Male roles, masculinities and violence: a culture of peace perspective
Also in the Cultures of Peace Series:

*The Culture of Democracy: A Challenge for Schools*
*Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr: The Power of Nonviolent Action*
*Peace! An Anthology by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates*
*Tolerance*
*UNESCO – An Ideal in Action: The Continuing Relevance of a Visionary Text*
*UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement*
*Towards a Women’s Agenda for a Culture of Peace*
Male roles, masculinities and violence
A culture of peace perspective

Edited by Ingeborg Breines, Robert Connell and Ingrid Eide
The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this book and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Published in 2000 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP
Typeset by Gérard Prosper, Paris
Printed by Presses Universitaires de France, Vendôme

ISBN 92-3-103745-5

© UNESCO 2000
Only together,
women and men in parity and partnership,
can we overcome obstacles and inertia,
silence and frustration,
and ensure the insight, political will,
creative thinking and concrete actions
needed for a global transition
from the culture of violence to a culture of peace.

UNESCO Statement on
Women’s Contribution to a Culture of Peace
September 1995

We hope therefore that this expert meeting
will throw light on the very complicated issues
of socialization and education
in shaping the minds and actions
of women and men in the service of peace
and how they together can create
peaceful means of resolving conflicts.

H.E. Helga Hernes
Ambassador, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
From her opening address at the
UNESCO Expert Group Meeting on
Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace
Oslo, Norway, 24 September 1997
## Contents

Introduction  *Ingeborg Breines, Robert Connell, Ingrid Eide*  9

### Part One

**The new social-scientific research on masculinity and patriarchy, and the ways gender is implicated in violence and peacemaking**

Chapter 1. Arms and the man: using the new research on masculinity to understand violence and promote peace in the contemporary world  *Robert W. Connell*  21

Chapter 2. Determinants of culture: men and economic power  *Alberto Godenzi*  35

Chapter 3. The identity of dominance: masculinity and xenophobia  *Georg Tillner*  53

Chapter 4. Masculinities in context: on peace issues and patriarchal orders  *Øystein Gullvåg Holter*  61

Chapter 5. The negative side of development interventions and gender transitions: impoverished male roles threaten peace  *Constantina Safilios-Rothschild*  85

Chapter 6. Questions about change and the traditional male approach to international politics  *Marysia Zalewski*  95

### Part Two

**Local or regional studies of masculinities, violence and peacemaking**

Chapter 7. South African men in the post-apartheid era: responses, dangers and opportunities  *Robert Morrell*  107

Chapter 8. Soviet and post-Soviet masculinities: after men’s wars in women’s memories  *Irina Novikova*  117

Chapter 9. Hunting, ruling, sacrificing: traditional male practices in contemporary Balkan cultures  *Svetlana Slapšak*  131

Chapter 10. Men and gender equality in the Nordic countries  *Knut Oftung*  143

Chapter 11. ‘Our best boys’: the making of masculinity in Israeli society  *Uta Klein*  163

Chapter 12. Education, masculinity and violence  *Mirjana Najcevska*  181
Chapter 13. Male roles and the making of the Somali tragedy
   Hassan Keynan  189
Chapter 14. Masculinity à la russe: gender issues in the Russian Federation today  Andrei Sinelnikov  201

Part Three
Discussion of peacemaking strategies or practices focusing on men and masculinities  211
Chapter 15. Working with men and boys to challenge sexism and end men’s violence  Michael Kaufman  213
Chapter 16. Neither male nor female: neither victim nor executioner  Judith Hicks Stiehm  223
Chapter 17. Searching for our identity  Daniel Rios Pineda  231
Chapter 18. Reducing men’s violence: the personal meets the political  Michael Kimmel  239
Chapter 19. Values education towards a culture of peace  Lourdes R. Quisumbing  249
Chapter 20. Engendering peace: creative arts approaches to transforming domestic and communal violence  Malvern Lumsden  257

Appendices
Appendix 1. Report of the Expert Group Meeting (excerpts)  271
Appendix 2. Statement made by Olöf Ölafsdóttir, Head of the Section Equality between Women and Men  281

About the authors  285
Introduction

This book is based on the first international discussion of the connections between men and masculinity, on the one hand, and peace and war, on the other. It addresses issues that are of great importance in the building of a culture of peace, but which, until very recently, have been marginalized or ignored. The chapters in this book discuss not only the existing connections between masculinities and violence, but also practical questions about how masculinities can change in ways favourable to peace and how peacemaking strategies should handle questions about masculinities.

In preparing these texts for publication, we gave attention both to preserving the distinctive perspectives from different national contexts, and to making the research, concepts and policy discussions accessible for an international audience. While the main focus of the conference was on the European region, participants also came from three other continents. We are convinced that the issues and ideas discussed here are of global significance.

We considered that the papers from the Expert Group Meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace, held under the auspices of UNESCO in Oslo on 24–28 September 1997, were themselves an important resource for policy and practice, and that is the reason for this book. We hope that it will contribute to further reflection and action on the issues of masculinity, gender sensitivity and non-violence, and how these issues can contribute to the worldwide development of a culture of peace.

The Expert Group Meeting

The Expert Group Meeting was not only a new departure, but also part of a series. Three previous conferences held under the United Nations’ auspices had addressed issues about gender and peace. Two of the meetings, Gender and the Agenda for Peace (New York, 1994) and Political Decision Making and Conflict Resolution: The Impact of Gender Difference (Santo Domingo,
were organized by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW). The Expert Group Meeting on Women’s Contribution to a Culture of Peace (Manila, 1995) was organized by UNESCO.

The meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace was organized because of the increasing recognition of problems concerning men and masculinity. Existing masculinities are often part of a culture of violence; yet men must become more actively involved in the building of a culture of peace. The meeting, it was hoped, would develop strategies and suggest concrete measures to move societies closer to a culture of peace. Even though the question of male violence was, and still is, a ‘burning’ issue, the idea, in organizing this meeting, was not to dwell excessively on violence. Rather, the intention was to pool the talents and energies of experts in the field to formulate suggestions and mechanisms for changing the deep-rooted patterns of the culture of war and violence. Participants were invited to investigate the obstacles to the development of a culture of peace and develop initiatives for overcoming them.

Among the fundamental questions that were raised and to which the United Nations system, research institutions and civil society all struggle to find timely answers, were:

• How can societies ‘construct defences for peace in the minds of men’, described as an enormous educational task in the UNESCO Constitution (1945)?
• How do we teach and how do we learn to develop an ‘active disgust for war’ as expressed by the first woman Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Bertha von Suttner (1905) in her book *Down with the Weapons*?
• How can nations educate their citizens for ‘the full development of the human personality and . . . the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’, as underlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)?

The Oslo Meeting brought together: (a) researchers in the rapidly developing field of social-science studies in masculinities; (b) activists in anti-violence work concerning men; (c) policy-makers, administrators and researchers with experience in gender issues; (d) policy-makers, administrators and researchers involved in peacemaking and violence prevention.

The group was given the task of advising UNESCO about the development of its Culture of Peace project from a gender perspective and also of making proposals that could be taken up by Member States. The experts were asked to contribute actively to the final report of the meeting, which was presented to the Director-General of UNESCO, quickly translated into French, Spanish, Russian and Kiswahili and widely circulated (see Appendix 1).

Due to the level of complexity, difficulty and sensitivity of the issues under discussion, UNESCO paid particular attention to the creation of a working climate that favoured open exchange and dialogue.
The expectations for the outcome of this first United Nations meeting to focus on men in relation to peace issues varied from outright pessimism and scepticism to optimistic thinking that positive strategies developed at the meeting would make a real difference in the lives of women and men.

The need for a gender perspective
At the fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) Member States of the United Nations system expressed their readiness to take the so-called ‘women’s issues’ out of marginality by underlining the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective throughout all the twelve Critical Areas of Concern of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995). Member States also stated their willingness to view women less as victims and more as important agents of change, and to further study the relations between women and men, and re-evaluate women’s traditional roles in society. This gender analysis, as an important tool for policy-making, inevitably called into question current male roles and the expectations concerning ‘being a man’ in different sociocultural contexts.

The importance of gender analysis and mainstreaming of a gender perspective was further highlighted at the ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council) meeting of July 1997 (Doc. E/1997/L.), which also provided the following clarification of the concept:

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

ECOSOC also drew the attention of other bodies of the United Nations system to ‘the need to mainstream a gender perspective systematically into all areas of their work, in particular in areas such as macro-economics, operational activities for development, poverty eradication, human rights, humanitarian assistance, budgeting, disarmament, peace and security, and legal and political matters’. Until recently, many of these areas, except in feminist critique, were considered gender-neutral or simply ‘a non-issue’. The lack of gender sensitivity tends to get stronger the closer one gets to international politics and defence issues.

The culture of peace perspective
UNESCO, as a member of the United Nations system, has emphasized a gender perspective within all its fields of competence (education, science,
culture and communication) including through its transdisciplinary project: Towards a Culture of Peace.

The UNESCO Culture of Peace Project was established in 1994 and builds on the mandate and the activities of the Organization that for more than fifty years has contributed to the building of peace through international and intercultural co-operation within its fields of competence. While assuming a new and dynamic role in conflict and post-conflict areas, UNESCO remains faithful to its original mandate of long-term peace-building and prevention of violent conflict; despite the fact that resources and recognition tend to be given to the more emergency-related, high-profile areas of activity.

The Culture of Peace Project can be seen as UNESCO’s response to the challenge of the United Nations Agenda for Peace. The project is ambitious and calls for no less than a global transformation from civilizations and cultures of violence and war to a culture of peace. It invites different partners to co-operate with UNESCO in providing their experiences, visions and practical solutions based on their particular sociocultural context. The strength of the project, besides the support for, co-operation with, and networking of, different peace initiatives and plans, and the establishment of national peacebuilding programmes, lies in the concept itself, which inspires hope and vision for change.

Building a culture of peace entails unlearning the codes of the culture of war that have pervaded our existence. This means questioning the institutions, priorities and practices of this culture as well as the destructive production, trafficking and use of arms. It further entails challenging the notion of development based primarily on economic criteria, and challenging different types of injustices, discrimination and exclusion. It also requires us to question the narrow concept of ‘security’, often measured by the counting of arms and tanks, instead of measuring the level of understanding between peoples.

A culture of peace cannot be imposed; it must be developed through a process and built upon local, regional and national efforts. As one village elder in Mozambique graphically asserted: ‘You can bring the culture of war in a plane and humanitarian aid in a truck, but you can’t bring us the culture of peace because it is a tree with its roots deep in our land.’ The Culture of Peace Project sets out to nurture this tree and help it to flourish and bear fruit in peoples and countries around the world.

Another feature embedded in the concept of a culture of peace is that people assume a global identity that builds upon other ‘layers’ of identities such as gender, family, community, ethnicity, nationality, profession and age. The concept underlines the growing interdependence between all people regardless of where they live. With the advent of modern technology and other human advances, the main threats to peace, security and quality of life for the individual transcend national borders and consequently impress
upon all the importance and necessity of a global identity linked to the values of a culture of peace.

At this moment in history, when it is perhaps possible to take action towards the general disarmament of nations, it is also both necessary and feasible to disarm our minds from the culture of war. Dialogue and respect for human rights must replace violence; intercultural understanding and solidarity must replace xenophobia and other ‘enemy’ images; sharing and free flow of information must replace secrecy; partnership and full empowerment of women must replace male domination. To quote the then Director-General of UNESCO, Mr Federico Mayor: ‘The culture of peace is a transition from the logic of force and fear to the logic of reason and love.’

To achieve a sustainable culture of peace, democratic participation, good governance and creativity must become the norm. UNESCO views education for all as the key to achieving democracy in everyday life and a guarantee of a broad basis for recruitment to decision-making positions. Education, both formal and informal, in schools, in the family, through the mass media and social institutions, is the most important process by which people can gain the values, attitudes and behavioural patterns consistent with a culture of peace. Education is the most important way to promote a culture of peace, provided that the education includes the excluded, is relevant to the different sociocultural contexts, is of high quality, is gender-sensitive, encourages interpersonal, intercultural and international dialogue and is based on ethical norms and solidarity.

In implementing the mainstreaming of a gender perspective on its trans-disciplinary project, Towards a Culture of Peace, UNESCO established in 1996 the Women and the Culture of Peace Programme whose other priorities are: (a) supporting women’s initiatives for peace; (b) empowering women for democratic participation in political processes to increase their capacity and impact especially in economic and security issues; and (c) contributing to gender-sensitive socialization and training for non-violence and egalitarian partnerships, with a special focus on boys and young men.

Overcoming a culture of war and violence

The decade of the 1990s alone witnessed some 100 armed conflicts and the twentieth century over 100 million deaths due to war and warlike activity. There is a strong and disturbing tendency in modern warfare for civilian victims, to a large extent women and children, to outnumber combatant casualties. Although entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected due to their general low status in society. UNHCR figures also indicate that women and children constitute 80 per cent of the world’s millions of refugees and displaced persons. UNICEF reports that 60 million women are ‘missing’ due to gender-based violence or lack of support.
Gendered violence may be deliberately undertaken. Sometimes systematic rape is used as a tactic or tool of war. The perpetrators often act with impunity because these acts of aggression are linked to traditional images of what it is to be a warrior, because of women being seen as men’s property, or because women fear to speak out. Research indicates that military cultures tend to foster attitudes that are demeaning to women, through training, violent and sexist language, images, jokes, drill chants, songs, etc.

The military still, despite some reductions, takes the lion’s share of the world’s economy. According to the UNDP 1997 Human Development Report the total figure for worldwide military expenditure in 1995 prices was estimated at $800 billion;\(^1\) in the same year nearly 22 million people were involved in military service. Ruth Leger Sivard’s publication World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 shows that the average amount spent per soldier was $31,500 a year, compared to $900 per student. For the biennium 1996/97 the United Nations regular budget was approximately $2.6 billion, while at the same time expenditure on the peacekeeping operations allocated by the Security Council amounted to approximately $2.7 billion ($4 billion in 1995). Budgets for emergency relief also grew enormously during those years. These figures show clearly that we are inefficient when it comes to the prevention of violence. Even within the United Nations system, Member States provided more resources for post-conflict reconstruction and costly peacekeeping than for prevention. Both humanitarian and peacekeeping operations come after human suffering, after the destruction of societies – in short, after our failures.

The former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, suggested some years ago to the General Assembly that the United Nations should establish a ‘Fund for Preventive Measures and Pro-active Diplomacy’. She promised that Norway would contribute to that fund and invited other Member States to join. Linked to the development of a culture of peace, it would be a long-awaited tool permitting us to transfer our attention from negative and disastrous effects of our action (or inaction) to constructive peacebuilding. Several initiatives such as peace corps, social and civil service as alternatives to military service, and training in gender-sensitive culture of peace, may be seen in this context. And why should a peacekeeper be a soldier, when he or she is normally trained for other purposes? In a post-conflict situation there is an enormous need for teachers, lawyers, psychologists, artists, doctors and nurses.

The UNESCO Culture of Peace Project attempts to mobilize civil society as well as the military against the growing violence in society, a physical violence that often manifests itself blindly against innocent people, or as conflicts between different interest groups, with homicide and war as its ultimate expression. When trying to tackle this violence at different levels of society, it is essential to address its root causes. As long as structural
violence exists in extreme forms of poverty, injustice, exclusion, inequality and lack of freedom, it is unlikely that a culture of peace can develop. So while addressing the problem of violence and denouncing war and the war machinery that profits from it, there is a need to reinforce our efforts to build an acceptable quality of life for everyone.

The women’s movement has made valuable contributions to the development of a holistic approach to this complex web of world challenges, as echoed in all the four United Nations Conferences on Women that have focused on the interrelation between equality, development and peace. These conferences have insisted that there will be no sustainable development without peace and no real peace without equality. Related questions have also been dealt with in other major United Nations conferences, such as the conferences on environment (Rio de Janeiro 1992), human rights (Vienna 1993), population issues (Cairo 1994) and social security (Copenhagen 1995). The Expert Group Meeting clearly showed the potential of the relative new men’s research and activism in favour of gender-sensitive and non-violent societies.

Men: a risk factor?

Often national statistics are not gender-disaggregated, and even when they are, gender differences are not adequately taken into consideration, either in the description of ‘reality’, or in plans for the future. We speak about the problems of violence in general terms, about criminality and youth gangs, without specifying that to an overwhelming degree it is boys and men who are represented in the statistics. Men’s life expectancy is lower than that of women, men have more accidents, they fill prisons and top criminal statistics, and are the ones who almost exclusively take decisions that lead to armed conflict and war. Average figures from Europe, the United States and Australia have shown that men stand charged for between 80 and 90 per cent of all violent crimes.

The questions then become: should we consider men a risk factor, to themselves, to other men and women, and to society at large? Do we socialize women for a culture of peace (to be caring, sharing, moderate, flexible and communicative) and men for a culture of violence and war (to be tough, over-decisive, forceful and aggressive)? If this is the case, then how can we best change these patterns? Are men like dinosaurs, as suggested by the British author Fay Weldon? Will they die out if they do not change? The Expert Group Meeting was organized to shed light on these questions and to suggest an agenda for change.

It was seen as essential that such an agenda for change take into consideration that men do not constitute, any more than women, a homogeneous group. It was hoped that the Expert Group Meeting would indicate the essential factors in the socialization process relevant to learning a non-violent response to conflict and disempowerment. A series of questions were raised:
• What are the expectations and role models that we present to children throughout their childhood and adolescence?
• Are some women who suffer from lack of access to power in society, low status, discrimination and patriarchal structures, trying to obtain indirect influence through fathers, husbands and sons, reinforcing in them traditional masculine behaviours and thereby perpetuating existing stereotypes?
• Does the school system still present a non-participatory, hierarchical and competitive model, and does the teaching of history still implicitly glorify war and war heroes?
• Is the market economy based exclusively on the survival of the fittest and world governance, favouring quickness and decisiveness more than reasoning, dialogue and consensus?
• Do the mass media emphasize the spectacular and dramatic, banalize violence and downplay the good examples?
• Is scientific research sufficiently geared towards peace?
• Why does violence sell so well?
• Are the resources in schools for military training or preparation, such as the cadet courses, more important both in time and resources than education for peace and global understanding?

From vicious to virtuous circles

The fact that the United Nations has proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace with UNESCO as the lead agency, and the following years 2001–2010 as the United Nations Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World and adopted the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (September 1999), impels us to reflect on what a culture of peace means to us and which scenarios for the future we want to support. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the past, and to refine and renew a vision for the future, to commit ourselves to eradicating from among us what is destructive to the survival of humanity and our environment.

At the start of this new century UNESCO’s Constitution is again growing in importance with its insistence on ‘intellectual and moral solidarity’. There is a search and seemingly a willingness by many different groups of society to establish ethical contracts, acknowledging the ethical role, the responsibility and the accountability of each and every person.

Among the many inspiring reports that provide guidance to our work are:
• The United Nations Report on The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, which gives incentives to the demobilization and social reintegration of children, and the draft Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child through which the recruitment and participation of children under the age of 18 in armed conflict will hopefully be prohibited.
• The Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, Learning: the Treasure Within (UNESCO,
1996), which highlights four pillars as the foundations of education: learning to know, learning to do, learning to be and learning to live together, with emphasis placed on the latter.

- The Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, *Our Creative Diversity* (UNESCO, 1996), which underlines the strength and richness of the world’s many cultures and how they are intertwined, as well as the importance of our common, creative diversity, and how creativity can help bring out potential and build happy societies.

A series of educational initiatives with immense potential to bring about change provides inspiration. For instance, in one of the more than 3,000 UNESCO’s Associated Schools, in Tromso, Norway, the teachers decided to avoid reacting to negative behaviour and disturbances from the pupils and instead give feedback only to positive behaviour. After four years they report a changed school environment, more gender-sensitive and less violent.

Another laboratory for change was started in Trinidad and Tobago where the teachers have put the culture of the classroom on the agenda. In Asia and the Pacific a broad high-level network for values education in schools has been formed and guidelines developed.

The Culture of Peace initiatives highlighted in this publication show how violence is ineffective, and thus contest the far too frequent view as to the socialization of boy-children, which presents violence as an acceptable means of expression and a sustainable solution to a conflict. These initiatives point towards an exciting gender-balanced, post-patriarchal society for the next millennium.

*Ingeborg Breines, Robert Connell and Ingrid Eide*

**Note**

The new social-scientific research on masculinity and patriarchy, and the ways gender is implicated in violence and peacemaking
The problem of men and violence

‘Arma virumque cano’, wrote the poet Virgil at the start of the Aeneid, ‘I sing of arms and the man who came first from the shores of Troy. . . .’ The Roman epic, and even more the Iliad on which it was modelled, are blood-drenched narratives of warrior men battling for pride, land and the possession of women. Thus the classical literature from which European culture stems, announces from the start the gender of war.

Though women have often manufactured weapons and serviced armies – and in an age of nuclear weapons are equally targeted – it is historically rare for women to be in combat. The 30 million members of the world’s armed forces today are overwhelmingly men. In many countries all soldiers are men; and even in those countries that admit women to the military, commanders are almost exclusively men. Men also dominate other branches of enforcement, both in the public sector as police officers and prison guards, and in the private sector as security agents.

In private life too, men are more likely to be armed and violent. In the United States, careful research by the criminologists Smith and Smith (1994) establishes that private gun ownership runs four times as high among men as among women, even after a campaign by the gun industry to persuade women to buy guns. (The average percentage of American men owning guns, in surveys from 1980 to 1994, was 49 per cent.) In the same country, official statistics for 1993 show men accounting for 91 per cent of murders and 84 per cent of arrests for aggravated assault (Department of Justice, 1994). In Australia in 1992/93 men were 90 per cent of those charged with homicide (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1995). These figures are not exceptional.

There is a debate about the gender balance of violence within households, and it is clear that many women are capable of violence (e.g. in punishing children). The weight of evidence, however, indicates that major
domestic violence is overwhelmingly by husbands towards wives (Dobash et al., 1992). Rape is overwhelmingly by men on women. Criminal rape shades into sexual intercourse under pressure. The national survey of sexual behaviour in the United States by Laumann et al. (1994) finds women six times as likely as men to have an experience of forced sex, almost always being forced by a man.

Further, men predominate in warlike conduct in other spheres of life. Body-contact sports, such as boxing and football, involve ritualized combat and often physical injury. These sports are almost exclusively practised by men. Dangerous driving is increasingly recognized as a form of violence. It is mainly done by men. Young men die on the roads at a rate four times that of young women, and kill at an even higher ratio. Older men, as corporate executives, make the decisions that result in injury or death from the actions of their businesses – industrial injuries to their workers, pollution injury to neighbours, and environmental destruction. Case-studies of such decisions, for example, Messerschmidt’s (1997) study of the Challenger spacecraft explosion, show their connection to a masculinized management style emphasizing toughness, risk-taking, and ruthlessness about profit.

So men predominate across the spectrum of violence. A strategy for peace must concern itself with this fact, the reasons for it, and its implications for work to reduce violence.

There is a widespread belief that it is ‘natural’ for men to be violent. Males are inherently more aggressive than women, the argument goes. ‘Boys will be boys’ and cannot be trained otherwise; rape and combat – however regrettable – are part of the unchanging order of nature. There is often an appeal to biology, with testosterone in particular, the so-called ‘male hormone’, as a catch-all explanation for men’s aggression.

Careful examination of the evidence shows that this biological essentialism is not credible. Testosterone levels for instance, far from being a clear-cut source of dominance and aggression in society, are as likely to be the consequence of social relations (Kemper, 1990). Cross-cultural studies of masculinities (e.g. Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994) reveal a diversity that is impossible to reconcile with a biologically fixed master pattern of masculinity.

When we speak statistically of ‘men’ having higher rates of violence than women, we must not slide to the inference that therefore all men are violent. Almost all soldiers are men, but most men are not soldiers. Though most killers are men, most men never kill or even commit assault. Though an appalling number of men do rape, most men do not. It is a fact of great importance, both theoretically and practically, that there are many non-violent men in the world. This, too, needs explanation, and must be considered in a strategy for peace.

Further, when we note that most soldiers, sports professionals, or executives are men, we are not just talking about individuals. We are
speaking about masculinized institutions. The organizational culture of armies, for instance, is heavily gendered. Recent social research inside armed forces in Germany (Seifert, 1993) and the United States (Barrett, 1996) reveals an energetic effort to produce a narrowly defined hegemonic masculinity. Similarly, organized sport does not just reflect, but actively produces, particular versions of masculinity (Messner and Sabo, 1994). Boys’ schools too may display a vehement gender regime designed to produce a combative, dominating masculinity (Morrell, 1994).

It is, then, in social masculinities rather than biological differences that we must seek the main causes of gendered violence, and the main answers to it. How are social masculinities to be understood? In grappling with this question, we are able to draw on a new generation of research, to which I now turn.

Understanding masculinities

The first step in the new thinking about men and masculinity was the idea of a ‘male sex role’. This idea became popular in the wake of liberal-feminist discussions of the ‘female sex role’ which both criticized cultural stereotypes and expressed optimism about change. According to sex-role theory, boys are ‘socialized’ to be masculine. They learn from the messages transmitted by family, school and mass media, and try to conform to a social stereotype of manliness.

Though a vital step beyond biological determinism, the ‘male role’ approach has severe limits. It has difficulty in understanding inequality, power, diversity and processes of change. The concept of ‘socialization’ is also a problem. It assumes that learners are passive, and so underestimates boys’ active engagement with masculinity.

Theoretical work on gender has decisively moved beyond the ‘sex role’ framework. There is increasing recognition that gender involves large-scale institutions as well as interpersonal relations. Gender involves power structures and economic relationships. Gender identities are plural, divided and may be unstable. Some gender processes operate at an unconscious level and some through impersonal processes in culture, such as language and symbolism. Gender is always interwoven with the dynamics of race and class (Ferree et al., 1998).

Given this rethinking of gender, we must always see masculinity as located in a structure of gender relations. Thus, for instance, Schwalbe (1992) argues that patriarchy, that is, the structure of gendered power, limits men’s capacity to take the position of the other and engage in an ethic of care – an argument highly relevant to the construction of a culture of peace. Yet masculinity is not just a static ‘place’ in a map of gender relations. It is an active social construction, a pattern of social conduct – conduct that responds to the situations (e.g. differences of power, definitions of bodily difference) in which people find themselves.
In recent years there has been a great flowering of empirical research on masculinities (surveyed in Connell, 1995). The trend includes sociology, anthropology, history, social psychology, education studies, cultural studies and political science. (The only social science missing seems to be the most masculinized – economics.) Many of these studies have great sophistication and complexity, and are not easy to summarize. Certain conclusions, however, emerge from this body of research as a whole. I shall condense them into seven points, noting in each case some implications for peace strategy:

1. **Multiple masculinities.** Different cultures, and different periods of history, construct gender differently. In multicultural societies there are likely to be multiple definitions of masculinity. Equally important, more than one kind of masculinity can be found within a given culture, even within a single institution such as a school or workplace.  
   **Implications.** Violent, aggressive masculinity will rarely be the only form of masculinity present, in any cultural setting. The variety of masculinities that are documented in research can provide examples and materials for peace education. Education programmes must recognize diversity in gender patterns, and the tensions that can result from social diversity.

2. **Hierarchy and hegemony.** Different masculinities exist in definite relations with each other, often relations of hierarchy and exclusion. There is generally a dominant or ‘hegemonic’ form of masculinity, the centre of the system of gendered power. The hegemonic form need not be the most common form of masculinity.  
   **Implications.** Large numbers of men and boys have a divided, tense, or oppositional relationship to hegemonic masculinity. Clear-cut alternatives, however, are often culturally discredited or despised. The most powerful groups of men usually have few personal incentives for gender change. Other groups may have stronger motives for change.

3. **Collective masculinities.** Masculinities are sustained and enacted not only by individuals, but also by groups, institutions, and cultural forms like the mass media. Multiple masculinities may be produced and sustained by the same institution.  
   **Implications.** The institutionalization of masculinity is a major problem for peace strategy. Corporations, workplaces, voluntary organizations, and the state are important sites of action. Collective struggle, and the reshaping of institutions, are as necessary as the reform of individual life.

4. **Bodies as arenas.** Men’s bodies do not fix patterns of masculinity, but they are still very important in the expression of masculinity, which constantly involves bodily experience, bodily pleasures, and the vulnerabilities of bodies.  
   **Implications.** Peace education may often be too much ‘in the head’. Health, sport and sexuality are issues that must be addressed in changing masculinity.
5. **Active construction.** Masculinities do not exist prior to social interaction, but come into existence as people act. Masculinities are actively produced, using the resources available in a given milieu.

**Implications.** The process of constructing masculinity, rather than the end state, may be the source of violence. No pattern of masculine violence is fixed, beyond all hope of social reform. Equally, no reform is final. It is possible that gender reforms will be overthrown and more violent patterns of masculinity reintroduced.

6. **Division.** Masculinities are not homogeneous, but are likely to be internally divided. Men's lives often embody tensions between contradictory desires or practices.

**Implications.** Any pattern of masculinity has potentials for change. Any group of men is likely to have complex and conflicting interests, some of which will support change towards more peaceable gender patterns.

7. **Dynamics.** Masculinities are created in specific historical circumstances. They are liable to be contested, reconstructed, or displaced. The forces producing change include contradictions within gender relations, as well as the interplay of gender with other social forces.

**Implications.** Masculinities are always changing, and this creates motives for learning. However, as any agenda for change is likely to be against some groups' interests, controversy and conflict are to be expected.

These lessons are mainly drawn from research on local patterns of gender. In thinking about a strategy for peace, however, we must go beyond local contexts, and think at a global level too.

UNESCO was created during the great wave of decolonization after the Second World War, and this connection has significance for a strategy concerned with masculinity. The colonial empires were gendered institutions, which disrupted indigenous gender orders, and installed violent masculinities in the hegemonic position. (For the broad outline of this history, see Connell, 1998, and for a striking case-study in southern Africa, see Morrell, 1994.) This process was the beginning of a global gender order, and the colonizers’ masculinities were the first globalizing masculinities. In turn, the process of decolonization disrupted the gender hierarchies of the colonial order. Where armed struggle was involved, the use of Western military technology also involved some adoption of Western military masculinity, and further disruption of community-based gender orders.

World politics today is increasingly organized around the needs of transnational capital and the creation of global markets. Neo-liberalism speaks a gender-neutral language of ‘markets’, ‘individuals’, and ‘choice’, but has an implicit view of masculinity. The ‘individual’ of neo-liberal theory has the attributes and interests of a male entrepreneur. Institutionally, the strong emphasis on competition creates a particular kind of hierarchy among
men. Meanwhile the increasingly unregulated world of transnational corporations places strategic social power in the hands of particular groups of men. Here is the basis of a new hegemonic masculinity on a world scale.

The hegemonic form of masculinity in the new world order, I would argue, is the masculinity of the business executives who operate in global markets, and the political executives and military leaderships who constantly deal with them. I call this ‘transnational business masculinity’, and I think that understanding it will be important for the future of peace strategies.

There is little research as yet on this pattern of masculinity, but we can get some indications from its reflections in management literature (Gee et al., 1996) and from local studies of the masculinity of business élites (Donaldson, 1997). On these indications, transnational business masculinity seems to be marked by increasing egocentrism, very conditional loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility for others. It is characterized by a limited technical rationality (‘management’), which is increasingly separate from science, and by an increasingly libertarian sexuality with a growing tendency to commodify relations with women (reflected in pornography, now generally provided in businessmen’s hotels, and sex tourism). But this does not represent a commitment to gender equality. International politics and transnational business are still almost totally dominated by men and are culturally masculinized. The neo-liberal politics associated with transnational business masculinity has undermined the reforms introduced by liberal feminism at the level of the nation-state: affirmative action programmes, anti-discrimination provisions, child-care services, etc.

It seems likely that different variations of transnational business masculinity are developing in different parts of the world. A version based in East Asia, with a strong commitment to hierarchy and social consensus, seems to be different from a version based in North America, with more hedonism and individualism, and greater tolerance for social conflict. These versions of masculinity are not necessarily compatible. In some arenas, including recent international debates on human rights, there seems already to be a struggle between them.

The politics of change in masculinity

Most politics is implicitly ‘men’s politics’, because in most countries men dominate the state. At times, however, gender issues about men are directly addressed, and agendas for the shaping of masculinity are proposed. This is what I call ‘masculinity politics’.

In the industrialized countries there has been an upsurge of masculinity politics in recent years and several distinct forms have emerged (Messner, 1997, distinguishes eight in the United States). It is important to recognize that there are competing agendas for the reform of masculinity. Contrasting agendas of change may lead in very different directions.
The best-known ‘men’s movement’ of recent years is a kind of psychological ‘recovery’ movement, which addresses the pain that heterosexual men feel and their uncertainties about gender, by trying to find the ‘deep masculine’ in their unconscious. Its activities range from the famous wilderness retreats and male initiation rituals to much more commonplace group therapy and counselling.

The social basis of this movement is the complicit masculinity that accepts the broad structure of gender relations but is not militant in its defence. The men in these movements have generally felt the impact of feminism. While their responses range from support to hostility, the movement’s main technique is separation from women to pursue men’s issues in ceremonies, support groups and other gatherings.

Their agenda for change is predominantly psychological, a healing of men’s ‘wounds’ and a greater acceptance of self, though there is often some emphasis on closer emotional bonds among men (Schwalbe, 1996). There is often a flavour of militarism in the celebration of the ‘inner warrior’ and the use of symbols like spears and swords. But some leaders of this movement, such as the American Robert Bly, are famous for anti-war stands. The movement’s constant exploration of emotions and relationships would undermine conventional patterns of men’s violence.

The defence of hegemonic masculinity is usually done quietly through institutions. Sometimes, however, an overt masculinity politics emerges that exalts men’s power and opposes feminism. Such a movement, though it mainly benefits already powerful men, may recruit key support from marginalized masculinities, for instance among working-class youth.

In recent years several versions of this kind of politics have appeared. One is the intensified promotion of exemplary masculinities in commercial mass media: in televised sports, Hollywood ‘action’ movies, violent video games, and the like. The messages in these media relentlessly insist on the bodily superiority of men and their mastery of technology and violence.

These themes are also picked up in right-wing movements such as the ‘militias’ in the United States. As Gibson (1994) shows, these are part of a wider paramilitary culture, in which a narrow model of masculinity – tough, dominating, and violent – is obsessively pursued. This masculine fundamentalism often goes together with hostility to the wider world: racist backlash against immigrants in Europe, the fear of the United Nations among right-wing groups in the United States. The problem such movements pose for a culture of peace is obvious.

On the religious right, new movements have emerged such as the Promise Keepers and the Million Man March in the United States, which have a somewhat different agenda. They reject personal violence and racism, and emphasize men’s role as husbands and fathers. These movements pick up masculinity therapy’s concern with what men have lost. Rather than separating further from women, they attempt to reconnect, but on
patriarchal terms, reinstalling men as heads of families. Consistent with this, these movements offer no criticism of the institutionalized power of the military or the symbolic violence of sport.

Since the 1960s there has been a movement among men concerned with change in gender relations, which is often overlooked in these discussions, though it is the longest-established social movement in masculinity politics – the gay movement. Gay men have mounted a vigorous critique both of conventional stereotypes of homosexuals, and of conventional masculinity as a source of oppression.

After a certain revival of conventionally masculine styles, gay men’s politics were reshaped in the 1980s around AIDS. In making their response to the HIV-AIDS epidemic, gay communities gave a stunning demonstration of men’s capacities for care, for emotional solidarity and for collective action in the face of crisis and abuse (Altman, 1994). The recent development of ‘queer’ politics has changed ground, now placing more emphasis on questioning identities and exploring new cultural possibilities.

In the early 1970s a small Men’s Liberation movement began to debate the implications of feminism for heterosexual men. Anti-sexist activism among straight men declined in the 1980s, but never died out, and found new strength in the 1990s. For instance in Canada, in the wake of the Montreal killings of 1989, a widespread movement emerged to contest violence against women, the White Ribbon Campaign (Kaufman, 1993). Discussions of how to change traditional masculinity are now occurring in countries as far apart as Japan (Ito, 1993), South Africa (Morrell, 1997), Germany (BauSteineMänner, 1996) and Chile (Valdés and Olavarría, 1998).

This transformative politics seeks to exit from current patriarchal gender arrangements; thus it is often called the ‘anti-sexist men’s movement’. But it also tries to transform existing forms of masculinity. The agenda for change usually emphasizes peacableness, sharing, and some rejection of careerism and competitiveness. It shares many goals with gay politics but has a mainly heterosexual base. Some forms of anti-sexist politics share masculinity therapy’s concern with the emotional lives of men and their capacities for nurturance. Its arenas are private as well as public, including the sharing of housework and child care, and attempts to create a more equal, reciprocal sexuality.

All these movements presuppose that masculinity can be changed (e.g. lost and restored). In that sense they have all departed from biological essentialism. I think, however, reform movements often overestimate men’s capacity to change themselves by individual acts of will, and underestimate the role of impersonal changes in the social environment.

The impact of the Western social order on colonized and post-colonial societies; changes in communications which disrupt established cultures; structural unemployment and changing technologies within industrialized societies – all have profound effects on gender relations and
forms of masculinity. Perhaps the most important influence in the 1990s was the growth of global markets in capital and commodities, and the accompanying changes in social and economic policy. This trend has been associated with the growth of transnational business masculinity, but also with changing the conditions of existence for all other forms of masculinity.

Any strategy for change in gender relations must recognize that the conflicting movements in masculinity politics reflect real interests. Gender reform is not easy. There is much to be learned, for instance, from the experience of desegregating military organizations. Where women have entered the military under 'equal opportunity' rules, the result has been cultural turmoil and attempts to reassert the masculinity of violence. Barrett (1996), studying US naval officers, shows how military men grapple with this cultural threat by reaffirming difference, circulating stories about women’s physical weakness and technical incompetence, etc.

An agenda for peace must expect to face opposition in depth, and will need to think of ways of dealing with it, including ways of making change attractive to significant groups of men.

Masculinities and educational strategy for peace

There are many causes of violence, including dispossession, poverty, greed, nationalism, racism and other forms of inequality, bigotry and desire. Gender dynamics are by no means the whole story. Yet given the concentration of weapons and the practice of violence among men (documented in the first section of this chapter), gender patterns appear to be strategic. Masculinities are the forms in which many dynamics of violence take shape.

The relationship of masculinity to violence is more complex than appears at first sight. Institutionalized violence (e.g. by armies) requires more than one kind of masculinity. The masculinity of the general is different from the masculinity of the front-line soldier, and armies acknowledge this by training them separately. The differing masculinities that are hegemonic in different cultures may lead to qualitatively different patterns of violence, as Kersten (1996) argues in a comparison of Japan with the United States and Australia.

Some violent patterns of masculinity develop in response to violence; they do not simply cause it. An important example is the ‘protest masculinity’ that emerges in contexts of poverty and ethnic oppression (for instance, under apartheid in South Africa: Xaba, 1997).

On the other hand, some patterns of masculinity are not personally violent, but their ascendancy creates conditions for violence, such as inequality and dispossession. An example is transnational business masculinity. Such masculinities may be indirectly connected with exemplary masculinities that are directly violent. An important example is business patronage of sports like boxing and football.
A gender-informed strategy for peace must, therefore, be sophisticated about gender patterns. It must also be designed to operate across a broad front, broader than most agendas of sex-role reform would suggest. On the basis of the research discussed in the second section above, and the movements discussed in the third section, the arenas for action to reduce masculine violence include:

1. **Development.** Schooling, child rearing and adult/child relationships in families, classrooms, play groups, etc. (including the issues commonly thought of as ‘sex-role modelling’).

2. **Personal life.** Marital relations and sexuality, family relationships, friendship (including the role of sexual and domestic violence in constructions of masculinity).

3. **Community life.** Peer groups, neighbourhood life, leisure including sports (including youth subcultures as bearers of violent masculinities).

4. **Cultural institutions.** Higher education, science and technology, mass media, the arts and popular entertainment (including exemplary masculinities in broadcast sports).

5. **Workplaces.** Occupational cultures, industrial relations, corporations, unions and bureaucracies; the state and its enforcement apparatuses (army, police, etc.).

6. **Markets.** The labour market and the effects of unemployment; capital and commodity markets both international and local; management practices and ideologies.

What guidelines, or general purposes, might link action across this very broad spectrum? I do not think we should follow the model of gender reform that demands men adopt a new character, and instantly become ‘the new man’. Such hero-making agendas deny what we already know about the multiplicity and the internal complexity of masculinities. Our goal, rather, should be to develop gender practices for men which shift gender relations in a democratic direction.

Democratic gender relations are those that move towards equality, non-violence, and mutual respect between people of different genders, sexualities, ethnicities and generations. Some of the qualities in ‘traditional’ definitions of masculinity (e.g. courage, steadfastness, ambition) are certainly needed in the cause of peace. Active models of engagement are needed for boys and men, especially when peace is understood not just as the absence of violence, but as a positive form of life.

The task is not to abolish gender, but to reshape it; to disconnect (for instance) courage from violence, steadfastness from prejudice, ambition from exploitation. In the course of that reshaping, diversity will grow. Making boys and men aware of the diversity of masculinities that already exist in the world, beyond the narrow models they are commonly offered, is an important task for education.

Although the hierarchy of masculinities is part of the problem in
gender relations, the fact that there are different masculinities is in itself an asset. At the lowest level, it establishes that masculinity is not a single fixed pattern. More positively, multiple masculinities represent complexity of interests and purposes, which open possibilities for change. Finally the plurality of gender prefigures the creativity of a democratic social order.

For men, the democratic remaking of gender practices requires persistent engagement with women, not the separatism-for-men which is strong in current masculinity politics. This is notably true in education and youth work. Kindler (1993) notes that educational programmes on masculinity can be gender-specific (involving one gender only) or gender-relevant (involving both). The gender-specific model has been the more common in educational work on masculinities, but the gender-relevant model has important possibilities also.

Educational strategies on masculinity must be inclusive in another sense too, responding to the differing cultural meanings of gender and the different socio-economic circumstances in which students live. A programme devised for suburban middle-class students may be very inappropriate for ethnically diverse inner-city children in poverty, or rural children living in villages.

Educational work on masculinity has many starting-points in school life (Connell, 1996). Although certain activities (e.g. sport, discipline) are especially influential in the shaping of masculinities, teaching about gender issues can occur across the curriculum. It is important that any programme be tailored to the specific culture and economic context of students. It is also important, as Denborough (1995) argues from Australian experience with anti-violence education, to develop respectful ways of working with boys and young men, ways that are able to hold their commitment.

Although school systems are the largest educational institutions in modern societies, they are not the only ones. We should think of educational strategies as operating across all the ‘arenas of action’ listed above. Masculinity politics are found in all of them, and learning may take place in any of them. Adult education in settings such as trade unions, community organizations and workplaces might be as important as school-based education of the very young. In the construction of gender there is little reason to think the earliest patterns are the most decisive.

We should also be inventive in the forms taken by educational action. Despite the recent reaction towards authoritarian teaching methods in some quarters, it is likely that education for peace is best done through participatory methods. We should learn from the experience of AIDS education, where community-based ‘peer education’ methods have proved the most effective in changing dangerous conduct.

A peace-education strategy on masculinity needs to follow a linking approach. There are already many educational and social campaigns confronting different forms of masculinized violence: sexual harassment in
the workplace, homophobic violence, rape, domestic violence, dangerous driving and so-called ‘road rage’, gun violence and militarism. The perspective of a ‘culture of peace’ can help to link these diverse educational efforts, and thus multiply their effectiveness.

Bibliography


Arms and the man: using the new research on masculinity to understand violence and promote peace in the contemporary world


To develop a culture of peace, the underlying conditions which would favour such a development must first be established. As a culture of peace is mainly interaction between human beings, and the concept of peace is to a large extent based on egalitarian relationships, equality between men and women is a crucial condition. Inequality is a form of structural violence and if the objective of a culture of peace is to solve conflicts in non-violent ways, by definition, inequality obstructs this development. This chapter discusses the relationship between gender inequality and violence or conversely between gender equality and non-violence. Furthermore it stresses that gender equality should be measured primarily by the factor of economic parity. Recent statistics show clearly how, despite a rising participation of women in education and in the labour force, imbalanced economic power between men and women still exists. A major transformation between men and women at the economic level would contribute to the construction of a culture of peace.

In this chapter it will be claimed that a culture of peace is not possible without gender equality. It will also be emphasized that gender equality is to a very large extent defined in terms of an equal distribution of economic power. Gender equality is, of course, not the only important influential factor for a culture of peace. In view of the theme of this book, it will be given precedence here. Gender equality is understood as a distribution of influence, power and opportunities based on parity.

Neither gender equality nor a culture of peace can be observed on a large scale at present; at the most, we can speak of approaches that are to be found in pockets of society. A (pre)historic perspective also shows up data shortages and takes us to the midst of controversies about archaeological interpretations (Tavris, 1992). However, what can be observed in abundance is evidence of gender inequality and a culture of war.
War cultures or destructive cultures (to take up Erich Fromm’s term) are characterized by violence, dominance and exploitation. The absence of such forms of interaction does not mean that a culture of peace has automatically been reached, but that itconsiderably increases the chances of creating such a culture. As dominance and exploitation are also forms of violence, gender inequality and violence or conversely gender equality and non-violence will be discussed in the following contexts.

**Inequality and violent behaviour**

Inequality between men and women and violence of men against women are worldwide phenomena. Although the extent both of inequality and of violence varies between different countries, it is now widely acknowledged, as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) states, that ‘there is no country in the world in which women are treated as well as men’.

We are – through comparative-cultural research – familiar with groups in which men’s violence against women belongs to the standard behaviour repertoire, and we know of groups in which men use less or even no violence against their partners (Levinson, 1989; Sanday, 1981). Groups with less violence are characterized by co-operation and equality between their members. Equality is attributed considerable importance.

We know today that control over income and possession, that is, over economic power is not only the primary variable affecting gender equality but is logically also the very foundation of violence against women. We also know that although women make up half of the world population and work more hours than men (see Fig. 1), they receive in return only a fraction of income (i.e. most of women’s work remains unpaid, unrecognized and undervalued, and, moreover, wages for paid work are on average significantly lower than those of men) and their global possessions make up less than 1 per cent.

In all the groups characterized by gender equality known through anthropological research, women wielded at least half the economic power (Blumberg, 1984). It is interesting to note that in the observed groups there exists no linear relation between gender equality and gender differentiation. Gender equality occurs where women and men do the same things and do not overtly stress their biological features, that is to say, gender differentiation does not exist. But gender equality also occurs where there is a clear gender differentiation and where the fields of activities are segregated according to gender. And finally there is gender equality in groups with higher gender differentiation and at the same time more co-operation between the genders in relation to different fields of activity. Once again the decisive factor in all three constellations is the economic parity of women.

Of course, these observations must be relativized, as all these groups are small in numbers. Their group structures are easily comprehensible as are their organizational and technical levels. In all more populous human
Fig. 1. Women’s work time in relation to men’s.
associations whose political, economic and stratification systems are correspondingly more complex, throughout the various stages of development, male dominance – especially the control of economic power – has asserted itself in no uncertain way.

I shall not go into the possible reasons for this seizure of power but merely stress that gender equality can hardly be achieved without deconstructing male control of economic power. The control of economic power exerts influence on such varying and relevant areas as fertility, marriage, divorce, premarital sex, freedom of movement, access to education (Blumberg, 1984). We can be certain about one point: 'The lower women’s relative economic power, the more likely they are to be oppressed physically, politically and ideologically' (Blumberg, 1984, p. 75), and the less likely will a culture of non-violence come into being.

The following observations exemplify the connection between equality and violence:

• Men’s violence occurs less often when men solve their conflicts with other men in a peaceful way.
• Men’s violence is less frequent when the future prospects of women facing divorce are good.
• Finally, physical oppression of women, especially men’s violence against women, occurs less in the anthropologically investigated groups in which women have organized themselves into separate economic entities which men do not enter or control.

This is an important point, which, however, must be qualified. The realization that economic groups and networks segregated according to sex protect women from oppression and violence is only valid when, first, men can exert no influence on these entities and, second, the ‘autonomous’ women’s enterprises are respected socially and play an important economic role regarding power and resources. It is therefore clear that here it is not the traditional sex-segregated work situation that is being referred to, because here the work areas generally attributed to women are, as is well known, associated with lower pay, lower occupational prestige and reduced opportunities for women (Barbezat, 1993); furthermore, these traditional sex-segregated work areas are controlled by men.

The relation between gender inequality and men’s violence is obvious and operates both ways. First, in so far as inequality promotes and encourages violence, it is to be interpreted as an expression or consequence of inequality and, second, inequality is perpetuated and promoted by violence. Here violence is the means, the instrument to maintain and assert inequality. The connection between inequality and violence has been summed up aptly by the Canadian Panel on Violence against Women: Ending Violence – Achieving Equality.

Although it is certain that unequal structures provide an ideal breeding ground for violence, they are not per se a precondition of violence.
Violence can be envisaged without inequality. Inequality, on the other hand, is always inextricably bound up with violence, not so much in a physical or psychological but more in a structural, that is, economic sense.

Attempts have been made by means of inequality and dominance to solve the tasks of distribution social groups are faced with. The tricky question is how scarce or finite resources ought to be distributed. Scarce resources include especially material wealth, prestige and power.

Inequality means a social disparity in power, opportunity, privilege and justice between groups. Therefore, inherent in the concept of inequality is a relation in which one or more groups exploit or expropriate another or other groups. ‘The advantage that one group enjoys depends inextricably on the disadvantage that another suffers. . . . If one group enjoys a larger portion of a finite resource, it can only have come from the other group or groups who reside in the same social system’ (Jackman, 1994, p. 2), respectively in the same social field. In these struggles for resources or capital there are winners and losers. The winners are defined as dominant groups, the losers as subordinated groups.

Particular fields are marked more by structural violence (for example, the fields of justice or economics); in others, physical and psychological violence dominate (as, for example, in the area of relations between couples). Physical violence (the most obvious form and therefore often the only identified, acknowledged and condemned form of violence) only needs to be practised when structural and psychological violence no longer suffice to maintain the unequal relations.

As physical violence is highly visible it is most difficult to legitimate. Therefore, dominant groups try to secure their access to, and control of, scarce resources for as long as possible without having to apply physical violence. The more established and the more institutionalized the inequalities are, the easier it is to do so. The sooner a group can play down its control as being normal (a matter of concealment), meaning ‘that’s just the way things are’, the less it needs to legitimize its dominance. And the less need there is for physical acts of aggression ‘to claim one’s due as a member of the advantaged group: benefits simply fall into one’s lap’ (Jackman, 1994, p. 8). In order to prevent this arrangement of expropriation being called into question, ideologies that cover up the true nature of the arrangement must be created and upheld.

On the cover of her book, Jackman (1994) says:

Ideology becomes the velvet glove, as dominant groups use ‘sweet persuasion’ and thus delimit the moral parameters for political discourse with subordinates. Dominant groups . . . are drawn especially to the ideological mould of paternalism, where the coercion of subordinates is grounded in love, rather than hate. . . . Love, affection and praise are offered to subordinates on strict condition that the subordinates comply with the terms of the unequal relationship.
If the subordinates no longer wish to comply with these terms, alternative methods of persuasion must be found. These include open, direct uses of violence.

The institutionalization of the relations of inequality, the system of varying ranks is known as stratification. A stratified society organizes its members according to their access to scarce resources. ‘Sexual stratification refers to the extent of difference between the overall status of women and men within a society’ (Chafetz, 1980, p. 105).

**Dimensions of inequality**

Weber differentiated between three levels of stratification: the economic (wealth and income), the political (power) and the social prestige dimension (status). In all these dimensions the inequality of women to men is striking. I have already referred to the economic inequality. I wish to add – in agreement with what has been said so far – that economic inequality is the *pièce de résistance* of gender inequality. Whereas compared with the rest of Europe, the Nordic countries have made great progress towards equality in the second dimension (i.e. the political), they have experienced unparalleled difficulties at the economic level. The Group of Specialists on Equality and Democracy of the Council of Europe (1996) states on page 15 of the final report: ‘Nordic women are still strongly under-represented in administrative and commercial élites, and although there is a large presence of women on the labour market, they play only a very minor role in the control of this market.’

The Human Development Report of the United Nations uses a Gender Empowerment Measure in order to examine ‘whether women and men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making’ (UNDP, 1995, p. 73). A total of 116 countries were examined in connection with four variables: the percentage of women who hold seats in parliament, the percentage of female administrators and managers, the percentage of female professional and technical workers, and women’s percentage of earned income (see Table 1). The results of this study are clear: ‘In most countries, industrial or developing, women are not yet allowed into the corridors of economic and political power. In exercising real power or decision-making authority, women are a distinct minority throughout the world’ (UNDP, 1995, p. 86).

It is also worth taking a closer look at the social dimension of inequality. This dimension has to do with what people think of you. If people think poorly of you, you have a low level of prestige (which is also a finite resource). If men think poorly of women, if men regard women as different as well as of lower value, the shorter are the roads to acts of violence, because what is of little value may be punished – a mechanism that also of course works at the level of race and class. Or, as Blaise Pascal said 350 years ago in another context, ‘Evil is never done as thoroughly and completely as when it is done with a clear conscience.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEM rank and country</th>
<th>Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)</th>
<th>Seats held in parliament (% women)</th>
<th>Administrators and managers (% women)</th>
<th>Professional and technical workers (% women)</th>
<th>Earned income share (% women)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Sweden</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>38.9c</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Norway</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Finland</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Denmark</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Canada</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 New Zealand</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Netherlands</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 United States</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Austria</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Italy</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>37.6d</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Australia</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Barbados</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>39.4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Bahamas</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>28.3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>24.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Cuba</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>27.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Switzerland</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Hungary</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>41.1e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Belgium</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 China</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Ireland</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Guyana</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>21.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Spain</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Japan</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>33.5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Philippines</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Colombia</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Portugal</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 France</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Poland</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Panama</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>22.8e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12.4f</td>
<td>42.9f</td>
<td>24.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Singapore</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Argentina</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.9f</td>
<td>54.8f</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>12.1e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Botswana</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>28.5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Honduras</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>16.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Chile</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Peru</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>19.4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Mexico</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEM rank and country</td>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)</td>
<td>Seats held in parliament (% women)</td>
<td>Administrators and managers (% women)</td>
<td>Professional and technical workers (% women)</td>
<td>Earned income share (% women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>27.4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 El Salvador</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>22.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Venezuela</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>22.8e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 Guatemala</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>13.8e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 Iraq</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>17.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 Cyprus</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 Malaysia</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>29.3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Korea (Dem. P. Rep. of)</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>38.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 Cape Verde</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>26.0e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Namibia</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>40.9e</td>
<td>18.9e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Ecuador</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Thailand</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Belize</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>21.1e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 Indonesia</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>25.3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 Uruguay</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 Brazil</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 Swaziland</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Romania</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>26.6e</td>
<td>37.6e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Mozambique</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>40.6e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 Mauritius</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 Haiti</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>34.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 Suriname</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>24.3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 Bolivia</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 Paraguay</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 Greece</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Cameroon</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 Lesotho</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>35.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Burundi</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>40.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 Malta</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>44.9e</td>
<td>18.3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.9f</td>
<td>26.2f</td>
<td>32.6e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 Nepal</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>26.4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 Gambia</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>32.6e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Fiji</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>16.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 Ghana</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>32.7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 Samoa (Western)</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>30.1e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 Maldives</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>17.2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79 Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 Syrian Arab Rep.</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.6f</td>
<td>26.4f</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>38.5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83 Angola</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.3f</td>
<td>27.7f</td>
<td>31.5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 Benin</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>30.1f</td>
<td>40.0e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 – cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEM rank and country</th>
<th>Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)</th>
<th>Seats held in parliament (% women)^a</th>
<th>Administrators and managers (% women)</th>
<th>Professional and technical workers (% women)</th>
<th>Earned income share (% women)^b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85 Morocco</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>25.6^d</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.4^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 Zambia</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 Algeria</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>7.5^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 Senegal</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.7^f</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>31.3^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Malawi</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>33.3^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 Korea (Rep. of)</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Tunisia</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.5^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>33.2^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 Kuwait</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>18.4^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>6.8^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 Iran (Islamic Rep. of)</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>14.9^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 Egypt</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 Mali</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.8^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Turkey</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 Jordan</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.4^f</td>
<td>33.8^f</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>31.2^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 India</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.2^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 Sudan</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>18.5^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 Lebanon</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1^f</td>
<td>37.9^f</td>
<td>21.8^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 Congo</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>33.0^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>29.4^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 Central African Rep.</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 Zaire</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>29.0^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 Nigeria</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.5^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109 Solomon Islands</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>29.6^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 Togo</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.9^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111 Mauritania</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>18.5^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.2^f</td>
<td>27.8^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113 Comoros</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>31.9^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114 Pakistan</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9^c</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>10.2^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115 Djibouti</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>33.4^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116 Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7^f</td>
<td>13.5^f</td>
<td>7.1^e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

a. Data are as of June 1994. A value of 0 was converted to 0.001 for purposes of calculation.

b. Data are for latest available year. The manufacturing wage was used for the Central African Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Syrian Arab Republic.

c. Data are from ILO, 1993.

d. Administrators, managers and clerical workers.

e. An estimate of 75 per cent was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage.

f. Data are for a year between 1970 and 1980.

g. Data are from ILO, 1994.

The logic of the different attributions has been summed up by MacKinnon (1994) in a critique of the Aristotelian theory of law (which constitutes to a large extent our understanding of law): Equals are to be treated equally. Unequals are to be treated unequally. The legitimatization of unequal treatment is based on the attribution of different values and features. These features (which are of a social and not biological nature) are reproduced in our minds and bodies daily in the sense of the doing gender. This is about the differences in a society ‘on the extent and degree to which males and females are expected to differ, regardless of whether or not they do in fact, on traits of behaviour, personality, interest, and intellect’ (Chafetz, 1980, p. 106).

A study recently carried out in Germany by a men’s magazine shows that the 4,000 interviewed men wished above all for the following three characteristics in women: an attractive appearance (94 per cent), faithfulness (87 per cent) and reliability (84 per cent). Self-confident (28 per cent), intelligent (19 per cent) and self-assertive (17 per cent) women are not popular among readers of this magazine.

Such desired or ascribed characteristics or resources of women or the lack of them can obviously not be transformed so easily into status, because ‘If status is based on resources and women have lower status than men, then we have to assume that women have fewer resources or that their resources are not easily converted to status’ (Nielsen, 1990, p. 240). The resources most likely to lead to status are: origin, education, class (income, wealth, property), race, ethnicity, age and of course, gender.

When, however, women cannot transform the same acquired resources (e.g. university degrees) or inherited resources (e.g. origin) or other attributed resources (e.g. gender) into the same proportion of status (e.g. income, top decision-making positions) then a problem of justification arises, should this connection be revealed.

We know that women have made significant gains in the area of education in the last twenty years in large parts of the world (see United Nations, 1995), but at the same time ‘still face major obstacles to assuming top decision-making positions in their societies’ (United Nations, 1996, p. 51).

This problem in relation to unequal opportunities and unequal treatment is legitimized by constructed ‘otherness’. Inequality does not correspond, as MacKinnon (1994) shows, to difference (as Aristotle thought) but to hierarchy. Whoever is below, and not whoever is different, may be treated unequally.

Gender differentiation which is, in fact, a measurement of stereotypes ‘does not imply inequality. It is logically possible to talk about “separate (different) but equal”. Empirically, it appears [at least as far as complex societies are concerned] that being different is strongly associated with unequal, that is, that the degree of gender differentiation and the degree of sexual stratification are highly correlated’ (Chafetz, 1980, p. 106).
To treat unequally means: not to grant the same rights, not to bestow the same privileges, to block access (official or unofficial), to exclude from spheres of influence, decision-making processes, discussions, to keep down, to use, to exploit, to put people in their place, in short: to treat badly. This also includes violent behaviour.

Violence and unequal treatment are closely connected. If – with regard to the above-mentioned study – self-assertion is important for men and an attractive appearance is important for women, men have few reservations about using violence against women in the struggle for control over economic, cultural and social capital. That is the logic of inequality. That they get away with it is part of the logic of the fields in which men encounter women, here especially in connection with relations between the particular fields (e.g. family, justice, economics).

In this logic violence appears not so much as an individual personal act or decision (though violence is also this to a certain degree) but as acts of violence that are prescribed strategies in body and mind, day-to-day practices for solving conflicts or for pushing through distribution among members of groups with special features. The logic of inequality is a logic of practice. Therefore, it is not so much a matter of trying to determine the motives of individuals, but more importantly of looking into the logic of relations between groups.

This logic of the relations between groups can be illustrated, for example, by the way women and men use their time. Table 2 shows, among other things, that women’s time resources in almost all countries are dominated by unpaid housework, whereas men everywhere devote most of their time resources to paid work. Table 3 illustrates the different distribution of housework between women and men broken down according to the main chores.

These different uses of time and the varying connected activities and experiences enable men to have women work for them either for no wages at all or for low wages in arrangements based on personal relationships or in paid employment. In domestic relations women are often instrumentalized as sexual and caring ‘service stations’ for men, children and the elderly. These interactions in earnings and household arrangements can undoubtedly be characterized as structural violence.

