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Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009

Overcoming Inequality: why governance matters

**Governance, Management and Financing of
Education for All:
*Basic Frameworks and Case Studies***

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1. Introduction

Developing countries have made rapid progress in providing access to basic education for all over the past two decades. However, they have not made much progress in providing education of adequate quality for all. As a result, poor countries rank low on international tests of academic achievement, and within countries there are large income-related, as well as random, disparities in achievement. While not as well-documented, poor countries are also concerned with the fact that the education system has not been able to bring in more institutionalized forms of values transmissions to fill in for the decline of traditional forms of values transmissions. Ministries are therefore often concerned with what they perceive as a decline of values of good citizenship, moral and ethical behavior, and cooperation, which education systems do not seem to be in a position to address.

Perhaps most frustrating for educators is the lack of progress by poor countries in raising academic achievement. Research on effective schools has shown what is required for schools to be successful in educating students. In addition, per student public funding for education has increased in many countries. The fact that knowledge and funding have not translated into higher quality schooling has led educators and education policymakers to ask whether the problem may lie with the governance or management of the education sector.

The term governance—derived from the Greek *kybernan* meaning to steer a ship—is loosely used to describe the process by which decisions are made and carried out on behalf of the members of an organization, the stockholders of a corporation, or the citizens of a nation. Applied to education, governance refers to the processes by which governments make and implement policy decisions that affect the finance and delivery of schooling to citizens. These processes are sometimes called the explicit rules [laws and decrees] and implicit rules [cultural norms and values] of the game. These rules create the incentives and accountability arrangements which “steer” the educational system. There are multiple modes of governance. In education, the most common modes of governance are the direct provision of schooling by government and government regulation of schooling provided through private markets and non-government organizations.

Good governance is an ideal in which political processes translate the will of the people into public policies and establish the rules that efficiently and effectively deliver services to all members of society. The development literature on governance identifies a number of characteristics of good governance, including the rule of law, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, participation and responsiveness.¹ These characteristics are easily applied to assess a country’s quality of governance in education.

This paper discusses the major education issues and challenges facing poor countries today, identifies governance problems that affect the capacity of countries to meet those challenges, assesses international experience with improving governance in education and its effects on educational outcomes, and presents analytic tools which are helpful for evaluating the governance of education and progress towards good governance.

¹ For example, see the recent DFID White Paper, which states that good governance requires [a] state capability to deliver services, [b] responsiveness to the needs of citizens, and [c] accountability of public institutions to citizens (Department for International Development 2006).

2. Outstanding Education Issues for the 21st Century

In this section we highlight note which issues should perhaps be “on the agenda” for the beginning of the 21st Century or, to be more modest and realistic, the next few decades, and their possible governance, management, and finance implications. To the maximum degree possible, we select issues on which there is fairly objective and widespread empirical evidence and clear definitions. In a few cases we note one or two issues on which there seems to be a great deal of “loose” consensus but on which the empirical evidence, as to whether there truly is a need, is not very strong. In each case we try to note what the governance, management, and finance implications of each issue might be, with an emphasis on the governance aspects. The agenda of issues to be empirically considered is partially driven by the “standard” agenda given by the EFA goals and the MDGs, and partially by our own sense of what might matter, from our reading of the literature and our policy dialogue with high-level policy makers in developing countries.

In the “empirically based” set of indicators we have chosen the traditional access issues and gender parity issues. But we add quality and quality distribution as important considerations. For many issues there is no sensible goal such as 100% achievement on some indicator. Therefore, instead, we have chosen a “comparative deprivation” or “comparative achievement” approach, where we compare low income, lower middle-income, and upper middle-income countries to the higher income countries.² And, in any case, the goals for which there is some absolute numerical indicator such as 100% achievement are typically the ones where the poorest countries are closest to the richest countries, though obviously with some notable exceptions.

Table 1 shows the results on broad set of indicators. No particular year is shown for the date at which the indicators apply, because we have chosen to use a “Most Recent Data” approach, as long as the data are from the year 2000 or later.³ Since many countries do not report data except with a considerable lag, we felt that a “Most Recent Data” approach is a reasonable compromise between wanting to offer the largest sample size possible and providing a fixed date for the comparisons. The table shows, typically, the current values for low income, lower-middle, and upper middle-income countries as a ratio of the values for high income countries. In cases where the high income countries have lower values, we present the inverse ratios, namely the value for the higher income countries as a proportion of the values for the other countries.

Table 1. Key comparative indicators of educational development

Row	Variable	Ratios of medians			
		LI/HI	LMI/HI	UMI/HI	HI/HI
Background or comparison sectors					
1	GDP Per Capita, PPP, US\$2000	0.05	0.16	0.36	1.00
2	Income Equality (inverse of inequality ratios)	0.72	0.74	0.79	1.00
3	Survivability under 5 (inverse of mortality)	0.05	0.14	0.23	1.00
Access Indicators					
4	Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER), Primary, Male and Female	0.95	1.05	1.03	1.00
5	Gender Parity in GER Primary	0.87	1.00	1.00	1.00

² Using the standard World Bank definitions and classifications, as of the writing of this paper.

³ With the exception of the data on learning outcomes, for which we do reach into the late 1990s.

6	Net Enrollment Ratio (NER), Primary, Male and Female	0.80	0.93	0.95	1.00
7	Gender Parity in NER Primary	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00
8	Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER), Secondary, Male and Female	0.32	0.80	0.89	1.00
9	Gender Parity in GER Secondary	0.78	1.01	1.01	1.00
10	Net Enrollment Ratio (NER), Secondary, Male and Female	0.28	0.74	0.87	1.00
11	Gender Parity in NER Secondary	0.81	1.02	1.00	1.00
12	Gross Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary, Male and Female	0.06	0.33	0.71	1.00
13	Gender Parity in GER Tertiary	0.87	1.00	1.00	1.00
14	Average School Life Expectancy (ASLE)	0.54	0.78	0.87	1.00
15	Gender Parity in ASLE	0.79	0.98	0.99	1.00
Primary Completion					
16	Completion, Male and Female	0.58	0.95	0.94	1.00
17	Gender Parity, Completion	0.93	1.00	1.00	1.00
Input provision					
18	Public Expenditure on Education as Percent of GDP	0.72	0.92	0.89	1.00
19	Pupil/Teacher Ratio (absolute)	40	24	18	14
20	Percent Teachers Certified	0.89	1.01	0.88	1.00
Learning Results					
21	Learning Results Means Across Disciplines and Tests, Method 1	0.61	0.80	0.90	1.00
22	Learning Results Means Across Disciplines and Tests, Method 2	0.55	0.77	0.84	1.00
23	Learning Result Equality (Inverse of Inequality Ratios)	0.49	0.77	0.85	1.00
Cost Indexes (Expense per Learner as a Share of GDP PC)					
24	Primary (absolute)	11	14	14	19
25	Secondary (absolute)	18	17	17	25
26	Tertiary (absolute)	195	41	28	30
27	Ratio S/P (Row 25/ Row 24)	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.3
28	Ratio T/P (Row 26/Row 24)	17.3	2.9	2.0	1.6

Notes

1. In cases where a high value of the index is more common in poor countries we have used HI/LI as the index of relative gap for the poor countries. These are indicated with an (i). In all other cases the index of relative gap is the more natural LI/HI. Both give a sense of how much (or how little) distance the LI countries have already traversed as they move towards where the HI countries are. In some cases (rows 19 and 24-26 it was not sensible to provide an index at all as the variable in question does not have a useful minimum to anchor the index, or the directionality of the LI/HI, LMI/HI, and UMI/HI is reversed for primary and higher levels, making comparisons awkward. Rows 27 and 28 are the ratios of rows 25 and 26 to 24.
2. Note that while these data are derived from EDSTATS, and use the same country groupings as used throughout the World Bank, the numbers used here may not be the same as those provided by EDSTATS, as we use a Most-Recent-Estimate approach for the underlying specific-country data.

Sources

Rows 1 to 20, 24 to 26: World Bank, EDSTATS, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/cd.asp>

Row 2: World Income Inequality Database, at <http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm>.

Row 4: World Bank, HPN Stats,

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats><http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats>

Row 21: calculated from PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS, SACMEQ, PASEC and MLA data according to our own methodology. Details can be provided by the corresponding author.

Row 22: calculated from PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS, SACMEQ, PASEC and MLA data according to a methodology developed by Altinok and Murseli as at http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/upload/site_120/equipe/nadir_altinok/nadir_altinok_personal_webpage.htm.

Rows 21, 22 and 23 use exclusively African and some Latin America countries for the low-income countries, as there are few Asian low-income countries that have participated in international and, particularly regional assessments such as SACMEQ.

Row 23: ratio of the average coefficient of variation in each group of countries to average coefficient of variation in high-income countries in PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS and, as an indicator for the low-income countries, SACMEQ.

A few issues stand out. First, on most indicators, poor countries are better off in the education sector than on overall development as measured by income per capita, or than in the health sector (to take another key target of development assistance) as measured by perhaps the most important overall health indicator, the under-5 mortality rate. In educational access, in particular, even the lower-middle-income countries have achieved levels that are nearly the same as those of the high-income countries. The poorest countries do lag seriously when it comes to, say, access to secondary schooling: their levels are only 32% of those found in the highest-income countries. But things have to be put in perspective. There are quite a few countries in the world where only 3 to 5 children out of every 1000 born die before their 5th birthday, but, then, there are also quite a few countries where more than 200 die—an enormous range of worldwide inequality. In the first set of countries (high-survival countries), secondary enrollment ratios are around 100%, whereas in the second set of countries (low child survival countries) secondary enrollment ratios are around 30% and primary ones are around 80%. It is one thing to have 80% (or even 30%) enrollment when the richest countries have 100%, it is quite another to have 230 children dying when in the richest countries only 3 or 4 die. In some sense education as a whole is “ahead” of other sectors and has made a better claim on at least the superficial implementation of key goals, particularly access goals, and particularly in the basic phase. Promotion of access goals is therefore unlikely to be a good reason to call for reformist changes, since education systems are already more or less delivering on these grounds.

