“The Public Management of Religious Diversity”
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Editorial

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The current issue of the *Journal on Multicultural Societies*, published by UNESCO, takes up the debate of the inaugural issue of the Journal on democratic governance in multi-religious societies. Whereas the contributions to the inaugural issue were devoted to the general dynamics of religious diversity at both global and nation-state level, this issue focuses on more specific trends in the public management of religious diversity. Its contributions are based on scientific discussions held during a thematic session – *Gestion publique du pluralisme religieux: évolution des problématiques et débats sociologiques* – at the biennial conference of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion held in Leuven, Belgium, 26–30 July 1999. This session was organised by Françoise Champion, guest editor of the current issue.

The contributions of James Beckford, Grace Davie and Roberto Motta, which were presented at the Leuven conference, address the legal, political and social questions related to the public management of religious diversity in two particular contexts, the United Kingdom and Brazil. They are introduced by Françoise Champion in a substantive article through which these case studies are placed in a wider perspective, both historically and comparatively, and are related to recent theoretical developments in the analysis of modes of governing religious diversity. Together with the contributions of James Spickard, Ole Riis and Paul Weller in the inaugural issue, these articles provide an overview of some current trends in the sociology of religion that may also be of interest to scholars from other disciplines.

The book selected for review in this issue focuses on another topical subject of the *Journal on Multicultural Societies*: in her review of the *Atlas of American Diversity* by Shinagawa and Jang, Eve Mullen discusses methods of data collection and presentation related to ethnic diversity and their potential for replication in other countries or regions.

Future issues of the *Journal on Multicultural Societies* will shift the focus of attention to other problems of cultural diversity, such as differences between civilisations in concepts governing the relation of politics and culture, mechanisms for implementing linguistic human rights, and transnational migrant communities. However, readers are invited to continue the debate of the first volume by submitting them with a view to publication in the Journal.
The diversity of religious pluralism

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In her introduction to the texts of Jim Beckford, Grace Davie and Roberto Motta, Françoise Champion situates the transformations analysed by the authors in a twofold comparative perspective: between past and present and between different countries. Religious pluralism is understood as a political principle: religiously pluralistic societies are based on the right to religious freedom. This introduction distinguishes between several forms of religious pluralism. In the diachronic perspective, a distinction is drawn between an emancipatory pluralism pertaining strictly to the individual’s right to religious liberty (and entailing, in particular, a de-ethnicization of religion), and a pluralism of identities marked by the demand from the different religions for full and equal recognition of their individuality. The concrete forms of religious pluralism in different European countries have been, and still are, bound up with their respective religious traditions. The latter’s socio-religious content, organizational forms and process of integration into the nation-state have resulted in different types of pluralism such as the French “individualistic” pluralism, the “communitarian pluralism” characteristic of the Netherlands until the 1960s, and the “communitarian individualistic pluralism” of the United Kingdom. The article ends by addressing the role of “critical research” in the “management” of religious or ethno-religious plurality.

In this introduction to the studies by Jim Beckford, Grace Davie and Roberto Motta, I take a twofold comparative approach to the transformations that they analyse: that of past and present, and that of different countries. A comparative approach is particularly fruitful, especially for the descriptive and theoretical decentring which it allows, but it also has its dangers. The analyst is liable to suffer from imperfect knowledge - the sort of knowledge that is gained from close familiarity with a country, if nothing else - and this risk increases with the scope, whether synchronic or diachronic, of the approach. There is also the risk of prejudice, since it is always difficult to break loose from one’s cultural moorings. One good way of overcoming these drawbacks is, I believe, to set side by side various comparative studies from different backgrounds - whether national or “ideological”: these may be general studies, such as that by Ole Riis or the one which I propose to outline here, or more specific analyses such as that which Davie
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provides by comparing certain features of the “English case” with the “French case”.

1. Emancipatory pluralism and pluralism of identities

Davie posits France as a prime example of a “pluralism of individuals” as opposed to a “pluralism of communities”. Jim Beckford points out that, in England and Wales, policies attempting to take account of religious diversity have existed for several decades. As a counterpoint to their observations I shall first add to the “kitty” of international comparisons a few remarks on the example of France, remarks which prompt us to ask, in relation to Beckford, whether the thinking behind these policies was on the lines “religious pluralism”.

In France, the term “religious pluralism” was still little used some 15 years ago, even in political terminology and social science. Today it is part of the ordinary vocabulary, if not of society as such, then at least of social-science researchers, political analysts and sociologists in particular. Without trying to explain this change, it is interesting to note that, quite obviously, it is not “automatically” linked to actual changes stemming from growth in religious diversity. Thus, while the mass influx of Muslim immigrants workers dates back to the 1960s, the blossoming of references to “religious pluralism” really began only in the second half of the 1980s (the exact period remains to be determined). Until that time, the Muslim newcomers were almost exclusively alluded to as “immigrant workers” with no reference to their religious affiliation. It is obvious that the consideration of their “religious otherness” and the attention focused on a new socio-religious reality, was determined by a change in ideology. Similarly, the arrival in France of North African Jews in the 1950s and 1960s considerably altered the demographic and cultural situation of French Judaism but did not immediately lead to an assertion of Jewishness challenging the “denominational model” intrinsic to the French republican model. The latter is epitomized in the words uttered by the Count of Clermont-Tonnerre during the French Revolution concerning the Jews: “Jews should be denied everything as a nation but granted everything as individuals; it is intolerable that they should become a separate political formation or class within the country: every one of them must individually become a citizen”. As far as the French State was concerned, in 1807 the Jews thus became French citizens of the Jewish faith. It is with the challenge to this denominational model - a challenge both fostering claims to identity and fostered by them - that reference to religious pluralism has developed in France. Not that the French republican and denominational model was not pluralist. It embodied a certain form of religious pluralism which I term emancipatory pluralism. But nowadays another form of pluralism is in the spotlight: identity-based pluralism.

The French republican model (in which religious affiliations are a matter for individuals and are strictly private) rejects intermediate groups between the individual and the State and has been, on the whole, more hesitant about pluralism than other models, which are founded to a greater (albeit varying) extent on a
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culture of pluralism, especially for religion. The United States immediately springs
to mind: there, the term “religious pluralism” has long been part of both ordinary
language and sociological vocabulary. Nevertheless, similar ideological tendencies
may be observed in both the United States and France, as in all Western
democracies. Obviously, the challenge to national models of integration considered
unfairly universalist, and as not recognizing the diversity of specific identities and
particularisms, cuts across national boundaries. Thus in the field of political
philosophy, research and discussion concerning “recognition” policy is trans-
national in nature, then at least in the “Western world”. Everywhere there are
springing up, if not always new policies, at least new debates. Consequently, the
question of pluralism, especially religious pluralism, has today become a key
political issue.

However, the term “religious pluralism”, which is now in widespread use, reflects
various realities and has various meanings. Ole Riis, for example, has observed that
the concept of religious pluralism may be used “in a descriptive and in an
evaluative sense”. In Beckford’s opinion, fact and value should be kept separate for
the sake of clarity. He therefore believes that we should use the term “religious
diversity” to describe empirical reality, since “pluralism” is a very specific way of
considering this diversity – “an ideological or evaluative response to empirical
diversity” - based on mutual respect between different religious and/or cultural
systems and the aim of peaceful coexistence for the various religions. I think it is
difficult not to follow Beckford in this, since accuracy demands that we distinguish
the objective existence of religious diversity from its political and ideological
interpretations.

However, once this distinction has been drawn, the problem of defining “religious
pluralism”, its scope and boundaries, still remains. It should, I believe, first be
remarked that “religious pluralism”, as opposed to “religious monism” in which a
single religion has religious and, more broadly, symbolic legitimacy, is a political
principle belonging to “Western” political thought. We may also note that although
reference to “religious pluralism” has positive connotations in Western societies, in
a good many countries the term has no real meaning unless - as is quite often the
case - to reflect political and ideological imposition of the “North” on the “South”.

Beckford’s strict definition of “religious pluralism” leads him to the conclusion
that it does not exist in England. To him, religious pluralism signifies a social and
political system which grants every religion equal respect and equal facilities for
individuals to practise their own religions without hindrance; this involves allowing
for the individuality of each religion and not turning the specific features of the
dominant religion into the norm. In fact, such pluralism would be “strong
pluralism”, to use Beckford’s term. This is a comment which seems to me crucial
in that it suggests that there are, as it were, various degrees of pluralism and that
weak religious pluralism exists in England. For my part, I prefer to speak of two
sorts of religious pluralism. The pluralism which is now taking root is an identity-
based pluralism: a pluralism which asserts identity, thus demanding equality for all
religious groups. The religious pluralism characteristic of “Western democratic” societies to date has been a pluralism based on the right to religious freedom. This right, at the collective level, means that religious diversity is not simply de facto but also de jure. In this sense - with this definition of religious pluralism - the various policies of tolerance in Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries which, to a varying extent, enabled minority faiths - sometimes Catholic, sometimes Calvinist or Lutheran, or sometimes even “sectarian”- not to disappear, were not yet a product of religious pluralism. In other words, religious pluralism is inseparable from the political modernity which actually became established in Europe and the United States from the turn of the eighteenth century. I have termed this first type of pluralism emancipatory pluralism.

Beckford and Davie analyse the debate concerning the actual introduction of the new religious pluralism (identity-based) in England. Davie uses a comparison with France, from which it emerges that the basic issues are largely the same, as in most European Union countries, even if the very concrete questions under discussion reflect specific national situations. Whether today’s issues and debates go beyond national boundaries or remain within them, we shall understand them better by placing them in relation to the past.

2. Socio-historical comparisons

What, then, was this right to religious freedom which provided the foundation for societies with religious pluralism? The definition of its scope and boundaries largely coincided with the social definition of religion that began to prevail at the turn of the eighteenth century. This definition of religion as involving the right to religious freedom as we know it today weakened the earlier claims of religion on society, making it above all a matter of personal belief and, at the collective level, of worship. Religion was considered able to give rise to a social community but not a political community: the definition of religion which emerged assumed a distinction between the spiritual and the temporal. By this definition, which is still the legal (and, more generally, social) definition adopted by Christian countries, a religious community is not an ethnic community, since this would preclude any possibility of leaving it. In other words: people cannot be assigned an identity unless they are free to renounce it. The Jewish “nations” of ancien régime France which became the “Israelite faith” are a case in point. From this definition, determining on the positive side what constitutes a religion and on the negative side what does not constitute a religion, it clearly emerges that the right to religious freedom was understood as a personal freedom.

This right of every individual to religious freedom meant that all citizens were equal whatever their religion - civil rights became independent of religion - and that a system of religious pluralism was established. The establishing of that pluralism was part of the process, which continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of completely freeing society from its dependence on religion.
The process followed different patterns in different countries, determined by the religious divisions which tore Europe apart from the sixteenth century onwards and the ways in which they were resolved. I have singled out some ideal typical patterns which have shaped the various Church-State relationships and, to some extent therefore, the forms of religious pluralism which still characterize the various European countries today. These types mainly depend on religious tradition (Catholic or Protestant), when one religion has a virtual monopoly in a country, and on whether a country is single-faith or dual-faith (when Protestantism and Catholicism are both important without, however, being equal). In dual-faith countries, the process of disjointing Church and State began earlier than in single-faith countries. This was very much the case for the Dutch Republic, since that republic was set up without establishing a State as such.

It was above all because of their very different structures that Catholicism and Protestantism gave rise to different processes of emancipation. The Catholic Church has always been a transnational church dependent on Rome, duly hierarchical and heavily regulated by the power of Tradition and the Church. Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century it became more and more ultramontane, antimodern and monolithic. It was also a Church which, because it considered itself to have overall jurisdiction in social matters, set itself up as a power opposing and competing with the State. The Protestant Church (when in a dominant or monopoly position) has never been a power opposed to the State in the same way as the Catholic Church but is an institution within the State forming part of the social fabric and assuming specific responsibilities in subordination (accepted or contested in various degrees) to political power. This power is accepted by some and contested by others, since in Protestantism, unlike Catholicism, the development and expression of diverse and divergent tendencies is in fact expected.

The history of emancipation in Catholic countries has been marked by the struggle between clericals and anticlericals. The latter often attributed greater importance to “freedom of thought” - the ability to argue soundly, critical rigour, and constant questioning based on reason - than to freedom of conscience. They thus challenged the Catholic Church in particular, and often religion in general. The pattern of emancipation which prevailed (when power was in the hands of the anticlericals) consisted in separating Church and State: political power was used to remove individuals and various spheres of social activity from the Church's influence (either partially or completely). Eventually, religion found itself relegated entirely to the private sphere. In Protestant countries, the Church (in a dominant or monopoly situation) underwent a transformation at much the same time as all other sectors of society. These transformations did not occur without conflict, but it was usually not the Church - and even less religion - that was challenged. The struggles, which may broadly be described as between conservatives and liberals, ran through

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both Church and the modern State. Since it did not bring into conflict two camps as indomitable as the clericals and the anticlericals in Catholic countries, emancipation from religion followed a pattern of secularization, involving less radical clashes than separation of Church and State, since religion was transformed at the same time as the various spheres of social activity and the State was also able to work for transformation of the Church, because the latter was not independent. The countries providing the best illustration of these two patterns are France, for separation of Church and State, and Denmark, for secularization (cf. Champion 1993 and 1999, Riis 1998).

