpful for recognized private schools than government subsidies:

“One immediate implication for policy is that over-restrictive regulations on private schools (including outright prohibition in some countries) may be suppressing an efficient way to provide education. Another implication for policy is that, in some cases, governments could encourage greater private sector participation in education. It should be stressed, however, that the relative efficiency of private schools is highly dependent on the institutional regime and structure of the incentives under which they currently operate. Government subsidies, for example, may not necessarily lead to greater efficiency in the educational system. Such subsidies will be effective only if they are not linked to restrictions on the schools’ ability to choose a suitable input mix and to strive for greater efficiency.” (Jimenez and Lockheed, 1995)

State funding arrangements to support certain types of private education (religiously-affiliated and community-based) may be reviewed and made more incentive- and merit-based through the use of formulae to stimulate competition between various private schools and to favour those with increasing enrolment and improving standards. Such a formula was introduced, for example, in Mauritius in 1989 (Ministry of Education, 1994). The case of Mauritius is often seen unusual because private schools are considered definitely worse than public schools but they enroll 80 per cent of pupils at secondary level.

The non-government schools in general have fewer academically qualified teachers than the state schools; they have a higher pupil/teacher ratio; many of them are poorly equipped and housed. Since certain state and confessional schools have a high reputation, they attract the best candidates, and hence obtain
the best results. At the other extreme, there are a small number of institutions which are a real disgrace to the system. (Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture, Mauritius, 1991)

In order to repair and upgrade the poor standards of private schools in this country, the government had to make them tuition free at its own expense and to provide them grants, covering their total staff costs and other expenditure, as well as to launch a programme of training private school teachers.

A related issue is the fact that private education development is often ignored or only passively observed in education development projects with foreign donors as the latter usually address the needs of public education, negotiated with the governments. Even large-scale projects and master plans for reform only take note of the private education presence and assume its self-sufficient nature. Of course, any direct assistance to private schools through foreign grants and loans would raise the delicate issue of competition between private and public education for funds. But a certain positive indirect ‘spill-over’ effect for private education from these projects may still be expected in an appropriate context.

Further analysis is required of private (by community and families) funding of both public and private education. If, previously, community contribution was limited to school construction and maintenance, nowadays different types of private expenditure for education tend to cover almost all expenses, except, so far, teacher salaries, thus effectively replacing the insufficient public funding. Tuition and user fees, as previously discussed, do not show all the variety of community/parental contributions for both public and private schools. In cases of existing and/or increasing tuition and user fees, as well as contributions in kind and labour in public schools, the difference in terms of funding between them and government-aided (community and religious)
private schools virtually disappears and becomes a factor of household income. This should be addressed, especially at a time when various cost-sharing mechanisms are being introduced or reviewed in public schools by the governments, thus giving private schools a natural comparative advantage.

In Africa, particularly, some degree of community participation, particularly in building schools, has been commonplace. Over the past ten years, the range of charges on the community, and the size of those charges relative to income, has shown marked increase. This has been the commonest way of coping with governments’ inability to provide funds, not just for new buildings, but also for recurrent expenses. Only teachers’ salaries remain for the most part in government hands. (Graham-Brown, 1991)

The obvious and increasing determination of households to send their children to ‘mushrooming’ private profit-oriented schools in the cities of sub-Saharan Africa (sometimes located just on the street) rather than public ones, gives much food for thought. Does it mean that parents can now more easily afford to pay for better-quality studies for their children? Or does it mean that some private schools have reduced their costs and charge more reasonable fees as compared to the household income? Does it mean that private returns to primary private education have dramatically increased in recent years? Does it mean that the ability of the state to provide primary and secondary education has reached its extreme and is now on the decline? These are the questions to be answered by further research, which should be based on regression analysis and case studies.

Special research interest should be given to newly opened private schools in sub-Saharan Africa which are not offsprings of existing well-established missionary and community schools. Who are the people...
taking these initiatives? Unemployed teachers who were not recruited by the civil service, or risky entrepreneurs who saw a profit-making opportunity in the liberalized economic climate? What kind of feasibility study did they make to determine the costs of running these schools, and how did they estimate the amounts of tuition and user fees to be charged?