Second, on most indicators, the gap between the poorest and richest countries is much greater in the indicator itself than in the gender parity of the indicator. Thus, for example, the poorest countries achieve 28% of what the richest countries achieve in the Net Enrollment Ratio at the secondary school level, but the gender parity of this ratio, for the same countries, is at a relatively high 81% that of the richest countries. It is also interesting to note, on the issue of gender parity, that almost all the difference in the gender parity indexes is between low income countries and lower middle-income countries. The gradient in gender disparity between lower middle-income countries and higher income countries is typically very gentle or in fact non-existent: as a group (evidently there is variance within the groups), lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries have gender parity ratios higher than 0.98, a level generally taken to be indicative of parity. In short, gaps between poor and rich countries (and the poor and the rich within poor countries) are very large compared to gaps between male and female within countries, and the largest male-female gaps are in the poorest countries.

A third general point is that a “relative gaps” approach, while interesting and suggestive, can hardly be used as the main driver in selecting important issues to work on, because filling all any given gap does not bring the same level of social returns as filling any other gap, and because some gaps that appear less important than others, in terms of comparisons between poor countries and rich countries, may preclude poor countries from moving ahead on the gaps that appear more important. This is the case with educational quality in the lower levels and the enrollment gap at the tertiary level. It is true that secondary and tertiary enrollment ratios in the poorest countries are at only 33% and 6%, respectively, of their values in the richest countries, while average achievement of those who do enroll in primary and early secondary school in the poorest countries is at about 60% of the levels of the richest countries.

This might make it appear as though the relative gap in quantitative or access issues, at the secondary and tertiary levels, might be more important than the quality issue. Such a conclusion is likely to be unwarranted, and illustrates the potential danger of taking a simple “relative gap” approach beyond its utility as a general illustration.

In this context it is important to note several factors that prioritize the importance of the learning achievement levels. As noted, children in the poorest countries achieve, on average, a little more than half as much as children in the richest countries. But paying attention to the distribution of achievement within the rich countries is instructive. To find children within rich countries achieving at 60% or so of the mean within those same countries one has to go “down” to the 3rd or 4th percentile of the distribution of achievement in those countries. For example, in TIMSS 2003 8th grade mathematics, children at the 5th percentile in high-income countries had scores on average 75% of the mean score in those countries, whereas the average child in the poorest countries had a score about 55% to 60% of the mean for the richest countries: lower than all but the 5th percentile of rich-country children. Looking across assessments such as TIMSS, PISA, and PIRLS, one can confidently say that the mean achievement level in the poorest countries corresponds to at best around the 3rd or 4th percentile of achievement levels in the rich countries.⁴ This should be a sobering thought for those who, rightly, believe educational quality is an important contributor to national economic and social development. While the average level of achievement of children in poor countries is a serious enough problem, one also has to note that the internal inequality of achievement in poor countries is very high. As Table 1 shows, internal equality of achievement in the poorest countries is around half that in the richest countries, and in lower middle-income countries equality is 75% that of the richest countries. A few specific numbers provide dramatic illustration. In Ghana, the children at the 95th percentile score 160% better than the children at the 5th percentile. In Peru the best-performing children perform as much as 147% better than the worst-performing children. In richer countries these numbers are only 25% or so.⁵

⁴ Our estimates put the number at 1% or 2%, but one can take 3% or 4% as more cautious. It hardly makes a difference to the overall argument. Furthermore, if one considers the fact that essentially all children are being tested in rich countries, whereas only those in school are being tested in the poor countries, and in these countries not all children are in school at the grade of test application, the figure is more likely around 1% or 2%. As noted, 3% to 4% is likely a very cautious estimate.

⁵ It is true that the greater inequality of performance in the poorest countries than in the richer is partly due to a much lower mean for a not-much-higher variance. But that is true of almost all inequality measures, since most of them are based on some notion of variability relative to mean (the Gini coefficient, for example, is a ratio of covariance to mean). One could say that the inequality problem in the poorest countries would be automatically reduced if average quality were to “simply” to improve in the poorest countries without increasing the variance. On the other hand, it is probably easier to improve average quality by starting with the most obvious quality problems related to simple accountability and control problems, such as poor children not learning to read well until they spend five or six years in school, if then. Looking at the percentages of children at given levels of proficiency (instead of looking at the proficiency levels of children at given percentiles of the performance distribution) in PISA, for example, it is clear that the biggest change between the poorest and worst-performing countries and the middle-income and better-performing countries is the rapid elimination of the percentage of children at the very lowest levels of proficiency (sub-1, in PISA terminology). More research should be done on precisely how average performance was improved in educationally successful countries: have these countries generally succeeded in raising their average performance via a concerted attack on performance problems at the lower end of the distribution, thus bringing up the average, or by improving performance along the whole distribution? In other words, is the cross-sectional appearance of fastest decline in the numbers of worst-performing children visible in PISA results verifiable through historical analysis of the dynamics of improved performance in the countries where performance historically improved greatly and speedily, such as Korea?

A related issue is that of costs relative to benefits. Table 1 also shows that current per student cost of provision at the tertiary level is 17 times higher than cost of provision at the primary level in the poorest countries, but only 1.6 times in the richest countries. In absolute terms, the cost of a tertiary student in the poorest countries is twice as much as income per capita. This kind of cost would in principle mean that these countries would have to get 17 times more return from the increased productivity of a university graduate than from the productivity of a primary school leaver, to justify much expansion of the tertiary system, under the current cost structure. Improving quality in basic education, on the other hand, while not free of cost, is less expensive than expanding access to higher levels, particularly when one notes how elementary many of the quality failures are. Evidence is accumulating that, for example, in many African countries, the grade at which one can confidently say “all children are reading adequately” is only the 5th or 6th grade, at best, when there is ample evidence that proficient reading can be taught in one or at worst two years, without much increased expenditure. Improving something as basic as the teaching of reading in the early grades would seem to require more organization and knowledge than cost. General technique, in-service training, better and tighter curricular sequencing, supervision, teacher support, and provision of inexpensive and simple materials, would be the key requirements. None of them require enormous expense, but they all require technique, management, and discipline: good governance and good management.

In low-income countries, the combination of extremely poor quality (but remediable at relatively low cost) in basic education and extremely high cost in post-basic education suggests a clear priority for gap-filling: the strong emphasis should be on improving the quality of basic education, while at the same time, where justified, and gradually, expanding provision at less basic levels. In lower- and upper-middle-income countries the priorities shift proportionately to their objective situation: quality in basic education is higher than in low-income countries, and costs in secondary and tertiary are lower.

The evidence on quality and equity of achievement is fairly strong and quantitative. It is usually the first problem to be noted by Ministers and commentators, in individual conversations and international conferences, perhaps after the now-customary reaffirmation of the access goals (EFA-FTE, MDGs) in basic education. There are two other issues for which it is impossible to find quantitative evidence as robust as that shown above, but which seem to come up increasingly frequently in conversations with Ministers and other high-ranking officials in most countries.

One arising issue is a concern with what might be termed a crisis of values—a concern over alienation, violence, gang behavior, teen-ager pregnancy and inappropriate sexual conduct, drug-taking, school discipline, and so on, often linked to what might be called the MTV-ization of morals. This seems to be particularly common in middle-income countries, where mass access to secondary education has become prevalent in the last decade or two. The concerns expressed in these countries today echo concerns that in the richest countries date back to the 1950s, when mass secondary education was becoming prevalent in those countries. High-income countries either have found ways to deal with these issues through their educational (and other social support) systems, or have in essence accommodated themselves to the fact that some of these issues may simply be somewhat intractable. Such an accommodation has not taken place yet in middle- or low-income countries, and high-level officials often express concern with these problems as at least a second-order concern, after issues of access and quality.

Another pair of unquantifiable issues relate to decentralization and school autonomy as ends in themselves or as political rather than educational ends. By “decentralization” we mean, broadly, devolution of governance functions to levels of government that are below the national level, are higher than the school level, and have authority over issues other than education. By “school autonomy” we mean some devolution of governance, finance, and management down to the school level. On this score there is also no quantifiable evidence as to the degree to which decentralization is a serious goal, or the degree to which it has progressed. Nonetheless, in just about every country there are decentralization policy proposals on the table. What varies is the degree of seriousness with which any of this has proceeded to implementation. In quite a few cases there has been a significant amount of devolution and real implementation, just as in other cases there is also some re-centralization of certain functions taking place—particularly functions related to standards and quality control. What seems notable about all this is that while educational quality goals are often discussed by educators as part of the reason for decentralization, the main reasons for decentralization actually proposed in developing countries seem to have to do more with overall political development than with service delivery. Decentralization is most often also a multi-sectoral issue, not an educational one. In general, the main reason has to do with a sense that sub-national levels of government have some “right” to determine certain aspects of service provision in their jurisdictions. Some of the most prominent and successful cases of decentralization, such as Spain, have precisely this motivation. This sense extends all the way down to parental involvement in school management, as a matter of rights and political development, not necessarily as a matter of educational quality. Since schools, in almost all countries, numerically dominate any other form of formal institution, it seems logical to focus on school governance as a locus of political development and adult learning about democratic problem-solving, in addition to, but not necessarily as part of, their role in producing cognitive achievement in children.

All of these issues relate in one way or another to governance, management, and finance, though to varying degrees. The last set of issues, namely decentralization and local empowerment for the sake of political development, or as a matter of local rights, seems to require no elaboration: the connection to governance and management is definitional.

The other issues relate to governance, management and finance in complex ways. Delivering on the already-accepted EFA and MDG goals will require strengthening of managerial capacity along fairly well-known lines, more than governance changes: ability to add to the stock of schools in a cost-effective manner, including skills in site selection and contracting; funding and training skills so as to develop and pay teachers, or negotiate more reasonable teacher costs; and, in some cases, financial reforms.