The real diversity of national models of emancipatory pluralism is also explained by the antithesis between individualistic pluralism and communitarian pluralism. Individualistic pluralism is founded on the freedom (independence) of individuals. Communitarian pluralism is a reaction to the assertion of modernity (rise of secularization and establishment of societies based on the individual); since this reaction is forced to take cognizance of the new situation with regard to religious pluralism, it (re)creates, within society as a whole, a faith-based community which is closed and hostile to modernity. To oversimplify, France is a country where individualistic pluralism has triumphed, while the Netherlands represents a country where communitarian pluralism has become established. Two basic issues have played a crucial role in both these countries (and elsewhere): freedom of organization for religious institutions hostile to modernity, and freedom of education (including State subsidization of denominational schools).

The Netherlands is distinguished by its primary religious diversity. Since the founding of this nation, the two great Christian traditions, Protestant and Catholic, have co-existed, with the former dominant and for a long time oppressive, although without ever reducing the latter to a minority in danger of being totally forgotten, or almost, as was the case in France for the Protestants after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This religious diversity is also due to the Protestant schism, from the nation’s earliest days, between Gomarists and Arminians. Over the centuries, this schism has been continually closed and re-opened in all fields. Liberal Protestantism and orthodox Protestantism here met and clashed to an even greater extent than in other Protestant countries. They clashed all the more because they were both politically active Calvinistic forms of Protestantism. In the Netherlands there were thus three groups in the politico-religious arena, and none was dependent on the State. The Catholics, having supported the liberals and obtained from them as much as they might reasonably expect - the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy and freedom of education - then allied themselves with the orthodox Protestants. Being unable effectively to oppose the emancipation of society in any way, each of the two groups tried to guard against the influence of modernity on its religion as much as possible while working for the collective advancement of the group. For this purpose, obtaining equality of religious and State education, over and above "mere" freedom of education, was crucial. In 1917 came recognition of full equality between religious and State education: State-funded denominational schools then proliferated at all levels of education. This
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played a major part in establishing the system of “pillars” which structured an individual’s entire life.

The significance of the French Republic’s individualistic model stems from its refusal, dating from the Revolution, to let “private” groups come between the individual and the State, the latter being considered a direct manifestation of the general will. It was during the Revolution that the Le Chapelier law against corporations was promulgated, laying down that there were no longer to be any corporations within the State; there was to be only the private interest of each individual and the general interest. Nobody was to be permitted to inspire citizens with an intermediate interest, separating them from the State by a spirit of corporation. Thus in France, the intercession of intermediate groups was allowed only belatedly: the right of association was not recognized before 1884 (1825 in England). As far as religion was concerned, this individualism was made more radical by the holistic and hierarchical countermodel of the Catholic Church and by the wish to fight its influence. Thus the egalitarian pluralism legally established in 1804 (the clergy of the various religions were all eventually paid by the State, on equal terms) was essentially underpinned by the struggle against the Catholic Church - by the determination to weaken its claims and prerogatives. Since the bond between State and Catholic Church had been broken by the French Revolution and Bonaparte, the Church no longer accepted its subordination to political authority as under the ancien régime: it demanded freedom of organization. The conflict was to last throughout the nineteenth century. It was largely settled when the Church was separated from the State, with certain “additions” being made to the Act of Separation itself (1905). If this law succeeded in being a lasting instrument of pacification, this was due to the fact that it was partly a law of compromise: contrary to the wishes of the most anticlerical section of the Left, it allowed a hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church.

As regards education, since the French State had taken control of this field and the Catholic Church could not hope to regain it, from 1828 onwards it fought for freedom of education. This was to be the major issue throughout the nineteenth century (and subsequently…) in the confrontation between the two Frances. The Catholic Church was finally to win its case in 1833 for primary education and in 1875 for subsequent education. However, it would not succeed in preventing the establishment of an only system of State education (although it succeeded in Belgium, resulting in the creation of a “pillar” system similar to that in the Netherlands). This system was made possible by the Republican victory in the elections, thanks to the decisive contribution of the "universal-suffrage Catholics" who had refused to follow the Church of Rome in its increasingly intransigent rejection of the modern world. The only system of State education managed to compel recognition, opening up the way to separation of Church and State (1905). The principle of separation thus established was successful in ensuring the coexistence, not without conflicts, of the two Frances (Republican France and Catholic France) without this compromise ever being shattered.
3. Emancipatory pluralism and the process of secularization in England

What are the context and the history of the current debate on religious pluralism in England as analysed by Davie and Beckford? The Church of England is the "established" Church in England but not in the rest of Britain. Its establishment means that it has certain recognized rights and certain responsibilities. The sovereign is the head of the Church and officially "Defender of the Faith". The Anglican episcopate is represented in the House of Lords by 26 bishops; the General Synod of the Church of England forms part of the country’s legislative system; and Anglican clergymen are not simply ministers of one faith among others but are also magistrates. This is accompanied by subordination of Church to State. However, it is not merely a Church in a State, totally subject to political authority, as in the case of Scandinavia’s Lutheran countries. It is a subordinate-cum-associate of political authority - reflected, among other things, by the special political representation of the Church of England in the House of Lords.

The political role of the Church of England following its establishment was accentuated by the militancy of the Calvinistic Puritans. And the initial association of politics with religion was further strengthened by the Glorious Revolution when the religious, Protestant, nature of England’s political identity was firmly reasserted (through an alliance between Anglicanism and Dissenters), with the religious principle prevailing over the dynastic principle. The assertion of this primacy was a crucial event which has sealed England’s destiny right up to the present: with the founding of a parliamentary monarchy there emerged a radically new political legitimacy. Political modernity and affirmation of Protestantism thus went hand in hand. Precisely because of this, institutionalization of religious pluralism was much more gradual and difficult than in other countries. Although the Toleration Act, which gave partial freedom (nevertheless considerable for the time) to the main branches of Protestant Dissent, was adopted in 1689, it was only in 1828 that the measures preventing Dissenters from participating in local government were revoked. The following year, Parliament passed the emancipation of Catholics, who thus acquired full civil rights: this vote gave rise to bitter dispute, since it represented the end of the traditional identification of national identity with anti-Catholicism. The remaining political discrimination against Jews was abolished in 1858. It may also be noted that it was not until 1886 that a relaxation of the parliamentary rules requiring all members of parliament to take an oath on the Bible allowed a militant atheist to sit in parliament.

This objection to granting full freedom of conscience was in no way the work of the Church of England as such. On the contrary, at that time (during the nineteenth century) it was much influenced by liberal tendencies favouring religious freedom. Political liberalism and conservatism both found support in the Church of England. The question of disestablishing the Church of England then arose. The liberals, whether in the Church of England or in politics, were not necessarily all in favour. Some inclined to the solution of a broad multidenominational established Church
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uniting all Protestant and even Christian faiths (therefore including Catholicism). In fact, rather than break its ties with the Church of England as the established religion, English society preferred to loosen them, as it were, by gradually conceding equal religious value to all Christian faiths. More generally, the emancipation of English society from its considerable religious dependence occurred both through an undermining of the privileged status of the Church of England and through a rewriting of its specific role. From guaranteeing the legitimacy of political power and representing the entire nation, it increasingly became the “mere” symbol of a national identity tied to Christianity and a political authority trying to maintain a Christian connection. This symbol has nevertheless retained considerable significance: English society chose, it seems, not so much to be secular or to separate Church and State as to be multidenominational, proclaiming itself, in the course of time, not only Anglican but also Protestant, then Christian and lastly Judaico-Christian. That is why English society was to find it much more difficult than other countries to accept atheism or even agnosticism. Anticlericalism and agnosticism were not part of political culture - understood in the broad sense as encompassing the trade unions, in particular. On the contrary, the religious connection was a feature of all political action and awareness. We know how important the role of some kinds of Nonconformism and revivalism was in the “making of the English working class”, to quote the title of E.P. Thompson’s fine book.

More than anywhere else in Europe, religion in England participated in modernity through its various components and tendencies. The type of emancipatory pluralism characteristic of England may, broadly speaking, be described as communitarian individualistic pluralism. This pluralism was propagated and promoted by most religious groups. Far from being anti-individualistic (or restricting individualism to the conscience, as was mainly the case in the Lutheran Churches), English Protestantism was to encourage the development of social and political individualism, attaching fundamental importance to voluntary and community life in both its religious and its social dimensions. This is very different from the communitarian disengagement of antimodern religions.

In England today, it seems that the practical problems raised by religious pluralism all call into question the status of the Church of England, its “nature” and significance. Davie outlines the current debate on possible solutions for reforming religious representation in the House of Lords in order to take account of increasing religious diversity in England. She explains the various options, together with the underlying issues, advantages and drawbacks of each. These are the same solutions that have long characterized this type of debate in England: disestablishment, political institutionalization of religious plurality, or the legal status quo with a rewriting of the role played by the Church of England. Being an essential part of England’s history, these various solutions were, of course, always the product of specific historical circumstances. It is now ironic “that new forms of religious organization should emerge in Britain at precisely the moment that large sections of the population appear to reject the concept of religion per se”. The
question of disestablishing the Church of England therefore occurs today against a background of large-scale religious disaffection. The danger for all religions is in that case a State that is indifferent to religion and little inclined to attach importance or value to religions or to promote the right to more extensive religious freedom such as may be demanded by the most recent faiths to arrive in Britain. For this reason, a good many leaders of such faiths are not in favour of disestablishing the Church of England. They think that such disestablishment would be likely not so much to encourage greater religious pluralism as to move in the direction of a “secularist” State. The disestablishment issue is basically a question of England’s identity: a secularized society or a multi-faith society? This issue recently cropped up again quite starkly in relation to blasphemy: at the very time when it seemed that the law prohibiting blasphemy against fundamental Christian beliefs would have to be revoked, the “Rushdie affair” raised the possibility that, instead of its abolition, the offence of blasphemy might have to be extended to non-Christian beliefs. Extension of religious representation in the House of Lords to faiths other than Anglicanism may seem attractive in terms of achieving genuinely stronger religious pluralism. This would amount to “establishing” not only the Church of England but also other religions - in other words defining England as a multi-faith society rather than a secular one. This solution comes up against the practical difficulty of how to select the religions to be represented in the House of Lords, since the days are long gone when only a few major Christian faiths and Judaism would have been concerned: the religions now present in Britain are very diverse. The preservation of the status quo could also, despite appearances, be one way of instituting genuine religious pluralism if the Church of England adopted the position of some of its senior clergymen: “to see themselves as the guardians and promoters of ‘faith’, rather than ‘the faith’”. This solution is possible, explains Davie, because the Church of England is today a weak Church - having lost its congregation - and therefore no longer has the ability to impose its influence; on the contrary, it would be very much to its advantage to enter into an alliance with the other religions.

In fact, it is precisely this role of the Church of England as defender of all believers that is discussed by Beckford. He specifically analyses how it manages the Prison Service Chaplaincy, which is its responsibility and which has to take care of the spiritual welfare of all prisoners, who now belong to a wide range of religions. This is not a very recent responsibility of the Church of England, since it was in 1952 that it was officially required by the State to facilitate the practice of non-Christian religions in prisons. The study of prisons conducted by Beckford leads him to conclude that the Church of England is not really fulfilling its mission. Why is this? Because even though more prisoners now belong to the minority religions recently established in Britain with the arrival of new immigrants, the chaplains are still Anglican: "Not a single Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Muslim or Sikh is employed as a full-time or part-time chaplain." The Prison Service Chaplaincy is run by senior Anglican chaplains, and decisions about whether to appoint visiting ministers from “other faiths” are taken by Christian chaplains and prison administrators. In such circumstances, the right to religious freedom cannot be, and indeed is not,
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respected. It is, we may note, a “standard” personal right that is concerned here. In Beckford’s view, it is clear that this personal right, which is a constituent element of emancipatory pluralism, can be properly respected only with the establishment of a “stronger” pluralism - an identity-based pluralism, to use my terminology - which is able to ensure that believers in the weaker religions are guaranteed their right to religious freedom. We see the same type of argument in France with the Muslims’ demand to be given real facilities for building mosques in order to practise their religion: however, the voicing of this demand, which relates strictly to worship, has been possible only in the context of wider demands concerning respect for Muslim identity.

4. “Critical” researchers engaging with the ethno-religious dimension

Beckford argues, implicitly and explicitly, for both equality of the different religions (and not simply of individuals) and allowance for the specific characteristics of religions “other than Christianity”, especially in terms of organization. He rejects Anglican domination and does not accept that methods of representation and organization adopted by Christian religions should be turned into a restrictive norm for “other faiths”: he is clearly and deliberately adopting the attitude of a critical sociologist.

Motta’s article in fact concerns the role which critical anthropologists and sociologists have played in transforming Afro-Brazilian faiths. That role has been paradoxical since, although the researchers wanted to bring out the specifically African nature of these faiths, the latter ultimately accommodated themselves to the dominant, Western, religious model. With that accommodation, the Afro-Brazilian faiths entered the Brazilian religious market, “an ‘anonymous’ and abstract market consisting of people of all skin colours and all ethnic groups”. This is an “unintended effect” to use Weberian terminology. Critical anthropologists and sociologists, such as Roger Bastide, wanted to improve the status of African culture, even if that meant, as they may have thought and regretted, “hindering the assimilation of the Black in the north-east of Brazil to Western culture”. In trying to consolidate authentic candomblé by emphasizing its African roots they were in fact encouraging the establishment of a modern, de-ethnicized and rationalized religion on the pattern of Christian religions. How? By performing a complete job of ”reinterpretation and codification” of African traditions. This then became the reference for the “efficacy and authenticity of their rites and beliefs”, with the researchers themselves becoming the authorities on African orthodoxy. The position of the Afro-Brazilian religions on the religious market is now all the more secure, since they would seem to fit in particularly well with a certain form of contemporary modernity which “will have nothing to do with notions of sin, either ‘original’ or ‘present’, of guilt or of expiation” and, more generally, the model of Protestant asceticism.