Whether cultures of peace are possible on a small scale, in such conditions, is the subject of a longitudinal study currently being carried out in Switzerland with 400 families. We hope that it will provide above all empirical data as to whether non-violent strategies for solving conflicts are more probable under conditions of egalitarian relationships.

A study by Yllo (1983) in the United States showed that the highest level of violence against wives occurs where the highest level of gender inequality prevails. However, decreasing inequality does not generate a linear drop in violence.
46
Alberto Godenzi

TABLE 2. Indicators on time use: time use of women and men in selected country
studies
Work (hours per week)
Area and country

Total
W

Paid

Unpaid

Household
chores

Child care

Personal care
and free time

M

W

M

W

M

W

M

W

M

W

M

Australia and North America
Australia
1987
49.9
1992
48.7
Canada
1986
46.4
1992
47.6
United States
1965
56.5
1986
56.4

50.9
48.9
46.4
47.1
58.4
59.5

16.9
14.7
17.5
18.7
18.7
24.5

35.5
31.4
32.9
31.5
48.3
41.3

33.0
34.0
28.9
28.9
37.8
31.9

15.3
17.5
13.5
15.6
10.0
18.1

27.2
28.2
24.6
24.7
32.1
29.9

13.8
15.9
12.1
13.9
8.8
17.4

5.8
5.7
4.3
4.2
5.7
2.0

1.6
1.6
1.4
1.8
1.3
0.8

118.0
115.6
121.0
116.8
111.0
112.0

117.0
115.9
121.0
116.3
109.0
109.0

Western Europe
Austria
1981
1992
Denmark
1987
Finland
1979
1987
Germany (Fed. 1965
Rep. of)
1991/92
Italy
1988/89
Latvia
1972
1987
Lithuania
1974
1988
Netherlands
1980
1985
1987
1988
Norway
1980/81
1990
Spain
1991
Sweden
1990/91
United Kingdom 1984

46.4
46.0
46.2
41.7
44.3
53.5
41.8
36.2
66.1
60.2
63.4
66.6
32.8
49.7
42.9
44.5
43.3
49.1
40.6
61.2
38.2

15.2
15.9
21.8
21.8
23.1
13.3
14.7
10.6
44.4
33.4
46.9
47.5
7.1
14.6
10.5
10.4
17.1
19.3
11.4
27.3
14.1

35.8
32.7
35.0
30.0
31.7
42.4
29.5
27.9
51.0
43.8
50.0
50.6
23.9
39.4
25.4
26.6
34.2
30.8
29.4
41.1
26.8

36.5
34.3
22.5
25.6
24.4
44.2
30.0
32.8
29.6
32.3
29.3
24.7
33.4
33.2
34.9
34.2
29.8
30.6
52.4
33.2
30.0

10.6
13.3
11.2
11.7
12.6
11.1
12.3
7.6
15.1
16.4
13.4
16.0
8.8
10.3
17.5
17.9
9.2
18.3
11.2
20.2
11.4

33.4
30.5
20.7
22.5
20.9
39.3
26.8
2.1
25.1
25.1
25.9
21.7
27.9
27.5
31.2
30.6
25.1
25.3
35.8
28.0
26.4

9.7
12.0
10.5
10.8
11.4
10.2
11.0
0.7
13.0
13.2
10.7
14.3
7.4
8.5
16.1
16.5
7.1
16.2
8.6
18.1
10.3

3.2
3.9
1.9
3.0
3.5
4.9
3.2
34.9
4.5
7.2
3.4
3.0
5.5
5.7
3.7
3.6
4.8
5.3
16.7
5.2
3.6

0.9
1.3
0.7
0.9
1.2
0.9
1.3
8.3
2.1
3.2
2.7
1.7
1.5
1.8
1.4
1.4
2.0
2.1
2.6
2.1
1.1

116.0
112.9
119.6
122.0
115.3
111.0
119.7
115.4
93.2
101.5
90.1
94.4
130.0
118.6
117.6
118.3
121.0
114.5
101.2
105.0
124.0

120.8
116.3
117.5
125.0
119.2
115.0
122.2
123.9
100.7
106.6
101.8
99.8
135.0
115.1
118.3
117.7
125.0
115.6
123.2
104.6
130.0

65.4
62.3
68.6
65.1
53.8
53.2
51.9

42.6
37.7
43.0
38.5
26.7
26.0
24.9

52.9
46.9
53.2
49.0
41.5
41.1
42.2

28.6
33.7
35.9
30.1
33.3
32.2
34.9

12.5
15.3
15.4
16.1
12.3
12.1
9.7

25.6
29.3
32.3
25.7
30.2
27.8
30.5

11.1
14.3
14.0
14.6
10.9
10.5
7.7

2.9
4.3
3.6
4.4
3.0
4.4
4.4

1.4
1.1
1.4
1.5
1.4
1.6
2.0

97.0
97.0
89.0
99.0
108.0
107.3
106.8

103.0
106.0
99.0
103.0
114.0
111.9
114.8

42.7
43.3
43.4
43.1
43.6
37.1
37.5

12.8
23.5
22.3
21.2
19.5
22.5
21.4

32.7
42.4
42.5
41.8
40.8
34.8
35.4

30.0
23.1
23.7
24.3
27.1
19.0
17.6

10.0
0.9
0.9
1.3
2.8
2.3
2.1

22.8
23.1
23.7
21.1
24.5
18.0
17.2

7.6
0.9
0.9
1.1
2.5
2.2
2.0

7.2
—
—
3.2
2.6
1.1
0.5

2.5
—
—
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.1

118.0
117.8
118.8
119.0
118.0
126.5
129.0

116.9
120.2
120.5
120.5
120.2
130.9
130.6

51.7
50.2
44.3
47.3
47.5
57.5
44.7
45.5
74.0
65.7
76.2
72.2
40.5
47.7
45.4
44.6
47.0
49.8
63.8
60.5
44.1

Eastern Europe and former USSR
Bulgaria
1965
71.1
1988
71.3
Former USSR
1965
78.9
1986
68.6
Hungary
1976
59.9
1986
58.2
Poland
1984
59.8
Asia
Israel
Japan

Korea (Rep. of)

1991/92
1976
1981
1986
1991
1987
1990

42.8
46.6
46.0
45.5
46.6
41.5
39.0

W = women; M = men.


TABLE 3. Indicators on time use: distribution between women and men of unpaid housework (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area and country</th>
<th>Preparing meals</th>
<th>Child care</th>
<th>Shopping</th>
<th>Other housework</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>78 22</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>53 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>78 22</td>
<td>61 39</td>
<td>53 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>81 19</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>58 42</td>
<td>67 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>71 29</td>
<td>59 41</td>
<td>59 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>90 10</td>
<td>82 18</td>
<td>66 34</td>
<td>78 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>78 22</td>
<td>73 28</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>61 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>95 5</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>73 27</td>
<td>77 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>73 27</td>
<td>95 36</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>65 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>82 18</td>
<td>77 23</td>
<td>57 43</td>
<td>54 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>78 22</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>57 44</td>
<td>58 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Fed. Rep. of)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>94 6</td>
<td>84 16</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>74 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>77 23</td>
<td>71 29</td>
<td>61 39</td>
<td>69 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>84 16</td>
<td>69 31</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>59 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>56 44</td>
<td>66 34</td>
<td>72 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>64 36</td>
<td>59 41</td>
<td>61 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>80 20</td>
<td>79 21</td>
<td>63 37</td>
<td>86 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>77 23</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>66 34</td>
<td>80 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>73 27</td>
<td>62 38</td>
<td>80 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>72 28</td>
<td>61 39</td>
<td>78 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>81 19</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>57 43</td>
<td>82 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75 26</td>
<td>71 29</td>
<td>58 42</td>
<td>58 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>89 11</td>
<td>86 14</td>
<td>73 27</td>
<td>79 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>72 28</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>60 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>74 26</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>76 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and former USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>89 11</td>
<td>68 32</td>
<td>53 47</td>
<td>64 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>88 12</td>
<td>81 19</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>58 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>87 13</td>
<td>72 28</td>
<td>50 50</td>
<td>67 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>62 38</td>
<td>59 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>66 34</td>
<td>60 40</td>
<td>62 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>91 9</td>
<td>66 34</td>
<td>74 26</td>
<td>87 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>89 11</td>
<td>64 36</td>
<td>69 31</td>
<td>60 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>90 10</td>
<td>69 31</td>
<td>70 30</td>
<td>76 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>90 10</td>
<td>75 25</td>
<td>52 48</td>
<td>79 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>86 14</td>
<td>96 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>93 7</td>
<td>82 18</td>
<td>90 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>87 12</td>
<td>79 21</td>
<td>94 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (Rep. of)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>98 1</td>
<td>90 10</td>
<td>89 11</td>
<td>82 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>98 2</td>
<td>79 20</td>
<td>90 11</td>
<td>83 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W = women; M = men.
It appears that with the increasing influence of women, the privileges of men are being challenged and threatened, all that was taken for granted in the arrangement between the sexes is beginning to falter, the pressure on men to do something is rising. Men as a group are likely to attempt to restore the previous state of inequality. Everyday practices are sluggish and inflexible in their response to social change. The struggle for attractive capital also continues in a society where there is less inequality.

Likewise in sexually equal societies violence will not be obliterated. But – and this is a decisive difference – the struggle, or if we use the post-modern term ‘dialogue’, for power, influence and resources, such as self-determination and freedom of movement, will be carried on under equal conditions.

Critics of a gender democracy think that if violence still continues anyhow in more egalitarian societies (even at a reduced level), why invest in equality at all (particularly with the risk of a backlash)? The answer is: on the one hand, democracies (or cultures of peace if you like) without gender equality are not true democracies and, on the other hand, the costs of violence for women, and in turn for society, are enormous.

According to an estimation in a study carried out by the World Bank, ‘the global health burden from gender-based victimization among women aged 15 to 44 is comparable to that posed by other risk factors and diseases already high on the world agenda, including HIV, tuberculosis, sepsis during childbirth, cancer, and cardiovascular disease’ (Heise, 1993a, p. 17).

Empirical analysis has shown that the economy is also affected by absenteeism from work due to the number of days women are off sick as a result of acts of violence. A study by Gelles and Strauss (1988) in the United States shows that women subjected to severe violence are unable to work because of illness for double the annual average of registered sick days. ‘Violence poses a powerful obstacle to achieving other goals that are high on the development agenda’ (Heise, 1993b, p. 21).

Conclusion

Men’s violence against women is both a means and an expression of the conditions of inequality between men and women. Systems of inequality must – unless they want to collapse – be reproduced daily. The rules of inequality must be recalled and confirmed. The actors must remain in the fields of unequal relations, since where there are no actors the rules become obsolete and the field loses its power. From this we can see the explosive potential of segregated worlds (spheres over which the excluded have no control); likewise the threat to heterosexual arrangements from homosexual constructions of social life.

If the relations between the groups struggling for control of capital change and consequently also the logic underlying the social fields, then the means of upholding these relations inevitably change too.
History is not the result of rational decisions (a fact that could give reason for hope). This means, for example, that even if men as a group joined up with women – there is no sign of this at present – this would not automatically result in gender equality, and certainly not a culture of peace. But even if men continue to back away from gender equality, it is not up to them only to keep up these relations.

Men will not give up the advantages of the present arrangement between the genders without a fight, despite the resulting disadvantages of this arrangement for themselves. Men have incorporated the experience of hegemonial dominance (Connell, 1987) and have deduced everyday practices from it. The practical sense used within the gender relationship has all in all paid off for men. Men belong even in the worst of cases to the privileged gender, that is to the gender that is granted more status/power/influence per gender.

This practical sense is extremely slow to change. Only when the structure of a field (the relations between the particular groups, the economic rules and regularities) is radically different; only when the schemas of perception, thinking and behaviour (in short: Bourdieu’s habitus) seem to be seriously inadequate, only then will the habitus attempt to change or will men change over to a different field while clinging to the usual habitus.

From a humanist or radical point of view, inequality is not only undesirable, but is to be condemned in all its forms. Yet from the position of the dominant groups, inequality, and even a culture of war and terror, is logical and practical. Equating difference with inequality provides men with an instrument to use violence against women when other forms of control no longer suffice.

It would be worth investigating if there are worldwide signs of a trend towards more gender equality and if this engenders a reduction in violence against women.

As there is no way of bypassing gender equality on the path to less violent social interaction, any registration of a short-term rise in violence could be interpreted as a desperate flare-up of the dominant groups, perhaps even as a sign of an approaching and long-awaited social change towards a peaceful society.

This chapter identifies the structural variable ‘gender equality’, particularly economic power distributed on a parity basis, as a crucial determinant of a culture of peace. Conflicts can be solved non-violently, when the parties concerned – women and men – can operate on equal terms. As Tavris (1992, book cover) wrote: ‘the real differences lie not in gender, but in power, resources, and life experiences’. This, of course, applies to all unequal relationships, and especially to the relationship between adults and children, but that is another issue.

The factor of the balance of economic power cannot be sufficiently emphasized, precisely because this factor is often neglected in statements and
recommendations made by governments and international organizations on the question of gender and violence. This book deals with men’s roles and masculinities. It should not forget that the software of roles is determined to a large extent by the hardware of economic practice.

The striving for a culture of peace based on gender equality is indeed a monumental undertaking. It aims right at the heart of the construction of social systems. Transplants cannot be undertaken for lack of donors (there are – as yet – no peaceful societies). New methods of treatment, which treat the roots of inequality, are needed. The UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme is a step in this direction.

Note
1. The main points of this chapter were presented at the International Seminar of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 1997, attended by men and women from all the member states. The theme of the seminar was: Promoting Equality: A Common Issue for Men and Women. Under the auspices of the Directorate of Human Rights two major topics were discussed. First, ‘Equality: A Factor for the Positive Development of Men’s Roles and of Society’. Second, ‘Men and Violence: The Logic of Inequality’. The first theme covered contributions to ‘New Roles for Men and the Benefit for Themselves and their Families’, and to the issue of ‘Equality between Women and Men: Better Life, Better Society?’ The second theme focused on ‘men’s violence against women: the need to take responsibility’ as well as ‘patriarchy, war and violence’. The goal set by the seminar was to initiate a European debate about the question of the active participation of men in the promotion of equality and in the combat against violence. For the UNESCO Seminar the chapter has been completed and updated by new international data relating to the economic and political position of women and men. Documentation related to this seminar initiated by Eva Moberg, which was held on 17/18 June 1997, can be obtained from the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. It includes contributions by Scilla Elworthy, Alberto Godenzi, Walter Hollstein, Pierre-Henri Imbert, Jorgen Lorentzen and Per Are Lokke, Eva Moberg and Bengt Westerberg. Among the invited experts were Michael Kimmel, Sven-Axel Mansson and Daniel Weltzer-Lang. The objective of the seminar, to integrate men into the debate on the question of the promotion of equality, explains the predominance of contributions by men.

Bibliography
The arguments presented in this chapter are based on an ongoing research project on masculinity and racism that involves group discussions with young people of diverse ethnic backgrounds in Vienna. Most of the participants are second-generation immigrants from Turkey and most of them are men. The project investigates how identities are constructed in everyday practices across various social differentiations such as gender, nationality and culture. The questions raised in this chapter are: How does masculinity function as identity and representation? Through which ethics and politics could this function be changed?

Identity

What do I mean by identity? For the purpose at hand I wish to stress that identity is not some kind of inner nature, a stable and homogeneous core of an individual; it could be understood as the image and sense of oneself, which is a product of one’s acts and the recognition by others. Identity then would be the effect of agency and recognition. As such it is a social relation and a process. It cannot simply be obtained, it has to be constructed and reconstructed in a never-ending effort. The idea of a stable and whole identity is an illusion, but an illusion can work, and whether it does or not is a function of power. The more room we have for agency and the more recognition we get by others, the easier we can believe that we are somebody, that we are a subject.

I take this view of identity to be well established. Judith Butler, among many others, has argued it extensively. Yet what are the consequences of this perspective as far as an attempt to change established, dominant identity practices is concerned? One conclusion is immediately apparent: if identity is not something that is obtained once and for all, whether by nature or socialization, but continuously re-enacted, then clearly a strategy that aims at shaping or changing a personality through a short-term process is too
limited. For example, concentrating efforts on the education of boys will be ineffective if they do not find the conditions in their later lives to live (i.e. re-enact, confirm) this different (gender) identity. It is necessary to create conditions in all areas of society for different identities to be practised; for example an organization of work that supports co-operation rather than competition. And we need a critical strategy that takes issue less with persons than with concrete practices.

The analysis of masculinity cannot be limited to ‘typical male behaviour’ or to male sexuality. Masculinity is not only a matter of individual identity but of the organization and representation of the social. This makes it difficult to define masculinity – it seems to be everywhere and nowhere – and certainly difficult to change. How can you change masculinity without changing all of society? Yet even if the totality of the relations of masculinity to the social are too complex to grasp, these relations are not metaphorical but concrete and can be named and analysed. The relations of masculinity to ethnicity are one set of these. This of course means that an effort to change masculinity should not be limited to ‘male behaviour’, but has to encompass the whole of the social fabric.

This may seem an unrealistically grand perspective. How can we then limit the discussion of masculinity from other areas of the social? Well, in fact, I do not think we can, either in the perspective of the individual male, or in a political perspective. Masculinity is commonly understood as a form of identity, the real or normative gender identity of men. But gender cannot be isolated from the other dimensions of identity, for example, ethnicity or work; all these aspects of identity intersect and overlap and are constantly combined in individual acts.

This implies that there are no distinct models for different masculinities (working-class, intellectual, urban, etc.), nor is there a master blueprint of which all other masculinities are simply other versions. Instead the whole diversity of lived masculinities can be understood as specific realizations of a vague set of ideas and demands, images and stories that are defined as masculine, adapted to the concrete situation that an individual or group has to cope with. The term for this process of realizations is ‘articulation’ (Laclau/Mouffe, 1991; Hall, 1993, 1996); put simply, it means that different elements such as masculinity and ethnicity get combined to fit a certain situation, to solve a crisis of conflicting demands. Identity can be understood as an articulatory practice: individuals and cultures find different ways to achieve certain goals, for example, a stable identity; this model can account for the diversity but also the dynamics of gender identity.

**Racism and masculinity**

Racist violence is predominantly committed by men, but what is the relation to masculinity, in what way is this violence a ‘situational accomplishment of masculinity’ (Kersten, 1995)? The traditional explanation would see racist
men as underprivileged ‘victims of modernization’ who compensate economic deprivation or an insecure gender identity by racial violence. Recent research on young male racists in Germany has problematized this view. Typically, violent racists would come from stable middle-class families (Hoffmeister and Sill, 1992); privileged youths seem more likely to be racist than non-privileged (Held, 1991); the only significant relation that could be established was between racism and a general value orientation towards success, competition, money and strength (Heitmeyer, 1989, 1992). One author summarized that racism is a consequence of *Dominanzansprüche*, ‘demands for dominance’ (Rommelspacher, 1994; cf. Michael Kimmel’s term ‘entitlement to power’); these young people try to meet their high demands on success and superiority, because only these seem to guarantee a desirable, i.e. masculine, identity. It is fairly irrelevant whether they come from privileged or underprivileged families, whether they in fact are dominant or not. It is the notion that identity can only be achieved as and through dominance that makes them racists. Whether as a fantasy (belonging to a superior culture) or as realized in racial violence, dominance can function in both cases as identity practice.

I therefore want to define dominance as a form of identity practice that constructs a difference, which legitimizes dominance that grants the agent of dominance the illusion of a superior identity; the other’s identity is denied, confined, erased. Dominance therefore is an identity relationship, a process of constructing between the other oneself an oppositional and hierarchical relationship.

It is no coincidence that sexism has been described in similar terms, because dominance is central to the concept of masculinity. Before I explain this claim, let me point out three aspects of the definition of dominance: First, I consider the identity relation of dominance to be the most general definition of violence, and as such the obstacle to a culture of peace. Second, colonialism is marked by the same logic of constructing identities; since the effects of colonialism still influence our present world, this identity relation still exists in Europe’s relations with the rest of the world. Third, as an identity relation, dominance is not only an empirical fact but a representation, such as the popular images of the Islamic world in European cultures. Through such representations the aggressive racism of individuals is linked to the ‘normal’ imaginations of cultural difference in mainstream culture.

**Dominance**

The discussion on masculinity encounters a paradox: some behaviours are clearly aimed at dominance – showing off, physical aggression, etc. – but not every man is dominant, some men are not dominant at all, yet, on the whole, a systematic dominance of men over women somehow seems to get reaffirmed. Even if the empirical differences between the genders have been
reduced in Western European societies – some women hold more economic or political power than many men, ideas about career, family and life in general are no longer absolutely differentiated by gender – a fundamental difference, ‘the difference difference makes’, does get re-established. It helps to remember that dominance, just like identity, is not an essential, or a stable and all-encompassing position, but a practice. Therefore only some of an individual man’s identity practices can be relations of dominance; not all men in a society have to be dominant, but through the repeated reconstruction of gender as a fundamental difference the effect of dominance is achieved, or male gender as dominance is achieved. I therefore propose to define masculinity as just that: an identity practice that aims at dominance. It is the notion of identity as dominance that most male roles express, whether in concepts of physical strength, power, or even competence. Masculinity is the articulation of dominance and male gender. But gender is nothing but the construction of difference. So dominance and difference are the prime elements of masculinity – and of a culture of violence.

The problem of masculinity is the notion of dominance, and masculinity as the attempt to achieve dominance. And masculinity as dominance is a relation not only between men and women, but also between whites and blacks, old and young, etc. I suggest that in so far as masculinity is not linked to dominance it is of no political relevance (it is something men do, but it is not masculinity!); and wherever a relation of dominance is established, the construction of gender identity is involved.

Towards a strategy of representation

It follows that there are three central aspects of the construction of male violence: the notion that dominance is a desirable or even necessary identity; the practices of this notion of identity; and the construction of gender difference. Obviously all attempts to abolish legal, economic and political discrimination of women are necessary to ‘de-construct’ gender as social difference. But it is sometimes disregarded what influence representations have on the construction of gender difference. Hollywood cinema for example not only establishes men as being more powerful, effective and competent than women, it thereby encodes the notion of strength, agency and competence themselves as male! Deconstructing this code is not as simple as it may seem; it implies not only casting women in male roles but also defining other concepts of power.

To counteract the first aspect, the notion of dominance as identity, clearly involves offering different models of identity; but instead of inventing more peaceful, co-operative, caring models of masculinity, I suggest making ‘female’ models of identity more accessible for men. This again implies a strategy of representation that works against gender difference. This strategy I would call an ‘ethics of difference’, a term I borrow from Heath (1990).
Since identity is relational, that is, dominance is a matter of the position taken in a relation, countermeasures cannot be directed against an essential gender: the same person can oppress and be oppressed. For example, Turkish males in Vienna are the oppressed in a racist relation and in a sexist relation they are the suppressors. The same practice can even have different meanings: for example, the affirmation of Turkish culture can be the naming of identity in resistance to marginalization, but it can also be a practice of exclusion when expressed by Austrians. What we need are flexible ethics, that can take specific circumstances into account, that do not address essential subjects (men as men) but any relation of dominance. The essentialization of dominance (all men are oppressors) may have a tactical relevance, but nothing more. In what follows I suggest some elements of such a flexible ethics.

**Particularization and negotiation**

If dominance as an identity practice works to secure an illusion of a stable, potent identity, and forces the other into a fractured, unstable identity, my conclusion is that any stable, secure identity, both individual and collective, must be called into question. Questioning identities means to question their seeming naturality. It means to lay open their contingency, their dependency on power relations and to particularize them: first, by representing non-dominant identities, but not as ‘the other’, ‘the exotic’, but as ‘normal’; not representing young Turkish immigrants in Vienna as Turks, but as Viennese, their cultural activities not as minority culture but as urban youth culture; by representing women authors as authors, etc. White men get enough attention as it is; by representing the voices of women and ethnic others as ‘normal’, they become possible objects of identification for men. Particularizing may also be carried out by representing what men do as being particular and only representing a certain social group of men, that is, denying them the right to represent the universal any more than women do. The politics of immigration is one example where these ethics could be applied.

Immigrants in Austria are generally treated as a problem to be solved, as a disturbance to be integrated into Austrian society as quickly as possible. This strategy, even if benevolent, reproduces the identity of the native Austrians as normal – as ideal. A different strategy would be to open up the native identity for discussion in the confrontation with the immigrants; to allow for the possibility that they could teach something, that they could initiate a productive exchange, that they represent a useful, desirable identity. ‘Hybrid identities’, such as those of Austro-Turks, are the product of a power relation: the recognition of an unstable, fractured identity is forced upon them as an effect of dominance. Yet hybridity may be a form of identity that the processes of globalization force upon everyone, as fixed national or ethnic identities become increasingly precarious. The apparent hybridity of immigrants may then represent our own predicament and allow
us to come to terms with it. (And it may help us to imagine our world in other than colonial terms; on hybridity and post-colonialism, see Hall, 1993, 1996; Morley and Robins, 1995; Gupta, 1992.)

To identify with the (ethnic, cultural, gender) ‘other’ requires the ability to recognize the other within oneself and oneself in the other. Sameness and difference have to be seen as dialectic not as opposition.

One example from sociology, this privileged site of the production of knowledge: research on immigration, integration and racism has become extensive in Austria, but little of it concentrates on the immigrants themselves, and in most of these not very numerous studies the distinction between natives and foreigners remains unquestioned; and certainly the position of the researchers is not questioned: they are the good natives, but in their professional capacity they are detached from the whole question, beyond racism but also beyond the vicissitudes of inter-cultural confrontations and communications. That is to say, their identity is regarded as stable and the fact that research is precisely a practice where this identity is being constructed and reaffirmed goes unnoticed.

In order to confront these aspects of research, we understand our research project to be an identity practice for everybody involved; it is an interaction with a group whose identity (e.g. ethnic) is not at all clear and defined but a matter of definition. The same applies to us: what identity do we produce in the group discussions: one of researchers, adults, native Austrians, etc.? One example. The stories that the participants told us about the conflicts they have with their parents are clearly culture/ethnic conflicts: their parents represent a traditional Islamic culture in contrast with their experience of secular, modern, Western Austria. But these conflicts are also generation conflicts: when to come home, whom to go out with, being properly dressed, etc. The first interpretation makes the young people ‘others’, whose identity we can report on but not identify with; the second makes them similar to ourselves, we can share their experiences by remembering our own adolescence, we can identify with them. Both interpretations are similarly ‘true’; it is not an intellectual but also an ethical, political necessity to keep both of them valid, at the same time. And through this process we as researchers are changed, our position and identity cannot remain untouched by this process of identification/non-identification. A term for this process could be negotiation or, to use one from the hip-hop culture most of the young immigrants are a part of, it is a matter of giving and receiving ‘respect’.

**Conclusion**

I have tried to argue that changing masculinity is an intervention into identity practices; it has to oppose any form of dominance. This can be done through the particularization of dominant identity practices, by an ethic of difference that stresses the negotiation of difference and sameness,
by representing non-dominant identity practices without reaffirming their marginality.

To achieve these goals flexible ethics are required, a form of political correctness or, to use a less abused term, pragmatic ethics, that allow for contextual, flexible criticism and affirmation of acts. I have concentrated on representation as a crucial arena for these efforts. This implies that the task is not so much to invent new forms of identity but to represent existing ones differently.

Note
1. 'Masculinity and Racism', a research project by Edgar Forster and Georg Tillner for MEDIACULT, International Research Institute for Media, Communication and Cultural Development, funded by the Austrian Ministry for Science and Transport.

Bibliography
Introduction
This chapter argues that masculinities may act like ‘gasoline on a fire’ in conflict situations, aggravating problems, escalating aggression and making peaceful solutions more difficult and vulnerable. The ways in which masculine norms are used by power-holders for aggressive purposes is a topic of central concern.

The chapter gives an overview of recent research in the Nordic countries, which includes theoretical perspectives that are still fairly unknown in the English-speaking world. First, a framework is presented for analysing variations in masculinity forms, with a shift of emphasis from ‘types of men’ to ‘processes creating masculinities’. Next I present an outline of how these processes may be manipulated by inegalitarian or patriarchal forces. Finally, some new evidence is presented on how to stop the build-up of masculine aggression and turn it towards more peaceful alternatives.

New approaches to masculinity
Over the last years, a new field of pro-feminist or equality-oriented studies of men has emerged in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, with studies casting new light on connections between masculinity and power. Research in this tradition has put emphasis on masculinities as a varied and pluralistic phenomenon which is nevertheless dominated by a central or ‘hegemonic’ pattern of masculine norms (Connell, 1995; Kimmel, 1996). In the Nordic region, studies of men and masculinities began in the early 1980s, and although the field is still fragmented, research has been relatively extensive in the region, with national surveys as well as interdisciplinary and qualitative studies.

The Nordic research has been developed from a slightly different angle than the English-language traditions. Rather than masculinities as such, the central topic has been men’s relations to women and to gender
equal-status issues, and how these are linked to men’s life patterns in general. The research has extended the ‘relational’ gender analysis approach of feminist theorists, where gender is seen as a system of social relations rather than traits that differ between the sexes (Haavind, 1984, 1988, 1994). In Sweden and Norway especially, quantitative and qualitative methods have been combined in order to map men’s attitudes and behaviours towards women and their orientation in terms of gender equal status (Jalmert, 1984; Holter, 1989; Holter and Aarseth, 1994).

These studies have shown considerable variation between men in areas like household task participation, orientation towards women in paid employment, and attitudes to men’s violence in private life. Men differ in terms of equal status and should not be seen as a monolithic block. A 1988 Norwegian survey gave a ‘three thirds’ main picture of men’s attitudes to gender equal status – a third against, a third neutral or for it ‘in principle’, and a third clearly in favour – which has been confirmed by later research. The proportions vary somewhat with the strictness of equal support items, and also men’s support varies from item to item. Generally men’s support is highest (at 70 per cent or higher) when equality issues are concretized and can be linked to caring issues (described below).

The research has shown that the equality dimension and the gender dimension are not identical, albeit often associated. Problems like battering, rape and sexual abuse partly run across masculinity forms. Different masculinity forms may be more or less gender-egalitarian in their content, but the structures of inequality seem mainly to exist on their own, emphasizing that power and gender should be kept analytically distinct. It is true that masculinities are often power positions, but they are also ‘attempted solutions’ to power positions, to power conflicts and to social structural problems in general.

As a status that is also a part of personal identity, masculinity is dynamically created and reshaped and there is usually a component of opposition in its formation. For example, masculine ‘risk behaviour’, measured in terms of men’s involvement in traffic accidents as well as their attitudes in the 1988 survey, was moderately but significantly statistically related to the men’s childhood experience of a strict father and to other items pointing to defiance or opposition as a background factor.

Historically, new masculinities have often been attractive precisely due to their contrary position vis-à-vis the ‘old men’ and their more traditional forms of power (Holter, 1997b). While masculinities can be analysed as ‘ideologies’ or legitimations of power, what is noticeable in recent studies is how the independent role of masculinity asserts itself, as something above the personal power of the man. These studies report on men’s feelings of being locked into arrangements where they feel powerless to change their own basic role, on men’s stress and time conflicts, and on emotional loneliness and the maintenance of male norms that create it. Even
in the peaceful Nordic context an element of inner ‘siege mentality’ appears in many portrayals of masculinity-associated power. Historical and cultural studies have shown how masculinities were ‘modernized’ in sometimes eruptive and traumatic ways (Lorentzen, 1996). At some basic level of male socialization, other men become a threat, and developing one’s masculinity means protection against this fear.

Attitudes to peace, violence and related items are associated with the ‘three thirds’ division of men on the gender equal status dimension, according to surveys. In broad terms, pro-peace and pro-women attitudes go together, though the character of this association is not well understood.

The research in the Nordic countries has confirmed what now seems a general rule of the new men’s studies. This rule says that male–male relations have considerable impact on male–female relationships and are important for interpreting men’s relations towards women. In a society like the Norwegian, which gives pride of place to cross-sex relationships for defining what gender is about, these results came as a surprise, yet they would be less surprising in more vertical and open patriarchal contexts where male–male relationships are anyway given greater weight for explaining social life.

The main predictor of men’s acceptance of male domestic violence against women in the Norwegian 1988 survey was not men’s background relations to women, nor their type of masculine identity, but instead their background relations to other men. Two items were significant: having experienced bullying in childhood or youth (i.e. victimization mainly from other boys or men), and having experienced violence in the family of origin (mainly from their fathers).

Researchers speak of ‘chains’ of violence that emerge in the studies, though these chains have not yet been fully mapped. However the empirical findings generally confirm ‘classical’ feminist theory regarding patriarchy as a two-sided affair – not only an ordering of men above women, but also an ordering within each gender, and especially of patriarchal power-holders above men in general. Masculinity theory, in this perspective, is a theory about how power-holders are able to use and exploit masculine traits, as well as about men’s reactions to these arrangements and their attempts to change them.

**Analysing gender-related inequality**

With this background, researchers have investigated not only how gender systems are linked to inequalitarian or patriarchal structures, but also how they differ. The barriers to equality are defined as arrangements that systematically disfavour women and create internal ranking within each sex. They are power arrangements. Gender, on the other hand, is not by itself a power arrangement, but a social organization of the sex difference which is basically a system of symmetrical social differentiation and, as such, common to all known cultures. It is not a system of social stratification. Rather,
Gender systems become power arrangements given certain historical circumstances, marked by patriarchal developments in society at large (Holter, 1997b).

This line of thought is not spontaneous in modern society, where we easily see gender as a sign of power or powerlessness per se. But this full gender/power overlap is not a common rule across known cultures, and recent research has indicated that it is not even a common rule within the subgroup of patriarchal or systematically non-equalitarian societies. Pre-modern patriarchal orders were often fairly ‘unisexed’, and patriarchy’s relation to gender (whether the gender system is ‘in use’, ‘bypassed’, ‘transformed’ or something else) has been a shifting one through the ages. In the earliest historical epoch, emerging patriarchal structures seem mainly to have co-existed with egalitarian or even femininity-prominent gender systems and to have used these as means of legitimization. It has been argued that until the advent of patriarchal monotheism, and in an important sense even until the modern age, women were not mainly oppressed specifically as gendered or feminine (since femininity may have been held in high regard), but in other capacities instead, for instance by being classified as children or minors. This was the case in classical Athens, and according to a sociological reanalysis of the available evidence on women’s status mechanisms in that society, patriarchal relations became operative and institutionalized mainly through the established age system, rather than a gender system which was still not fully transformed into a power relationship (Holter, 1994).

Historically changing barriers to gender equal status have been associated with changing forms of violence. With the modern economic reorganization of traditional patriarchal society, vertical forms of subordination of women were replaced by more horizontal and market-mediated forms. In this process, authoritarianism was reduced, but it was replaced by more anonymous and reified forms of power. The ‘power’ of body signs (Søndergaard, 1996) or the sex object as an ‘authority’ over women clearly differs qualitatively from traditional head-of-household authority.

What are these patriarchal structures that have an impact on (or even create) different gender systems? Here, feminist and masculinity theorists give different answers, including different views on ‘causes’ of oppression, and even whether power in this case is in need of any further explanation or should instead be seen as self-explanatory. A tendency towards gender fundamentalism can be found, as well as a lack of common terminology (‘gender’ or ‘gender power’ may be used in the sense of patriarchy, etc.) and little systematization of studies. Yet despite these problems, significant advances have been made in the last decade. New or reanalysed empirical material has generally supported a view of patriarchal structures as manifold, complex and wide. We know more about them, yet their wide character also sometimes means that they are more difficult to trace and separate from power and exploitation patterns in general (Holter, 1997b).
One main type of approach is focused on the control of women’s work. Women’s weak position as home-makers and their dependency on men as breadwinners are well known, and paid employment generally improves women’s status. Yet we also know that feminine-associated tasks remain low in the hierarchy whether paid or unpaid. The orientation of the task is often more important than the form of compensation. In modern society the ‘sphere of reproduction’ (activities oriented towards other people) is economically subordinated to the ‘sphere of production’ or activities oriented towards external nature, since the results of production can in principle be sold on the market, while the results of reproduction cannot be validated in this mainly modern way. They exist only as the capacities of people who are ‘self-owning’. Therefore, reproductive work must be compensated through other mechanisms (through the state, through breadwinner’s wages, etc.), which means that reproducers are handicapped in terms of economic power. This is reflected in the gender system – being masculine means being production-oriented, being feminine means being reproduction-oriented, with the first position being more powerful than the latter.

Even if a model of gender as a ‘superstructure’ passively mirroring a patriarchal ‘basis’ can be dismissed as simplistic, there is no doubt that the activity orientation is often important for explaining what modern gender is about. In current work organizations, it predicts the gender of the job-holder better than most other variables, along with (or even more than) the power level of the job. It is also highly relevant for interpreting the domestic division of labour including its ‘deep symbolic’ aspects (Solheim et al., 1987; Borchgrevink and Holter, 1994). The model may be used to explain why men keep their prerogatives in more horizontal divisions of labour even as the older vertical divisions are diminishing. In brief and somewhat functionalist terms, men do not need to be bosses over women if their work is anyway counted as more important in the market-place and in society at large. Current working-life studies show a mixture of vertical and horizontal dominance, for example in public displays of masculine symbols and norms (Lindgren, 1989).

The orientation of activities and responsibilities is also important for questions of peace and aggression. Reproductive work, or activities that exist as ‘objective results’ only in the capacities of other people, tend to create a practical logic or rationality that differs from that of production-sphere work. The result of the activity cannot be treated fully anonymously as a thing, a commodity, or some ‘factor’ in an external profit calculation. There is, in principle, a person at the other end, and in a sense everything ends there and then unless some basic credit is given to this fact. Reproductive competence therefore implies subject–subject involvement beyond the level of market transactions. But it should be noted that this also allows invasion of other authoritarian elements that feel no need to conform to market-associated democratic notions – for example, household and family power
may be quite ‘autocratic’ in this sense. In general, however, it is now well documented that the activity and responsibility pattern involved in reproductive work is linked to a wider orientation in the world, including items like greater emphasis on the personal side of relations, more social awareness and such. In one view, women’s reproductive work means creating the social glue (‘relations of production’) around men’s work (Prokop, 1978).

In this view, the empirical association between reproduction/production orientation and positive/negative peace attitudes stems from a real and broad social connection. When the orientation dimension is taken into account, the presumed gender differences are considerably diminished. We usually care for what we create, and violence against the person becomes less of an option the more our work is orientated towards other people’s needs. The focus of learning as well as activity differs between the two spheres, and this has led feminist theorists to formulate ideas of a ‘rationality of care’, a more ‘relational’ kind of knowledge, and feminism as a way to extend more broadly humanitarian values (in Norway represented by researchers like Kari Wærness, Bjørg Aase Sørensen, Hanne Haavind, and Elisabeth Fürst).

Is it true that reproduction-oriented economies are less aggressive than production-oriented ones, as we would expect from this view? Is a welfare system with public hospitals less likely to go to war than a more production-oriented system? Have light industrial societies been less aggressive than heavy industrial societies? Is there a correlation between the status of children and the propensity for war? I think the evidence confirms all these four hypotheses, yet these are not well-researched lines of inquiry today.

Also, exceptions to the ‘work orientation implies power’ (and influences peace attitudes) principle should be noted. For example, we may find mainly male groups of ‘reproducers’, like doctors, who are well paid and enjoy high status, while there are groups of ‘producers’ much further down in the hierarchy. How are these exceptions to be explained? In one view, they are classified as independent gender system effects that occur, since gender has become deeply entangled with social stratification, even if by itself it is only a system of differentiation. This view is warranted for example by studies showing how social stratification (social class, ethnicity, etc.) is ‘carried on’ through even in core zones of the gender system, like partner selection (Holter, 1983; 1990). Even if gender by itself is symmetrical, it becomes asymmetrical when entangled with the unequal division of labour sphere or other main societal power relationships. Gender sticks in the asymmetry sense, becoming synonymous with power (masculinity) or lack of power (femininity). It seems as if biology is now being ‘discovered’ as a social force, since it has become the medium of a new social process.

This theory is able to account for the fact that wages often fall when occupations become feminized, even though the main criterion for wage levels is not gender but the importance of the job in the reproduction/
production dimension. It is the latter that is strongly connected to capital intensity and other wage-relevant economic factors. Due to the ‘glue’ described above (economic reification and associated symbolic and material restructuring processes), the gender system has an independent impact on wages and other status-related indicators, and thereby ‘works back’ on patriarchal structures. There is a dynamic and shifting both-ways relationship.

Yet the dual sphere view of patriarchal structures is not the only one. Other aspects, like men’s sexual control over women and the need to control paternity – to mention some main themes of feminist theory – are important also. The different emphasis given to control of women’s work, control of sexuality, and control of children have historically divided feminism into different traditions (socialist, radical, etc.). Studies over the last decades indicate that all these inequality factors are important, and may act on their own and according to their own dynamics. Therefore, emphasizing men’s sexual oppression of women does not mean that economic or patriarchal power-related analyses are irrelevant, or vice versa. Instead, these factors are related, but often in contradictory ways. What appears powerful at the macro level is surprisingly frequently found to be connected to powerlessness in local circumstances. The interplay of power and counter-power (‘influence’ in some formulations) in modern male–female relationships is complex and we should be especially careful not to jump from macro-level considerations (‘men have power’) to local conclusions.

This contradictory element has also a more structural side to it. It is a fact that masculinity and patriarchy are in some important and long-term senses opposed categories. In general, constant tensions and conflicts between gender-system developments and society at large are now well documented. The history of ‘romantic love’ has often been used to prove this point, and it is relevant in contemporary circumstances, too. The more democratized the form of patriarchy, the greater the importance of inequality factors relating to ordinary men’s lives. Now, power-related masculinity is seen as the prerogative of men in general, while earlier it was a relatively insignificant part of the ‘lordly’ qualities of a select group of household heads. The stages in the historical ‘genderization’ of patriarchal power have now been studied, for example, in the case of the conquistadors and the colonial mentality (Connell, 1995).

These wider approaches may make the analysis more complex, but more true to life. As an example, consider the tendency of radical political movements of the twentieth century to turn towards new forms of oppression of women. We may study how ‘scientific’ socialism, supposedly a science also of the liberation of women, ended up with the geriatric patriarchy of the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era. The new forms often start with a ‘machismo of revolt’, and a tendency that men who move against power-holders on one front may feel the need, all the more, to secure their...
power on the other front, *vis-à-vis* women. There is much evidence on how the ‘revolts of the sons’ may go together with increased ‘fratriarchalism’, with negative effects for women, sometimes even compared to the older ‘patriarchalism’ (e.g. Weinbaum, 1978). None of this is surprising in the current framework. Patriarchy is a very adaptive social structure, or else it could not have existed through widely different social and historical circumstances. The co-optation and ‘perversion’ of masculine themes like heroism is an old patriarchal story.

Such a wide view which includes ‘gender power’ as an independent category may seem almost to bring us back to the masculine mystique, to a general reference to ‘men’ or male nature as responsible for violence and patriarchy. Yet we are not going back to square one of critical gender analysis. Instead, by exploring the distinctions between gender relations and inequality relations we may better understand why and how gender acts on its own not due to men’s inner nature, but due to the ways in which patriarchal structures constrain or transform gender relations. For example, we may analyse developments that are indeed anti-patriarchal in men’s worlds, yet inegalitarian in gender-relation terms.

Research on gender-related inequality has generally turned towards more historical and contextual interpretations over the last decade. This development has been spurred by new evidence regarding the historical uniqueness of many modern ideas of gender, family, sexuality etc. (Coontz, 1992; Gillis, 1996), as well as evidence on how current social changes relate to changes in the gender system (e.g. Levine and Pittinsky, 1997, on fatherhood). Different historical forms of patriarchy, and different gender systems within these, have therefore emerged as important topics of research.

In one view, ‘private’ patriarchy based mainly in the family system has been replaced by a more ‘public’ form in the course of the twentieth century (Walby, 1990). Research in the Nordic countries has often emphasized a similar development from more ‘personal’ to more ‘structural’ forms of inequality (Harriet Holter, 1970). Recent research has also focused on the emergence of women in a specific exploitation role, with femininity as ‘love power’ rather than just ‘labour power’ in general (Jonasdóttir, 1991, 1994). Such approaches are promising especially since they move in a direction where the different themes outlined above are combined, including sexuality theory, economic theory and power theory.

**Three modern forms of patriarchy**

In a study of changes in men’s life patterns connected to fatherhood, I have outlined three main ‘phases’ of modern patriarchal structures, phases that may also to some extent co-exist as tendencies (Holter and Aarseth, 1994; Holter, 1997b). Each phase corresponds to a typical sphere of production regime, a typical family order and gender system, and a typical relationship between the spheres of production and reproduction.
First, there is ‘paternalistic’ patriarchy (directly translated, this is called ‘the paternate’). This is an openly patriarchal order with male household heads in the role of patriarchs. It had its main basis in pre-industrial capitalism, with the household as the main framework of production as well as reproduction. However, paternalistic patriarchy exists as a tendency later also; we may even find it, in an idealized form, as a nostalgic reaction tendency in the currently popular gender-essentialist literature on masculinity (Bly, 1992). In the ‘paternate’ context, the state, religion and society in general are conceived in terms of fatherhood, and the social order is divided primarily into lords or property-owning heads-of-household on the one hand and dependants on the other. Power means Herrschaft in Weber’s sense. In the early capitalist regions of England and elsewhere, the ‘putting out’ system, where urban capitalists employed rural households for parts of the production process, led to a strengthening of an ‘archaized’ version of male household power, which in turn, paradoxically, turned women into a main production force in the early industrial revolution. The putting-out system was ‘formal factorization’, while industry made it a reality – outside the home, for the first time outside the reach of reproduction activity logic and rationale. The fact that the paternalistic framework differed from the male/female, production/reproduction-like ‘spontaneous’ ideas of gender in our time has been underscored recently by studies of how unisexed or not so clearly sexed conceptions of intimacy and the body survived long into the modern age (Laqueur, 1990). From a theory of knowledge angle, it is interesting to note that the differences between this early modern framework and the contemporary notions of gender were first highlighted in practice- and sexuality-oriented studies of gender, and to a considerable extent by gay researchers (like Michel Foucault), before the main body of feminist theory came to the same conclusion.

Second, there is ‘masculinistic’ patriarchy (called ‘the masculinate’). In this phase, most of the open, vertical patriarchal ordering of society is dissolved, yet systematic inequality and oppression of women continues in new forms. In political terms, paternalistic patriarchy was dismantled by democratic movements mainly among men, including the bourgeois revolutions that symbolically and sometimes literally cut off the heads of the old order. It is probably misleading to say that ‘masculinity became more democratic’, since what was involved was the fabrication or ‘factorization’ of a new sense of identity, one which seemingly conferred men’s power positions vis-à-vis women simply as a matter of the inner nature of each sex. As outlined earlier, this shift and the ‘glue effect’ of power on gender can be understood as parts of the widening division of spheres in industrial society, with a growing cleavage between the workplace and the home, and a culture where women were increasingly seen as reproducers or home providers whereas men were seen as producers or breadwinners. Gender segregation now by itself becomes a power mechanism (Hirdman, 1988, 1994).
analysis further distinguishes between two main subvariants of this ‘masculinate’ model, one democratic, the other authoritarian. In both, men rise to power based on contemporary, competitive masculinity criteria (‘leader’ quality) rather than the older paternalistic principles (‘father’ quality) (see Schutz, 1980). In the authoritarian form this masculinization of power appears as ‘Führerprinzip’ or ‘leading cadre’, ‘Big Brother’, and similar notions, and patriarchal conflicts become thematized (conceived as, spoken of) as ‘race’ or ‘class’ conflicts. Through masculinization, the societal relationship known as patriarchy ‘went public’ in new ways. In the democratic form, the older patriarchal structures were instead thematized as normal democratic norms and values, with men in general as the main role model of anything ‘normal’, and then, especially from the late 1960s onwards, also as gender issues and conflicts, with a new shift of emphasis towards the male/female dimension of anything ‘gendered’.

Third, there is ‘androgynistic’ patriarchy (called ‘the androgynate’). According to the study, this is still mainly a future state of society, and inequality today should rather be conceived in terms of ‘late’ masculinistic patriarchy. Since some of both are present today, the issue is left open. Some main androgynistic tendencies are becoming more visible. Some of these involve reactions against the extreme segregation of the masculine, not just the broad movement among women towards paid employment and public participation, but today increasingly a movement among men also, now in the direction of care and re-emphasis on family participation. Although the overall division of labour remains sharp, there are desegregation tendencies on both sides. Also, although the economy still remains production-oriented, the sphere of production is shrinking while the sphere of reproduction is growing in terms of labour, and more reproduction-oriented work relations are noticeable in many areas (Holter, 1997a).

The fatherhood study focuses on the men’s side, showing how current tendencies towards increasing family participation among young Norwegian fathers are motivated not only by women’s pressures or demands, but also and perhaps mainly by internal change processes among men. Masculinistic patriarchy has left fatherhood in crisis, and reactions against childhood experiences of the lack of a father, as well as a desire to develop broader and more socially oriented competence, emerge as important change factors among young fathers (Ehrenreich, 1983; Holter and Aarseth, 1994). It is argued that androgynistic patriarchy will further reduce the vertical and directly authoritarian forms of oppression of women, in favour of more horizontal, indirect and economically mediated forms. Yet this may also mean an increase, at least for a period, of reification and alienation connected to gender, and a strengthening of gender ‘fixation’ in current culture. Therefore, an overall improvement of women’s status may be associated with high or only slightly lowered levels of violence against women, while the violence becomes more sexualized and gender-fixated in character.
In the three-phases framework, we assume that inequalitarian structures may become operative (institutionalized, symbolized, culturally patterned, etc.) in different ways, first mainly through fatherhood and male–male seniority relations, later increasingly through male–female relations. This does not mean bringing back narrow, singular and essentialist idea of ‘patriarchy’ but extending historical analysis. The framework allows explanations of why the gender ‘mediation’ of power may persist or even become stronger, with associated increased sexualization of war and aggression, even as the power gap between women and men in society at large is reduced. Gender becomes more absorbent as a paradigm for social change and conflict in general.

A recent analysis of 500,000 international (mainly English-language) social science publication abstracts from the 1970s to the present may be interpreted in this light. While there were 3 publications on social class for each publication on gender in the 1970s, the proportion had been almost fully reversed by the mid 1990s, with 2.5 publications on gender for each publication on social class (Holter, 1998a). So in science, at least, it seems as if ‘gender’ is rising to the top of the social mind, and in most of this material, gender is used as an explanatory variable, while an explanation of gender itself is often missing.

Clearly, models like the one presented above must be nuanced and concretized in order to be of much use in any given conflict or change situation. They must be combined with other perspectives, for example on centre/periphery and global power relationships. With this extension, however, they offer useful starting points.

Using the three-modern-patriarchal-forms model we may analyse, for example, how power-holders in poor countries, or in relatively disadvantaged areas, turn to authoritarian masculinistic principles combined with aggressive nationalism, like the Serbs in the war in former Yugoslavia. Cohen (1998), describing the way in which the ‘hero’ was exalted by Serb nationalist propaganda in the pre-war years, reports a case during the war where the killing of a Serb ‘hero’ led to the Serbs killing 300 people in revenge. In the Serb view, this was a just equation.

On the other hand, new patriarchal developments may be combined with renewed paternalism in religious form, as in the fundamentalism seen in some of the Islamic countries. In both cases, old institutions (e.g. arranged marriages) are given a more modern content under the guise of ‘archaization’ – going back to the old ‘pure’ ways. Similar archaization tendencies are well known from the Western reorganization of patriarchy, too, especially from family-history studies.

The fate of Norwegian Quislingism
I shall use a Norwegian example in order to illustrate how the gender and patriarchy analysis may be applied. The word ‘quisling’, after the Norwegian
Nazi leader Vidkun Quisling, has become international, meaning a traitor to one’s country. Yet this was very far from, indeed the opposite of, how Quisling saw himself. Why was it that this mid-century ideology did not succeed in Norway? What lessons can be learned from this, regarding the build-up of aggressive masculinity in general?

Quisling was a ‘hobby’ philosopher who saw his ‘Nordic’ inheritance as akin to (or on closer reading, even superior to) the Aryan ideology of Nazi Germany. The masculinity message was not spelt out as such, but couched in racist language. Norwegian men and women needed to cleanse themselves of inner and outer parasitism (Bolsheviks, etc.) and restore their racial mission. Yet Quisling never succeeded in mobilizing the support of more than a small minority of Norwegians, even when he was installed as state leader by German military power during the occupation of Norway in the Second World War.

Folk humour was one of the forces that effectively deflated this brand of aggressive masculinity. For example, it was said that Quisling could not be portrayed on stamps, since people would then spit on the wrong side of the stamp. In general, Quisling’s vision of the Nordic-Aryan superman was dismissed as pathetic and laughable rather than heroic, and the men who fled to his banner often did so due to tragic personal circumstances rather than ideological conviction.

Yet the post-war reactions against Quislingism (as well as other Norwegian developments) showed the power of aggressive masculinity in this country as well as others. In studies of authoritarianism in Norway this has been summed up as a ‘contempt for weakness’. Typically, the men who had chosen ‘the wrong side’ in the war were branded as traitors and criminals – those other types of men who could not be excused. The annihilative and antagonistic aspects of modern masculinity were displayed in these reactions, typically targeting the followers rather than the leaders. So why did not Quisling rise to the status of a Hitler, or even a Mussolini? Why did 90 per cent of Norwegians turn against him? Many answers can be given, and I limit the analysis to the perspective of masculinities and patriarchal structures.

Two answers seem important. One concerns the male–female relationships of the Norwegian social structure, the other the male–male relationships. At this point, we may note the method of looking at both sets of relations and how they interact.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the Norwegian tradition did not allow for quite the women-as-object position that could be found in continental Europe. Women could not be portrayed, for example as in German Nazi propaganda, as simply objects to be owned – either in the ‘true’ sense of Aryan ownership, or in the ‘false’ sense of something stolen by Jews, Bolsheviks or other targets of aggression. Women were not owned in this strong patriarchal sense, and so they could not be stolen either. In
Norway as in the other Scandinavian countries, women’s independence was and is greater than in central and southern Europe (Holter, 1993).

Secondly, Quisling could not appeal to any major sense of ‘loss of face’ in male–male relations. Norway had not suffered during the First World War like the Germans, had not been made to pay war reparations, had no clear external enemies, etc.

Therefore, the two main lines of ‘appeal’ in terms of aggressive masculine build-up – through a sense of loss of power over women, and through a sense of loss of face or rank towards other men, based on this first power – both failed to work out. As a result, the informal gender politics of everyday life, including folk humour, acted against the authoritarian masculinistic model, rather than to encourage it, as occurred in Germany. Quisling’s vision of the Aryan superman was seen as a personal idiosyncrasy rather than a call for national rejuvenation. The ‘mythic core’ of authoritarianism was dismissed (Griffin, 1995).

**Domestic violence**

The authoritarian ideologies of the mid-twentieth century can be analysed as extreme forms of authoritarian masculinism, and the general ‘backlash’ tendencies affecting women in many countries from the late 1920s onwards can be interpreted in the same light. My main point is the method: by looking at male–male as well as male–female lines of violence and aggression, we understand more of both, and by distinguishing between gender system and patriarchal structure effects, we improve the analysis further.

Domestic violence does not have the calculated character of most political aggression, yet Norwegian studies confirm that an element of control and calculation comes into this arena of violence also. Here as elsewhere violence tends to follow the lines of power, not run against them. The experience of acute threat which is often a main propaganda point of aggressive political power (sometimes staged, like the faked Polish attack on Germany in 1939) is also often present in men’s accounts of the events leading to acts of violence.

Interviewing men, including those who have admitted violence problems and are doing therapy work for this reason, I have often been struck by the gendered character not perhaps of the violence itself, but of parts of its framework and often its immediate subjective ‘causes’. Acute anxiety connected to jealousy is a common theme. I have described this anxiety mainly in another area, namely, studies of how ‘normal’ partner selection is experienced in a commercialized context where ‘gender market’ attraction rules structure the entrance to a pair relationship (‘serial monogamy’). Here, participants must manage a threat of sudden anonymization, a possibility of being dropped by one’s partner in favour of someone else. Thereby, one is not just left alone on the concrete level, but also forcibly zeroed out as a person on a more abstract and intangible level.
There is a meta-message also, creating alienation-related anxiety. ‘Suddenly your personal world means nothing, you become something that is not attractive enough’, one female respondent said in a partner-selection study (Holter, 1980).

A Norwegian interview study with men jailed for rape shows how this gender market scenario, in a more extreme vein, is a common mental framework of men who rape (Ringheim, 1987). This is especially evident in the stories of men who have raped women on their way home from discothèques or similar. Further, these men’s attempts to normalize the situation, for example by arguing that ‘she wanted it herself’, subscribe to the ideals of normal gender market interaction – that there should be a fair exchange, attractiveness against attractiveness, free choice. This is a framework that structures the story of what ‘really’ happened when rapists give their version of events.

A study of sexual abuse distinguishes between two main forms of aggressive sexualization – one characterized by a vertical property relationship (‘she is mine’), the other by a more horizontal and exchange-like relationship (‘she confirms me’) (Sætre, 1989). Tentatively these two may be linked to the framework described above, with the property type representing authoritarian masculinistic and paternalistic tendencies and the exchange type representing democratic masculinistic and androgynistic tendencies. The more power is economically mediated, the greater the role of the self, in the social psychological analysis of Mead (1934). There is no mistaking the general horizontalization and simultaneous genderization of patriarchal patterns through the twentieth century. This is confirmed also by economic studies and work research on segregation and individuation of work roles. These studies, however, also show that vertical and horizontal forms of gender discrimination tend to coexist and reinforce each other, even if the long-term tendency is a shift of emphasis from one to the other, for example in explaining the average male/female wage gap. In gender-market-theory terms, the manifest level of ‘exchange between men and women’ becomes more important, relatively to the latent level of ‘exchange of women between men’.

Private forms of violence against women (and, if the analysis is correct, against people in feminine-associated positions in general) are seldom sociological in any direct sense, so rules at the macro level should not be expected to apply unmodified. Yet these patterns are not simply psychological either. They are not incidentally distributed according to personality. The current tendency to go back to a psychopathological type of explanation of abuse, rape or battering, since good social explanations seem missing, are not so surprising when we consider the types of explanation that have dominated the area.

In Norway as elsewhere, feminist research in the 1980s pushed back the ‘essentialist’ explanation of male violence. Yet the main alternative
seemed to be that these were simply ‘normal’ men. There was, for example, the ‘one strike is enough’ slogan of the women’s shelter movement, meaning that if the man had struck just once, the woman should leave. He was likely to become a batterer, since normal men and batterers were pretty much the same. Recent research, however, indicates that many men as well as many women strike once or a few times in pair relationships, yet only a minority develop more regular violent behaviour. The normalcy thesis failed to qualify what was meant by ‘normal’. For example, a study concluded that ‘normal’ Norwegian men used prostitutes; this was not a special group. Yet the criteria used for determining what was normal and what was not were not derived from gender and patriarchy variables, as would be the relevant thing to do, but from social class variables like education and income. It seems likely that the lack of gender-sensitive power and inequality variables that could be used for example in surveys was related to ‘masculinity’ being an easier target for feminist critique, given the 1980s political climate, than ‘patriarchy’. But this discussion cannot be pursued here.

What themes (and what kind of variables) should we look for? One theme, outlined above, relates to alienation and reification. On a psychological level this may mean a disturbance in the ability to fully participate in subject–subject interaction, problems with empathy, alienation-related anxiety, etc. We may suspect that ‘father absence’ is a fairly important background component, but this is not known.

Another theme, common in rape as well as male-violence studies, is ‘authoritarianism’, often through male–male relations. Studies of male violence among Christian groups, for example, have shown this, and also how a neo-patriarchal sense of masculinity may be erected on a ‘lay fundamentalist’ basis (Lundgren, 1985). The ideology here is not only one of ‘I hit her because she is mine’ but also often ‘I hit her because she needed it’.

Recent studies of men who are forcibly put in female-like positions, for example by being raped or sexually abused as children or youths, show a pattern of ‘masculine normalization’ which is surprisingly strong for a society as gender-equality-conscious as the Norwegian. This ‘male norm’, which is very close to some of the notions of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in international research, may even have been strengthened by some gender equality measures in so far as these have meant women’s participation on masculine conditions.

One study of sexually abused men shows a ‘distancing’ pattern where men overcome their traumatic experiences mainly by downplaying and ignoring them. A study of men who have been raped further clarifies this pattern by showing how men, most of whom have been attacked without provocation, often in public such as in a city street at night, nevertheless take on a strong attitude of denial, and are pushed along by people in their surroundings, in a collective process. Its motto is that ‘this cannot have happened’, it should not be talked about (or else talked about as if not really
rape), since everyone knows that men are not raped; only women are. ‘Raping’ is by definition masculine, ‘being raped’ feminine. What is especially noteworthy in this study is material that indicates that even the men’s inner reworking of their trauma is filtered by their conception of masculinity to the extent that they do not fear what has actually happened to them, that is, to be raped again, but instead a masculinistic upside-down version, namely that they themselves will become rapists (Almedahl and Danielsen, 1994).