Quality, and equity of quality, is the issue that most frequently calls for governance reforms such as decentralization, alternative forms of provision. The presumption is a fairly simple one: actors whose personal interest is at stake in the delivery of quality should have more of a say in the governance of the sector, including schools; reliance on actors whose interest in quality is abstract, or comes into conflict with other interests, is perhaps problematic. Similarly, a concern with values seems to require paying closer attention to citizens’ concerns.⁶ This is the basic assumption in most calls for governance reforms. The nature of


⁶ Upon asking a parents’ meeting in a developing country “how can you tell whether your child is educated?” assuming he would get an answer such as “if my child can read, but there is no standard of reading” or “if my child can pass the exam but the exam is set only at school level so I don’t know whether it is any good” (so that he could use the response to dialogue around a results orientation to educational rights) one of the authors of the

most governance reforms in developing countries can be illuminated via reference to a couple of frameworks.

3. Governance and Management in Education: A Framework

The quality of governance, and the differences between governance and management in education, can be assessed by looking at three types of relationships. The first is the responsiveness of government to the needs and demands of citizens, especially the parents of young children. The second is the capacity of the system to deliver the services that satisfies those needs and demands. And the third is accountability by schools to the parents and citizens they serve. These relationships are depicted graphically in the “accountability triangle” in Figure 1 for the simple case of a highly centralized education system.⁷ When some responsibilities are decentralized to different levels of government, these relationships can become considerably more complex.

Figure 1. Governance and Accountability in Education



The diagram allows a discussion of the sorts of roles and relationships that underpin well-functioning systems. In theory one could have an education system where none of these relationships work or are necessary, and where pure teacher professionalism and devotion lead to good results. At one step removed, one could have a society where only the right-hand

report was nonplussed, and reminded of the divergence of opinion between parents and professionals, when the first parent answered “if my child stands up for a senior citizen in the bus” and the other parents strongly backed up this statement. Parents and politicians frequently have opinions that are quite at odds with the opinions of either educators or economists. Empowering parents and citizens does not always lead to schools that behave the way professionals feel they should, as parents differ from professionals not just with respect to ultimate goals but also with respect to what they think works in education, as is evidenced by divergent opinion between parents and educators around issues such as uniforms, the emphasis on strict discipline and ritual that parents often seek (including physical punishment), the desire of parents to have their children taught not just the local colonial language but English, and so on.

⁷ Figure 1 is an adaptation application to education of the accountability framework presented in the World Bank’s 2004 *World Development Report*. See World Bank (2004b).

side of the triangle is at work: this would be the case of a benevolent technocratic authoritarianism, where the policy level presumes to know, and actually knows, what citizens think and want, and there there is effective control over service delivery. In such situations education could be well-provided. But as history shows, the presumption by leaders that they know what citizens think and want, and therefore do not need to consult and do not need to allow contestation of their ideas, even when initially true, can easily become perverted and self-serving. Thus, the left-hand side of the triangle is often seen in many societies as a clear necessity. Finally, when even the two sides of the triangle result in fragile or unreliable provision, societies attempt to provide a more direct relationship between schools and citizens, by experimenting with and reinforcing the base of the triangle, through the existence of PTAs, governing bodies, and other forms of direct citizen support and accountability.

Responsiveness of Government. In democracies citizens vote for representatives who represent their views and interests in the national legislature. While education issues may not be highly visible in general elections, the education committees of legislatures are usually the locus of informed policy debates. In mature democracies, the educational interests of citizens are also represented by national level organizations (e.g., association of PTAs), think tanks, and the press. These organizations also play a key role in informing citizens as to the state of education and help shape national priority setting. Legislators may be held accountable by the voters for their votes on key education legislation.

Capacity to Deliver Services. The legislative and executive bodies jointly determine the policies, goals, and funding for education. Education ministers may be charged with achieving specific short-term goals, be required to report back to the legislature's education commission, and be held accountable for meeting those goals. Accountability requires an information system that quickly and reliably measures the goal of interest. The Minister in turn puts the wheels of the bureaucracy in motion to allocate the resources and to implement the programs required to achieve the agreed upon goals. Successful implementation requires that resources in fact reach the schools, that bureaucrats dutifully follow their orders, that program goals are regularly measured and monitored, and that there are consequences—both positive and negative—for actions. Bureaucrats must be held accountable to their superiors, and ultimately to the minister, for ensuring that program activities are faithfully performed. Accountability requires that constant monitoring and measurement as well as consequences for failure to perform as required. Of course, principal-agent problems, management constraints (e.g., line item budgeting), and difficulty in disciplining civil servants all adversely affect both accountability and the capacity of governments to deliver what they promise. The magnitude of the principal-agent problem is perhaps most starkly seen in the high absenteeism rates among teachers in many countries.

Accountability by Schools to Parents. The long political and often physical distance between parents and policymakers and the equally long distance from policymakers to the schools translates into very weak accountability by schools to parents. Thus the existence of local level organizations (e.g., PTAs, school management committees) that allow parents to participate in school level governance and finance are especially important. The ability of parents to directly hold schools accountable for performance depends critically on [a] their knowledge of their school's performance and the norms and standards of service delivery that apply to their school; [b] the existence of incentives for the school to respond to parental concerns and interests; and [c] the capacity of school teachers and headmasters to make resource allocation decisions.


Decentralization and Governance. The decentralization of decision-making in education, either through devolution to lower levels of government or through delegation of responsibilities to the school, has the potential for stronger accountability and improved governance. At the same time, in many countries decentralization has led to less clarity as to who is responsible for which education decisions, and a system of shared responsibilities that makes it difficult to hold any single actor accountable.

The Impact of Poor Governance on Education. Poor governance gives rise to many of the problems observed in the educational systems of poor countries today. These problems include [a] failure of resources—books, instructional materials, construction materials—to reach the school; [b] ghost teachers; [c] high rates of absenteeism among teachers and headmasters; [d] poor teacher deployment with large differences in class size between schools; [e] low attention by teachers to students whom they are not paid to tutor; [f] wastage of resources within schools.


At this point we can provide a useful distinction between governance and management. The capacity to deliver services, roughly corresponding to the right leg of the triangle depicted above, has been variously referred to as the “compact” or “management” aspect, in contradistinction to the left leg and base of the triangle, which are more governance-like. Referring back to the etymological roots of the notion of “governance,” the left leg and the base of the triangle are mostly about “steering” (setting a general direction, monitoring whether the ship is progressing in the right direction) whereas the right leg, management and compact, are more about “rowing” or actually doing the work of delivery. In this respect, the management issues are those covered by Scheerens (2004).

In decentralized or decentralizing countries one can think of the accountability triangle as really being a series of triangles joined through the management relationships (the right legs of the triangles) where management (or “bureaucratic”) accountability flows upward between levels, but where there should not be upward accountability between the levels in the right legs of the triangle, and only strong horizontal relationships at the base of each triangle, as shown in Figure 2, first panel. That is, principals may be accountable to parents’ governing bodies, or district education officials to district assemblies or boards, and principals may be bureaucratically accountable to district education officials, but parents’ governing bodies are not accountable to district assemblies or boards. In some countries’ decentralization plans there are sometimes lines of (upward) accountability drawn between the governance levels of the system (as shown in Figure 2, second panel), but this likely represents a misunderstanding of ideal governance relationships and a false parallelism between relationships of upward or vertical accountability, often needed on the executive or bureaucratic side (even in a decentralizing country) and the same upward reporting relationships on the governance side (where it is not needed and is conceptually unclear in any case—a district legislature can hardly disband, say, a school governing body). Another common problem observed in countries’ decentralization plans is the existence of specific education sector boards or some form of legitimating body at, say, district level, when there is already a generic district board or assembly with an education committee (Figure 2, first panel, middle horizontal level). This can lead to lack of clarity of goals, as the “executive” branches of the system do not know how, or to whom, to discharge horizontal accountability.

Figure 2. Various visions of decentralized governance structures



Likely workable decentralized accountability structure



Less likely workable decentralized accountability structure

4. Emerging Lessons for Governance in Education

Lessons learned about good (or weak) governance in education come from assessments of whole educational systems and country-wide reforms, and from experimental or project interventions aimed at improving governance. In the following case studies we discuss issues of governance, and the relation between governance and management at the whole-system level, in three countries: Chile, South Africa, and Uganda—all cases receiving considerable donor and academic attention for their innovativeness.

4.1. Systems-level cases

4.1.1 Uganda

Uganda is in many ways an education governance success story. It is one of the few countries to successfully decentralize education to sub-national governments. District governments are responsible for recruiting and deploying teachers, for inspecting schools and teachers, and for transferring national capitation grants to schools. PTAs and Boards of Governors raise revenues and approve school spending plans for those revenues.

Uganda has a relatively sophisticated education management information system [EMIS] that is current and reliable. Primary and secondary school leaving examinations provide an indicator of schooling outcomes; league tables are widely disseminated; and headmaster performance is evaluated in part on the basis of the results of school leaving exams. In addition, the national examination board annually assesses the academic performance of a sample of third and sixth grade students, which enables the ministry to monitor improvements in academic performance.

The capitation grant used to fund non-personnel education spending at the school level is transparent and predictable and widely publicized, resulting in a low rate of leakage as measured by several public expenditure tracking surveys carried out over the past decade. Overall, a high percentage (94%) of educational resources reaches the classroom⁸.

At the school level, most schools have functioning PTAs or School Management Committees. Almost all households pay fees for public secondary education, and higher income households contribute significant funding for public primary education. There is anecdotal evidence that the removal of school fees in 1996 reduced the amount of community involvement in the schools. Being a headmaster is a career track, and headmasters receive high pay, about double that of school teachers.