Beckford suggests in his article that the claims of “other faith” communities are at present being strongly asserted because these religions have now gained confidence.
It is reasonable to assume that, although this confidence stems, as Beckford indicates, from their involvement in public life, it also stems to some extent from the reasoned input and support of researchers such as Beckford. In the case of the Afro-Brazilian religions, Motta believes that the researchers have become so involved that they have actually acted as “faith doctors” and that their symposia have in fact been syncretic events, halfway between scientific symposia and ecumenical councils. It is in this sense that he speaks of a “holy alliance” between the researchers and the leaders of those religions.

5. Conclusion

Religion in the Christian West has been defined as a specific and limited activity supported by a “separate” institution - a Church - bringing together a community of individual believers. We are at present witnessing various outflankings and a deregulation of the religious field. This is due above all to a remarkable decline in Christianity, reflected not only by a-religious social institutions but by the growth, if not of religious apathy, then at least of disaffection with Christian institutions. This is the crucial point. We are also seeing a (re)entwining of elements of human and social life which the “Western” definition of religion had separated, such as religion and therapy. Modernity, with its drive to institutional fragmentation, established therapy (first of the body and then of the mind) as a specific activity. Special policies were developed to remove care of the body from the influence of religion (especially in France with, in 1803, a law establishing the concept of “illegal practice of medicine”).

However, we are now witnessing the rapid growth of groups and networks in which religion and therapy are closely intertwined. In this connection, it is very interesting to see how Afro-Brazilian religions - which, as Motta has shown us, had accommodated themselves to the Western model of religion - have become hybrids of therapy and religion when imported into Europe at the Europeans’ demand. The “Western religious outlook” is also being outflanked by religions imported by immigrant communities. These are often “ethnic religions” or at least “holistic” religions in which community prevails over the individual (the latter cannot leave his or her community, for example). Membership of a religion is here bound up with an identity. Nor is this question of identity today specific to religions recently imported into the West by immigrant communities. We also find this preoccupation with identity among Jews and Christians concerned that their identity should be publicly taken into consideration. The issue of identity obviously seems to be replacing the issue of belief - and of freedom of belief with its implications in terms of religious practice. No doubt this is, at least in part, a protest against the increasingly widespread conception of religion as inner spirituality, a voluntary and strictly personal option, a “mere” ethical resource. Be that as it may, these various outflankings of recognized religion in the West call into question the very nature of religious pluralism and its specific relationship to pluralism in general in terms of how and to what extent different values, lifestyles and cultures are taken into account.
The diversity of religious pluralism

References


The diversity of religious pluralism


About the Author

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The Management of Religious Diversity in England and Wales with Special Reference to Prison Chaplaincy

JAMES A. BECKFORD, PH.D.

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The importance of policies governing the management of religious and ethno-religious diversity in England and Wales has increased in recent decades. This is not only because the variety of faith traditions represented in the country has grown; nor is it simply because the numbers of, for example, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims and Sikhs have expanded. It is primarily because these faith communities have established themselves in public life to the point where they can confidently demand “equal respect” and “equality of opportunity” to practise their religion in private and public. This argument is illustrated by an analysis of the issues surrounding the provision of religious and spiritual care to prisoners.

One of the ironies of secularisation (however the term is defined) is that it does not necessarily mean that religion becomes unproblematic. My argument in this paper is that, on the contrary, religion becomes more controversial precisely at the time when it is in the process of losing its significance as a force shaping social and cultural life.

I begin with some critical remarks about the concept of pluralism. I want to show that it is a deceptively difficult concept from a sociological point of view and that the notion of “diversity” is probably more appropriate to denote the focus of my research in recent years. The extent of religious diversity in the population of England and Wales and among prisoners is documented.

I then argue that prison chaplaincy in England and Wales is a site of growing controversy, not just because of the growth of religious diversity but also because of the continuing reliance of the British state on the Church of England to act as a universal mission to all prisoners at a time when universalism is of questionable
value. Anglican prison chaplains are in a strange situation: as representatives of a universalist religion they are legally required by the Prison Act of 1952 to facilitate the practice of other religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism. They are agents of the British state’s policy for managing religious diversity. I conclude that pluralism is not part of this policy because it is not based on the right of British citizens to freedom of religion.

1. Pluralism or Diversity?

The term “pluralism” appears in the title of the conference session at which this paper was originally presented, so it may seem impolite for me to be critical of the way in which it is commonly used by sociologists of religion. But I think it is essential to be as clear as possible about the terms that we use. There are two main problems.

(1) First, “pluralism” refers to an ideological or normative belief that there should be mutual respect between different cultural systems and freedom for them all. It holds that peaceful coexistence between different cultural systems is preferable to enmity between them. And it sometimes suggests that a state of balance in the importance attached to different cultural systems is better than an ideological monopoly or a very one-sided relationship between a dominant system and subordinate systems. But the research that most of us are doing is not about the ideology of pluralism or about the state’s management of this ideology. Most of us are actually concerned with religious diversity and with the public response to diversity. It is confusing, in my opinion, to use the concept of pluralism “in a descriptive and in an evaluative sense” (Riis 1999, 2), especially as Ole Riis himself recognises that it would be a mistake “to conclude from the empirical fact of plurality that such plurality should be embraced normatively”. For clarity, I think that fact and value should be kept separate. Pluralism is an ideological or evaluative response to empirical diversity. To be more precise, pluralism can assume many different forms. Riis (1999) has helpfully identified a wide range of uses to which the term “pluralism” can be put and, within them, three different ways of instituting religious pluralism: toleration, denominationalisation and individual religious freedom. Each of them is an ideological model of how to manage religious diversity. State authorities have therefore adapted them selectively to the perceived, and changing, need for social order and the maintenance of politico-economic power structures. I argue that strong pluralism needs to be based on the right of individuals to religious freedom.

(2) Second, some political scientists have used “pluralism” for their own ideological purposes to imply that the well-being of any society depends simply

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2 This paper is based on research that I conducted with Dr Sophie Gilliat between 1994 and 1997. We wish to record our thanks to the Church of England and the Leverhulme Trust for their generous financial support. See Beckford and Gilliat, 1998.
on having a plurality of competing interest groups, social classes or religions. But this perspective totally ignores the fact that inequalities of power or prestige can sometimes render the idea of pluralistic competition unrealistic. Relations of superordination and subordination can give rise to marginalisation, exploitation and oppression in some cases. The notion of a market for religions is also vulnerable to the same objection: that it distracts attention from gross inequalities and imbalances of power, opportunity and resources. We therefore need a notion of diversity that is open to the possibility that some religious groups are so much more influential and powerful than others that it is simply unrealistic to think of them as competing with each other in harmony. We need to focus on the opportunities that religious diversity creates for the perpetuation or the reduction of the power held by dominant religious groups.

There is a risk that research on religious minorities somehow implies that they necessarily represent social or sociological problems. But I want to argue that dominant religious groups can also be problematic, especially when they confront weaker minorities. Even when pluralism forms part of the public discourse about majority-minority relations, there is no guarantee of commitment to “equal respect” or “equal opportunities”.

But it is also necessary to analyse carefully what we mean by “religious diversity”. It refers primarily to a number of factors that may, or may not, be interrelated. In the first place, it refers to an increase that has taken place in the variety of religious groups operating in England and Wales since, say, 1950. Second, it refers to an increase in the number of faith communities that are separate from Christian faith traditions. Third, it refers to the growing popularity of religious and spiritual beliefs or practices which fall outside the categories of the world’s major faith traditions. Fourth, it refers to the differentiation of formerly unitary faith groups into separate groupings. In countries where one religious organisation used to dominate religious life, the term “diversity” registers the change from a virtual monopoly to a situation in which competition takes place between various religious organisations.

The precise configuration of all these dimensions of diversity varies from country to country in accordance with the religious history and religious composition of each. The political salience of religious diversity therefore varies with the local circumstances. The social implications of growing religious diversity are also shaped by them. This is why I think it is important to ground the study of growing religious diversity in particular cases, that is, in the framework of historical, cultural and social factors influencing the perception of diversification in any given country. And, as Riis (1999) has clearly demonstrated, the meaning of the term “pluralism” also varies with local circumstances and from country to country.

My reasons for insisting on a conceptual distinction between pluralism and diversity will become clearer when I explain the extent to which the treatment of prisoners from different faith traditions is unequal in England and Wales. My conclusion is that the British state is far from neutral in matters of religion and that
it merely tolerates a degree of religious diversity. I do not regard toleration as a strong form of pluralism. It is a *concession* made by the powerful to the weak and, as such, it always runs the risk of being manipulated or cancelled by the former.

### 2. Growth of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Although discussions of religious diversity concern new religious movements, the New Age and the continuing fragmentation of Christian denominations, the focus of this paper is on the increase in numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims and Sikhs in England and Wales since the 1950s. Table 1 gives a general impression of the relative size and rate of growth in these faith communities (although they are not homogeneous, self-conscious communities).

**Table 1:** United Kingdom, religious communities, in millions, 1975–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian Trinitarian Churches</strong></td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian Non-Trinitarian Churches</strong></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main religions other than Christianity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of population in</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinitarian churches</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Trinitarian churches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism and other religions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total all religions</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*estimated  
Source: Adapted from Brierley and Wraight (1997, 12).

The Prison Service in England and Wales was slow to adjust to the growing numbers of prisoners from the Caribbean, South Asia and East Africa in the 1960s and 1970s (Genders and Player 1989) and equally slow to recognise officially that Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs have specific religious requirements. Even
in 1979 it was not clear whether religious minorities in prisons were merely tolerated or really accepted (Russell 1979).

Table 2 shows the evolution of religious diversity in the prisons of England and Wales since 1991, as measured by the prison chaplains’ annual census of religious registrations. As many as 2,000 or 3,000 prisoners are “missing” from the census; and there is no way of checking the validity of claims that prisoners make about their religious affiliations or sympathies. But I have no reason to question the relative size of each registration category.

Statistics of religious registrations for earlier years are less reliable than those for the recent past (Table 3), but I estimate that between 1975 and 1999 there was a 33 per cent decrease in the proportion of prisoners identified with the main Christian Churches. By contrast, the proportion of prisoners identified with the major “other faiths” increased by 5.7 per cent over the same period. Meanwhile, a 27 per cent growth occurred in the proportion of prisoners who declined to identify themselves with any religion. In other words, the significance of the relatively small growth in the numbers of Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh prisoners becomes much greater when it is compared with the dramatic decline in the percentage of prisoners associating with mainstream Christian Churches, or indeed with any form of religious activity. The political significance of these shifts in religious registrations is of particular concern to me.

My point here is that, although the pattern of prisoners’ religious registrations has changed radically, the arrangements for prison chaplaincy have not kept pace with this change. The fact that prison chaplaincy is effectively controlled by the Church of England helps to explain why so little adaptation to religious diversity has occurred.

Every prison is legally required to have a “clergyman” of the Church of England; about 80 per cent of all full-time chaplains are Anglicans; and the Prison Service Chaplaincy is still run by senior Anglican chaplains (with the assistance of two Roman Catholic priests and one Methodist minister). More importantly, not a single Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Muslim or Sikh is employed as a full-time or part-time chaplain. And most significantly, from my point of view, decisions about whether to appoint Visiting Ministers3 to supply religious and pastoral care to prisoners belonging to “other faiths” are taken by Christian chaplains and prison administrators.

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3 Visiting Ministers are volunteers who conduct religious and pastoral activities with prisoners identified with religious groups other than mainstream Christian Churches.
Table 2: Annual census of religious registrations, prisoners in England and Wales, 1991–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Christian</strong></td>
<td>32,991</td>
<td>33,532</td>
<td>30,334</td>
<td>31,858</td>
<td>30,300</td>
<td>34,452</td>
<td>36,498</td>
<td>39,492</td>
<td>39,354</td>
<td>61.12</td>
<td>+16.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Christian</strong></td>
<td>644</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other main religions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>346</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>2,745</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>456</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td>4,799</td>
<td>5,521</td>
<td>5,598</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>+100.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other faiths</strong></td>
<td>238</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic, atheist, none</td>
<td>6,866</td>
<td>7,609</td>
<td>7,415</td>
<td>10,405</td>
<td>11,420</td>
<td>13,556</td>
<td>15,840</td>
<td>18,072</td>
<td>18,555</td>
<td>28.82</td>
<td>+170.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-permitted religions</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>+125.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43,601</td>
<td>45,114</td>
<td>41,848</td>
<td>46,851</td>
<td>46,299</td>
<td>53,351</td>
<td>58,005</td>
<td>64,489</td>
<td>64,382</td>
<td></td>
<td>+47.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of prisoners registering any kind of religious identity in 1999 ("religionists"): 45,827
Percentage of other main religions among "religionists" in 1999: 12.21
Percentage of Muslims among "religionists" in 1999: 9.50
Percentage of Muslims among other main religions in 1999: 77.79
Muslims as percentage of total registrations in 1999: 9.50

1. Adapted from "Annual Religious Census", Prison Service Chaplaincy. The PSC’s nomenclature and classification of religious groups are confusing and in some cases questionable. The probability of misregistration is high. We have rationalised the classification of several groups.
2. Church of England; Methodist; Church of Scotland; Protestant; Pentecostal; Baptist; Roman Catholic; Non-Conformist.
3. Calvinist; Celestial Church of God; Church in Wales; Church of Ireland; Congregationalist; Coptic; Episcopal; Orthodox; Orthodox (Greek/Russian); Presbyterian; Quaker; Salvation Army; Seventh-day Adventist; United Reformed Church; Welsh Independent; other Christian; Christadelphian; Jehovah’s Witness; Christian Science.
4. Baha’i; Druid; Jain; Mormon; Pagan; Parsi; Spiritualist; Taoist; others.
5. Nation of Islam ("Black Muslim"); Rastafarian; Scientology.
In order to discover how the Church of England used its established position to shape the provision of prison chaplaincy for prisoners from other faith communities, I followed a mixed strategy of documentary research, sixty interviews, questionnaires administered to all known Church of England chaplains and Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh Visiting Ministers, and participant observation in fourteen prisons of various types in England and Wales.

