International Migration and Economic Development

A trend report and bibliography
by
Brinley Thomas

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Since 1952, Unesco has been concerned with promoting studies of the social and cultural aspects of international migration.

In consultation with the International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation, Paris, Professor Brinley Thomas, of the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, Cardiff, was invited to prepare a general survey and critical assessment of research, theoretical and empirical, so far undertaken on international migration, from the standpoint of the various social science disciplines.

This survey is intended to be of use to national, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the field of international migration, in the clarification of the complex economic, sociological, demographic and cultural issues which they face. It is also intended for specialists engaged in research on this subject.
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CHAPTER I

An outline of the pre-1939 background

THE HEYDAY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

In the nineteenth century international migration played an important part in the process of economic growth. Up to the First World War it was relatively easy for people to change their country of residence. The belief widely held in that period was well expressed by an International Emigration Conference in 1889: 'We affirm the right of the individual to the fundamental liberty accorded to him by every civilized nation to come and go and dispose of his person and his destinies as he pleases.' If four freedoms had been proclaimed at that time, freedom to migrate would certainly have been one of them.

Looking back at the era of large-scale inter-continental migration, we can now see that it was an exceptional phase—an interval for scene-shifting on the world stage. New communities overseas, with spacious lands and rich natural resources, needed more people; and the continent of Europe, much of it densely populated, was only too ready to export its surplus. In just over a century, between 1820 and 1924, the United States received 36 million aliens, of whom about 70 per cent stayed there; nine out of ten of these came from Europe. It is estimated that between 1846 and 1924 no less than 50 million migrants moved into the continent of North and South America from the rest of the world. After this great reshuffle one-eleventh of the population of the earth were people originating in Europe living outside that continent.

International migration was in essence a vast secular transfer from agriculture to industry facilitated by the rise in agricultural productivity which was an indispensable condition of economic growth. Manufacturing could develop only if labour was released from the land, and labour could not be released from the land unless agricultural productivity was increasing faster than the demand for food. The mechanism can be seen most clearly if we forget national boundaries and regard the Atlantic community of nations as a single economy made up of interdependent regions. The growth of real income in this Atlantic economy in the century ending in 1913 entailed a redistribution of labour and
capital as between its component parts. There was an overseas transfer of 45 million people, the average rate of population growth each decade being 29 per cent in the United States and 8 per cent in Europe. By 1913 Great Britain, the world's leading exporter of capital, had invested £3,500 million abroad, 70 per cent of which was located in North America, South America and Oceania. The movement of population and capital from countries where they were relatively abundant to countries where they were relatively scarce was a necessary condition of the expansion of the international economy.

The transfer did not proceed at an even pace. There were four outstanding transatlantic outflows of migrants from Europe—1844-54, 1863-73, 1881-88 and 1903-13, and in each of these periods there was an upswing in the export of capital from Great Britain. An analysis of these upsurges in emigration reveals some interesting uniformities. Each of them was for the most part a rural exodus. Of the 2 million Europeans arriving in America in the years 1849-54, no fewer than 80 per cent came from Ireland and Germany. The tragic experience of the Irish peasantry after the potato famine of 1846-47 is well-known; similarly in Germany the operative fact was not the political crisis of 1848 but the break-up of the obsolete rural economy of the south-west. During the next two periods—1863-73 and 1881-88—two-thirds of the European migrants to America were from Ireland, Scandinavia and Germany. In the eighties no less than 1,250,000 left Germany and over 500,000 were uprooted from Scandinavia; it was early in that decade that technical progress in American agriculture had its first heavy impact on the agrarian economies of Europe. In Schumpeter's words, 'the story of the way in which civilized humanity got and fought cheap bread is the story of American railroads and American machinery.' [66, Vol. I, p. 319.]

1. With the introduction of the harvester in 1872 and the binder in 1880, the efficiency of American farming rose rapidly, and to this was added the technical revolution in transport by land and sea. A contemporary writer reported that '. . . on the wheat farms of the north-western United States it was claimed in 1887 that, with wages at $25 per month and board for permanent employees, wheat could be produced for 40 cents per bushel; while in Rhenish Prussia, with wages at $6 per month, the cost of production was reported to be 80 cents per bushel.' [71, p. 59.] This brought a crisis to agriculture in most European countries and caused more emigration. The greatest outflow occurred between 1903 and 1913 when nearly 10 million people left Europe for the United States, 70 per cent of them coming from Italy, Russia, the Baltic countries and Central Europe. Commenting on this influx the United States Immigration Commission wrote: 'Before

1. The figures in brackets refer to the selected bibliography on page 65.
coming to the United States the greater proportion were engaged in farming or unskilled labour and had no experience or training in manufacturing industry or mining. As a consequence their employment in the mines and manufacturing plants of this country has been made possible only by the invention of mechanical devices and processes which have eliminated the skill and experience formerly required in a large number of occupations. 1 [101, Vol. I, p. 494.] Exactly the same had been true of the 1,200,000 Irish migrants who landed in America in the years 1847-54.

Overseas migration and foreign lending fluctuated together, and they bore a significant relation to the rate of capital formation in the sending and receiving countries. There was a long-run community of interest which expressed itself in an inverse relation between the rate of capital construction in Great Britain and the countries of new settlement overseas. These fluctuations or long swings in migration and capital exports had a span corresponding to that of the building cycle, there was an upswing in construction (railways and building) in the receiving countries, e.g., the United States, Australia and Canada, and a downswing in Great Britain: in the downward phase of the lending-migration cycle, there was a downswing in capital construction in the receiving countries and an upswing in Great Britain. The inverse investment cycle arises when (a) a substantial part of capital formation is sensitive to the rate of population growth, and (b) the rate of population growth is mainly determined by the net migration balance. These conditions were fulfilled in the international system of the nineteenth century, and they also constituted a built-in stabilizer in that Great Britain, the leading creditor, was always putting its money back into the international circuit either by foreign lending or by a liberal purchasing of imports. The mechanism also entailed an inverse relation between internal and external migration. For example, when capital exports to the United States were in the upswing phase and British home construction was relatively declining, surplus labour from the rural sector in Britain tended to migrate to America rather than to urban areas at home; in the succeeding phase when the rate of capital formation in Britain was rising rapidly, the workers released from agriculture moved into the flourishing industrial towns and emigration fell away. A wave of home construction drew the rural surplus into urban employment at home; a wave of foreign investment drew the rural surplus into urban employment abroad. International movements of labour were thus a pivotal element in determining the rate of economic growth in both the sending and the receiving countries. A world balance-sheet of inter-continental migration is set out in Table 1. (For references on factor movements and economic growth see items listed in the bibliography at the end of the book.)
### Table 1. World intercontinental migration 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of emigration</th>
<th>Total (000's)</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Total (000's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>5 196</td>
<td>Argentina (1856-1932)</td>
<td>6 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>Brazil (1856-1932)</td>
<td>4 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles</td>
<td>18 020</td>
<td>British West Indies (1856-1932)</td>
<td>1 587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>Canada (1856-1932)</td>
<td>5 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (1871-1932)</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>Cuba (1901-32)</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>Guadeloupe (1856-1924)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4 089</td>
<td>Dutch Guiana (1856-1931)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10 092</td>
<td>Mexico (1911-31)</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta (1911-32)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Newfoundland (1841-1924)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>Paraguay (1881-1931)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>32 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1920-32)</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>Uruguay (1836-1932)</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1 805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2 253</td>
<td>TOTAL (America)</td>
<td>53 826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4 053</td>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 203</td>
<td>Philippines (1911-32)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (Europe)</strong></td>
<td>51 696</td>
<td><strong>Oceania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British India</td>
<td>1 194</td>
<td>Australia (1861-1932)</td>
<td>2 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde (1901-27)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Fiji (1881-1926)</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>Hawaii (1911-31)</td>
<td>216</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Helena (1896-1924)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>New Caledonia (1896-1932)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand (1851-1932)</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritius (1836-1932)</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seychelles (1901-32)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa (1881-1932)</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>53 450</td>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>59 187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNEQUAL RATES OF DEVELOPMENT

There is a school of thought which sees in the mechanism of international capital and labour flows a tendency to cause considerable inequality between rates of economic development. The record of creditor and underdeveloped countries in the pre-1913 period has been examined by many writers. A brief summary of this work is essential as a background for an assessment of its application to contemporary trends. Some authors hold that the underdeveloped countries of the second half of the nineteenth century had the worst of both worlds, as producers of primary produce and as consumers of manufactured goods. The argument runs as follows. The income and price elasticity of demand for manufactured goods tend to be greater than unity, whereas the corresponding elasticities for food and raw materials are less than unity. The industrialized creditor countries tended to take out the fruits of technical progress in the form of higher money incomes; in so far as they did this more than proportionately to the rise in productivity, they were placing an absolute burden on the consumers of industrial goods in the underdeveloped countries. But even if prices fell less than in proportion to the gain in productivity, there would be a relative burden on the foreign consumer. Moreover, foreign investment by the advanced countries resulted in the creation of export enclaves in the underdeveloped countries; its purpose was merely to secure sources of relatively cheap food and raw materials for the creditor economies. The multiplier effects of this investment were enjoyed mainly in the country of origin and not in the countries which received it. Thus, in terms both of the terms of trade and the investment multiplier, there was a secular bias operating against the underdeveloped areas and in favour of the advanced economies. The former were made to hand over to the latter a considerable part of their own technical progress. [60, 63, 67.]

A corollary of the above doctrine is that underdeveloped countries should beware of becoming enmeshed in a system of international division of labour which will condemn them to remain specialized in the production of primary produce. In the words of Professor Myrdal, 'The advice—and assistance—which the poorer countries receive from the richer is, even nowadays, often directed towards increasing their production of primary goods for export. The advice is certainly given in good faith, and it may even be rational from the short-term point of view of one underdeveloped country seen in isolation. In a broader perspective and from a long-term point of view, what would be rational is above all to increase productivity, incomes and living standards in the larger agricultural subsistence sectors, so as to raise the price of labour, and in manufacturing industry. This would engender economic development and raise incomes.' [60, p. 52.]

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The thesis just summarized refers mainly to the experience of underdeveloped countries which received imports of capital from the metropolitan countries, and these were usually colonies. If we took countries such as Canada, Denmark, Australia or New Zealand, which were certainly 'underdeveloped' in the middle of the nineteenth century, it could not be argued that they endured the worst of both worlds. On the contrary such countries enjoyed a rate of economic growth higher than that of Great Britain. [55, p. 13.] Moreover, the inferences made from the statistics of the terms of trade, i.e., the ratio of export prices to import prices, are suspect. A thorough analysis by Professor Kindleberger led to the following conclusion. 'It may be fair to conclude that there is no long-run tendency for the terms of trade to move against primary products in favour of manufactures. On the contrary if allowance is made for the unprovable but generally accepted fact that the improvement in the quality of manufactures, over the past 80 years has been greater than that of primary products, the terms of trade may have turned against manufactures and in favour of raw materials per unit of equal quality, however that may be defined.' [54, p. 263.] There are certainly cases of poor primary-producing countries which have had rising net barter terms of trade over a long period. For example, in Burma from the 1870s to the 1920s the price of the main export product, rice, went up, whereas the price of the main import commodity, cotton goods, went down. [49, p. 100.] The basic question is why some primary-producing countries in the nineteenth century succeeded in ploughing back a portion of the yield of their export booms into an expansion of domestic manufacturing, while others did not.

Unfortunately some of the literature gives the impression that there is something peculiar about agriculture which makes those who work in it relatively poor. One cannot say that a country gets richer because of the relative decline in its agriculture or that a country is poor because most of its people earn their living on the land. The causal sequence runs differently. Agriculture occupies a smaller segment of a nation's economy as a result of the growth of its real income; where we find 90 per cent of a country's labour engaged in agriculture it is because the general level of productivity in the economy is very low. In the poorest countries the people give all their time and energies to tilling the soil and they achieve only a bare subsistence level; the advanced countries have the highest standard of feeding with only about one in every eight of their workers engaged in agriculture. The investment of capital and labour in countries endowed with agricultural resources cannot in itself be said to handicap such countries; it is enough to mention Denmark and New Zealand. In the 50 years up to the First World War the average rate of increase per decade in real national product per capita was 19.3 per cent in Denmark as against 12.5 per cent in the United Kingdom. To explain why the export economies of
Latin America, South-East Asia or West Africa fared so much worse, we must look not so much at the mechanism of specialization and international investment as at the internal economic and social institutions of these areas.

A much deeper analysis of the pattern of growth in the nineteenth century is needed. Inquiries made into the course of wage rates and export prices in the United Kingdom lend no support to the argument that factor incomes tended to absorb the gains through productivity. There is no evidence that increases in the technical performance of British industry were taken out to any marked degree in higher money wages. Nor can it be overlooked that serious criticism has been levelled against the use of the movements in the net barter terms of trade as indicating the distribution of gain between trading countries. No one will deny that entrepreneurs from Western countries took advantage of a state of affairs in colonies which kept wages frozen at the level needed for bare subsistence, and the situation was often aggravated by non-competing groups. Furthermore, much of the international migration that took place was spurious and harmful. As Professor Myint has pointed out, '... in the latter half of the nineteenth century, immigrant labour, particularly from India, may really be regarded as an international commodity having a uniform price rather than as a factor of production. Wherever it was imported, it decisively pulled down wages and incomes in the “semi-empty” countries to the very low level appropriate to the over-populated countries instead of giving them a chance to rise a part of the way towards the high wage levels of the “empty” continents of North America and Australia.' [59, p. 135.]