The importance of this normalizing force of masculinity, to the extent of putting reality aside, has also recently been highlighted by studies of men in traditional feminine occupations, studies of men and women in business leadership, and in other areas (Holter, 1998b). In brief terms, it seems that when faced with the choice between the normal masculine perception of an event, and the reality of it, society and the individual often take the first course. We can only speculate what this costs in personal and social terms, for example in terms of a ‘monocultural’ male business leadership environment that ‘knows the man, not the person’, with resultant male risk behaviour, miscalculations, etc.

A fresh Norwegian survey also underlines the importance of the male norm for ‘men’s self-oppression’, to use the 1970s term (MMI, 1998). As in former studies, men’s emphasis on creating more ‘emotional openness’ is marked, and it also appears as an explicit reaction to a male norm that hinders contact and emotional reworking of personal life. Health is an important background matter here, with increasing concern about the high mortality among men compared with women and men’s shorter average lifetime. The survey indicates rising levels of stress among men, and perhaps as high a level of depression as among women. At the same time, many men indicate that they are not able to overcome the masculine barrier against change. Asked what they would do if they became depressed, the men are given many alternatives, including talking to their spouse or partner, talking to male friends, to female friends, or not talking to anyone at all about their problems. While the spouse is the most frequent alternative, not talking to anyone at all is the second, while male or female friends rank much further down the list. Men in the Nordic region generally seem somewhat more ‘women-oriented’ than men in the United States or the United Kingdom, yet in this study the expected support from other men (and also other women) seems slim. This may be compared with another recent survey result showing that women hold a much more positive view of the caring capability of the men they know personally than the capability of men in general.

Preventing male violence

In recent research there is an increasing attention to the relationship between violence and care, with men’s care experience emerging as a preventive barrier against violence. We should be careful not to assume any automatic relationship here, since violence and care may to some extent be combined
(compare the paternalistic forms of patriarchy discussed above) and for many other reasons. Yet one main answer to the question of why men so often outweigh women in violence statistics concerns men’s absence from ‘relational’ work, their relative lack of experience of tasks involving caring responsibilities, caring for children or the well-being of other people. Above, I outlined theoretical views of reproductive orientations to show why. Nordic studies have shown that men who do participate more in this type of activity also develop a more positive attitude to it (for example, they do not regard care work as ‘monotonous’).

A recent extensive Danish study of single parents has shown that mothers more often use violence against their children than fathers (Christensen, 1996). Although this may to a large extent be a selection effect (single fathers being a much more select group with more personal resources and higher average social status than single mothers), there are also other signs that women’s participation in violence, for example domestic violence, has been under-reported. If the male norm filters knowledge here, as it does in rape and abuse cases, we would expect a ‘forgetting’ of women’s violence among all parties concerned, men, women, therapists, researchers, etc., as a process similar to the process of denying that men can be or have been raped, abused or violated. Still, this may not be an exact parallel, since current inequality structures seem to operate under the principle that the feminization of men is more dangerous than the masculinization of women, and so we might expect that the under-reporting is not as serious in the case of men aggressors, as in the case of men as subjects of sexual aggression. Even if women’s acts of violence are more fully reported, we will still be left with a clearly masculine-associated area – violence.

For understanding violence, we may look at self-violence, such as suicide. Statistics show that suicide methods are surprisingly sex-segregated, indicating their gendered framework. Although exceptions exist, sex-segregation statistics may usually be used as indicators of the strength of independent gender system effects, while activity-segregation statistics and research on how activities are positioned in the production/reproduction cycle may be used to trace the patriarchal structures that are linked to the economy. Areas of social behaviour with strong sex segregation can therefore be regarded as ‘mediated’ power zones in the sense discussed earlier – mediated since patriarchal relations become operative not through open authoritarianism or paternalism but through more symmetrical gender-related exchanges. Suicide is a sex-segregated practice since it marks the border of a gendered social identity, in this interpretation. Violence against others, most of which is also fairly heavily segregated (even with the modifications noted above), further points to the ‘embodied’ character of current inequality.

In this perspective, the thermodynamic ‘boiler’ model of male aggression, to be found in Freud’s work as well as in that of most of his
contemporaries, may be reinterpreted as a partially true picture of the situation. The containment idea of the model is relevant, even if the energy part with men’s assumed socio-biological drives was misleading. Even this element may not be totally wrong, since some of men’s higher aggression level vis-à-vis women may in fact be biologically related, yet it is mostly a dead end, since most violence in our society is deeply social in character. It is the notion of masculinity as aggression containment that deserves further exploration.

In light of recent historical studies, it now seems likely that with the consolidation of modern gender power, men did indeed become more ‘loaded’ with violence, more often ‘acting out’ as carriers of aggression, not due to male nature or psycho-biological drives but to the changing framework of men’s social participation. The genderization of patriarchy and the individuation of power were important parts of the creation of a ‘disciplined individual’ as the basis of masculinity, and this disciplined individual participated in ways that emphasized the deferral, repression or postponement of reaction against aggression. It should be noted that recognizing the importance of social transfers of aggression does not mean going back to an ‘energetic’ interpretation of social life. Also, it should be remembered that men did not fall into this state from some natural spontaneous mode of hitting back, there and then, against aggression wherever they met it, that is, mainly from the more powerful men in their lives. Instead it emerged from a more direct obedience to these men and a more openly patriarchal form of power.

Recent historical studies have also shown how men’s emotional repertoire became constricted in the consolidation of capitalism and the Protestant ethic in the manufacturing/late paternalistic phase (Ekenstam et al., 1998). It has been argued that the pre-classical Greek eye could not just ‘see’, it could only see with or in some feeling, like ‘I look at you with joy’; the calculative non-emotional use of the eye came later. Such generalizations may be misused, yet it seems certain that there was a similar and quite drastic curtailing of emotional expressions available to men with the onset of the modern age. This new historical evidence is relevant also for understanding research on men in the twentieth century, including studies of the ‘authoritarian personality’ or the ‘panzer mentality’ of the class- or race-defined man, up to the somewhat softer, somewhat more intimate stereotypes of masculinity today.

There is empirical evidence to support the idea that male–male aggression was often deferred and transformed into domestic violence against women. Norwegian studies of informal male workers’ collectives in working life in the 1950s and 1960s have been combined with one-generation-later studies showing that men with fathers in this category experienced domestic violence more often than others and carried burdens also, associated with the reverse side of the ‘collective’ (Ly.Pegaard, 1967; Holter, 1989).
The problem of preventing male violence, in this perspective, must be rephrased and extended. There is a problem, mainly, of creating a peace culture, without which humanity will not survive. Men as well as masculinity (as a cross-sex capability) are parts of this problem. Gender-related power across the sexes as well as power related to inequality structures are important dimensions. Violence is not ‘politically correct’ but a complex phenomenon. Yet violence can be reduced by combining recent research and new theoretical perspectives.

Creating peace processes
How can peace policies overcome violence and aggression linked to unequal gender status, whether in private life or in main political conflict areas? At the outset, it should be noted that Nordic-region research generally has confirmed the importance of this issue of gendering peace. Although gender-related processes may be directly related to only a small proportion of ongoing violence in a concrete case, we can assume that they play an important background role for violence in general. Once more these links are not well mapped and it is the more general indications of their existence that is my point here. One gender- and equality-aware peace policy perspective is suggested by recent care-related changes among men. The ‘care model’ of change that emerges from this is relevant as a ‘peace model’ also.

In Norway as elsewhere, studies in the 1980s showed an increasing interest in family participation among young men and fathers. At first, this was mainly interpreted as an idealist wish and much was made out of men’s reality gap. When attitude measures showed care participation towards one’s own children to be a widely shared goal among men, the measures were dismissed as superficial. Yet further studies as well as broader social developments in the 1990s have shown something else. Men did want to participate in caring for their children in private life, and as soon as they got the chance to do so without strong economic discrimination, the change on the attitude level was transformed into a more practical movement also.

In 1993, the paid-employment leave period in relation to birth was extended to twelve months, with the new and significant premise that the last, twelfth month could only be taken by the father (if he did not take it, the mother still only got eleven months’ leave). Today, more than half of Norwegian fathers use this ‘dad’s month’ right, and it is used by almost 80 per cent of the fathers who are entitled to economic support (by having a partner with leave support rights). It is symbolic that the men’s payment is subtracted from their spouse or partner’s wage; a ‘new man’ is something childlike in masculinistic patriarchy. Even if the young fathers sometimes use women around them for help with the child, their support for the reform has been clear and strong. A new study has shown that almost all these fathers see it as right rather than a plight or a constraint, and even that a two-thirds majority want to extend it to several months (Kvande et al., 1997).
Today, we see significant movement in terms of violence awareness among many men, but it is often at the attitude rather than the behaviour level. Therefore the care change model symbolized by the ‘dad’s month’ may be relevant. What are the principles emerging from this remarkably successful change policy for creating a more balanced parenthood? We may substitute ‘peace’ for ‘care’ and outline some common traits and principles of the change model itself.

First, change policies must be based on internal processes in the men’s world, not only women’s expectations or the expectations of some modernizing agency. Identifying the pressures on men is an important first step. An ‘absence principle’ and a ‘learning from negative example’ rule are relevant for peace as well as care issues. It is precisely the absence of care in many men’s backgrounds and current job-stressed life that has motivated men towards developing new family attitudes and behaviours. ‘Care’ has emerged as a main theme mainly due to its absence. An absence of caring fathers can create a positive reaction. Yet this means learning from a negative example, an element that seldom comes about by itself, but requires external input and help. Feminism and women’s struggle in a very general sense can be seen as a main input in the care case.

The first main trait of our model, then, concerns grasping the internal dynamics of the situation, and for this goal, gender and patriarchy analysis, including how new masculine developments may be anti-patriarchal and yet inequalitarian, become important. Men must be given ‘ways out’ on a conceptual level, and these ways must be identified and explored.

A second trait concerns the dismantling of social and cultural mechanisms in which men’s gains become women’s losses (or vice versa). There must be some sort of cease-fire, at least, in the informal ‘gender war’ and competition. Note that the ‘dad’s month’ was not taken from women, but rather added to the existing number of care-leave months.

A third trait is a similar neutralization of the male–male hierarchical patterns linked to the oppression of women. This is often more obviously important in the case of peace than in the case of care. A good (and still pertinent) example concerns how common soldiers in the First World War had to reject their officers’ orders or even turn their rifles on them in order to avoid being slaughtered. In the contemporary case of care-related changes, the assumption that masculinity means absence from care has been challenged. There was a noticeable shift of ‘cultural capital’ towards a more care-oriented definition of masculinity even before the 1993 reform.

Fourthly and finally, identifying ways out must lead to some real opening of doors. Although men may need to be ‘motivated’ in terms of peace as well as caring, the main problem is often that the alternatives seem unreal, less sustainable or unsafe. Interestingly, the ‘dad’s month’ was launched in tandem with another reform where parents of small children could create a ‘time account’ for flexibility – yet this has only been used by a
tiny minority of men (or women). There has to be a clear way forward, and it should be clearly marked as ‘masculine’, not in the stereotyped sense, but in the sense of addressing real and widespread needs for improvement of men’s social situation.

We could add other considerations, like identifying ‘latent supportive processes’, for example men’s increasing orientation towards learning and information, the concern for health issues, ecology issues, etc., or developing more detailed analyses on how to break up the ‘mythic core’ of aggression, perverted heroism and the like. But I have to end here, and since we now reach areas of needed or ongoing research where results are still scattered. I have shown how masculinity must be placed in a social context to be useful as a peace-relevant concept, how masculinity and patriarchy differ and how an understanding of this difference is vital in order to analyse how the two also overlap and are linked. Finally, I have discussed how masculinities may be developed in more egalitarian and care-oriented ways that are relevant for the creation of a culture of peace among men.

Bibliography
Almedahl, Ruth; Danielsen, Laila. 1994. Voldtekt på menn [Rape against Men]. Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo. (Main thesis.)


Sætre, Marianne. 1989: *Seksualisert vold, seksuelle overgrep mot barn, seksuell kultur og identitetsbekreftelse.* Institute of Sociology, University of Oslo. (M.A. thesis.)


While during the last twenty-five years profound gender transitions have occurred for men and women in the developed as well as in the developing world, these transitions have had the benefit of more buffers and support in the developed world. In the developing world, on the other hand, gender transitions have brought about drastic changes that have not been adequately dealt with socially and psychologically. Moreover, widespread poverty in the developing world has often exacerbated the impact of these transitions. This chapter will, therefore, focus on developments and trends in developing countries and more particularly on Sub-Saharan Africa where these trends are relatively pronounced. This is not to imply that the characteristics and trends referred to are manifest in identical combinations and to the same degree in all countries South of the Sahara. Variations within and between countries must not be overlooked. The hypothesis is nevertheless that some observed changes are rather general and provoke changes in gender relations as well as increased resort to violence and to military responses during political conflicts.

Increasingly during the last twenty years development interventions have attempted to alleviate poverty and to decrease social and economic inequalities between different groups. The fact that women had been neglected and often left out of beneficial interventions has been addressed, and efforts have been made to integrate women in development planning and to improve women’s social roles and economic opportunities. Furthermore, development interventions and international conventions have directly and indirectly influenced the adoption of laws and social policies that favour equality between men and women.

While clearly these changes in development interventions were just and necessary, in many cases there has been a tendency to forget that in developing countries poverty is shared by men and women alike. Poor men do not have the same chance to participate in, and to benefit from,
development interventions that favour better-off men. Thus, even projects and programmes whose aims are to target the poor often have not reached them. For example, agricultural projects targeting smallholders with less than five hectares of land reach only those with two-to-five hectares and not those with less than two hectares, whether they be men or women. The main reason given has been that those smallholders are ‘subsistence’ farmers who cultivate only for consumption and not for the market, a contention that has been shown to be untrue. Similarly, projects that provide agricultural credit to co-operative members most often deny such credit to the large majority of both poor men and women who are not co-operative members. Furthermore, when flexible, appropriate and accessible credit for informal urban and rural women’s groups is made available, provisions are not made for poor men’s informal groups to also have access to such credit.

While in the developing world profound changes have taken place in the roles and behaviours of both men and women, the psychological impact of these changes seems to be quite different for men and women. Women’s traditional roles have not been invalidated in any way; nurturance, wifehood and motherhood are still greatly valued. Women are still food producers, small-scale traders and nurturers of children. But in addition, women are also increasingly undertaking male occupations and components of male roles. And because ‘masculine’ roles, occupations and activities have always been considered more important and more prestigious than ‘female’ occupations, roles and activities, women may have relatively less difficulty adding some aspects of traditional male roles to their traditional female roles. They feel overburdened but not downgraded. In fact, they tend to feel that they are gaining something important, that they are coming up in the world.

In most African societies men have traditionally played crucial roles in societal survival: they were the warriors that defended their villages, towns and families from enemies and could be awarded high status for their bravery, because, among other things, they killed lions and leopards. Increasingly, however, their status is becoming ambiguous. Men often perceive the changes in their roles as negative, since they feel that they have lost their long-admired unique roles as breadwinners and protectors (Silberschmidt, 1991). At present, they cannot hunt lions or leopards, at least not legally, neither can they brag about doing so. Of equal importance in many families now, especially among the poor, is the fact that men and women share the breadwinner’s role, and in a considerable number of families, the wife may be earning more than the husband. The strain experienced by men is shown by men’s malaise in recognizing that the loss of economic power has deprived them of domestic, familial power. In some fishing villages in Mali, for example, men who were traditionally fishermen can no longer support their families from fishing. The wives cultivate rice and are the breadwinners. During a field visit to these villages, the men said: ‘Before, we were the heads of the family because we could satisfy all the needs of the family. Now the
women are the heads because their income is essential for family survival. [It is] the women who bought the clothes we are wearing. There is also evidence the women adopt complicated strategies in order to dissimilate or at least significantly decrease the importance of their economic role in the family when their income is equal or superior to that of the husband (Safilios-Rothschild, 1988a). Men, on the other hand, who feel that the sharing of the breadwinning responsibility with their wives diminishes their power, try to dominate the relationship in order to reassure themselves of their masculinity (Safilios-Rothschild and Dijkers, 1978).

Men’s difficulties in successfully playing the traditional breadwinner’s role also derives from another source. In many African ethnic groups and countries, there has been traditional differentiation in the type of crops men and women cultivated. Men cultivated cash crops such as tea, coffee, cotton, and the women food crops. Men sold their crops for cash while women primarily used the food crops for household consumption since they were primarily responsible for feeding the family. However, a number of social and economic changes, local and global, have changed these patterns. Within the present monetized society, women need cash, and so they also cultivate cash crops, often the same crops that men cultivate. But the global fixing of prices for export cash crops has resulted in low prices, as has been true for many years for cotton and frequently for coffee. Furthermore, because of the high demand for food by an ever-increasing population, the prices of food crops have been consistently increasing. The situation for men has been often reversed: traditional cash crops often sell for lower prices than the food crops traditionally cultivated by women. Thus, increasingly men have had to perform tasks that have been women’s responsibility, such as cultivating food crops, and therefore, have had to compete with their wives, sisters, mothers and other women. Being forced into previously ‘female’ roles and activities makes men feel downgraded, since such roles and activities were usually considered inferior to male roles and activities. Women, on the other hand, have proved to be as good or better breadwinners than their husbands, since they are able to earn good incomes by intensively cultivating food crops and by selling all or most of their food production, especially fruit and vegetables (Safilios-Rothschild, 1988b).

WID (Women in Development) projects have often tended to exacerbate the situation by focusing on poor women only, even when men in the same community do not have access to self-employment opportunities and income-generating activities. In such cases the result has sometimes been that when the women’s project fostered activities that were successful, the men took them over. Their action has been interpreted as another patriarchal act that underlines the need to support the powerless women. While this explanation may appear to be correct, their action also indicates the possibly negative impact of these WID projects on these communities by widening the gender gap or by even further threatening powerless, poor men.
Traditionally men have also held the fathering of many children as another reassuring proof of their masculinity, potency and virility. Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, traditionally having many children by several wives and girlfriends has been a prestigious status symbol of manhood. In my fieldwork, a 50-year-old Ugandan farmer boasted that he had thirty-five children with ‘assorted women’. This has been one of the key reasons for the limited success of family planning efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially among less educated and poor people. In many developing countries this has led also to overpopulation, to high levels of unemployment and to land fragmentation. It has also contributed to the closed vicious circle in which the factors that make men feel more masculine often intensify their unemployment and income-generation problems and threaten their male breadwinner/protector image. But it must also be noted that family-planning campaigns, increasingly aimed also at men, have increased their feelings of ambiguity regarding their roles and their masculinity. It can be understood, therefore, why the last coup de grâce for African men was AIDS; their last avenue for proving their masculinity, womanizing and having many children by different women, is now threatened with the heavy cloud of death.

Even men’s protector role vis-à-vis women has been eroded mainly because of their economic weakness, women’s increasing ability to earn an income and because of women’s increasing independence and mobility and their relatively greater legal and social emancipation. In Muslim countries in which women had to have the legal and social protection of men, it is interesting to observe the violent reactions of some male ‘protectors’ when the women under their wings neither need nor want their protection any longer. This has been observed in Bangladesh where poor women, beggars, prostitutes and landless women with the help of the Grameen Bank and other NGOs have had a chance to organize themselves into small groups and to obtain small loans to develop profitable entrepreneurial activities. Men feel threatened by their declining ability to protect and control their women, and by the relative independence of these women who now prefer to purchase property in their own names rather than in the name of their protectors. In some cases the men have reacted violently to this threat.

It could be claimed that the fundamental elements of the essence of masculinity are: physical strength, courage/heroism, risk-taking, ability to control situations and outcomes, the protection of the weak and the nobility. Taking into consideration these fundamental elements of masculinity, it becomes clear that in the developing world men often face a troublesome identity crisis. They are at a loss as to how to define themselves and how to validate their masculinity. How are they to ensure that their identity is separate and different from women’s? Where are the lions to kill with their own hands? Where are the patriotic, honourable wars in which they could risk their lives defending family and country? In Sub-Saharan Africa, one can
see more vividly than in other developing countries the emerging identity problems with which most men are not able to cope (Silberschmidt, 1991). The majority of men do not feel needed, proud and powerful. They are at a loss as to how they are now to define themselves so that they can be respected, needed and loved.

In view of this profound identity crisis and the feelings of being socially and economically downgraded, the majority of African men turn more and more to revolutions and bloody ethnic and religious conflicts, swelling the ranks of the military. Violence and war seem to be men’s last resort, especially for the majority of poor, uneducated men. War is the sole remaining domain of men, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, which makes them feel powerful and strong and offers them the intoxicating cocktail of masculine superiority. Participating in battles still reassures men of their masculinity and of their superior status to women, and this is probably one of the fundamental reasons that such a large number of African lieutenants and generals, tribal chiefs, dissidents and rebels can easily convince men to undertake wars and bloody confrontations. This would partly explain the endless ethnic wars and genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Uganda and in parts of South Africa.

Unfortunately in countries with high unemployment and marked ethnic divisions, men have had little choice but to enter the ranks of the military. Furthermore, this choice represents more than an economic strategy, it is a psychological strategy. It represents an easy access to income, and a certain degree of psychological security and status. The image of the warrior is the key symbol of masculinity. Traditionally, combat and military experience separated men from women, made men ‘feel like men’ and bound men together. It is a separation that reaches deep into a man’s sense of identity and self. As long as masculinity is identified with physicality, emphasis on aggressive heterosexuality seems to lend support to the argument that masculine group solidarity organized around violence, legitimate or otherwise, forges masculinities. Formally and experientially, the military life appears as a highly bounded one, and this sense of ‘boundedness’ might seem to make it particularly appropriate for the construction of masculinities in military institutions. This ‘boundedness’ has a very direct and spatial representation in the guarded military camps clearly controlling access from the outside world (Morgan, 1995; Brod and Kaufman, 1994).

Women’s entry in the military represents probably the most serious threat to men’s basis for masculine identity. Their entry into military academies has been greatly resisted especially by authoritarian men who cannot accept equality with women (Safilios-Rothschild, 1977; Reynaud, 1988). It is important to note the grave threat felt by men in Burkina Faso when Sankara initiated military training for rural women, because this training hit the core.
The questions to be raised are: Is it necessary for men to feel that they are clearly different from women and that they play different roles in society? If their identities are blurred with those of women, do the malfunctions represent symptoms of a transition or do they inevitably lead to serious problems and antisocial reactions? Is it possible to replace the nature of the basis for masculine identity? Is it possible to help men build masculinities based not on physicality but on control and preservation of nature, on fatherhood or on intelligence? The problem of the need to perceive and define themselves very differently from women is strong in men who are insecure in their social and/or economic worth and who, therefore, need another social group that they can consider as inferior to themselves in order to feel more valuable (Safilios-Rothschild et al., 1977).

Evidence from the developed world has shown that men can elevate the value of the quality of fatherhood to unprecedented heights so that it becomes an important validation of masculinity (Cohen, 1987). But in most of the developing world, the recommendation to make fatherhood very valuable in terms of the quality of fatherhood, meaning caring for children physically, socially, and psychologically, would at this time be an empty recommendation. Fatherhood is being embraced by many men because it can satisfy men’s desire to fulfil the ‘protector’ role. In the developing world, however, it would be very difficult for the majority of men to forgo their masculine pride of having many children and to downgrade themselves to roles perceived as ‘women’s roles’. The most immediate issue is what society can offer the large majority of uneducated, poor men to replace the sense of power that deviance and brutal force represent for them.

It is in fact very difficult to make valid recommendations that fulfil all the needed requirements. First, such recommendations have to be cost-effective so that developing countries with low budgets can afford them; second, they must have the potential of being implemented so as to reach the masses of poor, uneducated men; and, third, they have to include the provision for some income in addition to their psychological value for masculinity validation.

One possible recommendation that may involve large numbers of poor, uneducated men may be the strong government endorsement of sport. Sport is a non-violent option that satisfies the physical aspect of the masculinity question. The assumption behind this recommendation is that a government-sponsored systematic organization of sporting activities for men in Sub-Saharan African countries would lead to the democratization of sports through the provision of subsidies for poor athletes. Athletic competitions of all kinds could follow the example of such competitions in developed countries where the winners earn substantial amounts of money contributed by large commercial companies. Of course, women would not be barred, but as sporting competitions are separated for men and women this may satisfy men’s need to be separate and different from women and to
compete against each other. UNESCO or a donor country could finance a pilot project in a Sub-Saharan country to determine implementation problems of such a programme and alternative ways for improving its relevance and applicability.

Another recommendation is for the strengthening of the social and psychological importance of fatherhood through family-planning campaigns. This strengthening of fatherhood would entail a drastic redefinition of the value of fatherhood from one based on the number of children fathered to men’s abilities to control the number of children they father. The importance of fatherhood could be defined as men’s ability to control reproductive behaviour so that they have two or three children only and their ability to raise productive and hard-working children. The emphasis on men’s ability to control the reproductive outcome is extremely important since control constitutes a crucial element of masculinity. The advantage of this recommendation is that family-planning programmes are usually well funded and could be interested in incorporating this recommendation in their campaigns, since they have in most cases neglected men’s role in family-planning decisions. The cost of the implementation of this recommendation, therefore, could be carried by family-planning organizations with some additional funding in order to reach large numbers of rural poor as well as urban men.

A third recommendation involves the socialization of boys on the basis of completely different fundamental elements of masculinity. While this type of recommendation is the favourite one for social scientists, it must be also recognized that it is the most complicated to implement, it is long term and can only impact future generations, and is probably the most costly. Efforts to socialize children in egalitarian gender roles in the United States and in the Scandinavian countries have shown the many difficulties involved and the frustrations experienced because the changes were not straightforward, significant or rapid (Safilios-Rothschild, 1982). Finally, the most crucial constraint is the fact that in several developing countries the large majority of boys among the poor, especially the rural poor, either never attend school or attend only for a very short time which may be insufficient to impact upon their socialization. The socialization into new validation bases for masculinity may have to rely heavily upon mass campaigns in villages with video and drama presentations that educate adults and children alike. Such campaigns could be supplemented and strengthened by a series of radio shows that carry entertainment with the same messages since the possession of radios is quite widespread but by no means universal.

But let us consider briefly what would be the nature of the messages concerning new bases of masculinity. A basic component would be the acceptance of the fact that men and women may be undertaking the same activities and playing the same roles with no diminishment of their respective masculinity and femininity. It means freeing men to adopt
characteristics, behaviours and roles previously labelled as ‘feminine’ without any ambivalent or negative feelings and societal evaluation. A central issue, therefore, to be squarely dealt with is the nature of femininity and masculinity, an issue that is not easy to settle, whether or not we tie these concepts to sexuality and reproduction. For a successful radically different gender socialization, the entire society needs to change – institutions, media and thinking processes. A lot of thought and testing is required in order to find the most desirable and powerful new definitions of femininity and masculinity that would be appropriate and relevant for the majority of people in the developing world, and that would diminish the acceptability of armies and wars as easy solutions.

In conclusion, therefore, the recommendation is that pilot projects are initiated in one or more Sub-Saharan African countries testing the validity and the mode of implementation of the first two recommendations while at the same time undertaking research to redefine the core of masculinity and femininity. In addition, pilot projects should be undertaken that would evaluate different types of media campaigns regarding the presentation of new concepts of masculinity and femininity in different urban and rural settings. It must also be noted that such campaigns should include training of primary- and secondary-school teachers in new concepts of femininity and masculinity, as well as similar training of different community agents, extension workers, development workers and health agents.

**Bibliography**


Questions about change and the traditional male approach to international politics

Marysia Zalewski

For this publication, I have been asked to contribute my thoughts on the question: ‘How can we change the traditional male approach to international politics?’ This is an important question, not least because of the assumptions that appear to underpin and motivate it. Among these is the assumption that this male approach leads to violence, wars and the marginalization of ideas on obtaining and maintaining peace. There is also another assumption – that challenging and changing the traditional male approach to international politics has the potential to change this situation. In other words, changing the traditional male approach may lead to a more peaceful world with fewer wars, less violence and decreased degradation, all of which are surely issues of great significance and seriousness. Yet while the hoped-for results of changing the traditional male approach to international politics are desirable, other assumptions contained in this question make me wonder if asking this question is the best place to start.

In this brief reflective chapter, I shall attempt to do two main things. First, I shall pose the question: ‘How can we change the traditional male approach to international politics?’ I will do this by focusing on what I think are two misleading assumptions contained in this question – the first concerns the subject of ‘the male’ and the second the subject of ‘international politics’. Second, I shall move away from questioning the male approach and men towards questioning masculinities in international politics. The move from males to masculinities allows me to rewrite the initial question as: ‘How is it possible to change the masculinities of international politics?’ To instigate a discussion about this question I shall offer some examples of how international politics is masculinelengendered.

From the ‘male’ question to the ‘masculinities’ question

Raising questions on how to change the traditional male approach to international politics tends to leave unquestioned and unchallenged two sets
of concepts that simply cannot be said to already ‘be’. These are ‘the
traditional male approach’ with its implication of a pre-existing universal
subject of ‘man’, and ‘international politics’, which implies a universal and
potentially gender-free understanding of international politics.

Positioning the existence of ‘man’ – who differs only in his cultural
manifestations – makes it difficult to ask questions about the constitution of
that subject. To be sure, questions about who or what men are have
consistently been the subject of investigation in numerous disciplines
including sociology, psychology and biology, to name but a few. But the
kind of questions that have been asked about men or males have
traditionally also assumed a subject of man – most often in the context of
distinguishing men from women. In biological terms men have variously
been differentiated from women in terms of brain size (a traditional
argument being that men are more intelligent than women because they
have larger brains – a problem arose when it was realized that elephants have
larger brains than men).

In sociological discourse much effort has been put into analysing male
roles and the functions and effects of the socialization of boys and men. This
analysis can, of course, be put to quite varied political usage, ranging from
justifying the functional and complementary relationships between male and
female roles, to trying to understand adverse behaviours of boys and men
which lead to dysfunctional lives, with a view to altering those behaviours.
The related fields of psychology and psychoanalysis have bequeathed a
multitude of explanations of male behaviours, for example object relations
theory, which claims that boys learn to be more autonomous than girls
because of the context of their different relationships to their mothers. This is
just a starting point for a plethora of further analyses of the differing
psychological landscapes of men and women. Underlying all these kinds of
approaches is a quest to find the truth of ‘man’. What is he really like? Why is
he like this? Can we change him? And what is it that makes women different?

Paradoxically, the discipline of international politics has rarely been
interested in interrogating man. To be sure, the image and identity of
international politics is axiomatically that of a ‘man’s world’, full of male
state leaders (some women – but so what?), soldiers, bombs and bullets and
tough negotiations to be made. But note that it appears not to matter that
some of the practitioners in international politics are women – hence my ‘so
what?’ comment about female state leaders. These women leaders carry out
their ‘manly jobs’ regardless of their biology, socialization or their juvenile
resolution of psychosexual dramas. So if women/females and men/males can
perform similarly, it seems that we should probably be asking about the
masculinity of international politics – rather than (only?) about the males
who predominate in it. In this way we can investigate the traditional theories
and practices of international politics without too easily assuming an
essentialized and monolithic subject of man.
But let me say two things about masculinity, which I shall state and then go on to elucidate. First, I do not find conceptualizing masculinity as a role very helpful. I am also not especially concerned to find out whether or not it is true that practitioners of international politics can simply learn and unlearn masculine roles. Instead, I think it is more illuminating to consider what work masculinities do in the context of international politics and to show what the effects are. It might be assumed that it is obvious what the effects are – as evidenced by the original question with which I started this chapter. I think this is a mistaken assumption. Second, masculinity is not singular – there are multiple masculinities. All the recent and prolific research on masculinities shows how many different varieties there are – gay, black, working-class, mytho-poetic, hegemonic and even snags (sensitive new-age guys). Additionally, this research also shows how masculinities alter over time and across cultures. But let me give a few examples of the differing masculinities in international politics. My examples begin with the experiences of ‘real’ practitioners of international politics, then move on to consider cinematic images of masculinity in two American films.

Example 1 – Herbert Kelman
In his analysis of six types of masculinity in international politics, Craig Murphy (1997, p. 99) tells a story about Herbert Kelman as a way of providing an example of a ‘Sisyphean peacemaker’, which Murphy links with a type of masculinity associated with being the ‘good soldier’ characterized by competence, courage and a deep sense of responsibility. Kelman, a key figure in peace negotiations including the Viet Nam war and the Arab-Israeli conflict, was noted for wearing a symbol of peace on his jacket, even in the most hawkish of companies. Responding to a comment that this made him a courageous man, Kelman laughed and said it was instead a selfish gesture as it prevented long conversations that he did not want to have with people who assumed he shared their hawkish views when he did not.

What are we to make of Kelman’s display of peace and activities geared towards achieving peace? And in what ways can we claim them as masculine? For scholars such as J. Ann Tickner (1992) and Craig Murphy (1997), Kelman’s behaviour is indeed an example of masculinity – but a specific kind. J. Ann Tickner, writing in the context of engendering international politics in the hope of achieving a more secure world, views Kelman’s masculinity as a positive masculine model for resolving conflicts. His reasoned negotiating strategies based on social-scientific models of conflict resolution offered a welcome and positive model of masculinity compared with the bullish and aggressive behaviour and attitudes of other masculine actors, especially in the context of US foreign policy in the early 1970s. But Murphy suggests that Kelman’s activities had the potential to expose him as something ‘less than a man’ because ‘Kelman’s dovishness provided a reason for other men . . . to question his competence and
responsibility, his understanding of the “tough” choices that face “real [states]men” (Murphy, 1997, p. 100). For Kelman to make himself vulnerable in this way surely marked him out as a man of courage?

How might this behaviour be described if it were exhibited by a woman? Would she run the risk of being exposed as ‘less than a woman’?

**Example 2 – white male physicist**

Carol Cohn (1993, p. 227) recounts a story told to her by a white male physicist. He and his colleagues were working on modelling nuclear counterforce attacks. They had figured out a way to reduce the number of immediate fatalities after a particular attack down from 36 million to 30 million. They were all congratulating themselves on this reduction. The white male physicist takes up the story: ‘All of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – Only 30 million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.’

Why did this man ‘feel like a woman’? Perhaps his concern for bodily suffering – his incredulity at the way they were talking in such abstract terms about the deaths of millions of people – was marked with the signs of ‘woman’ and ‘femininity’. One devastating implication of the statement ‘I felt like a woman’ must be that being positioned as a woman is not a good place to be in the realm of international politics, especially in the arena of ‘high politics’. In this example, masculinity is noted for its absence, evidenced by the unexpected and unwelcome intrusion of its presumed opposite – femininity. Would a woman have said ‘I felt like a woman’ in this context? Would she have felt ‘awful’ at such a realization?

**Example 3 – Rambo**

Do we get to win this time? (Sylvester Stallone as Rambo, 1982)

This infamous line, uttered by the monosyllabic, grunting Rambo, expressed a widely felt desire of a generation of embarrassed Americans. How could they have lost such a war [Viet Nam]? The deep sense of national shame about this ‘lost war’ engendered a temporary remaking of what counted as properly masculine. The signs of this were evidenced in a temporary disdain for military service.

Questions were raised about a process which turned ‘boys into men’ by extinguishing all things to do with the feminine and which reproduced itself by fighting and sacrificing oneself for one’s country. This traditional practice of ‘regeneration through violence’ (R. Slotkin, quoted in Niva, 1997, p. 115) temporarily lost its allure. Signs of the remaking of masculinity also emerged in popular culture directly after the loss of the
Viet Nam war, found in the declining sales of military toys and GI Joe dolls and the plethora of Hollywood movies emphasizing the vulnerabilities and sensitivities of men, often played by actors marked by smallish stature and ‘ethnic’ identities (Boose, 1993, pp. 71–3). But by the 1980s, the technomuscularity and invincibility of the masculine physique – exemplified by Rambo – became the dominant image. And by the time of the Gulf War, sales of GI Joe dolls were at their peak.

Example 4 – GI Jane

Suck my d . . .! (Demi Moore as GI Jane, 1997)

This comment is spat out of the bloodied mouth of Demi Moore in her role as a US Navy Seal in the film GI Jane. She has been ‘captured’ along with the other trainee Seals by her commanding officer in a mock enemy ambush. The name of the training game is realism – nothing is spared and GI Jane gets her fair share of beating up by the commanding officer. But GI Jane is determined to make the grade and gives as good as she gets – despite the handicap of having her hands tied behind her back. She brutally kicks the commanding officer and when he is sprawling and bleeding on the ground, she launches the ‘suck my d . . .’ comment at him to the cheers of her fellow trainees (all male) who are locked up in cages near by.

What a display of masculinity! This woman proves she is as ‘good a man as the rest of them’ (or as bad as) despite her biology, socialization and psychosexual training. What are we to make of these stories of masculinity (and femininity) in international politics? In the first anecdote Kelman’s masculinity is represented as cool and competent, rigorous and unrelenting. To be sure, he does run some risk of having his competence questioned because he can be positioned as ‘unrealistic’, open to accusations of knowing nothing of the ‘tough realities’ faced by real (states)men. His version of masculinity perhaps straddles the borders between ‘devalued masculinities’ and ‘femininity’. Kelman, like the white male physicist in Carol Cohn’s story, might have ‘felt like a woman’ at times.

But let us consider for a moment what ‘feeling like a woman’ means. It surely does not mean feeling like a biological woman; it is possible to imagine a white female physicist experiencing having been ‘caught out’ expressing inappropriate emotions and feelings, ‘blurt ing out’ the same fears as the man had done. She might have ‘known’ she was a woman, in the sense of biology (genes, chromosomes, genitals, reproductive organs, etc.), but being cast as a woman might have different meanings and repercussions entirely depending on whether you are already thought of as a woman by others.

But we still need to know more about what it means to ‘feel like a woman’ in this context. It’s not so much the presumed biological sex of the
person that matters in this instance. Rather it is that the feelings, beliefs and
demotions that are associated with femininity get heard in very different ways
to those things associated with masculinity in international politics. What
the male physicist really meant was that he felt like a fool. He had said
something ridiculous, inappropriate, not helpful. In order to ‘make the
grade’ in that job, participants had to behave in an appropriate manner and
work with appropriate ideas, beliefs and feelings. And behaving ‘like a
woman’ – in other words expressing ideas and feelings associated with
femininity – did not count as appropriate.

But it is also clear that what gets associated with masculinity and
femininity in international politics changes. Think of the vastly different
responses Kelman and Rambo might give to the question ‘What does “No
more Viet Nams” mean?’ For Kelman, it probably meant a deeply felt desire
to stop US military interventions in Third World conflicts for selfish
economic and political ends. For Rambo, it more likely signalled a chance
to re-win that lost war. Rambo is, of course, a fictional character. But the
character of this immensely popular film, for analysts of popular culture,
portrayed a feeling felt by many Americans at the highest and lowest levels
of society. It was President Bush who said, ‘By God, we’ve kicked the
Viet Nam Syndrome once and for all’, in the context of the ‘successful’ Gulf
War (quoted in Niva, 1997, p. 109). For Rambo and Bush, ‘No more
Viet Nams’ meant a chance to redress the problem of ‘fighting the war with
our hands tied behind our backs . . . kow-towing to the lily-livered liberals,
peaceniks and doves in Congress who curtailed American bombing’ (Boose,
1993, p. 72).

But what are we to make of the behaviour of GI Jane? One
interpretation is that she destroys everything about herself that is associated
with femininity. She stops wearing her little pearl earrings, she shaves her
head, she works out to re-make her body into a muscular sleek fighting
machine – she ends up ‘owning’ that most masculine of organs – the
penis and taking the de-masculinizing purpose of the insult for herself.
She has become truly masculinized. And why shouldn’t she? Her
behaviour is rewarded. Her aggressive, macho attitude and actions
eventually win her the rank of a US Navy Seal and the respect of the
commander she does battle with. The film ends with a gift of a book of
poems from him to her.

**Multiple and changing masculinities**

What kinds of masculinities are the four above stories examples of? Perhaps
the following:

- Kelman = snag
- White male physicist = ‘wimp’
- Rambo = hypermasculine
- GI Jane = supramasculine
What conclusions can we draw from these varied and often counterintuitive examples of masculinity in the context of the remit of this publication? Let us start with our original question: ‘How can we change the traditional male (read: man’s) approach to international politics?’ One of our conclusions might be that we need to retrain Rambo types and GI Jane types to be more like Kelman types. But clearly the issues are not quite so simple as Kelman is a man, GI Jane is a woman; but, as the example of the ‘wimp’ shows, being a ‘woman’ is not admired in the realm of international politics. But we have rewritten the question to ask, ‘How can we change masculinities in international politics?’ The ideas, theories and concepts that underpin this reformulation allow us to incorporate the facts that men can act like women and women can act like men. So what conclusions can we now draw from our perusal of these masculinized behaviours? Perhaps that we should retrain practitioners of international politics to revalue those ideas, beliefs and concepts that are associated with femininity and renounce those associated with masculinity – at least the hypermasculinity and supramasculinity of Rambo and GI Jane?

But this is where we run into problems with the notion of roles and socialization in the context of masculinities and international politics. The point that I hope will be established is not to talk about biological males or male roles, or even masculine roles, but rather about the constitution of masculinized meanings and identities. The constitution of identities is not the same as the formation of roles. The construction of masculinized meanings and identities in international politics – in theory and practice – must, I think, be understood in the context of the relationships of power and resistance that is known as gender.

**Gender organization**

The dualism of gender – the division into masculinities and femininities – is primarily characterized by hierarchy rather than by specific content. Simply put, that which is associated with masculinity is valued higher than that which is associated with femininity. Think of the phrase uttered by the ‘wimp’ – ‘I felt like a woman.’ The ways in which this hierarchy is held in place is perhaps a key area for further analysis. The answer is not, I would argue, either to simply add feminine values to international matters or to attempt in a simplistic way to revalue things associated with femininity. Both miss the point about the construction of identities and international politics. It is not that the feminine has been missed out of the theories and practices of international politics – rather that the construction of international politics is predicated on the omission and devaluation of the feminine. So, for example, ‘good thinking’ in the professional world of the ‘wimp’ means that options associated with feminine values (caring about suffering and making different decisions on that basis for example) are already structured out. To use Carol Cohn’s international relations
metaphor, ‘gender discourse becomes a pre-emptive deterrent to certain kinds of thought’ (Cohn, 1993, p. 232). But both strategies also miss the point because another dualism is at work within the discourse of gender and that is the dualism of sexuality: heterosexuality and homosexuality. In the context of sexuality what counts as properly masculine and properly feminine changes. Let me give two examples of this before coming to my overall conclusions.

The ongoing debate about gays in the US military has been described as one characterized by a clash between ‘feelings and fairness’ (Cohn, 1997, p. 138). Usually, in a Western cultural context, ‘fairness’ would tend to be perceived as the more masculine value especially when positioned against the stereotypically feminine value of ‘feelings’. But in the ‘gays in the military’ argument, ‘feelings’ seem to have won out over ‘fairness’, suggesting that the masculine/feminine hierarchy has been reversed. The arguments against having ‘out gays’ in the US military is largely based on the feelings of heterosexual men, rather than on fair and reasoned arguments about the rights of gays to serve in the military and the needs of their country for them. Surely it would only be fair to allow the latter – so that all citizens of the United States had an equal chance to serve their country?

Surely gay men can be useful and competent soldiers in the same ways that heterosexual soldiers can? In fact one might argue that gay men would make better soldiers if we accept cultural stereotypes that gay men are more ‘emotional’ and therefore might be more successful in the ‘male bonding’ rituals deemed so crucial to military life? But no, it is the feelings of heterosexual soldiers that are winning the debate. Consider the following comments that were made by male service members in the US military (quoted in Cohn, 1997, p. 138):

I can’t change or want to change any of them [gays]. But if you place one in my room, bunker, tent, or showers, I’d bash his head in.

It’s not right. It’s sick, it’s despicable, nauseating and I’ll kill them.

I’d go AWOL [absent without leave]. I don’t want fags staring at me while I shower or dress or anything..

These strong feelings – perhaps based on assumptions about how heterosexual men look at women (perhaps leading us to conclude that these heterosexual male soldiers did not want to ‘feel like women’) – have triumphed over reasoned and fair arguments. How is it that ‘feelings’ – traditionally associated with femininity – win over ‘fairness’ and reason when the gendered context is not only about masculinity and femininity but also about sexualities?
GI. Jane proved that she is as good a man as the rest of them, but she also had to be a specific sort of woman to make her entry into the realm of privileged masculinity legitimate. Following her successful passage through the training regimes of US Navy Seals she was accused of being a lesbian. This accusation fundamentally destabilized her claim of entry into that world. This actually seems counter-intuitive. One might imagine that the claim that GI Jane was ‘really’ a lesbian would calm fears about allowing women into one of the last bastions of masculine solipsism. After all, lesbians are supposed to be not ‘really’ women and more like men; think of the butch stereotypes that pervade imaginations about ‘what lesbians look like’. Yet it wasn’t until GI Jane successfully proved that she was not a lesbian, that she was a heterosexual woman, that her legitimacy as a ‘quasi-man’ was assured. How do these configurations and confusions about gender and sexuality work?

Conclusions – Can masculinity be terminated?

As a contributor to this publication, I have been asked to identify priorities and recommendations in the context of discussing the socialization of boys and men in the hope of moving towards a culture of peace. This is difficult for me partly because I do not work in the area of policy-making or educational programming, I mostly work with theories of gender and international relations. Clearly this does not necessarily inhibit me from making policy recommendations. But my reluctance is also due to my view that the resocialization of boys and men is not the way to move towards a culture of peace. In addition, anyone identified as a ‘feminist’ is likely to be accused of being a ‘feminazi’, or more recently, a member of the ‘feminist paparazzi’ if proposals are made to reprogramme boys and men in ‘feminist/feminine’ ways. But this wouldn’t stop me if I thought it would work.

So that is the bad news. The good news is that I do think that there are things we can do, but I can only suggest these in the context of the academic discipline of international politics. And these things are already being done. My concern is how discourses of gender and sexuality create meanings and beliefs – subjects and disciplines. My method is to expose and destabilize those things – rather than to suggest more appropriate (feminine? feminist?) alternatives. So, for example, instead of insisting that men behave more like Herbert Kelman or that ‘feeling like a woman’ should be revalued as a positive experience, I ask, ‘Why is it that we don’t investigate the subject of man in international politics?’ Or I rely on the seemingly simple but pathbreaking question raised by Cynthia Enloe (1990), ‘Where are the women?’ Or ‘Why is it so bad to “feel like a woman” for the wimp but necessary for GI Jane – as long as the latter meant heterosexual woman?’

It is questions about subjects and practices, thoughts, feelings and ideas in the context of gender and sexuality (and the ensuing research and further questions generated) which seem to me to offer some way into...
thinking about the relationships between masculinities and the practices of international politics. And such thinking always implies possibilities of different understandings and change and therefore potentially has transformative qualities. Just asking the question ‘What would be in the contents page of a book called Woman, the State and War?’ (Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War (1959) is a seminal text on international politics in the Anglo-American world) has the potential to fundamentally destabilize what the subject of international politics consists of.

These concluding comments actually lead me to think that I do have one specific recommendation to make, and that is that the teaching of the gender and sexuality of international politics be made compulsory in universities. As usual, it is ignorance about these issues that has devastating effects rather than knowledge about them.

**Bibliography**


Part Two

Local or regional studies of masculinities, violence and peacemaking
Between 1990 (when the then South African President F. W. de Klerk announced the move towards a negotiated settlement) and 1994 (when the African National Congress won the first non-racial, democratic election in the country), South Africa joined the free world and discarded apartheid, its system of legalized racial discrimination. In the process, the legalized violence of apartheid was ended and the foundation was laid for a peaceful future which would address the structural inequalities that were part of the country’s racial, capitalist system. Inequalities remain, which impact negatively on a climate for peace. Equated with silent or structural violence, these include the high infant mortality rate among Africans and the high level of malnutrition in the rural areas populated by Africans. These inequalities are the ongoing effect of the uneven development of South Africa’s economy and the enduring legacy of labour practices that created a working class that was primarily black, which was (until recently) largely migrant and which was, to use F. A. Johnstone’s timeless phrase, ‘ultra-exploitable’.

Later in this chapter I shall return to the importance of race and class inequality in any assessment of social and specifically gender justice. In the next section, however, it is important to identify the short-term effects of political liberation and the improved climate for peace. In the second section I shall turn to the position of men in the post-apartheid era. In this section, changing economic and social conditions will be described and the position of men discussed. In the third section, various programmes that have impacted upon or directly addressed the issue of gender justice and peace will be summarized. In the final section, I shall assess the prospects for peace against the backdrop of existing initiatives and the position of men, pointing out both the difficulties that need to be overcome and the progress that might be made.
Post-apartheid South Africa – moves towards peace and gender justice

With the accession of Nelson Mandela to the presidency, a period of radical judicial and political restructuring was initiated. Rejecting virtually everything that apartheid stood for and embracing a human-rights culture, legal texts were, and are still in the process of being, revised. It would be difficult to enumerate all the changes but let me briefly list some of the more important ones:

- Universal franchise was initiated.
- Trade-union rights were extended.
- Capital and corporal punishment were abolished.
- The racial imbalance in the social-security system was addressed.
- Education was made free and compulsory for all.
- Truth and reconciliation became a key element in dealing with past injustices.
- Mediation became a feature of dispute resolution, particularly labour disputes.
- A culture of tolerance and transparency was introduced into government.
- A state-led programme of economic upliftment and redress was initiated.

While most of these changes were designed to give the hitherto disadvantaged black working class and unemployed population access to government and its services, gender inequalities also were (and continue to be) addressed. A few indicators of gender affirmative-action policies can be cited: 25 per cent of Parliament is female, four government ministers are women, gender desks are being set up in many government departments (and also in the corporate sector), crimes of sexual harassment and rape are receiving increased attention, and in many jobs, being a woman is now considered a positive factor (situation in 1997).

Despite being highly interventionist, the state has not been able to reverse many trends that are well established in the country. The percentage of women in the labour force has risen, but they are still in a minority and dominate in the ranks of the unemployed and the underemployed. Pensions for black women still lag behind those of white women and the improvement of primary health care has not yet made a significant impact on the racially skewed patterns of disease.

In other areas, developments are more serious. The spread of AIDS, primarily among African heterosexual people, is accelerating and shows little sign of slowing down. The crime rate has risen, with increases in violent crimes (from murder and car-hijacking, to assault and rape) becoming particularly alarming. Two types of killings or assassination blot South Africa’s community life – taxi violence (a poorly understood war between taxi-owners and drivers vying for trade) and political violence (occasionally called ‘black-on-black’, ethnic or faction violence) which continues to disrupt community life, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to judge the state’s successes in creating a climate of peace, though it is important to constantly keep in mind its role and potential in this regard. A summary of the above would be that the state has become engaged with a range of diverse and in some cases intractable problems, many but certainly not all of them the result of apartheid. In this campaign, the African middle class has benefited. The position of women has to a lesser extent been improved. The rights of labour have been protected, though South Africa is far from being the socialist haven or the workers’ state imagined a decade ago. Of course, there have been casualties in this process. For the rest of this chapter, I shall consider how men have been affected and how they have responded.

Men in post-apartheid South Africa – the ongoing significance of class and race

The political trajectory to liberation that was followed in South Africa saw the transfer of power from a white, male, Afrikaans-speaking elite, to an African, male elite. Notwithstanding the comments about gender empowerment, the African middle classes have been the major beneficiaries of jobs in the huge South African public service. The African middle class has expanded rapidly but remains in proportional terms a small percentage of the overall black population. In comparative historical terms, the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaner political power was accompanied by a massive project of social engineering which gave the majority of Afrikaners (and indeed all whites) an interest, if not a political share, in the minority government. This was accomplished over two or three decades. Significantly, the same is unlikely to happen for the bulk of the African population. The economy is growing slowly (around 2 per cent a year) and is unable to absorb students exiting the education system, let alone provide employment for those who have been unemployed for their whole lives. This deep economic reality combined with ongoing political violence in some regions (notably KwaZulu-Natal) has had deep implications for gender relations and for male identity. In KwaZulu-Natal, possibly worse than anywhere else, family patterns and roles among the African working class (and here I include large numbers of unemployed people who live off informal or criminal earnings) have changed. It is widely commented that ‘men’ no longer make decisions, no longer provide for the family. While in some regions the absence of the man from the house may not indicate his absence from family affairs or a lack of interest and influence in family business, in KwaZulu-Natal at least, it signals the decline of authority and self-esteem among many men. Even in rural areas, the authority of the patriarch is being challenged. Economic realities combine with political developments. The rights of women to own and control land are being championed (by government and women’s organizations). This undermines the rights of chiefs whose power largely rested on the right to distribute land
and undermines the power of adult men who were in the past the only recipients of land. At the same time, the difficulty of making a living from the land has led most young men to seek a living in towns. This process of urbanization has removed young men from the direct political authority of chiefs and has fuelled an anti-elder, generational movement among the youth, which was striking and powerful in the anti-apartheid struggles of the 1980s. Young men and women no longer easily accept the authority of the formerly revered male family head. In short, African patriarchy is being eroded by a combination of forces – economic and political.

Among white men, the effect of change in the last few years is less easy to discern. Large numbers of the English-speaking middle class have emigrated, citing rising crime rates and, more recently, affirmative action, as their reasons. Older members of the same class have also gone into laager (retirement villages, basically high-security protected zones). These have sprung up all over the country as old and relatively defenceless people have been targeted by criminals. Among Afrikaans-speakers who seem less inclined or less able to emigrate, there seems a resignation about political change which in some quarters is accompanied by a willingness to submerge themselves into the melting pot of a new South African culture, while among others there is continuing adherence to ideas of cultural exclusivity and Afrikaner identity, particularly among embattled farmers.

Divorce rates among white South Africans are very high and the white birth rate is dropping. There is less commitment to marriage and family-making than in the past. In the late 1980s murder among middle-class families was relatively common. This normally took the form of a father choosing to kill his family and then himself because he was unable to deal with a variety of pressures, most commonly financial. While this phenomenon seems to be declining, there is no abatement of sexual violence which if anything is climbing. Instances of sexual crimes (harassment, incest and rape) are always difficult to measure. Nevertheless sexual violence is known to be widespread in all familial and social contexts.

**Men, masculinism and gender justice – responses, initiatives and programmes**

As indicated previously, the state is mindful of the importance of gender in the process of restructuring the country. This, however, has primarily involved identifying women for upliftment and has implicitly labelled men as ‘the problem’. There are no government programmes that consciously deal with issues of masculinity. This is not to say that government policies are devoid of male role models and prescriptions.

The power of the patriarch and the role of patriarchy is implicit in ministerial utterances. From the loveable figure of the [former] President, Nelson Mandela, to other ministerial figures, there is a common thread which is generationalist and which equates some of the country’s most serious
problems with the rejection of authority and a consequent rise of lawlessness. This really amounts to a generational counter-revolution, mounted by African men, many of them in their seventies, who for many years waged the anti-apartheid struggle from outside the country (or from prison) and who are not sympathetic to the ‘rampant’ aspirations of youth. President Mandela frequently chided ill-disciplined youth. The Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu, also became less tolerant of young people who refused to go to school or disrupted the education system. The Minister of Prisons, Sipho Mzimela, probably summed up the collective feelings of his colleagues when he suggested that criminals should either be incarcerated in decommissioned mine-shafts (so that they never see the light of day) or in old ships. Growing government intolerance of crime accompanied popular calls (from black and white alike) for a return of capital punishment, for harsher sentences and for more stringent bail conditions. The mood of government and sections of the population fell sharply out of synchronization with the human rights culture that accompanied the birth of the new South Africa.

Implicit in government pronouncements and in the highly publicized campaigns against crime is the idea that the authority of the patriarch ought to be restored. And it is not just at the level of government that these sentiments are pronounced. Among African, working-class women from war-torn communities, there is bewilderment at the decline of the old gender order and a hankering for its return at the same time as they struggle to gain legal rights and protection from patriarchy’s malevolent aspects. In the education system too, many teachers are unhappy with the ending of corporal punishment which they equate with the ending of respect for their authority and with the ending of discipline.

In 1994 a number of standing commissions were set up to address pressing social issues. One of these was the Youth Commission. In the work of this commission, more than anywhere else, conscious policies addressing masculinity can be seen. Identifying the break-up of families and decline in traditional rites of passage, the commission recommended the return of rituals as a way of rehabilitating young offenders. Local folklore is used to justify this approach, though reference is also made to Robert Bly’s work. This backward-looking, traditionalist view is currently supported among sections of the population. Initiation (circumcision) rites, for example, continue to play an important part among many Xhosa-speaking youth in rural and urban areas. But such rites separate those who go through them from urbanized youth who reject such practices as a sign of being old-fashioned and unsophisticated.

And yet if many of the images that government put out reflect a desire for the return of patriarchy, it is not necessarily the ‘old’ patriarchy. Government campaigns against sexual crimes (which now include the legal concept of rape within marriage) and the increasing focus of the media on acts of sexual violence perpetrated by high-profile public figures
(parliamentarians particularly) is leading to a groundswell of change in sexual attitudes. The new patriarchy must be respectful, disciplined and hard-working. It must accord other people their rights. It does not necessarily maintain that all decisions should be made by men – specifically in the public domain decision-making is not linked to either gender – but that within the family, men should be taking on responsibilities that they are held to have relinquished or neglected.

The content of the new patriarchy is impossible to predict and has generated much dispute. I shall briefly identify some of the pressures that are shaping public discourse about the new gender order. A small grouping of men (mostly white and middle-class) formed a movement called the South African Association of Men in 1992, which was openly hostile to feminism and women’s advances. Its vision of patriarchy was forcing women back into the household and reversing the direction of gender change. In KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s, the local ministry of education introduced into the school syllabus a subject for good citizenship called ubuntu botho, which apart from extolling the virtues of the Zulu monarchy and Zuluness also drove home the message of obedience: youth to elders, women to men. Both these initiatives are arguably right-wing and anti-feminist.

There is another ubuntu initiative which is not bellicose or vested in the defence of the old order. This is a programme championed by a number of prominent African personalities (including KwaZulu-Natal journalist and community leader, Khaba Mkhize) which calls for sxaxa mbiji (pulling together). Here the campaign dips into the African past to draw slogans of peace and create a vision of harmony. Similarly, there is another Africanist initiative with important gender implications which was recently initiated by a number of prominent KwaZulu-Natal leaders. Sbu Ndebele, provincial Minister of Transport, led the campaign — siyabakhumbula (we remember them) — to reduce the road-death toll. The campaign drew attention to the appallingly high road-death toll to which minibus taxis, which serve the huge African commuter market, make the biggest contribution. One reason for the carnage is that driving fast and dangerously is a sign of being a man. Unlike the punitive campaigns for capital punishment (which are infused with classist notions), these campaigns are about forgiveness, teamwork and grief. Ndebele’s own son was killed in a car crash and media coverage of him in tears offered a very different image of masculinity from that habitually presented by the region’s political head, Chief Buthelezi, who is frequently given to public admonition and anger.

These initiatives should be seen in the context of pioneering work done by non-government organizations. ADAPT (Agisanang Domestic Abuse Prevention and Training), based in the African township of Alexandra (in Gauteng), has taken a high-profile position on rape, organizing public marches in Johannesburg and embarking on training campaigns that work with young men who have been in violent relationships. Similarly, the South
African Association of Youth Clubs, with clubs all over the country, has embarked on a campaign to provide leadership and, importantly, mediation skills for its members. Both these initiatives operate from a position of openness, from a non-judgemental position which is in accordance with the national principles of reconciliation and justice which the Truth and Reconciliation Committee is putting into operation.

Initiatives by the state, civic and corporate institutions are united by two major features: the promotion of women’s rights and the identification of a particular type of inappropriate male behaviour. Violence against women is consistently condemned and is included as a priority problem in many government documents – for example, the Gender Equity Task Team in Education identified this as the most important obstacle to gendered improvements in education. But there is still a large measure of uncertainty about what constitutes the correct model of male behaviour and deportment. In two areas, for example, there are strongly opposing views. The gun and military lobby continue to be powerful in South Africa. Despite decades of militarization and the organized resistance within South Africa to conscription, the Defence Ministry has been successful in defending its share of the budget and maintaining the arms industry. This has not gone unprotested. Last year a campaign to ban guns in the country was launched, but in a climate where access to guns is easy and where policing is inadequate it is likely that this will continue to polarize attitudes.

Another area where debate continues to rage is around sexual preference. The country’s constitution was one of the first in the world to provide citizens with freedom to exercise choice in the area of sexual orientation. Recently the Supreme Court overturned a sodomy conviction and this laid the judicial foundations for an end to homophobic policing. Gay and lesbian groupings have become prominent and vocal yet homophobia remains a powerful part of everyday life and there are no gays in high-profile positions other than some personalities in the entertainment world.