Despite the many positive factors that contribute to good governance, efficiency, accountability, and academic performance are wanting. Teacher absenteeism rates are high—about 20 percent; more surprising, only about 20 percent of teachers are present in the classroom at the time of unannounced school visits. Headmaster absenteeism is about double that of teachers, which by and large precludes their serving as pedagogic leaders. Student absenteeism is also high, and case studies find student absenteeism rates to be much higher than reported in administrative data. Student-teacher ratios vary widely across districts and across schools within districts despite national norms on teacher deployment. While primary level enrollment rates are high (85% according to household survey data), quality as measured

⁸ See Winkler and Sondergaard (2007) for additional detail.

by student learning is low. The unit cost of graduating a primary school student attaining a specified minimum level of knowledge is 89 times the unit cost of enrolling a student.

Given the good information system and the level of parental involvement in schools, in what ways is educational governance weak in Uganda, and how does weak governance contribute to poor educational outcomes? An important weakness in governance is the weak incentive for teachers and headmasters to perform and the corresponding lack of accountability by schools to either parents or the education ministry or the district education office. The lack of an effective inspection system at the district level, which is partly the result of the inability of the newly created Education Standard Agency to enforce inspection standards on the districts and partly the result of district governments failing to recognize their role in ensuring quality, creates weak incentives for teachers and headmasters to even be present at school, much less to perform effectively. Weak inspection is not compensated for by giving PTAs and school management committees the information, capacity, and authority to take action to reduce absenteeism and improve performance. The fact that teachers hired with PTA funds are less likely to be absent than government-funded teachers suggests giving schools and school management committees increased authority over the employment and compensation of teachers could at a minimum reduce absenteeism rates.

4.1.2 South Africa

The South African case presents an unusual opportunity to study the impact of thorough-going reform. Everything in South Africa's education system was re-made, at least in principle and in the letter of the law, after 1994. All the changes were embodied in a set of new laws (and subsidiary norms and regulations), dealing with governance and finance (and to a much lesser extent management). This body of legislation was admirably coherent; laws and norms were clear, complete, assigned clear accountability, were generally non-overlapping, and were mostly consistent with each other. They were also "cutting edge" with regard to the standard play-book of reforms, having been based on lessons learned from changes under way in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. Policy design was, thus, enviable. But habits, the human and social capital which teachers and mid-level managers inherited, and the actual patterns of work and pedagogical management were another matter—these were, it turns out, not so productive. In a sense, the South African case study provides perhaps the canonical example of why legal and regulatory changes, even if very well-designed and reasonably well-implemented, have limited impact on school quality, if work patterns and pedagogical management in the classroom are constraining. Another way to put it would be to say that in the trio of governance, management, and finance, the (pedagogical) management aspect is key and not to be neglected, at least if the aim is to improve quality.

South Africa, before the end of *apartheid*, had already expanded its education system massively, even to the non-white population. The country had historically put value on *access* to basic education. It expanded (using secondary education as an example) access for the segments of the population of European descent faster than Europe itself did, during the middle part of the 20th century. Similarly, the expansion of access to primary education and then secondary education, for the African segments of the population, was much faster and more complete than anywhere else in the world, the system having gone from one of extremely limited access to mass access in one generation.⁹ (See Crouch and Vinjevoold

⁹ It is little understood that even during *apartheid* massive access to secondary education, even for the majority, was expanded rapidly. This included the speedy—maybe even crash—creation of teacher training institutions.

2007.) The emphasis on mass access seems to have come at a cost. South Africa is perhaps the biggest outlier in the (measured) world in terms of the gap between access (GER of 93% at the secondary level, when the median for middle-income countries was 89%) and learning achievement (dead last in TIMSS 1999, next-to-last in TIMSS 2003, behind all the upper- and lower-middle-income countries, and scoring, on SACMEQ, behind Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania, countries with, on average, 1/5th of South Africa's per capita income). Some of this gap is *definitionally* due to South Africa's high access rates: the tested sample in South Africa is essentially representative of the whole population of youth (since more than 90% are in school until age 15 or 16 at least), whereas in low-access countries the sampled population tends to be a more of an elite. Nonetheless, even adjusting for this problem, South Africa does poorly. Van der Berg and Louw (2006), for example, find that, controlling for variables such as parents' education, quality of infrastructure, and so on, South African students still do worse than those in other African countries.

South Africa's post-apartheid reforms were explicitly oriented at governance and finance, with much less emphasis on management. The goals were, explicitly, to improve equity, efficiency, and quality, and to foster democratic decision-making and a sense of localized communities' rights over the provision of education for their children. On the governance side, these changes took the form of decentralization to provincial governments, and a reasonably high degree of school-level autonomy or power. Within a framework of nationally-guaranteed rights, for example, provincial legislatures and executives decide how much to spend on education, and in most senses of the world "run" the schooling system. They are the employers and allocators of teachers, are the key repositories (along with schools) of accountability for performance, and are the ones responsible for ensuring sufficient places in schools to guarantee access to all and for making sure parents send their children to school. Below the provincial level, schools' communities have had (at least on paper) considerable power and autonomy, also, in deciding how to spend their funding, in leveraging private funds, in determining which teachers occupy posts, in employing (with considerable flexibility) teachers other than those provided by the government, and in running and improving school infrastructure. Schools are juristic persons, by statute, and can enter into contracts and can enter into legal disputes (with, e.g., the government). In terms of finance, various changes were aimed principally at improving equity of allocation. Funding from the national level to the provincial level was made formula-driven and dependent on enrollment and population, with some weighting for poverty; funding and resourcing from the provincial to the school level was also made formula driven, and dependent on enrollment, with considerable weighting for poverty, particularly in the allocation of non-personnel, non-capital expenditure.

What have been the results, given the explicit goals of the reforms? The more disappointing result is that quality, at least as proxied by learning outcomes, does not seem to have improved very much, or at any rate is still disappointingly low. South Africa has participated in TIMSS three times: in 1995, in 1999, and in 2003.¹⁰ Eight years appear to have made little or no difference, as South Africa performed last on all three versions of this assessment, and at least as far below the average, if not worse, in 2003 as in 1995 or 1999. South Africa's

That this involved a certain amount of populism and co-optation of local leadership into collaboration with the regime seems fairly clear. But in any case the net result was a massive growth in enrollment, even for the African population, from the 1970s to the 1990s, albeit with very poor quality. The fact that access without quality can be a tool of co-optation and populism should be a sobering thought.

¹⁰ Participation in the 1995 version of TIMSS did not meet sampling and other methodological standards and results are thus not included in most international reports of TIMSS results. However, results exist.

own systemic evaluation (a national assessment of learner performance), while not run for the same grade more than once since democracy, shows disappointing results, in that learner performance on Grade 6 tasks in 2004 was worse than performance on Grade 3 tasks in 2001, and, with proficiency levels, at about only 40% correct, are low in absolute terms. Results in areas other than quality are more promising. Equity of resource allocation has improved markedly. In Crouch, Lavado, and Gustafsson (2006) it is calculated that the concentration index of school-level (pre-tertiary) expenditures has improved from a pro-rich value of 0.26 in 1991 (three years before the official end of apartheid) to a nearly neutral value of 0.027 by 2004 (ten years after the end of apartheid).¹¹ The coefficient of inter-provincial variation in resourcing was reduced by about 60% in just a few years. Some inequality remains. The main culprit for the remaining slight pro-rich bias in allocations is the cost of the more experienced and highly-educated teachers. Their mobility, and, hence, pro-rich fixity even 10 years after the end of apartheid, is to *some* degree, ironically, the result of school power and school autonomy. The supply of non-teaching staff, which has not been normed using a pro-poor formula, is still slightly pro-rich. All non-personnel expenditure is strongly pro-poor, as dictated by legislation.¹² Finally, in terms of governance itself as a goal, and the role of school governing bodies themselves in allowing citizens to hone their participatory skills, it is certainly the case that South Africa today has thousands upon thousands of school governing bodies, where some degree of participation and democratic governance takes place, and where, prior to the end of apartheid, this was a democratic privilege (and duty) for whites only. How real and deep this process goes, and to what degree it follows lines of traditional social advantage, is a matter of debate, since progress in governance and the exercise of complex rights is harder to quantify than progress (or lack thereof) in learning outcomes or in financial allocations. In a thorough review of the issues, Naidoo (2005) concludes that while real progress has been made, South African governance at the school level, and in particular governance support to under-privileged communities, concentrates too much on the technical and formal aspects (e.g., budgeting and financial tracking, voting procedures, minute-keeping) and has tended to ignore deeper issues of power differences within communities, local capture, and the capacity for deeper inquiry on school matters by communities. Karlsson (2002) warns that governing bodies may just reproduce unequal localized power relations, and that the more privileged within communities, and the more privileged communities, may be able to take greater advantage of the latitude offered by school autonomy. All that being said, learning-by-doing in the rituals and processes of democratic governance are now available, at least in theory, to tens of thousands of citizens at thousands of schools. Schools can then at least have the potential of constituting an initial first step in citizen's political development as actors in a democracy.

It seems safe to use South Africa as a case in point in concluding that even well-designed and reasonably implemented reforms that emphasize governance and finance are insufficient, if

¹¹ These are "proper" concentration indices allowing for variation of expenditure by social group. The more customary concentration indices, often associated with World Bank expenditure reviews, typically assume that all children in public education receive the same spending, and count families who send their children to private schools as recipients, but recipients receiving zero benefits. Both assumptions tend to exaggerate the progressivity of expenditure. Our calculations for South Africa look at the progressivity of spending within the public sector, and allows for variable expenditure depending on income group.

¹² It is also a result of three other facts: a) pro-poor considerations in teacher allocation norms were not introduced until relatively late in the post-apartheid system, b) teacher allocation norms allocate only teachers, not teacher costs, and thus still result in higher-cost teachers being allocated to relatively privileged schools, and c) teachers themselves, and their organizations, as in all countries, prefer a teacher allocation process that has the unintended result of giving more educated and experienced (and hence costlier) teachers the easier posts, usually associated with the wealthier children.

quality and cognitive achievement are the goals. Project lessons from South Africa itself (in section 4.2) will suggest that sharp improvements in at least some types and levels of cognitive achievement are possible if more adroit school-level pedagogical management, support, and accountability are added to the mix of progressive governance and finance policies.