Table 3: Religious registrations, 1975–99, HM prisons, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Change in percentage 1975/99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Christian</td>
<td>30,974</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>39,354</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>−32.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main other faiths</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5,798</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>+5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic, atheist, none</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>18,555</td>
<td>28.82</td>
<td>+26.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-permitted religions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,975</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>64,382</td>
<td>99.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Brokerage

Anglican prison chaplains tend to justify their dominant position by stressing that their role is that of “brokers” between prison administration and “other faiths”. They see themselves as the go-betweens (intermédiaires or médiateurs sincères) who negotiate access and resources on behalf of the “outsiders”. Yet, this “brokerage” is regarded with considerable ambivalence on both sides. On the one hand, it is relatively difficult for the Visiting Ministers of some other faiths to feel that they have been able to obtain equal treatment for prisoners who belong to their faith communities. They complain that Anglican chaplains: fail to notify them about prisoners who want Visiting Ministers to visit them; fail to provide Visiting Ministers with enough opportunities to visit their prisoners; fail to supply adequate numbers of religious artefacts or books; and, fail to obtain suitable rooms in which other faith prisoners can worship or meditate. In fact, there are numerous complaints about the lack of responsiveness among Church of England chaplains to the demands for better religious resources from other faith prisoners and their Visiting Ministers.

On the other hand, the fact that Church of England chaplains are employed in all prisons and are under an obligation to facilitate the religious and pastoral care of prisoners from all faith communities means that prison authorities cannot completely ignore the rights of non-Christian prisoners. The chaplains are usually
well respected by prison staff and are therefore in a strong position to act effectively on behalf of all prisoners, regardless of their religious affiliation.

There were approximately 500 Visiting Ministers in 1995, according to the Prison Service Chaplaincy’s own records, but I have good reason to doubt the accuracy of this figure. Christian chaplains find it difficult to know precisely how many Visiting Ministers are actually carrying out their duties on a regular basis. Most Visiting Ministers are ministers of religion or other appropriately qualified people who visit prisoners regularly in order to offer religious, spiritual or pastoral care. Some are representatives of minority Christian groups or movements, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Assemblies of God. Others represent the major world religions and ancient religious traditions such as paganism, but it is currently not permissible for prisoners to receive Visiting Ministers from Scientology, the Nation of Islam or Rastafarianism. No Visiting Ministers are employed by the Prison Service; most of them visit prisons in their spare time, receiving only modest fees and travel expenses in return. Only ten of the Visiting Ministers on the Prison Service Chaplaincy’s list in 1995 were women, nine of whom were Buddhists.

Agencies of the British state are sometimes frustrated by the lack of formality and the lack of clearly representative organisations among other faith communities. Pressure from the state on, for example, Muslims or Hindus to create fully representative formal organisations that can speak unequivocally for their communities is ironically one of the sources of friction and factionalism in some faith communities. In effect, other faiths are told that they will be tolerated in prison chaplaincy on condition that they behave and organise themselves like Christian Churches. It is not surprising that tensions exist between the state-supported Christian majority and other religious minorities.

4. Discussion

The number of prisoners in England and Wales who come from religious backgrounds other than Christianity has been increasing steadily for about thirty years. Most of them are Muslims whose families migrated to the United Kingdom from South Asia. But the first cohorts of young prisoners who were born in the United Kingdom and whose ethnicity is Asian are now beginning to enter prisons. The label “immigrant” is not appropriate for these British-born members of extensive, well-established communities and networks of Muslims, Hindus, Jains and Sikhs. Yet the provision of religious and pastoral care to these British citizens who happen not to be Christians is still far from being equal to that provided for Christian prisoners. In fact, it discriminates against them. This is not done crudely by denying them access to religious facilities. It is a more subtle process of placing lower limits on the opportunities and resources available to them and of requiring them to follow Christian models of representation and organisation if they wish to take advantage of the resources.
The Prison Service Chaplaincy of England and Wales manages religious diversity by retaining a mainstream Christian model of chaplaincy in which Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic chaplains represent the norm. Minority Christian groups and non-Christian religions are tolerated in so far as they make their practices conform with the mainstream norm. But “toleration is only a limited licence. It is not an avowal of religious liberty …. It is a concession by those who enjoy power to those who are excluded from it” (Wilson 1995, 101). Moreover, the “privilege” of being tolerated can be withdrawn as a penalty for failure to conform to the norms set by those in power.

Most full-time Anglican chaplains in the Prison Service of England and Wales are civil servants who are expected to implement state policies. They serve, in effect, as the mediators between religious minorities and the prison system. They are managers of religious diversity on behalf of the British state. But they are not neutral in matters of religion. They are also representatives of the Church of England and of Anglican forms of spirituality. As such, they tend to favour certain attitudes and practices while deprecating others. In particular, they support the notion that chaplaincy should be co-ordinated by a single agency which is the most representative religious organisation in the country and which, by virtue of its dominant position, is best placed to protect minorities. Some Anglican chaplains argue that the necessity for a single, clearly dominant agency to run prison chaplaincy actually becomes more pressing at a time of growing religious diversity. They see themselves as the only stable point of reference against a backdrop of change and confusion. From the point of view of many Anglican chaplains, religious diversity is merely a challenge, not a positive benefit. The responsibility for managing diversity does not generate fresh theological reflections but it does reinforce the Anglican idea that the Church of England has a mission to all people in England and an obligation to respond to requests for help.

Another argument that Anglican chaplains deploy in defence of their position of power and responsibility is that the provision of resources and opportunities for prison chaplaincy would be greatly reduced if the British state chose to deal with all religious groups individually instead of using the Church of England as an intermediary and co-ordinator. This argument rests partly on the claim that the historical continuity of Church/state relations and the numerical preponderance of Anglicans in the population of England and Wales make it difficult for agencies of the state to ignore or counteract the Church’s claims for chaplaincy resources. There is some support for this argument among the leaders of minority faith communities. They regard the Church of England as a powerful source of protection against a potentially unsympathetic state. They are content to seek shelter behind the Church’s comforting size and established power, believing that they would be much weaker and more vulnerable if they had to pursue their own interests in direct negotiation with state agencies. They accept the argument that all religions can benefit indirectly from the privileges enjoyed by the Church of England.
There is an implicit understanding between the Church of England and those leaders of minority faith communities who gratefully accept its patronage in their prison chaplaincy system that the representation of religion will be left to the Anglican chaplains. In return for abandoning claims to equality of treatment or equality of opportunity to influence chaplaincy policies, minority faith communities can rely on Anglican chaplains to defend their interests and facilitate their access to prisoners. Pragmatism takes precedence over principles of equality. Not surprisingly, these pragmatic arrangements depend heavily on the goodwill of individual chaplains to act as brokers for minority faiths. Some chaplains perform the role of broker with reluctance, whereas others willingly accept the professional obligation to facilitate religious support for all prisoners without regard for their religious identity or lack of it.

But not all minority faith communities are content with their relationship of patronage and protection with the Church of England. Some radical leaders of Buddhists, Muslims and Sikhs, for example, challenge the universalist claims of Anglican chaplains to have a legitimate mission to all prisoners who seek their support. These dissenters reject Anglican universalism and assert claims to equality of rights. Despite official moves to encourage "dialogue" between Prison Service Chaplaincy officials and the leaders of “other faith” communities, some of the latter still press for the complete re-organisation of the legal and administrative framework for prison chaplaincy. In March 1996, Buddhist, Muslim and Sikh leaders presented a paper to the Secretary of State at the Home Office contending that “the central role of one particular religious denomination in the prison system is unacceptable in a multi-faith society, and ... that in the future when legislation is brought forward, it must ensure that all religions are treated equally”. Their aim was nothing less than the abolition of the “special privileges” enjoyed by Church of England chaplains in prison chaplaincy.

It may seem paradoxical that minorities can frame their case for equal rights in terms of their particularistic beliefs and practices, but the paradox dissolves when it is recognised that they are claiming the right of all minorities to practise their religion in their chosen manner. In this sense, particularism underlies universalism. This is how sectarian movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists have managed to contribute to the refinement of laws governing the freedom of religion in many countries over the past hundred years. Their position may be strengthened by the European Union. The European Commission intends to elicit debate on Article 6a of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which could form the basis for new legislation to combat discrimination based on religion or belief, among other factors.

Moreover, a Muslim member of the British House of Lords introduced a parliamentary debate on 28 October 1999 on proposed new legislation that, if

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enacted, would make it a criminal offence to discriminate against a person on the
grounds of religion. Lord Nazir Ahmed’s view was that tolerance is an inadequate
basis for the defence of religious freedom and for mutual respect among faith
communities because it presumes that certain religions are inherently valuable
whereas others are merely “permitted” by concession to operate. For this reason, I
consider that tolerance and denominalisation (Riis 1999) are weak forms of
pluralism. In my view, they merely assert that only one religion, Church or state
agency truly represents normality and that they alone have the power and authority
to decide which other religions deserve the privilege of being allowed to function.
Tolerance and denominalisation are not about mutual respect or equal
opportunities: they are about the capacity of relatively powerful organisations to
control their relatively weak competitors.

The struggle for control over the orientation of the Prison Service Chaplaincy of
England and Wales is a further stage in the process whereby minorities challenge
the taken-for-granted power and privilege of dominant Churches. The world of
prisons is one of the relatively few areas of social life where historical links
between the British state and dominant Churches remain strong. Ferrari’s (1999)
sceptical view about the widespread assumption that modern European states have
no competence in matters of religion certainly applies to the case of Britain, despite
the fact that it is not a laïque state:

Depuis longtemps, l’État laïque a choisi de coopérer avec les communautés
religieuses dans beaucoup de domaines, mais cette coopération est sélective; elle
privilégie normalement les confessions religieuses plus nombreuses ou plus
anciennes et désavantage celles qui sont plus petites, plus récentes, plus éloignées
des valeurs traditionnellement acceptées dans la société (Ferrari 1999, 370).

But the situation in the United Kingdom may begin to change when the Human
Rights Act takes effect in October 2000. This new law will formally incorporate
the European Convention on Human Rights into English and Scottish law and will
require British courts to take account of various international agreements on human
rights. Minority faith communities and new religious movements will probably try
to employ the Human Rights Act as a means of combating the discrimination
against them that they attribute to the ethos of selective tolerance. Nothing less than
the right of individuals to religious freedom is, in my opinion, the basis for mutual
respect between religions and, consequently, for real pluralism.

References


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Religious Representation in a Revised House of Lords

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This article is concerned with the representation (or not) of religious bodies and interests in the reformed Second Chamber of the British Parliament, bearing in mind that the Church of England played an important role in the previous House of Lords through the presence of its Bishops. The article does not offer a 'solution' to the problem; it attempts, in contrast, to point out the various possibilities that might be considered. Should the notion of religious representation be abandoned, reduced or extended (i.e. beyond the Church of England) and how might such policies be effected?

The role and membership of the House of Lords are currently under discussion in the United Kingdom, an initiative that forms part of the Labour Party’s political agenda. The debate is taking place at all levels of society, but is focused on the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords. One (and only one) aspect of the debate concerns the representation of religious bodies and interests in the future Chamber, bearing in mind that the Church of England played an important role in the previous House of Lords through the presence of its Bishops. This paper does not offer a “solution” to the problem; it attempts, on the contrary, to point out the various possibilities that might be considered. Should the notion of religious representation be abandoned, reduced or extended (i.e. beyond the Church of England) and how might such policies be effected?

It is difficult to discuss the possibility of religious representation in a reconstituted House of Lords without some reference to the religious situation in the United Kingdom. The following is simply a thumbnail sketch, drawing out the most salient features. A fuller discussion of the general situation can be found in Davie (1994) and Bruce (1995); the two volumes of Parsons (1993) cover the other faith communities and associated issues in more detail. Other key references are given in the text.

1. Social Background: Religious Pluralism in the United Kingdom

The first and most obvious feature to note is the marked diminution in the churchgoing population of the United Kingdom, particularly in the post-war period. This reduction has been going on for some time – exactly when it started and for what reasons are questions subject to ongoing inquiry – but its presence is undeniable. Its consequences, however, are both complex and unpredictable. Modern Britain now accommodates a bewildering mixture of spiritual and non-spiritual currents. On the one hand, the constituency of unbelievers has undoubtedly grown (both in numbers and in confidence), but this group remains a minority; one, however, that is clustered in particular and prominent places in modern society, notably the media. On the other hand, far greater numbers of British people have indeed lost their moorings in the institutional Churches, but not their inclination to believe – as a result belief becomes individualized, detached and heterogeneous (qualities displayed in abundance in the aftermath of Princess Diana’s death and, rather differently, in the debate surrounding the pronouncements of Glen Hoddle on disability). Outbreaks of this type of spirituality perplex the secularist just as much as the Christian believer.