Another issue untapped by previous research is the private supplements to teacher salaries and, at its extreme, recruitment of teachers by community-based and profit-making schools in sub-Saharan Africa. This phenomenon, typical in situations with a recruitment ‘freeze’ for civil servants, including teachers, accentuates the inadequacy of the public education supply and prompts the direct intervention by communities and households (Mehrotra and Buckland, 1998).

Furthermore, other features of ‘pure’ private education, such as autonomous administration and management, are becoming blurred in a decentralized context, where public schools also acquire authority in searching for additional funds. Being complementary in the supply of education, and already having fixed (regulated) shares of public expenditure for education, public and private schools will increasingly compete for unregulated private funds of communities/families.

*Private education cannot be treated as a homogeneous entity.* A common approach was often to view private education solely as a profit-making business, charging excessive fees and accessible only to rich families. But the experiences of sub-Saharan Africa showed a variety of types of private education, existing even in low-income environments. In terms of costs, private education in the sub-Saharan context can be both expensive and inexpensive (especially in the case of ‘bush’ (spontaneous) and nomadic schools becoming a natural monopoly), when teachers are low-paid or are paid ‘in kind’, and investments in classrooms and school equipment are negligible.
Provision of private education in sub-Saharan Africa is subject to disparities which depend on the income level of households, urban or rural setting, geographical region within the same country, religion, ethnic group and specific community.

A differentiated approach should be further applied to various types of private education, in particular, a distinction should be made between numerous community, religious and even between different profit-oriented schools. While a competitive element may arise between the best public and profit-oriented private schools, it is better to avoid it (by the means of school-mapping and certain incentives) between public and recognized community and religious schools because it may provoke unnecessary and unhealthy duplication of functions.

*Experience shows that where private schools are financed through tuition fees only, disparities between social groups increase; where they are financed by the state through a system of grant-in-aid or vouchers, disparities remain. The best private schools continue to attract students from more advantaged backgrounds: in some countries a real hierarchy can be established which goes from totally private and a few elite public schools, grant-aided private schools, to other public or municipal schools attended by rural pupils and children of a lower class of social background.* (Caillods, 1997)

.Private schools are often viewed as a privilege of urban centres only, and in its narrowest sense as profit-making schools for better-off target groups. This appears to be a simplification which ignores both the diversity of possible household incomes and contributions (in cash, in kind, in labour) and the diversity of private schooling. The existence of community, religious and spontaneous schools in suburban and rural areas (where the majority of the African population in concentrated) is a matter of neglect as their purchasing power to
contribute to the costs of education is considered negligible. Most recent studies, c.f. Jolliffe (1998), suggest that households can sufficiently contribute to the costs of education in kind and in labour, even in rural areas.

Finally, the ‘missing link’ of the existing research on private education in general, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is the issue of its dynamics and evolution. The available studies depict a sufficiently clear ‘picture’ of private education in a given moment in a given surrounding, but fail to make meaningful comparisons between the cases and time intervals. However, private education may not only be a useful reference point in terms of efficiency, it can equally show examples of survival skills and financial viability in non-supporting environments through decreasing unit costs (as an example of cost-reduction), practical modalities of tuition and user fees (as an example of cost-sharing) and original schemes of income-generation and other means of financial diversification, as compared to public education in the same context. In further research on private education finance, more attention should be given to non-monetary sources, such as contributions in kind and in labour.
Appendix I. Index to sub-Saharan countries mentioned in the text

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Documentary Appendix II. Selected African countries’ examples on private education development and financing

**Benin**

In 1996, private (profit-making) schools at all levels enrolled about 93,000 students, *i.e.* 9.4 per cent of the total school-age population. Their average costs per pupils are higher than at public schools. Benin’s private education is concentrated in large urban areas in the south of the country, and is aimed at a clientele that is sufficiently well-off to be able to support this level of spending. Private schools receive no material or financial assistance from the state, and are funded primarily by households.

In terms of unit cost per pupil at *primary* level, at private schools it is higher (37,000 CFA francs) than at public schools (25,000 CFA francs). Within this unit cost, teachers’ salaries amount to 17,000 CFA francs at public schools against 9,500 CFA francs at private ones. This difference is explained by the lower level of remuneration at private schools but it is balanced by a higher pupil/teacher ratio at public schools. Private schools also spend more per pupil on non-teaching staff, non-salary recurrent expenditure, canteens and capital expenditure. But public schools have higher per-unit-cost expenditure on teaching equipment. For the purchase of textbooks and stationery per pupil, families spend more at private schools (8,000 CFA francs) than at public ones (4,400 CFA francs).