4.1.3 Chile

Chile has become perhaps the paradigmatic reformist country—certainly one of the most written-about in the scholarly and donor literature.¹³ A few features make the Chilean case particularly interesting and tend to give legitimacy and credit to the education reforms, in the eyes of world-wide analysts and commentators. First, the fact that reforms started by a right-wing military dictatorship were mostly continued, at least until today, by democratic governments of a slightly left-of-center orientation, tends to give the reforms an aura of authenticity, legitimacy, and permanence. Surely there must be something basically right, or so the thinking would go, about policies started by a military right-wing government and mostly continued by a left-of-center democratic one, particularly as more or less the same things happened with economic reforms, and these have largely succeeded. Second, the fact that Chile has indeed succeeded in generating some of the highest and most sustainable economic growth rates in Latin America, and has succeeded admirably in reducing poverty rates, also gives the education policies a certain “cachet by association,” as it were. Thirdly, the policies are enormously varied and inventive and, similar to the case of South Africa, seem designed based on the most “fashionable” and current thinking on education policy, particularly as proposed by international financial agencies.

The range of policies, and the inventiveness of the policies, is indeed staggering. The following is only a partial list of the reforms introduced, either by the military or democratic governments. First, basic education was municipalized, greatly reducing the role of the national Ministry in administrative and personnel management (including, importantly, teacher employment, which involved also a shift in the contractual governance of the employment relationship between teachers and their employers), and bringing education closer to the citizen, as per decentralization theory. (Though this was not the original motivation of the Military government, it came to be seen as the motivation of the democratic government (see Parrin 1997).). Second, resource allocation to municipalities was made dependent on a reasonably transparent formula that rewards school attendance and has some (mild) pro-poor components. Third, competition between public schools and private schools, and amongst private schools themselves, was stimulated by providing private schools with subsidies on a capitation basis similar to the subsidy provided to public schools. Fourth, national census-type quality assurance exams were introduced and are applied periodically at various grade levels. The information from the exams is (eventually, actually under the democratic regime) disseminated rather than kept within the Ministry, so as to presumably inform consumer choice over schools and school accountability to parents. Relatedly, Chile assiduously participates in international assessments, and takes great care to try to absorb the lessons learned. Fifth, school-based plans and efforts were stimulated, by giving some of the

¹³ A Google Scholar search for the terms “education reform in Chile” as a phrase returned 55 hits on 11 August 2007. Similar searches for “Tunisia,” “Jordan,” “Egypt,” and “Mexico” returned 8, 1, 6, and 23 hits respectively. Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan have lower income per capita than Chile does, are seldom touted as reformist (on the contrary, in at least one case), and yet get better results in TIMSS than Chile does (in the case of Tunisia only if one averages science and mathematics). Mexico is at about the same level as Chile in both income and cognitive results, but is generally seen as less reform-oriented by donors and academics. None of these countries have much less access to school than Chile does, so the population tested is roughly the same.

poorest schools financial incentives (plan-based grants) to carry out school-based planning of a decentralized and bottom-up nature. Sixth, funding and teacher salaries were vastly improved over a period of about 10 years, leading to a more than doubling of the spending on education as a share of GDP. Seventh, school level teacher performance bonuses were introduced, where teachers are collectively rewarded for school performance, the latter judged using interesting value-added or (more strictly) social-equalization statistical techniques and improvement scores, rather than absolute scores, as the literature would suggest (see Text Box 1). Eighth, to make sure incentives are properly lined up, *individual* teachers are not rewarded for student performance but only for their own behavior and skills, using performance evaluation methods that include portfolio analysis. Ninth, the most skilled teachers are recruited and incentivized to assist other teachers, in a network of teachers-of-teachers. Tenth, the school day was lengthened to reduce double-shifting and provide more time-on-task. Eleventh, innovative competitions between NGOs have been held, to assess which methods of outside assistance could raise under-performing schools' learning outcomes. One could go on and on. Difficult as it may be to believe, these are only some (one third to one half?) of the reforms (or, more appropriately perhaps, reforms and innovative programs) attempted. For example, the more customary curricular changes have also been made. Standards have been specified more clearly than is customary in Latin America, and, helpfully, are provided in high-quality publications with plenty of detailed examples. All kinds of special programs, such as internet connectivity, drug awareness, and health programs have also been developed and, unlike in most other developing countries, quite thoroughly implemented. Reforms in the non-basic sub-sectors (universities and technical education) were also varied and profound. And so on, turning Chile into a sort of shop-window display of reformist ideas, all based on much leading opinion on how to improve education.

Text Box 1. Chile's Performance Incentive Grants

Established in 1994, Chile's National System of Performance Assessment (SNED) awards teacher incentive grants to schools based on an index of school excellence measures. The SNED is one of several programs within Chile's education system that introduces market-like incentives to enhance school performance. The SNED creates competition among schools to encourage teachers to improve their performance. The teacher incentive grants are conditional in that awarded school directors must use 90 percent of the grant for teacher bonuses based on hours worked. The school director is to allocate the residual 10 percent to "outstanding" teachers at his/her discretion to avoid the "free-rider" problem. Though, research shows that, in general, the director allocates the remaining 10 percent on the same basis as the main portion of the grant. Another design feature of the SNED program is that the teacher incentive grants are distributed through a competitive process. Schools are stratified within regions by socioeconomic status and other external factors that affect school performance. This ensures that the process is competitive among comparable establishments. Every two years, schools are ranked according to an index of school performance measures using the national System for Measuring Educational Quality (SIMCE) test as the basic criterion. In addition to cognitive testing, retention and promotion rates, school practices to help special needs students, and integration of parents and guardians into the school community are also considered. Schools are ranked according to the aforementioned criteria and awarded until the winning schools represent 25 percent of the stratum's population. Schools can win the teacher incentive grants repeatedly.

Sources: McMeekin (2000), Mizala and Romaguera (2000).

The results of all this experimentation and reformism have been rather disappointing, not least to Chileans themselves.¹⁴ Objectively, scores on national and international assessments have

¹⁴ See Eyzaguirre and LeFulon (2001) for a thorough review of outcome results.

not improved very much, if really at all. In the 1999 application of TIMSS, for example, Chile's performance was not better than that of various countries poorer than it, and which had carried out less profound and innovative, or at least showy, governance and financial reforms, such as Tunisia, Jordan, or Indonesia. By the time of the 2003 application of TIMSS, performance had not improved, and the same comparative story with respect to countries such as Egypt, Thailand, or Indonesia could be told. Many of these are countries traditionally decried as overly centralist and rather traditional in approach, yet their results were no worse (though not much better, for that matter) than Chile's, even though they are poorer. In Chile's own internal assessment the rate of improvement is also not anything particularly interesting. To top all of this off, in 2006 Chile was hit with some of the most serious student protests in a long time, where students (particularly secondary school students) were calling for improvements in quality and equity. All this, after at least 15 or so years of well-researched and well-implemented show-case reforms, if one takes into account only the democratic government's reforms, and 25 years of reforms if one takes into account the reforms of the military government (many, perhaps most of which, as noted, were not abandoned by the democratic government).

It is no wonder, then, that the most recently installed government of Chile has called for a basic revision of all the fundamental education policies, by creating a joint task force of the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of decentralization and municipal management), Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Education, along with other high-level representatives of the Executive. It is difficult to say what is amiss. But perhaps the best summary is that provided by an OECD study of Chile's education sector, which concludes, essentially, that a collection of clever and well-implemented policies and programs has not really been constituted into an integrated and coherent system of quality management—a story similar to South Africa's, with the difference that at least in South Africa the governance aspects do cohere into a well-articulated system, even if the pedagogical management aspects do not (OECD 2004, particularly pp. 73 to 75 and Conclusions section). A few examples of disarticulation and what some Chileans themselves call “program-itis” can be provided (see Waissbluth 2005, for example, for the use of the term “*programitis insularizada*”—insular programitis—, whereby special programs tend to be better-funded and are more authoritative than routine programs and are thus stove-piped into schools, creating confusion and loss of focus).

A key issue seems to be the disarticulation between three levels of the system: schools, municipalities, and the national Ministry. Schools face almost all the accountability pressure, yet have little leeway to respond with managerial agility, since municipalities control the resources and directly provision schools—in effect there is little school-based management or governance. Public schools are not real managerial centers with true decision-making authority: municipalities are their “owners” (“*sostenedores*” in Chile's regulatory parlance) and resource managers. Yet neither municipalities, nor the national government, actually face detailed accountability pressure; only schools face this pressure, on the main. Thus there is a broken link here. Though schools' results data, aggregated up to the municipality level, are available and published, mayors and municipal governments are not really judged (or incentivized) on this basis either by a bureaucracy or by the electorate: there is neither horizontal nor vertical municipal accountability for these sorts of results. The disjoint between public and private schools is also of interest. While public schools have to compete as a whole (e.g., as a collective under municipal ownership and management), they have to compete with private schools each of which individually competes with the others and has its own “brand.” (Even so, the performance of private schools, which are able to compete more freely and are less burdened with regulations, does not stand out. See McEwan 2001.) While

schools face the accountability-for-results pressure and municipalities are in charge of resources and could provide the managerial response (but typically do not, since they do not face accountability pressure), neither is really in charge of, nor skilled at, the pedagogical management response and the necessary innovation and quality assurance systems: the national Ministry, through its Provincial Departments, is truly in charge of this aspect. Pre-service and in-service training are disjointed, as universities' autonomy makes it difficult to prescribe the content of pre-service training, line it up with the curriculum, and ensure in-service follow-up and updating. Within the national Ministry itself, it is hard to conclude that all the interesting programs cohere into a clear, articulated approach to management of the sector: programs are well-designed and well-implemented from the point of view of those in charge of each program at the Ministry, but they "stove pipe" into schools, each following its own channel and interests, as noted in the definition of "programitis." The bottom line is that, as the OECD report says in a fairly chiding tone for a document of this nature, it is impossible to separate administrative from technical/pedagogical management, as Chile has attempted to do. It results in lack of articulation and a very weak quality control feedback loop.