The fact that this particular kind of migration caused the underdeveloped countries to be exploited is no valid reason for condemning the whole system of factor mobility in the nineteenth century. If lessons from history are to be sought as a basis for policies for the underdeveloped countries at the present time, a thorough and objective analysis of the record must be carried out.

THE DECLINE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The first stage in the undermining of the nineteenth century system of international mobility came with the First World War. The number of aliens arriving in the United States fell from 1,198,000 in 1913 to 111,000 in 1918. During the early years of the century the vast majority of the immigrants were from Central and South Eastern Europe; there had been a marked relative fall in the numbers from North-West Europe. There was a powerful upsurge of national feeling in the United States during her participation in the war, and a shift of opinion against a renewal of large-scale immigration was evident. There were fears of
social and racial fragmentation, and organized labour and representatives of ex-servicemen demanded exclusion. Shortly after the end of the war Congress passed a Quota Act in May 1921; this was followed in 1924 by the Immigration Restriction Act which laid down an annual quota equal to 2 per cent of the number born in each country resident in the United States at the time of the 1890 census. This legislation was designed to bring about a drastic decrease in the inflow from Southern and Eastern Europe. Under this Act the total amount of immigration from all countries covered by it was reduced to about 162,000 a year. It had a profound effect on the volume and direction of movement in the inter-war period. Whereas in the decade 1900-10 the population of the United States had increased 6,243,000 through immigration and 8,680,000 through natural increase, in 1920-30 immigration accounted for only 3,335,000 and natural increase 12,131,000. Thus began a cumulative series of restrictions in a number of countries and they were aggravated by the world depression of the thirties.

It is true that Great Britain, with the passing of the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, launched an ambitious policy of oversea settlement in the Dominions. In the 10 years 1922-31 as many as 400,000 migrants from the mother country received financial support to enable them to go overseas. The success of this programme, however, was short-lived. The environment in which British emigration had flourished in the nineteenth century had altered profoundly. When the United States imposed drastic restrictions, one might have expected the British Dominions to take her place as the main recipients of surplus population from Europe. With the exception of Canada’s strong absorptive capacity in the 1920s, nothing like this happened. It is illuminating to set out a population balance-sheet for the British Empire between 1901 and 1936. In this period the net outflow of people from Great Britain and Ireland was about 3 million, but the net absorption by the rest of the Empire was only 2,750,000. Thus, the British Empire as a whole lost a quarter of a million people by migration to the rest of the world even in a period during which a vigorous Empire settlement policy was being pursued and when the United States ceased to be an important receiving country. In the century 1836-1936 the net loss by migration of white people from the British Empire was 6,160,000.

The decline in inter-continental migration must be looked at in the light of what was happening to the balance of economic power as between the New World and the Old. At the end of the First World War the United States emerged as the world’s leading creditor nation. With the recovery of Europe and the re-establishment of the gold standard, countries outside the British Empire began to turn to New York rather than London for loanable funds. The change in the volume and direction of migration had its impact on international capital movements. The American Restriction Act of 1924 virtually stopped the transatlantic
flow from Central and Eastern Europe, the most over-populated part of the continent; this set in motion a movement of capital from America to Europe. By 1927 the average rate of return on European dollar bonds was 5.7 per cent as against 5.5 per cent on medium-grade domestic bonds in the United States; between 1924 and 1929 Germany absorbed 4,000 million marks of loans from the United States. This reversal of the direction of capital flow was a new element in the international economy. By 1930 the United States was a creditor on long-term account to the extent of $9,500 million. The nineteenth century mechanism had been disrupted. Much of the European migration which continued to flow to Canada and Latin America was pivoted on capital flows to those countries from the United States. However, the boom in American private investment in Europe proved to be precarious; the sharp curtailment in the supply of dollars after 1929 had a devastating effect on the outside world, particularly Western Europe. The world depression was so severe that it not only reduced movement to a very low level but had the extraordinary effect of reversing the direction of movement as between Europe and the oversea countries. In 1932, 11 European countries of emigration registered an aggregate net influx of 102,000, whereas Argentine, Australia, New Zealand, United States and Uruguay together had a net efflux of 65,000. In this period of general collapse of mobility there was one outstanding exception, Palestine, where 245,000 Jews were absorbed by migration between 1922 and 1937.

A study of the long-term experience of countries of immigration brings out some interesting qualitative changes, one ethnic wave being succeeded by another. France can be taken as an example. Over the long period from the nineteenth century up to the 1930s immigration into France was successively dominated by three ethnic elements—Germanic, Latin and Slav, and even a fourth was beginning to make itself felt with the relatively rapid increase in the number of Africans and Asians. In South America a similar process could be observed. The discriminating barriers erected against certain races by the United States and the British Dominions forced Slav and Asian people to seek admission to the one continent open to them—South America; no less than 34 per cent of the Japanese who had settled abroad by 1934 were living in Brazil and Peru. The spread of restrictions in the inter-war years had its heaviest incidence on the poorest populations in Eastern Europe and in Slav and Asian countries. If the nineteenth century regime of international mobility could have persisted after the First World War, it would have eventually brought within its sway the ethnic groups which needed it most. But this was not to be. Discriminatory protective measures became a permanent feature of the international scene which, together with restrictions on international trade, helped to aggravate the inequality of incomes as between nations.
The progress of research depends to a large extent on the availability of comprehensive and accurate empirical data. Statistics of external migration for most countries leave much to be desired, and unfortunately the rate of improvement in recent decades has not been encouraging. In the early part of the nineteenth century the records of movements of passengers were merely by-products of various pieces of legislation, e.g., Acts to regulate shipping. It was only when States began to see an advantage in having an order of priority for different groups of migrants that attempts were made to collect statistics as a guide to policy. Since there was a wide variety in the objectives of different governments, no attempt was made to establish a common terminology. The flood of British emigration was practically over before the Board of Trade decided (in 1912) to differentiate between outward passengers who were changing their permanent residence for a year or more and those who were merely going abroad for a short visit.

Statistical surveys of international migration have made use of six broad groups of data, namely, those based on control at ports, transport contracts, population registers, control at land frontiers, passports, and coupons detached from certain documents. In North America, South America, Asia and Africa the records are almost universally organized through controls at frontiers and ports. On the other hand, every kind of system has been practised by European countries [96].

Port statistics have the advantage that supervision is not difficult and the time when movement occurs is accurately ascertainable. Unfortunately the degree of coverage varied considerably. Some countries counted only passengers travelling steerage or in emigrant ships. The unguarded frontier between the United States and Canada, admirable as an example of how neighbours should behave to each other, had the disadvantage that it was impossible to keep accurate records. Many emigrants from Europe went into the United States through the back door from Canada, but the official statistics published about this
movement were worthless. It was not until 1907 that the figures of emigration from the United States were put on a basis comparable with those of immigration. When we turn to transport contracts and travel documents, we find the usual failure to separate migrants from other travellers and difficulties arising out of the cumbrous character of the machine. As for land frontiers, it is clear that the controls that can be exercised at such points are far less effective than at seaports. Countries such as Holland and Sweden, which use population registers kept by local authorities, have managed to collect demographic data of wide range and high accuracy; but here the external migration records have tended to be uneven or inaccessible.

Two classic official inquiries stand out as sources of empirical knowledge and statistical records, one on immigration and the other on emigration. The results of the exhaustive investigation made by the Immigration Commission in the United States were published in 42 volumes in 1911-12. Volume III, *Statistical Review of Immigration, 1820-1910* [102] is an important source. The report of the Swedish Royal Commission on Emigration (*Betänkande: Utvandringsfrågan*) was published in 1913, accompanied by 20 volumes of memoranda and appendices. Worthy of special mention is the fourth volume, *Den Svenska och Europeiska Folköknings—och Omflyttningstatistik* (Swedish and European Statistics of Population Increase and Migration) by Gustav Sundborg, 1910 [91]. This contains a comprehensive compilation of emigration time-series for Sweden and other European countries in the nineteenth century.

True to the traditions of state sovereignty, each country has organized its system of statistics to suit itself with hardly any regard to the need for international comparability. The researcher has thus been facing a bewildering variety of definitions and classifications. One of the most important of recent research activities has been the painstaking efforts of various departments of the United Nations to cut through this jungle and show what has to be done if we are to have reliable international statistics. Thanks to this valuable scrutiny, we know the relative quality of the migration statistics furnished by different countries and how far they are from the standard required. A broad outline of the situation is given in Table 2.

Only 16 out of 45 countries gave an analysis of emigrants by country of future residence or destination, and only 17 gave a classification of immigrants by country of last residence or origin. Only 16 differentiated between continental and inter-continental immigrants and 10 between continental and inter-continental emigrants. There are various definitions of ethnic or racial origin; and an age-grouping comparable to what is

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20
### TABLE 2. Tabulations of migration statistics for different countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries giving any data</td>
<td>Countries giving any data</td>
</tr>
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1 Based on United Nations, *Problems of Migration Statistics* [92].
usually available nationally was only given in 11 countries. It is disappointing for the demographer that only 16 countries give data on the marital status of migrants, and in 9 of them the information is not combined with age-grouping and in 5 it is not combined with sex.

The resolution passed by The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on 10 August 1948, requesting that attention be given to the improvement of statistics of international migration has borne fruit in the form of two basic studies, namely, *Sex and Age of International Migrants: Statistics for 1918-1947* [97] and *Economic Characteristics of International Migrants and Statistics for Selected Countries, 1918-1954* [98]. These have been prepared by the Population Branch of the Bureau of Social Affairs. Thus, for the first time we now have a survey devoted solely to the economic characteristics of migrants; it is a continuation of the path-breaking investigations published by the International Labour Office between the wars. The information covers 33 countries and territories, with tables based exclusively on original data classifying migrants by occupation or industry, state of dependency, possession or non-possession of a contract of employment, and amount of money brought in or sent back to a country. Only three countries were found to compile figures of the amount of money which immigrants bring in with them—the United States, South Africa and Israel. These studies are a mine of valuable data for the researcher and they indicate how varied is the quality and coverage of the primary material. The tables reproduce the nomenclatures used in the various countries for the grouping of migrants by occupation. The report makes it plain that identical titles often have a different meaning or scope in different countries. Terms such as 'skilled' and 'unskilled' appear in the statistics of certain countries, but no definition is furnished; the degree of comparability is unknown. Moreover, ' . . . the comparability and significance of the data by occupations are much diminished by the presence in most classifications of an active group variously described as “other”, “miscellaneous”, “not stated”, “ill-defined”, etc. Such groups may cover only those minor occupations which are not included in the defined groups, or they may cover persons who, if their occupations were known or more accurately described, would be included in one of the defined groups. In some countries the size of such a residual group is so large that the data for the defined groups cannot be considered as significant.' [98, pp. 23-4.

Recently a study of European migration statistics was carried out as a joint project by the secretariats of OEEC, ICEM, ILO and the United Nations in response to a request made by the Manpower Committee of OEEC, December 1958 [172]. It was found that it would be very difficult to relate the statistics of oversea migration to those of intra-European migration, partly because of a variety of methods and definitions and partly because the two types of migration are different in character. Governments, in recording European movements, rarely
use the definitions of permanent migration recommended by the United Nations. The common denominator was based on a concept of residence, and the project had to use this in preference to statistics which conformed to international requirements. With regard to statistics of overseas countries, it was also noted that very few countries had adopted the international recommendations.

Most experts would agree that a framework such as the following is the ideal to aim at. [100, p. 17.]

### Arrivals from other countries

1. Total arrivals (sum of categories 2-5).
2. Permanent immigrants, i.e., non-residents (nationals and aliens) intending to remain for more than one year.
3. Temporary immigrants, i.e., non-residents intending to take up an occupation remunerated within the country for a period of one year or less. Their dependents are placed in category 4.
4. Visitors, i.e., non-residents intending to remain for one year or less without engaging in an occupation remunerated within the country (including their dependents).
5. Residents (nationals and aliens) returning after being abroad for not more than one year.

### Departures to other countries

1. Total departures (sum of categories 2-5).
2. Permanent emigrants, i.e., residents (nationals and aliens) intending to remain abroad for more than one year.
3. Temporary emigrants, departing dependants being placed in category 4.
4. Visitors departing, including their dependents.
5. Residents (nationals and aliens) intending to remain abroad for one year or less.

### Special groups

Included in the above categories are groups which need to be shown separately, e.g., refugees, transferred populations, immigrants given special facilities such as government financial assistance, participation of inter-governmental organizations in cost of passage, facilities under bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Despite the patient work of experts in the United Nations, the ILO, OEEC and other bodies, the basic statistical records are not showing much improvement. It is inevitably a slow process where so many governments are involved. Even in Great Britain, with annual records stretching back to 1803, the present migration statistics are in some
respects very defective. They are still based on the manifests of ships on long sea routes only. There is no information about movement by short sea routes or by air; the latter is a serious omission since it is estimated that one in three of all emigrants from the United Kingdom goes by air. [94, Cmd. 619, p. 9.] In this respect Great Britain is lagging behind many countries which have legislation requiring passengers by air to fill the necessary forms, and the airlines co-operate as do the shipping companies. The obvious remedy would be the introduction of a common card to be completed by passengers on the long sea and air routes; there should be no difference between the action required of the airlines and the shipping companies. The Oversea Migration Board in Great Britain has repeatedly urged reforms on these lines. To quote the 1958 report, 'Not only are adequate migration statistics essential for the formulation of migration policy, but it is perhaps not generally appreciated how great a practical value improved statistics would have in other fields. They would, for instance, help the authorities concerned to assess the gross and net effect of migration upon our manpower resources, especially in skilled and technological categories in general and in the scientific and engineering professions in particular. In addition improved migration data would be of value for demographic purposes, and also for actuarial calculations in connexion with the National Insurance Fund. They would be valuable to the National Health administration.' [94, Cmd. 619, pp. 5-6.]