Masculinities and a contribution to peace

I started this chapter by sketching out the judicial conditions for peace, which includes, centrally, a culture of human rights. I then indicated that the legacy of apartheid militates against moves towards peace. It is not just apartheid that can be held accountable for ongoing violence; global, particularly economic, pressures associated with South Africa’s position in the world economy, and political and economic struggles that have histories older than and in some ways independent of apartheid, continue to stand in the way of peaceful development. Within South Africa race, class and gender continue to be key social divisions and cleavages for inequality. For men the current transition has been uncomfortable because of their dominance and previous unquestioned position in South African societies. The presence of
feminist concerns within government has put men on the defensive even though men of the African middle class have experienced rapid upward mobility. While there is little conscious acknowledgement of men’s predicament as a social problem (which is regrettable as it stems from the simplistic notion that gender justice is only about promoting the interests of women) there are a wide range of gendered initiatives in operation. The most prevalent focus is on the issue of crime and the ‘marginalized youth’. The increase in crime, the rise in the numbers of jobless and the continuing phenomenon of out-of-school youth has brought forth a range of weighty prognostications, most of which stress the return of the stern patriarch. Apart from people who are (often, but not always, out of necessity) dependent on crime and who oppose calls to discipline, stricter policing and prison policy, most of the population seems committed to an improvement in law and order.

It might be argued that most people would prefer the return of the patriarch but, as I have argued, the issue is really about what form male authority takes in post-apartheid South Africa. I have argued that there is evidence of a new kind of patriarchalism that is not predicated on misogyny or the abuse of women, a patriarchalism that brings into society features of respect, tolerance, justice and openness. There are struggles about the content of this new patriarchy and these are likely to have important consequences for the shape of the new gender order in South Africa.

A direct assault on a limited range of male rights and powers has been part of the recent legal process. In some areas, this has been resisted. Chiefs, for example, have banded together to protect their status and powers. In KwaZulu-Natal, the only female chief was recently forced to resign because of male opposition. Other responses have involved men attempting to restore their power by using the new constitution. In a highly public case, Lawrie Fraser, an unmarried father, took the issue of his unrecognized paternity rights to the constitutional court – and won. While struggle over domestic gender arrangements is important and will have far-reaching effects, this specific campaign has involved an attack on the one area where women historically have enjoyed the presumption of the court. It is a sad irony that the great male fighter for the rights of the father is facing charges of kidnapping his child from its adoptive parents in a nearby southern African country. State initiatives are unquestionably shaking up gender relations and provoking a backlash, but resistance seems unlikely to prevent the emergence of more egalitarian, and hence peaceful, gender relations. For example, the power of chiefs, while protected, is likely to fall less heavily on women than before. The right of men to have unconsensual sex with women within or outside wedlock has disappeared. The power of men to assault women is being constrained and monitored. Abortion, giving women power over their own reproductive capacity, is now legal. Maternity leave is increasingly regarded as a right rather than a privilege. In short, there is no
gender revolution under way, but significant changes are occurring which over time are likely to embed themselves in the society’s value system.

The state is one of the major actors in this regard, but men themselves, particularly in the cities, are responding to the new situation by imagining a more egalitarian gender order. Many men, assailed by the pressures of unemployment and political powerlessness, and still located in social structures that validate masculinity in terms of physical toughness, remain enmeshed in a system where they affirm their masculinity by competitively proving themselves against other men – in crime, on the sports field, in gang warfare. The importance of violence in the wider society has to be recognized and addressed. At the moment, the historically neglected area of male violence on women is receiving attention. For a context of peace to be created, the roots of violence in the construction of masculinity need to be recognized and confronted.

Constructions of masculinity cannot be laid down according to one model. The dignified, just, considerate but firm model may suit elderly statesmen, but it won’t suit young men without work and with little prospects. There is no one answer to the question of what to do with masculinity, rather there are a number of initiatives that should be supported, a number of sites that should be monitored and a series of acts that should be made illegal as part of a general commitment to gender justice and peace.
Chapter 8

Soviet and post-Soviet masculinities: after men’s wars in women’s memories

Irina Novikova

A living myth does not subject itself to anatomy. It grows anywhere. A dead myth is a static photograph of the generations that have engendered it. We have gone through the first and most elementary stage – neglect and humiliation of the myth of socialism. The time has come for studying it – this will still be partial (for we are too close in time!) but already – studying it. Everyone asks the same question of each other: what has happened with us? And was it not the dream of all utopians in the world?

Svetlana Alexievich, Enchanted with Death

Introduction

This chapter examines discourses of masculinity in Soviet and post-Soviet cultural and political spheres. While I draw on recent research on masculinity (Connell, 1995; Kimmel, 1995; Seidler, 1989; Brittan, 1989), I shall investigate historical change in masculinity specifically through the lens of women’s memoirs, as personal, gendered biography.

In the first sections of the chapter I shall examine the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet society, and the images of masculinity and nationality that have emerged (or re-emerged) in this transition. The latter part of the chapter presents a literary and cultural analysis of Soviet women’s memoirs of war (the Second World War and the Afghanistan war), considered as cultural texts that interrogate the construction of masculinity and femininity.

Cultural representations of masculinity are heterogeneous and contradictory. It is necessary to analyse them, to open up the problematic elements in the making of manhood as an individual and collective project. As Seidler (1989) argues, masculinity has to be understood as a historically emergent experience, as a process in which both men and women define and formulate each other, produce and reproduce values, ideals and stereotypes of the feminine and the masculine.
Post-socialist gender studies have not yet begun to theorize the construction of femininities and masculinities in the local and regional context. Yet the study of gender orders and their transformations in the post-Soviet cultural context raises important questions for current discussions of masculinity. These relate to problems of language, science, progress and civilization within the Enlightenment paradigm.

So the question is: What paradigms of social and psychological relations within the family account for the structures of feeling that precede the actual cultural practice and political articulation? (Segal, 1995, p. 13), in our particular context, in a transitional period where many people are searching for new ideals, new values, and new gender patterns.

Critique of the new gendered distribution of power is necessary, as well as study of how the gender inequalities of the Soviet paternalist state have persisted through post-Soviet transitions. Thus, an important issue for post-socialist agendas of gender research is to destabilize the current redefinition of masculine privilege. This can be done by historicizing the relation between hegemonic discourses of masculinity and cultural traditions of normative masculinity, by: (a) investigating social constructions of masculinity in the wider context of the construction of gender and sexuality; (b) re-reading our regional cultural histories, considering them as canonical symbolizations of masculinity; and (c) gender-sensitizing the production of knowledge in the post-Soviet political sphere.

**The current remaking of masculinity in post-Soviet society**

We are living through a period of redefining identity, through the process of state building (in some former Soviet republics) or state rebuilding (as in the Baltic countries). This stage is described by Brubaker (1996), referring to the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe, as ‘re-nationalizing the state’.

In this setting, masculinity and femininity are contested, reworked, and reaffirmed in a complex relationship with both residual and emergent institutions, practices and ideologies. How are we to cope with the desire to become part of a global, institutionalized post-modernity, and at the same time, with the desire to return to a glorified independent past? What are the expectations for masculinity, and for a culture of peace, in our ‘cultures’ of survival and scarcity, which follow their own scenarios of invisible wars, of border/boundary/body construction, of search for origins, foundations and certainties in small nations, or ‘small families’ as Milan Kundera (1995) puts it?

In post-Soviet society, masculinity as a process and a discourse of gender relations has to be analysed in historical terms. There was a complex relationship between local, traditional gender systems, themselves in transition, and the political and ideological norms of the Soviet gender order.

In the case of Latvia, the discourses of gender and the continuing construction of masculinity have reflected the dominant identity politics of
the ‘transitional’ period. This started with a ‘return to the past’, to the patriarchal traditions embedded in the paternalist and authoritarian model of the state that existed before Soviet annexation in 1939. The post-Soviet re-nationalizing process in Latvia in the early 1990s was structured retroactively, as ‘gathering the past in a ritual of revival; gathering the present’ (Bhabha, 1994, p. 139).

The restoration of political independence was claimed to be the renovating return of the Latvian nation to its pre-Soviet political borders, which were interpreted as ethnic boundaries by virtue of ‘authentic’ belonging (‘common destiny’). This period was marked by a hyperactive use of rituals and traditions, which were obviously exclusive, by virtue, to use Anderson’s (1983) famous phrase, of ‘belonging to this place and the presence of ancestors’.

In this process, men were supposed to reorganize the state, while women/mothers were supposed to enshrine the ‘umbilical’ role of a cultural gatekeeper within the family/home/nation/state. The position of men in this process has been problematic. It is commonly perceived that there is a crisis of masculinity, and a need for an active reconstruction of masculinity. This belief is a legacy of the hidden patriarchal gender politics of the Soviet gender regime. It is commonly believed that men were emasculated, made effeminate, by the official Soviet model of sex equality. It is popularly believed that men’s historic identity was lost, and now has to be restored.

Thus the critical response to the failure of the whole Soviet utopian project is reflected in a gender dynamic. In the arguments of post-Soviet nationalist and conservative state rebuilding, the essential falseness of the utopian project is proved by the fact that it attributed feminine features to men and masculine features to women, thus reversing the ‘natural’ sex roles.

Arguments that blame women’s emancipation for social problems such as falling birthrates, the ‘emasculating’ of men, the ‘selfishness’ of women, and sexual depravity everywhere, are not unique. There are precedents in European social history before the Second World War (Segal, 1995; Brittan, 1989). The difference is that we reproduce these ‘backlash’ arguments in a new transitional situation, marked by an endless political crisis. Political effeminacy can be compensated for, in nationalist and religious fundamentalist moods, by media imagery of a ‘powerful politician’ or a ‘strong businessman’.

No wonder that anti-feminism is present in our society, partly because of ignorance, partly because of misrepresentation and trivialization. In Anglo-American countries feminism has to some extent been a resource for men, as Connell (1995) indicates, at least in the sense of providing concepts that help to explain men’s unease in a society that is organized for their privilege. In our region, on the contrary, the popular call for gender reform is a neo-patriarchal call to harmonize man–woman relationships within the family. This opposes local to universal, and connects with
popular misrepresentations of the Soviet model of ‘women’s equality’, nationalist anti-feminist politics, and awareness of a current anti-feminist backlash in the West.

A search for exemplary masculinity is taking place as a compensatory project, reconstructing a paternalist state. Women’s labour is incorporated into national political projects which take the shape of fraternal, masculine projects. At the same time, the current process of constructing male roles, masculine subjectivity and masculinity politics is unimaginable without the influence of the set of masculine practices, values and images connected with the mercantilization of a dependent economy. This economic agenda uses an openly masculinist ideology, celebrating the survival of the ‘strongest’, in relation to entering the international economy as well as the hierarchy of world power politics.

The meanings of success, whether individual or collective (and fraternal), are fabricated in a form of wishful thinking, interpreting successful First World projects, Nordic, American and Japanese, as a normative (because economically successful) model of gender relations. It is imagined that capitalist economic relations, and the corresponding norms of hegemonic masculinity in these societies, are what brought them to their position as world powers. However, these remain imaginary models of masculinity, outside the problematic transitional project, both individual and collective, involving local male roles and images.

The values of a particular generation are emphasized in this process. A public representation of a new masculinity in the making is brewed from diverse images of a young man, strong, brave and national. Emphasis is placed on his instrumental role, especially as the hero of new technologies, a hero with a remote control.

Today high-technology war does not require individual bravery; very possibly, high-technology war has created a new masculine role. The relation between youth and the army is symptomatic. Rebuilding the small, dependent nation-states demands the restoration of an army as its crucial institution. This would only be a viable project in the presence of a visible enemy. As one Latvian newspaper put it: ‘The nation can be united only by showing it at least two things: an enemy and a front-line.’

The construction of such a state is confronted with a dilemma: it needs an army, but the army is unable to develop as a national institution in the traditional sense. On battlefields today, it is impossible to pursue the traditional ideal of masculinity as an individual project crowned by a brave death for the soldier’s motherland/fatherland. Instead of the ‘unknown soldier’ for the fatherland, the masculine hero today can only be an anonymous legionary supporting the international order in invisible and intangible wars, with invisible, media-defined enemies. He is a functionary of the system of ‘remote control’ for maintaining the integrated circuit (as Haraway, 1990, puts it) of the world order.
Gender and masculinity in Soviet Russian culture

In the Russian Federation, as distinct from other post-Soviet states, a transitional masculine identity is viewed as ‘corroded’ in different historical terms. Here there is a relationship between masculinity and warfare that is grounded in the specific history of the Russian and Soviet empires.

Russian history since Peter the Great, in the eighteenth century, has been shaped by several interwoven processes: the construction of national identity, the creation of an army and its use in wars, with a consequent militarization of the cultural definition of masculinity.

In the Russian Orthodox Church, a myth of individual and collective sacrifice for the sake of developing the nation developed as a Russian nationalist project; this underlay later Soviet national politics. The ascendency of the middle class in Russia was too short, and too limited, to alter this. The middle-class family pattern, emphasizing domestic harmony and the division of private from public spheres, followed a different course from the West; Tsar Nicholas I and his wife introduced this model of the family in the mid-nineteenth century. While a collective national identity was being forged during the nineteenth century, gender relations were very much affected by class divisions.

In the twentieth century, socialist paternalism was intertwined with a powerful residual patriarchalism in gender relations and attitudes. The change in family form towards the nuclear family model was still occurring after the Second World War, when the first or second generation of people were coming from villages to the towns.

Even the dissident movement among intellectuals, in the later stages of the Soviet regime, was affected by masculinist ideology. The ‘back to the roots, back to the land’ literary movement of the 1960s to the 1980s (e.g. V. Rasputin, V. Astafiev) was explicitly patriarchal. Masculinist undercurrents affected the ideologies of parenting and family relations found in national traditions and ethnic traditions, that persisted under the Soviet regime. The emasculation of men was explained as an effect of women entering the market and women failing in their roles in the family. Since 1986 the myth that women achieved equality under the Soviet system has not been refuted. Rather, it has been remythologized as a failed experiment, for instance in Gorbachev’s (1988, pp. 116–18) final call to women to go back to their homes.

In the eyes of the West, Russia always had a symbolic identity as an amazon, or as a sacrificial and suffering mother. Understanding the mother–son relationship is crucial to the semiotics of Russian culture. The masculinity of a son (with its derivatives of ‘husband’ and ‘father’) is produced in a dynamic centreing on motherhood, in its Russian Orthodox cultural meaning.

Although transformed by urbanization, this remained a strong residue in the Soviet paternalist gender order of scarcity. A woman was
defined as an incomplete project whether at work or at home, only to be completed through her relationship to sons. The patriarchal politics of Soviet motherhood was aimed at externalizing motherhood as a politically binding power in the collective psyche, working through the childcare and school systems. The ‘dutiful mother’ as a family role was projected into the public sphere, as a symbolic model of political as well as social conformity.

After perestroika – the liberalization process set in motion under Gorbachev – the imagery of ‘Russianness’ in the media seems to fulfil the philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev’s dream of masculinizing the ‘female’ body of the country by injecting into it a Western masculine spirit. Yet the discourse is doubly coded, because an image of powerful masculinity is also introduced by nationalists into their visions of saving the authenticity of Russian identity from the decay caused by immoral Western influences.

This double code is also seen in the ‘romance’ between reconstruction of the state and the agenda of mercantilization. The market is perceived as a conflictful international site which requires aggressive masculinity for success. The market brings new models and ideals of masculinity. These constructions of masculinity have been validated, it seems, by the course of history. Curiously, this contemporary process of appropriating roles finds ways of matching traditional and nationalist scenarios and definitions of manhood, from Peter the Great to the military heroes of Russian wars.

Now there is an attempt to revive a heroic tradition through the mass media. A unifying, homogenizing pedagogy can be seen in a recent series of clips broadcast on Russian television, shown regularly during commercial breaks. These clips are intended to reassert optimism and manhood through carefully selected short plots about war, peasant harvest and men’s friendship. The last clip of the series shows two grandmothers in white garments, who are washing clean a small naked boy in a bathtub. (Mother–son and grandmother–grandson links are emphasized in the whole series.) Washing clean has always had a special symbolic meaning in Russian traditional culture, of spiritual as well as bodily cleansing. In this final clip, it symbolizes the renaissance of masculinity, represented in the naked body of a laughing boy wrapped up in clean white fabric. The preceding clips provide the context, reinscribing this Russian boy’s future into the tradition of defining war/peace as masculine/feminine, in a specifically Russian historical and cultural frame of reference.

In the eyes of the West, in the politics of objectification during the Cold War, Mother Russia was imagined as being under the totalitarian yoke. Now New Russia (or Young Russia) is imagined as a huge market, a vast territory of potential investments – still underdeveloped, but an ambitious cousin for the Group of Seven. This image is qualified, however, by something more irrational and uncontrollable. The remorseless Russian Mafioso (his sexual partner symbolized as a Russian prostitute) has emerged to
join a string of stereotypes of the dangerous ‘other’, ranging from the evil black stud, the Indian rapist and the Mexican macho to the Asian ‘harpy-man’.

This hyper-masculinization in the imagery of the Mafia (pictured in pulp fiction, films and press stories) provides an ideal location for male bonding, creating invisible fraternal power to fulfil the will of the Godfather. Such images were channelled through all possible media with mixed feelings of hatred, envy and adoration. Uncontrollable, its secret, tough, ghostly fraternal presence is terrifying.

The search for an untouchable superiority in clandestinity, like the nationalist longing for mythical roots, is actually an imaginary project compensating for a failed future and a defeated self-image. The Soviet utopian vision provided a masculine vertical axis – from the miner to the cosmonaut – and a historical horizontal axis – a gallery of Russian, national and Soviet heroes. Both axes have been destroyed. The failed wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya generated anger because hopeless national failure followed the Soviet mythology of endless victories. The myth of war, now no longer providing a credible model of masculinity, was displaced by other mythical forms of the invisible power of male bonding – especially the myth of an atemporal, unlocatable, ‘cosmic’ Russian Mafia, overriding all other known mafias, Italian and Asian included.

At the same time, configurations of masculinity such as husband, breadwinner and lover have failed to signify order, stability or security, and are viewed as having to be ‘re-cast’. In fact, the family has become the most problematic site for solving women’s as well as men’s problems – whether emotional or economic – and dilemmas as spouses, parents and citizens.

In examining contemporary changes in masculinity it is necessary, as I have argued above, to inquire into the position of women, women’s influence on the construction and reproduction of masculinity, and women’s roles in shaping contemporary masculinist and patriarchal projects. How are definitions of masculinity bound up with definitions of femininity by women today? I shall approach this issue by a reading of women’s memoirs about the politics of motherhood, in the matrix of the Soviet ideology of war and its constructions of masculinity and femininity.

**Men’s wars, women’s memories**

In the USSR, the warlike ‘desire’ to build up ‘peace’ worldwide was inscribed in the regime’s gender norms, in historical and geopolitical constructions of time and place, and in individual and collective mythologies. It was strongly rooted in the image of a Russian collective peasant-soldier – that is, not a single warrior, but a heroic hunter as breadwinner.

This was one of the most powerful and enduring cultural representations of masculinity, until the destruction of peasant culture, reflected in Vasilii Shukshin’s films, and the challenges to the myth of war
provided by Afghanistan and Chechnya. Along with it, Soviet war mythology produced the stereotype of a woman, a two-sided heroine who was both a battlefield heroine (a sniper, an aviator) and a good mother and wife.

Women’s memoirs as descriptions of battle have received little or no mention from those charting contemporary female Russian writing. Nor do women’s memoirs fit well into the established genre of war memoirs. When writing *Distant Rumble*, her memoir of the last months and days of the Second World War, Elena Rzhevskaya was confronted with the canons of Soviet war memoirs as an established, ideologically formatted, tradition. The very act of remembering women’s experience of war, not within established boundaries of genre and ideology but breaking through them, brought a powerful dissenting voice into the still life of Soviet women’s iconography.

Rzhevskaya turned our attention to the sacred myths that played a significant role in structuring post-war Soviet gender politics. She rebelled against the ‘Great Father’s’ construction of history as part of his (i.e. Stalin’s) autobiography.

*Distant Rumble* is the story of the Soviet soldier who liberates a Europe that is, at the same time, the body of the political and ideological ‘other’. But he does not bring freedom to himself. He occupies the existential condition – and masculinist configuration – of man/liberator who is at the same time agent and victim. Men in this condition learned to be eternal soldiers, and to reproduce, through the maternal language, the experience of ‘bringing freedom’ again and again, as soon as the Soviet system of war/peace demanded it, into other spheres.

At the end of the Second World War Elena Rzhevskaya, a military interpreter, was attached to a secret intelligence group that had the task of finding Hitler, dead or alive. Later, but only after the death of Stalin, Rzhevskaya published a short memoir. Later again, in a memoir *Berlin, May 1945* published in the 1960s, and finally in *Distant Rumble*, published in 1988, she wrote about this episode from the ‘other’ war history.

In Soviet memoir-writing the ideological matrix was destructive to the essence of the genre. Memoirs about the Second World War most powerfully articulated the idea of a collective history, and functioned as a system of inclusion and exclusion. There was a historical master narrative, with private memory ‘beyond words’ for many years.

The literary problem was formulated by Dostoyevsky, for whom the plot is a story that must be narrated by the author and not by the hero. In memoirs the protagonist of a story is the narrator of the text. Both roles, however, are exposed by Rzhevskaya as problematic, because an individual who has to perform the roles is subjected to the desire of the ultimate author of history/story/narrative. The construction of historical and political time – and individual time – belongs to the author’s desire. Even the death of the other ‘author’ in the Berlin bunker becomes only a possible (but silenced) plot in the models of coherence derived from the victorious author’s desire.
By silencing the death of Hitler – the ‘death of the author’ indeed – Stalin asserted the paternal power of his aesthetic principles in politics and in history-making.

Reality, thus, is Stalin’s art. And with public life having its paternity in an aesthetically organized process, what is left to art except for mimetic representations of the author’s heroes and heroines, who are, by virtue of ‘sex equality’, affiliated to the world of myth? And finally, what is sex equality if not a masquerade in which women enact superior male roles, are trapped within the ‘privilege’ of belonging to the history of heroes, then to reproduce this history in mothering as an experience and as an institution?

Out of her marginal role as interpreter, as mediator, Rzhevskaya shifts from a tempting detective plot (the search for the dead bodies) for the story of a hero(ine)-at-war, to reflexive exploration of the dramatic contradiction of witnessing history and writing ‘her story’, from her own silenced experience.

Women’s memoir-writing, when it exceeds the accepted cultural boundaries, means using and challenging the language of war that operates through the body and mind of a perpetrator/victim. The established maternal language produces subjectivity and determines representation. A woman as a subject-at-war constitutes, through her language, future representations of herself. She and her life become occasions, reproduced through the body and the language, for the self-representations of her children.

But in women’s remembering, in the continuum from Rzhevskaya to Alexievich, whether through their own experience or through the experience of others, this language is broken, the rules of genre and gender are shattered. The understanding of war and peace in Soviet ideology which makes war the standard for equalizing gender behaviour, language and reproduction, is challenged.

In the late 1980s Svetlana Alexievich wrote *Zinky Boys*, a book about the ‘unknown war’ in Afghanistan and about the tragedy of Soviet motherhood which achieved a marked political and ideological reputation. In this book the search for origins turns into a questioning of the validity of the maternal language, the integrity of the maternal body/voice.

Alexievich not only performed a gatherer/mediator/editor’s function of finding people, convincing them to talk about their experiences and thoughts, gathering data about Afghanistan and finally editing the book. When she decided to voice the Afghanistan experiences she placed herself in a difficult situation.

She became a target of rage from both sides. Veterans whom she interviewed claimed that nobody was authorized to voice and judge this experience for them. Non-participants did not want to know about something they were ‘not involved with’, or they felt disgust towards veterans.

The internal divide, our mutual otherness, is outlined by Alexievich in the opening part of the book. She starts with the geographical opposition
between insiders/veterans, who made the war outside the country (another heroic journey for the other’s freedom), and outsiders, the onlookers (so many women among them) who claimed to be unaware, and thus not guilty.

What would they, the readers behind the border pretending to be ‘not engaged’, expect from collected interviews of ‘engaged’ storytellers, who once crossed the border in yet another tale of innocent crusading, and now live with the trauma of Afghanistan in their bodies and souls? What autobiographical terms would fit such repressed memories, at last voiced and printed by Alexievich, when a ‘hero’ does not consciously want to be an ‘author’ of his own life, or to belong to his own past?

Alexievich herself withdraws from the role of writer/author as cultural hero, and authorship is the most questioned status in the writer’s second reality, her diary:

I ask myself. I ask others. I look for an answer: how does the murder of valor happen in each of us? Why is it possible to do with us whatever is needed to a somebody? How is a killing man created from our common body? But I am not a judge for what I have seen and heard. I only want to reflect the world of a person as he/she is. And today the truth about war is speculated wider than earlier – as truth about life and death in general. A man has reached what he – in his own imperfection – has desired: he is capable of killing everybody. [Alexievich, 1992, p. 9].

To solve the problem of transmitting anonymous men’s experiences, thus verbalizing (and possibly fictionalizing) hardly representable or transmissible experiences of the other, Alexievich structures the narrative by using familiar cultural representations of the mother–son relationship at war and challenging them at the same time.

The attempt at multiple autobiography unavoidably uses the theme of the material body. This centres around the two roles of mother and writer, with Zinky Boys linking the text to motherhood. Alexievich links the creative act of writing – if it is possible to think of creativity when dealing with physical, emotional and psychological destruction – to the problem of motherhood as ‘a cultural and linguistic matrix (mother in language and culture, culture and language as mother) as well as biological motherhood’ (Meany, 1993, p. 64).

Alexievich’s Zinky Boys (the title is an allusion to the Soviet symbol of ‘people of steel’, and N. Ostrovskii’s novel How Steel was Hardened) reverses the conventional autobiographical line of development from innocent childhood to a heroic present. Veterans and women move, in their reminiscences, from devalued self-images in the present, to the utopia of childhood, and the silences in the representations of heroes and heroines, the myth of soldier/liberators, in post-war Soviet ideology.

The text is disconnected as well as naturalistic. Horrors about the dismembered bodies of friends, narrated by bodiless voices, alternate with
the memories of military nurses about the physical, mental and sexual
destruction of soldiers seen in hospitals, tortured corpses in piles, and parts
of dead male bodies.

All March here, near our tents, the remains of our soldiers, officers, cut off hands,
legs, were piled up. Corpses were half-naked, with punched-out eyes, cut-out stars on
stomachs and backs. . . . I saw such things only in the movies about the Civil War.
Here there was not a sufficient supply of zinc coffins. [Alexievich, 1992, p. 14].

It is a dismembered or dead male body, the body of a father/husband/son,
that finally makes up the disconnected textual body of testimonial voices –
thus reversing the symbolic link between text and maternal body. Monstrous
corporeality transgresses the prescribed borders of the imagination, in the
return from another ‘brave new world’. A monstrous creation, the destroyed
mind of a veteran in his or her devastated and defeated body, transgresses the
great subject/object divide, the border between ‘in’ and ‘out’, in its creator’s
own (albeit every time anonymous) horror story.

In the intersection of these unknown and anonymous realities, the
masculine/military and the maternal/wifely, in the text body, only one
artefact of the war culture is prominent: the cemetery where dead male
bodies are buried. The cemetery, the symbolic receptacle of memory and
history, becomes the domain of the absent future. Nobody knew whether a
coffin contained a body or was empty. The sacred myth of war cultures, the
Death of a Hero (materialized in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier),
collapses into the descent into hell. This theme replaces the ‘creation of the
future’ inscribed in the symbol of the mother’s womb. The distant political
authorship, unknown and mythical, ennobled with the legends of past
military traditions, constructs voids in families, the silences of dead words on
tombstones, and thousands of mausoleums for ‘zinky boys’.

The confessional body of Zinky Boys not only shatters the collective
identity of the soldier at war, not only deconstructs the ideally sexless
collective body and identity, constructed and maintained in experiences and
discourses of war. The multiple memories of mothers, wives and nurses
recall to the reader’s mind the image of the strong woman, the amazon myth
that is recurrent in Russian representations of women. But ‘amazons’ at this
war were confronted with sexual harassment and humiliation behind the
tragic masquerade of female agency.

The veil of the fighter for a larger cause, the identity given to a
woman by the military, is torn away in women’s accounts of the sexual
exploitation of their bodies. All romantic fantasies – dreams of marriage, love
affairs – are perverted at the very entry to the war, leading to frustration of
the women’s body and mind. Their heightened sexuality was supposed to be
part of their activism. This destructive experience of super-potency by female
veterans breaks through the conventional representations of a female
warrior, at war and at work; it breaks through the established code of the homeland as a sacred, militarized, maternal body.

The woman who came back from Afghanistan attempted to reconcile her post-war aspirations with the weight of cultural expectations. In order to survive emotionally, to match the model of a virtuous worker-wife, she erased her war experiences from her memory. One more ‘page’ of history, with another silenced zone of the maternal, was written for the culture of warfare, reproduced in mothers’ autobiographies. The continuing culture of warfare provided her with a fictitious ‘history’ through women’s/mothers’ bodies/texts.

In the montage of men’s and women’s confessions, a polarized world emerges: female potency versus male sexual impotence. This polarization indicates a political romance, Afghanistan being the desired, exotic other, a would-be colonized body. But the country that was supposed to be incorporated into the Soviet ‘family’ challenged its army – its collective body as a familial metaphor of Soviet power – and turned it into the vicious metaphor of sexual/political impotence.

Political emasculation, the sense of ineffectiveness and passivity, is transformed into male aggression against the other side of the Soviet equation ‘male/female’, the fiction of sex equality. Women are reminded that the masquerade is over, that equality was only a gift, and that female warriors are not to transgress the normal, biologically prescribed confines of their sex.

Both texts, Rzhevskaya’s *Distant Rumble* and Alexievich’s *Zinky Boys*, unveil the actual gender dynamics underneath the dominant representational systems in Soviet gender politics. But both also do more. These voiced experiences also help us to understand why women in the Russian Federation today want only the right to forget their activism. They want to play the virtuous role of wife and mother, and eventually become the staunchest proponents of male domination, neo-patriarchalism and the image of a powerful man.

**Bibliography**


Soviet and post-Soviet masculinities: after men’s wars in women’s memories


Hunting, ruling, sacrificing: traditional male practices in contemporary Balkan cultures

Svetlana Slapšak

Hunting animals is akin to taking men, in battle, or sexually. Hunting is a metaphor of men working out a relationship among themselves. [Schnapp, 1997, p. 142].

During the recent war in former Yugoslavia, foreign academics, researchers and political analysts – not to mention journalists – often had difficulties understanding the behaviour of individuals, state representatives, ethnic and social groups. Misunderstandings and insufficient information led to many new stereotypes. This was especially visible in the Western media and political actions covering mass rapes, mostly in Bosnia, which stressed gender relations in a most traumatic form. My aim here is to draw attention to some less-known types of traditional cultural behaviour among women and men in the Balkans, in order to seek and/or invent the semiotic space of re-evaluation of the new gender relations. We might define my attempt as searching for the grassroots models of traditional behaviour in order to adapt them, modernize and use them in a new context. It should also be understood as a strategy to throw more light on cases of inner-European cultural colonialism, especially traumatic in the Balkans – including Greece.

Re-evaluation and ‘recycling’ of the traditional types of cultural inter-gender relations has already been under way among pacifist groups in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and among Albanians in the region of Kosovo, shortly before and during the war. I shall try to structure the phenomena observed around three main traditional activities of malefolk in the Balkans – hunting, ruling and scarifying.

Research in the domain of ancient anthropology has demonstrated that, in antiquity, the male citizen was constructed and self-identifiable not only in the state and its institutions (army, parliament, market-place, public ritual, theatre), but also on the somewhat less structured margins such as hunting and private rituals. Ruling, however, does not refer only to
state institutions, but also to the large family unit (tribe, *zadruga* in the Balkans).

Many types of behaviour of men-warriors during the recent war in former Yugoslavia can be connected with hunting habits: unorganized paramilitary actions, taking prisoners to show off, taking/raping women as a sign of provisory/symbolic possession over the territory, hunting games and intensive communication with opponents/enemies (same language, modern technology and equipment), taboos – prohibition on touching a special ‘prey’ – individuals, social groups, women from specific ethnic or social groups. An example from before the war was gang rape in the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, when tourism began to develop in the 1970s and 1980s: a foreign woman, or city girls from Yugoslavia, would be raped by groups of local boys/men during summer vacations. The typical courtroom ‘explanation’ for such behaviour was that the victim allegedly ‘provoked’ them (by wearing a mini-skirt, shorts, T-shirt, or anything else for that matter). Elsewhere this type of rape is not so unusual. What makes it specific here is the notion of a woman-prey who wanders off beyond the boundaries of the territory in which she is considered protected by her own group (tribe, nation, state – male possessors in any case), and therefore can be hunted/raped. The hunting-raping rules change with the context. In the late 1980s, there was an intensive propaganda action by the Serbian press, in order to stir up public emotion, by accusing Albanians of raping Serbian women and thus ethnically cleansing the region of Kosovo. Sounds familiar? In order to make the argument stronger, the media indulged in stories which described Albanian rapists as bestial – they attacked children, old women, even domestic animals. The propaganda went so far that a new law was even introduced, imposing a more severe punishment on the Albanian perpetrator if the victim was a Serbian woman. Some politicians of Albanian origin publicly endorsed this law. It should be mentioned that the Yugoslav political structure had strict laws and local rules protecting the principle of equal ethnic representation at all levels, a form of political correctness, which earlier also included gender and age representation (1950s and 1960s). But in the case of ‘Albanian’ rapes, nobody cared about equal ethnicity. When I made a public remark that Serbs should stop raping Serbian women in order to show who was raping whom, one of my fellow dissident writers told me that I no longer belonged to the Serbian culture. International commissions came to Kosovo and were unable to determine the exact number of cases or individual cases, and the credibility of the alleged rapes was seriously shaken. A year later, official Serbian statistics showed that the number of rapes of Serbian women committed by Serbs had grown, and that the number of rapes of Serbian women committed by Albanians had diminished close to zero. What had happened? The firm grip of tribal discipline enabled Albanians to respect
the taboo imposed internally on Serbian women. The hunting context comes out clearly when we consider that the taboo-prey, Serbian women, live freely in Kosovo, while most of the Albanian women live secluded inside the high walls of their family homes, and only go out with men’s permission or accompanied by a male. The tribal discipline among the Albanians became even more visible in the years that followed, when the whole alternative system of schools, universities, hospitals, health protection and other institutions was organized to provide the Albanians with the public-sphere structure that was systematically denied by the Serbian authorities. The Serbian authorities established an apartheid system by dismissing Albanian employees, giving posts to Serbs and allowing all kinds of Serbian nepotism to spread. The Albanian response was this organized form of peaceful protest. The positive thing about this clash of two traditional modes of behaviour and ways of exercising power was that it enabled many Albanian women to be emancipated through the accepted form of acting publicly. The Serbian women, on the contrary, were pushed back into the patriarchal set of conventions and made much less visible, being ‘protected’, and used in public manifestations against Albanians. The highest point of this backlash was the rally of Serbian women in Kosovo, just before the war broke out in Croatia, in which they waved banners and shouted slogans calling on their ‘brothers, fathers and sons’ to protect them against the Albanians. This type of rally has been reproduced on several occasions during the tensions in Kosovo over the past few years.

Women-prey are classified by class and race: one of the first reported women victims of gang rape during the war, after the fall of the city of Vukovar in 1991, was an Albanian woman. Croatian propaganda manipulated the ethnic element in 1992, insinuating that Croatian women were not raped in large numbers because they were able to defend themselves and to resist, while ‘weak’ Muslim women were not so efficient. I would like to draw attention to the fact that these groups were not visible or definable before the war, and that generally, the religious criterion did not apply. These groups, especially ‘Muslim’ women, were invented by Serbian and Croatian nationalists, and by Bosnian conservative and nationalist ruling groups, but for the same purpose of control over women. It is not my intention to diminish the crime, or to play with numbers. On the contrary, I want to point to the cruel game of traditional behaviour, ideological constructs, media manipulations and clashes of political interests that abused women. One of the explanations for this violent backlash could be found in the general anti-Communist revenge taken against those members of the population who had gained much from socialist rule and laws – women. One of the most fascinating examples of academic manipulation in this field is the exercise of Lacan’s theories applied to the example of ‘Muslim’ women by the Slovenian author Renata Salecl:
Rape for Muslim women is an especially horrible crime because their religion strictly forbids any sexual contact before marriage; for a young Muslim woman, rape thus has the meaning of a symbolic death. The very way Muslim women are being raped, the very fact that rape is seen by the aggressors as ‘a kind of a “duty”’ to be performed on the captured woman, reveal how the aggressor aims to destroy precisely that aspect of the individual woman’s fantasy structure that touches her religious and sexual identity [Salecl, 1994, pp. 16–17].

This way of presenting women’s and men’s behaviour deserves some elementary analysis: ‘Muslim’ women stands here for ‘Bosnian’ women, which would mean that other ethnic women were not raped by any of the troops or paratroopers during the war, even if we limit the research to Bosnia. Let us be reminded here of the case of the five Croatian ‘witches’, five authors who were accused by the Croatian media of ‘raping Croatia’ (title in the Zagreb daily Globus in 1992), because they pointed to the fact that women in general were being raped, not primarily Croatian women (in a short initial period) or Muslim women (the secondary, but then permanent version), or any group of women representing a collective ethnic body. The action against the five Croatian authors included public attacks, largely quoted in the Croatian media, by pro-Croat French intellectuals like Alain Finkielkraut and Annie Le Brun and the Canadian-American feminist author Catherine McKinnon. In the interviews given to the Croatian press, the two French intellectuals pointed to the fact that the five women were ‘privileged’ in the former Communist regime, and even expressed their surprise that the five women still had their jobs in Croatia. This argument is exemplary: a job is connected to the level of expressed patriotism, in the sense of confirming anything that the state media say. Try applying this to any Western country, for instance to France: what kind of a scandal would it provoke if a public (or any) person should be fired from his or her job for not approving some media information or an ideological construct, or any opinion? Of course, there is a problem of ‘state’ media, which do not have their parallel in the West. In other words, the two French intellectuals when attacking the five women for their former ‘Communism’, and for their unpatriotic behaviour, used the Stalinist patterns of discourse in their purest form. Of course, the ‘Communist’ accusation is purely arbitrary, and in this sense very close to the anti-semitic pattern: in the post-Yugoslav world, almost every living person over the age of 10 had had something to do with Communist ideology and the socialist regime. The varieties of behaviour may include the former real nomenklatura, now trying to pose as anti-Communists, former dissidents eager for the new power, former political émigrés with a quisling past in the Second World War, former dissidents of pro-Yugoslav orientation, the former silent majority who wish to portray themselves as former victims of the regime, and so on. All these varieties are simply the consequence of the lack of the idea of citizenship over several...
generations, and the least that the Western visitor, researcher or journalist can do is to get the most relevant information, and not buy immediately from the first group that offers information, or far worse, power privileges. Let us mention just one interesting detail: Alain Finkielkraut has been elected to the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The consequence of the action was that all five Croatian authors have their jobs, and four of them now live outside Croatia.

Let us go back to Salecl’s assertions: ‘Muslim’ women are religious, and their sexual fantasy structure is connected to religion – that is why for them a rape is worse than for, supposedly, another group of women. To make this believable, one has to prove that this religious construct lasted long enough to form a fantasy structure, if we accept Lacanian terminology. Even if we skip the question of how much time is needed to form a certain collective fantasy structure in a society, we have to think about the space in which the alleged tradition exists: the former Yugoslavia was a secular state, and religious manifestations were private and personal. A very specific feature of Yugoslav Muslims’ identity was that this identity, made public and official in the beginning of the 1970s by Tito himself for the very obvious reason of maintaining a political balance between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, related to culture and certainly not to religion. Therefore, it was possible for the Bosnian Muslims to be eager Communists in the most ‘Titoist’ sector of the whole Yugoslav republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Muslim’ as a predominantly religious identity could be located in some remote villages, or among the religious fundamentalist groups in Sarajevo itself. Such groups were well known to the regime, because of their prosecution on charges of sending volunteers to Iran in the 1980s, and were also well known in the dissident circles, especially in Belgrade, where the group had its defenders. Being the President of the Committee for the protection of the freedom of expression at the Writers’ Association of Serbia at the time (1986–89), I issued a number of petitions in their favour, and had a significant correspondence with the accused themselves and with their lawyers. The names of Alija Izetbegović and of the Bosnian Muslim poet Meliha Salihbegović were well known, and Alija Izetbegović’s book on Islam was published in Belgrade, before the war, by an independent publisher close to dissident circles (Izetbegović, 1984). There is no doubt that we can speak of fantasy structures regarding the idea of Muslim identity, but we do not have the right to invent a tradition, which did not exist so massively as to determine a whole population of ‘Muslim’ women as being much more sensitive to the shock and the suffering of rape, because of this traditional fantasy structure. Research undertaken in Belgrade by local feminists among groups of refugee women from Bosnia and Croatia showed that most of the women raped or reported raped were generally well-established and financially independent, urban career women with clear political ideas (Nikolić-Ristanović, et al., 1996). Therefore the whole idea of ‘weak
Muslim’ women serves the new ideological construct of one political line in the new Bosnian state: it is the same line that is represented by the Croatian media in the affair of the ‘five witches’, and by the predominant nation-state line in Slovenia. This predominantly male invention of a collective self is by definition sexist, conservative and racist, and here we can see the general pattern comparable to all the other post-socialist states that started transitional processes without a universal war: far fewer women in power and representative bodies, less social and health protection, women as the first and the most numerous victims of poverty and unemployment, and so on. In the case of the post-Yugoslav states, this situation is much more dramatic because of war, violence, loss of homes and possessions, and of family and friendly ties, social context and refugee trauma. Salecl (1994) avoids mentioning that the frontiers of Slovenia were closed to refugees from Bosnia in August 1992 (only four months after the war broke out in Bosnia). The recent media language research showed that most of the Slovenian media constructed a negative and racist image of the Bosnian, almost exclusively Muslim, refugees (Æagar, n.d.). My conclusion would be that Salecl’s construct of ‘religion’ serves the conservative backlash, and that the ‘weakness’ of Muslim women serves a purely racist stereotype. Salecl therefore invents rape that is acceptable to Western opinion-making, because it typcasts the exclusive ethnic victim, silences other victims, and prevents other women from speaking and testifying about other types of rape.

Julie Mostov (1995), in her study on nationalism and women in the war in Yugoslavia, points to another, much more convincing fantasy structure about rape – the masculine fantasy of symbolic territory. A woman’s body represents this fantasy in a patriarchal society: being men’s possession, women’s bodies are the empty space, the blank paper to write down a virtual message to other men’s groups, be it the nation or the next village. The message is simple: We have been here, you are challenged, your possession is corrupted, worthless, lost. A woman’s body as a symbolic territory is the non-state: nature, wilderness, prey. It moves in two symbolic directions: first, that women’s bodies are the moving frontier of the other group, defining conflict space by their simple presence; and, secondly, that they are the prey as soon as they appear without the protection of the other group, their own group. In both cases, they can be raped by the other and by their own ethnic group, delimiting the more complicated power relations within the same group of men. In a documentary sponsored by the Croatian Government, two women from Bosnia, a Croat and a ‘Muslim’, tell the stories of their rapes, of the rape camps, and become anti-rape activists in the process. The English subtitles, however, never give the whole information, but which is understood immediately by native speakers. Both women were judges, prominent members of the nomenklatura in their city. It was quite unimaginable for a judge in former Yugoslavia not to be a member of the Communist Party and therefore definitely unreligious, and
certainly they had significant social privileges. One of the women befriended a Croatian Nationalist Party leader just before the war. They were raped by men they knew from the same city. In this case, the social relations (power and privileges on the one hand and poverty on the other) reveal that the rape of the two women had to do with personal revenge and class, much more than just with the ethnic element, added to the pattern to fit the new male identity – the ethnic Serbian ‘freedom fighter’. The two women, who were capable of expressing themselves, were chosen to represent everyone, and other victims of rape, less representative, were left out of the picture. The Croatian woman becomes the state-sponsored representative, which again is understood only by native Serbo-Croat speakers. However, this case clearly reveals the masculine anthropological pattern of war as a state of licence – a licence for hunting people. The Western audiences, however, remain manipulated by the lack of proper information (translation of the dialogues in the documentary), and can therefore draw all the wrong conclusions.

There are very few wars in modern times with such deep gender lines – I would dare to say trenches: pacifist movements in former Yugoslavia, even before the war broke out, were predominantly women’s movements. It was in women’s interest to preserve Yugoslavia, not only for socialist privileges for women, but also because of many multinational families, job and housing possibilities, mobility and the common pattern of migrant workers whose families usually remained in another republic. That was the case with workers from Bosnia and the region of Kosovo moving to work in Slovenia, and leaving wives and children in their own villages, with or without the control and/or protection of the family, parents, the remains of traditional *zadruga*.

Pacifist movements, especially women activists, reinvented/subverted some of the traditional patterns of hunters’ behaviour by mixing in some other traditional patterns of behaviour like brotherhood–sisterhood contracts, hideouts for male-deserters and conscientious objectors. In the situation in Belgrade in 1992–94, during the years of massive draft for the Croatian front, women organized and invented many cunning ways to hide their sons, husbands or friends and relatives from the military police who practised random calls. The women’s chains of solidarity that transcended not only the ethnic and the front lines but also extended to other countries throughout the world, possessed many of the features of a clever prey and by playing on the stereotypes that were attributed to them they displayed the intelligence of the hunted. The male in this case is a secondary prey, a cub that has to be protected from a violent and dangerous initiation. This weak male is not supposed to become a patriarchal male: rivalling the father, the son has to be feminized in order to survive, and to innovate a new kind of masculinity. Many women during the war in Yugoslavia offered the mighty Chronos-father a stone, instead of baby-Zeus, wrapped in nappies.
My point is that the urban and rural women read the cultural texts with remarkable precision and gave them a new interpretation. In the traditional behaviour of the rural population in the Balkans, as recorded in oral literature and in ethnographic research, there is a possibility of making a series of contracts between young boys and girls, women and men, that regulate their non-sexual relationships, and prevent sexual violence, and especially hunt-rape. Sometimes, this kind of regulation is given a symbolic fantasy form, as a contract between a hero and a fairy. The hero and fairy in the oral narratives help each other, but also have competitive clashes (singing contests, archery contests), which may end in violence. Among humans and in the real world, this brotherhood–sisterhood relation between non-relatives, sometimes based on the same month of birth ('one-monthers'), is made for a lifetime, and includes protection from violence (rape and such like) on the man’s side, and providing for hideouts and medical help on the woman’s side. The universal Balkan custom of ‘given word’ shifted here into inter-gender relations. Recycling this type of relation based on mutual protection and solidarity, women pacifists could engage menfolk in the contracts, offering them protection from the draft and help in leaving the country, and asking for their participation in political activities in exchange. A Yugoslav feminist in the 1930s, Julka Chlapec-Djordjević, wrote that women cannot engage in pacifism without co-operation with pacifist men (Chlapec-Djordjević, 1935). The contracts during the Yugoslav war also meant co-operation between women of different political orientations. But most of all, they meant deconstruction of hunting behaviour.

The ruling pattern in former Yugoslavia was predominantly masculine in the state and in the family, though the official positive action policy permitted far more women than at present to participate in political life, which by definition lacked direct democracy. In fact, the short love affair between the Communists and women started in the Second World War, based on exchange of political rights and social liberties for voluntary work (providing food, nursing and other services for the partisan movement). It had already come to an end by the early 1950s, when large and powerful women’s organizations, considered politically dangerous, were abolished at the time of the split with Stalin. Ever since, the old patriarchal habits mixed with consumerism and women-as-objects iconology have been creeping in. The Yugoslav male was a traumatized individual, and often his private patriarchalism and machismo was credited with a quality of anti-Communist resistance in dissident circles. If one reads Milan Kundera’s extremely misogynist novels, one will find many parallels to this kind of attitude. Violence against women and children was never considered an important issue, and it is understandable why, in 1994, Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party MPs in the Serbian Parliament, most of them former Communist nomenklatura, laughed at the proposal of the legal condemnation of family violence, and did not even allow any preliminary voting; it was considered
that violence in the family was men’s exclusive prerogative. During this war, women pacifists found the most neutral and the most efficient spot to touch this traumatized masculinity, i.e. the space of power. As many men could not move freely, being literally hunted by Serbian and Bosnian-Serbian military police in the cities in 1991–94, public space was left to women, especially the street, the principal arena for presenting opposing political views. Women’s bodies, in this case, featured not only the symbolic frontiers for the other to grab and to trespass, but the conscious demonstration, and therefore the resistance. While organizing some of the most spectacular street events in Belgrade and other cities in Serbia, like wrapping the city centre in black cloth, exposing babies in front of Milošević’s window, or lighting candles at this same spot for several months running, or ringing bells in front of the Parliament, women were occasionally attacked by paramilitary militias and fascist groups. This means that they were rightly understood as performers of political power. The long-lasting winter events of 1996/97 in Belgrade can only be explained by good co-operation between the women who controlled the streets and the men who joined in and were backed up by them. I witnessed some of the new rituals in the spring of 1996 in Belgrade during the massive street union protest: the presence of old ladies, and the new attitudes in treating them including hand-kissing, which was never part of the Balkan tradition. A young Serbian writer Vladimir Arsenijević (1995) pictures this change in gender relations in his autobiographic novel, in which a young woman works on the streets as a drug-dealer during the war in Yugoslavia, while a young man hides at home planning their escape to some remote country. The public appearance and the parallel political party conducted by Milošević’s spouse should also be interpreted as a clumsy attempt at showing that women’s privileges from the socialist period are not forgotten by the new regime. The lack of any subtlety in this political game led to even more hatred for women in politics.

Constructing the national-nationalist identity along gender lines is also quite visible in all the post-Yugoslav societies and cultures. First, there are gender fantasies of symbolized collectives: the Croatian media invented a female motherly figure for Croatia. The Serbian media constructed Serbia in a way that, ironically, could be interpreted as bisexual, while Serbian propaganda portrayed Slovenia as a gay male or an unfaithful female lover, and the Albanians as a bestial, twisted, male collective. This has much to do with the visual tradition of nineteenth-century popular pictures and illustrations, in which a symbolic gender representative in a classicist-heraldic mixture was part of the semiotic system – France as Marianne, England as John Bull, Uncle Sam, the sleepy Turk, the Russian (male) bear, and so on. Therefore, the strategy used by women pacifists to deconstruct the traumatized male was primarily symbolic: invading territory, just as men did during the war, then letting them inside the alternative group with new rules, under different conditions.
As Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1981) and Alain Schnapp (1997) demonstrated, hunting and ruling have a very ambivalent relationship. Hunting is a part of masculine initiation, but it has its role in constructing the citizen’s self and functions on a symbolic level in the homosexual and in other men’s or intergender relations. It is neither wild nor civilized, and it can also use a woman’s body in its self-construction. The hunting-and-rape pattern written on women’s bodies-territories can be subverted and given the completely opposite meaning, that of women hunting and hiding the masculine prey from the masculine predator. The two masculine bodies in this case are not separated by ethnic, territorial or power differences: on the contrary, a symbolic basis of this subverted hunting and power game is the family. In this case, the psychoanalytical oversimplification of the Oedipus myth receives the last blow: it is the active and inventive Jocasta who saves and educates her son against the patriarchal, archaic husband/father.

The practice of sacrificing is not easy to define. One should remember the extreme case reported by Netherlands soldiers during the siege of Srebrenica. The Serbian self-proclaimed general Ratko Mladić, in his self-styled royal Yugoslav army officer’s uniform, kept a live pig, hung by the rear trotters, during the talks with Netherlands military representatives, only to slaughter it in front of them at the end of the talks. This horrible and barbaric scene had its effects. What Mladić was actually performing was a ritual sacrifice of Muslims, a clear message of things to come. The receivers should have read the message and then might have saved Srebrenica, but they did not.

Death rituals – the other area of sacrificing – were this time clearly divided between men and women. In all Balkan cultures, since antiquity, women perform the death rituals and deal with the dead body, because they are closer, and therefore resistant or linked to miasma (Parker, 1996), the ritual pollution. Giving birth is in fact a miasma. Before and at the beginning of the war, women were used by nationalist media to stir up public emotion simply by appearing in black by the coffin of a male victim of violence committed by the other ethnic group, performing traditional lamentations or just crying. Women pacifists immediately responded by publicly introducing ‘Women in Black’, a political performance already in use in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. In silence, women symbolized men’s fear of death and acted as a living warning of the perils of war. When the wrapping of the city centre in black cloth was organized in Belgrade, many men came out from their hideouts and joined the women. Playing on the death ritual gives a very strong anti-war message, that death should be natural, not caused in an untimely fashion by war and violence.

Another sacrificial ritual performed by women which questioned male politics was the exposing of babies. Several hundred mothers appeared in public in 1993, and left their babies in front of Milošević’s official quarters, in order to show the poor state of children’s protection, shortage of
baby food and supplies, and the general poverty caused by the war. Babies were left to cry, watched over by nearby mothers, for about twenty minutes. This was a replay of the very ancient Balkan ritual, in which a father has to decide whether a child lives or dies by lifting it, or not, from the ground where women have placed it in front of him. If a father did not accept a child, it would be exposed in the woods or a deserted place and left to die. The Oedipus story starts with this act of exposure. In our case, Milošević did not wish to appear to accept the symbolic future of the country. In fact, women made him publicly confess that his patriotism was false. After twenty minutes the mothers picked up their crying babies, which constituted the symbolic gesture of taking the future of the nation/collective into their own hands away from the incapable male rulers.

The uselessness of male self-sacrificing in war, and women’s anger over this gambling with the future and with the quality of life for shallow ideological goals, is reflected as early as the forming of the ancient Serbian national myth, the myth of Kosovo. In a battle there in 1389 the Serbs lost their Christian kingdom to the Turks for some 400 years. Although the historic sources define the battle as undecided, what followed in the next half century was the Turkish invasion of the central Balkans. The oral poetry about this event celebrates the choice of the ‘kingdom of heaven’ made by the Serbian King Lazar and his knights, but also records the voice of the anonymous maid of Kosovo, who bitterly laments her future sterility, because all the available men have been killed in battle. In a more recent oral tradition, there are several short poems in which King Lazar’s spouse refuses to accept her miraculously revived husband, because she manages to marry off all her daughters and sons and apparently the family is living happily. Queen Milica, according to historical sources, did marry her daughter to the son of the Turkish sultan killed in the battle of Kosovo by a Serbian knight, and her son was a Turkish vassal. She conducted at least two successful missions to the Porte. One of them involved retrieving the body of a famous female saint, Petka or Paraskeva (Saint-Friday), from Bulgaria and bringing it to Serbia. Milica obviously thought that there was a need for a women’s saint at that time since she introduced this cult which is still very strong in the central Balkans.

My intention has been to explore the pacifist strategies and their recycling of clearly masculine traditional behaviour, in order to invent a new behaviour acceptable to men. It is not an attempt to search for grassroot possibilities, which may end in a conservative repetition, but rather to research and make creative use of the cultural patterns, texts, anthropological data and folklore. I could define this invention as urban, carnivalesque, and bearing the signs of time, particularly the students’ culture of the 1960s. In fact, this was the meeting point of women and men: traditional cultural memories, re-examined in the best memories from the recent past. Self-criticism and irony are necessary to produce such a reinvention.
Bibliography


Kosovski Ëvor: dreciti ili seˇci [Kosovo Knot: to Unravel or to Cut]. Titograd, 1990.


Introduction

In this chapter I wish to focus on different aspects of men’s lives, the way we bring up boys, dominant forms of masculinity and, not least, the absence of responsibilities for caring in many men’s lives. These issues are relevant to the development of new ways of being a man and will play a decisive part in the development of a culture of peace.

It is important to piece together different aspects of modern men’s lives to form a larger picture. Areas such as work, care of children, men’s honour and power strategies and their search for gender identity must thus be seen as part of the same picture. However, it is important that this does not just become another narrative about the male. Men cannot be described as one group. We cannot talk about one male role or refer to ‘the’ masculinity.

We bring this up at this initial stage to show that even our use of language is part of the creation process of the phenomena we are talking about. Through rhetoric and public debate, we the participants help to define the space that men can move about in. There is considerable variation in men’s perception of gender and gender roles, of what a man should be like and of what masculinity really means in present-day society. We see these differences between men as an important and positive driving force in the promotion of gender equality. Therefore, different male cultures also need different political instruments.

An example of a conflict between men is the case of the boss and the male employee who wants to take leave of absence to care for his children or to work shorter hours because the children require attention. Documentation has gradually been forthcoming on the serious, emotionally charged conflicts that men face in a work context in their struggle for a career, recognition, honour and promotion opportunities and, not least, the difficult choice they have to make between work and family. In many cases,
the boss and the male employee will have widely differing ideas about how much time the family needs.

The differences between men are expressed in competing forms of masculinity, but it is important to be aware that the relationship between the different forms of masculinity is not coincidental. There exists a hierarchy of various masculine roles and male cultures. It is possible for young men in the Nordic countries to do their compulsory national service in the form of civilian service instead of military service, but the choice most often puts them in a more vulnerable position in relation to other men. It is also possible for men in some jobs to work shorter hours in order to have more time for their children, but then they risk facing hostile remarks from their colleagues. Robert Connell (1987) calls the dominant form of masculinity hegemonic masculinity. It is this form that defines and dominates other, alternative, forms of masculinity. But no once-and-for-all definition has been made of what the dominant norm and ‘right’ form of masculinity are. The norm changes; it is disputable, and is probably more uncertain today, especially in relation to children and family.

The conflicts between different forms of masculinity tell us that masculinity can be more than one thing at the same time and that we have to understand masculinity as the result of a continuous process. None the less, some masculine ways of behaving are obviously more acceptable than others. This becomes clear when we consider the discrimination and exclusion to which homosexual men have been subjected in our societies. A fear of being regarded as homosexual has pushed many men into unnecessary masculine, macho-like roles from the time they were small boys. In this way, homophobia has helped to stop an expansion of heterosexual men’s repertoire of roles.

An important objective of the work relating to men and gender equality is to demonstrate the possibilities men have of expanding their repertoire of roles. Although it is not necessarily a good thing in itself to have all the options, we can still say today that men have too few ways of expressing masculinity.

**Everyday life and choices**

Fathers of small children are one group of men who now have the chance of expanding their repertoire of roles. The changes that are taking place from year to year in how fathers spend their time are small, but in a longer time perspective the changes are quite large. In this section, we will look briefly at what helps and what hinders the gender equality process in the family and thus contributes to limiting men’s repertoire of roles. From surveys of attitudes in the Nordic countries, we know that men have a positive attitude to more equality in the family, but in practice the division of labour in the home is still relatively gender-bound (Holter, 1989; Jalmert, 1984). It is our interpretation that the slowness of the equality process is due to something
more than just stubbornness on men’s part. In the following, we shall outline an ‘average life situation’ for families with small children with reference to the priority given to work outside and inside the home.

Today’s labour market is demanding. This applies not only to people who want to make a career for themselves, but also to most of those who want to follow up and keep their jobs (truck-drivers, welders in engineering workshops, cashiers, etc.). We know that the establishment phase for families with small children includes some strenuous periods, in addition to the demands of a job. After completing their education and embarking on a career, most people are looking for a more settled home situation. The establishment phase places the man and the woman in a relationship in a new situation and subjects them to a different type of pressure than before.

Most Nordic women today go out to work, but it is still the case that many women have part-time jobs. Fathers of small children constitute one of the groups in the Nordic countries that work most overtime. A survey carried out in Iceland shows that 75 per cent of the men did not think they had enough time for their children, while 60 per cent of the women replied that they had enough time at home (Júlíusdóttir, 1993). In Norway, one in every three fathers with children under the age of 3 works forty-five hours or more a week. When the youngest child is between 3 and 6 years, an even larger number of fathers work forty-five hours or more a week, that is, almost half (SSB, 1989). Surveys also show that many companies are making more and more use of overtime among their employees (Rogstad, 1993).

In the Nordic countries, the average pay for women is lower than for men. There is some discussion linked with the figures for unequal pay, but in this context we do not need to go into the problems linked with the nature of the work or what equal work is. It is the difference in pay between men and women as such that interests us here. In Iceland, for example, women’s pay averages 17 per cent less than men’s (Iceland, 1995). The average hourly wage for women in Norway is 21 per cent lower than for men (SSB, 1996). It is only natural that such a difference in pay will affect the family’s choice of who should work most and who should work overtime if necessary. The person (read: he) who earns the most should work most outside the home. If we compare the figures for unequal pay with the figures for men’s overtime, the picture of a slow equality process becomes easier to understand. In the gender equality debate, these data should open the way for a more sympathetic interpretation of men’s lack of participation in the family. One explanation of men’s overtime could just be that some men are forced by the family’s financial situation to give priority to their job. The picture of the family situation is therefore not necessarily what we have learned to imagine it: a rather weary, idle man stretched out on the couch, while the wife does the washing up. In Norway, the difference in the average amount of work (paid employment, housework and care of children all
added together) carried out by women and men in the small-children phase is in fact thirty-eight minutes in the men’s favour (SSB, 1992). In the average family with small children today, it is still the mother who washes the dishes and washes and dresses the children. However, the father is not lying on the couch; he is at work.

We know that, in addition to lower pay for women and more frequent part-time employment, fewer women advance in the career structure in working life. Owing to the organization of workplaces, pure discrimination factors and by choice of profession, women have not advanced to leading positions in the same way as men. With these conditions in the labour market, it is ‘easier’ for many women to enter into a looser, less ambitious work situation.