At *general secondary* level, the difference between public and private schools is more pronounced. At public schools, the unit cost per pupil is 43,900 CFA francs, plus 12,800 CFA francs of additional expenditure by parents for textbooks and stationery. At private secondary schools, the unit cost is 106,800 CFA francs, plus 27,200 CFA
Private education in sub-Saharan Africa

francs of school-related expenditure by parents. This greater difference is explained by the “elite” nature of private secondary schools.

Source: Peano and Oulai, 1999a and b.

Cameroon

Since independence, the national budget for education, for many years the largest single category for state expenditure, ordinarily financed all the operating costs in public schools and, because of an accord reached during the so-called crise scolaire in 1968, 70 to 80 per cent of those in most denominational schools. Except for small fees for insurance and uniforms, public schools did not charge for tuition before the 1980s, unlike state-supported denominational schools, albeit at levels controlled by the government. The situation in state-supported denominational schools became particularly acute when their subsidies were reduced in 1989 at the national level from CFA francs 8,000 million to 6,000 million.

But the situation worsened during the next three years as the government began to delay making payments, and by 1993 was over CFA francs 205 million in arrears for the 51 Catholic schools in Yaounde alone. The non-payment of subsidies and the consequent raising of fees led the Secretariat for Catholic Education to estimate that their national network was losing an average of close to 20,000 students per year. A campaign by local church officials to organize their congregations to save their state-supported denominational schools resulted in the creation of an association of limited effectiveness in obtaining subsidy payments.

The beginning of similar delays in the payment of teacher salaries in 1993 demonstrates the extent to which public and state-supported denominational schools faced a virtually identical set of problems.
created by the penury of public resources (despite their allocation on paper), and exacerbated by the rapid expansion of the population. Among the consequences of the crisis has been the closure of the only primary school in Nkolnkumu, a village on the outskirts of Yaounde. Typically, new residents in the rural areas around the capital find that the nearest school, usually private, can be as far away as 10 kilometres.

If this crisis has generally made classrooms more crowded and instruction more costly, it has certainly stimulated changes in school management and financing, notably by the creation of an Association des parents d’élèves (APE) in every public and state-supported denominational school. Outlawed until the early 1980s because they were deemed “subversive”, each APE exists to promote the good management of the institution, and with complete autonomy manage its own funds. The voluntary organizations arose in response to the need to fund a social service from which the state was withdrawing financial support. The relative success or failure of each APE depends on several factors, including the presence and motivation of leading parents, and the degree to which local officials in both church and state help or hinder their activities. Unlike the earlier situation in which all state-supported institutions, public and denominational, received fixed levels of budgetary assistance, the financial well-being of each school now depends on the management skills of its director and the effectiveness of its APE. The creation of APEs, and the parental participation they encourage, comes at the price of a new dependence on local economic conditions. Already, differentials in the availability of resources in various neighbourhoods determine the provision of social services to which the residents have access.

The state has been responsible for only four out of 14 new schools established in a district called Yaounde II since 1980, the others being profitable ventures that offer either preparatory and/or primary education. Since new schools are being opened in response to local
initiatives and funding, and not according to any plan or design of the Ministry of National Education, they follow roughly the flow of population and resources. For example, many private schools are located in those neighborhoods where the construction of cement-block houses on relatively large parcels of land is gradually creating sparsely populated areas out of semi-rural villages. In contrast, the Yaoundé II neighborhood of “Carrière”, so called because of the quarry around which it is built, had become by 1992 a densely populated low-income centre for over 40,000 residents, with only two primary schools, both run for profit. In areas such as these, neither the state, nor the churches, nor even the private schools are able to keep up with the demand for education.

Source: Boyle, 1996.