Some of the most useful advances made from the point of view of research have come from the application of appropriate statistical methods to population census data. In this way the degree of probable error in the migration time series may be checked and fairly accurate estimates of net external movements can be arrived at for inter-census periods. Two outstanding examples may be cited, namely, the work by S. Kuznets and E. Rubin, *Immigration and the Foreign Born* [27], in which the figures of immigration for the United States have been checked against census data on resident foreign-born, and that of N. Keyfitz, 'The Growth of the Canadian Population', *Population Studies*, IV, 1950, which sets out a population balance-sheet for Canada, 1851-1950, with the number of births, deaths, immigration and emigration in each decade.

**ECONOMIC ANALYSIS**

*Theoretical models*

In recent years there has been a distinct advance in the analysis of international migration in theoretical terms. We shall give a brief outline of four lines of approach.
Trade as a substitute for migration

There is a formally valid theoretical model which demonstrates that, under certain assumptions, free mobility of commodities in international trade is a complete substitute for the mobility of factors of production and will lead to complete equalization of factor prices. The argument had been clearly set out in a remarkable paper which Professor A. P. Lerner read in 1933 at a seminar at the London School of Economics when he was a student there [106]. The conclusion was put in the following words: '... if two (or more) commodities are produced in each of two (or more) countries, between which commodities can move and in which the same technical knowledge is available, then in any stable or reasonably likely equilibrium, physically similar factors, even though they may not move between the countries, will have the same price in each country.' [106, p. 84].

Professor P. A. Samuelson independently produced a similar model in 1948 [112], and ventured to indicate policy implications concerning migration in these words. 'The United Kingdom is a densely populated region. In the post-war period it has suffered from loss of overseas investment income, from high prices and adverse terms of trade, from a certain disorganization of production and internal division of labour. Is widespread emigration the way out? Perhaps it is. But, despite numerous qualifications, the gist of the present discussion has been to show that relatively free commodity trade is a better substitute for mobility of factors of production than was hitherto thought to be the case. So long as raw material can be carried to the United Kingdom by relatively cheap ocean transport, the law of diminishing returns is largely robbed of any particularly immediate local effects. The question arises: What can English industrial workers do for themselves in the remote parts of the Empire that they cannot do in England? What can they do for the present generation of Australians and Canadians after migration that they cannot do in England? Obviously, no simple answers can be given to such complex questions. Undoubtedly industry is in many parts of the world asleep, and new catalytic agents would contribute towards a better and more suitable long-run equilibrium. But to have asked the questions in the above form shows that the favourable effects of migration are by no means automatic and cannot be simply taken for granted. They would be so only if it were proposed that Englishmen migrate in order to go on the land as primary food producers. This, few experts would propose on a large scale, even now when the terms of trade are abnormally favourable to agricultural production. Without venturing upon rash prophecy, one can venture scepticism that this abnormal trend of the terms of trade, counter to historical drift, will continue. And even if the trend towards relatively higher food and raw material prices should continue to develop, it would have to go...
a long way before comparable labour effort on the land could anywhere in the world be expected as a matter of cold fact to yield the material real incomes of industrialised labour. [112, pp. 183-4.]

Professor Samuelson's article led to an interesting controversy, too long and intricate to summarize here. [104-114.] His policy implications concerning migration proved to be somewhat premature, and in his second article he expressed himself much more cautiously. 'And while it may have been rash of me to draw a moral concerning the worth of emigration from Europe out of an abstract simplified model, I must still record the view that the more realistic deviations from constant returns to scale and the actual production functions encountered in practice are likely to reinforce rather than oppose the view that high standards of life are possible in densely populated areas such as the island of Manhattan or the United Kingdom.' [110.]

It was not long before the sceptics launched a broad attack on this doctrine. The logic of Samuelson's argument within the ambit of the assumptions he made is formally correct; his assumptions, however, are far too restrictive to warrant the broad conclusions which he ventured to draw. (These assumptions are free trade, free competition, a two-country, two-commodity, two-factor world, no specialization, identical production functions in both countries for the same products, small optimum units in comparison with markets.) I. F. Pearce has shown that, without making any unusual assumptions, it is possible to demonstrate that free mobility of commodities in international trade will increase the disparity between factor prices. [110, pp. 111-13.]

A penetrating contribution by Professor Harry G. Johnson did much to clear the air [105]. He reaches the conclusion that the proposition that free trade will tend to equalize relative factor prices and will do so if both countries continue to produce both goods is true only in certain conditions, i.e., '... if, as a consequence either of the nature of the available technology or of the endowment of countries with factors in not too dissimilar proportions, the relative factor-intensities of goods do not reverse themselves as the capital/labour ratio varies between the endowment ratios of the two countries. ... Thus the conclusions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model depend not only on the assumption of competition, absence of trade barriers, constant returns to scale, and so forth, but also on an empirical assumption about the nature of technology of the degree of variation in the factor endowments of countries.' [105, pp. 28-9.] Professor J. R. Hicks, while recognizing the narrowness of the assumptions underlying Samuelson's model, thinks that it is appropriate for the very long run in which we might suppose that man-made capital stocks could be changed into whatever form

was most suitable and '... if environment became such that Indians or Africans could earn European incomes if they had European efficiency ...' [194]. In other words, a regime of universal free trade, without factor movements, would in the long run tend to equalize factor prices. This very general conclusion leaves some of the more important theoretical issues unresolved.

A thorough and conclusive treatment of this subject is to be found in Part III of Professor J. E. Meade's *Theory of International Economic Policy* [108]. He shows that the assumptions required for factor price equalization are of a very restrictive character and some of them are unlikely ever to be even approximately fulfilled. Given more reasonable postulates it can be demonstrated that free trade must be accompanied by international migration of factors if total production in the international economy is to be maximized. According to Meade these postulates are: costs are influenced by differences in '... the atmosphere in which, and the scale on which, products are produced in different countries' (Chapter XXI); costs of transport of the products made in both countries are allowed for (Chapter XXII); the existence of a large number of factors relatively to the number of standardized traded products; complete specializing of certain countries on certain lines of production; appreciable differences in the technical possibility of substituting one factor for another in different industries producing traded products (Chapter XXIII). Having established beyond doubt the rationale of international mobility of labour and capital, Meade concludes with two arguments in favour of controls. 'In the first place, if in any countries there are demographic conditions leading to a rapid and uncontrolled increase of population there may be strong arguments for the prevention of the free migration of labour from such countries into the other countries where the rate of population increase is better controlled. If population increase is really uncontrolled in the countries of emigration, there might be no end to the movement of labour in conditions of unrestricted migration until all the countries of immigration were also severely over-populated. Freedom of international migration demands some control of domestic births in the countries of emigration so that it does not lead to an unlimited expansion in the total of world population. Secondly, in the case of the international movement of labour and of capital we have placed special stress upon one aspect of the "second-best" argument. If different countries have different domestic policies for the distribution of income and property, there may be a very special reason for exercising some control over the international movement of labour and capital. Suppose that in one country great stress is laid on policies for equality and relatively little on efficiency, while in another country in the formation of economic policies much stress is laid on free incentives for efficiency and relatively little on equality. Then factors which are most capable of earning high rewards
will move to the latter country, and factors which are most in need of the comforts of the welfare state will move to the former. These movements may be quite uneconomic. There is for this reason much truth in the idea that either countries must keep roughly in step in their welfare policies or else, while trade in products may be free, factor movements must be subject to some degree of control.' [108, pp. 569-70.]

Migration and inverse investment cycles

It was shown in section 'The Heyday of International Migration', in Chapter I of this report that the era of relatively unrestricted international mobility was characterized by an inverse relation between long swings in capital construction in the United Kingdom and the countries of new settlement overseas. A model designed to explain the nature of this interaction may be summarized as follows. [118, Chapter XI, and 119, Chapter I.]

Let there be two countries A, an industrialized creditor, and B under-populated but rich in natural resources. Let each country be divided into two sectors—capital construction and export. There is free mobility of factors between the countries and between the sectors. The following relationships are assumed. The level of activity in the export sector of one country depends on the marginal efficiency of capital in the capital construction sector of the other country in the same period. The export capacity of each country is a function of the rate of expansion achieved in the capital construction sector of that country in the previous period. The following two principles are postulated. First, a major fraction of total capital formation is governed by the rate of population growth. Secondly, the rate of population growth depends mainly on the net external migration balance.

Let us suppose that a migration movement, from whatever cause, takes place from A to B. The rate of construction is relatively stimulated in B and depressed in A; the upswing in capital formation in B induces a flow of capital from A and a boom in A’s export sector which will draw in factors from the relatively depressed construction sector in A. Meanwhile in B there is an internal suction of factors into the expanding construction sector. When the building boom in B reaches its downturn explained, say, by the interaction between the accelerator and the multiplier, the rate of immigration falls and a revival in building begins in A. Factors and loanable funds in A now move from the declining export sector into the reviving construction sector; migration into towns in A takes the place of emigration from A to B. The upswing in building in A induces an upswing in the export sector in B; this goes on until A’s boom reaches its downturn, coinciding with the trough of building activity in B. Space does not allow an account of the price implications of these inverse cycles. Mr. R. C. O. Matthews in his recent book
recognizes migration movements as being the most plausible explanation of the inverse relation between fluctuations in building in the United Kingdom and the United States in the period 1870-1914. [116, pp. 109-10.1] An explanation of a similar character has been suggested by Professor Simon Kuznets in his model of a self-perpetuating long swing in population and product in the United States up to the 1920s [115]. He puts the essence of it as follows: 'Given the long swings in addition to per capita flow of goods to consumers, the result—with some lag—will be long swings first in the net migration balance and then in the natural increase, yielding swings in total population growth. The latter then induce, with some lag, similar swings in population-sensitive capital formation—residential housing and fixed capital expenditures by railroads. The latter cause inverted long swings in “other” capital formation, and in changes in additions to per capita flow of goods to consumers. The swings in the latter then start another long swing in the net migration balance and in natural increase, and so on.' These models, taken together with the theoretical results set out in Professor Meade's work, furnish a basis for an interpretation of the role of international migration in the process of growth.

Substitution and aggregative effects of immigration

Much popular discussion of the economic impact of immigration is vitiated by the absence of clear theoretical concepts. Leaving the problem of cyclical fluctuations aside, we may ask how does an inflow of immigrants affect the receiving economy. Such an analysis must begin by distinguishing between the aggregative effect and the substitution effect. The core of the distinction is defined clearly by Professor B. S. Keirstead: 'By the “aggregative mode” we mean the form or mode through which any change works its effects on the economy via its effect on aggregate income. By the “real mode” we mean the form or mode through which any change affects the economy via the alteration in the margin of substitution of one good, or group of goods, or one factor, for another good, group of goods or factor, the structure of the market, the level of real income and welfare and the real rates of reward.' [120, pp. 109-10.1] The effectiveness of this type of analysis is well illustrated by the work of Professor J. J. Spengler. [123, pp. 18-22.1] The method of approach is as follows. 'Let us suppose that migrants are moving from Country A to Country B, and that the immigrants streaming into B include, besides a relatively small number of non-workers (chiefly women and children), a relatively large number of workers who fall into four occupational categories, \( a_1, a_2, a_3, \) and \( a_4. \) Let us suppose also that Country B has a very small propensity to import and export. In the event that B’s labour force embraces four analogous occupational
categories of workers, \( b_1, b_2, b_3, \) and \( b_4, \) the immigrant workers will be substitutable for native workers included in these categories. In consequence (abstracting from income and aggregative effects and proceeding on the assumption that the immigrant workers find employment in their occupational categories), the relative rates of remuneration received by native workers in these occupational categories will decline. Simultaneously the relative rates of remuneration received by native workers in occupational categories other than these four will rise, in part because the increase in categories \( b_1 - b_4, \) which are complementary to all or most of categories \( b_5 - b_8, \) elevates the schedule of demand for (and the value productivity of) workers in the latter categories. The native labour force at first will experience both real or (substitution) and complementary effects from the immigrant workers, with the substitution (complementary) effect being overriding in proportion as the relative number of workers enrolled in categories \( b_1 - b_4, \) was large (small) already prior to the arrival of the immigrants.' [123, p. 19.]

Groups within an immigration country naturally tend to see only the substitution effect, but this is by no means the whole picture. Campaigns for immigration restrictions are often based on the experience of particular groups. The view is disturbed, however, unless the aggregative aspect is borne in mind. It is put as follows by Professor Spengler. 'Immigration also entails aggregative or income effects, and these will be relatively most pronounced in developing and expanding countries. The supposed influx of immigrants would almost certainly (abstracting from transient trade-cycle effects) be attended by an increase in the aggregate amount of income produced in B. This increase would be relatively greatest \((ceteris paribus)\) if conditions were such that B's population was of infra-income-optimum size, since it might then be expected that (as an indirect result of immigration after the composition of B's labour force had become appropriately adjusted to the influx of the immigrant workers. It would not be likely, however, that absolute income per worker would rise also in occupations \( b_1 - b_4 \) unless the population of B had been of infra-optimum size and a sufficient number of native workers in these occupations had transferred into occupations \( b_5 - b_8; \) relative remuneration in occupations \( b_1 - b_4 \) would tend to be lower than it was prior to the coming of the immigrants. The aggregative effect of immigration just described may be reinforced, even though it alone tends to be great enough to swamp the substitution effects of immigration when an economy is in the stage of increasing return; for some consequences eventually attendant upon socio-economic changes generated by immigrants may also be aggregative in effect.' [123, pp. 19-20.]