Thus, if we are to understand the priorities men and women set with regard to the care of their children and their careers, we must make allowances for the situation in which families with small children find themselves. The choices regarding care and work must be seen in conjunction with pay, working hours, competitive mentality and family finances, but we must also consider these choices in relation to what men and women identify with.

In everyday situations, with a child crying at night, the physical strain of overtime and the smell of varnish hanging about the house after an evening’s and night’s renovation, it is tempting to choose the ‘simplest solution’. In many cases, the ‘simplest solution’ is for the mother to get up and comfort the crying child. The ‘simplest solution’, where the mother picks up the child, can be seen as the typical picture of the division of labour between men and women in a strenuous establishment phase. These types of solutions are based on previous experience and competence. Through gender socialization, pregnancy, breast-feeding and closeness to the child during its first months, it has often been the woman who has had the grasp of the situation when things get tough. We are thinking particularly of situations where the child will not sleep (gets breast-fed at night), is sick or is just a mummy’s boy or girl. In very many cases, it is simpler if the woman looks after the child, while the man does the practical work (like laying tiles, changing windows and earning as much money as possible in the shortest possible time). The tendency to choose this solution is also intensified by the situation around the couple. The man will tend to get his friends and relatives together to help him lay a new roof on the house or build a foundation wall, even if he is not necessarily any more practical by nature. Based on tradition and expertise, he will rarely call on his mother-in-law or sister-in-law who is an occupational therapist. There are probably great geographical and social differences when it comes to who does much of the practical work themselves. In the towns and cities and among the higher social classes and the so-called free professions (also called full-price people), it has not been customary to do practical and manual work oneself. This
type of work has largely been overlooked in public discussion about division of labour between the sexes. This is because it is the higher social strata who have to a large extent defined and led public debate.

In the socialization process, important framework conditions are laid down for the choices made by boys and girls as regards the role of carer, what is natural for them and what confirms their identity. Traditional socialization patterns are confirmed when macrofactors and institutionalized schemes give women the care of the children when they are small (private and intimate), while the men work away from home (public and action-oriented).

The possibility for, and willingness of, men to take independent responsibility for the care of their children and to take a critical view of the at times insatiable demands of working life are two fundamental aspects of men’s process of change. Practical care is part of creating new forms of masculinity. These will be forms of masculinity that are able to a greater degree to perceive the child’s needs. Being with a child provides basic training in communication with an eye for other people’s needs. New masculine roles linked with caring can be an important safeguard against some of the rawest forms of capitalism. Men who practise care will therefore provide an important basis for a culture of peace. But as we can see from the analysis, it is an important precondition for men to be able to take part in the work of caring for children, that the traditional political equal policy demands have been met. We are thinking specially of women’s education, equal pay and financial independence.

**Men, power and powerlessness**

Having a gender means being the bearer of a physical mark. You can generally recognize a man or woman from their exterior appearance. When we look at people, consider them and judge them, their sex is an active category. We often take into consideration whether we are talking to a man or a woman. In this process, we have a double standard system for normality. What is considered to be within the range of normality for a woman is not necessarily considered normal for a man and vice versa. It is ‘abnormal’ for a man to knit. We link up ‘knitting’ with ‘man’ in a fraction of a second and find it strange to see a man knitting. A more interesting example than knitting is where two strangers get off a bus in a dark, isolated place. It is of especial interest to the woman whether the other person getting off is a man or woman. This example illustrates the link between sex and power.

When we notice a person’s sex, we apply more or less the same mechanisms as when we notice the colour of their hair or their clothes. Sex is something we perceive immediately. That is not saying that it has to be that way. What we see as relevant in a situation does not need to be just as relevant for another person in another situation, in another culture, in other
social strata or in another historical era. By pointing out these obvious experiences, we can show that men have often reaped considerable ‘automatic’ benefits from being men. Being a man has not only been an advantage; it also used to be necessary in order to participate in arenas such as politics and working life. Men have also benefited a great deal from monopolizing certain labour markets. Men were admittedly grossly exploited in many cases in the productive process, but have not as a group been excluded from participation in many parts of working life in the twentieth century. This way of sorting men and women is no longer legal in the Nordic countries, but at an informal level these social mechanisms still work. Our own social constructions become power.

Looking at men from the perspective of power also gives us the chance to demonstrate the powerlessness of many men. Men can also be the losers in patriarchal systems. A concept of patriarchy must therefore embrace the oppression not only of women, but also of groups of men. The relationship between men and women is not a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is the other side’s loss. A more nuanced view of patriarchy shows clearly that there are also many men who lose out in patriarchal systems. In earlier debates on men, gender equality and sex perspectives, the zero-sum game has played a dominant part, the argument being that if women are the losers in a patriarchal society, men must be the winners (Kimmel, 1996). This is not correct. Social and health statistics show that our form of society is extremely costly for men. Another example is war, where gender mechanisms between men of power and young boys create alliances which are in many cases totally manipulative.

In any discussion about gender equality, it is important to point out that it can also be a relief not to have power; not to have control but to depend on others. Many men find power and responsibility a burden, and too much power makes many men uncertain and cynical. Admitting such an attitude to power will cause an upheaval in the traditional masculine hierarchy of values, where to have the greatest possible power and control has been seen as a good and a goal in itself. A more even distribution of power will also mean a more democratic attitude. Power is something we should negotiate, not distribute according to biological criteria.

The possibility and expectation of power that men have leads to different forms of powerlessness. Many men react to powerlessness by becoming aggressive. Being brought up to compete and fight has made aggression one of several problem-solving strategies when the level of frustration rises. Some male roles are closely linked with control and power. When this goal is not achieved, some men react by becoming violent and abusing themselves or their surroundings. When power slips out of their grasp, some men see illegitimate instruments of power as a natural solution. This is also the way many men put it when explaining why they beat their partners (Skjørten, 1994). The wish for and the expectation of power
implies (to put it mildly) an inappropriate way of organizing masculinity. The unfulfilled expectation of power can lead to bitter disappointment and set many men on the road to dizzying immorality.

One of the most important aims of gender equality work in the Nordic countries is to get more men to do housework and look after their children. This objective means that we also have to look at the power of women in the home. Research shows that many men also dominate in the home (Moxnes, 1989). ‘Just wait till your father gets home’ is a familiar threat. The traditional man puts his foot down when he feels this is required, but not before. At the same time, men have not previously become very much involved in the day-to-day domestic responsibilities. They have thus disclaimed power in traditional work in the home. Now that a large number of men want to enter the sphere of care and the home, they have to step out of this role. The modern man cannot rant and rave when dinner is not on the table; he either has to make it himself or discuss with his wife who was supposed to make it. The modern man no longer enters the woman’s arena in a position of command. In this new situation, we have to be aware of what the traditional relationship between the sexes means for the man’s possibility of taking on a new role. Holter and Aarseth (1993) have described how difficult it can be for a woman to give up her identity-creating position of being ‘the one who sorts things out at home’. It is important to include this power relationship when we draw up strategies for men’s process of change. When it comes to mastering both day-to-day and special care situations, men and women often have completely different starting points. Through their training, women have often built up more self-confidence and skills as regards looking after and caring for a family. Studies of girls and boys show that, through social learning and identifying themselves with their mother, girls are more interested in cultivating the intimate and the relational when they are with other people. Women are also expected to want and to enjoy the role of carer. Thus for many women ‘home and care’ becomes a territory they regard as their own. Much of their sense of identity is linked with the role of carer. From way back, we know that it was considered acceptable for a wife to tease her husband for his ‘guest performances’ in the kitchen. Men’s self-confidence and feeling of mastering the situation are probably often lacking in the area of care, because this gives them no confirmation of identity or immediate recognition of possible problem-solving strategies. But it is also often difficult to combine the needs of many men to be in control and have everything under control with the work of caring for a family. It is probably more difficult for a traditionally brought-up man to find a strategy for getting his 2-year-old daughter to eat, without causing a terrible scene, than it is for his wife who works in a nursing home.

When you are under pressure, you usually choose the repertoire you feel you can master. When it proves difficult to bring up children, many men will choose a more traditional repertoire, that is to say, an authoritarian style.
This is not only the case in relation to the children, but also in other difficult situations. Strong masculine expressions from the father will make a lasting impression and stick in the child’s mind as it is developing its own identity. In this way, the rather authoritarian, traditional forms of masculinity can be handed down without the individual man being fully aware of this.

**Home and work: an unequal exchange**

Another problem connected with power lies in the exchange of care, on the one hand, and production of goods and services for sale to the market, on the other hand. Traditionally, production for the market has been the territory of the male, while reproduction has been the female area. Market mechanisms have not succeeded in putting a proper value on women’s housekeeping and care activities. This means that the relationship between production and reproduction is lopsided. A comparison between our palatial banks and makeshift kindergartens brings out the power relationship between production (men) and reproduction (women). The purely mercantile way of considering utility and profit has failed to appreciate the work of women in the care sector (Holter, 1989).

The relationship between the situation at home and the situation at work is a cardinal point in the analysis of the relationship between men and women. If we cannot understand how our way of thinking, our language, our views of one another, our views of what has value and what creates value are affected by this unequal exchange, we understand little of the gender differences in our society. The preparation of a boy for competition in the market and a girl’s training for participation in and empathy with care responsibilities both express something we connect with gender, while our ways of behaving also express something behind gender. In today’s society, it is a long step from throwing a pay packet on to the table to throwing 80-year-old Auntie Bessie’s incontinence pad in the rubbish bin with the same proud masculine air. This deeper structure is formed through the unequal relationship that exists between production and reproduction (Holter and Aarseth, 1993). Seen in this light, it is important in gender equality work to understand how institutions in society maintain an unfair distribution between production (of goods and services) and reproduction (of people).

The values set in the financial cycle affect more than the individual man and woman’s wallet. Values set in economic processes also become accepted as social norms for what is worth while, who and what have the right of life and what is worth fighting for. From this point of view, the unreasonable relationship between production and reproduction is difficult to combine with the idea of new, more care-related roles for men.

**The concept of gender equality: equal time**

The debate on equality and fairness circles round problems such as contribution, work-load and reward. An important factor in this respect is
time. How much time do men and women spend on what? When we speak of equal time, we compare responsibilities and duties on the basis of how long they take, provided that they entail a fairly similar work-load (Engelstad, 1990). We recognize this discussion from the workplace where piecework and working hours are important subjects for negotiation. The difference in the working hours of office staff and factory workers has been a major issue for the labour movement. Moving away from the typical market relationships over to the family, we find time is still an important element in negotiations on equality and fairness.

When we judge equality by the criterion of time, we add together the time spent on work in paid employment and the time spent on work in the home. These time data can tell us something about the total amount of time we spend on our obligations to each other. If you work just as long and in this way contribute just as much as your partner to the family as a whole, this is a form of equality; this is equality in time. An example of equality in time is when he spends an hour washing up and she spends the same time washing clothes, or she puts the children to bed and he tidies up after the day’s activities, or she works overtime while he looks after the children. The point is that they are both doing something from which the other benefits and which benefits the whole family. If the family organizes itself in accordance with this principle of time, each day will not be just one big round of negotiations where the one party has a tendency ‘in the name of fairness’ to act in a pedantic manner towards the other. Seen in this light, the situation becomes unfair when one does a lot and another does very little for the family as a whole.

Spending the same amount of time on what we call joint tasks should, however, be problematized in relation to reward and unintended consequences. As long as the family operates with one joint economy, the time principle would seem to be a fair arrangement. But what happens when we only focus on time is that men and women acquire different skills and different resources. The tasks we carry out, such as caring and working overtime, play their part in forming us as people. And what is ‘natural’ for women and what is most ‘profitable and rational’ for the family as a whole often adds up to systematic inequality between the spouses. The one who works at home will lose career opportunities and come off worst when pension points are allotted in old age.

**Equality in tasks**

Equality in tasks means sharing tasks fairly equally between the man and the woman. This kind of organization gives both mother and father the responsibility for paid work; they both look after the children, and the work in the house is shared equally. This kind of equality is a departure from the system of complementary gender-bound roles. What we lose when we focus on equality in time is the chance to alter fixed gender role patterns. Equality in
tasks, on the other hand, offers both men and women a chance to change. New tasks create possibilities and new qualities in the people who carry them out.

Practice as a carer is an important basis for the way many women behave and for their rational approach to care. If we opt for equality in tasks, men’s participation in this field will offer the possibility of changing the gender role pattern and many of the traditional forms of masculinity. Men will then take part in a world that used to be alien to them in some ways. We could see a shifting of male and female cultures. And women will, by taking more part in the men’s world, have to understand and find the answers to new problems. It will then be an open question, and an area for conflict, how much men and women will allow themselves to be formed and how they manage to create new situations. What happens to men who have domestic responsibility and are the main carers for the children? Can women leaders change corporate culture? What will it mean to the stock exchange as an institution to have more women working there as stockbrokers?

Negotiating equality in tasks can be difficult and hard on a relationship. The code for family life in Western culture is very much characterized by the ideal of love and affection. The romantic ideal sees living together as something natural, something obvious, not as two parties facing each other over the negotiating table. In this way, everyday life conflicts with the images of love we find in advertisements, films, music and literature. Here, the unspoken word, the obvious and the complementary are presented as the very driving force in a relationship. Marianne Gullestad’s book *Kitchen Table Society* about working-class families in the suburbs of the Norwegian city Bergen gives us a good insight into a marriage built around complementary gender roles (Gullestad, 1984). The strangeness between men and women is, at least among her informers, an important element of the love relationship. The fact that they belong to two different worlds, do different things and understand each other through dissimilarity means that equality in tasks can become something frightening.

But even if equality in tasks often seems threatening to our gender identity, it is precisely this kind of equality that is being called for in many Nordic countries. Equality in tasks is a goal that can be achieved by a variety of means. We can encourage women and men to correct the imbalances created by gender socialization. We can allocate quotas by gender and we can reward men and women differently in order to encourage them to stay in their jobs or apply for untraditional jobs. The paternity quota (four weeks of parental leave reserved for the father) is one example of a strategy for change which attaches importance to equality in tasks.

The good thing about equality in tasks is that men are given the chance to share women’s everyday reality, and sharing women’s care responsibilities could help to give men a new view of the value of these responsibilities. But we also need a redistribution of the exchange value between the people who produce people and the people who produce goods.
and services. This is one of the cardinal points in the problems relating to gender equality, and it also makes the battle for gender equality more political and the battle for equal worth clearer and more critical of the system.

Costs of masculine roles

Many of our forms of masculinity have proved to be very costly, also for men themselves. Men are over-represented in social statistics, be it accidents, suicide, misuse of alcohol or psychiatric illness. Other problems are more closely linked with the workplace, such as accidents at work, stress and repetitive strain injuries. These costs are difficult to criticize because they are closely associated with men’s earnings at work. Some traditional masculine roles are also extremely costly for other people. For example, nearly 100 per cent of those found guilty of criminal offences are men, and the great majority of thugs and abusers in the home are men (Nordic Council of Ministers, 1995, p. 36).

As we see it, an important objective of gender equality work is to lower the price men themselves and the persons closest to them have to pay for virility. In many ways, we can say that men are the ‘extreme sex’ (Bonde, 1995). Men represent both the top and the bottom of social statistics.

But why are men the extreme sex? And why is there an increasing tendency to marginalize young men in certain sections of the population in the Nordic countries? In the transition to a service and information society, some of the traditional forms of masculinity have become redundant and some of the male population do not pass muster in the labour market. Typical men’s jobs are disappearing from the labour market (unskilled factory workers, farm workers, fishermen and whalers), new forms of production require other types of workers with other qualifications and employers are looking for a new kind of masculinity. The software industry does not need silent, aggressive computer engineers in customer supplies. If a man worked in a copper mine in Kongsberg 100 years ago, it was probably just as well not to talk of feelings while he was down the mine. The form and content of men’s jobs have changed radically. New ways of being a man are needed in modern commerce and industry, and, more particularly, new forms of production need educated young men. Statistics for the Nordic countries show that part of the young male population are unable to hold their own in the school and education system, and in certain strata of society it is unusual for boys to take further education. As a parallel to this development, growth can be seen in those industries which have been remote from men. The skills inherent to the women’s culture are appreciated, especially in the public sector, but also to an increasing extent in the private sector. These may be social skills, service, care and, not least, the discipline many girls display in relation to education and the labour market. These developments create expulsion mechanisms that come down hard on boys and men with an inherent old-fashioned, outdated masculinity.
(uneducated, uncommunicative, unable to master the ‘relational’ part of working life, etc.).

The age of brutal capitalism is over in the Nordic countries. Mixed economies and class compromises characterize the formation of society, but the inheritance from capitalism’s competitive logic is still an important element in modern forms of masculinity, and many markets are more competitive than before. How many ‘unnecessary’ employees (messenger boys, orderlies, etc.) is there room for, for example, in large-scale industry in Sweden or Finland today as compared with 1960?

It is not always popular to turn the spotlight on men’s extreme work culture and on the competitive mentality between men. In the first place, this way of looking at things meets with reactions from men themselves. For many men, much of their identity is tied up with their work. Such a focus also meets with negative reactions from many within the business sectors. In many sectors long working hours and a competitive mentality among men are a precondition of competitive strength. In many of the traditionally male professions, such as oil engineers and doctors, we see that the pressure of work is actually increasing. One explanation to this is that a great deal has been invested in each individual employee and in the technology the employee masters. Moreover, the costs of not achieving maximum utilization are high. But in a system of this kind the price paid by each employee is also high. Stress and uncertainty, anxiety and the need to control are psychological conditions that often correspond well with serious somatic illnesses, such as cardiovascular disease and cancer. The health-related effects of men’s day-to-day life should be seen in conjunction with the average life expectancy for men. Although these statistics presumably also contain genetic components, it is normal to regard lifestyle and more particularly attitude to life as vital to a person’s state of health. In the Nordic countries, the average life expectancy for men is between seven (Faroe Islands) and four (Iceland) years lower than for women.

Boys are brought up to be more ‘independent’ (or call it egoistic or self-centred) than girls. It is accepted and expected that a boy is more self-reliant and can manage on his own during the phase when he breaks away and creates his own identity. This is expected by his mother and father, siblings and friends. A boy can more easily see that he is different from his mother when he is developing his own identity. He is supposed to grow up and become something ‘different’ from his mother. The problem is that the separation process can easily become too much for a boy when he is socialized into a tough, masculine climate. There is, moreover, often a lack of close masculine role models around small boys who have to form their gender identity. Many boys create their identity by denying all that is feminine, while at the same time they are not given realistic pictures of what it is to be a man. They become rigid in their rejection of intimacy, tears and feelings. This rejection stays with many men throughout their lives. The
requirement of independence and managing without the mother (read: other people) makes men easy prey in some sectors of working life. Many men's personalities are perfectly suited to extreme working and living conditions. Many men also have a minimum social network to support them when unemployment, crises and conflicts arise.

Much of our culture is built up around Christian ideas and not in the least Freudian metaphors. To open up, speak freely, confess and be forgiven are psychological processes that a modern society uses. But for many men this ideology is quite unsuitable. They prefer to flex their muscles, hold their breath, keep going and hide their lives from themselves and other people. These can be dangerous solutions. Men shut themselves up in their private homes. Abuse, violence and despair can continue without men being able to confess, open up, correct the situation and take action. So ‘talk-about-it’ solutions are difficult for many men to implement. These solutions do not work because many men have to hit rock bottom before they will open up. The threshold they have to pass before they can let go is too high. The distance and the repressions many men have in relation to their own bodies, their disappointments, sufferings and despair are reflected in social statistics.

It is important to show how many men suffer under patriarchal rule in order to bring to light what men can gain from greater equality. At the same time we must emphasize that the new masculine roles also have a price. Men have to prioritize. More time for the children means less time on the job. Greater freedom of choice for the other members of the family means less control. Longer life expectancy means less stress. We have to make certain choices between career and contact with the children, between efficiency and humanity, between dominance and creativity. It is in these new situations where choices are made that the new masculine roles are created. An important goal is then for men to be given the chance to expand their repertoire of roles. It is not necessary for a man to be a superman able to combine all kinds of possible and impossible qualities. The goal must be to give him as a man the possibility of choosing between different ways of being a man.

Changes in gender role patterns will add new dimensions to men's lives. Our goal is an expansion in men's repertoire of roles. A culture of peace is dependent on the existence of possibilities whereby men can create new ‘rooms’ for themselves where the masculine hierarchy and disciplinary strategies are less active.

**Redefinition of masculine symbols**

Our use of symbols makes us more than biological creatures. We need signs and symbols to give meaning to existence. However, the expressions of culture are not static. Symbols change, are transposed and redefined. Redefining symbols means that we see phenomena in new contexts, that we create new contexts and that we give the expressions a new content.
Modern society’s liberation of signs and symbols gives men the possibility of retaining their identity as men, while allowing them greater freedom to juggle with old and new masculine symbols. Just imagine a man with shoulder-length hair and a ring in his ear twenty-five years ago who wasn’t a homosexual, hippie or an extra in a pirate film. Today, men can use these symbols and still be interviewed on television about a serious subject.

Today’s fragmented symbolism in the Western world means that men can choose to a greater extent how they will act out their gender identity. In the post-traditional or post-modern society, mobility and the possibility of belonging to and identifying with different groups are present simultaneously. It is no longer necessary to purchase the whole ideological or political package where, in order to be a caring father, one also has to eat biodynamically cultivated food, vote radical and have rustic pine floors.

It is characteristic of symbols today that they cannot be defined unambiguously. However, many of the new symbols we use today should of course be regarded with a critical eye. We must ask ourselves: what is a positive redefinition of masculinity and what is only the old content served up in a new way? One example here is the discussion of Robert Bly’s new definition of the content and form of male fellowships.

There are several reasons why questions about the use of symbols are relevant to the debate about men and forms of masculinity. In the first place, it is important for men to be able to use parts of the traditional masculine symbolism in a process of change. At the same time, the question arises of whether it is possible to go on using the traditional masculine symbols, while changing as a man. One thing that has not proved to be very constructive is a mechanical repetition of the old interpretations of gender role patterns to new generations of women and men. We must be continuously concerned with and discuss how people react to phenomena such as sexy underwear, advertising images, ideals of beauty and the language of top-level sport. How do young men in the armed forces really fare or what does it mean to compete? What about groups of men who play at being Vikings and cultivate group fellowships? Are they conservative or are they redefining the old symbols in a positive way? What is active or passive, which symbols represent power and what can be interpreted as powerlessness? Vulgarity is another field for discussion. Men’s working environments can be full of vulgar, hard symbolism. What does it mean? What should be kept and what should be cut out in order to improve these working environments? Men should ask what the symbols of male cultures mean today. In this process, the important thing is that we encourage male studies (research on men from a gender perspective). We must carry out systematic studies in which men, too, are interpreted from a gender perspective. This will make it possible to bring to light the special features of boys’ socialization patterns, the expectations people have regarding men’s achievements and the different positions men have in relation to women.
Focusing on changes in symbols and signs may seem like splitting hairs, but such changes in our culture must be seen as the heralds of something new. There is no longer one absolute norm for what masculinity rightly is. Masculinity has new forms of expression. This is a basic strength of the masculine roles of the 1990s, which we are going to utilize in promoting gender equality from now on. It is particularly important that new ways of being a man pave the way for a gender-based criticism of an authoritarian masculinity. The marked standardization of men that we have seen right up to the present has had a very negative disciplinary effect on men.

**Violent men**

In the course of the past ten-to-fifteen years, domestic violence has become a visible social problem. In the 1970s, the women’s shelters and woman’s movement launched a campaign, in which violence against women and children became part of a public discussion. In the 1980s, the spotlight was turned on to another dark side of society – sexual abuse. Sensational headlines, discussions of statistics and moral condemnation were part of the media coverage of this theme. The legal system, not least, was the focus of attention when it had to uncover and adjudge incest cases. Strangely enough, however, there has been little discussion of men and the roles men played during the revelation process we have witnessed during the past two decades. Violence and abuse are taboo subjects. This applies in particular to the victim, but also to the abuser. As a result of these taboos, the work of treating abusers has not yet properly begun in the Nordic countries. Or to put it another way: the available treatment is in no way commensurate with the need that has been documented.

There are several reasons for this. It has not been customary for the primary health service to concern itself with violence in the home as a possible problem until the patient brings it up. Health personnel in the Nordic countries are not trained to look for and uncover violence as the family’s fundamental health problem. Nor has it been customary to try to do anything about the husband’s abusive behaviour.

This situation should be seen in conjunction with the fact that it is largely men who set the priorities in the health service. It is not that most men have had a conscious wish to keep domestic violence concealed. On the contrary. Most men become really angry when they are confronted with cases of abuse and battering. Instead it would appear that the male eyes in the health service have blind spots and that the men who have themselves been victims of violence and abuse have lost their voices. Men are suffering from a kind of hysterical paralysis. However, there is another side to this story. Women in positions of power in the political ‘health and care’ sector have not been taking their responsibilities seriously when it comes to men who batter women. There are in fact a number of women in positions in the Nordic countries who wear the same blinkers as the men.
The argument, based on biological determination, that aggression is an inherent and necessary part of masculinity also helps to intensify this paralysis. It is difficult to gain acceptance for the idea that it is worth while treating men who use violence in the home.

One of the main impressions from Norwegian criminologist Kristin Skjørten’s (1994) interviews of 2,000 men who use violence is that they try to play down or minimize the violence. In the first place, they try to minimize the extent of their violence. Another form of minimization is that they do not see the connection between the abuse and its consequences for the woman. Some men do not link the direct injuries suffered by the women with their use of violence. Skjørten claims that it was not unusual for a man to claim during the interview that his wife bruised easily. The indirect consequences were even easier to ignore. Women who are abused over a period of time often suffer from depression, nervous problems and psychosomatic conditions. Even if the men confirmed that the women were afraid of them, they often chose to interpret this as an unfounded fear. They did not see themselves as violent men. Men often shut out the connection between the violence they exercise and the other person’s reactions.

Skjørten’s main impression from the interviews was that the men did not deliberately distort the truth, but that they often unconsciously minimized their use of violence. One man reflects in the interview:

It’s a kind of process where you repress as much as possible, sort of automatically. You try to protect yourself or . . . I think I may be able to remember more later on, if I . . . maybe I don’t dare to remember more. I feel sort of strange now. It’s difficult both to remember and to talk about it. But I’m not making a point of keeping anything back [Skjørten, 1994].

In our efforts to combat violence in the home, we must see the connection between having been exposed to violence or having seen a lot of violence in childhood and the later exercise of violence. Psychologist Thore Langfeldt, who has fifteen years’ experience of treating people who have committed violent and sexual abuse, says that most of the people he has had in therapy come from families where violence was part of day-to-day life. But researchers warn against seeing a determining connection between exposure to violence in childhood and exercise of violence later in life. Many men who grew up with a violent father do not exercise violence themselves as adults. About half of the men in Skjørten’s total material stated that they were exposed to violence as children. Psychologist Per Isdal suggests how we can understand that exposure to violence as a child is significant for the use of violence later in life. The child learns a specific behaviour and how men relate to women. The child can also learn that it is possible to achieve something by using violence (Isdal, 1990).
The work of treating men who hit women will play an important role in breaking the vicious circle in families where violence is part of the repertoire. And we are in fact experiencing in several of the Nordic countries that many men voluntarily go to the few centres that provide this kind of treatment. They do so in spite of the fact that hitting women is a taboo subject in the Nordic countries. A culture of peace will mean an active effort to combat violence in the home and to combat sexual abuse. In this work, it will not be enough to relieve the pain of the victims; the abuser must also be given the opportunity to choose new ways.

From a battle between the sexes to a battle between values

Today, most of the schemes in which gender is given formal significance have been removed in the Nordic countries, while at the same time there have been great changes in settlement patterns, organization of working life and family conditions. The Nordic countries of the 1990s give scope for a modern project, which allows more freedom to experiment with new ways of being men. If one lives in a large city, one can work in a ministry during the day and be a drag artist in the evening. In this way, the end of the twentieth century can be regarded as an era of opportunity for men. Society and power institutions are more accepting of the fact that there are several sides to a personality. However, our form of society must not be understood uncritically. We also have to see the problematic aspects of the modernization processes in society. A naïve belief in progress and pure rationalism is exactly what has made so many men unhappy. This is a strange paradox; because hidden violence, loneliness, loss of network and distance from family are also a side of the modernization process. We can see this in all the Nordic countries. Our kind of society is both the reason for men’s need for new thinking and the condition that makes this rethinking possible.

Men’s thoughts about themselves as a sex are closely linked with the change in women’s lives and women’s new self-understanding. Without the women’s liberation movement and the feminist currents in society, men’s lives and possibilities of reflection would have been quite different today – and, the way we see it, far worse. At the same time, men’s new interest in themselves from a gender perspective must be interpreted as more than a result of the change for women. Changes in gender roles for men are concerned, on the one hand, with their relationship with women, but, on the other, the process of change is also about how men relate to other men, to new tasks and to important social institutions run by men. The process of change is not least about men’s having to work out their own choices, values and preferences. One example is how men relate to caring and the care culture. Undertaking the whole responsibility as carer should be a choice a man makes on the basis of his own reflections, priorities and possibilities. Arguing that this is fair to women is a type of defensive argument that puts men in a rather unproductive position. Of course, the
man must also be confronted with an unfair division of work, but it is just as important to confront the man with his own choice of values. What do these choices mean for his own life? What do the children in his life mean? What did he mean to his own father when he was a small boy? What do men think about themselves and their own choices when they become grandfathers and are sitting with their grandchildren on their knee? There are two important points in this way of arguing. One is giving men their independence in relation to areas that have been alien to them (care, closeness and so on). The other is avoiding unnecessary contrasts between men and women as groups, as they are often presented in discussions on gender roles.

The questions and answers relating to gender equality are more complex today than they were in the early days of the women’s liberation movement. One important change is the greater extent to which men and women now hold down the same positions at work and at home. Men and women will therefore notice the same discrimination strategies. This will turn the focus on gender equality issues from a battle between the sexes to a battle between values, and the political potential in the debate will become more visible. Equality is not a politically neutral concept, though it may appear to be in the simple gender equality strategy that aims to get almost as many women as men into different positions in society. We must see the battle for equality as a battle for values, too. The battle concerns upgrading carers’ responsibilities, which have traditionally been the sphere of women, and it concerns our own relationship with children and the value systems that are linked with the practice of caring. And it concerns willingness, as well as the possibility of making different choices and accepting tasks that can open up new perspectives.

Note

1. This Nordic contribution to UNESCO’s Expert Group Meeting is based on a note submitted to the Nordic Council of Ministers on Men, Political Instruments and Gender Equality (Divs, 1997, p. 904). The note gives examples of how men can be seen from a gender perspective and it presents problems that arise when we want to render questions relating to men’s roles visible in politics. The note is intended to be read in the context of the Nordic countries where large sections of the economy are part of a mixed-economy system and where it is accepted that the state uses certain instruments to further a policy of gender equality.

Bibliography


Men and gender equality in the Nordic countries


——. 1991. La domination masculine. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (Paris), No. 84.


——. 1996a. *Grunntabeller til Arbeidskraftsundersøkelsen*. Oslo, SSB.
——. 1996b. *Ukens statistikk 48/96*. Oslo, SSB.
——. 1996c. *Levekårssundersøkelsen*. Oslo, SSB.
In February 1997 a tragic accident occurred: on their way to Lebanon seventy-three young soldiers, members of the Israeli Air Force, died when the two helicopters transporting them collided. The newspaper articles, the television programmes, the speeches of the politicians in the following days and weeks named the dead young men as ‘the cream of the crop’, ‘the best of our boys’, and ‘the best of our country’s youth’. In one article it was said that the helicopter disaster has ‘reminded us all of our common fate, of the bonds of blood and steel, that bind us together’. The agony of the families ‘was a unifying force’. The then Labour MK (Member of the Knesset) Ehud Barak reminded the population of the fact that ‘in this bitter hour we are the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces]’.

Professor Orbach, psychologist at the Bar-Ilan University, explained in an interview: ‘The Jews are world champions in dealing with tragedy throughout our history, from ancient times through the Holocaust and during the years of statehood. It’s part of our identity – not that we wish it so or have asked for it’ and he called upon the political leadership to ‘make a daily effort to preserve the feeling of brotherhood’.¹

Two points deeply connected with the construction of gender in Israeli society seem to me to be worth exploring. The first one is the centrality of the military and military discourses in Israeli society. The military has determined the demarcation of the collective boundaries – who belongs to the collective and who does not – and it has strongly influenced the social arrangements in Israeli society.

The second point is the narrative that establishes and enhances the central position of a military discourse: the dominating force in the Israeli ethos is securitism, or siege mentality. This siege mentality leads to the belief that nothing can harm Israeli (Jewish) society more than critical voices from inside and that it is therefore essential to enforce the cohesiveness of the Jewish people.
This siege mentality, maintained through cultural, educational and political mechanisms, has shaped a ‘military-mind’, which has had a disastrous impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict and constructs different identities for women and men. Men are the warriors, fighters and protectors, and women are the emotional supporters of the fighters, the worried and the protected.

In the following I want to discuss how the military has become the main agent of society, shaping gender roles, constructing masculinity based on military criteria and thus maintaining gender inequality.

**Militarized masculinities**

Common theories about war and the state system, explaining that militarism is a logical consequence of capitalism or arguing that militarization is an inherent part of the state system, have not been interested in gendered aspects. They ignore the fact that there are only few women in decision-making positions in government and almost none in the military, that armed forces in different cultures and at different historical periods have been male institutions marked by masculinized culture and that defence industries are moulded on a hierarchical sexual division of labour.

Feminist theories have shown that militarization is sexualized. However, some writings have used essentialist approaches and accepted male and female stereotypes relating women to peace and men to aggression and war. In this sense some scholars argue for the inclusion of women in the political world in order to introduce ‘feminine values’ into it (Reardon, 1980).

Another feminist perspective, which has influenced gender studies, rejects traditional and essential images of what seems to be feminine and masculine. Instead, they investigate the connection between militarism and the military, and concepts of femininity and masculinity. Those studies aim to deconstruct conceptual dichotomies of male and female. They have worked on sexual politics in order to ‘create a link between the presumed cultural and physical properties of maleness and the institutional needs of the military as an organization’ (Enloe, 1993, p. 52). Thus Stiehm (1982) has demonstrated that the overall exclusion of women from combat, which has been practised until recently, is necessary in order to maintain the myth of the male protector and the female protected. Feminine and masculine attributes in the language-symbol system of ‘defence intellectuals’ have been explored by Cohn (1989).

Critical men’s studies laid emphasis both on masculinity as it is practised and on the complexity of the social construction of gender identity (Connell, 1995). Several scholars view the military to be a most forceful institution in constructing images of masculinity even in the wider society (Connell, 1992; Morgan, 1994; Kimmel, 1996). Usually society and armies see the soldier as an embodiment of traditional male sex role attitudes and behaviour. Army service can thus be described as a right of passage to male
adulthood, where the socializing process aims to teach toughness and masculinity and to eliminate what is regarded as effeminate. As the military in general is a male institution, it proves Kimmel’s (1996, p. 7) argument that masculinity is largely a ‘homosocial enactment’, that it’s other men who judge masculinity.

Connell (1995) has emphasized that there is rarely just one masculinity, and what was commonly understood as the male role is the hegemonic pattern of masculinity alongside other patterns like subordinated, marginalized and complicit masculinities. Using Connell’s framework, Barrett (1996) explores masculine discourses and identities of male officers in the US Navy and shows that constructions of masculinity vary across job specialities. I should like to mention here that early studies on military socialization (Eisenhart, 1975), and especially psychoanalytic grounded works on soldiers’ combat training and experience, revealed the connection between images of manhood and the denial of grief and mourning, and aggression as a result of that process (Shatan, 1977, 1983). With regard to fantasies of men in the German Freikorps, Theweleit (1980) analysed the production of woman hatred through militarization.

Given that scholarly background, certain characteristics make Israel an interesting case-study for investigating the connections between gender and the military. Participation in the military is compulsory for both Jewish men and women (exceptions are discussed below). Conscientious objection is not possible at present and motivation to serve in the military is high. That means the military is socializing most Jewish Israelis. Furthermore male civilians are obliged to do annual reserve duty until they reach the age of at least 50 years. Given the geopolitical situation of Israel and the persecution of the Jewish people throughout history, the armed forces are a centrality in Israeli society that structures the gendered social practice in daily life, as I will show further on.

Studies about critical aspects of civil–military relations in Israel are rare: ‘Ideological and value loaded considerations blur the issue, making even the use of the term “militarism” in the canonical textbooks a taboo in Israel’ (Kimmerling, 1993, p. 196).

**Historical roots: Zionism and masculinity**

Zionism developed at the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the pogroms in southern Russia and the eruption of modern anti-semitism in Central Europe. Viewing the history of the Jewish people as a continuous persecution, the Zionist movement aimed to renew the national life of the Jewish people in Palestine. This desire involved the creation of the ‘new Jew’. Who was this ‘new Jew’?

The Zionists perceived the Diaspora Jew as passive and effeminate. The Zionist ideal of manliness was constructed as an antithesis of the Diaspora Jew. Physical strength and readiness to defend honour by means of
fighting were the desired characteristics of the ‘new Jew’. The Zionist sports and gymnastic clubs assumed a highly visible role at Zionist congresses and displayed the new Jewish male according to Max Nordau’s (1900) credo of *Muskeljudentum*, a text in which Nordau calls for a ‘new muscle Jew’ as an answer to the (as he saw it) degeneration of the Jew ‘in the narrow confines of the ghetto’. He wrote, ‘in the narrowness of the Jewish streets our poor limbs forgot how to move joyfully; in the dimness of our sunless homes our eyes developed a nervous blink’, and he urged the Jews to ‘let us once again become deep-chested, taut-limbed, steel-eyed men’. The heroes of these Zionists were fighters of Jewish history. ‘The Maccabees will rise again’, Herzl (1946, pp. 156 et seq.) hoped. He imagined a new stalwart Jewish male personality.

We must not forget that the Zionist movement emerged as a kind of latecomer among European nationalist movements. As assimilated Jews had adopted traits of courage held up as ideals in the Gentile world, the Zionist movement used symbols that were familiar to other nationalist movements: patriotic songs, glorification of the heroes of the past and military education. The ideal of manliness was very much the same and as Zionism envisaged a nation like all other nations, on the level of reform of the Jewish psyche it was to be men like all other men. Nevertheless it received a special impetus because of the rejection and the contempt of the Diaspora. The complete transformation of the Jewish people could only take place in Palestine.

The political Zionist approach was not the only one: Ahad Ha-Am advocated a spiritual Zionism, which rejected the emphasis on physical strength. According to his interpretation of Jewish history, the secret of the survival of the Jewish people was the respect of spiritual power and not being impressed by physical strength. Instead of the fighters of Jewish history he praised Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, who, as the legend tells, fled from Jerusalem under siege, hidden in a coffin, and established the Yavneh rabbinical centre. The ‘true Jew’ in Ha-Am’s view was not ashamed of physical weakness. Nevertheless, political Zionism represented by Herzl became the mainstream of the Zionist movement.

Regarding our issue, the historical background is important in several respects. First, since the ‘new Jew’ was regarded as a ‘new man’, no models or visions had been created for women. That is why the early female pioneers coming from a socialist background tried to attain gender equality by assuming male jobs in the establishment of the kibbutzim. We know today that they were not successful in preventing a male-oriented society.

Second, the Zionist ethos of masculine ideals of physical force and strength underwent an intensification because of the Shoah, and has since then been engrained in Jewish Israeli society. It is part of the mythological *Sabra* that the prototype of the Israel-born new Jew, the native Israeli, is a person who is soft inside but thorny on the outside. The Jewish-Arab conflict, the living in a continuous state of conflict, enhanced this ethos.
state of Israel was ‘born’ in a war (1948/49), which ended with armistice agreements and with the recognition that the conflict between Arabs and Israelis was deep and complex. The Holocaust syndrome and political geography conditioned a sense of isolation. Israel regarded its neighbours as enemies, which up to now has only changed towards Egypt and Jordan. In its fifty years of existence Israel has experienced six wars, each of which has strengthened the impetus to excel in the military realm.6

Strength is of tremendous importance to Israelis and their identity. Any signs of weakness are regarded as threats to the identity. This has disastrous political effects on gender relations and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Third, this situation and its interpretation sharpened the national duties of men and women and constructed them in a dichotomous way. Security and reproduction are in general strongly connected concerns regarded as necessary for the survival of states during conflict and war. We know from many examples that nationalist projects of societies in times of conflict or war view women as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities (see Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989). The Israeli state, being in conflict and wars with Arab neighbour states and having a Palestinian population within its borders,7 tried from its inception to enlarge the Jewish population by mass immigration and by natural growth, thus creating a ‘demographic race’ which took place in women’s bodies (Yuval-Davis, 1989). The striking equivalence between maternal and military service which we find throughout history and which is expressed in several rites of passage in different cultures (at the final stage of the rituals the boys are called warriors and the girls are married off) can also be observed in Israel.

Just recently it was shown that even today Israeli politics are trying to define (Jewish) women’s duties simply by their reproductive capability. The Public Council for Demography presented the cabinet with a plan to increase the Jewish birth-rate and to prevent abortions. The instrumentalization of Jewish history was well demonstrated when the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs said that ‘we need to find solutions to the problem of the continuing shrinkage of the Jewish world. After the Holocaust there were about 12 million Jews, and the number today is similar.’ Moreover, the presented plan seeks to promote education to emphasize ‘the national aspects of the demographic problem’, referring to nothing but the birth-rate of the Palestinian population.

The Defence Forces as a rite of passage to male adulthood
Military service in Israel is compulsory. The Defence Service Law (1949) specifies which persons are exempted from service: married [sic] women, pregnant women, mothers and women who declare that religious reasons prevent them from serving. The law does not exempt men for reasons of religion, conscience, or marital status. Yet in practice Jewish religious men
who are actually studying in a Yeschiwa are exempted, and among the Arab population only Druse men are obliged to serve, Bedouin men can volunteer and Muslims are exempted. Half of the Jewish girls are drafted, so 50 per cent of them do not serve in the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) compared with 10 to 15 per cent of the boys.

Three times a year Israeli newspapers report on the recruit motivation as the annual draft gets under way. In July 1998 the papers reported on the motivation of that year’s draft, that is, youths who were born after the peace treaty with Egypt, who came of age witnessing the signing of the Oslo peace agreement with Jordan, but with incessant conflict on the northern border. Army representatives said in the news that they have witnessed an increase in the desire to serve in combat units: four out of five (male) soldiers eligible for combat duty want to serve in a field unit.

In Western societies most activities have become desegregated. Traditional notions of the masculine role have been called into question; images of manhood are no longer clear cut. In modernized society initiations into manhood are less clear (see Raphael, 1988). In Israel, where war is always present, it creates a challenge for manly virtues.

For Israeli Jewish males, military service is an inherent part of maturation, a rite of passage to male adulthood.

Military service is internalized by members of the Israeli Jewish collective as essential to a boy’s right to belong to this group and more specifically to the inner circle of adult males. Literally a rite of passage, it is related to and spoken of in fatalistic, quasi-religious terms, as an inevitable, inescapable, pseudo-biological phase of male maturation [Mazali, 1993].

Military service fulfils typically male adolescent desires like intense thrills, adventure and peril: ‘military service in Israel, often including the experience of war, provides the specific cultural context for the Israeli transition to adulthood’ (Lieblich and Perlow, 1988, p. 45). That is why army service is described and perceived by war veterans as an opportunity for fulfilment of masculinity (see Lomsky-Feder, 1992).

In contrast to most other regions, war in Israel is still experienced as man-to-man combat. In the Israeli news you will find reports about (often deadly) clashes of Israeli soldiers with Hizbullah in Lebanon at least once a week. Israeli culture creates pressure towards heroism accompanied by the message to be strong. This message, internalized and felt as a personal inner demand, is transmitted primarily to men, because men are the soldiers who fight the wars and who serve in the reserve units. Transcriptions of Amia Lieblich’s therapeutical work with Israeli males show the burden this demand for ‘toughness’ causes for individuals. One man, who served in the Israeli army for six years but who was educated in Europe and did not have a ‘toughening’ Israeli education, reports a repetitive dream:
In my dream I am standing in line with many soldiers since we are supposed to start our march to the battlefield any minute. . . . As I try to assemble the various parts [of the gear], I feel very clumsy and inadequate. It takes me a long time to get ready, and in the meantime the whole unit is gone. . . . I have a very strong sense of my obligation to join my unit in the battle, but I don’t know the direction they have taken. . . . Inexplicably, a command car with an unknown driver shows up and takes me through the desert to a camp where I find my unit. However, now I realize that my gun is missing. . . . All this takes a while, and in the meantime I hear that two thousand six hundred soldiers were killed in the first day of the war [the Yom-Kippur War]. I realize that my unit, for which I was searching, does not exist any more, and I missed the war [Lieblich, 1983, p. 48].

Describing the dominant feelings of his dream, he talks about his feelings of inadequacy and clumsiness and says: ‘I am the Schlemiel type’, thus addressing the polarity between the strong and competent Israeli type and the helpless and clumsy Diaspora type.

While still at school, Israeli Jewish youths prepare themselves to join the military forces. Lectures are held in school classrooms, delivered by members of the IDF, to give information and impressions of life in the Israeli army. Some youths volunteer for special units or undergo pre-induction courses. Young men have very different reasons from young women for joining the army, and participation means something very different for their self-perception. Research shows that males, when being asked for their motivation to serve in the IDF, attach greater importance to normative reasons (‘to be like everyone’) and value roles, which can be recognized from outside: ‘to be a fighter’ and ‘to do something prestigious’ are the reasons for preferring a certain job in the IDF, which show a clear gender difference. On the other hand, young women show a more intrinsic motivation (‘meeting new people’, ‘doing something interesting’) and public recognition does not seem to play a significant role (Mayseless and Gal, 1993, pp. 9 and 13).

Parents play an important role in this context. They support their sons’ maturation process and their fulfilment of the military task, feeling it as a necessary, justified sacrifice. Mazali (n.d.) sees in this phenomenon the upholding of what ‘is arguably the most fundamental social contract in Israeli Jewish society’. By this, according to her argument, soldier sons in Israel are performing the task of resocializing their parents to the collectivity. Even while the son is still a small child, it is in the parents’ mind that one day he will be a soldier, possibly a member of a combat unit. Tamar Katriel (1991, p. 80) describes a talk with a father in his mid-thirties, a paratrooper, during one of the customary Saturday picnics of parents and their soldier children. The man told her he ‘got the creeps’ thinking of the possibility that his son, when he became a soldier, would find himself in some of the situations in which he had found himself during his own days as a young
soldier. He added that the thought of his son’s military service sometimes kept him awake at night. When she asked him when his son was to go into the service, he told her that he was only 8 years old.

The Israeli Defence Forces themselves are a gendered institution. This is not the place to go into details, but some of the factors enhancing the gendering of the army should be addressed (see Izraeli, 1997). Currently women serve one year and nine months compared with three years’ service required of male conscripts. According to law, men are obliged to do reserve duty service until they are 54 years old; women until they are 38. As pregnant women and women with children are exempted from compulsory service and from reserve duty, given the birth-rate in Israel and the fact that women’s qualifications are not needed, there are no women in reserve units. The reserve units make up about two-thirds of the IDF. The percentage of women in the permanent service corps (sherut keva), the group of military professionals, though very small, is nevertheless the ‘backbone’ of the military organization. Most senior positions are held by these members. That means that when we talk about women in the IDF, we are talking about the conscripted population making up most of the standing army.

The steady decrease in the length of women’s service and the fact that they are not required to do reserve duty is a double-edged sword: economically it is unreasonable to allocate women to jobs that require a long investment in training and education. That means that new professions for women are only considered when they are cost-effective. The number of professions in which women in the Israeli military are occupied increased during the last decade, as in many defence forces around the world. In 1996 women served in 282 jobs of the 447 jobs open to them; the closed positions were the 178 which were classified as combat related (Izraeli, 1997, p. 18).

In spite of the increased number of positions open to women, the major category of women’s work in the army is still office work, as it is in the civilian labour market. Today 40 per cent of the women are in administrative positions, which means mainly clerical work. The other most popular areas in which women are involved are connected with education, welfare and communication. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to surveys the majority of female soldiers in all branches feel highly or somewhat overqualified for their job and only half of them declared themselves to be highly satisfied with their job (Gal, 1986, p. 50). It has always been said that ‘women perform those functions that do not require great physical effort, enabling the army to send the healthy men to combat units’ (Bar-On, 1976, p. 145).

Women who serve in the IDF are administratively controlled by Chen, an abbreviation of cheil nashim, which means Women’s Corps. In Hebrew the abbreviation means ‘charm’.

No woman has ever achieved the rank of chief-of-staff. Among the officers, there are no women with the rank of major general or brigadier and
now, after one woman's recent promotion, the number of women brigadier- generals still only comes to two. Ten per cent of the lieutenant-colonels are women, whereas the female representation in the lowest qualification among officers – second lieutenant – comes to 66 per cent (CEDAW, 1997, p. 81).

Because women do not serve in combat positions, they are excluded from the upper echelons of the military hierarchy and confront a classic ‘glass ceiling’ in their effort to advance professionally. The combat exclusion also has an important symbolic role. Owing to the prohibition of combat roles for women, in Israel as in other armed forces around the world, men are identified as the protectors and women as the protected (Stiehm, 1982).

All in all, despite the presence of women, the unit is perceived as a male peer group, a place of male comradeship and brotherhood, as a community of warriors. As in other institutions or companies there are many actions or conditions pointing to women as being different and making the difference? The question is, what exactly does the institution gain by this difference. One ‘advantage’, which was admitted more frankly in former times than today, was the influence of women on the atmosphere in the units: ‘there is no doubt that the presence of girls in army camps has a restraining influence on the language and behaviour of the boys’ (Bar-On, 1976, p. 146). ‘Feminine’ characteristics and appearance are appreciated, female soldiers humanize military service:

The female soldiers in the IDF also have an additional, non-assigned, though culturally encouraged, function. With their visible femininity, in sharp contrast to the rugged army milieu, these women soldiers serve as a nurturing factor, especially in the combat units. They soften the atmosphere in the unit, bringing to the barracks a touch of warmth and affect, reminiscent of home and family (Gal, 1986, p. 52).

Female soldiers are sometimes symbolic (or non-symbolic) rewards and the disposal of them marks the differences in the hierarchical positions of male soldiers. In a sociological study about parachuting, Aran (1974, p. 128) discusses the role of the parachute instructor, whom he describes as a kind of ‘high priest’ in a ritual. His position is unchallenged, he is the only one who is not nervous before jumping (or, better, seems not to be nervous) and there are countless popular stories about his sexual prowess. Aran observes: ‘Interestingly, they also have an almost absolute monopoly over relations with the women in the camp.’

**Impacts on the private sphere**

Whereas admittance into the society of men is only possible through a test of strength, force and power (participation in the military), women are defined through their relation to the male members of society. Their task, being either wives or mothers or sisters of soldiers, is the female role in a process of initiation.
Military training cultivates young men’s ability to become skill-oriented ‘doers’, more than reflective individuals – an orientation that finds its sociolinguistic expression in the prevalence of the typical dugri speech style (Katriel and Nesher, 1986). The experience of war enhances that orientation and every war reinforces the traditional male/female stereotypes. We should keep in mind that today’s entire active generation of fathers experienced the traumatic Yom-Kippur War. Everyone has friends who were killed. A huge percentage of those ten years younger experienced the Lebanon war. All of them are still in the reserve forces. Their experiences include fear of death, the death of friends, being wounded resulting in the often described ‘pseudo-strength’, a façade of toughness, of blunt aggressive behaviour. From a more sociological view, the Israeli male norm respects performance and achievement more than words and feelings and gives priority to the state and the nation rather than to individual and private aspirations.

Expressing emotions or other aspects which are said to be incompatible with the role of the combat soldier is regarded as feminine. Let us once more listen to a man ten years after his regular service speaking about his relation to his father, who fought during the Independence War:

I was made to see his tremendous sacrifice for this country, something I felt I would never be able to compete with. Only once did I try to talk to him about his own fears. This was toward the end of my service. I asked him two questions and put a lot of pressure on him to answer. One was whether he was afraid, and the other was whether he felt guilty about killing people. To the second question he said that he never felt any guilt, and this despite the fact that he had many more face-to-face encounters with the enemy than I did. I felt very helpless when I heard this answer. I realized I was more of a sissy than he ever was, since I was bothered by these matters, while he wasn’t. As to the fear, he had a very simple answer to that, too: he felt fear was something one had to overcome, and that’s it [Lieblich, 1978, p. 225; emphasis added].

Women play their parts in the sexual arrangements and expect men to be the fighters. One woman said in an interview:

I know that I prefer men who are combat soldiers to others who are just jobniks.\(^{13}\) I am quite ashamed of this preference. . . . Admiration is, perhaps, too strong a term, but my attitude toward the combat soldiers is something like it. . . . Namely, I would prefer that my boyfriend fight in the war rather than sit at home with me [Lieblich, 1978, p. 270].

The Gulf War gave us some impression about what happens when men cannot fulfil their roles as protectors. As Israel did not join the war, Israeli men for the first time were spared the stress of participating in combat. On
the other hand, they were deprived of defending and forced to ‘passivity’. They had to stay at home with their women and children in sealed rooms, which undermined the male identity. Reports show that the number of sexual offences and domestic violence against women increased during the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{14}

Sophisticated research about the connections between the military orientation of society and domestic violence in Israel is still missing. The number of murders of women by their partners or male relatives is high, taking into account the size of the population in Israel. Statistics speak of between 73 murders of women (counting only husbands or spouses) and 127 murders of women (counting male partners or other male relatives) in the years 1990 to 1995.\textsuperscript{15} In 1991, the year of the Gulf War, 35 women were killed by their partners. Looking through the reports in the newspapers, I found that a quarter of them were murdered with firearms, sometimes firearms owned by the IDF. There are some cases in which a connection between violence during service in neighbouring territories and domestic violence is obvious. One such case is that of a soldier who shot and killed a Palestinian girl who was sitting reading in the entrance to her home in 1989 and who, two years later in 1991, shot his Israeli girlfriend who had decided to leave him. I do not wish to be misunderstood: in general, men in Israel, as they carry out the military operations, are those who are wounded and killed. But it might well be that women, because of the heightened aggression, become targets of beatings from men in their own society.

Men talking about their army experiences often consider themselves as somehow becoming another person in the army. Let me quote one soldier, who served in the West Bank:

I’ll tell you the truth, I was not a paragon of human kindness that day. I was amazed at how I struck people, even children. We were patrolling a street when a girl threw a stone at us from a window on the second floor. I rushed upstairs and I hit her with my hands, my boots, my rifle. I found that I enjoyed this tension and release, somehow. From then on I understood how soldiers could behave like animals, as they had in Viet Nam. I behaved that way as if I were a different Alon for a couple of hours [Lieblich and Perlow, 1988].

Nearly every Jewish man in Israel is regularly called upon for reserve duty, usually once a year for several weeks. General Yigael Yadin, former Chief-of-Staff, called the civilian ‘a soldier on eleven months’ annual leave’. On average, Jewish Israeli males devote five to six years of their lives to military service (Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974). During that period the women remain behind, taking care of the home and the children and dealing with all the everyday problems. Although reserve duty means an interruption in the lives of the reservists, a loss of control of their time and family lives, as well as an element of risk, the motivation of individuals to bear this burden is still
high. Through participation in the reserve they show their integration into the value system of Israeli society.

Israeli Jewish women live in ambivalence. When their husbands, the soldiers, come home, the women's duty is to comfort them and they are relieved that nothing has happened to them. The taboo on complaining about the burden of the centrality of the armed forces has apparently been successful because every Jewish family in Israel has someone in the armed forces.

Impacts on the public sphere

Among the impacts of the centrality of the IDF on gender in the public sphere, I will only name two: the impact on employment and on politics.

Those who do the most dangerous jobs gain from it not only in the military sphere but also in the civilian sphere. Because of the centrality of the military in Israeli society, service is crucial for a civilian career. Service in the higher echelons of the army is a path towards positions involving importance and influence in public life. The Israeli Defence Forces are the stepping-stone to a civilian career for most senior officers. This automatically means discrimination for those groups not incorporated in it, which are primarily Muslim Arab Israelis of both sexes. Jewish Israeli men profit from their military service by accumulating social capital, establishing contacts for their professional careers (networking) and achieving material and symbolic benefits. The capital Jewish women accumulate is not very highly valued in the civilian labour-market.

In high-tech industry the links between defence forces and civilian employers are very strong. A manager says about Israeli companies: ‘Israeli entrepreneurs have technological experience and prefer teams that already worked together in the army or the defence industry’ (see Izraeli, 1997). In other fields, military experience is even a condition for getting the job: Israel’s national airline, El-Al, recruits its pilots exclusively from the military. Until a court decision in 1995, the defence forces excluded women from pilot’s training; only men were chosen by El-Al. A research study on the mechanisms for recruiting and selecting job applicants in Israeli firms, which was carried out to find out whether there were discriminatory elements regarding Arab Israelis, shows that between a third and a half of the firms took into account the applicant’s army record when selecting managers, professionals, technicians, clerical staff and craftsmen, and a third did so when hiring operatives and labourers. The firms consider ‘army service as a means of screening out unreliable individuals and identifying potentially high achievers’ (Wolkinson, 1994, p. 271).

Men convert their military rank into the ranks of political parties. Military background is regarded as a necessary precondition for public office. In the 1996 elections, the Labour Party secured six out of forty-four places for women on its list, the Likud Party three out of forty-two and Meretz, the left coalition, three out of fourteen. The percentage of women in the Knesset
since the establishment of the Israeli state has never exceeded 10 per cent, which is lower than the percentage of women in European democracies! The ethnic and national division is obvious. Of the fifty-two female representatives (until the 1992 Knesset) only five were born in Arab countries and not a single Palestinian Israeli woman has ever been a member.

Women’s representation in local authorities has also been extremely limited. During the state’s existence only six women have served as heads of local councils, none of them in a town with a population over 10,000. Currently there is only one woman heading a local council. The political sphere is predominated by men who, during the last ten or fifteen years have, in their forties, retired as generals and transferred into business or into the political domain.

In the peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbour-states, Israel is represented by senior army officers, senior reserve duty officers and top echelons in the civil service – three sectors in which female representation is nil.

Conclusions

Israel is often viewed from outside as an egalitarian society where women even entered the last male preserve – the military. Inside Israel, for decades now, gender equality has been regarded as secondary. The demand for national unity and the obsession with security has caused the issue to be dropped from the agenda. Moreover, principles of social justice in the Zionist movement and desire for equality between the sexes from female Pioneers created the myth of the liberated Israeli woman. The lack of women’s equality has often been explained away with the socialist ideology of the (former) state and the traditional normative system (see e.g. Moore, 1992). My argument, on the contrary, is that the military and the military discourse are the main agents in shaping gender relations in Israeli society.

We have to take into account that the history of persecution, culminating in the Holocaust, the ‘eclipse of civilization’, forms the collective memory of Jewish people and especially of Jewish people in Israel. The permanent state of conflict and war with its neighbours is an objective basis for daily-life anxiety. But we also know that anxiety rarely exists in a pure, objective form. Anxiety can be provoked and it can be turned into a political instrument that is useful for political interests. Israeli policies, and especially Israeli military policies, use the Holocaust as a mighty force (Zuckermann, 1996). The enemy from outside, waiting for the opportunity to destroy Israel (according to the siege-mentality), served to appeal for cohesiveness and unity within. As Coser described, ‘groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside tend to be intolerant within’ (Coser, 1956, p. 103).

Education, culture and politics use the siege mentality with the result that members of the Jewish Israeli collective protesting against military
procedures or protesting against a dominance of military thinking or attitudes are likely to feel like traitors. It is difficult for women and men to express the ambiguities they might feel. Addressing discrimination against women has often been felt to be somewhat subversive. Yet, women and men are bound into the national collective in different roles. Israel as a case-study supports the suggestion that societies challenged by an ‘environmental threat’ (Sanday, 1981) such as frequent warfare tend to be dominated by men and to develop a masculine-oriented legitimating ethos. The linkage between masculinity and the military still provides the dominant gender image in Israeli society. According to Morgan (1994, p. 169) whether or not a society is in a state of conflict is not the only factor to describe a society as a militaristic one. One needs to consider the extent to which military training is seen as a necessary feature of the training of all male citizens, the extent to which political leaders have military backgrounds and the extent to which military uniforms are a persistent feature of the public sphere and finally the economic variables. All factors up to now still apply to Israel. Yet it is necessary to investigate the effects of political change on gender identities. Israeli society is not static. In the same way as I argued that the siege mentality is leading to militarization and thus to a hegemonic masculinity, the weakening of the siege mentality inevitably will have an impact on images of masculinities. Slight signs of changes start to worry the political establishment. Politicians worry about some drop in motivation for conscription and some observed reluctance in the army to engage in battle – they call it ‘going soft’.16

Notes
3. The Maccabees, a Jewish family in Jerusalem in the second and first centuries B.C., fought against Roman intervention and the taking of Jerusalem (63 B.C.). Several Jewish gymnastic clubs were called ‘Maccabees’, the international Jewish sports games are called ‘Maccabiah’ and today several sports clubs are named after the Maccabean, like the football clubs Haifa and Tel Aviv.
4. The link between the construction of heterosexuality and masculinity is shown in a most challenging book (Boyarin, 1997).
5. I am not elaborating here about the fact that, parallel to other national movements, the project of Zionism was a highly gendered one. One element of the gendered discourse has been the narrative of the female soil (see Klein, 1997). The Zionist movement imagined the ‘return’ of the Jews to their ‘motherland’ as the return to the bride Zion. It called for the fertilization of the virgin land, as if it was an uncultivated land without people. The poet Uri Zvi Greenberg frankly expresses this connection: ‘We redeemed one acre of land; and when we pierced it with the plough, we looked forward with painful love, with a great masculine lust, to the second acre’ (quoted in Shapira, 1992, p. 149).
6. If we count the War of Attrition, then we speak of seven wars. Every war of course was experienced in a different way. The most traumatic one was the Yom-Kippur
War (1973). The Lebanon war (1982) was a watershed, as it provoked the criticism of a huge part of the population and led to the rise of a strong peace movement. The second Gulf War (1991) was the first war that Israel did not join actively – the impact of this enforced passivity on male identity will be addressed below.