Overlying this nominally Christian confusion can be found a rather different form of pluralism: the small but significant other faith communities that have established themselves in modern Britain (more in some places than in others), in order to sustain populations that arrived primarily for economic reasons in response to the demand for labour in the early post-war period. It is ironic that new forms of religious organisation should emerge in the United Kingdom at precisely the moment that large sections of the population appear to reject the concept of institutional religion per se.

2. Religious Representation: Constitutional Issues at Stake

Reform, or possible reform, of the religious presence in the House of Lords must be seen against this background. Significant in this respect is the growing tendency for at least some representatives of the established Church to see themselves as the guardians or promoters of “faith”, rather than of “the faith”. Paradoxically, such a stance may be altogether easier as the Church of England finds itself increasingly to be one minority alongside others. What was unthinkable for a dominant, excluding and exclusive Church might well be possible for an historically influential but numerically weak institution, with a developed understanding of vicariousness. It is significant that senior members of the Royal Family have thought in similar terms. It points to one possible solution to the current dilemma, but inevitably raises the appropriateness of a privileged or established Church in an increasingly pluralist society.

The links between some sort of reform in the House of Lords and the established status of the Church of England are bound to arise, although the degree to which such links are logical or necessary raises multiple and complex issues. A full
discussion of these questions goes well beyond the limits of this paper, but a significant start can be made in clarifying the meanings covered by the term “disestablishment” (Modood 1997). For some, disestablishment means the gradual loosening of the present arrangements, a step-by-step unpicking of the status quo, which may take several generations to accomplish and which could, at any time, be reversed. For others, the term means an extension of the present situation rather than its unpicking, a process that will gradually accommodate Christians other than Anglican and faiths other than Christian in representative roles. A third group of disestablishmentarians are aiming for more radical reform; nothing short of a rigorously secular state is likely to satisfy this lobby – although the precise form that this will take is markedly less clear. It is worth noting that a body of opinion within the Church of England is equally supportive of the third option, stressing however the independence of the Church rather than the secular nature of the state as the desired outcome.

In much of the debate that has taken place on the question of disestablishment, these threads have been mixed together – sometimes irretrievably. It is quite common, for example, for the secular liberal lobby to argue for radical reform in the name of an increasingly pluralist constituency, without any reference to the members of the other faith communities themselves, who – for the most part – hold an entirely different view.

A further question follows: that of the different understandings of religious pluralism. Jonathan Sacks (1991) discusses this in some detail, underlining two quite distinct meanings within the concept itself. The first is a pluralism of individuals in which each citizen has both equal rights and equal privileges, regardless of his or her ethnic origin or religious preferences. It is a model very much favoured in France – unsurprisingly, given the commitment of the French to the Rights of Man. Sacks, however, encourages a different approach, outlining a pluralism of communities rather than of individuals, in which citizens are encouraged to develop two languages: one “local” for use within their particular community, the other “public” for shared or national discourse. Both aspects are important, each providing a check or balance to the others. But what in the United Kingdom is seen as a practical solution to the way that people behave (it is normal to find both material and cultural support in communities) is sometimes seen from across the Channel as a risky (with the connotation of divisive) communautarisme. For the French, too great a stress on groups implies division rather than commonality. The merits of each point of view need not be debated here; they do, however, have considerable implications for the understanding of representation in a religiously diverse society (see below).

3. Formulating Options for Constitutional Reform

The remarks made so far are contextual and describe the religious dimensions of the society that is to be involved in the selection or election of a reconstituted Upper House. If we turn, now, to possible futures, one choice, surely, is to maintain
the status quo – not necessarily in detail (for example, the precise number of Bishops who sit in the Lords might alter) but in affirming an historically privileged, possibly established Church which maintains a presence in the Upper House. The representatives of this Church might well choose to use their privileged role on behalf of the diverse communities of faith, but that would be their choice. It is, I think, a point of view that rests, implicitly if not explicitly, on a relatively strong view of establishment – albeit subject to a certain “unpicking” in terms of the precise numbers involved.

What, on the other hand, might be considered an "extensionist" view, although initially attractive, involves three sets of difficulties, all of which are covered in considerable detail in Professor Martin’s paper, “Deposition on the Lords Spiritual”, presented to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, April 1999. They need only be summarised here. The first concerns the question of “scope” – an issue that repeats itself over and over again in an increasingly, if unequally, pluralist society. Who should and who should not be included? Exactly the same question is constantly confronted in relation to (a) the financial/legal position of the Churches (the demand for charitable status), (b) the educational world (the demand for schools with aided status), and (c) the mass media (the demand for equal access). This is not easily resolved. The second set of difficulties is equally, indeed possibly more, problematic in that it involves finding common models of representation in communities with markedly different understandings of the concept of representativeness. A further example from across the Channel illustrates this point nicely. It is customary for the French President to give New Year greetings to the representatives of the different spiritual traditions present in modern France. For some time, the Muslim community have been unable to agree who should be their representative and, despite everyone’s best efforts, were absent once again from the 1999 ceremony (Le Monde, 10–11 January 1999).

The third question picks up the earlier discussion of pluralism and begins to move in a different direction. Are the constituencies to be represented composed of communities or aggregates and is such representation to be formalised or left to chance? Are Muslims, for example, to be elected as Muslims (representing a distinct constituency) or as individuals, taking their chance alongside everyone else? A pluralism of communities implies the former; a pluralism of individuals implies the latter. A mix and match of these approaches, with neither being properly specified, may simply end in confusion. With this in mind, the radical alternative is indeed attractive. It is conceptually clean – or at least cleaner – and avoids the multiple difficulties outlined in Professor Martin’s paper. A further point should be borne in mind. De facto, if not de jure, religious constituencies are likely to be well represented even if this is left to chance. Religious organisations encourage habits that transfer easily to the political sphere, a fact that is easily demonstrated by looking at the yearbooks of some of the major denominations in the United Kingdom. There are already disproportionate numbers of Methodists and Jews in the present House of Commons (to give the two obvious examples); the under-
representation of the newly arrived other faith communities may simply right itself as these populations become increasingly rooted in British society.

4. Concluding Remarks

A concluding note points, however, in a different direction. Conceptual cleanness is indeed a tempting option, but does it deal well with the realities of life? France, for example, has had a rigorously secular state for a century, one that is based on the concept of laïcité. The French, however, have had to rethink the basis of their common life, given the changing nature of European societies at the turn of the millennium. A rigid approach of laïcité cannot easily adjust to the demands of a pluralist society, which – just like Britain – includes constituencies with very different understandings of pluralism. Paradoxically, the underlying fact remains the same on both sides of the Channel. How is it possible to accommodate significant other faith communities in societies that have been dominated by a Judaeo-Christian culture for the best part of a millennium? Neither the status quo nor the radical alternative can fully come to terms with this situation for both depend, inevitably, on the deposits of European history, be they Christian or secular.

References


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Sociologists managing religion: 
the formation of Afro-Brazilian theology

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Scholars studying Brazilian religions often tend to evaluate religious movements according to their conformity to the criteria they consider as representative of modernity. Afro-Brazilian religions, in spite of their conspicuous sacrificial character, agree with a certain modernity by both their rejection of the notions of sin and guilt and by being religions of the oppressed. Therefore, thanks to the writings of sociologists and anthropologists, the candomblé religion was invested with highly rationalized theological reinterpretations, as represented for instance by the ase theology. Congresses and conferences, attended by both researchers and priests, function as ecumenical councils during which faith is defined and proclaimed.

The process of de-catholicization in Brazil has been visibly growing faster over the last four decades of the twentieth century. It takes place alongside both secularization, of a kind, and the growth of a number of forms of religion within what is often referred to as the country’s “market for magical/religious goods and services”. Among the religions and religious movements which are on the increase we may discern Afro-Brazilian rites, of which there are a number of different tendencies, and also Pentecostalist movements, likewise fragmented into many

1 paper presented to the Biennial Conference of the Société Internationale de Sociologie des Religions (SISR), held at Louvain in Belgium from 26 to 30 July 1999.
2 This paper does not deal with the general features of secularization, or the particular ones of contemporary Brazil; suffice it to note, without further comment, that the three Brazilian cities with the highest proportion of declared followers of Afro-Brazilian religions (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Salvador de Bahia) are also those with the highest proportion of people describing themselves as of no religion (Pierucci & Prandi, 1996; 216).
3 There is a strong case for speaking of an “Afro-Brazilian nebula”, roughly as Françoise Champion (1991) speaks of a “Mystical/esoteric nebula”; though of course, it would be highly naive to find in this ‘Afro-Brazilian nebula’ unmistakable signs of a process of restoration of enchantment of the world, or of Brazilian society - unless all magical manipulation of the world is to be taken to be, not merely a symptom of someone enchanted, but also a genuine power to ‘restore enchantment’ to the world. In fact, in spite of their frequently orgiastic and festive aspects, Afro-Brazilian movements may very well involve a “decomposition of the religious”, in Champion & Cohen’s sense of that term (1993). For these religions display a “market behaviour tendency”, and are “…increasingly governed by rules reminiscent of those of the markets in publishing, training and therapy, etc.” They also have “…the tendency to individual do-it-yourself assembly which characterizes the ‘Mystical/esoteric nebula’”, while at the same time turning into “a purely magical object, devoid of
sects. This religious diversity has quite definite political consequences, including electoral ones. However, the main subject of this paper is the way in which this plurality is handled by Brazilian social scientists. As a general rule, they have not limited themselves to a Positivist, value-neutral and detached study of religious institutions and changes: in fact, they have often taken on a managerial role in the matter, on the grounds that it is up to us, as sociologists, to define “modernity” and to discern its appropriate features. While we still wait for the full flowering of the Positivist programme, sociology has the interim task of providing management of the religious sphere.

1. The Afro-Brazilian paradox and the many faces of modernity

And that is what, in Brazil, sociology is putting into practice, by interpreting and evaluating new religious movements in terms of their relationship with “modernity” as Brazilian sociologists understand the term. There are authors, for instance, who consider the Pentecostals as the current representatives of that “ascetic rationality” which Weber attributed to the Calvinist ethic and the Baptist sects, and hence of modernity itself. Our problem appears more complex, in that in the case of the Afro-Brazilian movements there seems to be a paradox which

4 In this paper, the terms “sociologist” and “sociology” are used, in a very broad sense, to refer to social science in general. Anthropologists, ethnologists and even some historians are in this sense considered bona fide sociologists.

5 We should not forget that Weber’s views, especially as set out in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1988: 17-206), represent one of the core dogmas at the foundations of the Brazilian sociological “church”. In this way, the association between the Protestant ethic and Modernism is, to borrow the diction of the theologians, “articulum stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae” - an article by which the church stands or falls. This influence of Weber’s was powerfully reinforced, in the literature on the growth of Protestantism in Latin America, by opinions such as those of Peter Berger in the preface to Tongues of Fire, by David Martin (1990), concerning the expansion of Protestantism and Pentecostalism in Latin America: “following the insights of Weber and Halévy, what one may expect is that the new Protestant internationale will produce results similar to those of the preceding one - to wit, the emergence of a solid bourgeoisie, with virtues conducive to the development of a democratic capitalism. It hardly needs emphasizing that this would be an immense event in Latin America as well as elsewhere in the Third World” (Berger 1990: ix).

6 Maria das Dores Campos Machado’s book (1996), Carismáticos e Pentecostais: Adesão Religiosa na Esfera Familiar [Charismatics and Pentecostals: Religious affiliation in the private sphere] is one that seems to me a good example of this tendency. Among the conclusions of this work, we read “the emergence of Catholic charismatic communities, and the astonishing expansion of Pentecostal groups, in Brazil over the last three decades [...] represent the readoption of a form of religion which (though mystical and emotional) brings with it an ethic which can articulate the public and private spheres, and give orientation to the ordinary daily activities of its devotees [...]. As for the evangelical sects (above all Pentecostalism, which is spreading in the Third World), a number of authors, such as the Brazilians Procópio Camargo and Cecília Mariz, emphasize the rationalizing (and hence modernizing) effect they have, in spite of the “backward-looking intentions” of these groups” (Machado, 1996: 189-190).
arises from the simultaneous presence of a rapid process of economic development and an equally rapid growth in those forms of religion which one would have thought were the diametrical opposites of modernization. Nevertheless, some have managed to discover an underlying affinity here (a Wahlverwandschaft which could also, in its way, be traced back to Weber) between the sin-rejecting and guilt-denying aspects of modernity and the rejection of all forms of puritanism which characterizes the Afro-Brazilians. A new syncretism is apparent - and is the specific subject of the present paper - resulting from the way sociologists, frequently those who lay claim to the heritage of Roger Bastide, have taken in hand the Afro-Brazilian religions and invented for them an entire, highly rationalized theology. We shall return to the matter later in this paper.

The current fashion for the concept of modernity, as it is understood in Brazil, appears to stem from the accommodation of one strand of Marxism, which may or may not in fact predate the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of genuine socialism, with the sociology of the Weberian tradition which had formerly been regarded as reactionary. One of the sources most frequently cited in Brazil by the advocates of this new view is the book by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas on Modernity (Habermas, 1985). It is as if the paradigm of this modernity were a second line of defence for progressivist historicism, which is threatened not only by political events in Eastern Europe but also by the rise of theories of the postmodern, which would also seem to involve the “exhaustion” (Lyotard, 1979) of the historical school rooted in the ideals of the Enlightenment and the Revolution.