Numerous cases could be cited from past experience to show how illuminating this distinction between substitution and aggregative effects is. A good example is the marked change in the volume and quality of British emigration to the United States at the turn of the century.

30
Whereas in 1880-1900 the proportion of unskilled labourers in this inflow was between 60 and 80 per cent, in 1900-13 this proportion had fallen to 25 per cent, with a rise in the proportion of skilled workers to 45 per cent. The average annual volume of immigration from Great Britain to the United States fell from 150,000 in the early 1880s to 50,000 between 1900 and 1913. After 1900 the economy of the United States, transformed by technical innovations calling for a 'widening' of the capital structure, was able to absorb large supplies of unskilled and even illiterate labour—the 'new' immigrants—from Central and Eastern Europe. There was a complementarity between the new immigrants and the managerial, technical and skilled grades; hence a relatively increased demand for British skilled labour. The lowest stratum among immigrants from Britain and Ireland found it difficult to compete with the southern Europeans. On the other hand, the movement up the social ladder of second-generation British and North European stock in the United States was a substitute for British skilled immigrants. In the case of British skilled migrants after 1900 the complementarity effect was probably a little stronger than the substitution effect, whereas for the unskilled the substitution effect overwhelmed the scale effect.

**Immigration and inflation**

Among the problems raised by immigration is its tendency to generate inflation; this has been a major preoccupation in the post-war period in countries such as Australia and Israel. Theoretical models have been constructed to show the conditions under which this result may be expected; they also seek to explain why immigration proceeds by fits and starts. An example of this type of analysis from the work of the Australian economist, P. K. Karmel may be noted [126]. Suppose the receiving economy has an annual output of 100, consumption being 90 and investment 10, and the capital-output ratio 3 : 1. Let the population be increased by 2 per cent per annum through immigration, and let full employment be assumed. Consumption rises from 90 to 91.8, i.e., by 2 per cent. The capital stock of 300 needs to go up by 2 per cent—by 6. Whereas aggregate real supply increases from 100 to 102, aggregate real demand goes up from 100 to 107.8. To the extent that the migrants would work harder, save more and demand less house-room than the average Australian, the inflationary gap could be narrowed. The unfavourable effect of the excess aggregate demand on the balance of payments could temporarily be offset by an import of capital, but the situation would be precarious. It is highly likely that the Government has to intervene to cut down imports by lowering incomes; at this point the rate of immigration will fall. This certainly has a bearing on the post-war experience of Australia. Another analysis, using the technique of comparative statics, is that of W. M. Corden [125].
An interesting model, strongly influenced by the experience of Israel, has been developed by Professor A. P. Lerner [127]. This shows that there can be a self-perpetuating cost inflation even when the authorities are successful in preventing excess demand. If the immigrants bring with them a conventional notion of a standard real wage or adopt it from the indigenous workers, we get a process in which, with unemployment present, costs rise, sellers raise prices and the real wage falls below the 'standard'. Money wages are then put up in order to restore real wages to the standard. Costs again rise and the spiral goes on. The intervention of the Government to prevent the level of employment becoming 'unsatisfactory' ensures the continuance of the process. Professor Lerner reaches the following conclusion: 'There is no necessary demand inflationary pressure induced by immigration, or by the capital formation that immigration calls for, if the Government holds to a policy of preventing excess demand from developing. A “cost inflation” can, however, develop even with the most conservative monetary and fiscal policy that is possible in practice, if “unrealistic” real wage and income standards are strongly established. These are likely to come about where there is a large immigration. Such a cost inflation is compatible with severe unemployment and non-absorption of immigrants into productive economic activity. It tends to establish an unfavourable balance of payments by which the unemployment and the cost inflation are aggravated in return. There is then a conflict between the measures that would alleviate these difficulties in the short run and those that are necessary for the long run cure. It is important to recognize whether an inflation is a cost inflation or a demand inflation because treatments that alleviate one kind of inflation may aggravate the other.' [127, p. 62.]

We have examined four departments of economic theory—factor price equalization, inverse investment cycles, substitution and aggregative effects, and the inflationary process; the models which have been developed have helped to integrate the study of migration with the general body of price and income theory. Moreover, with a deeper understanding of the nature of the interaction of the relevant variables, statistical and demographic analysis can be made more meaningful and productive.

**Empirical studies**

There is an extensive literature which deals with the statistical and empirical aspects of international migration since the Second World War. Space forbids more than a summary of the major contributions. The trends in research can best be brought out if we first attempt to establish a broad framework of interpretation. Inevitably a large number of interesting studies will have to be left out: we shall include within our purview those which contribute towards an explanation of the changed
role of migration in the international economy since 1945 as compared with previous periods. In later sections of the report more specific reference will be made to investigations which have a direct bearing on operational and policy problems.

Migration and private capital movements

We have already summarized the chief features of the mechanism of international mobility in the period ending in 1913, and some of the factors underlying the decline in the inter-war period were noted. It is not easy to trace an equally clear pattern since the Second World War. In this section we are restricting ourselves to purely economic analysis. We might therefore single out for particular attention the following aspects—inter-continental and intra-continental movements, the determinants and consequences of migration flows, the influence of Government policies, the role of international migration as an aid to economic growth in underdeveloped and mature economies.

Our frame of reference requires us first to ask what has happened since 1945 to international flows of labour in relation to international flows of capital, since the high positive correlation between these two flows was a pivotal element in the system during the heyday of migration. In an effort to throw light on this difficult question, we shall divide the post-war period into two parts—1945-52 and post-1952. The years 1945-52 were an interlude during which the international economy of the free world was recovering from the tremendous dislocation caused by the Second World War. The question about the role of migration in the new setting can be answered only on the basis of experience in the late 1950s; but it is necessary first to find out what was taking place during the temporary phase of post-war recovery.

In contrast to the experience of the century ending in the 1930s, there was hardly any correlation in 1945-52 between the main movements in international migration and in private foreign lending. In the latter seven years the total net outflow of private long-term capital from the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France and Belgium was $11,000 million; over 70 per cent of this (i.e. $7,900 million) came from the United States. One profound change which has occurred is obvious. In the pre-1913 period the great supplier of private long-term capital, the Old World, especially Great Britain, was also the great supplier of emigrants: since 1945 the primary source of private long-term capital has been the United States, the erstwhile country of immigration which has practically closed its doors. Has this flow of American foreign lending been going to countries which have been absorbing immigrants? If we take Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa together, we find that they absorbed 899,000 immigrants between 1945 and 1952, but the volume of private capital exports from
the United States to these countries was negligible, the total amount of direct investments there in 1954 being only $600 million. Then again, Israel in the same period took in 526,000 migrants, but there was virtually no American direct investment there. However, if we look at Canada and three Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela—there was a correlation between immigration from Europe and capital inflow from the United States.

What was the nature of American private foreign lending? No less than 40 per cent of it in the years 1945-51 went into petroleum and 32 per cent into manufacturing; the latter investments were made almost entirely in countries already well advanced industrially, e.g., Canada and Western Europe. The American private investor showed a strong preference for oil, mining and smelting, and plantation products, particularly where the output could be sold in the United States or for dollars in other markets. The value of United States long-term private investment went up from $12,300 million at the end of 1946 to $24,400 million at the end of 1954, and three-quarters of the latter was direct investment by United States undertakings. Portfolio investment had declined sharply. Half of the direct investment in 1954 was in three countries: Canada ($5,939 million), Venezuela ($1,399 million) and the United Kingdom ($1,245 million). A report issued by OEEC in 1954 made the following comment: ‘The most striking fact is that the activity of United States private investment abroad since 1930 has not kept pace with the growth of the United States economy or even with that of the world economy. Annual exports of private capital show no appreciable expansion since 1947. In the post-war period they represented less than 4 per cent of gross domestic capital formation in the United States. As a source of dollars the outflow of private American long-term capital in the post-war years represented about 6 per cent of total dollar receipts accruing to the rest of the world from United States imports, invisible payments and loans made by government agencies and the IBRD (excluding grants), whereas this percentage reached 20 per cent in 1927-28, when American investment abroad was at its peak.’ [147, p. 20.]

Whereas in the nineteenth century British private foreign lending went to a considerable extent into public utilities in the then under-developed areas, hardly any of the post-1945 private capital exports went into public utilities. This change was stressed by a United Nations report in 1954: ‘Until the 1930s public utilities in under-developed countries were to a large extent established by means of foreign capital, either in the form of government loans raised in foreign capital markets or of direct investment by foreign-controlled enterprises. In fact the great bulk of the foreign capital that entered under-developed countries for development purposes belonged to these two categories. This analysis leaves little doubt as to the dilemma of under-developed countries with regard to the financing of development by foreign private capital. It is precisely
Now let us turn to the post-war pattern of international migration. The intercontinental balance sheet for the years 1945-52 was as follows: emigration from Europe, 4,452,000; immigration into Europe, 1,150,000; non-European migration to non-European countries, 460,000; other intercontinental migration, 250,000; a total of 6,312,000. The gross outward movement of 4,500,000 people from Europe was the equivalent of four-fifths of one year’s natural increase; this contrasts with a corresponding outflow in 1900-07 equal to two year’s natural increase. The chief sending countries were: United Kingdom, 1,107,000; Italy, 741,000; Netherlands, 318,000; Spain 272,000; Portugal, 152,000. There were 1,200,000 refugees. On the receiving side were: United States, 1,104,000; Argentine, Brazil and Venezuela, 883,000; Canada 726,000; Australia, 697,000; Israel, 526,000; South Africa 125,000; New Zealand, 75,000. One aspect of the profound change in the economic status of the United States in relation to the rest of the Western World is the eclipse of immigration into the United States as a dominating factor. In the decade 1904-13 the inflow into America was at the average rate of 11 per 1,000 of the population; in the corresponding period since 1945 it was a mere 1.3 per 1,000.

From the brief survey it is apparent that in the immediate post-war recovery period the oversea movement of migrants from the traditional sending countries was still going on but the relation which used to exist between it and flows of private capital seems to have been ruptured. To understand the new relationships it is necessary to bring other factors into the analysis.

American aid and European emigration

The key to an understanding of the mechanism of international migration in the years immediately after the Second World War is to be found in the international flow of public capital. A new triangular relationship emerged on the basis of North American aid to Europe. In the period 1945-52 there was a gross international movement of public capital amounting in the aggregate to $75,500 million, and the United States and Canada supplied 58 per cent of it. The part of this great flow which mainly concerns us in this context is the transfer from the United States to Europe. The net outflow of public capital from the United States was $33,000 million, and the net inflow into Western Europe was no less than $22,000 million. This generous blood transfusion from the New World to the Old enabled the exhausted economies of Western Europe to export capital (public and private) as well as migrants to the oversea countries traditionally dependent upon them. This triangular
mechanism may be illustrated by examining the case of the United Kingdom. Her adverse trade balance in the years 1945-51, although it was severe, was only about one-sixth of the public loans and grants of $10,000 million which she received from the United States and Canada. Because of this influx, the United Kingdom was able herself to export $3,700 million of public capital (mainly to her dependencies and as relief to Europe) as well as $4,000 million of private capital chiefly to oversea members of the Commonwealth [149]. Even in the critical year 1947 there was an efflux of $507 million of capital to the sterling area, partly portfolio investment and partly money taken out by emigrants. Free mobility of capital within the sterling area was maintained, and emigration according to the old Commonwealth pattern went with it. We have seen that Great Britain had the highest volume of oversea emigration in Europe. Thus, straight after the end of the war, thanks to the inflow of public capital, there was a resumption by European countries, e.g., the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Belgium, of a regime of factor mobility and a great deal of multilateral trading. Although the American private investor was reluctant to lend, his Government on his behalf rendered aid on an ample scale where it was required. At the same time, the flow of American private capital to Canada and Latin America served indirectly to sustain the flow of migrants from Europe to those countries. Such was the triangular system which in the years 1945-52 contributed so much to the rapid recovery of Western Europe as well as less developed economies overseas. [The main references are 159; 154, p. 110; 158; 119.]

Implications of the rapid economic growth of Western Europe

The rapid rate of economic growth in Western Europe since 1953 entails some important implications for the future of international migration. We have seen that the international mobility experienced in the period 1945-52 rested on a set of conditions which were far from permanent; Western Europe was being helped to recover from the ravages of the war. There was a preoccupation with the problem of world dollar shortage; the developing economies overseas looked to Europe as the traditional source of surplus population, the magnitude of which was swollen by millions of refugees and displaced persons; the old pattern of inter-continental movement seemed to be reasserting itself. Since 1953 the enormous input of public capital in the previous period has borne abundant fruit. Any attempt to assess the determinants of international migration in the next decade must take into account the economic consequences of the economic resurgence of Western Europe.

Some striking indices may be quoted. Between 1953 and 1958 industrial production in member countries of OEEC taken together rose by 30 per cent; the rate of increase was as high as 50 per cent in Western
Germany, 48 per cent in France, and 40 per cent in Italy. [184, p. 17.]

In the 10 years 1947-57 the achievements of the OEEC countries as a group included the following increases: electricity, 179 to 409 billion kilowatt hours; steel, 31 to 88 million metric tons; petroleum products, 11 to 100 million metric tons; cereals, 47 to 86 million metric tons; automobiles, 15 to 52 per 1,000 inhabitants; total private consumption, 380 to 530 dollars (of 1954 purchasing power) per head; total investment, 22 to 44 billions of dollars (of 1954 purchasing power). [183, pp. 128-9.]