7. I refer to the 1948 borders, not the Occupied Territories.
8. That means my remarks about masculinity apply to the Jewish Israeli collective. On the one hand, the IDF creates a common bond between Jewish Israelis coming from different ethnic backgrounds; on the other hand, it might be worth exploring if the exclusion of most Arab males leads to the creation of what Connell calls marginalized and subordinated masculinities along national ethnic lines.


10. The length of service for women has steadily decreased in the last years: it was cut from 24 months to 22 months in 1992, and in 1994 to less than 21 months.

11. In 1952 twenty-five roles of women in the regular army were listed; twenty years later, 210 out of 709 jobs were opened to women (but only half of them were staffed by women); and in 1988 women they worked in 234 of the 500 jobs open to them (Yuval-Davis, 1985).

12. According to a press note, she was promoted in appreciation of her ‘work with bereaved families and disabled veterans’ (Jerusalem Post, 13 May 1997). The other brigadier-general is a commander of the Women’s Corps.

13. ‘Jobniks’ is the name for people who hold non-combat jobs in the army.

14. See e.g. the Israeli National Report to the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 1995, p. 46.


Bibliography


Introduction

I am profoundly convinced that the transformation from violence and militarism to a culture of peace must start with educational action.

I offer two hypotheses about the current situation:

1. The teaching in schools about peace and non-violence is mainly rhetorical, theoretical and sporadic. In contrast, the teaching about struggle, war and violence is historically grounded, well illustrated and well fitted into the context of the whole development of civilization.

2. In the study of violence and war, males and females are treated differently. The approach is burdened by prejudices and stereotypes which make more rigid the positions of males and females in contemporary social life. Undoubtedly, struggle has been, and always will be, a substantial component of human social development. But in teaching about social change, struggle is all too often presented only when it is realized as violence. At the same time, struggle defined this way is inseparably tied to the male sex and masculinity.

Struggle and gender in school textbooks

These issues became clear in a study of school textbooks currently in use in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Textbooks of history and literature were examined: sixteen at primary-school level and ten at secondary-school level. All books were written after 1991 (i.e. after the independence of Macedonia), most of them dating from 1995–97. Except for the first three grades of elementary school (for which new textbooks have recently been written) all these textbooks are currently in use.

Let us consider first the textbooks of history, which is taught as a specific school subject from the fifth grade of elementary school. It is very obvious that they are designed as a collection of wars and revolutions rather than a description of trends in culture, art and civilization. For instance, the textbook for third-year high-school students speaks with great sympathy of
the *gemies* (anarchist-terrorists) who strove to attract European attention with self-sacrificing individual actions, raiding railways, banks and similar targets, in support of attempts to free their homeland. The first action was the damaging of a French passenger ship, then of a passenger-train locomotive, then the disabling of electric power in Thessaloniki, followed by the bombing of a bank. On page 122 of the book we read: ‘The actions of Vladimir Pingor, who set Bosanak Inn on fire, and the diversion by the youngest *gemigija* Milan Arsov, who threw a bomb in a tavern, deserve to be noticed’ – after massacres of the innocent Macedonian people in Thessaloniki had been carried out by Muslims. According to the textbook, the deeds of the *gemies* were acknowledged by generations of Macedonians with pride and piety. All criticism of them soon faded compared to the greatness of their spirit. ‘Their final goal, to lay their young lives on the altar of the freedom of the Macedonian people, was naturally viewed with sympathy by future generations, who passed on their great deeds for years, from generation to generation.’

Some 90 per cent of the books’ content – counting the texts dealing with different topics – concerns struggle, suffering (described as the sufferings of the common people) and injustice (presented as the starting-point for the people’s struggle). In the first-year history textbook it is explained that Karpash was killed in a very cruel manner (impaled, hung, stabbed with spears, cut into pieces and thrown into the Vardar river). Page 89 of the second-year textbook points out that Gavrito Radomin himself killed Teofilakis with his spear, even taking out his intestines. Turkish law carried out extremely severe punishments on captured road thieves: they were impaled, decapitated, flayed alive, etc., as stated in the second-year text, ‘The Ottoman State from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century’. The third-year textbook (page 118) gives the example of Done Toshev, who remained absolutely strong, revealed nothing, and thus became an idol, serving as an example for younger generations of Macedonians of how to behave before the authorities.

In these descriptions of struggle and revolution, the covert but undeniable message is that the rightful response to violence is more violence: ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’.

Since women are not included in this narrative of public life and historical events, they cannot be connected with struggle, defence and violence. Instead, women play a passive role, and are mainly linked with the theme of suffering (a characteristic sentence speaks of the ‘suffering of the innocent population’).

In these textbooks, a man can be a soldier or a fighter, an enemy or a defender. He can be a bearer of ideas, either progressive or destructive. A woman is just a presence in the background, whether positively or negatively valued. Only in very rare situations is a woman an active factor in the story.
The difference in the treatment of women and men in the history textbooks is emphasized by a simple fact: with rare exceptions, the only names found in these books are the names of men. Women are a part of an anonymous mass that suffers, or that supports somebody or something.

In this way a mental pattern is created (and related to the whole of human history, and especially national history) in which man is linked with struggle, whether just or unjust, whether defender or aggressor. This link remains unchanged even in the most recent history textbooks. The last lessons in the textbook, describing the events after the Second World War, still make no effort to introduce the topics of individualism, tolerance, peaceful resolution of conflict, or building international co-operation.

Literature textbooks treat the topic of gender in identical fashion. Both in form and content, the literary works selected offer a narrow, fixed view of the position and role of the sexes.

Men are positively characterized as military leaders, fearless fighters ready to sacrifice their own lives for the fatherland, conquerors, leaders of people, patriots, heroes whose fundamental values in life are the fatherland, freedom and honour. In terms of the presentation of emotions, the most frequent situations in which male characters are placed are revolt, tumult, hatred, freedom-loving, combat against tyranny, loyalty to the people proved even under torture. The characteristic roles in which masculinity is manifested are the rebel, the hero, the dreamer, the assassin, the suicide, the man of action, the fighter against tyranny and the super-patriot.

Women possess none of the characteristics just listed, and cannot be placed in the same context as men. Women characters can be housewife, mother, girlfriend, sister. A woman can be represented in positive terms as tender, industrious, faithful, self-sacrificing, marvellous, full of love for her children, careful, selfless, a good inspiration, a muse, perfect, noble, good-hearted, decent, sensible, fair, patient, obedient, sad, dignified, proud, devoted.

Only in cases where a husband, son, father, brother or beloved is murdered, can a woman possibly continue the deed of the murdered man, thus becoming heroically strong, exalted, proud and noble. A woman is often described as a supporter of some man’s ideals, but never as a bearer of her own ideals or plans for the future.

According to the texts in use in both primary and secondary schools, a woman’s resistance to oppression usually does not generate violence against others – in the way men’s resistance does – but generates violence against herself. She is a martyr, a heroine dignified in her grief and sorrow. A woman’s heroism means that she is capable of bearing grief, while a man’s heroism means that he is capable of fighting.

The conclusions just presented become specially important in the light of the fact that traditionalism is deeply rooted in the consciousness of
the young people of Macedonia. This is reflected in a recent survey conducted in the higher primary-school grades and the secondary schools, of the republic.

The survey was conducted in 1995/96 by assistants at the Institute and students from the Faculty of Education in Skopje. Written questionnaires were administered to 1,560 elementary school pupils (802 female, 758 male) and 723 secondary school pupils (308 female, 415 male) in Macedonia. To the majority of respondents, tradition is the most important thing (Table 1). Most think that social change should occur, but only when consistent with the existing way of life (Table 2). As well as showing considerable commitment to tradition on the part of the younger generation, these answers suggest there may be certain gender differences in social attitudes. These may be seen in questions about situations that could be related to violence. The first question asks for responses to other nationalities living in the territory of Macedonia (Table 3).

### Table 1. Responses to the question: Do you agree with the attitude that tradition is the most important thing? (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>&lt; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>&gt; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Responses to the question: Do you agree with the attitude that changes in society should be implemented only if they do not ruin our way of life and our customs? (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3. Responses to the question: Which nationality do you hate the most? (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Other groups</th>
<th>I hate nobody</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Boys, it seems, more freely express hatred towards other nationalities, and girls are more likely to claim they have no such hatred.

The gender gap is smaller in responses to questions about marriage within one’s own nationality and religion. In the first case, boys and, in the second case, girls are more restrictive (Tables 4 and 5). To a question whether a person should be loyal only to one’s own nation, 74 per cent of females and 78 per cent of males agree. To the question whether nationalities endanger the survival of the Republic of Macedonia, 41 per cent of females and 35 per cent of males agree. Similar numbers of girls (53 per cent) and boys (51 per cent) agree that neighbouring countries endanger the survival of Macedonia.

In the following cases there is not a large difference between the sexes. But many more boys than girls would contemplate starting a war, if it were in the interest of their own people, as Table 6 shows. On the other hand (Table 7), there is overwhelming support for peace, in general terms.

**Table 4. Responses to the question: Should spouses (wife and husband) belong to the same nationality? (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5. Responses to the question: Should spouses belong to the same religion? (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6. Responses to the question: Do you agree with the attitude that I will even start a war if it is in the interest of my people? (percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7. Responses to the question: Do you agree with the attitude that peace is the most valuable thing in the world? (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peace, education and gender

We cannot deny the fact that war has played a significant role in human history. War and other forms of violence have been common to human development. War has often been regarded as a kind of economic activity, sometimes more and sometimes less successful. But as society has changed, it has become possible for people to conceive of other means of resolving conflicts and satisfying needs.

Since it has been normal for men to dominate public life, to be assigned responsibility for the security of families, to be conscripted for military service and to be recruited into the forces maintaining public order, it is to be expected that there would be a more widespread tendency among men than among women to solve problems by the use of force.

But it is likely that women’s penetration into public life, and other fields traditionally regarded as masculine, will increase in the future. This might allow for the adoption of a different vision on issues of violence and peace. It will certainly release men from the pressure of believing that they alone bear responsibility for defence, struggle, and issues of war and peace. On the other hand, it will deprive women of their position of passivity, and any expectation of conflicts being resolved without struggle.

Yet, the movement of women into public life and other ‘masculine’ fields is no guarantee that the approach to violence will be changed. Nobody can guarantee that women will be oriented towards peace after assuming positions of equality with men in public life. We would be trapped again by stereotypes if we were to assume that women are by nature more passive and peaceful than men, or that women are more prone to peaceful resolution of conflicts.

I would argue that women’s arrival in public life creates a new danger for the development of a culture of peace. Up to the present, history – as shown in the textbooks discussed above – has been men’s history, with women relegated to marginal importance, particularly in issues of war and peace. If we agree with the UNESCO statement that ‘wars begin in the minds of men’, we should equally recognize that peace has begun in the minds of men, too. In both cases, women have played a marginal role. The attempts to find human solutions to conflicts, the decline of war as an activity pursued for economic goals, and the growth of international law, have been mainly accomplishments of men.
The participation of women in these processes has been marginal, sporadic and indirect. To attain a level of equal participation with men in the development of a culture of peace, women must skip some stages and develop faster. Even if we overthrow the former stereotypes, we can naturally expect that women will need some time to find their place, and their specific way of action, in public life. In this process, women may suffer from some regressive attitudes, among them support for violence or for positions likely to lead to violence. Some evidence for this can be seen in the survey of Macedonian schoolchildren presented above, in the girls’ levels of support for nationalist and ethnocentric attitudes.

In my opinion, participation in peace education and the building of a culture of peace must not, ultimately, be determined by a person’s sex (or any other characteristic). Men’s and women’s different views of war and peace issues are due to their different social positions. They are not the products of psychological characteristics immanent in the sexes. The whole pattern of education is, at present, directed towards creating and deepening differences between the sexes, and minimizing their common humanity.

With this as a starting-point, I would argue that school curricula must deal with differences between the sexes, but without taking for granted the traditional perception of differences in relation to violence and war.

For that purpose, I would suggest the following curricular changes:

- Creating as many opportunities as possible for the sexes to work together in projects dealing with tolerance, respect for differences, non-discrimination and equality.
- Achieving gender balance in the content of teaching and textbooks, whether dealing with history or current practice.
- Showing men as frequently as possible in the context of emotional and family relationships that have been characteristic for women.
- Emphasizing issues of humanity as a general category, not limited by sex (or any other division).
- Emphasizing topics dealing with opportunities to choose (even the right to change sex, or the ethnic or religious groups to which a person belongs).
- Avoiding biological reductionism, and psychological over-generalization, about the sexes.

I would note once more that we cannot deny that struggle remains a principle of human survival and development. As long as struggle is still identified with physical combat and violence, then support for peace is identified with passive acceptance of injustice and renunciation of struggle. Therefore I consider that a foundation of peace education must be an active approach to social change, including many forms of struggle not based on physical force or violence.
Male roles and the making of the Somali tragedy

Hassan Keynan

Introduction

Societies evolve and operate in complex and mysterious ways. They embody both liberating forces and tyrannical tendencies, but they combine the two in ways that do not allow us to see them clearly for what they are. Social systems are inward-looking, evasive, and deceptive. They reveal very little to us both when they develop and make progress and when they sink into atrophy and decay.

The tragedy that has devastated Somalia since 1991 can be seen as a good example. The tragedy has made Somalia a household name, placing the country and its people in the spotlight on a scale not seen in recent years. So much has been said and written about what went wrong in Somalia (e.g. Besteman and Cassaneli, Drysdale, Gasse, Isa-Salwe, Lewis, Omar, Sahnoun). Yet what we know is, at best, fragmented and incomplete. We are still in the dark as to how and why the Somali Government and society disintegrated so completely and so violently.

This chapter adds to the ongoing search for answers. At the same time it parts company with earlier investigations in the sense that it introduces into the debate a crucial – indeed central – issue that has received little or no attention in the literature: gender, particularly the links between masculinity and violence.

The chapter sets out to explore the links between the heavily masculinized culture that pervades Somali society and the protracted conflict and violence that have devastated the country. It begins by outlining the foundations of what I shall call the ‘Somali equation’. It then proceeds to underline the making of hegemonic masculinity in Somali society, how it manifests itself, in what domain and with what consequences. This will be followed by a discussion of the status and role of women in Somali society. The chapter then attempts to establish a link between the heavily masculinized/patriarchal order that defines and animates the Somali
equation and the making of the Somali tragedy. Finally, a number of recommendations are proposed.

The Somali equation

The Somali people are a product of what I shall call the ‘Somali equation’: the complex of ideas, values, beliefs and institutions that define and underpin Somali society. In other words Somali society is a product of Somali culture and vice versa. Culture is defined as ‘a system of interrelated values, active enough to condition perception, judgement, communication, and behaviour in a given society’ (Mazrui, 1990, p. 30).

Foundations

The Somali equation is founded on three principal core traditions: Somali (the clan system/nomadism), Islamic and Western (the state system). Each core tradition constitutes a distinct system in its own right. At the same time it is an integral part of a larger, more complex system. Through a long, tortuous process of interaction and integration, the three core traditions have dovetailed into each other, forming what can be referred to as an overarching meaning system.

This meaning system (i.e. the Somali equation) closely resembles the notion of ‘habitus’, a system of durably acquired schemes of perception, thought and action (cited in Wallace and Wolf, 1991, p. 99). The notion of habitus encapsulates two meanings: (a) individual habitus meaning ‘the learned emotional and behavioural dispositions which are specific to a particular person’; and (b) social habitus meaning ‘the learned dispositions shared by most members of a group or society’ (Fletcher, 1997, p. 11).

The two meanings are inseparable in real-life situations as Elias notes in his sociology of figurations (Fletcher, 1997, p. 56). The Somalis are an embodiment of the Somali equation. The three core traditions forming the Somali habitus live and manifest themselves in most Somalis, both individually and collectively.

There is a tendency among many writers to reduce the complex Somali equation to a static, one-dimensional universe, conceptualizing the Somalis solely in terms of one core tradition, particularly the clan system. This is reductionist in the extreme. The Somalis embody all the principal core traditions underlying the Somali equation. They are at once clans, Muslims, nationalists and citizens.

One core tradition may outshine, even eclipse, the other core traditions in the Somali equation, but this does not mean that these traditions vanish into oblivion. It rather means that the dynamics of the Somali equation have changed and, in the process, tipped the scales in favour of one core tradition. The emergence of the clan system as the dominant core tradition at the present time can be explained in terms of this dynamic.
Whenever the dynamics of the Somali habitus change, and they do change, the core traditions in the Somali equation are reconfigured and redeployed. Thus, what is important is to adequately comprehend how the dynamics of the Somali equation operate, and to understand when and under what conditions one core tradition emerges as the dominant force in Somali politics.

The making of masculinity in Somali society

A prominent feature characterizing the Somali equation is that it is heavy with masculinity. Masculinity is a complex, dynamic concept, and, more important, it takes a variety of forms (Connell, 1997). In this chapter masculinity refers to socially constructed patriarchal ideologies, habits and practices that can lead to violence. In other words, the Somali equation is characterized by ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and ‘the centre of the system of gendered power’ (Connell, 1997, p. 4).

But where does this masculinity come from? Cultures vary greatly in the way they construct and deploy gender relations. The making of masculinity in Somali society has been a function of the making of the Somali equation. Thus in order to answer this question it is important to delve into the innermost recesses and dynamics of the Somali equation.

As explained earlier, this equation has been shaped by a multiplicity of forces and traditions. Of these, three have been central to the making of the masculinized order that pervades Somali culture: pastoral nomadism, the clan system and the state system. What is unique about these traditions is that they are all characterized by: (a) a prevailing sense/perception of insecurity/threat; (b) a preoccupation with survival; (c) hegemonic masculinity/patriarchy; (d) militarism; and (e) endemic conflict.

These characteristics, particularly the perception of threat, have become deeply embedded in the fabric of the Somali equation. As a result Somali society’s core traditions have become impregnated with a kind of siege mentality and a primeval quest for survival, with men assuming the role of protectors and providers. This in turn has led to the emergence of a pattern of socialization that glorifies and rewards aggressiveness, bravery, courage, strength and toughness, traits associated with the macho male.

This is particularly evident in the clan system, which in fact is an embodiment of aggressive masculinity. Military/security considerations pervade the social and political institutions of nomadic societies, particularly those defined by segmentary lineage organization (Khazanov, 1983; Gellner, 1995). The culture of conflict underlying the clan system can be primarily attributed to the notion of feud, the clan system’s ‘most characteristic institution’ (Gellner, 1995, p. 180). Feud can be defined as ‘a conflict that maintains itself by a perpetuated perception of Self and Other [and in which] recognition of membership in the alien group is sufficient basis for aggression’ (cited in Azar et al., 1978, p. 51).
This is an institution that was born out of conflict and which at the same time thrives on conflict or the threat of conflict. The underlying logic is that offences or wrongs occur between clans, not individuals; and when an offence is committed it provokes immediate retaliation/revenge, creating a kind of vicious circle. More important, the idea of feud is closely bound up with ‘honour’ and ‘shame’. Offences that are not avenged instantly create a deep sense of humiliation and shame. Retaliation removes the stigma of shame. It brings about redemption. This is one reason why feuds between and within clans are endemic and perpetual.

Masculinity and militarism also went into the making of the state system in Somalia. The masculinization and militarization of the Somali state can be attributed to three main factors. First, male dominance and the ‘monopoly of violence’ were integral parts of the emergence and development of the modern state. War-making and state-making have been inseparably linked. Second, the colonial powers carved up the Somali peninsula into five parts, dividing a people whose ecology and economy demanded unity. This directly threatened the very survival of the Somali people and, in the process, created a feeling of a nation under siege, reinforcing the perception of threat that was already deeply ingrained in the Somali psyche. This in turn gave rise to militant nationalism, militarization and war. The inter-clan feud that pervaded the clan system was transformed into an inter-state feud, involving Somalia and its neighbours, particularly Ethiopia.

In fact, the protracted and bloody conflict that tormented and traumatized the peoples of the Horn of Africa has its roots in this terrible legacy (Markakis, 1998). Third, the Somali state has borrowed heavily from the clan system. Most of the basic structures and ethos underlying the clan system went into the making of the state system in Somalia, among them a high masculinity ratio, conflict-prone social and political structures, a strong sense of insecurity, and militarism.

**Women and men in Somali society**

The hegemonic masculinity underlying the Somali equation has profoundly influenced the ways of Somali society. And nowhere is this more pronounced than in gender relations. Somali society is overwhelmingly and unashamedly masculine in how it views and treats women. Deeply embedded in the Somali equation are patriarchal ideologies, habits and practices that victimize and dehumanize women. More important, there are elaborate and well-entrenched narratives that condone, even celebrate, these atrocious practices. This patriarchal order manifests itself in a variety of manifestations in many areas: politics, culture, economics, etc.

**Political power, authority and leadership**

According to a Somali proverb: ‘Enlightened people are rare among men and nil among women.’ In Somali culture, power, authority, and leadership are
men’s domain. As a result Somali politics has always been male politics, and has always tended to marginalize and, at times, exclude females. The tendency to exclude women from positions of power and authority emanates from and is most evident in the clan system. The Shir, the traditional clan parliament, is an all-male institution. Women are completely excluded even when issues directly affecting them are being discussed. In fact women and children are considered to be legal minors and are treated as such.

This discriminatory practice has also become deeply ingrained in the state system. As noted earlier, the Somali state has borrowed heavily from the clan system. Women have never been allowed to become actively involved in national politics.

Thirty years (1960–90) of independence failed to produce even one woman MP or minister. It is true that the military regime (1969–90) took steps that appeared to promote gender equality. For example, it enacted the 1975 Family Law on the equality between men and women. It also appointed two female deputy ministers. Unfortunately these efforts were at best an exercise in tokenism.

The main reason was that the military government was quintessentially a patriarchal institution. In fact it combined two patriarchies, clan patriarchy and state patriarchy. As explained in Nuruddin Farah’s novels, particularly *Sardines*, clan patriarch and state patriarch converged, victimizing both women and the Somali nation as a whole: ‘What the clan [did] to women the clannish dictator [did] to the nation’ (Wright, 1994, p. 74).

If the state was a patriarchal tyranny, what happened when the central government completely collapsed in January 1991 was even worse. The collapse paved the way for the ‘clanification’ of the Somali equation. This means that the clan system, the epitome of masculinity/patriarchy in Somali society, emerged as the dominant core tradition in the Somali equation. For Somali women this development represented a nightmare. The collapse of the state system has in effect enthroned the most anti-female core tradition in the Somali equation: the clan system. What is worse, the bulk of the international community tends to reinforce this madness.

**Ideas, wisdom, and knowledge**

Another Somali proverb states: ‘A bosom that produces milk cannot produce intelligent ideas.’ Somali women are also greatly marginalized and, at times, excluded in the realm of ideas and knowledge. The generators and keepers of ideas and knowledge are predominantly masculine. Somali women are perceived to be inherently incapable of being productive, neither intellectually or cognitively.

The only time women are allowed to be intellectually active is when they are with other women or when dealing with young girls. And what women produce in the company of other women or young girls is classified as ‘women talk’ or ‘women’s story’, i.e. mere talk or meaningless.
One area in which this marginalization is most evident is oral poetry. Poetry is a national institution in ‘a nation of poets’. It is also the repository of Somali history and culture, and the dominant medium of communication and public discourse. This is one reason why poets are the most powerful and most influential figures in the country, for they are the agenda-setters and shapers of public opinion. In fact poets are believed to possess supernatural powers that enable them to prophesy future events.

But the muses are all male. The producers and keepers of Somali poetry are exclusively men. There is one category of poetry in which women are allowed to participate – buraanbur, which has the following characteristics: (a) it is exclusively by women for women; (b) it deals with themes relating to women and girls only; (c) it is not required to comply with the basic rules of poetry; and (d) it is routinely dismissed as ‘women talk’. In fact, when a man wants to tell another man that what he says is ‘nonsense’ or ‘rubbish’, he often says: ‘You’re babbling a buraanbur.’

In the early 1980s the country reverberated with a series of poems in which the policies of the military regime were severely criticized. They included two poems written by a famous woman artist by the name of Sada Ali. Sada’s poems displayed a great deal of creativity, cohesion, and analytical vigour. But the vast majority of the people, including women, refused to accept that she composed the two poems, arguing that a woman could not and did not compose the poems. The two poems were serious, high-quality literature. In other words the two poems were not buraanbur, therefore they were not the work of a woman.

When men say that women are incapable of rhyming one word with another in ‘a nation of poets’, what they mean is that women are at their best when they are silent, without voice. After all, Somalia’s patriarchal culture and politics place severe restrictions on what women can say, where they can say it and how they say it. For example, traditional etiquette bars women from speaking in public and from engaging their husbands in serious discussion or debate. In fact, in the masculine scheme of things, speech and eloquence enhance men’s power, prestige and influence, but diminish and ultimately ruin women. Women are therefore expected to be quiet, to watch their words, to speak in whispers and only to girls and other women. Silence is wedded to womanhood. The silent woman/wife thus becomes the ideal Somali woman/wife.

The economy
Somali women come face to face with this brutal treatment the moment they are born. When a new baby boy is born, the entire household becomes ablaze with excitement and joy. More importantly, part of his umbilical cord is tied to a young cow or she-camel. From that moment, he owns property. In financial vocabulary, he has his own bank account. If a new baby girl is born, she is greeted with silence and sadness. And the only thing she gets is
that ‘her arrival in the family is tolerated, with the hope that . . . baby-boys would follow her’ (Gassem, 1994, p. 12).

Women contribute significantly to the national economy and to the welfare of their own households. Yet they are systematically denied access to resources and independent means of livelihood. Women also face huge obstacles in developing and benefiting from their creativity, talents and skills. In short, the economic marginalization that the Somali woman encounters at birth stalks her throughout her life.

Women represent a latent culture of peace
But this does not mean that Somali women are completely powerless and passive. The same culture that marginalizes, and at times completely excludes, women, also embodies liberating qualities that enable Somali women to play a crucial role in the affairs of the nation, particularly with regard to issues relating to reconciliation, peace and social justice.

What this means is that Somali women constitute a latent culture of peace. And although they are still oppressed and unable to express themselves fully, freely, and confidently, they nevertheless represent a powerful force for peace. Somali men themselves are not unaware of this as illustrated in the following stories.

‘A man’s mattress is peace’
A young man who wants to marry meets two sisters, but cannot decide which one to marry. He consults with a sage. The sage tells him not to dwell on physical beauty, but to look for signs of intelligence and wisdom. The sage gives the young man three questions with which to test the intelligence of his would-be bride. The most important question is: What is a man’s mattress? The two go together to the two sisters. The sage asks them the question. The first one answers: ‘A man’s mattress is a well-woven fibre mattress.’ The second one answers: ‘A man’s mattress is peace, because if he has peace he can sleep anywhere any time without worry or fear.’ The young man falls for the latter, and the sage nods.

This story has deeper meanings. First, it indicates that women have a deeper understanding of the value of peace both for men and for society as a whole. It also reveals that men too value and need peace, but somehow are unable or unwilling to connect to it and campaign for it with openness, confidence, and conviction. In other words, peace rarely features in their agendas and priorities. It is not part of their socialization. It is not part of their masculine culture. Had Somali men sufficiently heeded what their female counterparts say, Somalia would probably be a different place than it is today.

‘Where blood is shed it must be soaked with birth fluid’
When inter- and intraclan wars occur, a large number of men usually perish. Often women are excluded in all matters relating to the declaration,
management, and execution of these wars. But when men can no longer continue to fight and need peace, women suddenly pop up in their minds. 'Where blood is shed it must be soaked with birth fluid' they would shout, quoting a Somali proverb. What this means is that whenever there is bloodshed, the warring clans must marry from each other. The women married from the enemy clan are referred to as godob-reeb, roughly meaning 'wound-healer'. The women who marry into the enemy clan and the children they give birth to will act as bridge-builders and peacemakers.

This story again illustrates vividly that the male-dominated Somali culture also includes a culture of peace, that the marginalized Somali women constitute a powerful force and a powerful voice for peace, and that if they are given the opportunity to serve the cause of peace, they will do so with determination and foresight.

Masculinity and the making of the Somali tragedy

Is there a link between Somalia's heavily masculinized culture and the protracted and violent conflicts that led to its collapse? So much has been said and written about the tragedy that befell Somalia. Yet what we know to date is, at best, scant. As a result we are still largely in the dark as to what exactly went wrong in Somalia. We are still groping for an answer.

The violent disintegration of Somalia no doubt has its roots in a complex web of factors. It involves a bewildering array of local, regional and global forces, operating within the context of one of the most complicated and messiest geopolitical arenas in the world, the Horn of Africa. A link can, nevertheless, be established between masculinity and the making of the Somali tragedy.

Countries or communities characterized by such perpetual military conflict or threat of war tend to develop and deploy heavily masculinized and heavily militarized cultures, institutions and ethos (Golan, 1997; Klein, 1997). More important, hegemonic masculinities can, and do, lead to conflict and violence, both directly and as the means by which other causes of conflict are transformed into violent confrontation (Connell, 1997).

As explained earlier, the evolution of the ‘Somali equation’ has been shaped by a profound and perpetual sense of conflict or fear of conflict as well as a primeval quest for survival. This has been woven into the social and political fabric of the nation; and has saddled the Somali peninsula and the Horn of Africa as a whole with endemic strife, protracted and costly military conflict and civil war.

The conflict/violence has pervaded the Somali equation in its entirety. It has, nevertheless, been most evident in the state system and the clan system, the two core traditions with the highest masculinity and military ratios.

Since its inception the Somali state has been in a state of war with its neighbours, particularly Ethiopia. This is not the place to conduct a detailed
investigation of the intractable conflict in the Horn of Africa. Suffice it to say that this conflict has transformed the region into a vast military zone, with war and war-related activities becoming the central preoccupation of the states in the region. The prolonged involvement of the superpowers inflamed the situation even further. The United States and former Soviet Union inundated the Horn of Africa with huge stockpiles of sophisticated and lethal weapons, making Ethiopia and Somalia, along with Nigeria and South Africa, the most militarized countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Arlinghaus and Baker, 1986, p. 123). The Somali state has either been fighting a war or has been preparing for war. In fact, it has become synonymous with war and war-related afflictions including a repressive military regime, violent upheavals, drought, famine and civil war. The result: 'social dislocation and human suffering' on a scale not seen anywhere else in Africa (Chege, 1987, p. 87). The complete and violent collapse of the central government in 1991 can be seen, at least partly, as one of the catastrophic consequences spawned by the Horn of Africa conflict.

Thus a link can be established between the making of the Somali equation and the making of the Somali tragedy. The two have been inseparably linked. The debilitating constraints deeply embedded in the Somali equation – the harsh exigencies of nomadism; the anxiety, insecurity and violence endemic in the clan system; and the protracted and bloody inter-state conflict in the Horn of Africa – severely strained the integrative girdle that held Somali society together.

Conclusion and recommendations

As the title of this chapter shows, it attempts to establish a link between masculinity and the making of the Somali tragedy. It suggests that the protracted violence that has traumatized the Somali people for so long may have its roots in the heavily masculinized culture that pervades the ways of the Somali people.

At the same time the chapter underlines the fact that the Somali equation is complex, multidimensional and dynamic. For example, it is pointed out that the Somali culture embodies a powerful force for peace, which can be tapped for the construction of an enduring culture of peace. It is also pointed out that both the troubles and fortunes of Somali society are inextricably intertwined with broader regional and global issues, and that dwelling on what is happening inside Somalia alone would be an exercise in futility.

Recommendations

Bringing about enduring peace and gender equality in Somalia is a formidable challenge that requires, among other things, enlightened minds, skilled, patient and committed hands, huge resources and time. The specific measures listed below deserve particular attention.
Understanding the Somali equation
Efforts aimed at building peace in Somalia require understanding the nature, structure and dynamics of the Somali equation. The root causes of the tragedy that befell Somalia are found in the structural make-up of the core traditions that define and underpin the Somali equation, particularly the clan and state systems. These core traditions need to be restructured and transformed. But before they are re-created they must be thoroughly understood.

Understanding the Horn of Africa connection
As noted earlier, the fate of Somali society is inseparably linked with that of the Horn of Africa. Particularly important are the impact of the fragile ecology and the protracted inter-state conflicts that characterize this region. The emergence of hegemonic masculinity and the large-scale and lethal militarization that enveloped Somali society can be primarily attributed to these two factors.

Showing solidarity with Somali women
As explained above, Somali women represent the most genuine and most determined force for peace in Somalia today. Unfortunately, the ‘clanification’ of the ‘Somali equation’ has not only trivialized their efforts, but also has made every effort to completely silence and exclude them. This is unacceptable and intolerable. Yet, the bulk of the international community tends to turn a blind eye to this abominable situation. Those who care about Somalia’s future should support the efforts of Somali women and enlightened men unequivocally and with conviction. Patriarchal forces will no doubt make every effort to undermine, even sabotage, any move aimed at strengthening the position of Somali women. But they should not be allowed to dictate destinies that, in time and space, transcend them.

Bibliography


During the summer of 1994 I rented a house in the countryside near Moscow. I spent my time working on papers and entertaining guests. One day a female friend of mine from my university days arrived with some children – hers and her sister’s. We had a great time walking, playing with the kids, talking about our lives. The troubles only started when we sat down to dinner. After we had cooked the meal and sat down at the table my friend suddenly said: ‘And now you, as a man, have to serve us our food.’ At first I did not understand her, but when she passed me the ladle I grasped what she wanted from me. She wanted me to act as a man, as a king of this rented castle, the head of this company of women and children sitting around the table. She wanted me to demonstrate for the children the system of power that existed in Russian society. But I declined. ‘No,’ I said, ‘we cooked everything together, so it would be better if we all chose someone to serve us.’ ‘Let’s draw lots!’ said one girl. So we did, and had real fun doing so. But my friend was upset, and I didn’t feel very comfortable. It was, in some sense, a remarkable situation, even though it was a frustrating experience for her and for me. It was as if two different systems were trying to establish some sort of communication, to find a common language. I chose to tell this story at the beginning of the chapter not only because it perfectly reflects the situation in which we are living in the Russian Federation today – a situation fraught with jumbled thoughts, ideas and visions about what the male role is and should be. This situation also raises some very important questions about the dominating model of masculinity we have in the Russian Federation.

Why am I talking about one model? Of course, there are a lot of Russian subcultures. Each of them has its own model of the male role based on different ethnic, sexual, social or even age characteristics. To be a 60-year-old man means something different than to be a young guy. Or to be a gay man is not to be a straight one. But at the same time, the main tendency
within the gender relation system of patriarchal society is ‘to reduce all others to the economy of the Same’, as it was articulated by Luce Irigaray (1985, p. 74). According to the logical formula offered by her analysis, one can say that the goal of this strategy is to eradicate the differences not only between the sexes, but also within the sex as well as in systems that are self-representative of a dominating model of a ‘masculine subject’ (Irigaray, 1985, p. 74). And all men are supposed to accept this model as natural.

Russian men have a short life. According to data for 1997, the average life expectancy for men is only 59 years. In spite of this fact, they manage to do a lot. Statistics perfectly reflect their lives, and these numbers seem more like a casualty list from the battlefield: in 1993 there were 331,815 crimes reported against women in the Russian Federation; some 14,500 women were killed by their husbands or partners. In 1995, out of 791,000 domestic crimes, 641,000 were carried out against women. In 1996, 10,888 rapes were officially registered, which is only about 5–10 per cent of all committed rapes according to research conducted by women’s organizations. Currently, from 30 to 40 per cent of all murders committed in the country take place in the family (Human Rights Watch, 1997, p. 11). And the numbers only increase with each passing year. Thus in 1994 there were 565,000 criminal cases reported against women – an increase of around 70 per cent over the previous year (Surviving Together, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1997, p. 53). In October 1997, the Russian Department of Internal Affairs under the Ministry of the Interior (GUVD) admitted that in the Russian Federation every two seconds a woman is beaten. The Russian family has become a very dangerous place, where one can find real examples of the most damaging aspects of male roles.

At the same time the general attitude towards domestic violence cases is far from idyllic. According to recent studies, most Russians still remain unable both to accept domestic violence as a social phenomenon and to grasp its negative social impact. For instance, despite the fact that 80.5 per cent of Russian women and 63.6 per cent of men identify violence in the family as a crime, at the same time, around half of those surveyed believe in the myth that it is women who provoke such violence against themselves. Over half of Russian men surveyed also consider domestic violence to be a rarity (RACCW, 1997, p. 10). Conventional wisdom holds that ‘it’s a family matter’, ‘husband and wife together form one devil’, ‘she provokes it’, etc.

Domestic violence is still the subject of a myriad of jokes, and sounds more like the plot of a comedy than grounds for a court case. For instance, one popular Russian joke goes as follows: ‘A husband starts to beat his wife. She cries, “What are you doing that for?” He answers, “If I could think of a reason, I’d kill you instead.”’ As statistics show, such husbands usually keep their promises.

The Russian family is in crisis – these are the words on everyone’s lips. And statistics back them up: the number of divorces in post-Soviet
Russia is increasing steadily: 606 out of every 1,000 couples in 1992; 764 out of every 1,000 in 1996 (Powell and Palchikoff, 1997). According to recent polls, only 65 per cent of Russian women are satisfied with their marriage (MCGS, 1997, p. 134). Yet for all the debate, one issue remains unverbalized. It is domestic violence, and it is as silent and powerful a force today as at any time during Soviet history. Why, after eighty years of proclaimed equality, does domestic violence remain invisible, treated as an isolated incident, if at all?

Men’s socialization starts in the family. And the relationship within the family is, as a rule, not the original creation of an individual and individualistic husband and wife, but rather a reflection of the totalitarian system of power that has existed in Russian society for so many years. To understand the roots of the Russian model of the male role and power of this dynamic within the family today, one must examine Soviet Russian history – the recurring past. And to start with history is to end with politics.

Russia approached the revolution of 1917 in a patriarchal trance, burned by its own set of strict hierarchical models – intricate many-layered structures, a precise system of values and priorities. The first act of the new Bolshevik Government combined two wholly incompatible elements: Machiavellian violence and lip-service to democracy. While the former was already familiar to the majority of the population, the progressive ideology in which it was cloaked was utterly foreign. The continuing battle between these elements perfectly demonstrated that progressive ideology without practical work cannot change the old patriarchal formula. For women, the Bolsheviks believed the rhetoric of women’s full emancipation, their comprehensive participation in the labour market, and equal pay for equal work, would automatically put an end to their discrimination. However, no practical steps were taken to radically re-educate society about gender roles, no preventive strategies regarding violence against women were created, and the declared freedoms were never actually realized. Such was the case for equality between the sexes, as a constitutional right, which was never realized in everyday life. Although women received ‘equal pay’ in their assigned work roles to build communism, they still had no equality in their nuclear families and were expected to take all responsibility for raising the children and doing the housework.

Although there was a sexual revolution in Russian society, it followed the rules that men created. Good ideas, aspirations, and intentions were met with entrenched patriarchal attitudes (conscious and unconscious), and the hope of a new era of gender equality faded quickly.

The events of the Stalin years only highlighted this irony. Arrest, deportation and murder were accepted almost without a murmur by the population at large. These violent acts are, after all, organic elements of a patriarchal society. Such state-mandated violence may be responded to in a variety of ways: one may fear it, condone it, even utterly ignore it, but one
can admit that it is ‘understandable’ – it is an inalienable aspect of patriarchy, with its intrinsic vertical hierarchy and survival of the fittest.

It is impossible to engage in extremely repressive tactics without a representative model, that is, a figure who possesses the aggression upon which such tactics are based. In the Soviet Russian patriarchal environment, a masculine gesture carried with it an inherent threat because man was pointed out as this representative model. Within the system of gender constructs that characterizes any patriarchal society, a man is always viewed in the light of his militaristic function. He must be strong, courageous, etc., ad infinitum. And, of course, he requires an object to be protected, for the strong need the weak. In a patriarchal society, this subject, this ‘weakness’, is the woman. She needs not only to be protected, but to be taught as well.

The Stalinist terror was not a punishment – so many of those taken were innocent of any crime. Its main goal was education. It was a lesson for those left behind. Stalin was a real man in the old Russian sense of the word – as understood in Domostroi, the sixteenth-century ‘good housekeeping’ guide for men of the day, thorough instructions as to how to manage one’s women – to inculcate the desired behaviour through fear.

So Stalin was the archetypical Russian father, teaching Mother Russia to be the perfect Communist ‘wife’. At the same time, despite the cult of leaders rooted in Russia, the patriarchal power ‘is neither individual nor can it be gained in isolation’ (Theweleit, 1989, p. 369). This point was the bottom line of Soviet politics in forcing the creation of a collective male identity. From that time till today the patriarchal system that has existed in Russia can be best described using Heidi Hartmann’s definition of patriarchy as ‘relations between men, which have a material base, and which . . . establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women’ (Hartmann, 1981, p. 14).

Taking this into account, it is not at all surprising that ideological statements about equality between the sexes were quickly ‘corrected’ by asymmetrical laws on gender. New laws passed in the early 1930s prohibited homosexuality – marked as the last vestiges of bourgeois mentality, bogged down divorce procedures in paperwork and attempted to make divorce itself socially unacceptable. Lists of those who had filed for divorce were published in local newspapers, and would-be divorcees had to explain themselves to local committees created specifically for this purpose under the auspices of the Communist Party. The aim of these laws was to encourage men and women to engage in sexual relations only within the framework of the ideal Communist family. The Soviet regime did need the strong discipline of family life. All private matters were becoming increasingly subject to strict government control. ‘The way in which one’s personality – as a product of one’s upbringing – is formed, should occur at the dictates of society’, as was pointed out by A. Makarenko, father and icon of Soviet pedagogy, in the 1930s, thus it became a slogan for the next sixty years (Makarenko, 1988, p. 65).
In 1936 a new law on abortion was passed. According to it, abortion was prohibited for those women who did not have children or who had only one child. Motherhood in Russia became institutionalized again as woman’s foremost function, a holy debt to be paid to the state-planned economy. ‘We will not remain in debt, we will provide Russia with strong, good children’, thus the state forcefully encouraged women to show their appreciation for their glorified, glorious female fate (Rabotnitsa, 1944, p. 9). The state orders ‘Mother’s Victory’, ‘Mother-Heroine’, and ‘Motherhood Medal’ were just another tactical move in the battle to create and ideologically support the ‘necessary’ gender models. Men received their medals for courage in the field of war, women for their endurance in the maternity ward. The decree of 8 July 1944, known as the Decree on Illegitimate Children, stigmatized unofficial (common-law) marriage. Children born into such families were registered and stigmatized as fatherless, regardless of their actual circumstances.

The collapse of the Soviet Union clearly revealed that underneath the weighty surface of Communist ideology lay other ideological systems equally ridden with patriarchal intent. During perestroika, the demand that one should adhere to those gender constructs as propagated by patriarchal power came cloaked in terms of ‘natural destiny’. As it was articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987:

We have discovered that many of our problems – in children’s and young people’s behaviour, in our morals, culture, and in production – are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and slack attitude to family responsibilities . . . we are now holding heated debates . . . about the question of what we need to do to make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission [Gorbachev, 1988, p. 35].

Latent patriarchal stereotypes (earlier marked as the dying vestiges of bourgeois mentality) became institutionalized. As it was articulated by one popular female journalist in the mid 1980s:

The question of how to raise the genders is a pressing one today. People continue to shy away from these words as if they conceal a Pandora’s box. But gender education means one thing, and one thing only: education based on gender. Boys as boys, men, husbands, fathers. Girls as girls, women, mothers. We have talked much of equality, now it is time to talk of difference [Rudenko, 1985, p. 32].

Pandora’s box was opened. During perestroika we could read in a schoolbook:

If a healthy woman refuses to give birth to a child, she is acting in the manner of someone who violently holds onto that which does not belong to her alone. She is appropriating the right to single-handedly decide the question of her husband’s immortality and the well-being of the older generation. She is deciding this pressing, societal question from an exclusively selfish position [Afanasieva, 1988, p. 74].
Glasnost brought not only open discussion. It also revived attention and attraction to previously ‘forbidden fruits’, such as ideological concerns about inequality between the sexes. In this sense, we can not ignore the cultural impact of globalization on the Russian family model. Since the beginning of perestroika, the Russian mass-media have been inundated with Western advertisements where women are portrayed as permanent consumers of washing machines, cleaning solvents, family food products, etc. Considering that during the last decades of the Soviet era all things Western were mythicized as vivid examples of ‘the good life’, it would be a mistake to minimize the influence of capitalism’s model of consumerism on the Russian system of gender relations. At the same time the new approach has been created to control the existing gender roles, which, as was perfectly explained by Michel Foucault (1980, p. 57), ‘presents itself no longer in the form of control by repression but that of control by stimulation’. In the framework of this control, the trick is not to change the power relation between the genders, but ‘to describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to place them’ (Beauvoir, 1974, p. 33).

According to the existing model, the male role scenario in Russia highlights his non-familial characteristics, effectively alienating him from his family. In Russian society, man is an eternal soldier, returning home not in order to unite with his family, but to rest briefly for the next campaign in a series of eternal battles. This discourse romanticizes the family as an object to be protected physically and materially, while simultaneously turning it into a symbol that has nothing in common with the reality of the male world.

In this scenario, man is always a figure on the outskirts of the family circle, not identified with it (such identification falls under the ‘female’ rubric), but viewing it as the object of his fatherly affections and patronage. When it comes to the family, man is on an eternal odyssey. But at the same time, he remains king of his castle. In this sense it is not surprising that two out of every three Russian men think that even if their wives work full time, that does not excuse them from the second shift – complete with a piping hot meal on the table every night in time for their husbands’ homecoming (MCGS, 1997, p. 132). As it was articulated by one man: ‘The man should be the boss. In our family, my wife follows my directions. If I want to go to a movie, that’s what we do. If I want to go to bed, we do it as well’ (Geiges and Suvorova, 1990, p. 110).

Life without a family is also life without parentage. Patriarchal power denies men the opportunity to feel themselves parents, to be fathers. The men’s movement which arose in the Soviet Union in the 1980s in order to protest against the automatic placing of children with their mothers in cases of divorce did not admit to a clash with the patriarchal power structures. These movements lacked both the consciousness of such a battle (which could in all fairness be termed a matter of defending one’s rights) and the understanding of the reasons why such a battle had to occur
(precipitated not by a cranky judge in an individual court case but by the power structures that determined that a system of ‘separate spheres’ reign over society). Judges, in fact, were defending not simply ‘woman’, but ‘man’ as well – from qualities that should not be attached to them. The real loser was individuality. These divorce cases were a mirror for the narcissistic gaze of the powers that be.

This power dynamic justly mirrors the manner in which the state has dealt with its people. If Marshall McLuhan (1964, p. 23) was right in saying that ‘the medium is the message’, the history of the Soviet Union provides a vivid example that the method of communication, the process of delivering the messages can be identified in terms of gender. Despite the fine words of propagandistic statements about equality, they were delivered in a very masculine way – through the ‘broken door of privacy’, thrust by ‘ideological tortures’. In the USSR the conducted politics themselves were extremely masculine and, hence, they formed the male role. In this sense, one can say they prove Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s assumption that ‘when something is about masculinity, it isn’t always “about men” ’ (Sedgwick, 1995, p. 12). Today, the Russian family is nothing less than a specific ‘love triangle’ structure – woman, man and power. An individual woman and man wish to create a family; the powers-that-be have just one model for them to use. Indeed, it is the only model that exists, or so society at large stubbornly continues to insist, and its dynamic was shaped into a pithy, often-heard and oftener-repeated, brutal formula – ‘If he beats you, it means he loves you.’

But as we have learned from the worldwide history of social activities, the ‘male role’ is not carved in stone. It is, like everything else, mutable, history need not recur, and the situation in the Russian Federation today is far from static, it is changing constantly, and even relatively rapidly. For instance, when in 1992 a few activists organized the first women’s conference in Dubna, there were just a couple of dozen women’s organizations in Russia. Now there are over 1,000. Women’s and gay- and lesbian-rights movements are provoking an inspection of the cultural norms, values and practices that patriarchy sanctions.

Russian women’s organizations consistently have violence against women as a priority concern, including both physical violence and economic oppression in the forms of women’s unemployment, sexual harassment and discriminatory practices in the workplace. Founding members of the Russian Association of Crisis Centres for Women (RACCW), created in October 1994, include the St Petersburg Psychological Crisis Centre for Women, the Moscow Sexual Assault Recovery Centre ‘Sisters’, the Crisis Centre for Women ANNA (Moscow), the Nizhny Tagil Centre ‘Lana’, the Ekaterinburg Hotline ‘Dialogue’, the Sergeev Posad Crisis Centre.

The growth of the women’s movement is forcing men to look at gender issues and inspect their roles. My own experience of meeting and
talking with various men tells me that some of them are ready for change. This was the reason for my starting the Male Solidarity project in 1995. At that point we were a small band of friends who wanted to support the women’s movement and to change our own attitudes, a support group for those who found themselves swimming against the tide in a patriarchal society. When, in 1995, we helped to organize the Women in Black march against the war in Chechnya and violence in society in general, it was the first time in the Russian Federation that the women’s movement and men’s groups worked together, in acknowledgement of the fact that we can and must be allies.

I remember a call that I received in the course of the Male Solidarity project from a wife-beater who said: ‘I beat my wife. I know that it is wrong because I love her, but I don’t know any other way to behave. I have been trained this way.’ Right now we are working on creating new models, an educational programme for ex-batterers. We are still just a small group, and we understand that we cannot change the overall situation, but our goal is to create alternative possible roles, to show that there are other ways for men to behave. When discussing strategies to combat the aggressive male role, especially in the field of domestic violence, members of our group decided that educational efforts were the key.

To combat violence means to work with its roots hidden in the collective (un)consciousness, to air the dirty laundry of Russian society. The most crucial obstacle that we face is the lack of awareness of domestic violence as a pressing societal problem and male roles in it. People still consider domestic violence as a family matter in which police and other state institutes refuse to intervene. Consider this: the main goal at present is to articulate this problem, to visualize it, to create a whole new discourse that can give us the tools for speaking to people in one understandable language. We understood that public education events and using efficient communication models can be extremely important keys for raising public awareness, changing minds, and promoting totally new attitudes not only towards issues of domestic violence, but also towards male roles in general. As far as we can judge from our experience, there are certain steps that can be taken to improve the situation. In order to tackle the problem when men are still in their formative years, a school education programme, including training in non-violent communication and an examination of gender roles, would help to change the stereotypes of aggressive masculinity which children seek to emulate and to promote non-violent role-models for young men.

There is no a short and easy way to change public attitudes about male roles, to make violence unacceptable, to create a whole new image of the man. But it is the only way we have. Paths of prevention can help lead Russian society away from the culture of violence, and towards a culture of peace.
Bibliography


MCGS. 1997. *Materials of the First Russian Summer School on Women’s and Gender Studies*. Moscow, MCGS.


*Rabotnitsa Magazine*, No. 12, 1944.


Part Three

Discussion of peacemaking strategies or practices focusing on men and masculinities
It is the individual man, raising his fist at his wife.

It is the gang of boys, cheering on the fight in the middle of a tight circle.

It is the young man on a date, acting without regard for the desires of the young woman he is with.

It is the man, pushed by rage or fear, driving his car to his death.

It is the physical or verbal attack on another man, because of his sexual orientation or religion or skin colour.

It is the gangs of men – we call them armies – who have been commanded to view each other as less than human, and to view civilians as something even less.

It is violence on the playing field.

It is the structural institutionalization of violence in our factories, in the design of our cities, in the rigid hierarchies of education, work, politics, and in the privileges conferred by accidents of birth: our colour, nation, and physical well-being.

It is, perhaps metaphorically, perhaps not, our relationship to our natural environments.

It is men’s violence in its myriad forms.

This chapter sketches a framework for understanding this violence and its relation to the lives and experiences of men. It then looks at two sets of activities in which I have worked to challenge men’s violence: the activities of the White Ribbon Campaign, the largest effort in the world of men working to end violence against women and, secondly, work within the education system.

**The roots and articulations of men’s violence**

My previous explorations of men’s violence have described what I call ‘the triad of men’s violence’. I have looked at the ways that men’s violence
against women is linked to men’s violence against other men and to the internalization of violence, that is, a man’s violence against himself. This triad – each form of violence helping create the others – occurs within a nurturing environment of violence: the organization and demands of patriarchal or male-dominant societies.

What gives violence its hold as a way of doing business, what has naturalized it as the de facto standard of human relations, is the way it has been articulated into our ideologies and social structures. Simply put, human groups create self-perpetuating forms of social organization and ideologies that explain, give meaning to, justify and replenish these created realities. It is also built into these ideologies and structures for the more simple reason that it has brought enormous benefits to particular groups: first and foremost, violence (or at least the threat of violence) helps confer on men a rich set of privileges and forms of power. If indeed the original forms of social hierarchy and power are those based on sex, then this long ago formed a template for all the structured forms of power and privilege enjoyed by others as a result of social class or skin colour, age or sexual orientation. In such a context, violence or its threat becomes a means of ensuring the continued reaping of privileges and exercise of power. It is both a result and a means to an end.

But men’s violence is not simply a result of men’s individual and social power and, as Michael Kimmel suggests in his chapter on pages 239–47 the sense of entitlement to that power.

My work has also analysed what I call ‘men’s contradictory experiences of power’. The very way that men have constructed social and individual power is the source of enormous fear, isolation, and pain for men themselves. If power is constructed as a capacity to dominate and control, if the capacity to act in ‘powerful’ ways requires the construction of a personal suit of armour and a fearful distance from others, if the very world of power and privilege removes us from the world of child-rearing and nurturance, then we are constructing men whose own experience of power is fraught with crippling problems.

And, on top of that, the internalized expectations of masculinity are themselves impossible to satisfy or attain. This may well be a timeless problem, but it seems particularly true in an era and in cultures where rigid sex boundaries have been overturned. Whether it is physical or financial accomplishment, or the suppression of a range of human emotions and needs, the imperatives of manhood (as opposed to the simple certainties of biological maleness) seem to require constant vigilance and work, especially for younger men.

The personal insecurities conferred by a failure to make the masculine grade, or simply, the threat of failure, is enough to propel many men, particularly when they are young, into a vortex of fear, isolation, anger, self-punishment, self-hatred and aggression.
Within such an emotional state, violence becomes a compensatory mechanism. It is a way of re-establishing the masculine equilibrium, of asserting to oneself and others one’s masculine credentials.

What makes this possible as an individual compensatory mechanism has been the widespread acceptance of violence as a means of solving differences and asserting power and control. What makes it possible are the power and privileges men have enjoyed, things encoded in beliefs, practices, social structures and the law.

Men’s violence, in its myriad forms, is therefore the result both of men’s power, the sense of entitlement to the power, and of the fear (or reality) of not having power.

And, finally, it is the result of a character structure that is typically based on emotional distance from others. As both myself and many others have suggested, the psychic structures of manhood are created in early child-rearing environments often typified by the relative absence of fathers and adult men. The result of this complex and particular process of psychological development is a dampened ability to experience what others are feeling and to not experience other people’s needs and feelings as necessarily relating to one’s own. Acts of violence against another person are, therefore, possible.

This analysis, even presented in such a condensed form, suggests that challenging men’s violence requires an articulated response that includes:

• The dismantling of the structures of men’s power and privilege.
• The redefinition of masculinity or, in fact, the dismantling of the psychic and social structures of gender that bring with them such peril.
• Organizing and involving men, as it has involved women, to reshape the sexual organization of society, in particular, our institutions and relations through which we raise children.
• Activities that involve men and boys in actually challenging themselves and other men to end all forms of violence.

The rest of this chapter looks at two sets of activities in which I have been involved that address a number of these responses. The first is the White Ribbon Campaign. The second is on working through the education system to reach young men.

The White Ribbon Campaign
In late 1991, a handful of men in Canada took the first steps down a road seldom travelled by men. We decided we had a responsibility to urge men to speak out against violence against women, and we decided to launch what would become a very large-scale public campaign.

We knew that most men were not violent against women. But we also knew that the vast majority of men remained silent. Through our silence, we allowed the violence to continue.

We decided that wearing a white ribbon would be a personal pledge never to commit, condone or remain silent about violence against women.
From the start, the primary goal of the White Ribbon Campaign (WRC) has been to encourage men to look at our own attitudes and behaviour, and to learn to challenge other men to stop all forms of violence against women. We believe that as more men and boys take responsibility for challenging ourselves and others, then the epidemic levels of violence against women will finally end.

During six challenging years we moved from an idea organized in a living room, to active campaigns in schools and communities right across Canada, in various areas of the United States, Australia, Norway, and with growing interest beyond.

In Canada, the primary dates of the White Ribbon activities start at the end of November and run up to 6 December, the anniversary of the 1989 massacre of fourteen women engineer students in Montreal, Quebec. Organizers in other countries have chosen dates and events that are relevant to the experiences in those countries.

From pathway to highway

Just as the problem of violence against women is not one on the margins of society, our efforts to reach men cannot be marginal. We know that we must find ways to involve the vast majority of men.

We purposely used something that employed a simple symbolic language: wearing a white ribbon didn’t require reading ten books or attending an eight-week men’s support group. On the other hand, this did not make wearing a white ribbon a simple act. How many times did we hear stories like this: ‘The first year, I thought you guys were a bunch of male bashers and the whole thing made me angry. The next year I started listening to what you said and it seemed to make sense, but there was no way I was going to wear a ribbon because what would the other guys think? Finally, in the third year I got up the nerve to wear a white ribbon.’

We knew that wearing a white ribbon could be a catalyst for discussion and for self-reflection and even personal change.

Many efforts by pro-feminist men to challenge men’s violence against women have reached out to only a small number of men. Walking along a little pathway can be nice: it’s quiet and cosy. But there’s only room for a few of you. From the start White Ribbon decided to make room for hundreds of thousands, even millions of men and boys. To do so, we had to find the highways where men travel.

First and foremost that has meant working in the school system. We do so to reach boys whose ideas about the other sex and about themselves as men are still forming. White Ribbon has produced a series of education kits that are now used in over 1,000 junior highs and high schools across Canada, representing 1 million students. Many more schools hold annual White Ribbon activities, doing educational work and raising money for local women’s programmes.
We also want to reach men where they work, and men and women where they shop. So a second and rapidly growing area of our work has been with corporations and trade unions. We have worked hard to develop these partnerships for several important reasons: Most adult Canadians spend a good part of each day at work. A trade union or company can act as a transmission belt, bringing the ideas of White Ribbon to a large audience in offices and on the shop floor.

The corporate partnerships also allow us to reach people as consumers. In Canada, for example, ribbons were available as of 1999 in the largest drugstore chain, and shoppers purchasing certain products both there and in some other stores can automatically have a portion of the purchase cost go to White Ribbon and receive information on the problem of violence against women.

Finally the support of corporations and unions is important because the Canadian WRC does not receive money from any level of government. It relies entirely on support from these groups and many concerned individuals.

Building unity
Finding a highway where men can join women in stopping men’s violence against women is a process of finding common ground among men. We are particularly proud that it is a place where those who have many areas of disagreement about political, economic, and social issues can work together. By building unity, we can not only better address these issues, but men can find ways to work together in a co-operative and positive environment.

In our second year, 1992, I was cutting ribbons in the office with a man active in the Catholic Church. He had worked impressively hard to raise awareness about violence against women. He said to me, ‘I think we have to address another violence issue. The violence done by abortions.’ I said to him, ‘I also think that the abortion issue raises issues of violence. But to me, the issue is the emotional violence done to a woman who is forced to have a child she doesn’t want and then perhaps the child who may not be wanted.’ We calmly argued back and forth and something became clear to me: we had two choices. One would be agreeing to disagree on the issue of abortion. We could agree that sexual assault, wife beating, harassment, genital mutilation, and sexual and physical abuse of the young must be stopped now. And we could agree to work together to end these crimes.

Or we could say, because we cannot agree on such an important issue (which abortion certainly is), we cannot work together. The implication would be clear: It would mean that no Catholic church (and some others), no Catholic school, no one who opposes abortion would be taking part in the White Ribbon Campaign, and the millions of men whose beliefs lie in this direction would not take part in speaking out to end violence against women.
So I said: ‘As an individual, I’m going to keep speaking out and writing about the right for a women to choose whether to have a child or not because I believe women should have control of their own bodies and so every child is a wanted child. I’m going to keep giving money and attending pro-choice marches. I’m also sure that you, as an individual, are going to continue to do the opposite. We don’t agree. But we agree that many other things certainly do constitute violence against women. We agree these things affect millions of Canadian women. We agree that all men have a responsibility for speaking out against that violence. So let’s agree to work together as part of the White Ribbon Campaign where we agree, and agree to go our own ways where we disagree.’