I do not intend, however, to deal here with the definition, or definitions, of Modernity, with whether or not it should be distinguished by its adherence to the Enlightenment project, conceived as progress guided by Reason, i.e. as the “progressivist optimism which expects the passage of time to fulfil the certain promise of a better future” (Pessin, 1992: 261); or whether it belongs not so much to Reason per se but, as Max Weber claimed in his introduction to the Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (1988: 1 - 16) to that rationality which is not to be confused entirely with reason, or even with the Reason of the philosophes, but rather consists of a particular way of using reason. And it may very well be that such rationality, which apparently only flourished in the West, and which takes us to the very heart of the Weberian system, is really no different from the abstraction which Karl Marx, at the outset of Das Kapital, considers to be the quintessence of capitalism, both on the level of the “real world” of “homogeneous work” and on the “fantastical” level of the religions of “abstract humanity” (Marx 1962). Now as soon as the problem of relations between religion and modernity arises, we may wonder whether the latter is not, as Max Weber maintained, inextricably linked with what is called, often in too facile a manner, “the Protestant ethic”. Alternatively, given its Enlightenment ancestry, might not modernity be associated

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Although this paper is a new and original work, I have dealt with relationships between sociologists and the formation of the Afro-Brazilian theology already, in earlier works. The following (published in French) are a selection: Motta, 1989, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d.
with Deism, secularization, and the separation of Church and State [laïcité]? It is a complex matter, and leads me to borrow a term adopted in another context by Françoise Champion (1991), and speak of the “nebula of modernity”. We should possibly conclude that the myth of modernity is not perfectly expressed in any of these versions: that what we are dealing with is “a structure of the collective spirit, which is nowhere expressed, but which enables individual formulations to arise and be mutually connected” (Pessin, 1992: 212).

The present paper, I should emphasize again, has no strictly theoretical purpose, least of all the elaboration of an unequivocal definition of modernity. What I wish to do is simply to describe certain specific features of the Brazilian scene, among them the paradox of economic modernization coexisting with forms of religion that many people, with some justification, point to as the very opposite of the “religions of abstract humanity” and of the Protestant ethic, with their repugnance for any kind of magic, for all that is concrete and immediate, and consequently as contrary to the requirements of rationality. I am speaking here of the increasingly rapid growth of the Afro-Brazilian religions, candomblé, umbanda, and others; a growth that has been taking place, not in the most backward regions of the country, as might be supposed by a rather simplistic view of development, but on the contrary in the large industrialized cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and even Porto Alegre in the far south, where the population is largely descended from Italians and Germans (Oro, 1994; Prandi, 1991). Indeed, one of the primary paradoxes associated with these religions is their “loss of ethnicity”. These cults, which were originally those of certain African peoples, now draw their devotees from the whole of Brazilian society, without seeking any exclusiveness or exclusion. They keep their African traditions, nevertheless, and although these are subject to all manner of reinterpretation and codification by scholars and theologians, they are still thought of as the very source of the efficacy and authenticity of their rites and beliefs, which are offered in present-day Brazil on an “anonymous” and abstract market consisting of persons of all skin colours and all ethnic groups (Motta, 1994b).

Afro-Brazilian religions consist at bottom of a system of magical manipulation of the world. The faithful establish personal relationships of dependence with their gods, to whom they offer animals, slaughtered on stone altars, as sacrifices. They also present them with the symbolic gift of their own bodies, for the gods to inhabit and make themselves manifest in, especially in the dance and trance states in which the god’s personality takes over that of the human being. Nothing could be further from this religion than any attempt at ethical or ascetic rationalization.

Devotees set no store by abstract principles or by abstract concepts of good and evil; these are categories which are, as it were, negotiated according to circumstances. Nor is there a corpus of social ethics in this form of religion, whose attitude is characteristically and fundamentally “naturalistic”, non-ascetic and conformist with regard to the status quo. All of reality is to be found in the world of appearances, which is accepted as experienced in the daily lives of the faithful.
Why change the world, when the more it changes the more it will stay the same, with rich and poor, powerful and weak, bosses and subordinates, etc.?

We find ourselves here at the opposite pole from the religions of abstraction and rationality as Marx, Weber and their successors think of them. Yet *candomblé* does not fail to come very close to a certain kind of modernity: for if modernity involves belief in progress supported by the power of reason, which is only the reflection of humanity’s natural goodness, then it will have nothing to do with notions of sin, either “original” or “present”, of guilt, or of expiation.

This is, without any doubt, one of the greatest obstacles to an enduring accommodation between modernity and Catholicism, if not the strongest of all. Now Afro-Brazilian religion, being based as we have seen on the notion of reciprocal relations between humans and gods in the form of an exchange of goods and services, is another system that cares not at all for a concept of sin rooted in some original deficiency in human nature. The supreme acts of the Afro-Brazilian religion, the bloody animal sacrifices, the trance, are openly and unrefinedly orgiastic, even where they do not take on a strictly sexual character. The basic human passions are here given full rein, not ascetically controlled or repressed. This is an essentially permissive religion, which views human moral behaviour, including sexual behaviour in all its variety, as something of perfect indifference to its gods - or even as directly under the influence of their preferences.

There is also a sense in which *candomblé* favours modernity, in its aspect as a religion of the people, practised, in the North at least, by Blacks who are considered to represent the descendants of former slaves. For the position of Blacks is in fact viewed as similar to that of an oppressed class; one which, at least at the symbolic level, has resisted the oppressor by this very preservation of its religion, which is thus viewed as a rudimentary precursor of class consciousness, with a kind of revolutionary potential: it is the opposite of the Catholicism of the élites. Once things have been seen in this way, there has been a conscious rejection of any moves towards syncretism between the gods of Africa and the saints of the Church, for such moves could only mean a hidden form of social control. The authenticity of Africa, to be recaptured at any price, thus represents a form of ideological purity and a political counterweight.

2. The holy alliance

A “holy and scholarly alliance” has therefore been established in Brazil between Afro-Brazilian religion and the sociologists (and virtual sociologists) who define and represent certain of modernity’s values. It is in this way that researchers have given *candomblé*, which has, of course, always been a *self-proclaimed* religion with its own rites and myths, a well-structured theological system which enables it

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8 *Candomblé*, in the broad sense of the term, refers to the Afro-Brazilian religions as a whole.
to become a *self-sufficient* religion, with an enlightened awareness of its unique and independent status among other religions which compete with it for converts.

A theological rationality was in fact lacking in this religion; and it is academic research which is supplying it. There is a possibility, therefore, that the sociologist may become a “doctor of the Faith”: not in every instance unwillingly. Indeed, the new function is often eagerly embraced. Sometimes a true symbiosis grows up between researchers who receive information (and may indeed also receive what Durkheim might have called “recreation of morale” into the bargain: spiritual and psychological comfort which the *terreiro*, or conventicle, can provide), supplying in return a certificate of orthodoxy or authenticity which, for the *terreiro*, is a strong card in its competition with other *terreiros* and with other churches and quasi-churches.

In this context, I would give prominence to the name of certain scholars. First there is Arthur Ramos, one of those who first introduced the ideas of Freud and Jung into Brazil. Influenced by psychoanalysis, Ramos (1940) arrived at the concept of the “collective unconscious” of the Brazilian Black, who had, of course, a “racial memory”, and where this left gaps Ramos regarded these as “elements buried in the collective unconscious” and did not hesitate to fill them in by recourse to purely African sources, although their ethnographic authenticity was not always of the surest.

The work of establishing standards and a canon for Afro-Brazilian memory was mainly done (before Bastide) by the couple Edison Carneiro (1936, 1937, 1948, 1959, etc.) and Ruth Landes (1967). They were in fact the ones who consecrated the *nagô* rite (and indeed, more strictly, only the one practised in two or three *terreiros* in Bahia where Carneiro and his friends were particularly well received) as the sole authentic rite in the Afro-Brazilian religion, all others being literally relegated to the status of degenerate heresies which should be put down by the police as required.

Carneiro’s ideas had a brilliant career. They crossed the ocean, and came to influence the ideas of the most distinguished European students of Africa. I am referring above all, as you may guess, to the adoption of Carneiro’s views by Roger Bastide. There are many long passages in Bastide’s works which are directly dependent on the works of Carneiro and Landes. However, I do not believe that Bastide’s ideas on African memory in Brazil are due solely to this couple’s influence; but as for tracing all the subtleties of the sociological study of memory that come from the European side - may the *orixas*, the gods of *candomblé*, preserve me from that! I intend to go no further than point out that the influences of Bergson, Durkheim and Husserl appear to converge on Halbwachs, while he in turn appears to have had a major influence on Bastide’s work. Now Halbwachs, following Durkheim on this point, maintains that if society manifests itself in “conscience sociale”, or social awareness, it is because that is what it consists of. And awareness which endures is memory. Society, then, is nothing more than
collective memory: and that is Bastide’s theoretical starting-point: for him, as he expounds many times, both in Le Candomblé de Bahia (1958) and in Les Religions Africaines au Brésil (1960), African society in Brazil, or African civilization in Brazil, which is virtually coextensive with candomblé, is nothing other than the product of the African collective memory.

I shall not deal here with all the ins and outs of the theological management of the Afro-Brazilian religions by sociologists, which continues to this day. I shall accordingly mention only in passing the anthropo-theology of the ase (or axé) developed by Juana Elbein dos Santos in her book Os Nagô e a Morte: Pade, Asese e o Culto Egun na Bahia [Nagô and Death: Pade, Asese and the Egun Cult in Bahia], a book which, from the moment of its publication to the present, has constantly influenced the doctrine and practice of candomblé itself just as much as the theories of researchers. According to Santos, the ase (or axé, as it is commonly known in Brazil) is the specifically African conception of the force “which gives existence its present and future, and which is made manifest, upheld and nourished in the shrine” (Santos, 1976: 11). Santos did not invent the concept of the ase: Bastide traces it back to Bernard Maupoil, and speaks of it in his book on the Candomblé de Bahia. But there is a structuralist influence in Santos which derives unexpected consequences from this concept. Thus the ase is to be found “in a great variety of substances representative of the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms [...] which may be grouped into three categories of blood: the red, the white, and the black” (Santos, 1976: 44).

Scholars have, moreover, often been well aware of the role they were playing in this creation - for that is what it is - of an Afro-Brazilian religion, which is becoming more and more of a fully-fledged church, with its own dogmas, its ritual and its priesthood. Roger Bastide, for instance, expresses himself, in a little text published 55 years ago (i.e. even before his major works on African religions in Brazil), as follows:

I recall that Anísio Teixeira, with his characteristic lucidity and intelligence, reproached us - Ramos, Herskovits, Pierson, Carneiro and myself - with having strengthened the candomblé and thereby hindered the assimilation of the Black in the north-east of Brazil to Western culture. He was quite right. The pais-de-santo [lit. “fathers of the sacred”] use our work in order to comprehend Africa...
(Bastide, 1953: 521)

The scholars have even gone so far as to produce an entire, invented Africa ad usum candomblé. Nor need I do more than mention the role that academic conferences have played in the elaboration of candomblé theology, and its transmission to the clergy and followers of this religion, who rub shoulders with the academics at such meetings in the most complete liberty, equality and fraternity. The first Congresso Afro-Brasileiro met in Recife in 1934, convened by Gilberto Freyre who had just published Maitres et Esclaves [Masters and Slaves]. Three years later, Edison Carneiro was organizing his own Congresso Afro-Brasileiro, in
Salvador de Bahia: this was the second. A number of others have been put on over
the last 20 years, with on occasion a considerable overseas contribution in both
papers and attendance, including the III Congresso Afro-Brasileiro, in Recife in
1982, on the initiative of the Fundação Joaquim Nabuco; the Congresso
Internacional sobre a Escravidão [International Congress on Slavery], organized
by the University of São Paulo, in 1988; the IV Congresso Afro-Brasileiro, which
took place in Recife in May 1994, again on the initiative of the Fundação Joaquim
Nabuco, as well as the V Congresso Afro-Brasileiro, at Salvador de Bahia, in
August 1997.

3. Management and domination

We can see, then, that modernity presents itself in various versions, not all of
which are, on the face of it, obviously consistent with one another. The example of
Brazil appears to allow us to conclude that it can also take the form of a blueprint:
a blueprint which certainly works to the advantage of those who present themselves
as its managers…

It would be too much to set about identifying all these manager/beneficiaries; and
the power they gain often seems to be a fairly vague one. It governs words and
theories; but it is this power over symbols which is, perhaps, the most consummate
form of domination. We are thus led in the end to a sociological investigation of
Sociology, and of the myths surrounding our own profession’s birth and history.

Of course, there is more than one kind of sociologist, just as there is more than one
kind of Sociology. We have dealt here only with the scholars of Brazil, who have
in many cases taken over the theology of candomblé. But their Congressos Afro-
Brasileiros, these seminar-synods, which define candomblé orthodoxy: do they,
with their exotic disguise, ultimately represent anything different from a fairly
ordinary scene in the practice of our own profession, with its congresses, seminars,
conferences and lectures, where we define, or hear defined ex cathedra, the true
faith, the true history, the true society, “after the order of Auguste Comte”?