The effects on import and export trade and on the external balances were considerable. From 1953 on the gold and dollar reserves of Europe went up continuously, except during the Suez and the 1957 currency crises. The imports of OEEC member countries from the United States rose from $2.6 billion in 1953 to $5.2 billion in 1957. The pressure of demand was such that additional supplies of fuel, steel, scrap and non-ferrous metal had to be obtained from the United States; between 1955 and 1957 one third of the growth in imports from America was accounted for by fuel imports. Between 1953 and 1957 industrial production in the United States rose by only 7 per cent as compared with 31 per cent in Europe. Member countries' exports to the United States over this period went up from $2.1 billion to $2.8 billion, i.e., by about a third. There were spectacular increases in European exports of passenger cars and high quality consumer goods such as photographic and optical instruments and clothing. During the American recession of 1957-58, in contrast to what happened in the two earlier recessions, European exports to the United States did not decline. The tenth annual review of OEEC summed up the record as follows. 'At no time since 1953 has expansion in Europe, although much faster than that in the United States, been seriously hampered by a lack of dollars. . . . The experience of the last few years suggests that Europe should be able to achieve high rates of growth on a sustainable basis without undue pressure on the balance with the United States as long as inflationary demand on the domestic supply of basic materials is avoided.' [184, pp. 81-2.]

One is tempted to suggest an analogy with the mechanism which worked during the nineteenth century when Great Britain was the leading lending country; periods of intense investment in capital formation in overseas countries were followed by periods in which the productive and export capacities of those countries showed a rapid increase. The remarkable upsurge in productive capacity in Europe in 1952-59 is a corollary of the basic capital formation which American aid made possible in 1945-52.

It is not easy to trace the effect of this change on the volume and direction of migration. Fortunately, however, a rough estimate of trends can be made on the basis of the valuable statistical groundwork furnished by the joint project undertaking by ICEM, ILO, OEEC and the United Nations, i.e., Joint Statistical Project on European Migration (ICEM, ILO, OEEC and UN), A Decade of Post World-War II European
Migration 1946-1955, submitted to the twelfth session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, 4 April 1959 [172], also issued as MO (58)31, OEEC. This document contains the best available estimates of intra-European movements and the oversea outflow in the years 1946-55; it is an indispensable source on the range and quality of existing statistics. An admirable survey of the laws and regulations governing intra-continental migration in 15 European countries is to be found in Dr. Gustav Hampel's Einwanderungsgesetzgebung and innereuropiiische Wanderung [168].

Table 3 reproduces the figures of intra-European migration for Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium and France for the years 1948-57. Table 4 shows the oversea outflow in the same period from Germany and Italy, distinguishing between nationals and aliens.

### Table 3. Intra-European balance of migration for selected countries, 1948-57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>107.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>107.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>102.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>168.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>215.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Gross permanent migration to oversea countries from Germany and Italy, 1948-57

| Calendar Year | Germany | | Italy | |
|---------------|---------| |       | |
|               | Nationals | Aliens | Total | Nationals | Aliens | Total |
| 1948          | 27.4     | 98.5    | 125.9 | 112.7     | 29.7   | 142.4 |
| 1949          | 24.8     | 245.9   | 270.7 | 157.7     | 12.4   | 170.1 |
| 1950          | 31.3     | 136.5   | 167.8 | 140.0     | 10.8   | 150.8 |
| 1951          | 65.0     | 94.6    | 159.6 | 144.4     | 13.6   | 158.0 |
| 1952          | 90.4     | 15.7    | 106.1 | 134.0     | 3.0    | 137.0 |
| 1953          | 75.9     | 4.1     | 80.0  | 113.3     | 1.4    | 114.7 |
| 1954          | 78.3     | 3.3     | 79.6  | 141.3     | 3.1    | 144.4 |
| 1955          | 66.5     | 5.3     | 65.8  | 137.2     | 2.1    | 139.3 |
| 1956          | 82.2     | 10.2    | 92.4  | 132.2     | 2.1    | 135.0 |
| 1957          | 70.8     | 7.9     | 78.7  | 103.3     | 2.8    | 106.1 |
Space does not allow an adequate appreciation of the material made available by the Joint Project, but some of the important data summarized in Tables 3 and 4 may be briefly noted. Let us first examine the intra-European balance of migration. Up to 1951 Germany had a heavy net outward movement (in the four years 1948-51 aggregate departures were 180,000 and aggregate arrivals 42,000). In the six years 1952-57 the position was reversed; Germany had become a net absorber of European labour (481,000 arrivals and 384,000 departures, i.e., a net gain of nearly 100,000). The annual inflow rose from 9,000 in 1951 to 106,000 in 1957. The picture for Austria also shows a steady rise in recruitment between 1952 and 1957, but the outflow was at a much higher level. Italy stands out as a leading supplier of labour to the rest of the continent; between 1951 and 1957 she exported 838,000 people and imported 363,000. France has always been an important absorber of outside manpower. Her net inward balance fell from an annual rate of 64,000 in 1948-51 to 15,000 in 1952-55, but in 1957 it was up to 94,000. In the case of Belgium there has not been a very clear pattern, but in the years 1955-57 the rate of absorption rose sharply.

A glance at Table 4 shows that in the years 1948-51 the huge efflux from Germany to oversea countries comprised a large proportion of refugees; this element has played only a minor part in the outflow from Italy. Of the 7,200,000 people who emigrated from Europe overseas between 1946 and 1957 about 1,400,000, or one in five, were refugees. The striking feature of Table 4 is the marked decline in oversea movement of nationals from Italy between 1954 and 1957 from 141,300 to 103,300. From this evidence we may infer that the relatively rapid economic growth in Europe in recent years has tended to increase the propensity of certain countries, especially West Germany, to absorb from neighbouring countries workers who might otherwise have emigrated overseas. There seems to be an inverse relation between the rate of intra-continental migration in Europe and the rate of emigration from Europe overseas.

Valuable light has been thrown on an aspect of this problem by recent research into the supply of and demand for highly qualified technical manpower in Europe. [161, 175.] One conclusion from these studies is that the annual rate of increase in the number of engineers, about 1 to 2 per cent, is well below the rate required to sustain development in the next 10 years, even if there are no major technological innovations. Merely to increase the capacity of universities, colleges and schools will not be enough: the training systems themselves will have to be made more flexible in order to enable the available talent to come within the field of recruitment. The international aspects of this question are intricate and far-reaching. It is becoming increasingly true that unskilled workers willing and able to emigrate to developing economies overseas cannot be absorbed unless there is a complementary flow of skilled labour. The recent economic resurgence of Western Europe is intensifying
the relative shortages of highly skilled manpower in these countries, and wages and salaries will reflect this stringency. Can the underdeveloped countries hope to compete with the more advanced economies for the very limited supply of skill? Is this a major cause of the unfortunate tendency for the rate of economic growth of underdeveloped countries to lag behind that of the more mature countries? In contrast to the long-run community of interest between the investing countries and the emergent oversea areas of new settlement in the nineteenth century, is there now a deep-seated and cumulative conflict of interest?

It is economically healthy that there should be large transfers of different grades of skill as between various countries. Just as a large part of international trade is between highly industrialized nations, so we can expect a two-way traffic of skilled manpower between such nations. There is, however, a noticeable tendency for engineers and other skilled grades from Europe to be attracted not to countries which are desperately short of them but to countries where the remuneration and general amenities are very attractive. For example, one in two of the engineers graduating in Denmark in 1951 went to work abroad; there has been a large-scale emigration of Austrian engineers to the United States in the post-war period. A good example of the kind of research which is required in this field is the ILO Report on International Migration of Labour in the Construction Industry (1959) [170]. It contains detailed statistics of the movement of construction workers of various grades into and out of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Argentina, and into the United States and Canada. The significance of this type of recruitment to a growing country may be seen from the fact that in 1957 one third of the houses and buildings of all kinds under construction in Australia were being built by skilled immigrant tradesmen, and one fifth of the workers employed on major public works construction projects were immigrants.

Drawing on the results of recent research, the Economic Commission for Europe concluded as follows: 'Against the background of vast needs for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, the danger of a genuine over-production of highly qualified technical manpower in the developed countries seems indeed to be remote. It was seen . . . that forecasts of domestic demand for engineers as have been made in various countries are extremely vague and inconclusive. In most cases they appear to be on the low side even with respect to purely domestic requirements, and they do not take into account the need for an increased flow of highly skilled manpower to overseas countries. If the assistance to underdeveloped countries were to be increased to anything near the desirable level, the output of engineers in the highly developed countries would have to increase at a considerably faster rate than domestic requirements. In other words, forecasts of domestic requirements should be regarded only as indicating the bare minimum of training requirements.
If there is no reason to fear an over-production of engineers and scientists in the highly developed countries, there is, on the other hand, a danger that an insufficient supply may have unfavourable repercussions not only in the highly developed countries themselves but also in the less developed ones, where an already insufficient number of engineers—especially of scientists—may be diminished by emigration towards the richer countries, where highly paid jobs can be offered. There has been increasing evidence in recent years of such a perverse flow of highly skilled manpower from the poorer to the richer countries. In assessing the future of migration, it is of vital importance, as we shall see when we deal more fully with the underdeveloped countries in the next section, that the complementarity between flows of unskilled and skilled labour be recognized. Perverse movements of capital, entrepreneurial ability and highly qualified workers can have a profoundly inhibiting effect on the migration of unskilled labour.

Another aspect of the rapid rate of economic growth in Western Europe, which may have a profound long-run effect on international migration, is the bearing which it has on the balance of payments of the United States. In the year ending June 1959 the net transfers of gold and liquid dollar assets by the United States to the rest of the world amounted to $3.8 billion, not allowing for the increase in the United States subscription to the International Monetary Fund: this contrasts with net transfers of only $1.4 billion in 1954-55 which was also a time of recovery from a recession. The export of private capital from the United States has been steadily rising; it was $2.2 billion in 1958-59—a rise of $750 million over the figure for 1954-55. The net volume of government non-military grants and loans to other countries was $2.5 billion in 1958-59 and military expenditures abroad were $3.3 billion. Between 1954-55 and 1958-59 American imports of goods increased by one third while exports of goods went up by only one-sixth. An important factor here is the much strengthened competitive position of Western Europe; for example, between the first half of 1955 and the first half of 1959 the United States excess of exports over imports of automobiles, trucks and parts declined from $627 million to $182 million. By the middle of 1959 the gold and dollar reserves of West European countries had reached a total of $23 billion; they had gone up by as much as 40 per cent as compared with 1955. It is being stressed in the United States that, to quote the Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1959, ‘...very substantial further expansion of United States exports is required...to provide for renewed growth in the flow of United States private investment abroad, and to achieve the needed equilibrium of payments at a high level of international trade’ (p. 1241). However,

the European Common Market (the ‘Inner Six’) and the Free Trade Association (the ‘Outer Seven’) have unfavourable implications from the point of view of United States export trade. Members of the Outer Seven will keep their national tariffs on goods from non-members, and the Inner Six have a common tariff wall. These two European blocs account for about a quarter of United States commercial exports. Measures will have to be taken to correct the imbalance. Countries will be expected to lower or get rid of their discriminatory barriers against American goods. Western Europe will no doubt be required to do a greater share of the lending to underdeveloped countries. The United States Government might think it necessary to cease to give any incentive to United States private investment in Europe. If the required equilibrium in the United States payments can be achieved only at a lower level of international trade, this will have unfavourable reactions on international mobility.

Migration and the oversea economies

We have attempted to single out for special treatment the major determinants of international migration suggested by recent research. In economic terms much depends on the nexus between capital and labour movements; the immediate future pattern is not easy to discern. Much will depend on the character of the equilibrium to be established between the United States, Western Europe and the oversea underdeveloped countries. An adequate flow of development funds, public and private, to the underdeveloped countries is indispensable if the migration needs of the latter are to be met. Thus, in this fundamental respect the future of international migration will be governed by crucial decisions made in other spheres of international economic policy.

Most of the vast amount of research on migration is concerned with the receiving countries; to them the relative significance of a given labour inflow is much greater than that of a corresponding labour outflow to the sending countries. Recent surveys have stressed the transformation which has taken place in demographic trends. On medium assumptions the population of the world is expected to increase by 53 per cent in the quarter century, 1950-75; in the various continents the expected rates of increase are as follows: Europe (including USSR) 31 per cent; Latin America 86 per cent; Africa 52 per cent; North America 43 per cent; Asia 60 per cent and Oceania 59 per cent. The most striking part of this prognosis is that in 1975 Europe (including USSR) will have about 19.6 per cent of the world’s population instead of 23.0 per cent as in 1950. [392, pp. 23-4.]

It is clear that a far larger segment of the Earth is now going to rank as ‘overpopulated’ than ever before. International migration, even in the heyday, could not do much to alleviate population pressure; it
produced its beneficient results through marginal adjustments in particular areas. If the population of Latin America increases from 168 million in 1950 to 303 million in 1975, the role of immigration must become negligible. Moreover, there is the significant fact that the United States, the richest country in the world, is having a spectacular population upsurge; in the second half of the twentieth century the dynamic of a high rate of natural increase has replaced the dynamic of immigration which was dominant in the nineteenth century. This demographic revolution does not mean that migration will cease; an interchange of various grades of labour will always be economically desirable. What it does mean is that the range within which international mobility can be expected will contract.