It is safe to conclude that Chile—in this respect similar to South Africa, another reformist country that has put most of its eggs into the governance basket—lacks an effectively integrated system of pedagogical management (a loop consisting of educational and curricular standards, and then supervision, information, specific school-oriented inspection and support, and in-service training, all coordinated and based on the standards). Not surprisingly, the latest reform ideas, which question the dis-integration of the system, sketch out a proposal for keeping the decentralized nature of the system, but putting more accountability pressure and technical support duties and skills in the hands of administrative units who control the resources. As of the writing of this paper, several drafts of bills and policies are tabled before public opinion and legislative body opinion of Chile, which to create new fundamental education laws to deal precisely with these problems.

4.2. Project and Research Evidence

In addition to the country cases discussed above, there is a growing body of evidence generated by experiments, projects, and special studies and surveys (e.g., public expenditure tracking) as to the impacts of changes in governance and management on educational processes and outcomes. In addition, other studies specifically focus on problems of corruption in education.¹⁵

Transparency in Finance

The evidence indicates that simple, explicit, transparent funding formulas reduce leakage. For example, for Zambia, Das (2004) asks whether resources allocated by the central authority actually reach the intended recipients. He finds that cash transfers allocated through clear guidelines and legislated rules (rules-based grants) reached the final recipients (targeted schools) whereas those allocated at the discretion of province and educational offices (discretionary grants) did not. Overall, twice as high a percentage of funds reach the schools in the rule-based versus discretionary grants. The success of direct cash transfers occurs in an environment of high corruption as assessed by Transparency International. The implication for public policy is that the effects of increased education spending depend very much on the rules and incentives that accompany that expenditure.

¹⁵ Sor example, see Hallak and Poisson (2006) who supervised a multi-country investigation into the problems of corruption in education and means to reduce corruption through improved governance.

In addition, Levacic and Downes (2004) studied formula funding and decentralized education expenditure of governments in four countries—Victoria, Australia; Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil; England, the UK; and two cities in Poland—to explore whether fiscal decentralization in education increases corruption by giving more actors the opportunity to misuse funds. Their conclusion was the formula funding reduces the potential for corruption by increasing transparency as to what amount each school should receive and by reducing the opportunities for large scale fraud by the few. The potential for fraud is further reduced through clear financial regulations, local monitoring of school accounts, and external audit of school accounts.

Management, including Management of Teaching and Teacher Training

Studies of El Salvador's EDUCO program and Nicaragua's autonomous schools program have received considerable attention because they carefully followed control and experimental schools and carried out surveys of schools and families as well as administered academic achievement tests.¹⁶ In El Salvador, community-managed (EDUCO) schools achieved similar academic results to traditional public schools, although they served poorer students and had fewer resources. Also, teacher absenteeism was found to be lower in the community-managed schools. These results were attributable in part to the high level of participation by parents in the EDUCO schools, close monitoring of the school by the community and the strong incentives to EDUCO teachers to perform well or face not being re-contracted by the community.

The evaluation of Nicaragua's autonomous schools finds that autonomous schools make significantly more schooling decisions than do traditional schools, especially on personnel matters and in determining the school plan and budget. However, even the autonomous schools seldom make teacher training decisions. Another key finding of the evaluation is that the degree of decision-making actually exercised by autonomous schools varies greatly, and there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of decision-making exercised and student achievement. Furthermore, the strongest positive relationship to learning was found for variables measuring decision-making on teacher staffing and monitoring of teacher activities.

An assessment of the promise of alternative, community-centered modes of delivery by DeStefano, Schuh Moore, Balwanz, and Harwell (2006) provides unusual evidence by using test score gains in some nine programs, where comparisons against standard public schools are possible, to show the impact of both improved governance and pedagogical management. Improvements of some 30 percentage points over standard public schools are shown. The authors take care in explaining how it is the combination of strong governance *and* a well-managed pedagogical response that has led to improved results.

Similar evidence can be found from the DDSP project in South Africa. Above, in section 4.1.2, it was noted that though South Africa has innovated considerably in governance and finance, the managerial response, particularly in terms of pedagogical management and quality control, has been weaker. A paper by Schollar (2006) notes that a tight integration of assessment, analysis of learner weaknesses, supply of supplementary materials such as item banks and workbooks, and a demand for accountability, all in the context of an improved

¹⁶ See King and Ozler (2000) on Nicaragua and Jimenez and Sawada (1999) on El Salvador.

model of school governance, could lead to an improvement in learner achievement of some 30%. The DDSP project had started out by working only or mostly on school governance and curricular support, but without strict accountability and specific results-oriented teacher support. The introduction of accountability and support to teachers specifically oriented at improving learner performance was an important missing ingredient which, when introduced, appear to have led to the learning gains.

A rather interesting case is that of Uruguay in the last decade or so, because it is one of the few country-wide experiences with fairly quickly improved learning results in recent history, and because the reforms or programs credited for these improvements focus almost entirely on pedagogical management and not much on governance. Using a combination of careful measurement and testing, teacher involvement in understanding the results of the measurement, cluster-based and highly intensive teacher training and mutual support spread out over a whole year, incentive pay for participation in the training, targeting schools based on poverty rather than results, and focusing much of the teacher support on items which analysis shows are weak in the learning results, Uruguay seems to have improved learning results in certain grades by about 30% in a period of about 6 years (see Ravela 2006).

Regulation and Inspection

Another body of evidence assesses the quality and frequency of school inspection. Here De Grauwe (2001) analyzed school supervision/inspection in four African countries—Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe—and found little clarity about the norms that should inform and guide the supervisors' work. In general, less than a quarter of inspectors' time is spent in school visits; most their time is spent on routine administrative tasks. In Tanzania, an inspector visited only three schools per year. In Zimbabwe there is an unwritten norm that teachers should be inspected three times per year; in reality the average teacher in urban areas is visited once every three years. This study reinforces the findings from at least two of the country case studies noted above, about the importance of pedagogical management, support, and quality control.

Participation at the School Level

A number of studies document the important role that parental participation and parent organizations can play in improving governance. In a study of sixth and seventh graders in Argentina, Eskeland and Filmer (2007) find that principal components of measures of school autonomy and parental participation are positively related to student learning.

The need for central administrations to support school-community partnerships cuts across rich and poor countries. Honig (2003) examined the challenge of changing central administration's top-down culture to one that supports collaboration between schools and their communities in Oakland, California.

Information

Information can help improve governance. Research in some countries shows that parents tend to be quite happy with the provision of education at their children's schools, even when, objectively and based on professional opinion, such education is quite poor. Worse, there is often a low correlation between parental satisfaction and measurable school performance (see Abadzi et. al. 2005). In a sense, if one considers the provision of quality education as a right,

parents have no clear idea when their rights are being violated. If access is a right, the violation of a right to access is easily visible; not so, evidently, with quality. In this context information, and especially information that is either comparative amongst schools, or comparative against standard, is key. As discussed in Text Box 2, Uganda provides evidence that simple changes in policy can dramatically reduce the leakage of funding for public education. As documented by Reinikka and Svensson (2004), central government capitation grants to schools experienced very high leakage rates—87%--in the early 1990s. After carrying out a Public Expenditure Tracking Study (PETS) that documented this leakage, the government undertook a newspaper campaign to inform citizens what their schools should be receiving, resulting in a reduction of the leakage rate to less than 20%. As reported by Winkler and Sondergaard (2007), subsequent PETS have found continued reductions in the leakage rate over time.

Text Box 2. Uganda PETS

Schools in Uganda receive funding for nonsalary education expenses on a per-pupil basis through capitation grants, which are transferred by the central government to local governments for administration and distribution to schools. A World Bank Public Expenditure Tracking Study (PETS) in 1995 showed that schools were only receiving approximately 20 percent of the grant funds, with the other 80 percent being lost to “leakage.” This may have been due to monies being diverted for other sectors, used for political activities in lieu of education development, or stolen. To increase accountability and reduce misuse of funds, Uganda took steps to raise awareness about the “leakage” and give voice to parents and schools. A two-pronged approach to education finance information was adopted in Uganda. Schools were instructed to post in public spaces detailed information about the funds received from the local government. In addition, information about grant transfers from central government to local governments, including the date and amount, was published in several newspapers, including some periodicals in local languages. In addition to this information dissemination, the government took a firm stand on disciplining education officers found to be misappropriating school funds.

The result of this campaign is encouraging. Schools now have the information needed to hold local governments accountable to turn over all entitled grant money and, at the same time, parents are now able to monitor school finances to ensure that school grants are being used to improve learning opportunities. The pressure that schools and parents have exerted has led to increased accountability and better financial management: a 2001 PETS study found that, on average, schools were receiving 80 percent of their entitlement. Research and analysis shows that the use of newspapers had a significant impact on school directors’ knowledge about the grants program and that a strong relationship exists between schools’ proximity to newspaper outlets and a decrease in leakage.

For more information, visit <http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=34028>.

As reported by Karim (2004) Transparency International conducted a report card survey of primary schools in Bangladesh to identify the nature and level of corruption in the appointment of teachers; in the district education offices; in the admission of students in primary schools; and in the food for education program. The results of the survey have been used in public advocacy to curb corruption and improve governance.

As discussed in Text Box 3, another experiment with report cards in Parana, Brazil, aimed to disseminate performance information to schools and parents while simultaneously giving them opportunities to engage in education policy discussion, including creation of a state-level education advisory board comprised of the representatives of PTAs.