**Chad**

Until the end of the 1960s, private education was composed of religious schools, mainly Catholic, which had been set up before independence. In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, more schools appeared: Protestant, Arab and secular in urban areas, and spontaneous schools in rural areas. In 1991–92, there were 102 primary private schools with 32,000 pupils enrolled, or 6 per cent of total primary enrolment, and 25 secondary institutions with 6,500 pupils, or 9 per cent of total enrolment. In addition, 547 spontaneous schools were set up by village communities and accommodated 53,000 pupils, or 9 per cent of total primary enrolment. These schools appeared due to the absence of public schools in the vicinity to serve the “minimum” needs of poor families.

Under the conditions of strong social demand for quality education (as in the case of Catholic and private secular schools), or those complementary to public education (as in the case of spontaneous and
Arab schools), all types of private education face various constraints or obstacles to their expansion:

**Catholic education** is obliged to preserve its serious image of education-provider to the country elite. It will develop with the established regulations which require recruitment of teachers who are civil servants. Their cost is a particular burden for the state because of its principal obligation for the funding of public education;

- **Private secular schools** are also in demand for their efficiency. Their high cost for families limits their recruitment, but they may expand towards secondary education. Eventually, other difficulties will emerge in the recruitment and suitable qualifications of teachers (who are paid less than civil servants) and because of financial constraints for land and construction;

- **Arab education**, which is designed for certain categories of the Chadian population, is the one that faces the most difficulties in its development: bad teaching conditions, inability to follow official programmes, grave financial problems in urban areas, with families definitely less privileged than is the case with other private schools. Without mentioning drop-outs (which are frequent), it is advisable to re-examine their present situation;

- **Spontaneous schools** are mushrooming because of insufficient coverage by public education, and they have the strongest potential for expansion, having more than 15 per cent of total primary enrolment. This type of private education requires more regulation if it is to contribute to better coverage, *i.e.* minimal quality of instruction with more administrative support. Their better management (with qualified teachers) may help to solicit international aid (equipment, textbooks, food) in a more efficient way.

*Source: Esquieu and Peano, 1994.*
Kenya

(a) Authority to establish private schools

The private sector has participated in the provision of education in Kenya for many years. The legal basis for its participation is the Education Act, which vests in the Minister for Education the powers to keep a register of all unaided schools in the country. Any organization or individual interested in establishing a school applies to the Minister. The applications are processed by the Ministerial Committee for Registration of Schools. Each application is carefully considered, including inspection of proposed site and facilities by the professional staff of the Ministry of Education. The Minister will approve a request upon being advised by the Committee on the suitability of the proposed site, availability of adequate facilities, and whether other necessary arrangements have been made for the provision of education, in keeping with the requirements of the Education Act.

The school may be given “full” registration if the Minister is satisfied that all requirements are fulfilled, or may be given “provisional” registration for a period of up to 18 months as the management prepares to fulfil the remaining requirements. The number of streams that may be approved will depend on available tuition and playground facilities.

(b) Bodies responsible

Private education is managed by NGOs (mainly church organizations) and individual entrepreneurs. Foreign missions accredited to Kenya and expatriates who may wish their children to have an education that is relevant to situation in their home countries are also free to open private schools.
(c) Ways of operation

The operation of private schools and institutions must adhere to the Ministry of Education’s regulations governing the management of education in the country. These include also the regulations laid down by other related bodies, such as the Kenya National Examinations Council, regarding the administration of both local and foreign examination.

(d) Private primary and secondary schools

These offer the same 8:4:4 education curriculum as public schools. But, as has been said above, interested bodies, such as foreign missions, may apply to the Minister for authority to offer foreign curricula based on other grade systems, for example the General Certificate of Education of the United Kingdom. Recommended enrolment is 40 students per class. However, since some private schools prefer to give closer attention to their pupils/students, it is not uncommon to have 20-30 learners. In genuine cases such requests are normally allowed.


Kahuhu Unaided First-Level School. The Kahuhu school was established in 1967 through the joint effort of the local Roman Catholic church and the local community, notably the 12 people who formed the school committee. They provided ideas and drive, but did not know how to start such a venture, particularly how to finance the school. However, with the assistance of the local Roman Catholic priest, the project got under way. The role of the Catholic church in the venture was of special interest, for the area was predominantly Protestant, and
there was a tradition of rivalry around Kahuhu between the Catholic and the Protestant churches.