Some of the most effective migration movements are very small in size. Scholars who have specialized in migration problems of the Far East emphasize that what is required is not a huge mass transfer (which is in any case impossible) but small migrations of qualified personnel. The significance of this point has been brought out by Professor Silcock in these words: 'The process of combining migration with cultural assimilation and organized diffusion of skills is of first-rate economic and political importance in many countries of Asia. One of the functions of migration in the Asian economy is to mitigate differences between the structures of different economies, and not merely to help to equalize basic levels of income per head. Training and cultural change within the areas themselves provide a substitute for migration in modifying the relative scarcities of different kinds of labour, but there are important obstacles to this training no less than to migration, and a part of the practical problem of maintaining standards of living in the area is to find methods of combining a properly controlled migration with a proper educational reform. This is the goal towards which governments of the region appear to be converging.' [260, p. 268.1]

The role of migration is not restricted to countries which are relatively under-populated. In the over-populated areas of Asia the diffusion of skills is a vital condition of economic improvement, and the pattern inherited from the days of colonial rule is not helpful. The supply of entrepreneurs, managers, administrators, teachers, foremen, accountants, efficient tax collectors, and skilled craftsmen is very small in relation to the vast need. It is more economical for a given area in the short run to import skill than to train local candidates; if it succeeds it can then hope that in the long run the migrants will transmit their skill to the local population. If this is to work, the skilled migrants must assimilate. If they remain a class apart with a vested interest in maintaining the

relative scarcity of their expertise, the migration process will have been abortive. Migrations on a very minor scale between different Asian communities will have a tremendous marginal social product if they are accompanied by measures to secure that difficulties of assimilation are eased and the channels for the diffusion of technical knowledge are kept open.

Writers on the immigration problems of Latin America have drawn attention to the declining inflow in recent years. In the period 1952-57 the total immigration into Latin America was 1,158,000; the annual number fell from 239,000 in 1952 to 189,000 in 1956. The operative factors are to be found in the defective flow of capital and the lack of diffusion of skills. In discussing the labour markets of Western Europe we noted the increasing propensity of highly qualified manpower to be absorbed in the booming European industries or to be attracted by high salaries in North America. There does appear to be a conflict of interest. A small corps of skilled manpower introduced into Latin American countries would have a far greater marginal social product than in more mature economies. These countries have also suffered badly on account of the changes in the quantity, quality and direction of international capital flows. It is true that American private investment has been considerable, but the building of essential social capital has been relatively neglected. The basic problems were well analysed in the United Nations Study of the Relation between Economic Development and Immigration in Latin America [394], and in F. Bastos de Avila's Economic Impacts of Immigration: the Brazilian Immigration Problem [236]. The history of immigration does not yield examples of land scarcity as a serious limiting factor. However, conditions have changed materially and we can expect this consideration to become increasingly more important. The relative scarcity of land will be enhanced by technical inventions which are labour-saving in relation to land; and it might happen that immigration, which would otherwise occur smoothly, would be inhibited.

Much valuable research has been done on migratory movements in Africa, where the problems are complex and baffling. [See especially 210, as well as 206, 207, 211, 212, 214.] Here again the various disciplines must come together if the issues are to be properly assessed. Space does not allow a summary of the extent of the migration movements, but the following quotation touches a matter of immense importance. The fact is that while impermanence and instability in employment spring largely from the circumstances in which the African leaves his traditional environment to seek work, it is equally true that in many territories little has been done to develop positive employment and social policies which would tend to change the attitude of workers towards wage labour and accelerate the emergence of a permanent stabilized labour force. Indeed, in some areas restrictions of a legal or customary nature have done much
to perpetuate the migrant labour system and to circumscribe the opportunities open to Africans to become members of a settled labour force. Nevertheless, the fact does remain that over large areas of Africa the African who seeks wage-paid work in an urban or other employment centre does so with very considerable reservations. On the one hand he may do so because he needs cash for a particular purpose and therefore seeks paid employment to earn the necessary amount of money, which he cannot acquire within his traditional agricultural environment; on the other, while prepared to adopt work for wages as a more or less permanent means of subsistence he is not prepared, at least under the conditions now prevailing, to give up contact with the village from which he has come, since he considers that there alone lies security for him in old age and in periods of sickness or unemployment. His services as a worker are, therefore, not continuously available particularly if, in addition to lacking long-term security, he receives wages which are not sufficient to enable him to maintain his family in urban conditions or if the conditions under which employment is available prevent him from having his family with him. The social consequences of all this are far-reaching. The countryside is temporarily or more or less permanently deprived of large proportions of its adult male labour force, with the detrimental effects on farming practices and on the women and children who are left to cultivate the family land already described. Traditional work and other family patterns are broken up, the separation of families leads to undesirable associations, and the existing social structures begin to disintegrate without being replaced by viable social structures suitable to the circumstances of existence of the majority of the workers concerned. **[210, pp. 137-8]** This passage serves as a pertinent reminder that the term 'migration' covers a variety of phenomena and that the criteria by which it is to be judged over large parts of Africa have to be very different from those usually used.

This monumental survey of Africa South of the Sahara is an invaluable source book; those interested in migration will find important material in the sections on 'Social Security', 'Workers' Housing', 'Productivity of Labour', 'Technical and Vocational Training', and 'Recruitment and Conditions of Work'. Appendix II gives a detailed and up-to-date list of the laws in force on labour matters in the countries and territories covered by the survey. Reference may be made in this context to Recommendation No. 110 on the protection of migrants in underdeveloped countries adopted by the General Conference of the ILO on 22 June 1955. The relevance to Africa is clear from the reference to '. . . those countries and territories in which the evolution from a subsistence form of economy towards more advanced forms of economy based on wage earning and entailing sporadic and scattered development of industrial and agricultural centres brings with it appreciable migratory movements of workers and sometimes their families.'
The future of emigration from the United Kingdom to overseas members of the British Commonwealth has been the subject of much speculation during recent years. Professor J. J. Spengler has made a careful assessment of demographic trends in the Commonwealth [314] and has drawn attention to certain divergencies of interest between the United Kingdom on the one hand and the receiving countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand on the other. Immigration will remain a prime mover in the economic growth of the latter countries. Professor Timlin [232] has pointed out that '... the effects of post-war immigration on the structure and size of the labour force and on the expansion of the internal market have been active factors in the expansion of the Canadian economy in the post-war period, and that this expansion has been a retarding force in emigration, particularly in management and professional groups. It is nevertheless necessary to remember that the maintenance of expansion for an economy as open as the Canadian economy depends, and will depend for a long time to come, on activity in the export industries and on the international balance of payments. Short-run factors determining intake of migrants will depend in turn again mainly on changes in these and on the effects of past population changes.' [232, pp. 159-60.]

The prospect in Australia has been thoroughly investigated by Professor W. D. Borrie [270]. He notes that the resurgence of economic activity in the United Kingdom has been making it more difficult for Australia to recruit labour on the previous scale from the mother country. Public opinion in Australia now favours the granting of expensive state assistance to non-British immigrants. Of the 900,700 permanent arrivals over the period 1945-54, 461,300 were non-British (only 209,400 of whom were unassisted) and 439,400 were British. Professor Borrie concludes as follows: 'The key to the success of immigration in the immediate future certainly lies in the volume of exportable surpluses, and particularly of primary exports. Pointers to the need for a reasonable degree of caution have been the fall late in 1954 and early in 1955 in oversea reserves and a 15 per cent cut in import quotas imposed by Government in March 1955, together with a further tendency to internal price increases and a rise in the cost of imports (e.g. increased shipping freights). But there seems no justification at the moment for assuming that Australia cannot reasonably aim at the “target” of the original planners of the immigration policy, namely an annual net inflow equivalent to 1 per cent of the population.' [269, p. 172.]

The official view in the United Kingdom as expressed by the fourth report of the Oversea Migration Board [99] is that it is not until after 1967 that there will be any significant changes in the British population aged 20-44. By 1982 it is expected that there will be over 120,000 additional people in that age group. The report declares that '... on this showing it would seem that this country should be able to sustain emigration numerically at the current average rate until 1967, after which
even higher levels might be possible and even desirable. We think it is necessary, however, to emphasise again the words of our first report that "we cannot afford too selective a flow of migrants: a disproportionate loss of skilled and the young is far more dangerous to our economy than a far larger flow outward of a balanced cross-section of our people".1

The International Economic Association devoted its seventh conference to a reappraisal of the role of international migration in the world economy; the results were published in 1958 [41]. In an essay entitled, 'Are there preferable alternatives to international migration as an aid to economic development?', Professor Howard S. Ellis reached an interesting conclusion. The essence of his argument is found in the following quotation: '...the income effect of emigration—over the world generally and specifically also for Europe—is nowadays greatly attenuated. This does not, of course, imply that the presently developed economies will not experience favourable, and conceivably even strong, income effects if the aspirations of presently underdeveloped economies are realized. But there are, as I have argued, two reasons for supposing that this income effect will not be significantly related to migration. First, the economic development of underdeveloped economies chiefly depends today upon endogenous factors, of which the most important are those bearing most directly upon the creation of mass purchasing power and the expansion of domestic markets. Second, in so far as development does depend on exogenous factors, the immigration of labour plays a lesser role because of new labour-saving processes, because of the transfer of techniques through equipment or even independently of either labour or capital, because of the reduced international flow of complementary capital, and because of rapid rates of population increase in the underdeveloped world. What I have been saying sums up to the generalization that migration is ceasing to be a major factor in the rise of per capita incomes, not because of legal barriers to movement but because of its reduced economic significance. For the advanced countries this is traceable to the decline of the income effect of emigration, and for the newly developing countries it is ascribable to the lesser significance of immigration per se and to the greater significance of endogenous factors.' [41, p. 360.] As a generalization this statement would receive assent from most economists, but there would be a divergence of view when we moved from the general to the particular. The economic significance of migration varies widely in different contexts, and there are serious gaps in our knowledge. Even though the volume of international, as distinct from intra-continental, migration may decline, its qualitative impact in the circumstances of particular countries may yet be considerable.

We shall now turn from economic analysis to the demographic and social aspects of international migration. Of particular interest are the effects on the population structure of sending and receiving countries, as shown, for example, by the experience of Ireland, Canada, Australia, Israel, and the Federal Republic of Germany. We shall also review briefly recent research on the social problems of assimilation of immigrants.

**Demographic analysis**

**Effects on sending countries**

Emigration acts upon the structure of the population in the country of origin mainly through its unequal incidence on various age groups. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Ireland, a country which has had a high rate of loss through migration for over a century. Of the males in the following age groups in 1936 in the Republic of Ireland, the proportions emigrating during the 10 years 1936-46 were as follows: 15 per 100 aged 10-14, 21 per 100 aged 15-19, 19 per 100 aged 20-24, 10 per 100 aged 25-29, and 5 per 100 aged 30-35. [287, p. 118.] During the nineteenth century the rates of outflow were even higher. The long-term effect on the age-composition of the population of Ireland was as follows. In 1951 persons aged 45 and over comprised 30 per cent of the population as against 16 per cent in 1841; the proportion in the age group 65 and over went up from 3 per cent to nearly 11 per cent between 1841 and 1951, and the average age from 24.8 to 32.5. However, even under these conditions of mass emigration, the contraction in the economically most active section of the population, i.e. the 15-44 age group, was relatively small (from 45.9 per cent of the total to 41.0 per cent). The dominating factors here were mortality and fertility rather than emigration.

Research on the dynamics of mass emigration has indicated the possibility of a self-perpetuating process. The outflow through emigration is heaviest in the age group 15-35. This entails a fall in the number of marriages and a reduction in the size of the 0-5 age group. Since the propensity to emigrate is less for children than for young adults, the 0-5 infants, by the time they are aged 10-15, constitute a group which is relatively large. Hence the paradoxical result that a country losing population at a substantial rate has a relatively large number of teenagers.

A self-sustaining mechanism is operating; 15 years after the original depletion of the 15-35 age group, the number passing into the 15-20 group (where the propensity to emigrate is high) is substantial relatively to the population as a whole. [40, Chap. VI; and 90, pp. 40-69.]

An appreciable volume of net emigration usually tends to reduce the marriage rate; this is borne out by the experience of Ireland, Sweden
and Scotland. In the Republic of Ireland the number of married women under the age of 45 per 1,000 of the population in 1930 was 73, compared with 105 in Scotland, 123 in England and Wales and 145 in the United States. When emigration was heavy in Sweden, it removed a considerable number of peasants whose rate of fertility was high. It is not safe to generalize on this matter. It is worth noting that in 1930 the number of children under 5 years of age per 100 married women under 45 was 123 in the Republic of Ireland, compared with 83 in Scotland, 64 in the United States, and 61 in England and Wales. Mass emigration caused Ireland to have a record number of spinsters, but the women who did get married had a record number of children. It is not easy to isolate the effect of emigration on the death rate; one would expect a loss of the best lives from the 15-35 age group to make the rate of mortality in that group higher than it would be otherwise.

Effects on receiving countries

Early in this century much attention was given in the United States to a theory propounded by Professor F. A. Walker, according to which the increase in the American population due to immigration had been offset by the induced fall in the fertility of the native-born Americans [338]. This so-called 'substitution theory' is untenable. It has been conclusively demonstrated that in any 10-, 20-, or 30-year period between 1830 and 1920 the addition to the population of the United States through immigration was larger than the decline of fertility attributable to all causes [336]. Moreover, it has been shown that a big inflow of immigrants into urban areas may arrest the rate of rural exodus in the receiving country and thereby make the fertility of the native population higher than it would otherwise have been [343]. Any doubts on this subject were completely dispelled by the results of Mortara's exhaustive analysis, 'A Contribution to the Study of the Influence of Immigration on the Birth Rate' [328]. He showed that the immigrations of the last century had exercised practically no net effect on the trend of natural increase of native-born persons in the receiving countries. Where immigration played the most prominent part, e.g., in the United States and France, the secular fall in the fertility of the native population had been in progress for some time before the largest waves of immigrants occurred.