Text Box 3. School Report Cards, Paraná, Brazil

School report cards, as established in Parana State in 2001, are a simple, effective management tool for accountability, transparency and constituency building. They were designed with the objective of getting clients (parents) to demand quality from service providers (schools). The annual school report cards measured school quality through six sets of indicators:

1. School-level student achievement: test results for grade 4 and 8 compared to averages for municipality and state.
2. School characteristics: teachers with tertiary education, pupil enrollment and average class size.
3. Student socio-economic background
4. Principal's style: evaluated through self-statements
5. Parents' perceptions about school organization and quality collected through a parents' survey

Parent surveys were administered in information meetings. In the first year, only 53,000 parents attended the meetings. School report cards were not aimed at reaching a representative sample, but to motivate parents to get involved and voice their concerns. To avoid misleading the readers, the report cards always disclosed the number of parents' responses obtained. In year two, the number of parents attending the meetings increased by 50 percent. Principals were also given an opportunity to express their views.

Continuous and intense dissemination to stakeholders must follow reported results, and it must be designed in a way that parents, teachers, principals and the general public can actually use that information. One way to do this is by using simple language, easy-to-read tables or graphs, and vignettes from parents, teachers and principals. It is also important to present a frame of reference for the public to understand what the results mean. The 2002 Parana School Report Cards showed the results for a given school in comparison to other schools in the area with the same socioeconomic characteristics, indicating whether the school's results are higher or lower than expected given the student socioeconomic profile. To increase even further the accessibility of school report cards, a vision statement for education in Parana was advertised broadly: "*Parana wants all children in school, learning, and completing 11 grades in 11 years*".

Finally, though not a panacea, periodic school report cards are a tool for administrators *and* stakeholders to track improvement over time and know whether schools are improving. School report cards do not have to be annual, but must be done on a regular basis.

One of the major challenges for accountability tools such as report cards is continuity. Thus, sound mechanisms are needed for sustaining these initiatives despite changes in administration.

Source: Alcyone Vasconcelos Saliba (alcyone.v@terra.com.br), presentation at the International Conference on *Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization*. World Bank, Washington, D.C., 18-19 February 2004.

A promising area on information-for-accountability is to tap the potential of EMIS systems. Donors and countries have invested a great deal in EMIS systems, but these are hardly ever truly used for either management or governance, and thus are in a sense a wasted potential. Crouch (1997) maintains that unless EMIS functions are incorporated into real accountability functions, and are used to settle issues that matter, EMIS will continue to be under-utilized. A novel idea for using EMIS for accountability purposes is provided in Text Box 4.

Text Box 4. Decentralized Information in Kano, Nigeria

Kano State, Nigeria, is undergoing a transformation of its education management information system—from one that serves very few people and very few purposes to one designed to meet the needs of all stakeholders and go beyond merely counting students and teachers.

A new collection tool and a data management system were created after soliciting input from stakeholders state-wide, including central planners and managers; local education officers; PTA and teachers union members; and members of the legislature, the governor's office, testing authorities, and the Ministry of Finance. In addition to capturing information relevant to all stakeholders, the new information system also generates multidimensional reports targeting different issues and different users, as designed by the end-users themselves. For example, state personnel managers can easily review information about the number of teachers eligible for promotion and the subject areas with the greatest need for teachers, both of which inform recruiting. At the same time, school communities receive a school report card that shows basic information about their school and presents key indicators in graphic form for the school, the local government area, and the state. As new information needs emerge, the information system will be revised to capture the necessary information and generate useful information products.

While some users can access the information system via the Internet, the majority relies on paper-based reports. In addition to disseminating these on an agreed-upon schedule, education information is shared with the general public via radio shows that not only discuss the measures and implications of various indicators, but also inform stakeholders about the availability of information from the EMIS.

In addition to increasing the number of users by making information more relevant and accessible, the uses of information have increased in Kano. No longer just for supporting decision-making, such as planning the number of books to purchase, information is now being used by stakeholders to ensure transparency in system management, create accountability from provider to client and from central to local government, and obtain a baseline measure on the basis of which system goals and standards will be developed. Information can be presented to stakeholders to compare schools' allocations to each other as a way to demand accountability for the fairness of allocations.

Sources: Personal Communication, Alastair Rodd, 14 August 2007, Destefano and Crouch (2006).

5. Analyzing Governance and Management


Indicators. The analysis of governance in education requires first of all measures that indicate the magnitude of the problem. There has been some success in the development of overall indicators of governance, such as those reported by Transparency International and the World Bank.¹⁷ However, similar indicators for education are still in their infancy.

Perhaps the most promising of indicators developed to date are those coming out of the World Bank's work on public expenditure tracking (PETS). Public expenditure tracking studies in several countries have documented the magnitude of leakages and delays in financial transfers to schools. Reinikka and Smith (2004) summarize the findings of PETS for primary education carried out in Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Peru, and Zambia. The leakage of non-wage funds is a significant problem in many countries, reaching as high as 57 percent in Tanzania and 76 percent in Zambia for discretionary transfers. In addition, a recent study of Papua New Guinea finds the leakage of school subsidies ranges between 16 and 29 percent,

¹⁷ For example, see the World Bank and Transparency International websites: <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance> and <http://www.transparency.org/>

and on average it took three months for funding to reach the schools from the central government.

Figure 3. Rates of Teacher Absenteeism




Source: Winkler (2005)

Complementing PETS are surveys that attempt to document teacher absenteeism, as seen in the graph above¹⁸. Here, too, the World Bank has developed a standardized survey instrument to measure teacher absenteeism. In some countries—e.g., Uganda—this instrument has been applied repeatedly to monitor changes in teacher absenteeism over time. This survey also provides a picture of how teachers who are present in the school spend their time. Accurate information on teacher absenteeism has to be collected via special surveys; administrative data almost always show there to be no problem, indicating possible collusion between the teacher and the headmaster reporting the information. As shown in the figure below, while teacher absences from schools is a significant problem in Uganda, an even more serious problem is the low proportion of teachers who are present in the school but absent from the classroom.

¹⁸ See Chaudhury et.al. (2005) for a detailed review of absenteeism of education and health workers.

Figure 4. Uganda: Where Teachers are at Time of Enumerator's Visit



Source: Winkler and Sondergaard (2007).

Checklists. Good governance has a number of requirements.¹⁹ Some effort has been made to systematize and translate these requirements into checklists, which can then be used to assess the extent to which good governance is likely to be present.²⁰ However, very little has been done to develop education-specific checklists. Winkler (2004) has developed a checklist for education accountability, given in Annex 1 of this paper. An additional checklist, developed by one of the authors of this paper as background thinking for the CPIA assessment system used by IDA, and which can be used to assess governance and management issues, is presented in Annex 2 of this paper.²¹

Tools and Surveys. As with checklists, there exist numerous surveys constructed mainly by the World Bank to capture various dimensions of good governance. These surveys include Public Officials Surveys that analyze the incentives faced by civil servants; Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Surveys that seek the views of households, private firms, and public officials on the extent and causes of corruption; and Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) that identify the share of budget disbursements that reach intended beneficiaries. Of these surveys, only the PETS have been used in the education sector. USAID's EdData II project is experimenting with standardized surveys using a simple Snapshot of School Management Effectiveness (SSME), which can be used by countries or donor organizations to assess school management effectiveness using a relatively fast approach on a limited sample of schools.²²

¹⁹ For example, see the recent DfID White Paper (DFiD 2006).

²⁰ Much of this work has focused on anti-corruption strategies, e.g., the World Bank's *Checklist of Anti-Corruption Measures* <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR>.

²¹ CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. IDA: International Development Association, a branch of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For the actual criteria which eventually emerged and which are used in country prioritization, see <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/CPIA06CriteriaA2.pdf>, accessed on 14 August 2007.

²² See EdData II website, specifically on the SSME, <http://www.eddataglobal.org/documents/index.cfm?fuseaction=showdir&ruid=2&statusID=3>.

6. Conclusions

This paper has argued that the outstanding education issues for the next few decades focus on quality and equity of quality. These issues may require governance, management, and finance approaches that vary from those traditionally used in the past to generate mass coverage by emphasizing issues such as decentralization, accountability, citizen ability to use information to demand fairness of allocations and a results-based orientation to education. The paper has warned, however, that reformism only in areas of governance and finance, and that neglect the management side, in particular the management of pedagogical issues, are unlikely to show much-improved results in terms of learning achievement.

Areas for further work include the following.

First, by now there are sufficient cases of countries and districts where good assessment systems have been operational for some years. What can be learned, in terms of governance and management structures, for what has worked in whole countries, but particularly innovative districts that have boosted quality or equity-of-learning to a significant degree? What has really been the balance of governance as opposed to managerial initiatives and innovation? Is it just as counter-productive when lack of governance and accountability constrain the demand side of management initiatives (e.g., when managerial or teacher training is not taken up because there is no pressure on utilization of what has been learned?), or when lack of appropriate management constrains the supply side (e.g., there is accountability pressure but no practical knowledge of how to respond)?

Second, taking a longer view, what did countries that progressed a good deal in terms of average achievement in the last few decades focus on—raising the average, or making sure that the left tail of the learning distribution received special attention?

Third, what innovative financing mechanisms have been characteristic of the more successful cases?

In this paper we have presented some empirical evidence about some successful and some not so successful cases, but this has not been based on a serious and systematic search of every single case of national or sub-national success. It might be time to undertake such a search in depth and systematically and then extract the lessons learned. The search could include special projects, but the more interesting lessons will be provided when a whole system improves.

A useful area of research would also be the development, by international bodies in education, of simpler, powerful, standardized survey checklists and facilities surveys, so as to enable countries (and donors desiring to assist countries) to take in-depth but relatively quick and inexpensive snapshots of governance and management constraints in the education sectors of countries. The Annexes include sketches of such possibilities, but these sketches are not legitimated by international bodies, nor have they yet been widely tested. The developing of such protocols could include minimum effective sample size suggestions, taking into account clustering designs. In this, there may be lessons to be learnt from the health sector.