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9 I had the honour of being scientific director of this congress, and of the joint work published as a
result (Motta, 1985)


About the Author

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"La Gestion sociologique du religieux: la formation de la théologie afro-brésilienne"

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RÉSUMÉ

Un certain nombre de chercheurs en religions brésiliennes s'est aussi chargé de la gestion de la modernité, à l'aune de laquelle sont évalués les mouvements religieux. Or, les religions afro-brésiliennes flattent une certaine modernité tant par leur rejet des notions de péché et de culpabilité que par leur caractère de religion des opprimés. C'est ainsi que, grâce aux travaux des sociologues et anthropologues, les religions afro-brésiliennes ont élaboré une théologie rationalisée, axée sur la notion d'une mentalité ou d'une mémoire africaine (qui au Brésil impliquerait la survie de la société africaine) et qui aboutira à la doctrine de l'ase et au rejet de tout syncrétisme capable d'entamer la pureté de cette mémoire. C'est cela qui constitue la sainte alliance qui fonctionne aussi dans des colloques-conciles où se définit et proclame la foi.
0. Introduction

0.1. On assiste, dans le Brésil des quatre dernières décennies du XXe siècle, à l'accélération d'une décatholisation qui s'accompagne tant d'une certaine sécularisation (1) que de la croissance de plusieurs formes de religion dans le contexte de ce qu'on appelle souvent le marché national des biens et services magico-religieux. On signale, parmi les religions et mouvements religieux en ascension, les cultes afro-brésiliens subdivisés en plusieurs tendances (2), et les mouvements pentecôtistes morcelés eux aussi en plusieurs sectes. Cette diversité religieuse a des conséquences politiques certaines, y compris sur le terrain électoral. Cependant l'intérêt de cette communication porte surtout sur la gestion de cette pluralité par la science sociale brésilienne. Celle-ci ne s'est pas limitée, en règle générale, à l'étude positive, neutre et détachée des institutions, mouvements et changements religieux. En effet, elle a souvent pris la qualité de gestionnaire de l'histoire. Car ce serait à nous, sociologues (3), qu'il appartiendrait de définir la modernité et de discerner ce qui lui convient. En attendant le plein épanouissement de l’état positif, la sociologie doit assurer, par intérim, le gouvernement du religieux.

1. Le Paradoxe Afro-Brésilien et la Diversité des Modernités

1.1. C'est ce qu'elle met en pratique, au Brésil, par l'interprétation et l'évaluation des nouveaux mouvements religieux à l'aune de leurs rapports avec la modernité, telle que la comprennent les sociologues brésiliens. C'est ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'auteurs tient les pentecôtistes comme les représentants actuels de la rationalité ascétique, attribuée par Weber à l'éthique calviniste et aux sectes baptistes (4), et donc de la modernité elle-même (5). Notre problème semble plus compliqué, car concernant les mouvements afro-brésiliens, il y aurait un paradoxe dérivé de la coexistence
entre un processus accéléré de développement économique et une croissance également accélérée des formes de religion que l'on croirait situées aux antipodes de la modernisation. On a cependant réussi à retrouver une affinité profonde (une Wahlverwandschaft qui pourrait aussi à sa façon se réclamer de Weber) entre une certaine modernité refusant les notions de péché comme de culpabilité, et le rejet de toute forme de puritanisme caractérisant les Afro-Brésiliens. On remarque, et ceci constitue le sujet spécifique de cette communication, le développement d'un nouveau syncrétisme, qui se fait par la prise en charge des religions afro-brésiliennes par des sociologues se réclamant souvent de l'héritage de Roger Bastide et qui pour ces religions ont inventé toute une théologie hautement rationalisée, à laquelle on reviendra dans ce papier (6).

1.2. La vogue actuelle du concept de modernité, tel que compris au Brésil, semble dériver de l'acceptation par un certain marxisme à la rigueur antérieur à la chute du mur de Berlin et à l'effondrement du socialisme réel, ainsi que d'une sociologie d'inspiration wébérienne vue auparavant comme réactionnaire. Une des références les plus souvent invoquées au Brésil par les partisans de cette nouvelle conception est le livre du philosophe Allemand Jürgen Habermas sur le discours de la modernité (Habermas 1985). C'est comme si le paradigme de cette modernité représentait une deuxième ligne de défense de l'historicisme progressiste, menacé non seulement par les événements politiques de l'Europe de l'Est mais aussi par la montée des théories de la postmodernité, laquelle semblerait aussi impliquer la saturation du projet historique (Lyoard 1979), qui s'inscrit dans la continuité des lumières et de la Révolution.

1.3. Mais je n'ai pas à m'occuper dans cette communication de la définition, ou définitions, de la modernité. Faut-il la caractériser par l'adhésion au projet des lumières conçu comme le progrès guidé par la raison, c'est-à-dire
comme cet "optimisme progressiste, qui verrait dans l'accomplissement du temps la sûre promesse d'un avenir meilleur" (Pessin 1992: 261)? Ou plus qu'à la raison per se, ne se rattacherait-elle pas, comme l'eût voulu Max Weber, de l'introduction aux *Essais Réunis sur la Sociologie de la Religion* (1988: 1-16), à la rationalité qui ne se confond tout à fait avec la raison, même philosophique, mais consiste dans une certaine manière à employer la raison? Et cette rationalité, qui ne s'épanouirait qu'en Occident, cette rationalité qui nous place au plus profond du système wébérien, serait-elle vraiment différente de l'abstraction que Karl Marx dans le début du *Capital* considère comme quintessence du capitalisme, tant sur le plan du "monde réel" du "travail homogène" que sur le plan "fantasmagorique" des religions de "l'homme abstrait" (Marx 1962)? Or dès qu'on soulève le problème des rapports entre religion et modernité, on pourrait aussi se demander si celle-ci, comme le soutient Max Weber, n'est pas indissolublement liée avec ce que l'on appelle, souvent avec trop de facilité, l'éthique protestante. Ou bien, étant donnée sa parenté avec les lumières, la modernité ne serait-elle pas associée avec le déisme, la sécularisation, la laïcité? C'est cette complexité qui m'amène à parler, en empruntant le terme adopté dans un autre contexte par Françoise Champion (1991), de la nébuleuse de la modernité. Peut-être faut-il conclure que le mythe de la modernité ne serait qu'imparfaitement exprimé par chacune de ses versions. Nous serions là devant "une structure de l'esprit collectif, qui n'est exprimée nulle part, mais qui rend possibles les formulations individuelles et les relie entre elles" (Pessin 1992: 212).

1.4. Cette communication, soulignons-le, n'a pas de but proprement théorique, et elle ne veut nullement arriver à une définition univoque de la modernité. Ce qu'on y souhaite n'est que la description de certaines spécificités brésiliennes, parmi lesquelles on trouve le paradoxe de la croissance simultanée de la modernisation économique et de formes de
religion chez lesquelles beaucoup, et non sans raison, découvrent tout le contraire des "religions de l'homme abstrait" et de l'éthique protestante avec leur répugnance pour tout ce qui est magique, concret, immédiat, et par conséquent contraire à la logique de la rationalité. Je parle en ce moment de la croissance accélérée des religions afro-brésiliennes, candomblé, umbanda et autres, et cela non pas comme l'aurait voulu un évolutionnisme assez simpliste dans les régions les plus arriérées du pays, mais au contraire dans les grandes villes industrialisées comme São Paulo et Rio de Janeiro, voire Porto Alegre dans l'extrême sud largement peuplé de descendants d'Allemands et Italiens (Oro 1994 ; Prandi 1991). En effet, un premier paradoxe lié à ces religions se trouve dans leur "désethnisation". Ces cultes, à l'origine associés à certains peuples africains, trouvent maintenant leurs adeptes dans l'ensemble de la société brésilienne sans aucun souci d'exclusivité ou exclusion. Ils conservent néanmoins leurs traditions africaines, lesquelles, quoique sujettes à tout un travail de réinterprétation et codification par des savants et théologiens, sont conçues comme la source même de la qualité ou de l'authenticité de ses rites et croyances, proposés dans le Brésil contemporain à un "marché" anonyme et abstrait, formé par des personnes de toute couleur et origine ethnique (Motta 1994b).

1.5. Or, les religions afro-brésiliennes consistent fondamentalement en un système de manipulation magique du monde. Les fidèles établissent des rapports de dépendance personnalisée avec les dieux, auxquels ils offrent des sacrifices souvent sous la forme d'animaux égorgés sur autels de pierre. Ils leur font aussi le don symbolique de leur propre corps, pour que les dieux y habitent et s'y manifestent, surtout par la danse et la transe dans laquelle l'identité du dieu s'empare de celle de l'homme. Rien de plus éloigné de cette religion qu'un souci quelconque de rationalisation éthique ou ascétique.
1.6. Les fidèles n'attachent pas d'importance à des principes abstraits ni à des conception abstraites du bien et du mal. Ce sont là des catégories qui, pour ainsi dire, se négocient selon les circonstances. Et il n'existe pas non plus d'éthique sociale dans cette forme de religion, caractérisée par une attitude foncièrement "naturaliste", non-ascétique et conformiste vis-à-vis du statu quo. Toute la réalité se trouve dans le monde des apparences, accepté tel qu'il se donne à l'expérience quotidienne des fidèles. Pourquoi le changer, si plus il changera plus il restera le même, avec ses riches et pauvres, puissants et faibles, patrons et dépendants...

1.7. Nous nous trouvons ici aux antipodes des religions de l'abstraction et de la rationalité, telles que les conçoivent Marx, Weber et leurs épiçones. Et pourtant, le candomblé ne laisse pas de côtoyer une certaine conception de la modernité. Car pour peu que celle-ci soit comprise comme la croyance dans un progrès appuyé sur les forces d'une raison qui n'est que le reflet de la bonté naturelle de l'être humain, elle rejetera toute notion de péché, "originel" ou "actuel", de culpabilité et d'expiation.

1.8. Cela est sans aucun doute un des plus fort, sinon le plus fort, obstacles à un accord durable de la modernité avec le catholicisme. Or, basée comme on l'a déjà signalé sur la notion d'une réciprocité entre les hommes et les dieux qui s'échangent un certain nombre de biens et services, la religion afro-brésilienne ne se soucie pas non plus d'une conception de péché qui trouverait son point de départ dans quelque faille originale de la nature humaine. Les actes suprêmes de la religion afro-brésilienne, le sacrifice sanglant d'animaux, la transe, sont ouvertement et brutalement orgiastiques, même s'ils n'assument pas un caractère proprement sexuel. C'est l'épanouissement, et non le contrôle ascétique ou la répression, des passions fondamentales de l'être humain. Et il s'agit d'une religion essentiellement permissive, qui considère le comportement moral de l'homme, y compris le
comportement sexuel dans toute sa variété, comme parfaitement indifférent aux dieux, voire comme directement influencé par leurs préférences.

1.9. Par ailleurs, le *candomblé* (7) flatte aussi une certaine modernité par son aspect de religion populaire, pratiquée, au moins à l'origine, par des Noirs censés représenter les descendants des anciens esclaves. Car on assimile les Noirs à une classe opprimée, laquelle, au moins sur le plan symbolique, aurait résisté à l'opprresseur précisément par la conservation de sa religion, considérée comme une pré-conscience de classe avec un potentiel quasiment révolutionnaire, située à l'opposé du catholicisme des élites. Ce point de vue une fois adopté, on a aussi voulu rejeter tout syncrétisme entre les dieux d'Afrique et les saints de l'Eglise, car ce mélange ne pouvait signifier qu'une forme latente de contrôle social. L'authenticité africaine, à laquelle on a voulu à tout prix revenir, représentait par conséquent une forme de pureté idéologique et correction politique.

2. La sainte alliance

2.1. Une sainte et savante alliance s'est donc établie au Brésil entre la religion afro-brésilienne et sociologues et assimilés, qui définissent et représentent certaines valeurs de la modernité. C'est ainsi que des chercheurs ont doté le *candomblé*, lequel certes a toujours été une religion en soi, avec ses rites et mythes, d'un système théologique bien structuré, ce qui lui a permis de devenir une religion pour soi, avec une conscience éclairée de ses spécificité et indépendance vis-à-vis des autres religions, avec lesquelles il se trouve en compétition pour le recrutement des adeptes.

2.2. En effet il manquait à cette religion la rationalité théologique qui lui vient, précisément, de la recherche scientifique. Le sociologue risque alors
de devenir "docteur de la foi". Et il ne le devient pas toujours malgré lui. En effet il est souvent heureux d'assumer cette nouvelle fonction. C'est parfois une vraie symbiose qui s'établit entre chercheurs qui reçoivent l'information, voire recevant en outre les réconforts spirituel et psychologique, la "réfection morale" comme Durkheim l'aurait peut-être appelée, que les terreiros sont capables de lui accorder) et qui confèrent en échange des certificats d'orthodoxie ou authenticité qui représentent, pour les terreiros, des atouts majeurs dans leur compétition les uns avec les autres et avec les autres églises ou quasi-églises.


2.4. C'est au couple Edison Carneiro (1936, 1937, 1948, 1959 etc) et Ruth Landes (1967) qu'est surtout dû (avant Bastide) l'effort de de normatisation et de canonisation de la mémoire afro-brésilienne. Ce sont eux en effet qui ont consacré le rite nagô (et encore seulement celui qui était pratiqué dans deux ou trois terreiros de Bahia où Carneiro et amis étaient particulièrement bien reçus) comme le seul rite authentique dans la religion afro-brésilienne, tout le reste étant littéralement relégué à la catégorie de dégénération, devant au besoin être supprimé par la police.