Statistical evidence on the long-run contribution of international migration to population growth in the leading countries of absorption may now be summarized. In France it is estimated that net immigration between 1801 and 1936 amounted to 3,060,000 and accounted for over a third of the increase of population within the 1936 boundaries of France over that period. [325, pp. 513-14.] In 1790 there were about 3.2 million white persons in the United States; it is estimated that the number of their descendants living in the United States in 1920 was 41.3 million.
In the same year there were about 53.5 million survivors or descendants of immigrants since 1790. The net inflow of white persons into the United States in this period has been put at 26.5 million. [337, p. 139.]

Under the auspices of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Professor Frank Lorimer has prepared, with the assistance of numerous specialists, a book on Culture and Human Fertility, published by Unesco in 1954 in the series Population and Culture [327]. This study explores the main data on the subject available in historical, anthropological, sociological and demographic studies, in search for clues to specific relationships between culture and fertility.

Special cases

An excellent survey of the demographic effects of post-war international migration on various countries may be found in International Migration, 1945-1957, published by the International Labour Office, 1959, Chapter X, pp. 303-610 [324]. Rather than attempt to summarize that analysis, we shall here draw attention to one or two cases of special interest.

Both Canada and Australia have received a substantial addition to their labour force through immigration since 1945. The gain for Canada in the years 1945-52 represented nearly 13 per cent of the 1952 working population. In Australia there was a net immigration of 939,000 persons from 1947 to 1957, and 51 per cent of these were economically active. This brought about an increase of as much as 13 per cent in the 1947 labour force. These examples show what a potent influence immigration can exert on the balance of active and inactive population.

Interesting evidence of the impact on sex- and age-composition is available for Israel where the inflow has been abnormally large. Among the 1,160,000 immigrants between 1919 and 1954, for whom data were recorded, males comprised just over 51 per cent of the total. Several influences have been at work on the age structure. In the earlier inflows the age group 15-34 was predominant—54 per cent in 1928-38 and 59 per cent in 1938-48. Four-fifths of all the immigrants during the mandate were in the productive age group 15-64. After the establishment of the State of Israel the trend changed, partly because many of the migrants were the survivors of Nazi extermination and partly because the age composition of Jews of African and Asiatic origin was much more normal. Israel no longer has the relatively large numbers in the productive age groups which it had in the period of the mandate. The age structure of the population does not now diverge much from that of other Eastern European countries. However, the increase in the proportion of children will mean a big inflow into the productive age groups in the future. [318, pp. 323-6.]

Perhaps the most remarkable case is the experience of Western Germany which absorbed over 12 million immigrants in a little over a decade since the war. The population increased by one third in 12 years, three-fifths
of which took place before the end of 1946. This influx, particularly the part of it which occurred after 1949, partially offset the severe demographic consequences of Germany's military losses. The extent of the latter was indicated in the census of September 1950 which showed that females outnumbered males by 3 million and, in the 25-45 age group, by over 1.7 million, i.e., a ratio of 100 to 77. The immigration into Western Germany since 1950 has been of the traditional type comprising a high proportion of people under 40 and among them more men than women. Among the expellees admitted to the country the birth rate has been higher and the infant death rate lower than among the population as a whole. The ILO study concludes as follows: 'Nevertheless, leaving out of account the immigration from Eastern Germany, which has had a wholly corrective effect, the remainder of the immigration has brought about only a relative improvement in the demographic structure of Western Germany. The expellee population had, after all, been affected by war losses in the same manner as the local population, and its structure was similarly unbalanced as a result, though not to quite the same extent. Therefore, all that can be stated with any confidence about the demographic consequences of the influx of refugees is that the age and sex structure of the West German population would have been still more unfavourable and the birth rate even lower if it had not taken place. But it has by no means filled the gaps caused by war losses among the younger adult generation.' [324, pp. 27-8.] The most ambitious study of the experience of Western Germany is Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland, 3 volumes, edited by Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, published in Kiel in 1959 [353]. Volume III contains an invaluable bibliography.

Problems of assimilation

The process of integration

There is an extensive literature on problems of assimilation in recent years. Despite the many-sidedness of the subject and the unavoidable vagueness of many concepts used, a considerable area of agreement has been reached among experts from a wide range of countries. Much has been gained through international discussion, particularly the conference held by Unesco in Havana in April 1956 [339]. Reference should also be made to an earlier symposium, Cultural Assimilation of Migrants, edited by D. V. Glass, initiated by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and published with the assistance of Unesco on behalf of the Population Investigation Committee by the Cambridge University Press, London, as a supplement to Population Studies, March 1950 [345].

The results of a survey carried out under Unesco's auspices on the assimilation of Italian and German immigrants in Australia have been
compiled by W. D. Borrie and published under the title *Italians and Germans in Australia: a study of assimilation* by F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, Australia, in 1954 [348].

A summary of the main findings of a study of conditions favouring the cultural integration of immigrants in Brazil was prepared by Dr. Alberto Araújo Parro (Peru) and published in Spanish.

Dr. H. B. M. Murphy (United Kingdom), with the collaboration of various specialists has prepared a study of the psychological problems affecting those who for various reasons, as individuals or in groups are dislocated from their normal socio-cultural setting and are compelled to face major readjustments of their lives as a result of migration. This study was conducted for Unesco and published in its series *Population and Culture* in 1955 under the title *Flight and Resettlement* [330].

A symposium on *The Positive Contribution by Immigrants* was prepared for Unesco by the International Sociological Association and the International Economic Association with Oscar Handlin (USA) and Brinley Thomas (UK) acting as rapporteurs, in collaboration with other scientists, who prepared country studies on Argentina, Australia, Brazil, United Kingdom and the United States). The symposium was published by Unesco in 1955 in the series *Population and Culture* [323].

A draft of a popular manual on the cultural integration of immigrants, for the use of officials and voluntary workers concerned with migration problems, was prepared by Rev. Fernando Bastos de Avila and Professor Manuel Diegues, Jr. (Brazil) and circulated in mimeographed form by Unesco to governmental and private agencies operating in this field, in English, French and Spanish.

It is now agreed by the majority of writers that the concept of 'integration' is superior to that of 'assimilation.' Robert E. Parks defined assimilation as 'the process or processes by which peoples of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence.' [359, pp. 281-2] This emphasis on 'cultural solidarity' seems to imply a one-way rather than a mutual process, and it suggests that 'cultural pluralism' is incompatible with assimilation [351]. The new concept of conformity within a milieu of cultural pluralism has been well expressed by William Bernard in the following words: 'To say that "integration" is a happier and more exact term than others to describe the successful inclusion of a new group into an existing society is not idle pedantry. The older term "assimilation", besides its misleading biological connotation, implies a one-way street in group relations. It suggests that the newcomer is divested of his old culture completely and is virtually remoulded in everything from clothes to ideology. It denies or ignores the many gifts brought by the immigrant to his new home, and the impact of his ideas, his talents, his hopes upon the community that has admitted him. The fact of the matter is that the United
States has not assimilated the newcomer nor absorbed him. Our immigrant stock and our so-called “native” stock have each integrated with the other. . . . It will be apparent that this concept of integration rests upon a belief in the importance of cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. It recognizes the right of groups and individuals to be different so long as the differences do not lead to domination or disunity. [339, pp. 93-4.] One is here reminded of the story of President Franklin D. Roosevelt beginning an address to the Daughters of the American Revolution with the words, ‘Fellow immigrants.’

The discussions at the Havana Conference showed that there has in recent years been a striking tendency to widen the sphere within which cultural variety is permissible. For example, the official view in Canada was expressed by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration as follows: ‘Integration . . . is used in Canada to express a theory which combines unity and diversity. The unity is sought in common principles of political philosophy and in participation in common citizenship. The diversity is maintained by reciprocal appreciation of diverse cultural contributions.’ [339, p. 95.] The broad agreement on the nature of the process is not difficult to maintain as long as the problem is being discussed on an abstract plane. The essential elements are the immigrant’s propensity to adapt himself, the receiving country’s attitude towards permissible cultural variety, and the degree of stability of the economy and the social and political structure in the receiving country. Even on this level of abstraction, however, there is a latent ambiguity. It is not always clear whether the criterion of successful integration rests on the point of view of the immigrant or on that of the receiving country. Judged by a series of objective tests, a group of newcomers might be held to be assimilated, and yet they are not ‘accepted’ by the receiving country. This adds force to S. N. Eisenstadt’s view that ‘. . . comparison between different immigrant countries cannot be made on the basis of external “objective” indices but only through the analysis of intervening variables of the absorbing country’s institutional setting and of various kinds of pluralistic societies.’ [342, p. 102.]

At this point it may be asked what are the inter-relations between integration of immigrants as here defined and the process of economic growth. This aspect was dealt with to some extent by the Conference of the International Economic Association which met at Kitzbühel in 1955, the proceedings of which were published in Economics of International Migration [41]. The present writer summarized the discussion on ‘Psycho-social Aspects of Immigration’ in paper No. 7 contributed to the Unesco Conference in Havana in 1956. The following quotation is relevant in this context.

‘Pluralism entails a number of diverse elements imperfectly fused and it is characteristic of societies such as the United States where immigrants have been of different ethnic origins. Descendants of the foreign-born
share increasingly in the common core, but they may retain the cultural characteristics of their group. Such a pluralistic society has great advantages which would be endangered by an excessive zeal for assimilation. The fact that the process of fusion has been imperfect is in itself all to the good.

The Kitzbühel Conference then considered more closely the connexion between the cultural core and economic growth. The phases of immigration were considered to be: first, a wave of alien immigration proceeding to the point where it threatens to disrupt the community core; secondly, a decline in immigration with a consequent slowing-down in inter-group tensions and also of economic development; thirdly, a final phase in which the community has to choose between a relatively low rate of economic growth with little social tension and a rapidly growing community core on the one hand, and a rapid rate of economic growth with considerable tension and a weakening of the community core on the other.

As illustrations of the above we could first take the United States which was able to receive large numbers of aliens over a long period because there was a strong core which grew during the process. There can be no doubt that the periods of heaviest immigration were also the periods of most rapid economic growth; and it was at those times that strong outbreaks of feeling against aliens took place. Ultimately the point was reached, immediately after the First World War, when a further enormous influx of people from Southern and Eastern Europe would destroy the delicate equilibrium between the core of the nation and the series of imperfectly fused groups; the latter would become so dominant as to undermine the basis of nationhood. In the Latin American countries the core is relatively smaller and it does not grow easily with progressive immigration; the margin for development without friction is much less than it was in North America.

Israel might be regarded as a case where there was no core at all to begin with and, therefore, no such limiting factor; the uniqueness of Israel lies in the fact that massive immigration, far from being a potential threat to the community core, is the sole means by which a core can be brought into existence. The population of Israel in 1922 was only 84,000 and it is now 1,500,000. No less than 75 per cent of the inhabitants in 1950 were foreign-born. Nevertheless, it can be said that these diverse immigrants brought a common core with them; they all had a Jewish background; they were inspired by the ideal of Zionism; they were united in a struggle for independence and believed in a policy of free immigration.

We conclude from this analysis that the creed of a receiving country concerning its nationhood and the strength of its community core has a strong bearing on the flow of immigrants which will be admissible and on whether assimilation will be an easy process. Each country has
its unique features, and it is unwise to place too much emphasis on purely economic grounds.' [339, pp. 114-15.] This general thesis can be tested in the experience of a variety of countries. In a valuable paper on 'The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants in Brazil', A. H. Neiva and M. Diégues, Jr., conclude in the following words: '... imported cultural elements are respected and accepted though—as is only natural—the traditional bases of our fundamentally Portuguese structure are preserved. Accordingly, it is laid down that the immigrant's assimilation shall be effected by adjustment to that scheme of basic values, and by his adaptation to Brazilian customs and usages, to which he will in turn make his own cultural contribution.' [358, p. 233.]

**Factors inhibiting integration**

In the normal stream of migration there is a concentration in the age group 15-34 and there are more men than women. For example, in Australia between 1947 and 1954 a net inflow of 683,000 immigrants brought about an excess of males of about 110,000 in the age groups 15-64. Whereas a large proportion of young unmarried males is an aid to economic mobility, it entails other difficult problems. It is generally recognized that every effort should be made to foster the family unit. However, where the newcomers are of a different ethnic group from the majority in the receiving country, there may well be a conflict between the ideal of family integration and the ideal of rapid integration. Much depends in such circumstances on the work of voluntary organizations in making both the immigrants and the non-migrants aware of their responsibilities.

In some countries, particularly in Latin America, great efforts have been made to organize group settlement, and the experience gained thereby has added much to our knowledge of the practical difficulties of integration. The success of such settlements depends very much on the skill shown in the choice of immigrant. Some experiments have fared badly because of inaccurate information about prospects. Here again there appears to be a conflict between the short-run interests of the individual migrant living in his group and the ultimate goal of cultural integration.1

Many difficulties are experienced by newcomers in a strange country because they have not been adequately instructed in advance. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration has been active in developing methods of selection, education and pre-training, and countries like Australia and Israel have introduced adult education schemes for the immigrants once they have arrived. There is room for further

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1. On group settlement see 'Immigration and Group Settlement' by C. A. Price [361]+

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co-operation between governments, specialized agencies and voluntary organizations in improving the provision of information and training before the migrant has arrived. Most receiving countries, in the spirit of cultural pluralism, are now liberal in their attitude to foreign-language newspapers. These media of communication certainly ease the path for the foreign-born and do not inhibit the absorption of their children into the new environment.

One important criterion of the degree to which diverse ethnic groups are being fused is the prevalence of homogamy, i.e., intermarriage between persons of the same race or nationality. Research in this field has yielded interesting results [365]. Savorgnan found that the main factors influencing the degree of homogamy were: 

1. when a national group is topographically isolated;
2. when the native population and perhaps also other groups of immigrants have a strong feeling of repugnance for the nationality considered;
3. when a group is differentiated from the main body of the population not only by nationality but also by other characteristics;
4. when the ratio between the sexes of a nationality is unbalanced.