The Catholic church made an initial contribution consisting of half of the corrugated-iron sheeting required for the first two classrooms, together with a substantial loan. The committee also relied on the church for assistance with the school's legal constitution and its accounts. School fees were paid directly to the headteacher, who then sent the money to the bishop's office in Nyeri, where an official arranged to have it banked. These fees were used to pay the salaries of the two teachers and the headteacher and to buy books and stationery. Thus, the money for school fees was not normally handled by the local committee. The committee kept a record of parents, however, and checked whether they appeared for community work on appointed days. A fine was imposed on those who failed to show up. Otherwise, the committee handled finance only when money had to be raised for specific projects.

Such projects had been kept to a minimum for, in 1967, after a decision to levy each parent to pay off the debt for the school roof, 11 parents withdrew their children. Withdrawal had to be resisted at all costs, as the school had to be run to full capacity to be financially viable. From time to time emergencies arose with regard to finance: for example, in August 1968 and December 1969, both school holiday periods, money could not be found to pay teachers' salaries.

The case shows why some of the unaided schools had difficulty in maintaining a proper accounting system. The committee did not draw in the money and then run the school. Instead, the school just seemed to continue, although many parents were in debt, teachers were occasionally unpaid, and the committee members were forced to provide money from their own pockets. If accounts were to be audited, especially if they showed a deficit, parents might become disillusioned.
and might then withdraw their children and jeopardize the school still further.

**Kenyatta Unaided Second-Level School.** Kenyatta High School, in the Mahiga, and isolated part of the Nyeri district, was built in 1965-1966 by voluntary self-help. The organizing committee developed around a nucleus of old Kikuyu independent school leaders who, soon after independence, began to urge the people to start a self-help second-level school in the area to replace one closed down by the colonial authorities during the emergency. A committee was formed and began to organize a massive self-help effort to construct a school.

At first, this committee was under the sponsorship of the African Independent Pentecostal Church, which had been responsible for many independent African self-help schools in colonial times. The elders who came to the first meeting had considerable experience, both in organizing self-help work and in running schools. Well over 90 per cent of the money for this capital development was found by the local community. Construction of the school started in September 1965. Collections were made in cash and materials, cement, stone, and so on, and self-help labor was used for heavy work, such as digging and providing ballast for the foundations and sand and shingle for concrete mixing. Small-scale local contractors provided the building skills, and an old Ministry of Works plan was the basis for the classroom design.

Total costs are difficult to assess. The cost of a government classroom of similar dimensions would have been at least twice as high as the actual cost to the Mahiga community. Initially, the main problem was the provision of education rather than capital development. No suitably trained local headteacher was available to advise the committee on educational matters, and most of the staff obtained in the early years were second-level graduates with poor grades who were looking for temporary posts until they could find more permanent work in some
other sphere. The teaching staff was erratic and for the most part of poor quality; too few textbooks were available and, in general, they were badly chosen. Even so, the results of its first Kenya Junior Secondary Examination were only just below the national average for unaided schools.

Recurrent expenses are handled by the secretary and treasurer of the committee, who bank the fees and approve any disbursements. The headteacher advises on expenses but does not handle any money. The school runs almost entirely on fees, which are supplemented by considerable donations for equipment.


**Madagascar**

Private schools are numerous and enroll from 20 to 50 per cent of enrolment, depending on level. They are set up and managed by religious organizations, mainly by the Catholic and Protestant church, and individuals. Their financing is organized through tuition and user fees, paid by families, and government subsidies.

Private schools are supervised by the administrative unit of the National Office of private education. Its responsibility is to administer subvention of the state to private schools. The available amount in the state budget funds is divided according to three criteria:

. the first part is estimated on the basis of the number and qualifications of teachers;
. the second part is planned for recurrent non-salary expenditure of schools, and estimated on the basis of number of pupils, location of school etc. according to the norms;
the third part is to finance capital expenditure.


**Mali**

In Mali there are four types of non-public schools of basic education, recognized by the state: Catholic (enrolment of 18,000 pupils in 1994–95), private secular (6,000 pupils), community (25,000 pupils) and medersa for education in Arabic (71,000 pupils), compared to public education which enrolls 578,000 pupils. In spite of the courageous efforts of public education providers, the most dynamic expansion is expected for private secular and community schools, whose cumulative enrolment can increase from 31,000 pupils, or 5 per cent of the total enrolment, to 170,000 pupils after the year 2000.