2.5. Or, les conceptions de Carneiro eurent un illustre destin. Elles traversèrent l'Océan et vinrent influencer les idées des africanistes
européens les plus distingués. Je me réfère en premier lieu, on le devine, à l'adoption des points de vue de Carneiro par Roger Bastide. De longs et nombreux passages de l'oeuvre de Bastide se trouvent en dépendance directe, y compris dépendance littéraire, de passages très antérieurs aux travaux de Carneiro et de Landes. Je ne crois pas pourtant que les idées de Bastide sur la mémoire africaine au Brésil soient dues aux seules influences de Carneiro et de Landes. Que les orixás, les dieux du Candomblé, me gardent bien de vouloir suivre les subtilités des études sociologiques sur la mémoire du côté européen de l'Atlantique. Je me limite donc à remarquer que les influences de Bergson, Durkheim et Husserl semblent confluer sur Halbwachs, lequel a apparentement exercé une influence capitale sur l'oeuvre de Bastide. Or pour Halbwachs, qui suit en ce point Durkheim, si la société se manifeste dans la conscience sociale c'est qu'elle est la conscience sociale. Or la conscience qui dure est l'équivalent de la mémoire. La société n'est donc rien d'autre que la mémoire collective. Et voilà le point de départ théorique de l'oeuvre de Bastide. Pour lui – c'est une thèse qu'il exprime à plusieurs reprises tant dans Le Candomblé de Bahia (1958) que dans Les Religions Africaines au Brésil (1960) - la société, la civilisation africaine au Brésil, qui se confondrait pratiquement avec le candomblé, n'est rien d'autre que le produit de la mémoire collective africaine.

2.6. On ne va pas traiter ici de tous les tenants et aboutissants de la gestion théologique des religions afro-brésiliennes par les sociologues, qui se continue dans le présent. Ce n’est donc qu’en passant que l’on va mentionner l’anthropo-théologie de l’ase (ou axé) développée par Juana Elbein dos Santos dans son livre Os Nagô e a Morte: Pade, Asese e o Culto Egun na Bahia, lequel, dès sa parution, n’a cessé d’influencer tant la doctrine et la pratique du candomblé lui-même que les théories des chercheurs. Selon Santos, l’ase (ou axé, comme on épelle couramment au
Brésil) représente la conception spécifiquement africaine de la force “qui donne à l’existence son être et son devenir et qui est actualisée, maintenue et alimentée dans le sanctuaire” (Santos 1976:11). Santos n’a pas inventé le concept d’ase. Bastide, qui le fait remonter à Bernard Maupoil, en parle dans son livre sur le Candomblé de Bahia. Mais chez Santos, sous l’influence d’un certain structuralisme, cette notion arrive à des conséquences inattendues. C’est ainsi que l’ase se retrouverait “dans une grande variété d’éléments représentatifs des royaumes animal, végétal et minéral [...] lesquels peuvent être groupés dans trois catégories: le sang rouge, le sang blanc et le sang noir” (Santos 1976:44).

2.7. Par ailleurs les savants ont souvent eu conscience du rôle qu’ils jouaient dans cette véritable création d’une religion afro-brésilienne, laquelle devient de plus en plus une église à part entière, avec ses dogmes, son rituel, son sacerdoce. Roger Bastide, par exemple, dans un petit texte publié il y a plus de 55 ans (donc avant même la parution de ses grands travaux sur les religions africaines au Brésil), s’exprimait sur ce sujet de la façon suivante:

Je me souviens qu’Anísio Teixeira, avec l’intelligence si lucide qui le caractérise, nous blâma --Ramos, Herskovits, Pierson, Carneiro et moi-même- pour avoir consolidé le candomblé, empêchant ou retardant l’assimilation du Noir du Nord-Est du Brésil à la culture occidentale. Et il avait raison. Les pais-de-santo utilisent nos travaux pour comprendre l’Afrique... (Bastide 1953:521).

2.8. Les savants en sont venus à inventer toute une Afrique ad usum candomblé. Et on ne fera que mentionner le rôle joué par les colloques scientifiques dans l’élaboration de la théologie du candomblé et dans leur transmission au clergé et aux fidèles de cette religion, qui y côtoient les
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3. Gestion et domination

3.1. La modernité se présente donc en plusieurs versions dont l'accord mutuel n'est pas d'emblée évident. L'exemple brésilien semble nous permettre de conclure qu'elle peut aussi se présenter comme un projet; un projet tout au bénéfice de ceux qui se présentent comme ses gestionnaires...

3.2. Il serait excessif de vouloir identifier ici tous ces gestionnaires-bénéficiaires, qui assez souvent ne paraissent gagner qu'un pouvoir assez vague, sur les mots et les théories, ce pouvoir sur les symboles qui est peut-être la forme la plus accomplie de la domination. Ce qui nous ramène finalement à une sociologie de la sociologie et aux mythes qui entourent la naissance et l'histoire de notre profession.
3.3. Certes, il y a sociologues et sociologues, sociologies et sociologies. Ici nous nous sommes limités aux savants du Brésil, qui se sont emparé de la théologie du candomblé. Mais est-ce que leurs "congressos afro-brasileiros", ces colloques-conciles qui définissent la bonne doctrine du candomblé, représentent-ils autre chose finalement avec le déguisement de l'exotique qu'une situation assez banale dans la pratique de notre profession, avec nos congrès, nos colloques et nos conférences, dans lesquels nous définissons ou écoutons définir ex cathedra l'orthodoxie, l'orthohistoire, l'orthosociété, secundum ordinem Augusti Comitis?

NOTES

1. On ne va pas traiter, dans cette communication, des caractéristiques de la sécularisation, en général, ou, en particulier, de la sécularisation dans le Brésil contemporain. Signalons, sans ajouter de commentaire, que les trois villes brésiliennes avec les plus fortes proportions d'adeptes déclarés des religions afro-brésiliennes (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo et Salvador de Bahia) sont aussi celles avec la plus haute proportion de personnes qui se déclarent sans religion (Pierucci et Prandi, 1996: 216).

2. On pourrait très bien parler d'une nébuleuse afro-brésilienne, dans un sens proche de la nébuleuse mystique-ésotérique dont parle Françoise Champion (1991). Par ailleurs il pourrait y avoir beaucoup de naïveté à découvrir, dans la nébuleuse afro-brésilienne, des signes inéquivoques d'un processus de réenchantement du monde ou de la société brésilienne, sauf si on veut attribuer à toute manipulation magique du monde non seulement un caractère enchanté, mais le pouvoir de réenchanter le monde. En réalité, malgré leurs aspects souvent orgiastiques et festifs, les mouvements afro-brésiliens peuvent fort bien impliquer une décomposition du religieux dans
le sens que donnent à cette expression Champion et Cohen (1993). Car ces religions présentent une "tendance à la marchandisation", étant "de plus en plus régies par des règles relevant du marché de l'édition, du marché des stages de formation et de développement personnel, du marché des thérapies, etc". Elles présentent aussi "la tendance au bricolage personnalisé caractéristique de la nébuleuse mystique-ésotérique", tout en devenant "un object simplement magique, désacralisé, qui cesse donc de relever d'une réalité totalement hétérogène à la 'réalité ordinaire'" (Champion et Cohen, 1993: 87-88). Si donc la croissance des religions afro-brésiliennes relève d'une décomposition, plutôt que d'une recomposition du religieux, il devient moins difficile de comprendre sa simultanéité avec le processus de sécularisation, aussi bien qu'avec un développement économique accéléré.

3. Sociologues, sociologie ont, dans ce papier, une acception très large et désignent la science sociale en général. Les anthropologues, les ethnologues et même des historiens sont donc considérés comme des sociologues à part entière.

4. N'oublions pas que le wébérianisme, surtout celui qui s'associe avec l'Éthique Protestante et l'Esprit du Capitalisme (Weber 1988:17-206), représente un des noyaux dogmatiques fondamentaux de la quasi-église sociologique brésilienne. L'association entre éthique protestante et modernité devient ainsi, pour parler la langue des théologiens, articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae. Ce wébérianisme a été puissamment renforcé, dans la bibliographie sur la croissance du protestantisme en Amérique Latine, par des opinions comme celle qu'exprime Peter Berger dans la préface à Tongues of Fire, le livre de David Martin (1990) sur l'expansion du protestantisme et le pentecôtisme en Amérique Latine: "following the insights of Weber and Halévy, what one may expect is that
the new Protestant internationale will produce results similar to those of the preceding one –to wit, the emergence of a solid bourgeoisie, with virtues conducive to the development of a democratic capitalism. It hardly needs emphasizing that this would be an immense event in Latin America as well as elsewhere in the Third World" (Berger 1990: ix).

5. Le livre de Maria das Dores Campos Machado (1996), Carismáticos e Pentecostais: Adesão Religiosa na Esfera Familiar, me paraît bien représenter cette tendance. On lit dans les conclusions de cet ouvrage que "l'apparition des communautés charismatiques catholiques et l'expansion étonnante des groupes pentecôtistes, dans le Brésil de trois dernières décennies [...] représentent la reprise d'une forme de religion laquelle (bien que mystique et émotionnelle) apporte une éthique capable d'articuler les sphères publique et privée et d'orienter les actions quotidiennes des fidèles [...] Concernant les évangéliques (surtout les pentecôtistes qui se répandent dans le Tiers Monde) plusieurs auteurs, comme les brésiliens Procópio Camargo et Cecília Mariz, soulignent leur effet de rationalisation (et donc de modernisation), malgré les 'intentions' nostalgiques de ces groupes” (Machado 1996: 189-190).


8. J'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir été le directeur scientifique de ce congrès et de l'ouvrage collectif qui en résulta (Motta 1985).

RÉFÉRENCES


La gestion sociologique du religieux: la formation de la théologie afro-brésilienne


**SUR L'AUTEUR**

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Book Review:
Atlas of American Diversity

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The *Atlas of American Diversity* is an admirable feat of data organisation. Authors Shinagawa and Jang are experienced in the endeavour of analysing and synthesising difficult, often overwhelming, amounts of governmentally compiled population data, each having served a number of federal, state and civil organisations that rely upon, or themselves gather, census-like information on a grand scale. Their mastery of data presentation is evident in their new *Atlas*. It provides the reader with not only a clear, visually compelling and understandable picture of diversity in the United States but also of the social, racial and ethnic preconceptions existing there, as they are reflected in the categories for data and peoples borrowed from the authors’ American sources.

It may be shocking for scholars of diversity in the United States, perhaps studying any of the myriad of national or ethnic communities with much internal diversity themselves, to discover that the United States officially recognises only four racial groups (African Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Native Americans, Whites) and one cultural group (Hispanic Americans), the latter’s status as cultural group based on language and heritage. Shinagawa and Jang present chapters on each group, providing summary text, statistical data and brief commentaries, and they make effective use of graphs, maps, tables and charts throughout. For example, each chapter includes text on a group’s voter turnout, marital status, poverty, housing and educational attainment, among other issues, in which population numbers and percentages are discussed in comparison with other American groups. These comparisons are a highlight of the *Atlas*: they reveal gross inequalities among peoples and the repetition of patterns of inequality through decades. The scope and number of sources informing the authors are impressive and range from the Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis to the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration. The data are as recent as can be expected from such a large project; most data comes from the 1980 and 1990 United States census results. Charts such as “African Americans and Whites Below the Poverty Level, 1991” and “Changes in African American Family Composition, 1950–1991” show the authors’ thoroughness and, more importantly, the disturbing realities of life for many people in the United States.
The final chapter of the *Atlas*, “A Comparison of American Race and Ethnic Social and Economic Status”, deals with contrasts in a more detailed manner. The authors here draw upon the data organised in their book and upon American history to better explore and explain the conditions previously described. Useful sections offer counter-evidence for many commonly held stereotypes and misconceptions about racial or ethnic groups in the United States, but the chapter is far too short to discuss substantially these obvious issues. The authors’ dedication to brevity and simplicity in presentation often results in too little explication and too simplified statements: perfunctory declarations such as, “African American elderly persons are located in all 50 of the states” are unnecessary. A further criticism concerns the conspicuous absence of crime and justice statistics: none are reported here in the clear, concise ways in which many other useful statistics are. Use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s annual crime reports, which always provide further evidence against common American racial and ethnic stereotypes, would be a fine suggestion for the authors’ next update of the *Atlas*. Indeed, a regular, updated edition would be an equally welcomed work in all of the scholarly, political and general-interest arenas in which the *Atlas* is now invaluable.

The greatest danger and most positive opportunity that the *Atlas* offers the reader are interrelated. The limited governmental categories of racial and cultural groups often seem unquestioned by the authors, but the reader is allowed to see at once the generalised categories, their telling statistics and their possible exclusions and inadequacies. In short, the reader can be motivated by the data originating from sources unwilling to question their own categories; the reader can be encouraged to deconstruct the categories. The introductory remarks do include a discussion of the categories and recent scholarly treatments of race and ethnicity. The remarks, however, are cursory and at times seem to gloss over the seriousness of the issues at hand: Are organisations which rely on these data furthering these questionable classifications, and at what cost? How are Americans affected by the furthering of these established classifications? What groups of peoples are not recognised adequately but subsumed under inaccurate generalisations? What groups are made invisible by sweeping racial or cultural classifications? Because it is necessary to question the adequacy and effects of these classifications, it is best to imbue with great significance a statement in the authors’ acknowledgments: “This book is dedicated to all those who are curious about the world around them and continue to ask ‘Why?’.”

In summary, the *Atlas of American Diversity* is a commendable work. It effectively organises difficult, often impenetrably large amounts of data into understandable forms. The scope of resources consulted, both over decades of time and in breadth of agencies and polls, is impressive and results in a valuable addition to the literatures of social science, business, public administration and more. While this method is problematic in the ways discussed above, it is feasible for use by other nations and scholars wishing to make large amounts of data coherent. In particular, the synthesis of information gathered from a wide variety of sources is worthy of imitation, and the creative uses of charts, graphs, tables, maps and text allow for
clear presentation and immediate comparisons. All these elements are integral to the achievement of Shinagawa and Jang.

About the Author

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