In a similar vein we have right-wing and left-wing politicians working together, corporate leaders and trade-unionists, and many others who usually face each other across a divide.

In agreeing to disagree, we were doing something different than most groups during the whole history of social, political, and religious causes. Rather than focusing on where we disagree and always insisting that, to be pure, we could only work with an increasingly small and fractionate group whom we agreed with, we would seek broad unity.

Supporting women’s efforts and other activities
Although the WRC’s primary focus is to do educational work to reach men and boys, we also want to support the important work of women’s shelters, rape crisis centres, and women’s educational programmes across Canada. From the beginning, we have only done this in a somewhat scattered way: we have encouraged schools, workplaces, and communities across Canada to raise money for these women’s programmes. Women urged us to do more so, in 1997, the WRC proposed forming a partnership with two women’s organizations and launched a major fund-raising effort to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for anti-violence efforts across Canada.

At the same time, the WRC continues to seek new avenues: avenues to work with men and boys in different areas, opportunities to encourage the spread of the WRC to other countries. It was a road less travelled. We’re glad to see the thousands and thousands of men and boys who are now walking at our side.

Working with young men in the education system
In recent years there have been three moments that have helped shape my work with young men in high schools.

Creating a new pedagogical/emotional setting
The first occurred in 1991 when one board of education invited me to design and co-facilitate the male component of a parallel retreat for male and female high-school students. I wanted to start with an exercise that would
allow each boy to talk about his own experiences as a young man. At our
two-day training session, the male teachers who had volunteered to facilitate
all insisted that there was no way a group of 16- and 17-year-old males
would divulge much of anything. There would be jokes, exaggeration,
silence, awkwardness, but nothing approaching the truth. I said – perhaps
optimistically, or perhaps just glibly – ‘They’ll talk, if you talk.’ And so the
teachers agreed to stop being ‘teachers’ for a moment and just be part of the
group, which would include, to whatever extent felt safe, talking about their
own feelings and experiences.

The retreat began and, by the end of the first day, the teacher/
facilitators were glowing. The young men had not only opened up, but they
actually listened with more interest and respect than any of the teachers had
ever before experienced.

There might be many lessons in this one story concerning the role of
adults in working with young men and boys. But perhaps the chief
conclusion was that boys want a chance to talk about their lives, their points
of confusion, worries, doubts and joys. They want to escape, even if just for
a moment, from the macho pressures that engulf them. In other words, the
iron-clad world of male buddying and the armour of manhood is not so
impregnable after all. All we need to do is provide a safe, confidential, and
encouraging place.

If we truly believe, as I do, that the many things we hate about
the attitudes and behaviour of so many young men is not a biological fiat,
then there can be only one conclusion: we must challenge sexist attitudes
and behaviour, and at the same time also provide opportunities and
encouragement for young men to re-examine and jettison these negative
things. Providing such an opportunity requires many things, including:

• Working with educators to develop what will be for many of them, a
  new theoretical framework for understanding men’s behaviour.
• Working with educators to develop practical skills at group facilitation.
  In particular, this often requires that teachers act as models, both in their
  willingness to participate in the discussion and to respect discussion
guidelines.
• Within a group (a classroom, a workshop, etc.) involving students in the
development of discussion guidelines. Such a process gives students an
opportunity (which they seldom have) to help define the learning
environment. (Perhaps it should be no surprise, but I am always taken by the
similarities of the guidelines developed by group after group of both young
people and adults. These include: respect for different opinions, no put-
downs, honesty, sharing the time, not forcing anyone to talk, challenging
words or behaviour that are oppressive without personally attacking the
offending person, and respecting confidentiality.)
• Providing follow-up activities and support for both students and for
educators new to such work.
There is no one correct format for carrying out this work. Not only can exercises and workshops be planned that can range from fifty-minute in-classroom activities, to two-hour workshops in which selected students are taken out of class to participate, right up to two-, three-, and four-day workshops. But more important is the whole integration of this type of pedagogical/emotional framework into the daily life of our schools.

Whatever the format, when we give young men the opportunity to examine gender issues in a challenging yet non-threatening environment, they open up in remarkable ways. With support and encouragement they examine hitherto unexamined parts of their own lives. Through this they begin to develop greater sympathies and a greater awareness about the oppression of women and other groups. In no way does giving a space for boys to talk about their own experiences and problems mean muting a pro-woman message. Rather it is a recognition that the very ways that men have defined and constructed their power have brought not only rewards, but a price to men themselves. By allying themselves with women in a struggle for equality and change, men will also free themselves, even if it means giving up very real forms of privilege and power.

**Ending sexism, ending homophobia**

A second experience was actually an accumulated one. For several years, I heard terrible stories from young women about the harassment they endured. I often retold these stories to boys. But there was something more that I was missing. The light bulb finally clicked on for me one day when a group of girls told me about the boys who harassed them in a hallway outside the gym. The boys stood in a line and graded the young women as they passed, giving them numbers from one to ten and making comments about their bodies. The girls said it was humiliating and intimidating. I had heard such stories before. But then they said that a lot of the boys were really nice and would never do it on their own. Some girls even said that some of the boys had said it made them feel uncomfortable.

Finally, I realized what should have been obvious to me all along: although the girls were the objects and the victims of the harassment, the boys weren’t doing it primarily to have an impact on the girls. They were doing it for the other boys. They were proving to the other boys and, presumably, to themselves, that they were real men. The harassed girls were tokens of their masculine credentials.

What does it mean that these young men felt they had to demonstrate (and constantly re-demonstrate) their masculine credentials? It means that masculinity is a fragile construct, requiring constant nourishment and replenishment. For most men, particularly when young, there is a running dialogue of doubt about their masculinity. There is enormous terror that other boys will discover one’s own fears. There is also enormous fear of ridicule and of violence at the hands of other boys. There is enormous fear of other males.
We have a word for this fear of other males, and that is homophobia. Of course, the term ‘homophobia’ is more commonly used to refer to a fear or hatred of gays, lesbians and bisexuals. I do not want us to lose sight of this specific and important meaning. But I do feel that this specific form of men’s homophobia is a product of the broader fear of other men and the fear of not being ‘manly enough’. In a culture that defines manhood as an ability to dominate women, dominate other men, control one’s own unruly emotions and display the heterosexuality that is compulsory in our society, it comes as no surprise that for many men, particularly when they are young, there is an active fear or hatred of homosexuality. To love and desire other men means being vulnerable to them.

Boys have various means of dealing with this combined fear of other males and fear of not being manly enough. Some are violent against other males and against females, some engage in self-destructive forms of behaviour and some engage in forms of controlling and dominating behaviour not normally considered violent (domination of classroom discussion, control of the hallways, conquest in sports, etc.).

While this is an all-too-brief account of the role of homophobia in the construction of ‘normal’ masculinity among teenage boys and young adults, I think it points to one important conclusion: just as our work with men must be constructed within a framework of feminist analysis and action, this work must also be constructed within a framework that challenges homophobia in all of its forms.

This means not shying away from issues of sexual orientation. And while homophobia obviously has a much greater and more direct impact on those who define themselves as lesbian, gay or bisexual, the point being made above is that homophobia affects us all in many different ways. Anti-sexist work must include work to challenge homophobia and to respect diversity.

**The rapidly changing world of gender relations among youth**

A third, more recent, defining moment occurred during a workshop I was leading in Canada’s northern Yukon Territories. In one session we were dealing with issues of sexual harassment. As in other sessions I have carried out on sexual harassment, there was a fair degree of resistance from the young men. (In this case, most were 16- to 18-year-olds.) I did my best to reach them all, but I had my eye on one young man who was simmering with anger. Finally he exploded and told us a personal story that was later corroborated by two teachers at his school. One day in the school yard a female student came up behind him, reached through his legs, grabbed his genitals and yanked down. For most people this would be a humiliating experience, but it was even worse for this young man who had been sexually abused as a boy. He turned around and punched the girl. And who got into trouble? He was expelled; nothing happened to her.
One of the things I hear over and over from both boys and girls is the rapidly increasing amount of sexual aggression, harassment and violent behaviour by young women. There are reasons for this. Young women are growing up with a sense that they, too, are powerful. Unfortunately, society’s definition of power remains the tried-and-true definitions of patriarchal power: our own power is defined by our capacity to control others and control the world around us. It is not surprising that as young women come into a sense of their own power (a positive thing) a significant number of them will express it within the dominant discourse of our society (a negative thing).

Recognizing this does not mean we are anywhere close to having equality in physical violence – most violence is still committed by males, though verbal harassment is rife among both boys and girls. But I think we ignore the rise of girl-against-girl and girl-against-boy violence at our peril. For one thing it means that we fail to address fundamental gender issues as they now affect young women. The other thing, particularly relevant to this chapter, is that boys and young men do not perceive us as telling the truth when we ignore or play down violence and harassment committed by young women. If we only talk about harassment of girls by boys and fail to recognize the reverse, then boys will never take our anti-harassment message seriously.

Bibliography
Neither male nor female: neither victim nor executioner

Judith Hicks Stiehm

Introduction

Different cultures vary greatly in the amount, the nature and the usual victims of their violence, but even in societies that come closest to achieving a culture of peace, violence does not completely disappear. In this chapter I will explore two questions. The first is: What is the effect of men’s near monopoly on the use of legitimate violence? This question involves the complex issue of how cultures define masculinity, and how they could define it. The second question is: How can a community ensure that the violence it authorizes works to protect potential victims and does not itself become a menace? This includes an analysis of the policies that guide police and military selection, training and direction.

To think thoroughly about benign official protection will require also thinking about what private and extralegal violence is present in, and condoned by, different societies. Equally importantly, we must consider what kind and amount of violence is expected even if it is not condoned. Further, while women are appropriately concerned about the essentially unilateral violence done to them by men, that violence must be considered in the context of the violence men do to men. (To men the violence done to women may be seen as merely incidental to a larger, all-male struggle.) Finally, in considering the violence carried out in a particular society we must consider whether that violence is somehow inherent to a culture, or if it is principally the result of rapid change and its accompanying fear and lawlessness which have temporarily weakened usual social restraints.

The male monopoly of legitimate violence and masculinity

Biology is certainly not destiny, but it remains true that women can give birth to and nurse the young, while men cannot. In contrast, there is nothing men can do that women cannot. Because men do not have a unique capacity by which to define themselves, they tend to define themselves by
oppositeness — specifically, as being the opposite of women. Further, because there is nothing biological that defines them, men must define themselves by a social role, and in most societies, most of the time, the one social role that is reserved to men, the role which only they do, and which any man might be called to do, is the role or roles that involve the exercise of a community’s force. This force is described as protective. It is typically exercised by the police and by the military.

Again, because their special role is only socially defined, men need to assert and protect it. This is because their masculinity is vulnerable, more vulnerable than women’s femininity. Because women’s identity is quite secure, they are able to engage in a far wider range of social behaviour, to wear a greater variety of clothing, and even to perform traditionally male tasks and still ‘know’ they are women. When men say that women who, for instance, work as auto mechanics have ‘lost their femininity’, their real meaning is that they, the men, feel they have lost their masculinity, because women are doing something they had considered part of male identity.

This asymmetry between women and men’s gender identity is very serious. If women’s more secure identity stimulates men to assertiveness, to public performance, to the pursuit and use of power, including legitimate violence, it follows that if we want to reduce male violence, it will be necessary either to offer a new definition of masculinity, or to redirect men’s risky and aggressive behaviour so that it better benefits society.

Winning acceptance of an entirely new definition of masculinity would be a profoundly difficult task. Also difficult, but a worthwhile task would be the redirection of men’s risky and arduous activity, for example as United Nations volunteers in a peacekeeping operation. My proposal is simpler. It is to end men’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This would break the link between gender identity (i.e. masculinity) and the use of force. If one could no longer ‘prove’ oneself a man by soldiering or policing, it would, I believe, reduce the overall use of force. To do this would require establishing the right as well as the responsibility of women to serve as police, as soldiers, as peacekeepers. It would mean making these important jobs neither male nor female. This will be discussed further below. In the section that follows, it will be argued that unlinking gender and force-using occupations will also help to ensure that these occupations are properly practised — that they, in fact, serve their community rather than themselves, that is, that persons in these jobs offer protection without becoming executioners.

Boys and girls are socialized differently in every culture. In the United States children are taught that boys/men protect girls/women. Girls are taught that they will be rescued, that a hero will save them. Girls are also taught to refer to the rules, to adults, to authorities. American boys, though, learn a very different lesson. They learn that sometimes larger, older boys will bully them, and that they must be prepared to fight. If they fight with
courage (even if they do not win), they will be accepted (and safe) in the future. The message also is that one does not snitch, one does not tell, one does not appeal to authority; instead, one takes care of matters oneself. Girls’ stories, then, teach that violence is unnecessary because a rescuer will appear; boys’ stories teach that violence is necessary to prevent future violence.

American boys, then, are taught that extra-legal (as well as legal) use of violence is both pragmatic and preventative. But the element of ‘honour’ is also involved. This slippery concept is worthy of great attention, for it can drive both murderous and sacrificial behaviour. ‘Honour’ seems to be a part of all cultures, though its precise meaning and requirements vary. For instance, in some cultures a man’s honour is tied only to his own behaviour; in others his honour is tied to the actions of others, such as his wife. This means a man’s ‘honour’ can actually require the killing of his wife. In some societies the requirements of honour may extend over many, even hundreds of years. Honour-induced violence may be illegal and still be expected and also condoned. It may even be excused in a court of law. The reduction of extra-legal violence and the reformulation of what is required by honour may be essential to any programme to develop a culture of peace.

One goal of a culture of peace, I believe, should be to transfer responsibility for the righting of wrongs and the exercise of community force from individual men whose honour, masculinity as well as interests are necessarily involved, to those specifically assigned the duty of protection by society, that is, the military, police, peacekeepers. Condoned and uncondoned but expected violence must be reduced. Indeed, the basic argument for the existence of government has long been that it eliminates the passionately personal from the pursuit of justice. Citizenship, then, must be given centrality. It must displace kinship as the basis for community.

When the roles of protected and protector are defined by sex, there are consequences for women as well as for men. At present women mostly avoid the unpleasant tasks asked of protectors; they can also (often wilfully) be ignorant of what is being done by their protectors. Indeed, women’s distance from legal violence can make it easier for them to stereotype the enemy/criminal than it is for the men who do the actual fighting/policing. Women’s ignorance can even lead them to support, to applaud, to incite behaviour by men which they (the women) would not endorse if they had to participate in it. Conversely, men who see themselves as protectors, as doing violence on behalf of others, can be moved to murderous behaviour of a kind that they would never try to justify merely on the grounds of self-interest or self-defence.

Even if it is mostly men that fight, we should remember that getting them to fight is difficult. They have to be drafted, trained, disciplined, threatened, exposed to danger. In all wars it is young men, even boys, who do most of the fighting, and they are induced to do it by very deliberate, even blatant appeals to prove their manhood. When masculinity is removed as a
tool for managing protectors, and when women as well as men have to accept
the responsibility of executing decisions of state, we can expect the same
moderating effect as that which results from the transfer of responsibility for
judgement and execution from the individual to the state; and for the same
reason, individual passions will be neutralized by collective judgement, and
responsibility for decisions and actions will be shared more broadly.

The equivalent of the medieval hooded executioner who was set apart
from civil society cannot exist when all citizens have the possibility of being
required to serve as protectors. Indeed, a case could be made that the
military and the police should not even be considered specialized, élite
professions, but something more like a citizen’s duty, perhaps one similar
to that of serving on a jury in the United States. This could be a two- or
three-year duty owed to the state for, let us say, having received a university
education.

Rousseau described the citizen as one who is simultaneously subject
and sovereign. In this new scheme both male and female citizens would be
defenders, individuals who were simultaneously protectors and the
protected. ‘Masculinity’, then, would no longer attach to the role of
protector, nor ‘femininity’ to the role of the protected.10

Guarding the guardians

Since men and women still have rather separate cultures, women’s insertion
into existing military and police units would undeniably bring new skills and
approaches to soldiering and policing. For instance, women would almost
certainly give more emphasis to defusing conflict than to domination, and to
the construction of non-zero-sum as opposed to zero-sum situations.
Further, even if women entered the military and police in rather small
numbers, their mere presence would change how those forces were
perceived, and it would also affect how those forces saw themselves. Great
self-consciousness is generated by having even one woman present in an all-
male group,11 and even though chivalry is an awkward way to relate to
constituents and to fellow members of a team, it is preferable to the raw
sexism of the all-male group.12

One important way to influence the behaviour of guardians lies in
their selection. Although officials may prefer a homogeneous group because it
is easier to build cohesive units, a group that represented the whole
community would be better accepted/supported. It would also be more
effective in reaching out to a variety of groups. Further, because police and
military now serve in a wide variety of roles, it is an asset to have people with
different backgrounds and skills.13 This suggests the value of a draft, of
compulsory service or, if only a limited number are needed, of some kind of
random selection.14 An all-volunteer force would be different and probably
more conservative, more patriotic and more committed to a belief in the
efficacy of force than any population taken as a whole. Also, if there was no
draft or required service, civilians who had the ultimate responsibility for setting military policy would be more likely to lack military/police experience, and, therefore, (a) be tentative in their decisions, and possibly (b) lack the respect of military and police personnel. Any service can, of course, refuse service to individuals with mental, emotional or physical deficiencies that make it inappropriate for them to have the responsibility of using a weapon.

In the training process great emphasis is placed on discipline. This involves the obeying of orders, but it also involves the development of self-discipline, of a capacity for self-control whatever the stress. Still, the best training is not necessarily the harshest. It does, though, include (a) understanding the reasons behind the training being received, and (b) training in problem-solving.

In recent years both military and police personnel have found that the range of their training has greatly expanded. It no longer consists of just learning to fight the enemy or catch the criminal. Now both realize that their relationship with those they are pledged to serve is of great importance, both because those who are to be protected are the reason for the very existence of the military and police, but also, and more importantly, because the military and police can be far more effective when they are supported by the community. This argues for training in the understanding of the differences between subcultures, in respecting the rights and feelings of those being served, and in learning local languages. This may sound ‘soft’; however, the US Special Forces (the Green Berets), who are rated among the best trained and most effective military personnel, are, very specifically, taught to take appropriate initiative, to interact with local people with respect, and to learn the language of those with whom they interact.

The United Nations’ Peacekeeping Training Manual is for soldiers who are to serve as peacekeepers.¹⁵ There is a general belief that while training is necessary for military personnel assigned peacekeeping duty, retraining is required when soldiers return to more conventional assignments. Still, it seems clear that training in the minimum use of force and in techniques of negotiation are of general and ongoing value. Further, as a result of some unfortunate experiences, a manual has been prepared for peacekeepers on the proper relationship between them and, particularly, local women. Again, properly done and received, such training can contribute to the advancement of a culture of peace.¹⁶

In some countries the military and the police clearly take direction from civilian governments; in others the relationship is problematic; in still others the military is in fact the government whether up front or behind the scenes. No formula(e) can guarantee that guardians will restrict their activities to the guarding of citizens, but a variety of policy proposals should be considered. These include:

1. The abolition of military academies: have all military personnel pursue their education in public, civilian institutions.
2. The regular rotation of officers and seniors enlisted to avoid the development of personal over community loyalties.

3. Making military and police dependent on annual budgets provided by the government: no profit-making activity, no surpluses.

4. Making the bulk of military/police personnel short-termers, i.e. five years or less.

5. Drawing personnel from a cross-section of the community and, of course, removing the gender link from service. Again, forces should be neither all male nor all female.

Conclusion

A wise man noted that police and military forces must be strong enough to control any disruptive segment of society, but weak enough to give way before a unified citizenry. By extrapolation they must be strong enough to defend against an invader, but weak enough that they cannot invade. This brings us to the issue of impunity. The difference between Camus’ executioner and a guardian is that an executioner is invulnerable. An executioner wields power without risk. A guardian, though, assumes a risk on behalf of the community – and occasionally a guardian is sacrificed.

There is a natural desire to avoid sacrifice. But perfect protection of forces as well as citizens is impossible, and to seek it (perfect protection) leads to the acquisition of a massive, expensive, but essentially unusable force. Further, if one uses force on others from a position in which one is unassailable, one is, in essence, an executioner. In contrast, if one takes action with risk to oneself, it lends legitimacy to one’s action. One is more likely to be perceived as a guardian.

Again, in considering a culture of peace it is important to understand that such a culture cannot avert all injustice or danger, that terrible things will still happen (e.g. the massacre at Srebrenica); the measure of success is relative efficacy, not perfection.

In thinking about a culture of peace it is also tempting to focus on the (unilateral) violence women experience from men. The asymmetry is striking. But men also do terrible things to each other, legally, illegally and extra-legally, so it is important that men’s violence to men also be on the agenda.

Finally, it is important that peacebuilders have the capacity to take the same kind of strategic view as that taken by statesmen and military planners. This involves both the large-scale and the long-term view. It means not being diverted by miscues or even tragedies.

Most difficult of all, it is important to remember that most people who exercise force on behalf of the community do so with a clear conscience and with confidence that the roles they fill contribute directly to peace. Look again at the winners of the Nobel Peace Prize over the course of the twentieth century. Some have been non-violent peacebuilders (e.g. Jane Addams). Some have been organizations (e.g. the International Committee
of the Red Cross); but others have been masters of the application of force (e.g. Henry Kissinger). As we seek specific future actions, we must include the last group in our analysis. In so doing we need not agree with their particular analysis, especially if they prefer to exercise force without risk, that is, to be both invincible and invulnerable, for it is my argument that it is precisely impunity that turns guardians into executioners.

Notes

1. *Neither Victim Nor Executioner* is the title of a pamphlet by Albert Camus. I read it decades ago, and have never been able to retrieve it. I am certain of the title, but could be misremembering the precise content of the essay. I take it to mean that in our zeal to end victimization we must beware of creating (or becoming) a new source of impugn force. Indeed, Camus, writing in the context of occupied France, seemed to suggest that if one is prepared to take a life, one should be prepared to sacrifice one’s own life. This is an unorthodox version of the golden rule, but one that acknowledges that while it may not be possible to entirely end violence, if one expects to suffer what one inflicts, significant restraint could result.

2. I understand ‘legitimate violence’ to be that used by police and the military in the name of, on behalf of, and with the consent of a state, a community, a government.

3. Max Weber assigned a monopoly of legitimate violence to the state. However, it is evident that no state monopolizes violence, and that other sources of legitimate violence do exist in various societies, for example (almost?) everywhere parents hold authority which includes the right to use force on their children.

4. There is a good deal of literature on this subject, much of it built on the work of Nancy Chodorow. The brilliant Simone de Beauvoir, then, may have had it just backwards. While men may treat women as the second sex, it may be that it is they who are ‘the other’ and struggling for identity. And, Freud, too, may have had it backwards – as to just who it is that envies what.

5. In his widely reprinted essay, ‘The Moral Equivalent of War’, James (1971) addressed the value to society of discipline, responsibility, exertion, service – things that many men now find in the military. James argued the importance of preserving these values, while bringing them to bear on challenges with a more productive outcome than war.

6. This monopoly is quite constant across cultures. However, cultures typically also have a variety of ways in which men behave differently from women. Thus, to break men’s monopoly on the exercise of community force would not be to entirely undermine a culture’s definition of the masculine.

7. The problem addressing the difficulty of keeping protectors rather than predators is sometimes referred to as the ‘who will guard the guardians?’ problem.

8. Girls are probably taught that they will be rescued more than boys are taught that they should rescue. In tales like Cinderella, Snow White and Little Red Riding Hood rescued girls are the central character; such stories are more often read to girls than boys.


10. Detaching gender from the roles society creates to protect itself and its citizens is strongly recommended in the interests of advancing a culture of peace. It does not, however, resolve the problem of men’s need for a defining identity. It is possible that at some time in the future DNA testing’s capacity to establish fatherhood with certainty will elevate the importance and significance of fatherhood without requiring the excessive control, even cloistering, of adult women which too many experience today.
11. Shomer and Centers (1972) found that men were their most sexist in all-male groups, and were least sexist when confronted with one woman. Larger numbers of women may be perceived as a threat, as competition, and chivalry will almost certainly be reduced. Only when the proportion of women and men approaches a ratio of at least 1:2 or 2:3 is gender easily set aside. See Kanter, 1993.

12. Interestingly, women in all-women groups do not behave in a more feminine way, but men in all-male groups do seem to behave in a more masculine way.

13. A favourite story that illustrates the value of a heterogeneous force concerns American Navajo Indians who served during the Second World War. Because so few people knew their tribal language they were able to communicate freely over insecure communication lines.

14. The exemptions offered from military service by different countries at different times make an interesting study. Both the most and the least privileged tend to be able to secure exemptions.

15. Reference is to the second draft. The existence of a manual, of course, does not guarantee that it is used.

16. More than thirty nations now provide peacekeeping training for their own and other countries’ personnel. It has become an accepted part of military education.

17. Although the culture of peace is necessarily a holistic concept, it is hoped that participants at the Expert Group Meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities can develop an agreed-upon shortlist of concrete policy proposals. Even if they would not be sufficient to the creation of a culture of peace, working towards them gives supporters specific goals to pursue, and ensures that the issue of a culture of peace remains on the world’s agenda.

Bibliography
Introduction

A war that lasted a little more than a decade ended some years ago, but its duration was enough to create a marked tendency towards violence, in all its forms, in the young generations in El Salvador. The end of the war was achieved through a process of negotiation between the parties in dispute, but society remains divided along political and ideological lines. The topics of male roles and masculinities in the perspective of a culture of peace only became subjects of interest very recently.

As the process of democratization has moved into new phases (we have had two national elections), various groups have begun to identify their specific purpose in society from a perspective of civilian society. The political changes that took place in the country did not necessarily cause changes in gender relations.

The influence exerted by the women’s organizations, those that watch over the respect for human rights of both men and women, the campesino organizations, public opinion institutions, environmental organizations and the NGOs in raising the levels of consciousness and sensitivity towards a culture of peace, is fairly significant.

The Culture of Peace in El Salvador Programme, sponsored by UNESCO, has undoubtedly begun an unprecedented task, first, in transforming the culture of violence that continues to exist in our society and now adding the dimensions that sensitivity in gender equality can contribute to the programme’s objective.

Since the end of the armed conflict, it is definitely the women’s organizations that have participated the most actively in the Culture of Peace Programme, implemented civic activities in defence of their rights, and allowed the ‘women’s issue’ to gain ever more importance in society.

Today the conditions exist to enable men to discuss their masculinity and the roles that they should play in a new process of socialization that will
generate social processes towards gender equality within the framework of a culture of peace.

Masculine identity: why are men like this?
Physical and biological characteristics distinguish men from women and constitute the symbols of masculinity, of being male. This presentation will focus more on the characteristics that are socially constructed, the ones that we learn through the process of education and training in the family, in school and through the mass media. Through this process the difference between male (biological distinction) and masculine (socially constructed distinction) is established.

It is not surprising that one of the principles of the culture of peace is: ‘All human beings are equal by nature’. But socially? In terms of how the genders are formed socially, the patriarchal society makes a distinction from the moment of birth: ‘If the woman bears a son, the family wins a chicken.’ The midwives charge more if it is a boy.

In the family unit the new citizen learns to be a man or a woman. Boys and girls are taught the traditional roles that will distinguish them as such: boys learn not to cry, to be tough, to play at war.

The advice of parents to their male children when another child hits them is as follows: ‘You have to defend yourself by fighting so they’ll respect you. If they hit you, return the blow.’ Violence is promoted in regard to other male children, but the son is also a victim of violence when he’s bad: ‘You have to hit a child when he’s bad in order to put him on the right road.’

When children get to their first level of schooling (pre-school) the family’s socialization process already exerts its influence. ‘Boys are restless and aggressive in their play.’ In both social institutions being violent is legitimated. In school, ‘boys prefer rough games and without girls’. Even though the place of learning is for both sexes.

Thanks to the expansion of technology the influence of the mass media begins at a very early age through television programmes of cartoons and movies with a large content of violence which directs the process of socialization.

We cannot overlook social, political and economic factors. They are topics to be examined on another occasion in the future. Young children learn the values that will distinguish them as one gender or the other. It is undeniable that at an early age each one of these factors contributes to ‘moulding’ the human being.

We have learned to recognize women as different and inferior, making these traits normal and natural within society. We must also consider that in different cultures certain characteristics may not be considered as masculine or feminine. In general terms, there must be common traits that constitute the distinction between genders. In the process of social construction, men are moulded into the following characteristics:
• Sense of property, which permits domination and control over other persons, especially women and girls, and extends itself into the political sphere.
• Rational intelligence, which establishes a personality prepared for decision-making, for being competitive, hard-working, sharp and less inclined to be led by emotions.
• Freedom, as a right that belongs to men, comprising both sexual and social freedom.
• Physical force, which establishes attitudes of not showing fear, not crying and not complaining, but of being provocative, resistant, hitting, challenging.

Due to the process of socialization those characteristics that are considered feminine are rejected for men: fragility, affection, consideration, tenderness, soft-spokenness, etc.

**Does masculine ‘superiority’ exist?**

In informal discussion circles among men about masculinity, the following conclusion was reached:

> We are equal as human beings . . . in our ability to think, to do physical labour, in our ability to carry out intellectual tasks, in intelligence (although men have the privilege of choosing to study), in our capacity to have feelings, in relation to sexual pleasure and desire, in taking initiative, having talents and decision-making power.

Masculine superiority is a social fabrication in which patriarchal society moulds the new member from the moment of his birth. This vision should not be patented as a desirable characteristic of masculinity for the next millennium.

**And what about violence?**

To speak of violence in a country that has just ended a conflagration where homage was paid to it is redundant. Nevertheless, a type of violence hidden by El Salvador’s experiences during the 1980s and early 1990s is still latent in regard to the violence that men exert against women, children and other men. This is the topic of our attention.

Despite the political changes and the implementation of a culture of peace, gender relations must also be a factor that guarantees, on a daily basis, the values of democracy, tolerance, non-discrimination, equality, etc.

This violence is carried out with a level of impunity that is characteristic of a social construction that takes violence for granted as a necessary measure, and it is at the heart of the family where it is seen every day. This violence has various ways of manifesting itself, from child abuse to mistreatment of spouses and even of the elderly; in addition to being exerted physically, it can also be psychological.
All men, without exception, have been victims of, and have exerted, violence at different times in their lives and in various forms. As children and young men they experienced discrimination and physical and psychological violence. They learned that these were ‘legitimate’ forms of treating their wives and children. It is part of their formation as men in our society, and in general we have not thought very much about whether it is ethical or moral behaviour, or even contradicts the principles of a culture of peace.

In the family unit, the majority of children’s games imply violence, teach corresponding values, attitudes and behaviour. Through play, violence is evident in various forms: verbal, moral, physical and psychological. During their childhood, boys even prefer violent and competitive games that stimulate rivalry. They discover at a very early age that exerting violence during games that they imitate, guarantees them status, respect, control and power. For this reason, they are very discriminatory, they isolate the weak, marginalize those that do not play well, and also women.

To give an example: on the town feast-days in Nejapa (a city in El Salvador) the game *La Recuerda* (‘The Memory’) is considered a custom of their ancestors. The game consists of forming two groups of young men and boys who fight against each other, not allowing the rival group to advance into their territory and to prevent it, they throw balls of fire. In this way, the eruption of a volcano is commemorated.

A very common example in our culture is: ‘Breaking the *piñata*’ which is played to celebrate children’s birthdays. The game consist of hitting a papier-mâché figure of an animal or a cartoon character with a big stick; the attraction for the children is that there are candies inside. As the *piñata* is hit repeatedly, it loses resistance and slowly lets out its contents. Very young children do not enjoy the celebration; on the contrary, they cry and do not want the *piñata* to be mistreated. Their reaction denotes frustration since they do not understand why the adults are hitting the animal figures.

The same logic applies to electronic games. The games with the greatest content of violence are those with the greatest demand in the population who use them (children, teenagers and even adults). In the opinion of the consumers, games without these components are ‘boring’; a comment like that reveals that violence has replaced action.

It is not a question of not playing; children’s games are an important part of socialization. The current orientation rewards the strong and violent because it tends to imitate more closely the roles that characterize men. It is more a question of reorienting the nature of children’s games so that they become an instrument of the society that builds values in accordance with a culture of peace.

This framework of socialization is consolidated and during adolescence is expressed in different ways among the young population. Phenomena such as student or youth gangs (very widespread in recent years) are difficult challenges even for the formal education system and for the
authorities in charge of law and order. The initiation ritual consists of the new member tolerating a beating by the youth group and being willing to fight other youths and/or students in order to defend himself and establish superiority and domination over other youth groups.

Violence is learnt. To justify it, it is argued that in the animal domain, the stronger survives. However, paraphrasing Simone de Beauvoir, I would say: ‘We are not born violent, we are made violent.’ In other words, we learn to act as men.

The same way we have learned to be violent, we can also unlearn violence and question ourselves, with the aim of making changes on a personal level which transcend the political and social arenas.

It is not surprising that most men have a passive, tolerant attitude, and even one of complicity towards violence against women. In the face of this, various movements of women’s organizations have established strategies of self-defence against rape, physical mistreatment, sexual abuse, etc. What has not existed is an effort on the part of men to accompany those efforts.

This is an opportunity for the Culture of Peace Programme to promote a new form of social co-existence, that is to say, to make it a custom, a habit and the norm to incorporate these new values into the identities of nations.

Conclusion
We must aspire to building processes of socialization of the new generations within a framework of gender sensitivity where the culture of peace prevails over violence (against women, children and other men) without discrimination, establishing relations of equality and justice, not only in the rights recognized by states among their citizens, but also in daily life, in schools, workplaces and within government.

Despite the efforts of recent years by various organizations, and despite official recognition of the problem of equal rights, the role of women is still being discussed and debated at a worldwide level. Specific policies regarding women have been established; these efforts are important but they limit themselves to the public sphere, while in the private sphere, in the family, the values they claim to be eradicating are reproduced.

I would conclude with a quote from Francisco José Lacayo in his publication, *A Culture of Peace, A Viable ‘Utopia’, Urgent and Necessary*: ‘The challenge is not only in institutionalizing but also in interiorizing all of these values, attitudes, norms, behaviour models, etc. So that they become part of the personality of each one of the citizens.’

Case-study
The women’s movement, with so little time to seek its own feminist vindications, tries to have a sensitizing effect in mainly masculine arenas, in order to facilitate the process of change in a patriarchal society.
In this respect, we have the Association of Women for Life and Dignity,\(^2\) one of whose objectives is to sensitize and legitimize the topic of equity and gender equality.

What follows is an example of the experience that Ana Cisneros (member of Las Dignas) has in sensitizing agents of the National Civil Police (PNC) of San Jacinto, a sector of San Salvador.

We began the sensitivity sessions on sexist violence with twenty-eight agents of the PNC (National Civil Police), among them two women. From the beginning, they were completely disposed towards learning and unlearning the behaviour that we all know exists, even though the uniforms and shined shoes hide it. We realized that it was necessary to change erroneous procedures and concepts of police work: those that tend to blame the woman in cases of rape or abuse. A blame that society has sown within the women, for example, the propagation of the myth, false, of course, that we (women) are those who provoke sexual aggression by the way we dress. And in reviewing this behaviour, we also looked at the feminine fears and emotional and/or economic dependencies on husbands or companions.

In these working groups the participating agents registered significant childhood memories: the mistreatment and abuse that they grew up with, as well as being able to recognize the marks of resentment for the social mandate that they should be the all-powerful heads of the family unit.

The reflections on these memories produced the conclusion that ‘men’ transformed into ‘machos’ play the role of executioners in their homes, and that this role by no means makes them more manly.

This effort that was begun in January 1997 continues and has been fruitful. The PNC (Police) of San Jacinto is doing follow-up on four Protection Orders issued by a judge so that the aggressors abstain from harassing, threatening and using the material goods of their families. There is also a favourable disposition towards beginning to keep a file of sexist violence – the PNC as an institution has never taken it into account – to make an effort to provide the necessary support for women who are mistreated, to carry out house patrols and provide women with official claim papers in order to file their cases.

In the interview with the author of the article, she mentioned the concern of the agents centred on perfecting the compliance with police procedures in cases of mistreatment of women. Despite the interest and human sensitivity shown by some of the agents, when they took their uniforms off and returned home, they reproduced the patriarchal values.

In the interviewee’s opinion, there was no doubt that if the sensitizing were to be done by men speaking about masculinity, the reception on the part of the agents would be better.
Notes

1. There are meetings of men whose life companions are women who belong to the feminist movement. As a product of the daily interchange within the couple, they have seen the need to discuss the topic also from the perspective of men.

2. Better known as Las Dignas.
I should like to begin with two ‘texts’, two very different images of men and their relationship to violence. First, I’d like you to close your eyes and picture the following scenes, scenes which will no doubt be familiar from newspapers or television news. What gender comes into your mind when I mention the sneering, arrogant guards at the border crossings in Bosnia, the caravans of jeeps and trucks following their warlords in Somalia, the cheering throngs that hear of yet another terrorist bombing or attack in the Basque country, the youths slinging their automatic weapons as they swagger down the streets of bombed-out Beirut?

Now, what gender comes to your mind when I invoke the following significant social problems that today haunt the United States, Europe and other advanced metropolitan countries – teenage violence, urban violence, gang violence, drug-related violence, violence in the schools?

Chances are you’ve imagined men. And not just any men, but younger men, men in their teens and twenties, and men of a specific social class – poor, working class, or lower middle class.

Now think again about the ways in which we understand those social and political movements, those violent outbursts of ethnic nationalist hatred. Do the commentators ever even mention that these are phalanxes of young men? Now imagine that these were all women, would that not be the story, the issue to be explained? Would not a gender analysis be the centre of every single story? The fact that these are men seems so obvious as to raise no questions, to generate no analysis.

Of course, I want to comment upon it. But first, listen to the voice of another young man, this one a 23-year-old stock boy named Jay in a San Francisco corporation, who was asked by author Tim Beneke to think about under what circumstances he might commit rape. He has never committed rape, mind you. He’s simply an average guy, considering the circumstances under which he would commit an act of violence against a woman. Here’s what Jay says:
Let’s say I see a woman and she looks really pretty and really clean and sexy and she’s giving off very feminine, sexy vibes. I think, wow I would love to make love to her, but I know she’s not interested. It’s a tease. A lot of times a woman knows that she’s looking really good and she’ll use that and flaunt it and it makes me feel like she’s laughing at me and I feel degraded. If I were actually desperate enough to rape somebody it would be from wanting that person, but also it would be a very spiteful thing, just being able to say I have power over you and I can do anything I want with you because really I feel that they have power over me just by their presence. Just the fact that they can come up to me and just melt me makes me feel like a dummy, makes me want revenge. They have power over me so I want power over them.

Notice how the stock boy speaks not with the voice of someone in power, of someone in control over his life, but rather with the voice of powerlessness, of helplessness. For him, violence is a form of revenge, a form of retaliation, of getting even, a compensation for the power that he feels women have over him.

Let’s stay with Jay for a moment. His words are the words of someone who does not see himself as powerful, but as powerless. And I think that perspective has been left out of our analyses of men’s violence, both at the interpersonal, micro-level of individual acts of men’s violence against women (rape and battery, for example) and the aggregate, social and political analysis of violence expressed at the level of the nation-state, the social movement, or the military institution.

How do we typically see men’s violence? We see it as the expression of men’s power, of men’s drive for power, for domination, for control. Now this makes a certain sense, because most of the theorizing about men’s violence has been done by feminist women. And feminist women have understood men’s propensity for violence from the perspective of those against whom that violence has so often been directed. So men’s violence — whether against women or against national enemies — has been theorized as an expression of men’s drive for domination, a senseless need for power. Mass rape in Bosnia is theorized as an expression of men’s desperate need to control; gang warfare as an expression of men needing to dominate their territory.

So we understand masculinity as the drive for power, domination and control. Many of us have accepted that definition and used it in our work. Some, like myself, have even taken it on the road, giving talks about how men have all the power and how we have to give up that power to make the world equal for women. What happens when we say that?

Well, if your experience is anything like mine, it looks like this. The women sit there and nod appreciatively, in agreement. The men raise their hands. ‘What are you talking about?’ they ask. ‘I have no power at all! My wife bosses me around! My kids boss me around! My boss bosses me around! I’m completely powerless!’
In their eyes, the feminist definition of masculinity as a drive for power and domination is theorized from the women’s perspective. It’s how women experience masculinity. And, in that sense, it’s right. But it’s not how men experience their masculinity. Men do not feel as though they are in power. Individual men feel powerless.

I think that is the reason why some anti-feminist groups have gained such popularity in the United States and elsewhere. Men’s rights groups argue that those feelings of powerlessness are true, and that women, these days, have all the power. ‘Let’s get it back!’ they shout. And Robert Bly and his mythopoetic minions have the same perspective. If you feel like you have no power, you have no power. Come with us, we’ll get some. Here’s the power stick, the power drum, the power chant. To me this is like American yuppies in the 1980s wearing power ties and eating power lunches. These are not the activities of the powerful, but of those who feel powerless. Only the powerless would think that power was consumable, or a fashion accessory.

I think the voices of the men tell us something important. Their sense that they are powerless is real, as they experience it, but it may not be true that it is an accurate analysis of their situation.

What it also points to is the theoretical inadequacy of simply focusing on whether or not men have power, and whether or not men feel powerful. Of course men are in power – both as a group over women, and some men, by virtue of class, race, sexuality or any other dynamic of difference – over other men.

Masculinity is not, however, the experience of power; it is the experience of entitlement to power. Let me illustrate this with an anecdote from my life. I recently appeared on a television talk show opposite three ‘angry white males’, three men who felt that they had been the victims of workplace discrimination. The show’s title, no doubt to entice a large potential audience, was *A Black Woman Took My Job*. In my comments to these angry men, I invited them to consider what the word ‘my’ meant in that title, that they felt that the jobs were originally ‘theirs’, that they were entitled to them, and that when some ‘other’ person – black, female – got the job, that person was really taking ‘their’ job. But by what right is that their job? By convention, by a historical legacy of such profound levels of discrimination that we have needed decades of affirmative action to even begin to make slightly more level a playing field that has tilted so decidedly in one direction.

Or, consider the story of Iron John, now made so famous by Robert Bly. In the legend, there are four male characters: the little boy and three kings: the boy’s father, the father of his chosen bride, and, of course, Iron John himself, who turns out to be a great king as well. At every mythopoetic gathering, discussion group, retreat or conference where the work was discussed, virtually all the middle-aged men present – most of whom are themselves fathers – identify with the young boy. And it’s obvious that the
author does as well, punctuating his narration with occasional recollections of his own father. No one identifies with the father, the king, but with the son, the little prince.

What are we to make of this? Well, who is the prince? He is the man who is entitled to be in power but who is not yet in power. He is entitled to power, but feels powerless.

It is from this place – shall we call it the ‘inner prince’ – that I believe men speak, a place of gnawing anxiety, a place of entitlement unfulfilled. No wonder men are defensive when we present feminism to them – it feels like they will be forced to give up this sense of entitlement (as well, of course, as the rewards that are promised to follow directly upon its achievement). Feminism, to men, feels like loss – a loss of the possibility to claim their birthright of power. And violence may be more about getting the power to which you feel you’re entitled than an expression of the power you already think you have.

This model of violence as the result of a breakdown of patriarchy, of entitlement thwarted, has become the bedrock of therapeutic work with violent men. Again and again, what research on rape, on domestic violence finds is that men initiate violence when they feel a loss of power to which they feel entitled. Thus he hits her when she fails to have the dinner ready, when she refuses to meet his sexual demands, that is, when his power over her has broken down; not when she has dinner ready or is willing to have sex, which are, after all, expressions of his power and its legitimacy.

And just as men become violent individually when they experience the breakdown of patriarchal power, when they feel the loss of their entitlement, so, too, do men become violent collectively, in social movements of men. In particular, they become violent in the atavistic expressions of ethnicity, racism, and nationalism that today tear the global community apart. If what I have been exploring is what we might call the social psychology of gendered violence, let me now try to raise the political and moral economy of men’s violence expressed at a national or local political level. Let me try to establish the links between ethnic nationalist violence and urban gang violence, on the one hand, and this social psychology of entitlement, on the other.

Let’s begin with the demographics. Who exactly are these young men who form the columns of ethnic nationalist soldiers? They are not only young men, but they are young, fairly-well-educated sons of the lower middle class. Their fathers are the artisans, small shopkeepers, craftsmen who populate the urban marketplaces, who set up shop as independent producers, the petty bourgeoisie. They experience domestic patriarchy at home, and economic autonomy and fraternal community at work. And what about their sons – the sons, who expected that the words ‘and son’ would one day swing over the door of their father’s shop; the sons, who expected to
experience the same economic autonomy as independent producers as their fathers who felt entitled to it and who felt entitled to be the kings of their own castle?

Perhaps the most significant result of economic globalization has been the worldwide squeezing of this lower middle class, its proletarianization. These young men face an uncertain economic future, a future in which, if they are lucky, they will obtain jobs in their own home town. But in factories, not in shops of their own. Ethnic nationalism gives voice to the inchoate economic fears of lower-middle-class men as they face the proletarianization that accompanies incorporation into the global economy. The fathers are incapable of shielding their sons from this; the fathers’ control is weakened as they capitulate to the state. The disintegration of material resources of domestic patriarchy leads to the rebellion of the sons. As Barrington Moore argued almost three decades ago, the real revolutionaries are not drawn from those social groups on the rise, but rather represent the cry of those over whom history is about to roll.

I am suggesting that ethnic nationalist violence is the expression of a gendered protest against proletarianization by lower-middle-class younger men. Thus it would follow empirically that ethnic nationalist violence is likely to erupt in regions where traditions of local and regional autonomy were abridged by centripetal political machines emanating from centralizing states, as well as where traditions of local craft autonomy have been subsumed within larger patterns of global economic development. Participants have been those economic actors who had enjoyed historical traditions of autonomy – the lower middle classes of artisans, skilled workers and tradesmen, who dominate urban craft production, and the entrepreneurs and small shopkeepers who dominate local urban trade. In Iran, for example, the backbone of the revolutionary movement was the lower-middle-class shopkeepers, the bazaar owners, as well as the students. This is also the case among the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Basque movement included shopkeepers and small-scale businessmen and skilled workers. Members of ETA were virtually all young men (the average age at induction was 24), educated (over 40 per cent had some university training), who were the sons of artisans and lower-middle-class shopkeepers whose upward mobility was blocked by the region’s economic dependence (see Clark, 1984, p. 145). In American cities, ethnic and racial violence is almost invariably the work of young men whose economic mobility is thwarted, and who often articulate a gendered political discourse of that projected downward mobility, even as the media continue to observe their behaviour in racial terms. Wherever nationalist movements set up shop, it is these frustrated young men who are the shopkeepers.

In the Baltic states, as well, it was the skilled workers and small-scale merchants who composed the rank-and-file of the independence movements. And it is often younger men – students, the young men preparing as
apprentices to local craftsmen, the teenage sons who would have taken over their fathers’ small shops – who compose the largest group of movement members. It is they who were raised to expect the same economic autonomy that characterized the world of their fathers, and it is they who face the uncertain and tenuous future as proletarians, at best, and itinerant migrant workers or unemployed (and thus emasculated) men at worst.

Couple this with the ways in which the history of the nation-state in the West has been the progressive appropriation of the means of violence by the state, and the result is particularly explosive. This process has always left a cadre of young males resentful, especially when the traditional avenues of expressing their manhood – economic autonomy, control over their own labour, a sense of a secure place in a local political and social community – were eroded by state centralization and proletarianization. This resentment can turn to rage against that centralizing state. ‘Once,’ they will say, ‘we were kings. But now they have made us pawns.’

What better way to channel that energy than to cast state policies as authoritarian paternalism, its policies emasculating and feminizing, and thus brandish weapons as a way to assert a claim to ‘righteous’ manhood? (Contemporary Serbs say that Tito ‘was a woman’; his programmes of national integration were emasculating.) Ethnic nationalism is the rebellion of the sons against the regime of the father, who is depicted as either emasculated by dependence on the superpowers, or as emasculating his sons, who therefore carry the hope and future of the traditionally glorious and now-suppressed nation. In these deeply structural ways, then all nationalisms are gendered.

Such processes are exacerbated by patterns of immigration, particularly that of young male workers from developing countries to the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe and the United States. The immigration of disproportionate numbers of younger males, clustered in ethnic enclaves in major industrial cities, heightens political and economic tensions experienced by both the new migrants and older, more established lower-middle-class males, who see increased economic competition in an already tightening labour market.

Of course, it can be pointed out, rightly, that these men receive significant support from women. But the gender composition of ethnic nationalist violence is only a small part of the story. (On the other hand, had these movements been composed entirely of women, gender would have been virtually the only story.) Far more significant is the gender ideology, the meanings of manhood that are being played out through ethnic violence. To ignore this would be to fail to listen to the voices of the participants themselves. They frequently use a gendered language that speaks about how ‘they’ would not let ‘us’ be men to take care of our families, have the jobs we were raised to expect, experience the control, power, authority, we wanted, and which we were assured was our destiny. How such a language is
corrupted into the rapacious nihilism of warlordism or the systematic terror of ethnic cleansing is one of the more profound political and moral questions of our time.

There is another way to frame that question. Instead of focusing on what we are doing wrong, perhaps it also makes sense to discuss what other societies are doing right. Can it be otherwise? Why do some societies not experience this same violence of the entitled younger men? Thus far, I have used social psychology and political economy to sketch some of the dimensions of the problem. To think about alternatives, we turn first to anthropology.

Some twenty years ago, anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday proposed a continuum of propensity to commit rape upon which all societies could be plotted from rape-prone to rape-free. (For the curious, by the way, the United States was ranked as a highly rape-prone society, Norway as a highly rape-free society.) Sanday found that the best single predictors of rape-proneness were: (a) whether the woman continued to own property in her own name after marriage, a measure of women’s autonomy; and (b) the father’s involvement in child-rearing, a measure of how valued are parenting and women’s work.

Some ten years ago, Norwegian social anthropologists Signe Howell and Roy Willis posed the obverse question: What can we learn from peaceful societies? In their fascinating collection, ‘Societies at Peace’, they suggested several fruitful themes. For one thing, they found that the definition of masculinity had a significant impact on the propensity towards violence. In those societies in which men were permitted to acknowledge fear, levels of violence were low. In those societies, however, where masculine bravado, the repression and denial of fear, was a defining feature of masculinity, violence was likely to be high. It turns out that those societies in which such bravado is prescribed for men are also those in which the definitions of masculinity and femininity are very highly differentiated.

Thus, for example, Joanna Overing tells us that in the Amazon jungle, the extremely violent Shavante define manhood as ‘sexual bellicosity’, a state both superior and opposed to femininity, while their peaceful neighbouring Piaroas define manhood and womanhood as the ability to co-operate tranquilly with others in daily life.

In sum, these are a few of the themes that anthropologists have isolated as leading towards both interpersonal violence and inter-societal violence:

- The ideal for manhood is the fierce and handsome warrior.
- Public leadership is associated with male dominance, both of men over other men and of men over women.
- Women are prohibited from public and political participation.
- Most public interaction is between men, not between men and women or among women.
• Boys and girls are systematically separated from an early age.
• Initiation of boys is focused on lengthy constraint of boys, during which time the boys are separated from women, taught male solidarity, bellicosity, and endurance, and trained to accept the dominance of older groups of men.
• Emotional displays of male virility, ferocity and sexuality are highly elaborated.
• The ritual celebration of fertility focuses on male generative ability, not female ones.
• Male economic activities and the products of male labour are prized over female.

Taken together, these works provide a series of possible policy-oriented goals towards which we might look if we are to reduce the amount of gendered violence in society. First, it seems clear that the less gender differentiation between women and men, the less likely will be gendered violence. This means the more men can be seen like women – nurturing, caring, frightened – and the more women can be seen like men – capable, rational, competent in the public sphere – the more likely that aggression will take other routes besides gendered violence.

Men’s violence towards women is the result of entitlement thwarted; men’s violence towards other men often derives from the same thwarted sense of entitlement. I would propose a curvilinear relationship between male-to-male violence and male violence against women and the entitlement to patriarchal power. To find peaceful societies one should look for those cultures in which entitlement to power is either not thwarted or not present. Thus, societies with the least male–male gendered violence would be those in which patriarchy is either intact and unquestioned, or those in which it is hardly present at all, and has not been for some time.

To diminish men’s violence against women, and to reduce the violent confrontations that take place in the name of such mythic entities as nation, people, religion, or tribe, we must confront the separation of symbolic and structural spheres. Women’s involvement in public life is as important as men’s involvement in parenting. And the definition of masculinity must be able to acknowledge a far wider range of emotions, including fear, without having that identity as a man threatened. And we must develop mechanisms to dislodge men’s sense of identity from that false sense of entitlement.

The value of anthropological comparisons is that it provides documentation that it need not be this way, that it can be otherwise. It gives empirical solidity to our hopes, a non-utopian concreteness to our vision. Making it otherwise, however, will require dramatic transformations, in the ideal definition of what it means to be a man, and the cultural prescriptions that govern the relationships between men and between women and men.

Some 250 years ago, the British moral philosopher David Hume wrote the following in his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*:
Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men who were entirely divested of vice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies.

Hume’s remarks both remind us of the cynicism with which our ideas are likely to be met, and suggest the possibility that such a world remains within our grasp.

**Bibliography**

V a l u e s e d u c a t i o n t o w a r d s a c u l t u r e o f p e a c e

Lourdes R. Quisumbing

Introduction to UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Project

UNESCO was built on a hope and a promise expressed in the preamble of its charter that ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.’ Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO, wrote in the Foreword of the UNESCO Medium Term Strategy, 1996–2001:

After 50 years – let it be said at once – that objective is far from being attained now that conflicts within nations are supplanting wars between states. . . . Indeed, peace has found havens here and there, but its defences are still weapons and in many instances, they are nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

While it is true that peace has been built gradually in those societies that have succeeded in maintaining their cohesion and progress in the observance of human rights, in building democratic structures and in ensuring that the fruits of development are shared fairly, many of these societies still face the threats of those pervasive enemies of unemployment, poverty and exclusion. Even where tolerance used to be the rule, racist xenophobic tendencies and ethnic and religious conflicts are asserting themselves. Added threats to our human security today are environmental degradation, urban decay, rural decline, arms and drug trafficking, breakdown of law and order, terrorism, erosion of moral values, and the total loss of respect for human life and dignity.

UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Project is, in a very real sense, today’s expression of the Organization’s original mandate and mission.

Building a culture of peace is a dynamic, complex and multi-dimensional process which involves changing values, beliefs and behaviours. It consists of overcoming prejudices and intolerance within the minds and hearts of every human person in all nations and in the global community; denouncing all forms of violence and of leading society away from cruelty
and inhumanity towards a genuine capacity of learning to live together in harmony. It embraces the total human environment and the whole complex of features, material and non-material, that characterize a group in the search for peaceful solutions to conflict and ways to promote the total welfare of its individual members without discrimination as to gender, religion, language, occupation or status.

A culture of peace recognizes and respects all cultures in their diversity, and at the same time seeks a common understanding of what encompasses a shared vision of peace that leads to a more just and free, more democratic and human world order. A genuine culture of peace is founded on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights and the dignity of the human person. It cherishes and values ‘otherness’ and promotes tolerance, the virtue that paves the way for the transition from the culture of war and violence to a genuine and sustainable culture of peace.

The importance of values education for equality and peace

Change in values, attitudes and behaviour, albeit a difficult process, can take place through some meaningful experiences and interaction with others, through structured experiential learning exercises, the formal school curriculum, or continuing education in a learning society.

UNESCO’s Medium Term Strategy for 1996–2001 states that:

Education is at the heart of any strategy for peacebuilding. It is through education that the individual acquires the values, skills and knowledge needed to build a solid basis of respect for human rights and democratic principles and the complete rejection of violence, intolerance and discrimination.

History teaching for example can be an excellent vehicle for values education and mutual understanding, especially between neighbouring countries, provided that it does not confine itself to extolling the national identity to the unfair exclusion of others. Thus, promoting historical research and the sharing of historical knowledge can serve as a sound basis for developing national identity and pride in one’s own heritage as well as mutual understanding and acceptance of other cultures. Art and music and other forms of cultural expressions are likewise potent vehicles for values education.

Alongside educational institutions, the media exert a tremendous influence on the formation of attitudes, judgements and values and are a powerful venue for value formation and attitude change.

The importance of education for tolerance and peace is reiterated in UNESCO’s Declaration of Principles on Tolerance adopted and proclaimed in Paris, by the world community of Member States on 16 November 1995, during the solemn occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations and the founding of UNESCO. The Declaration states that education is the most effective means of preventing intolerance. The
first step in tolerance education is to teach people what their shared rights and freedoms are, so that they may be respected and to promote protection of the rights of others.

Education for tolerance which is the key to peace should be considered an urgent imperative. Hence, it is necessary to promote systematic and holistic methods of teaching tolerance that will address the cultural, social, economic, political and religious sources of intolerance, major roots of violence and exclusion. Education policies and programmes should contribute to development of understanding, solidarity and tolerance among individuals as well as among ethnic, social, cultural, religious and linguistic groups and nations.

Education for tolerance and international understanding should aim at countering influences that lead to fear and exclusion of others, and should help young people to develop capacities for independent judgement, critical thinking and ethical reasoning. It must likewise give importance to the development of the affective faculty: the ability to love and to value what is beautiful, right and just. The education of the heart is the heart of education.

Special attention must be devoted to improving teacher training, curricula, the content of textbooks and lessons, and other educational materials including new educational technologies and the valuing process with a view to educating caring and responsible citizens open to other cultures, able to appreciate the value of freedom, respectful of human dignity and differences and able to prevent conflicts or resolve them by non-violent means.

Education must be directed to the development of the whole human person, the intellect, the emotions and the will, and should include concepts, values and skills for peace, respect for human rights and democracy. The formal education curriculum, which has emphasized knowledge and skills but neglected values, attitudes and behaviour, needs to seek innovative ways to introduce values education in the curriculum based on the culture of peace values, as it conveys knowledge about the possibilities and obstacles to peace, and the particular skills of peacebuilding and peacemaking and non-violent resolution of conflicts. Such knowledge, values and skills must be integral to education at all levels and in all areas.

In 1988, the Philippines introduced a national values education programme offering values education as a separate subject in the secondary-school curriculum and integrating it in all subject areas of elementary schools. Higher education opened college courses for teacher training in values education. This move was considered necessary after the overthrow of the dictatorial regime on the realization that transformation of Philippine society would not be possible unless individuals change their values and behaviour. The historic, non-violent people-power revolt at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) is an unfinished revolution because personal and social transformation is a lifelong process.
The Philippine Human Rights Education programme for the armed forces and the police is a fine example of how change can take place through experiential learning. It is based on the theory that behaviour modification in adult life is possible through ‘intensive’ training and re-education. In this case, the aim was to change their role perception as warriors to peacekeepers and peacemakers, with the co-operation of academia and non-government agencies. Experiential training, values education, structured exercises and informal dialogues in non-confrontational situations gave the military new exposures and experiences in peaceful non-violent conflict resolution and management, tolerance and peace activities. This holistic transformational approach to human-rights education was intended to make the soldier, the policeman, and peacekeeping forces realize their inner worth as human persons and to respect the inherent dignity of others, leading to the building of a culture of peace.

Education for a culture of peace is education in its widest sense, involving not only schools and educational institutions but all social spheres where people continually learn. Values education should be pursued within the context of an emerging global village and the realities of interdependence that transcend the concept of separate and distinct societies viewed by their members within the inside-outside paradigm. Since the new reality is that the global society is but one unit, all are essentially ‘insiders’ and education must help to develop consciousness of this interdependence which can serve as a deterrent to violence.

If our goal is to transform the culture of war to a culture of peace, all sectors of society must be willing to accept and bring about change in our attitudes and our behaviours. Peace educators advocate the transformational approach. Betty Reardon (1988) writes:

The transformational approach seeks a larger, more comprehensive goal: the rejection of all violence, not just arms races and war. The goal of the transformational approach is to make violence unacceptable, not only in interactions among individuals but also in interactions among nations, and to make violent consequences unacceptable in foreign policy planning. The changes sought are behavioural and institutional but also, and primarily, changes in thinking and in the formation of values. It is the transformational approach that, in my view, holds the most promise for the future of peace education.

To sum up, peace education must be holistic and integrated, educating the whole person’s intellect, emotions and will, in the context of lifelong education in a learning society. The valuing process of freely choosing values, internalizing them and translating them into behaviour is as important as the content of education. One does not teach about peace but must educate for peace.
The crucial role of the socialization process in gender equity and peace

It is in this light that this chapter emphasizes the crucial role of the socialization process through which an individual imbibes and internalizes attitudes, values and behaviours at the earliest formative stages of childhood in the context of the primary social group he or she belongs to – the family.