The analysis led to the conclusion that '... culture and wealth are two factors which accelerate the process of amalgamation, while ignorance and poverty retard it. The large bodies of immigrants who formed the lower strata of the population must in most cases be assimilated first before they can amalgamate with the native population. But emigrants who come from the cultured classes can more readily make mixed marriages, even though their assimilation has not yet taken place. The main difference between the two groups of emigrants is to be found in the fact that while in the case of those nationalities which are uneducated and poor, assimilation (i.e. the adoption of the language, customs, etc., of the country of immigration) is the premise to amalgamation, in the case of cultured and wealthy nationalities assimilation is the consequence of amalgamation.' [365, p. 67]

In assessing the attitudes of immigration countries since 1945, it would be unwise to be too optimistic. There has been a long upswing in capital formation and a vigorous rate of economic growth. Australia and Canada, which were restrictionist before the Second World War, now look upon immigration as essential to their development, and are therefore tolerant towards aliens of a different ethnic or social background. Some writers think that this liberal attitude would not survive a serious economic recession.

Some policy implications

It is generally accepted that it is the duty of governments to create conditions in which the process of integration can be as smooth as possible.

1. On Canada, see Planned Migration by William Peterson, p. 137 [360].

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States will retain the right to control and discriminate. But once immigrants have been admitted, it is reasonable to expect that certain principles should be respected. Normally a newcomer must be in residence for at least five years before he can be considered for the rights of full citizenship. Unfortunately, some countries still impose irksome restrictions during this period of probation. The Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations interested in Migration in 1951 drew up a set of general principles which could be regarded as the Immigrants' Charter. [369, pp. 16-18.] The following are examples which deserve recognition.

'That there should be no discrimination, de facto or de jure, against a migrant for such reasons as race, religion, political opinions, financial means, country of origin or status as an alien.

'That every migrant should have the right in the receiving country to treatment no less favourable than that granted to nationals of that country.

'That every migrant should have the right to do work in accordance with his abilities and within the laws of the receiving population generally, and should enjoy equal rights as regards conditions of employment, wages, freedom of trade union affiliation, public assistance and social security.

'That every migrant should bear in mind that these rights imply a corresponding series of duties to his new community.'

Finally, it must be stressed that acceptance of certain principles by governments is a necessary but not sufficient condition of success. In the words of S. N. Eisenstadt, 'It is only when one is fully accepted on the informal level that full integration can be said to have taken place.' [339, p. 153.] There must be an enlightened public opinion which will uphold the right standards of conduct in the day-to-day affairs of work and leisure.

RESEARCH PROJECTS, PAST AND FUTURE

An admirable summary of post-war research on international migration by the United Nations, the ILO and Unesco up to 1952 is given in Summary of Results of Studies and Research Activities on International Migration undertaken by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies since 1946 [390].

Reference has been made to a number of the studies in the present report. A powerful impetus has been given to this work by the activities of the Non-Governmental Organizations interested in migration. Of outstanding value is the bi-monthly publication, Migration News, issued by the International Catholic Migration Commission and edited by Dr. T. Stark. Now in its eighth year, this periodical has established itself as a comprehensive and illuminating review of world-wide developments relating to migration, population, land settlement and refugees; it contains useful supplements entitled, Migration Facts and Figures.
In 1959 the International Labour Office published a comprehensive study of post-war movements under the title, *International Migration, 1945-1957* [324]. This is an invaluable survey covering all countries. Among the major topics dealt with are political and economic migration movements, labour demand and supply throughout the world, organized and assisted movements, and the demographic, economic and social consequences of economic migration.

Unesco has contributed on a broad front to the study of migration problems [380]. Special attention has been given to factors governing the process of assimilation of migrants. Thanks to the initiative of Unesco, a scholarly study was published by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population in 1950 entitled *Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants* [377]. In 1956 the organization held a conference in Havana on The Cultural Integration of Immigrants; the subject was carefully explored in a series of valuable papers.

Research devoted to land settlement deserves special mention. Here the Food and Agricultural Organization has made an important contribution, e.g., 'Land Settlement for Agriculture' [375]. This study lays down general principles—the assessment of natural resources, the selection of possible areas of settlement, the criteria to be used in choosing settlers, and the type of preliminary training required. It also deals with the preparation of selected sites, the conditions for smooth assimilation and the activities of commercial agencies concerned with land development. Food and Agriculture Organization experts have been engaged in important field research in countries such as Brazil and Bolivia. Valuable investigations have also been conducted by the Instituto Agronomico per l'Oltremare in Florence, where a body of expertise is being built up.

In September 1958 a convention was signed by the Italian and Brazilian governments to set up at the institute in Florence a centre for the study of agriculture and rural economy in Brazil, including an information office to furnish technical and economic data on the development of that country.

We have already referred to the work of the ILO on migratory movements, in Africa. Also noteworthy are the research projects which arose from the recommendations of the Inter-African Conference of Social Sciences of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara in 1955. A meeting of international experts was held in London in July 1956. Participating in the organization of the project are the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, the Office de la recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre Mer, the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, the University of Ghana and the governments of French West Africa and Ghana. Investigation teams have been conducting detailed inquiries into migration in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, using a variety of enterprising methods. The projects are bound to yield a wealth of new knowledge [381].
The International Committee for European Migration has done a considerable amount of work in helping to plan immigrant land settlements in Latin America. Considerable experience has been gained in the course of this work and although it is not available in any specific document, this experience can be drawn upon if necessary.

Everyone agrees that an indispensable condition of good research is a supply of accurate and comprehensive statistics. We have seen that the rate of improvement in statistics of international migration has been disappointingly slow. More vigorous progress in the reform of the statistics of advanced countries is urgently needed; and the lessons of the past must be borne in mind when new records are introduced in underdeveloped countries. The following are some considerations which might be noted in this sphere. The most efficient methods of recording migrant traffic by air should be investigated, and far more use should be made of sampling techniques. The fundamental reason for the lack of comparability lies in the fact of state sovereignty. It is the duty of scholars to indicate precisely the different ways in which a given question must be asked in different countries if comparable answers are to be received. Much work needs to be done in each country possessing long time series, so that the basic data can be checked and reconciled. The operation performed on United States sources by Kuznets and Rubin [27] is a model which could profitably be adopted in a number of countries. [201, pp. 534-5.] An operational organization like the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, which has immense achievements to its credit, would be greatly helped if it were equipped with a statistical radar screen. It should be possible to gauge the probable effect of a given rate of change in certain economic variables on the supply of and demand for different categories of migrants. Techniques already used in other types of market analysis could be adapted to the requirements of the labour market. There is ample scope for fundamental research in this field. An instructive analogy may be found in the evolution of the placing machinery of employment exchanges in the national systems. The employment exchange system links up regional labour markets within a nation; similarly we can envisage an International Placing Organization linking up various national labour markets. The fund of operational experience now existing in ICEM could be the basis for a new kind of international action in a most important field.

One of the objects of this report has been to indicate the main trends of recent theoretical work on the economics of international migration. There is necessarily a close interaction between abstract speculation and empirical inquiry; the work of the model-builders is an indispensable basis for fruitful statistical analysis. Organized research projects, particularly when conducted by official international bodies, should not be carried on in isolation from the theorists. There has to be a rational
division of labour. The well-known contributions to theory by Professor Alfred Sauvy and other scholars have been pivotal to the achievements of the Institut National d'Études Démographiques in Paris. Another institute to which students of migration owe a great debt is the Research Group for European Migration Problems (REMP), founded at The Hague by Dr. G. Beijer in 1952. The monographs published by this group and the REMP Bulletin have added considerably to our knowledge of migration problems in the post-war setting; here again the claims of theory have not been overlooked. In one respect REMP has made a bold pioneering effort by inspiring with the financial assistance of ICEM the production of econometric models of international migration, namely, The Effect of European Migration on the Economy of Sending and Receiving Countries: an interim report, by Julius Isaac assisted by C. A. van den Beld [293]. It is admirable that a private research centre of this kind is encouraging individual scholars to pursue basic theoretical research.

In the section 'Unequal Rates of Development' in Chapter I of this report we alluded to the doctrine that the underdeveloped countries of the pre-1913 era were doubly exploited by the advanced investing countries. There is room for debate about the validity of this thesis; it is sometimes better to suspend judgement until more thorough investigations— theoretical, statistical and historical—have been carried out.

Unesco is examining the possibility of conducting a study of the return movement of immigrants in order to analyse the factors associated with the unsatisfactory adjustment of migrants in their new communities. In order to provide basic data bearing on the issues involved, Professor G. Germani (Argentina) is conducting, with the financial assistance of Unesco, a study of the acculturation, adaptation and success or failure of foreign immigrants resident in the greater Buenos Aires area; an interim report has been submitted; data are being collected on the social and cultural factors which favour or frustrate the successful integration of immigrants.

There is a strong case for a division of labour whereby the fundamental research is done by individual scholars or an independent institute and the applied studies on trends and policies are done by the secretariats of official organizations. The latter would not confine themselves to particular doctrines but would test alternative hypotheses in the light of all the evidence available; they would also bring out the implications of various alternative methods of achieving the given policy objectives of governments. An excellent example of how to do it is the report by a panel of experts, Trends in International Trade, commissioned by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [376]. This would be a good pattern to follow in the field of international migration in relation to economic development.
Within the wide area surveyed in this report there are many serious gaps in our knowledge. We shall conclude by touching upon a few lines of research which would prove rewarding.

Reference has already been made to the paramount need for improving the original statistical data on which all quantitative analysis depends. Unless we have more accurate, comprehensive and comparable data, progress is bound to be disappointing. It is to be hoped that the scope of the valuable work done on migration statistics by the Population Commission of the United Nations and the International Labour Office and ICEM will be enlarged; at the same time it behoves individual scholars to press for a reform of statistical sources in their own countries.

When we consider the economics of international migration there is a tendency to conclude that this branch of inquiry is becoming less and less important. It is true that international movements of population are no longer the strategic element in economic growth that they were in the nineteenth century. The character of the international economy has been profoundly altered, and so has the intellectual climate. Nevertheless, in the new setting we are confronted with different problems which are quite as challenging as the old. The accent is no longer on mass movements but rather on qualitative factors, transfers of skill, and particularly the migration of relatively scarce 'human capital'.

It would be wrong to infer that we should abandon research into the mechanism of migration in the era when movements were considerable. Immigration still plays a prominent part in the growth of countries such as Australia and Canada, and it is impossible to interpret the process adequately without comparing it with past experience. This is not just a matter of academic interest, as Kuznets and Rubin have explained in relation to the United States. ‘An understanding of these past processes and of the implications of the decisions made about them is of great practical importance, today perhaps more than ever. Decisions about immigration, like those about the public domain, internal improvements, industrial organization, and protection, were among the basic secular decisions—basic in that they were far-reaching, and secular in that they were important for the long-run development of the economy. Although such decisions cannot be reversed easily, and often cannot be reversed at all, retrospective understanding of their consequences may forestall haste in future decisions and stimulate foresight where it is obscured by over-concern with the apparently pressing problems of the day. . . . Even a hasty survey of the data in this field and a glance at the implications of some of the findings reveal the vast need for a methodical quantitative analysis of this aspect of the country’s past growth.’ [27, p. vi.]

The following lines of inquiry suggest themselves:

1. A detailed sector analysis of the relation between an inflow of labour and the course of mechanization, technical innovation and...
capital-output ratios in countries which have experienced waves of immigration, e.g., the United States of America, 1890-1913.

2. What are the similarities and differences between the process of immigration since 1945 in, say, Australia, Canada or Brazil and the corresponding process in the nineteenth century?

3. The economic determinants of the future pace of immigration in Latin American countries.

4. The relation between economic integration in Western Europe and the propensity to emigrate.

5. Private and public capital movements since 1945 in relation to migration movements.


7. An historical inquiry into international flows of emigrants' remittances and their recent significance in overpopulated countries such as Greece and Italy.

8. Immigration as a factor in inflationary pressure in countries such as Australia, Canada and Israel.

9. Problems of capital requirements in relation to immigration in various countries, especially Latin America.

10. International migration of technical experts and highly qualified manpower. Quantitative estimates of the 'multiplier' effects of various rates of immigration of skilled manpower in underdeveloped countries.

11. Reactions of migration restrictions on the degree of internal and inter-regional migration, e.g., in Asian countries.

12. Methods of estimating future supply of and demand for migrants in various countries.

The kind of quantitative material required for research on cultural assimilation has been admirably surveyed by Max Lacroix and Edith Adams [352]. If the suggestions in that paper were adopted, a fruitful prospect for research in this field would be opened. Moreover, much more use could be made of the increasingly plentiful economic data on consumer behaviour. A most promising avenue of research was revealed by Hans Stachle as long ago as 1934 [377], but there has been no follow-up, except for a mention during the symposium held by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population in 1949. Stachle found that poor Scandinavian immigrants in the United States conformed to the food-habits of the Americans because of the constraint of their low incomes; when their circumstances improved they began to diverge by gratifying their taste for Scandinavian food; when they became richer still, they became 'Americanized' in their food-habits and conformed in a more genuine sense. It would be interesting to see analyses of this kind carried out in several countries, using sampling methods where
necessary; it would be a profitable sphere of co-operation between econ-
omists and sociologists.

Other lines of useful inquiry in the demographic and social field would be the following:
1. Migration and the dependency ratios in various countries.
2. The implications of the population upsurge in rich countries, with particular reference to future migration trends.
3. The relation between social security developments and migration.
4. Inter-country comparisons of rates of 'assimilation' for given ethnic or nationality groups.
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