Source: Esquieu and Peano, 1996.

**Mauritius**

In June 1990, there were 278 primary schools in the Island of Mauritius, with a total student population of 131,200. These included 223 government schools, 46 aided schools administered by the Roman Catholic Education Authority, two aided schools run by the Hindu Education Authority and seven non-aided schools. Government schools with a total of 101,200 pupils accounted for 77 per cent of the school population.

In 1990 there were 124 secondary schools comprising state, confessional and other private schools. Some 20 per cent of all children go to state schools, and 80 per cent – to private schools. There are many disparities. The non-government schools in general have fewer academically qualified teachers than the state schools; they have a
higher pupil/teacher ratio; many of them are poorly equipped and housed. Since certain state and confessional schools have a high reputation, they attract the best candidates, and hence obtain the best results. At the other extreme, there are a small number of institutions which are a real disgrace to the system. There are also regional disparities; the best schools are located in Port Louis and Plaines Wilhems, while certain areas – especially in the South – are poorly provided with secondary schools. It is expected that there will be a net movement of 10 per cent of students from private secondary schools to state secondary schools. According to the estimates of the Private Secondary School Authority, less than 20 per cent of pupils attending private schools are in institutions comparing favorably with state schools. Others attend schools of varying quality, but generally lower than in state schools. These disparities are in terms of the teaching force, infrastructural facilities and in the quality of entrants.


The expansion of primary education, which was largely in the public sector, was accompanied by a mushrooming of private secondary schools. Private schools account for an 80 per cent share of secondary education enrolment, although provision of secondary education is free. Secondary education was fee-paying until 1976, when the government decided to make it free. In 1982, despite serious economic problems and suggestions by the World Bank and the IMF to review the issue of free secondary education, the government maintained it, and it is heavily subsidized by the state. Since 1983, there has been a process of reform of government grants to private schools with the intention of:

(a) making them more reflective of actual costs,
(b) incorporating incentives for improvements,
(c) providing financial resources for infrastructure development.
Before 1986, the system of grants provided for payment of teachers’ salaries *plus 25 per cent*, and a further 10 per cent to meet other costs. But this system provided no incentives for the schools to improve their standards. A new formula was introduced in 1986, based on a per capita grant, and including incentive grants for laboratories, libraries etc.

This formula was replaced in 1989 by a “Comprehensive grant formula”. This included an “Operation grant” to meet teaching and non-teaching costs and to provide incentives for operational improvements; and a “Management grant” to stimulate improvements in management and capital expenditure.

The Comprehensive grant formula has been subject to revision to allow for changes in policy orientations, cost structure and education development. The latest revision provides enhanced incentives for science and technical subjects, computer education, sports and extracurricular activities. In addition to grants, various loans may also be given by the government to private secondary schools for infrastructure development and transportation.

It is planned to level up the salaries and conditions of service in public and private secondary schools. In its efforts to either eliminate sub-standard private schools or to improve them, the government has started a program of in-service teacher training of private teachers.


**Senegal**

Private education exists at all levels: at primary it covers 10 per cent of total enrolment, at lower secondary 26 per cent, at upper secondary 17 per cent. In 1990–97, dynamics of its evolution were the same as in
Public education, and its share in total enrolment virtually remained unchanged in the 1990s.

At secondary level the number of private schools is higher than public ones (221 out of 413) because of smaller school size. The majority of private secondary schools are located in Dakar and other urban areas. In the Dakar agglomeration, private enrolment in lower secondary (23,000 pupils in 1996/97) accounts for half of public enrolment at this level, in upper secondary, about 25 per cent. At the level of primary, the majority of private schools are Catholic; at the level of secondary, the number of secular profit-making institutions set up by retired teachers is at present higher than Catholic schools (105 and 92 in Senegal, 60 and 18 in Dakar). Pupil/teacher ratio in private education varies from 13:1 in rural to 55:1 in suburban areas.

Relations between the state and private schools are regulated by a special law of 1994. The legislation is favorable to private schools, which are recognized by the state and have the authorization of the Ministry of Education to operate under its supervision. In reality, the number of actual classes and their size may be higher than authorized by the Ministry. For administrative matters private schools depend on the Division of Private Education at the Cabinet of Ministers.