The role of the socialization process in the family and of women as mothers and first teachers of children must be addressed in our efforts towards equality, tolerance and peace. The family is the first environment through which a culture of peace, which can be achieved only within the context of mutual respect and equality between women and men, can be transmitted and internalized. What happens in the domestic realm lays the groundwork for building either peace and tolerance or violence and discrimination in the larger society.

Role definitions of what a child, a girl or a boy, a woman or a man should be are socially and culturally determined. Consequently, they represent the norms and expectations of what one should be and how one should behave. Child-rearing practices of parents, especially mothers, or parent surrogates determine what is considered appropriate or inappropriate for men or for women, what are desirable or undesirable responses to conflicts, differences and grievances. Hence, gender inequality, superiority and dominance of boys over girls begin almost unconsciously in the mind. The sanction system of reward and punishment reinforces values and behaviours, such as submission and resignation to injustice and discrimination, or retaliation and revenge, or the search for peaceful, non-violent ways to resolve conflicts.

Thus, the importance of child-rearing during the most formative stage of the individual cannot be overemphasized, because it is during this period that basic knowledge, values and attitudes are acquired. The family, which includes both parents, mothers and fathers, all adult care-takers and the siblings, is the primary socializing agent. Consciously or otherwise, it is the first school and the first determinant of personality.

This chapter supports the view that masculine and feminine roles are more socially and culturally prescribed than biologically determined. Differences and diversities existing among men and women are complementary rather than exclusionary. It espouses equality, not uniformity; partnership not superiority or inferiority; empowerment of the sexes, not dominance or submission of one sex over the other.

Peace educators assert that tradition-bound and culturally determined stereotypes of gender roles, male and female, masculinity and femininity, can be changed through values education using the transformational approach.

The thesis of this chapter is that gender roles and differentiation, perceptions of equality or inequality, acceptance or discrimination, dominance
or submission, have their roots in the early socialization process within the family. Taking place within the context of a particular society and culture, patterns of upbringing children, young boys and girls, are the result of parental norms and expectations.

Cultural definitions of an ideal child, a ‘good boy or girl’, qualities desirable in a man or woman, what is meant to be masculine or feminine and the subsequent sex differentiation of tasks, treatment, rewards and punishments, behavioural norms, values and attitudes determine patterns of child-rearing and personality traits.

More egalitarian family structures and decision-making patterns result in more partnership-oriented male and female roles, less differentiated and less discriminatory treatment of the sexes, more tolerant behaviour, more peaceful resolution of conflicts and more harmonious relationships.

Lessons can be learned from studies of family practices in various cultures, by identifying and reinforcing child-rearing patterns that are conducive to equality and peace, respect of differences, and appreciation of every individual’s dignity and contribution to the group, or by minimizing and changing those that generate attitudes of unfair or unjust treatment of the sexes, leading to intolerance and violence.

Early socialization of boys and girls in traditional and rural or in transitional and modernizing societies like those in the Philippines and other countries contains features which are supportive of equality, justice and peace. Philippine mythology tells the creation story of how the first man and the first woman came out together, not the male ahead of the female, from a single bamboo when it split into two, suggesting unity, equality and complementarity. Empirical evidence shows that Philippine family decision-making patterns are egalitarian, not patriarchal or matriarchal, giving equal importance to males and females, husbands and wives, features that are conducive to tolerance and peace. However, preference for avoidance of conflict, rather than resolution of conflict, recognition of bravery, courage and valour as masculine traits shown in readiness to fight when attacked, and in the suppression of emotions and of submission, meekness and gentleness as feminine traits can be obstructive to the development of a culture of peace.

**Mechanisms of transformation**

During the UNESCO organized Expert Group Meeting on Women’s Contribution to a Culture of Peace held in Manila, Philippines, on 25–28 April 1995, the following mechanism for transformation towards a culture of peace were suggested:

- Consciously transforming the socialization process towards gender equity and peace through changes in the definitions of identity, masculinity and femininity.
- Providing open opportunities for both genders in all spheres of human endeavour.
• Overcoming notions of female dependency, male dominance and superiority, exclusionary terms of identity conditioned by racism, sexism or ethnocentrism.
• Changing child-rearing practices to involve women and men equally in parenting and child-care, responsibility for the welfare and education of children.
• Establishing a peaceful environment in schools by reducing competition, encouraging creativity, critical thinking and co-operative problem-solving.
• Including in research agenda studies on the differences in men’s and women’s tasks, achievement and decision-making styles, significance of gender stereotypes and violence in media.
• Featuring in the media instances of non-violent conflict resolution, constructive co-operation between men and women.
• Using the arts to play a role in the development of peace, for example through cultural events and films and other forms of cultural and artistic education and activities.

In the final analysis, education for peace, human rights and democracy, for international understanding and tolerance is essentially a matter of changing values, attitudes and behaviour. Hence the need and importance of values education for our citizenry; especially the young at home, at school and in the total learning environment of society should be our absolute priority if we want our children to live and develop in a genuine culture of peace and tolerance, where people learn to live together in harmony, and where citizens of a nation and of the global community can work together in solidarity and in peace.

Bibliography
Engendering peace: creative arts approaches to transforming domestic and communal violence

Malvern Lumsden

Introduction

‘If men cannot build, they destroy!’ These words, by Seija Anagrius, a Finnish ‘war baby’, now a therapist in Sweden, encapsulate important truths, equally applicable to domestic and communal violence. While it is true that men are responsible for most family violence, as well as for most of the destruction of war, they are also builders of homes and cities, political systems and cultures. The discussion of ‘masculinities’ in the context of a culture of peace needs to pay attention to both the personal and the situational factors that prevent men ‘building’, so that their energies become destructive.

At the situational level, breaking the cycle of violence and building a culture of peace (and here I include domestic peace) should be approached from at least three angles (Lumsden, 1997).

First, finding a balance between population and resources (an ecological and economic balance) at the level of whole cultures; ‘peacebuilding requires access to resources’. Whether or not human families and societies resolve this issue is a major factor in whether they thrive or collapse (see, for example, the great historian Arnold Toynbee’s twelve-volume world history, summarized in one volume (Toynbee, 1976). Psychology professor Ervin Staub’s (1989) attempt to explain the roots of evil takes as its point of departure ‘difficult life conditions’.

The recent wars in the former Yugoslavia are an illustration of Staub’s thesis: they were preceded by the drastic decline of the economy all the way through the 1980s, which was exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet/East European system. ‘Scapegoating’ and other social and psychological factors in the community (attitudes, values and beliefs – see below) were manipulated by desperate politicians, leading to the breakdown of Yugoslavia, to war and social atrocities. The underlying ecological/economic issues of the Balkans remain to be solved.
Second, adapting attitudes, values and beliefs (the ‘software’ of society) to the notion of ecological/economic balance within and between increasingly complex, multicultural societies; ‘peacebuilding requires knowledge and constructive beliefs’, including confidence in neighbours and co-operative partnerships.

Finally, increasing the role of creativity and artistic expression in society as a ‘free zone’ with the twin goals of (a) poiesis – increasing the space for innovation (in thought, practice and production) and (b) catharsis – giving form to feelings at the individual and collective levels; ‘peacebuilding requires transcending the grief and anger of past wounds in order to build on a healthy basis for the future’.

In this chapter I wish to focus on the third aspect, in particular the use of creative approaches to dealing with trauma, whether from domestic or communal violence. The perpetrators of violence are usually themselves victims of violence. There are also connections between domestic and social violence – for example, the case of combat veterans who get drunk (self-medication) and beat up their families. Dealing with the traumatization of war and dealing with traumatized sexual relationships have elements in common. The experiences of men and women in family, communal and wartime violence may be different, but in each case, what is traumatized is the sense of self and the sense of community. Both have to be rebuilt for a culture of peace to be meaningful.

Gender is an essential component of the sense of self. The extent of sexual torture and abuse in recent wars makes it clear that gender issues are also important in the sense of community – and, consequently, not only in war but in a culture of peace. Killing the enemy’s men and raping ‘his’ women seems to be a frequent accompaniment of war – with reports coming in from very different cultures across the world. While individual men may have personal (pathological) reasons for this kind of behaviour, it also serves to make community identities (‘us’ and ‘them’) very clear. Clearly we need other approaches to establishing personal and community identities, as well as dealing with the issues raised by complex, multicultural societies.

The sense of self is made up of multiple components, including the sense of embodiment, the feeling or affective self, the sense of agency, mastery or efficacy, a sense of coherent time and space, an (en)gendered self, a moral self, a relational self and a verbal and narrative self (cf. Stern, 1985; Lumsden, n.d.). A sense of community has many parallel elements, the geographical area forming the community equivalent of a ‘body’ and space, a communal history the equivalent of individual, biographical time. A collective sense of agency is particularly salient in situations where one group or gender has long been subjected to the whims of another. Together these components need to form a coherent whole if an individual or community is to be healthy (Antonovsky, 1987).
Because the verbal, narrative sense is only one element of the sense of self and community, verbal approaches to individual or family therapy, intergroup relations and community development, though important, are limited in scope: they are inadequate to deal with issues that are relevant to survivors of war, torture or sexual abuse such as the traumatized bodily sense, emotions, or the sense of agency. Resolving marital and communal conflicts requires more than legal negotiations and political agreements – both require dealing with the emotional issues if the parties are to get on with their lives.

What is needed is a rich variety of approaches which together can handle all aspects of self, gender, relationship and community. If conflicting parties are ever to be brought together in a ‘culture of peace’ they must (a) work together to resolve practical problems and (b) harmonize their energies in the common rhythms of mutual attunement.

**The value of the creative arts approaches**

A creative arts approach offers three advantages:

1. It is multimodal, using form and feeling, colour and sound, music and drama, dance and movement, offering opportunities for work with both concrete, physical expression, bodily experience, and with metaphorical and symbolic forms, individually or in small or large groups.

2. It offers a ‘container’ or ‘safe space’ for catharsis and the exploration of threatening material, involving emotions such as fear, rage and grief, as well as for joy and sensuality.

3. It offers the possibility of poiesis, the exploration of play, innovation and creativity, in which new meanings can be tested and new relationships tried out before they are applied in the real world.

The essence of the creative arts is the relationship between form and feeling. Creative art-forms are found in all cultures and have important individual and collective functions. Nevertheless, there are also significant cultural differences, not least with respect to the expression of emotion. Perhaps because they are expected to be able to kill on behalf of the community, men may be even more conditioned to repress emotions than women. Soldiers returning from combat often have no way of dealing with the emotional turmoil and resort to ‘self-medication’ with drugs and alcohol – frequently accompanied by abusing their women and children, and not infrequently leading to self-destructive and suicidal behaviour. This pattern, in turn, leads to a new generation of traumatized women and children.

In this, as well as by more subtle psychosocial means, the trauma of war can be passed on from one generation to another. Among a number of coping strategies, one group of the children of war survivors may grow up seeking to become militaristic ‘heroes’ as soon as an opportunity for a new round of violence occurs, perhaps joining forces with sociopaths created by family violence.
In this brief essay I shall focus on some of the creative art forms, particularly dance, drama and creative movement, as means of breaking this cycle of violence, offering (re)socialization and therapy for victims of war (including the men who have been fighting) as well as for subsequent generations of men and women.

It should be emphasized that the term ‘therapy’ here refers both to the constructive ‘building’ (ego-building, peace building, poiesis) and to the ‘working through’ or catharsis (‘cleaning out’) of negative emotions such as grief and anger.

Werner and Burton (1979, p. 1) quote the Chinese proverb ‘I hear and I forget; I see and I remember; I do and I understand.’ They add:

Learning through movement is the oldest teaching method. Gradually educators have come to realize that intelligence permeates all human activity and that it is inseparably interrelated with emotions, social interaction, and physical activity.

Their book gives a multitude of examples of the use of movement approaches to teaching the full range of traditional and more modern school subjects, ranging from reading, writing and arithmetic to geography and social relations. It is the latter that are particularly relevant in dealing with gender and peace issues. Traditional education systems have focused more on teaching verbal and logical skills and on the mechanics of the natural world than they have on developing the personality of the individual and on sexual and social relationships. Movement, dance and drama are traditionally applicable to dealing with all three sources of uncertainty in human existence: relations with the natural world; relations with other people; and knowledge of our selves.

Carla DeSola (1974, p. 4) describes the use of improvisational dance, poetry and imagery to teach social relations themes like communication, freedom, love, life, war and peace, happiness. She writes:

Socially, the shift from Puritan attitudes to the current libertinism has had little effect on promoting true understanding or deep respect and reverence for the body. The rise of consciousness of the inter-relatedness of life, as explored in ecology, and the Teilhardian vision of all matter being sacred and filled with the Divine is much closer to supplying the spirit for our exploration of dance. For a person to be a rich leaven in life he has to know himself, body and soul. He has to be instinctively aware of his body and to see the beauty of movement of the human body and spirit as they interact, unifying his inner and outer life into a unified, whole, harmonious expression.

The ‘inseparable interrelationship’ between emotions, social interaction and physical activity has hardly been explored in academic education systems but it is familiar from at least two other important areas of socialization: (a) tribal
rites of transition in puberty and (b) the demanding ritualistic training programmes of élite military units. In both cases, the goal is to create a new identity, group identification and loyalty. In reasonably stable societies, rites of transition are mostly positive, contributing to the individual’s sense of self and sense of community. But in other situations, socialization procedures seem more intended to break down than build up a sense of self, and a sense of community is reduced to that of the military unit or of a group of rebels or a criminal gangs, threatening the overall coherence of a functional society. Violence may be legitimated, even glorified, in such groups, and the individual with a fragile or damaged self-structure (perhaps resulting from an abusive family) displaces his personal identity on to the group. Here are two examples:

**Example 1.** One young man I worked with was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for uncontrollable outbursts of rage (symptom). He wore combat clothes and boots and explained that his dream was to become an élite, anti-terrorist soldier (displaced identity). He had told the recruiting sergeant proudly of his experience as ‘hit man’ in the drugs business around Washington Square in New York City: he claimed to have already killed four people. One weekend on a home visit, the father (who had wanted him to be ‘tough’ and had done things like throwing him at the wall when he was 5 years old) broke down into uncontrollable crying and said he had ‘only wanted him to love him’. For the first time the son, somewhat confused, began to show signs of colour in his cheeks and moisture in his eyes.

**Example 2.** Another man had been a US Marine in Viet Nam and had been captured and tortured. After some years of therapy focusing on this, I came in contact with him for a short time when he wanted to work with earlier issues. It turned out that he had volunteered for the Marine Corps in the first place to get away from a violent home. Now he was struggling with childhood issues and his own unsuccessful attempts to establish/maintain a family of his own.

Here it is argued that the ‘inseparable relationship’ between emotions, social interaction and physical activity is a crucial factor in working with young people to build a healthy sense of self (including gender identity) and a constructive sense of community. A pioneer in work with larger groups in different countries around the world, Arnold Mindell (1995, p. 166) writes:

> The individual self cannot be differentiated from the community self; they are one spirit. Relationship healing means getting to the bottom line, feeling that what we are experiencing belongs to community. It is the spirit moving us in unknown ways, making us afraid, angry and also peaceful.

The question is how to develop constructive social programmes that draw on the positive aspects of emotion, social interaction and physical activity,
rather than leaving them to become pathological. The massive social promotion of sporting activities is doubtless in part an effort not only to develop achievement motivation and competitiveness (which are good for business) but also to channel some of the energy and frustrations of large parts of the population into controllable activities. Pitting football teams etc. against each other is better than fighting battles, but much richer methods are required, which involve not only expenditure of energy – even ‘fighting efforts’ (Laban, 1948, 1998) – but also greater opportunities to explore and integrate emotions and social relationships along with socially productive work.

Anton Makarenko (1975) provides a classic example of such an approach. From 1919 to 1933 he led a number of ‘homes’ or ‘colonies’ for some of the hundreds of thousands of war orphans left by the First World War, civil war and revolution in Russia. The desperate plight of these youngsters is similar to that of many others in the world today (including quite a number in the former Soviet territories). Makarenko believed in creating firm boundaries (in modern terms, he organized chaos) but within these boundaries young people could create a constructive relationship to the land (horticulture and the like) and to the broader society outside the ‘homes’. His book was originally published in 1932–35 and became a major influence in the pedagogy of the USSR, being printed in many languages and in millions of copies.

One of the methods Makarenko used most was the theatre; he writes: ‘I am almost embarrassed to say that we devoted nearly all our time on winter evenings to the theatre’. Despite the indescribable poverty, they were even able to create a theatre-space able to accommodate an audience of 600 from many local villages. In the course of a winter season they could produce twenty-four plays (‘only large, serious works of four or five acts’) mainly taken from the repertories of the major theatres in the capital. Each project offered a multitude of activities, usually assigned to groups of six youngsters (actors, managers of the audience, costumes, decor, heating, props, lighting and special effects, cleaning, audio, and so on, with opportunities to try out different functions in other productions).

There are so many different things to be done that there is something for everyone – and if your role this time was more mundane, next time there will be a chance of something more exciting. The project becomes a superordinate goal – something that everyone has to contribute to if it is to be realized. (A superordinate goal, ‘discovered’ by social psychologist Muzafer Sherif in his famous summer camp studies in the 1950s, remains one of the few approaches to conflict resolution with some scientific support.) By basing this pedagogical practice on major works of Russia’s important theatre tradition (Chekhov, Stanislavsky, Mayakovskiy), the youngsters became not just consumers of, but participants in and contributors to the wider culture, forming a link between local villagers and big-city culture.
In the current world there is a vast movement of world music, world dance, and alternative theatre with many interesting variations such as interactive theatre. The interactive element is important in emphasizing active participation rather than passive consumerism.

In Mali, theatre has been used to stimulate discussions of both gender relationships (in a highly African version of Ibsen’s *A Doll’s House*) and war and peace (in a performance which was said to have influenced the peace process). In the United Kingdom, the Geese Theatre group is working with violent offenders in prisons. In Northern Ireland, the Wolf and Water theatre group acted as ‘Theatre Company in Residence’ at the European Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution in Belfast in 1998. In Mozambique, a ‘peace circus’ project used local folklore as a source of inspiration for peaceful conflict resolution.

The theatre is perhaps the clearest example of an important resource – a transitional zone that acts as a ‘safe space’ for traumatized individuals and communities. In social reconstruction, a distinction can be made between three ‘zones’ of activity: Zone 1 is the external world (food supplies, housing, political systems, etc.); Zone 2 is the internal world (inner meanings, how individuals try to make sense of their lives); and Zone 3 is the intermediate or transitional zone between the external and internal worlds – the worlds of play in childhood and ‘culture’ in adulthood (derived from Winnicott, 1971, 1988). This intermediate zone is not the ‘real world’ but at the same time it is projected out of the inner fantasies or imagination of the individual, playwright or collective where it can be shared, worked over, assimilated or rejected. It provides a ‘safe space’ for (a) working through terrifying emotions and (b) trying new approaches to social relations – both of which may be invaluable in breaking the cycle of domestic and communal violence (Lumsden, 1997).

**Working in Zone 3**

Humanitarian aid agencies have long been involved in trying to improve social conditions – the external world (Zone 1) – at home and abroad. Sometimes such agencies also have a specific agenda of influencing ‘hearts and minds’ – the inner world (Zone 2) – of the people they work with. In recent years there have been specific attempts to work with the psychosocial issues arising from social catastrophes such as massacres and mass rape and sexual torture.

Although this must be seen as a positive step in the right direction, there is a twofold dilemma here. First, although there has emerged an extensive literature on ‘post-traumatic stress disorders’ (whether from war trauma, sexual abuse, violence or other sources) in the past two decades, it is still a very demanding area, with no simple solutions. For the most part, even the psychosocial services of the rich countries in peacetime are overloaded. The ratio of psychosocial/therapeutic needs to resources in inner
cities, rapidly urbanizing areas and war zones is so great that we cannot expect the needs to be met by conventional means in the foreseeable future, if ever.

The notion of ‘Zone 3’ is therefore presented to suggest the need for and possibility of a new approach, involving larger groups of people than traditional individual or small-group therapy in activities which, if not ‘therapy’ as usually defined, can be, at least to a degree, therapeutic. Makarenko’s work with war orphans in the Soviet Union in the 1920s is a major example. Since that time, there have been great developments in the fields of educational drama, creative dance and related fields, and their extensions in expressive arts therapies.

A working model for therapeutic groups

The following is a very brief sketch of a method of working.

Building up the sense of self before catharsis

The initial emphasis is on building up the sense of self (through the components of body, emotions, time, space, agency/mastery, relationship, gender, moral thinking, and narrative) and sense of community. As the positive identity grows, it can more easily cope with expressing and integrating otherwise too-threatening feelings of grief, anger, pain.

Warm-up

The notion of warm-up is known to the sportsman or dancer as an initial set of physical exercises intended to mobilize every part of the body before putting them to more demanding tests. In the present context, warm-up has two other important functions: psychological and social. The concept of psychological warm-up is well-developed in psychodrama/sociodrama and refers to initial exercises intended to set off psychological reactions in one or more participants, enabling a ‘protagonist’ or central person to be chosen for the drama. More generally, psychological warm-up implies that participants get in touch with their feelings, with an ‘inner voice’ or with their own ‘authentic movement’. Social warm-up facilitates group interactions (whole group or sub-groups). Physical, psychological and social warm-up provides the working material or theme for the process undertaken in a working session.

Example of a warm-up exercise

Capoeira is something between a martial art and a dance form, developed by African slaves in Brazil and now to be found around the world. It involves a great deal of physical energy without any actual bodily contact. A simplified form of capoeira may be a useful warm-up for young people. They are invited to form a ring, clapping and chanting the rhythm, while two at a time go into the ring in an imitation ‘fighting dance’. Everybody gets the chance to participate (this can include men and women) and most people will start to
sweat. Socially, a ‘good time is had by all’, even though some may find the public exposure stressful. Psychologically it raises issues of personal feelings about aggression and it offers a lot of dynamic movement information about personality styles.

*Capoeira* is a good example of a movement style which develops integration, co-ordination, centring, flow of movement (in the individual and between the movers), focus of attention, intention, timing of decisions, clarity of personal boundaries, implicit communication and other skills of great value in personal and sexual relationships and in social life more generally. Although an excellent form of physical training, it develops a sense of self (body sense, space, timing, agency, relationship) as well as a social context, the group providing the rhythm and setting the constraints, so that no one gets hurt and all have a chance to participate. Some other martial art forms have some of these characteristics, but few have the rhythmic group participation, adding to a sense of community.

Example of a group exercise for teenagers or adults on the theme of alliance formation

Divide into three groups (or more if you have lots of time) and give them three rules:

1. If anyone wants to join another group, they are free to do so.
2. If someone wants a person from another group to join them, they are free to go over and fetch that person.
3. If someone does not want a particular person in their group, they are free to place that person in another group. (The groups usually laugh at this last suggestion but very rarely act on it!)

The effect of these rules is to induce a lively interchange between the groups. In almost every case, one group disappears, leaving two. Sometimes one of the two remaining groups is larger than the other, and they make a take-over bid, sometimes resulting in one large group. Before long some people begin to break out of this group, sometimes chanting ‘We want peace!’

This simple movement exercise shows, in about ten to fifteen minutes, some of the dynamics of social systems. Examination of parliaments or groups of countries readily illustrates how easily two ‘blocs’ are formed – it is extremely difficult to maintain a middle-of-the-road, third party or neutral power. (Social science theories such as the theory of games, power theory or cognitive balance theory all suggest the tendency to form coalitions of two against one (see Caplow, 1968), based on interests, power or affiliation.) It is equally difficult to act as a third party in someone else’s conflict – just as it is difficult to intervene in someone else’s marital conflict.

There is, however, an exception here. It is possible to produce a ‘coalition of the whole’, at least on the basis of affiliation (liking/disliking).
This result can be more readily brought about if music is played during the exercise. Music helps to produce a common ‘pulse’; by co-ordinating their movements to the music, the participants also tune in to each other. This mutual attunement is the basis of trust and empathy, enabling them to get together in a larger group. The world-famous French choreographer Maurice Béjart compares the heated debates of a Greek tavern with the communal dancing which joins the debaters when the bouzouki music starts up: *La parole divise. La danse, c’est l’union!* (Words divide. Dance is union!)

**Theme(s)**

A working session will usually come to focus on one or more themes. There are many possible themes and they may be more or less abstract, concrete, symbolic, individual or collective. Some people might focus on solving practical problems, with or without creative methods to help. I believe, though, that giving form to feelings is a more important (though more challenging) initial goal in the context of domestic and communal violence – both for the perpetrators and for their victims.

*Example of a larger group exercise on the theme of gender differences*

A large group (100+) of adults (caring professions) were asked to divide into men and women. The men went out temporarily to the next room. Each group (i.e. men and women) was asked to find a common rhythm, a common movement and a common sound. The women formed a large, swaying circle. The men started a rhythmic jumping, thrusting and grunting. The men were then led back so that the two groups could be reunited. The men lost any sign of solidarity; it became each man for himself trying to break into the circle of women and attract the attention of one or more members. The women simply stretched out their linked arms and absorbed one man at a time into their circle. Eventually the contrasting rhythms merged into a higher synthesis. What began as a gender confrontation developed into a transpersonal, spiritual, experience as the whole group swayed together.

Although this was treated by most of these professionals as a playful opportunity to fall back into the ‘wild man’ or the *ur*-woman, others saw it as a highly provocative event, able to produce psychotic breakdowns. However, the collective rhythm provides a ‘holding environment’. Here it is interesting to note the work of the Brazilian psychiatrist Ackstein who deliberately uses rhythmic samba-type music to induce trances in groups of psychotic patients who ‘let it all hang out’ once a week (surrounded by friends, relatives and therapists) and then are able to cope with life outside an institution the rest of the week. This work has subsequently spread to North America and Europe, for example in work with borderline youngsters.
The exercise above brought together groups of men and women in a group experience which transcended the individual and the sexual. A key point in this transition was the merging or fusion of the rhythms. Note that fusion is the name of a type of music that blends contrasting styles (for example, jazz, Indian and Western classical music). Fusion is richer – not mutual impoverishment. This is a crucial point to remember when dealing with conflict resolution, whether between the sexes or between ethnic groups. The richness of modern music shows that it is quite possible to ‘fuse’ widely differing musical cultures into exciting new styles. This example needs to be extended into the realm of sexual, ethnic and international politics.

**Development of themes**

In the creative approach described here the focus is on an increasingly rich integration, as opposed to ‘dealing with’ a particular symptom. A theme may be picked up again in multiple sessions but approached in different ways or with different media. It may be woven together with other themes which together form a collage. Changing one element of a collage may suddenly cause a shift in the whole perception. In this way therapeutic and artistic processes merge as new forms – patterns of organization of the material – come to the fore or merge into the background. The process may eventually lead to a performance or film vicariously involving an even greater number of people in the (essentially therapeutic) process.

*Example: from youth project to full-length film*

Director and film-maker Zarina Khan has carried through several projects in Sarajevo, Lebanon and Paris. In one she began to work with a group of unemployed immigrant youngsters outside Paris. They began to tell their own stories, hopes and fears. Out of this they constructed a script which was originally intended as a stage play. One thing led to another and after two years they had produced a full-length feature film, with themselves playing the roles. The sense of ‘agency’ achieved by the participants also inspires the much larger audiences who can be reached through the film. What began as a form of social therapy for a small group can be extended to larger communities.

**Integration and closure**

The final topic in a working session (or, indeed, at the conclusion of a project) is integration and closure. This might involve a brief run-through of events, a reminder of each individual’s contributions, a simple collective ritual, and taking leave of the group in order to re-establish one’s independent existence in the real world outside the ‘transitional space’.
Conclusion: arts approaches to conflict transformation and peacebuilding

There is slowly (re)emerging an appreciation that artistic expression, symbolic acts and ritual have important roles and functions both for individual adults, and for families and communities (see Liebmann, 1996). For example, Karen Callaghan (1996) describes her use of dance and movement psychotherapy with survivors of torture at the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture in London. Refugees frequently do not speak the social workers’ language in host countries; but they often do have cultural traditions that can be built upon to create healing rituals and the like (see Honwana, 1997).

Marian Liebmann (1996, p. 2) points out that most approaches to mediation and conflict resolution (domestic or communal) emphasize a number of common principles such as listening to others, speaking for oneself rather than accusing others, or looking for a solution where everyone’s interests are satisfied. But, she believes, art’s approaches to dealing with domestic and inter-communal violence offer a number of additional benefits:

- They involve participants actively, so that they can actually experience – in role play, for example – someone else’s point of view.
- The engagement in an external activity can provide a ‘distancing’, which can help people to gain a new perspective, which in turn may then help to resolve a particular situation.
- People can try out different options and ways of being, whether using drama, movement, music or painting, in a frame of reference which is parallel to everyday life.
- Involvement in the arts engages the whole person, ‘speaking from the heart’, and using their creativity and emotions. This can lead to learning and insights which can pave the way for the personal change needed to resolve many conflicts.
- Co-operative projects can teach participants skills of working together to resolve conflict, and arts activities provide a tangible forum in which to achieve this.
- In many situations, people in conflict with themselves or others do not have the communication skills to resolve situations verbally, and arts approaches are extremely helpful here (Liebmann, 1996, pp. 2–3).

A striking example of an arts approach in a war-torn society is the Circo da Paz project in Mozambique, supported by UNICEF Mozambique, which assembled a group of artists to ‘motivate, train and empower Mozambican children as active agents in a national movement for peace’ (Brubaker, 1993).

The group began by requesting performances (in dance and song) from the children in the village, and then built on the children’s work to encourage additional learning and production. In short, the group had
developed an ‘elicitative’ model of training, and if anything seemed loath to share their ideas and skills with children for fear of over-influencing them. The dancing, music and theatre productions (prepared often in very short time periods) were quite impressive, and the games and art groups were equally creative and talented (Brubaker, 1993).

Hazlehurst (1994) has produced an excellent handbook on community healing and mobilization activities to counter the marginalization, alcoholism, family violence and sexual abuse against and among indigenous peoples of Australia and North America. The book contains a wealth of material, including instructions for personal discovery exercises, healing, team-building and other topics relevant to community mobilization for empowerment, such as alternative dispute resolution.

Both sex ‘wars’ and world peace are matters of relationship – they involve at least two of us. Each of us needs a secure sense of self and community, individuation and belonging, differentiation and integration, all of which imply a multitude of existential incompatibilities that require both skill and creativity if the resulting forms and feelings are to grow up from the shattered fragments of the war zones to the gardens and temples of the human spirit.

What we currently lack in society – that old-time numinous experience of people together – can be found in the very thing we fear the most: large groups, masses of people feeling deeply about things. The spirits in such groups can be the creativity, the dance, the sense of community we long for (Mindell, 1995, p. 239).

The approaches referred to here may be new but have their roots in ancient traditions. They are suitable for both men and women, separately or together depending upon cultural norms. They may be a complement to activities aimed at conflict resolution, reconciliation and peacebuilding between conflict parties. They are appropriately combined with work to resolve the practical issues of finding an ecological/economic balance between growing human populations and diminishing productive land and other resources – itself a goal which requires both creativity and constructive social relationships.

Bibliography


Appendix 1

Report of the Expert Group Meeting

Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace, Oslo, 24–28 September 1997 (excerpts)

Preface

UNESCO organized through its Women and the Culture of Peace Programme the Expert Group Meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace in Oslo, Norway, from 24 to 28 September 1997. The meeting was organized in cooperation with the Norwegian National Commission for UNESCO and with the support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Council of Europe and the Nordic Council of Ministers.

While women’s roles and status have been broadly debated over the last decades, men’s roles and positions have hardly been discussed. Recently, however, the question of masculinities has been addressed in a series of publications; and the importance of a gender perspective, as underlined strongly in the Beijing Platform for Action and in the ECOSOC meeting in July 1997, is more widely understood.

In a world in rapid transformation, characterized by high risk of unemployment, marginalization and exclusion, the linking of male identity primarily to positions of power and decision-making in public and private life seems to create frustration and severe problems that counteract and put at risk transformations from a culture of violence to a culture of peace.

Drawing on existing literature and theoretical knowledge in the relevant academic disciplines and interdisciplinary fields, the meeting, which brought together peace and gender researchers and activists with experience of anti-violence work among men, examined gender-related factors that hinder or sustain movements towards a culture of peace. It further explored the development of new, more egalitarian and partnership-oriented types of masculinities as opposed to traditional and stereotyped expectations of masculinity that might lead to undue acceptance of the use of authority, dominance, control, force, aggressiveness and violence.
The meeting further addressed the harmful consequences of rigid and stereotyped definitions of masculinity and femininity, roles of dominance and submission, the consequences of raising boy children to be tough and dominating and the social, cultural and economic conditions producing violence among men.

The meeting explored practical strategies for reducing men’s violence, and the possibilities of raising boys in ways that emphasize the qualities (such as emotional response, caring, and communication skills) needed in building a culture of peace. It undertook the task of formulating recommendations, addressed to the United Nations, UNESCO, Member States and NGOs, for practical measures that enhance the development of a gender-sensitive culture of peace, in relation to society and its major institutions such as the family, the education system, the media and political, military and religious structures. Special emphasis was given to how to develop insight and training in addressing conflicts and ‘disempowerment’ without recourse to violent behaviour.

Rapporteur’s summary of issues and themes

Introduction

The Oslo meeting, 24–28 September 1997, on ’Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace’ arose from the work of UNESCO’s Women and the Culture of Peace Programme. Contemporary feminism has opened up important issues about gender and peace. Men are now invited to continue this discussion, and to explore with women a new set of issues about masculinity, violence and peace.

Why men and masculinity are an issue for a culture of peace

It is a familiar fact that most of the world’s soldiers are men. It is men, almost exclusively, who make the decisions that launch international aggression and civil wars. It is further true that men are responsible for most crimes of violence in private life. Men rather than women are central to the symbolism of violence in mass media, sports, and political rhetoric.

In situations of sustained armed conflict, in situations where ethnic nationalism is being mobilized, and in violent racist movements, polarized models of manhood and womanhood are typical, with men encouraged to show dominance and aggression. It is common in military training all around the world to link manliness with brutality, and to discredit fear and sensitivity as unmanly.

There are, clearly, links between masculinity and violence. To recognize this is not to say that all men are violent, or that men are naturally violent (ideas that the experts at the meeting clearly rejected). It is to pose important problems: How can men as men, as gendered beings, be drawn into the making of a culture of peace? What alternative ways of being a man can be found? How, especially, can violent masculinities change?
Problems and pitfalls

Work on these issues among men may have to take different forms from those familiar in women’s programmes, and will face certain difficulties.

Highlighting issues about masculinity is easily misunderstood. It may be seen as unfairly blaming all men for violence, implying that men are evil, or that women are inherently better people. This view would lead to instant alienation of most men from any programme of change.

Alternatively, highlighting masculinity may be seen as a way of excusing violent men, since their behaviour is attributed to a masculinity which many believe to be ‘natural’ and unchangeable.

In responding to these misunderstandings, the experts emphasized that the focus should be on the characteristics of social masculinity that lead men towards violence, and on the institutions and ideologies that reinforce aggressive masculinities. This neither excuses violent behaviour nor simplistically blames men, but allows a focus on the prevention of violence and the building of positive alternatives.

Moving towards gender equity and equality is an important part of the culture of peace. Co-operation and dialogue between women and men create new knowledge and positive change. Therefore programmes addressed to boys and men should not compete for funding with programmes for girls and women. New programmes for men should not pander to the ‘backlash’ against feminist pressure for gender equality.

There is a further problem about the prominence of Western research and concepts in the new debates on masculinity. It is important to acknowledge cultural difference and local knowledge. At the same time we must recognize the hegemony of certain Western gender arrangements in a globalizing world, and their (often disruptive) impact on non-Western cultures. Some masculinities are now operating in a global arena, while most programmes of reform operate only locally. International organizations like UNESCO are vital for addressing this problem.

New research and policy discussions

Efforts towards a culture of peace have an important new resource in recent research and policy discussions about masculinity.

A new generation of social-scientific research on men and masculinity has emerged, in many parts of the world, in the last ten years. This embraces studies in sociology, ethnography, history, psychology, criminology, education and other fields. Empirical research has provided new understanding of:

- the diversity of masculinities;
- the making of masculinities in childhood and social life;
- hierarchies and power relations among men, and broader structures of patriarchy (conditions creating gender discrimination);
- the institutional contexts of masculinity;
- historical and psychological changes in masculinity.
Such research has stimulated fresh efforts to understand gender relations and the position of men. Theorists have addressed questions of gender identity, the economic circumstances of men, and the patterns of male sexuality. This work helps to ‘make masculinity visible’, and thus supports new practical initiatives and policy discussions.

For more than a decade there have been campaigns in a number of countries to reduce masculine violence, especially domestic violence and rape. Within the last decade, policy debates have emerged about boys’ education, men’s health, and men’s involvement in road casualties. In a few countries, issues about masculinity have begun to enter policy documents about gender in education.

Thus we have new resources of empirical knowledge, concepts, and practical experience, to assist in addressing the problem of masculinity and peace.

*How should we understand masculinities?*

The expert group meeting discussed traditional and new ways of understanding masculinities. There was agreement that the biology of sex does not explain the issues; biological differences are biological differences, while social patterns of violence require social explanations and social solutions.

The concept of a ‘male sex role’ is helpful in calling attention to the social learning of gender (often called ‘socialization’), and to the stereotypes in media and culture which offer boys only narrow, aggressive models of masculinity.

However, many contributions to the meeting illustrated the need to go beyond a focus on ‘role’ stereotypes to a broader view of gender relations and masculinities. Our understanding of masculinities must embrace economic production, power and authority, sexuality and emotions, and identities and communication. The discussion emphasized:

- **The influence of economic circumstances.** Where men have economic advantages over women, they have a privilege to defend, which may be defended with violence, or may make women vulnerable to violence. Economic changes which put at risk or destroy men’s traditional livelihoods, without providing alternatives, make violence or militarism attractive options.

- **The complexity of masculinities.** Masculinities are often interwoven with ethnic or generational identities, and violent confrontations may result. A hegemonic masculinity may have great social prestige, yet many men do not match it, nor desire to. Social conflicts and psychological tensions about masculinity may lead to violence, but may also create possibilities for change. Latent ‘cultures of peace’ may be found in many situations.

- **The importance of historical change.** Gender relations are dynamic, and can change rapidly; though they are widely believed to change slowly or not at all. Masculinities do not move only from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’. Young women can take on traditional masculine behaviour to achieve equality more
easily. New militarized masculinities emerge in states or communities under threat. Even peacekeeping forces can provoke such a response. Globalization may introduce ‘Western’ models of domesticated women and aggressive/competitive men, to communities that had relative gender equality; or may create other dislocations in patriarchy, resulting in an upsurge of violence.

**How are masculinities connected to violence?**

There are multiple causes of violence (including dispossession, poverty, greed, nationalism, racism, the concept of ‘honour’), and violence develops in diverse situations. There are, nevertheless, persistent connections with masculinities, including the following points.

- Social arrangements generally place the means of violence – such as weapons and military skills – in the hands of men, not women. This is true for privately owned weapons as well as military weapons.
- Boys’ peer-group life, military training, and mass media often promote a direct link between being a ‘real man’ and the practice of dominance and violence.
- When men feel entitled to power and status (especially with respect to women) they are angered when they cannot achieve these ‘entitlements’. Reactions to a sense of powerlessness may include violence against women, or joining a gang, a racist movement, an army or an armed revolutionary movement, that restore feelings of control.
- Racist, ethnic-nationalist, and extremist movements often express a ‘demand for dominance’ which is centred on the figure of the man, with woman cast as supporter and mother-of-warriors. The psychological pressure to act the warrior or hunter can be intense.
- The maintenance of hegemonic masculinity requires disrespect for other forms of masculinity and for women’s empowerment. This often takes the form of mutual harassment among boys, and serious violence against homosexual men by some young men.

Aggressive and dominating masculinities may be a direct source of violence. In many cases, however, gender ideologies serve as the means by which other causes of conflict are converted into violent conduct. When violent masculinities are created, men’s and boys’ recruitment may prolong or intensify armed conflicts. In all these cases, action to change masculinities is a relevant strategy for peace.

**What kind of change is needed?**

It is often suggested with horror that reform of gender means turning men into women: emasculating men, making men ‘soft’, and therefore unable to compete or stand with pride in the world.

Solving the problem of violence and building a culture of peace certainly requires change in masculinities. But it does not require men to become weak or incapable. On the contrary, violence often happens because
masculinities are constructed to make violence the easy option, or the only option considered.

We would emphasize that building peace is an arduous and complex undertaking, worthy of heroic effort from men as well as women. The sense of competence important to some masculinities can be linked to equality rather than exclusiveness; democracy needs skilled practitioners, too.

Education cannot ‘re-socialize’ boys and men, in the sense of pressing them into a non-violent mould (to replace the violent mould). Rather, education can open up a diversity of pathways, and allow boys and men to use a broader spectrum of their capacities – emotional, communicative, and political. Education can show boys and men a variety of ways of being a man, and allow them to experience this diversity. It can develop boys’ and men’s capacities for non-violent action, training them in techniques of peace as they are now commonly trained in the techniques of combat.

An educational effort in this direction cannot work in isolation. It needs to be supported by action in other areas of life, which will make greater diversity of experience possible for men, and non-violent conduct easier for them. This means action to reduce gender hierarchies and antagonisms across the spectrum of social life addressed in the recommendations from the meeting: the public arena, media, private sphere, workplaces, institutions.

A key example of the need for change is the essential social task of peacekeeping. This is currently performed by organizations, such as police and international peacekeeping forces, which are overwhelmingly staffed by men, have a heavily masculinized culture, and are liable to act in confrontational ways. Here there is need for change both in organizational culture and in the gender division of labour.

**How is change accomplished?**

It is an important conclusion of recent research that there are different masculinities, not just one dominating, violent form. There are many non-violent men in the world, and men already actively involved in work to reduce violence.

The expert meeting discussed examples of men’s involvement in building a culture of peace. They included both community activism and governmental programmes:

- The Canadian White Ribbon Campaign, a broad programme of community involvement to reduce men’s violence against women, now spread to a number of other countries.
- The Nordic countries’ ‘fathers’ quota’ (or ‘dad’s month’) of parental leave, and experience in recruiting significant numbers of men to work in child-care centres.
• The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and community actions such as the ‘We Shall Remember Them’ campaign about road deaths.
• Anti-sexist and anti-racist men’s groups in a wide range of countries from the Russian Federation to Australia, such as the National Organization of Men Against Sexism in the United States.
• Efforts to change occupational cultures of violence by in-service programmes for police, in countries such as El Salvador and the Philippines.
• Development of gender-specific programmes for boys in Australian schools, addressing issues from literacy to human relations and violence, allowing boys to examine issues about masculinity.

Although it is still too early to design a comprehensive programme of change, some significant principles have already emerged in this work:
• It is important to break down gender isolation. Although some activities need to be targeted to single-gender groups, programmes should be planned by men and women in consultation.
• It is essential to find respectful ways of working with boys and men. Blame and antagonism are very likely to disrupt peacebuilding.
• The institutional and structural causes of violence must be carefully considered. For instance, if economic disruption has occurred, action needs to include a search for alternative bases of livelihood.
• Educational issues about peace and gender arise across the curriculum in schools and adult education. They should not be a tightly defined speciality located in only one curriculum area.

Issues for the future

Serious research on issues about masculinity is relatively new, and its connection with work for peace is even newer. The meeting acknowledged that many formulations and proposals must still be tentative, open to testing in new circumstances.

Certain issues were debated in the meeting and left open. These appeared to be fruitful themes for further discussions and research:
• How far the institutional masculinity of the state and corporations negates the effects of women’s arrival in management and political leadership positions.
• To what extent violence arises from the fragility of masculine identities.
• The role of shame and humiliation in the origins of men’s violence, an issue that appeared in many of the case-studies discussed. Humiliation might not happen so easily if it were not for exaggerated ideas of masculine honour, an issue needing careful examination.

With participants from many European countries and other continents, the Oslo meeting itself was a unique opportunity for exchange of information and ideas. It became clear that the international circulation of practical experience in peacebuilding work with men, as well as research and writing, is an important task for the future.
Concluding note

The constituency for work on masculinity and peace is not just a small group of marginalized men. It is all men – and indeed all women – since gender is interactive, and all of us participate in, and shape, the gender arrangements of society.

While the historical record of men’s violence is horrifying, masculinities differ greatly and there are many points where change may begin. Many experiences in personal life show men as well as women moving towards equality and non-violence if given the chance. As long as institutional and cultural patterns block their way, they stop. Yet even small measures to unblock the path may create considerable effects.

The recommendations from the meeting reflect this sense of many possibilities, in the wide range of topics they address. Our proposals are starting-points. To develop a comprehensive strategy requires more work, by many hands.

In this discussion, we focus on gender polarities to find how we can move beyond them. ‘Masculinity’ does not exhaust the character of any man. What men share with women is far more than what divides them. The common humanity they share – common capacities, shared languages, shared institutions, shared interests, and shared responsibilities for children – is the most important basis for a future of peace.

Recommendations

General

1. The meeting of experts has agreed that work on men’s issues about violence and peace can only be successful in the context of a broad movement towards gender equality and non-violence. Accordingly we think it is essential to continue and strengthen the policies and initiatives currently being pursued to reduce violence, promote demilitarization, increase economic and political equality between women and men, combat discrimination of all kinds, promote creativity and peace-related cultural manifestations and works of art, and disseminate the ideas and techniques of a culture of peace.

Within this context, we propose the following specific measures addressed to male roles and masculinities.

Parenthood

2. Support initiatives which stress that men as well as women have responsibility for child-rearing, and encourage child-rearing practices based on emotional support, empathy and non-violence.

3. Support family planning programmes which emphasize that reproductive responsibility is shared by men and women.
4. Encourage all countries to adopt state-supported paternity leave, in addition to maternity leave, and encourage trade unions, professional associations and corporations to support such policies.

**Education**

5. UNESCO should support school programmes by:
   (i) developing an international curriculum resource kit on diverse forms of masculinity and on men in relation to a culture of peace;
   (ii) organizing pilot projects for teacher training in effective methods against discrimination and violence (for example sexism, homophobia and racism).

6. School systems should:
   (i) provide training for boys, girls and educators in conflict resolution skills, emotional expressions and inter-group communication;
   (ii) develop curriculum resources and textbooks depicting non-violent and non-aggressive behaviour of men.

7. UNESCO, through its Chair programme, should support university chairs on gender issues including men and masculinities in relation to a culture of peace, and support similar action in the UNITWIN programme.

**Community**

8. Support community-based groups and movements which involve men and boys in exploring changes in masculinity towards a culture of peace.

9. Promote the organization of non-violent and more co-operative sports and games.

**Work and economy**

10. Encourage governments, businesses, and unions to develop family-friendly forms of working life, including training programmes to end workplace sexual harassment.

11. Support and encourage men and women to choose non-traditional jobs and reduce gender barriers in working life.

12. Encourage the development of gender-inclusive management cultures in businesses and bureaucracies (including international aid), to replace cultures of masculine dominance.

**Police and military**

13. The United Nations should develop a gender-sensitive training programme for the personnel of peacekeeping missions, including all functions represented in such missions.

14. Police forces should develop a gender-sensitive approach to the policing of domestic violence.

15. Military and police organizations should encourage participation by both women and men, and should include negotiation skills, gender sensitivity and human-rights education in the training of all personnel.
16. UNESCO should encourage all countries to offer community service work which either replaces or is an alternative to military service.

Culture
17. Promote debates on the representations of men in mass media, in video games, on the Internet, and in mass culture generally in order to create forums for community reflection on the impact of violent images of masculinity, and critical interventions to promote alternatives.
18. Government and communities should acknowledge the legitimate diversity of non-violent sexuality, including both homosexual and heterosexual masculinities.
19. UNESCO should explore the potential of the creative arts in the construction of new masculinities and a gender-sensitive culture of peace.

Violence against women
20. Support community-based programmes among men and boys to prevent violence against women (such as Canada’s White Ribbon Campaign and South Africa’s ADAPT).
21. Encourage programmes for male batterers based on accountability to women in their community.
22. UNESCO should compile an international directory of resources and men’s organizations working to end violence against women.

Research
23. Support the development of multidisciplinary studies of masculinities and male roles, especially research on the social and cultural conditions producing violent and patriarchal masculinities.
24. UNESCO should support the establishment of international consortia and networks for collaborative research in this field.

Public-sector organizations
25. Encourage governments, United Nations bodies and other organizations to appoint staff specialists on masculinities and men’s issues, locating them within gender-related programmes and peace programmes.
26. UNESCO should sponsor leaflets, articles and bibliographical resources on male roles and masculinities, and disseminate them through National Commissions for UNESCO, unions, the military, police forces and NGOs.

Follow-up
27. There should be follow-up to the Oslo meeting: translation and dissemination of documents, consultation with home governments and educators by participants, regional meetings, and (in a year’s time) re-convening on the Internet of the Oslo participants to discuss progress.
I must first say how pleased I am to be at this Expert Group Meeting in Oslo, and how grateful I am to UNESCO’s Ingeborg Breines in particular, for having invited me. My task is to present briefly the Council of Europe’s work on the subject which you will be discussing.

I feel that the approaches of the Council of Europe and UNESCO are somewhat complementary. You will be focusing on male roles and masculinities in the perspective of a culture of peace. The Council of Europe, for its part, has for some time now been looking at how men’s roles can be developed towards more partnership and better co-operation with women, in order to achieve equality between the sexes, and a better society for all.

Why suddenly this increasing focus on male roles and masculinities? In recent years, through the activities of the Steering Committee for equality between women and men in the Council of Europe, it has become increasingly clear that equality cannot be achieved unless women and men begin a dialogue, in a spirit of co-operation. The traditional approach to equality has been the antidiscrimination approach. It means fighting discrimination against women, obtaining the rights men have for women. Of course, this is important. However, it is not enough, because such an approach looks at women mainly as victims, and it does not involve men. Equality cannot be achieved if men do not feel concerned, if they do not take part in equality work, and make no effort to change their roles. Therefore, the focus is now moving towards the questioning of the male norm, of the male power structures of society. It is felt that these structures should be challenged, and new norms created, for the benefit of both women and men.

In the Council of Europe, this new focus has come about because today there is little progress in Europe where equality is concerned. There is consensus about the fact that new methods, new actions, new strategies and approaches are needed, and these are being sought. But another reason is
that the work of the Steering Committee has demonstrated that there will be no real democracy and no real equality unless male structures, male norms and male traditional roles are challenged. Democracy is male, and the whole society functions according to a male vision of how it should be. The activities concerning equality and democracy, violence against women and trafficking in women, and the mainstreaming of the gender perspective have made this visible. One clear example: at a hearing with migrant women, held in Strasbourg in 1995, some of the migrant women said to the European women who were discussing with them – I am quoting from memory – ‘If equality means being like men, adopting their values, their behaviour, their norms: we don’t want equality.’ Equality based on male norms is not necessarily attractive for women.

Of course, involving men in equality work, making them understand that they, too, might benefit from it, is a slow process. In June this year, the Council of Europe organized a seminar under the title: ‘Promoting Equality: A Common Issue for Men and Women’. I think this was the first time we have been able to organize a meeting where women and men, almost in equal numbers, discussed this issue together.

The conclusions of this seminar will be at your disposal tomorrow.

The main recommendations drawn by participants at this seminar in order to promote equality and actively involve men were the following:

1. The need to develop research on how masculinity is constructed with emphasis on several issues, such as relationships between men and between boys. Such research should emphasize pluralism and diversity, and take into account the different expressions of masculinities, and differences according to countries. The differences, even between Council of Europe Member States, are enormous as expressions of masculinity are concerned, even if they all stem from the same idea that men are superior to women. Research on gender-based violence should also be developed.

2. Meetings and seminars at which men and women together discuss and develop a post-patriarchal vision of the future should be organized at both national and international level. It is encouraging to think that this very meeting might be considered as giving a follow-up to this recommendation.

3. New ways of bringing up boys should be developed and supported, and they should receive non-violent and non-stereotyped education.

4. It is urgent that both women and men combat violence against women. This should be done on three levels: by condemning and by preventing this violence and by helping the victims (it was suggested that the Council of Europe begin drafting a European Convention on this issue next year).

5. Action should be taken in order to raise awareness about equality issues among individuals and groups – this action has to be adapted to the different groups if it is to be successful.

6. Action should be taken in order to favour male participation in domestic work and enhance the role of the father.
Several recommendations were also addressed to the Council of Europe. They will be studied by the Steering Committee next week, in Strasbourg, and some of them will be taken further, and discussed at the fourth European Ministerial Conference on Equality between Women and Men, to be held in Istanbul on 13/14 November 1997. One of the themes of this conference will be ‘Promoting Equality in a Democratic Society: The Role of Men’.

I am looking forward very much to following your discussions. We are probably all convinced that equality would mean a better quality of life and a better and possibly a more peaceful society for both women and men. But the main question that remains is, How can we convince men of this?

After all, as Alberto Godenzi has demonstrated in his studies, men have benefited from the present situation. They belong to the privileged gender, the one that has more power, more influence and better status. Why would they give up these privileges?

Fortunately, and this was clearly visible at the Council of Europe seminar, some men are beginning to question the male power, role, values and the male structures. These men have an important role to play in the coming years to promote equality.

However – and this shall be my conclusion – they should, even if it is necessary for them to discuss these questions among themselves, take care to associate women from the beginning. Women and men should not discuss in closed groups about their roles, about equality, and about peace. There should be a constant dialogue, and respect for each other’s identity. That is, in my mind, the only way to build this shared and peaceful world we want to bring about.
About the authors

Ingeborg Breines is Director of the Women and Culture of Peace Programme in UNESCO (1996–) and former Special Adviser to the Director-General of UNESCO on women, gender and development, responsible for UNESCO’s contribution to the fourth World Conference on Women (1993–96). She was Secretary-General of the Norwegian National Commission for UNESCO for many years and previously worked in the Norwegian Council for Innovation in Education. Her work is mainly in the field of gender equality, pedagogy, conflict-resolution and international understanding.

Robert W. Connell is Professor of Education at the University of Sydney. Formerly Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz (1992–95), Professor of Australian Studies at Harvard University (1991/92), Professor of Sociology, Macquarie University, Sydney (1976–91). Author and/or co-author of fifteen books, including *Class Structure in Australian History*, *Making the Difference*, *Gender and Power*, *Schools and Social Justice*, and *Masculinities*. Past President of the Sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand, member of a range of policy advisory committees, and a contributor to journals in sociology, education, political science, gender studies, culture and public affairs.


Alberto Godenzi, Professor of Sociology, Head of the Department of Social Studies at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), *Privatdozent* of Social Psychology at the University of Zurich, Research Associate in the Family Research Laboratory of the University of New Hampshire, member of the ‘group of specialists for combating violence against women’ of the Council of Europe, author of several books and numerous articles on violence against women and children, research on interpersonal violence, non-violent conflict management, gender, organization, risk behaviour and prevention.

Øystein Gullvåg Holter, Ph.D. (University of Oslo), sociologist, senior researcher at the Work Research Institute in Oslo, and from May 1999 Co-ordinator of Men’s Studies in the Nordic region (at NIKK, University of Oslo). He has written books on gender and work/family issues as well as papers with wider theoretical and historical content, and has contributed to research networking and contact in the new field of studies of men.

Michael Kaufman, Ph.D., is prominent among Canadian men working to end men’s violence, and to develop new and better relations between the sexes in workplaces and communities. He is the originator of the idea, and a founding member of the White Ribbon Campaign, the largest effort in the world of men challenging men to end violence against women. Dr Kaufman
is former professor at York University in Toronto and works full time as writer, speaker, and workshop leader.

**Hassan Keynan**, researcher, former Associate Professor at the Somali National University (1979–91), former Secretary-General of the Somali National Commission for UNESCO and former Deputy UNESCO Executive Board member (1987). His areas of interest are: educational and national reconstruction in war-torn countries; gender relations and particularly male roles and masculinities; human rights, particularly for women and children; matters relating to refugees and immigrants; conflict resolution and culture of peace.


**Uta Klein**, Dipl. päd., Ph.D., educational scientist and sociologist, teaches gender studies at the University of Münster, Germany. She has researched and written on feminist criminology, gender equality policies and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She has been a visiting lecturer at the Hebrew University in Israel (1995) and research fellow in the ‘Europe in the Middle East’ project (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute) from 1996 to 1997. Research project: ‘Military, Militarism and Gender in Israeli Society’.

**Malvern Lumsden**, Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Edinburgh (1969). He has been involved in peace research for more than thirty years, many of them as researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He was joint editor of the *Journal of Peace Research* from 1994 to 1997. In the 1980s he completed a Master’s programme in dance-movement therapy at New York University and he is now head of the Department of Dance Psychology and Therapy at the Norwegian College of Dance, Oslo.

**Robert Morrell** teaches in the Educational Department at the University of Natal, Durban. His doctoral research work was on the development of settler masculinity in the colony of Natal. He currently lectures on gender and education, and is active in the Gender Studies Centre at the University of Natal. His research work concentrates on educational issues – sexual violence in schools, corporal punishment and the gender regimes of schools – and on the construction of masculinities in a transitional society (South Africa), paying particular attention to men’s movements and gender politics.
Mirjana Najcevska, PhD. from the University St Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, in Juridical Studies, is Deputy Director of the Centre for Ethnic Relations, which is a part of the Institute for Sociological and Political Research at the University in Skopje. She is working on projects on: administrative studies for the administrators in the ethnically mixed municipalities; identifying gender discrimination in educational processes and the possibilities to overcome the same; the ethnic identity of the Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia, and possibilities of establishing civil identity.

Irina Novikova, Associate Professor of Department of English and Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Latvia. Her teaching and research are in the fields of women’s literary discourses in a comparative perspective, gender theory and cultural studies. She is actively engaged in networking gender studies in her region.

Knut Oftung, sociologist from the University of Oslo. He has been employed at the Gender Equality Council since 1993, and has specialized within the field of men and gender equality. He has frequently been asked to lecture at different universities and colleges. He is currently a co-ordinator for the Norwegian Network for studies of men, and is a member of the board at the Centre for Women’s studies, University of Oslo.

Daniel Rios Pineda is a Salvadoran sociologist. During the civil war he was a member of the FMLN (political branch). Since 1996 he has participated in masculinity workshops and is currently working in the fields of gender issues in Salvadoran culture and in gang violence in urban cities. In 1996 he was an observer at the FAO World Food Summit and a participant in various FAO meetings with civil society about food security. Until December 1996 he was General Manager of an NGO in El Salvador and is a member of the General Bureau in the Co-operative and Financial Worker’s Bank.

Lourdes R. Quisumbing was appointed the first woman Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports of the Republic of the Philippines in 1986. She is a former Secretary-General of the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines and former member of the Executive Board of UNESCO. She received her doctorate in education benemeritus from the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. She has received numerous scholastic honours and service awards, among them the Comenius Medal, a UNESCO international award, for her contributions to educational research and practice, and the degree of doctor in human letters, honoris causa, from the University of Southern Carolina.

Constantina Safilios-Rothschild is a Greek sociologist who has been a professor of sociology in many American universities such as the University of California at Santa Barbara and Pennsylvania State University as well as the Agricultural University of Wageningen in the Netherlands. She has formulated and evaluated numerous development projects in Africa and Asia and has undertaken research on family dynamics and the roles of men and women in four continents. She is currently a research professor at the Greek
National Centre for Social Research and is preparing a book on men’s affective dilemmas.

**Andrei Sinelnikov** is a lecturer and writer working for ANNA (Association No to Violence). He also works as Director of the recently founded Moscow Centre of Men’s Studies and is a member of the expert group under the Presidential Commission on Women, Family and Demography. He is the author of articles on gender issues published in the Russian Federation and abroad. He is co-author of the book *The Broken Cell: Politics, Culture and Domestic Violence* (written in co-operation with Marina Pisklakiova) published in 1998.

**Svetlana Slapšak** has taught at universities in Europe and the United States and is currently Professor of Ancient Anthropology and Anthropology of Gender at ISH, Ljubljana Graduate School in Humanities, Slovenia. Her books include essays, novels, translations from Greek and Latin, and since 1995 she has been editor-in-chief of the feminist periodical *Pro Femia*, Belgrade. She received the American PEN Freedom of Speech Award in 1993 and the Milos Crnjanski Award for a book of essays in 1990.

**Judith Hicks Stiehm** is Professor of Political Science at Florida International University in Miami. She was a founder and is past president of the Women’s Caucus in Political Science. Her works include *Non-violent Power: Active and Passive Resistance in America*, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*, *Women and Men’s War* (editor) and *It’s Our Military Too!* (editor). Her current work is on peacekeeping and on the military education given to senior officers.

**Georg Tillner** works in the field of media, gender and cultural studies as independent researcher and as a teacher at the Department of Contemporary History at the University of Vienna. He has published works on masculinity, Austrian film history, film and new media in historiography, and migration. He contributes regularly on film and other issues on the Austrian Radio (Ö1) and in other media.

**Marysia Zalewski** teaches at the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. She specializes in feminist theory and gender and international relations. Her most recent publication is an edited volume (with Jane Parpart) entitled *The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations* (1998). She is currently working on an article to mark the tenth anniversary of the contemporary debate on gender and international relations as well as completing a full-length manuscript: *Feminist Theories after Postmodernism: Theorising Through Prenatal Screening.*