As regards funding, those private schools that are recognized and operate for at least two years (about 30 every year) are eligible for state subventions, such as teacher salaries and other recurrent expenditure. Teachers in registered private education are entitled to salaries at the same level as civil servants. In reality, there has been a “freeze” on government subventions for private education since 1993 and delays have occurred in the actual release of funds for this purpose.

The range of tuition fees in private education is from 6,000 FCFA (60 French francs, or US$10) per month in rural areas up to 10,000-
15,000 FCFA in the cities, and sometimes up to 25,000 FCFA in prestigious profit-making private institutions at secondary level.


**South Africa**

*State-aided schools*

State-aided schools are those that receive various percentages of state funds but are not owned by the state. The three main models of state-aided schools are: farm (or mine) schools, community schools and Model C schools.

*Farm schools*

Farm schools are found on private farm (or mine) land and are owned by the farmer (or mine). They were originally built for the children of the farmer’s (or mine’s) own black farmworkers, but at present children from neighbouring farms often attend these schools. The state pays for teacher salaries, textbooks, furniture and stationery and may subsidize building costs (up to 100 per cent) and maintenance costs (up to 50 per cent). Farm schools are controlled by the farmer or manager or by a governing body consisting of the farmer or manager and four elected parents. The farmer or governing body can hire, promote and fire teachers, supervise the principal and teachers, decide who can attend the school, upgrade the school or not, control subsidies etc. The farmer, however, is not obliged to establish a governing body and can abolish it at any time. Thus, the farmer or manager has considerable control over both the management and educational functions of the school. Most farm schools are small, multigrade primary schools. They are among the poorest and least well-resourced schools in the country with the most inadequate buildings, least-
qualified teachers and are dependent on the farmer's generosity to provide basics such as water, electricity etc. Teachers cannot live on the farm if they wish to receive a housing subsidy. Farm schools are by definition rural and are often in remote areas. Since not all farms have schools (only about 10 per cent), children often have to walk long distances to attend school.

**Community schools**

Community schools are built and maintained by the community on community land in rural areas especially in the former homelands or in urban townships. They may receive subsidies for construction, but this depends on whether extra funds are available. The state is responsible for paying teacher salaries, textbooks and stationery, while the community is responsible for all other expenses. Most community schools are poorly resourced in terms of buildings, educational materials and such basic facilities as water and electricity, because most of these communities are very poor and do not have the resources to adequately support a school. Community schools are supposed to be run by an elected school committee made up of parents. However, in some communities, traditional leaders exert considerable influence over the school. Children often have to walk long distances to attend school and class sizes are often very large. As is the case with farm schools, many children who should attend the school do not, and the drop-out rate is high. Approximately one-third of South African pupils are enrolled in community schools.

**Model C schools**

Model C schools were established in 1992 by the previous apartheid government. At that time 94 per cent of the former state schools for whites, the best resourced and staffed, were semi-privatized and each turned over to an elected body of parents. The state continues to pay
teacher salaries according to an agreed-upon student/teacher ratio (about 80 per cent of their operating cost). An elected governing body is responsible for collecting additional money for operating costs which may include additional teachers. The governing body has wide-ranging powers and can determine school policy and admission criteria, set tuition fees, hire, promote and dismiss staff, make changes in curriculum, raise additional funds, make decisions on other capital expenditure and generally manage the school.

*Private (or independent) schools*

Private schools are owned by individuals, companies, churches, trusts or other bodies and are governed by them. These schools seek to meet the linguistic, cultural, religious and other needs of various groups. Although they raise most of their own funds, usually through school fees, they may receive some subsidies (up to 50 per cent of an estimate of the cost of replacing fixed assets) from provincial authorities. In the past, some church schools received funds from NGOs or from religious organizations outside the country. Private schools must be registered with the provincial education department and must comply with certain minimum conditions concerning teacher qualifications, curriculum, standards, length of school day and the school calendar, as well as school building standards. The school enrolment must meet a minimum standard. Private schools vary from well-funded elite schools charging high tuition fees to poorly resourced inner city and township schools for children whose parents have given up on under-funded and chaotic state and state-aided schools.

Zambia

A small missionary private-school sector existed before and after independence in 1964. These schools operated according to the principles of government policy. They followed a policy of free education, as in government schools, and recruited pupils from all social and economic backgrounds. *New commercialized private schools emerged in urban areas in 1976–77 and were allowed by the government to complement its efforts in the provision of education in order to avoid the introduction of tuition fees in public schools.* Private education institutions were permitted if they satisfied the requirements for registration and were run or operated in accordance with the relevant government act. The main purpose of the legal requirements was to protect the students and families concerned by ensuring that fees were charged at a reasonable level and that satisfactory standards of education provision were maintained. In the 1980s there were 74 officially registered and approved private schools, mostly of secondary education.

At the same time, a group of elite private schools emerged (both primary and secondary), which are registered and approved by the Ministry, to serve high- and middle-class expatriate and Zambian families. But entry to some of these schools is restricted; applications for admission take a long time to process, during which time the school checks the families’ socio-economic background. These schools charge high fees which are established and increased without the involvement of the Ministry of Education.

Neither type of private school receives grants or subsidies from the government, teachers are recruited and managed by school proprietors from the school income.

Zimbabwe

Among African countries, Zimbabwe traditionally has the largest share of private education at primary and secondary levels. There are in all 4,301 registered private primary schools of all types compared to 266 public schools, and 1,325 private secondary schools compared to 197 public schools at this level. Most of the private schools are community schools which are managed by local community districts.

For all registered private schools, the government pays teacher salaries, wages and allowances and a tuition per capita grant, designed to help poor communities. For approved building projects at these schools, the government may also pay a building grant-in-aid of about 30 per cent of construction costs.

Because of the tuition per capita grant provided by the government (from US$7 to 20 in primary and from US$8 to 24 in secondary), tuition fees charged by the school have to be approved by the Ministry of Education.

Source: Madamombe et al., 1997.
Appendix III. Private enrolment as percentage of total enrolment in primary and secondary general education in African countries in 1985 and 1995

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Appendix V. Comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages of private education as compared to public education

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<td>• can be profit-oriented&lt;br&gt;• quality of instruction and conformity with formal curriculum are not guaranteed</td>
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<td><strong>2. Management and administration</strong>&lt;br&gt;• less bureaucracy and administrative regulations&lt;br&gt;• flexible arrangements for teaching and learning conditions</td>
<td>• less reporting and accountability&lt;br&gt;• appropriate conditions are not guaranteed</td>
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<td><strong>3. Teachers</strong>&lt;br&gt;• more flexible procedures for teacher management&lt;br&gt;• savings on teacher wages and benefits&lt;br&gt;• teachers may be part-time recruited from public schools</td>
<td>• teachers may not be civil servants&lt;br&gt;• teachers may be unqualified or under-qualified or untrained&lt;br&gt;• teachers may be paid less than in public schools</td>
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<td><strong>4. Achievements and assessment</strong>&lt;br&gt;• performance should correspond to parents' expectations</td>
<td>• may not be formally licensed, accredited or recognized by authorities</td>
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<td><strong>5. Funding and finance</strong>&lt;br&gt;• has its own funding sources, which are independent from government funding in cash and in kind</td>
<td>• depends on parents and community finance&lt;br&gt;• may create inequity and inequality in access and provision of education, subject to income of households and their contributions of tuition/user fees and in kind&lt;br&gt;• cost-effectiveness may not be consistent and durable or may become counter-productive when same variables (teacher remuneration and teaching/learning conditions) change</td>
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<td><strong>6. Cost-effectiveness</strong>&lt;br&gt;• may be more cost-effective than similar public schools due to various economies and savings in teacher remuneration and teaching/learning conditions</td>
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### Appendix VI. Private consumption in sub-Saharan Africa

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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</table>

Appendix VIII. Factors determining the volume of tuition fees in profit-making schools

- Level of income/purchasing power of household
- Competition with other schools and comparative performance
- Legal regulation if any
- Actual costs of running the school (wage bill, building, maintenance, etc.)
- Accountability vis-à-vis school committee (board of trustees)
- Private demand and expected private rates of return to education


Private education in sub-Saharan Africa


Foster, Ph. 1965. Education and social change in Ghana. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.


Krashinsky, M. 1986. “Why educational vouchers may be bad economics”. In: *Teacher College Record*, No.88. pp. 139-151.


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