Annex 1. Checklist: Accountability in Public Education²³

Elements of Accountability: Client Voice

Question	Answer Y/N	Comments
Is the quality of education an important issue in local or national political campaigns?		
Does each school have an elected school management committee [SMC] or school council that includes parents and other community members?		
Do SMCs play an important role in formulating the school budget or setting school fees?		
Do SMCs play an important role in selecting the headmaster or school principal?		
Is there a regional or national association of SMCs or PTAs?		
Is the national association of SMCs or PTAs active in advocating education reform?		
Do parents know how to and whom to express their complaints about the school?		
If a parent wanted to complain about the frequent absence of teachers or headmasters, would she/he receive a response from the responsible policy-maker within two weeks?		
Does the SMC hold open, public meetings more than once per year?		
Does the percentage of parents attending open SMC open meetings exceed 50%?		
Do parents contribute financially or in kind to the school—SMC, PTA?		
Client Voice--Percent “yes” responses:		

Elements of Accountability: System Management

Question	Answer Y/N	Comments
Are there fewer than three layers of bureaucracy in the chain of command between the policy-maker and the school?		
Does the SMC have a say in who is selected as director or headmaster of the school?		
Is the ratio of schools to inspectors less than fifty?		

²³ Winkler (2004). *Strengthening Accountability in Public Education*. http://www.equip123.net/equip2/index_new.html

Do inspectors visit each three or more times per year on average?		
Do inspectors personally observe teaching performance [versus simply reviewing records in the headmaster's office]?		
Do headmasters and/or inspectors prepare written evaluations of teachers each year?		
Do SMCs and/or headmasters submit evaluations of inspectors to their [the inspectors'] supervisor as part of the inspector's annual performance evaluation?		
Do parents participate in preparing the school's development or improvement plan?		
Do parents contribute their time in the school [e.g., cooking or cleaning] or classroom [e.g., work as teachers aides]		
System Management--Percent "yes" responses:		

Elements of Accountability: Good Information

Question	Answer Y/N	Comments
Do parents receive an annual report on the financial and academic performance of their school?		
Is the budget of the school posted in a visible place in the school for all parents to see?		
Does the school inspector assess the quality of schooling and make recommendations for its improvement?		
Is the school inspector's report of each school visit posted in a public place for parents to see?		
Do parents know how well their school performs academically compared to other schools in the area or in the country?		
Do parents know how often teachers are absent from the classroom in their school?		
Do parents know the national standards concerning class size, teacher qualifications, and student achievement levels?		
Do teachers and parents know how well their school meets national standards?		
Is there a national assessment system – standardized exams, school leaving exams, etc. – which provides information on each school's academic performance on an annual basis?		
Good Information--Percent "yes" responses:		

Elements of Accountability: Clarity of Roles

Question	Answer Y/N	Comments
Are there unique assignments of government responsibilities for particular education functions?		
Can the school director or SMC recruit and select their own government-financed teachers?		
Can the school director or SMC recruit and select their own locally-financed teachers?		
Do different levels of government (e.g. national education ministry vs. regional education ministry) usually agree about who should make particular decisions?		
Are the roles and responsibilities of SMCs set out clearly in laws and regulations?		
Does the SMC or school director have enough control over the use of the school's budget and resources that they could be held accountable for poor performance?		
Can school select the textbooks which they wish to use [versus the education ministry mandating the use of certain texts]?		
Can schools [headmasters or SMCs] veto the transfer of teachers when a suitable substitute is not available?		
Clarity of Roles--Percent "yes" responses:		

Elements of Accountability: Incentives & Consequences

Question	Answer Y/N	Comments
If a school performs especially poorly in teaching children, are there any negative consequences for the school director?		
If a particular teacher performs especially poorly in teaching children, are there any negative consequences for the teacher?		
If a school performs especially well given its circumstances, is there any reward for the school or its teachers?		
If the school director and/or SMC misappropriate school monies, are they likely to be caught?		
If a teacher is frequently absent from the classroom, is the teacher likely to be fired or otherwise punished?		
Strong incentives--Percent "yes" responses:		

Annex 2. Checklist: High-level governance issues applied to hypothetical country

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
Policy and legal framework	
<p>There is a clear and complete hierarchy starting with state policy (e.g., White Papers), laws, and regulations, norms and standards.</p>	<p>There is a clear hierarchy between law and regulation, and many of the regulations are well-documented. There is a private response in the reproduction of norms, as kiosks outside many district offices sell key regulations that school directors and others can purchase. However, the regulation is extremely detailed, confusing, and often contradictory. Most importantly, there is no clear state policy on many issues. The high-order laws actually take the place of state policy documents. But because laws cannot be as detailed or explain justification as well as, say, White Papers can, there are really no clear state policy documents.</p>
<p>Policies and laws were thoroughly debated and consulted with legitimating bodies in civil society and the legislative branch. Public opinion was systematically sought, catalogued, considered, and thorough responses were made.</p>	<p>There is a tendency to craft law via consultants rather than through the state itself. However, consultants seem highly experienced, are often ex-Ministers, and can constitute a fairly effective source of state-like advice. This is not quite as appropriate as a state-led policy of legal crafting, since the process is often quite directed by the consultant teams. Laws and policies appear to be somewhat under-consulted and such consultation appears somewhat unsystematic.</p>
<p>Laws and norms are available to the public on the World-Wide Web in a well-organized manner, and in public venues such as public libraries and bookstores in hard copy.</p>	<p>The Ministry's Web page has many of the key regulations. However, it is not as complete as it could be. Many norms are reasonably well disseminated by entrepreneurs who publish them, and other entrepreneurs that sell them outside district offices.</p>
<p>Policies and laws, and above all norms, were checked with educators, legal experts, and economists, national and if possible international, for viability and cost-benefit.</p>	<p>Technical opinion seems to be widely sought and international best practice is understood and taken into account. However, the final legislation has tended to be slower than that of other countries in allowing important innovations, largely because of the difficulty in overcoming political-economic obstacles, and difficulties in generating consensus, more than because of the lack of good technical input.</p>
<p>Legislation and norms propose standards that are reasonably implementable.</p>	<p>In many areas, such as finance and learning outcomes, there are few or no useful standards. On the other hand, in administrative processes, there are many standards but they are cumbersome and difficult to apply, e.g., in budgeting, in dismissing staff who behave improperly or illegally, and in other aspects.</p>
<p>Capacity to enforce implementation exists.</p>	<p>In most areas, no. Selective enforcement for political or personal purposes is reportedly common. Supportive enforcement and guidance are rare.</p>
<p>Legislation for norming functioning of private sector is neither unduly restrictive nor lenient.</p>	<p>Legislation is appropriate. (See below on funding, however.)</p>
<p>Legislation and regulation give explicit attention to gender, ethnic, and income equity.</p>	<p>No. Most regulation mentions these issues, but there are few numerical standards, e.g., in compensatory financing.</p>
<p>Legislation and regulation, above all on decentralization or function assignment, imply powers and duties that are a) specific, b) mutually exclusive or if not explain a clear precedence, c) refer to</p>	<p>Generally, no. Many duties and powers are overlapping or conflicting and there is no indication of whose policies and regulations have precedence. Many duties are assigned vaguely to levels of government rather than to specific actors. Key technical issues, such as spillovers</p>

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
specific actors rather than institutions. Function assignment has been carried out via specific technical analysis regarding efficiency and spillovers, economies of scale, informational asymmetry issues and local participation, and equity.	between governance units (e.g., in teacher training), appear to be under-considered.
Difficult problems in policy have not been left up to regulation but are handled, to the degree reasonable, in the law itself. Regulation truly focuses on practical and implementation issues.	As noted above, there is a lack of state policy embodied in well-consulted documents such as White Papers, which take on difficult issues. This is due to a basic political incapacity to conduct policy processes and come to agreement, or suspend disagreement, on basic issues. As a result, many important issues are not tackled in law, but are left to regulation, or are left vague. Examples include, currently, the financial and economic attributes of school governing bodies, their capacity to influence teacher and principal choice and evaluation, etc.
The legislative power has regular access to technical support and opinion on education design and implementation issues independently of having to call upon the executive body.	On a casual and/or case-specific basis, yes. On a systematic basis, no. There is anecdotal evidence of very poor law-crafting, e.g., borrowing legislation from other countries with few relevant changes. This is partly caused by lack of access to good legal drafting teams, and partly due to lack of seriousness with regard to legislation.
Development programs are part of the management and policy of the Ministry, not donor-driven add-ons. Donors buy into existing development programs and projects. Donors trust the ministry's plans and willingly buy into existing plans and execution systems.	Largely not the case.
Expenditure and finance	
Expenditure is more than 5% of GDP but less than 10% of GDP.	No. Expenditure is well under 5% of GDP.
Public expenditure is systemically pro-poor, as opposed to having special poverty programs. Poverty-fighting is part of the normal spending, both current and capital.	No. There is no formal pro-poor spending. There is some allocation that is incidentally pro-poor in that, for example, teacher-pupil ratios may be lower in very small schools, which typically cater to the poor. But this is not part of a pro-poor policy. There are special programs that are pro-poor, e.g., programs oriented at rural education.
The roles of public and private expenditure have been carefully analyzed and thought through, and policy responds to a clear vision of shared funding and implementation. Private expenditure is well-normed to maximize self-help and minimize inequities. Public expenditure is programmed to compensate for lack of private ability. Private expenditure on schools is well regulated and monitored. Private expenditure, as a proportion of total cost, is higher the higher the school system level.	Largely no. There is no clear, explicit, sector-wide funding approach that takes all of the relevant issues into account in a coherent system of finance sensitive to public-private issues and capacity, by level of the system.
The funding system allows for the funding of private schools according to explicit and transparent formulae that reward quality and efficiency.	No. Funding for private schools is relatively ad-hoc in terms of who is funded, and how. Much of resource transfer is physical provisioning (e.g, placement of teachers) rather than funding.
Teacher salaries are no more than 65% of total (capital and current) cost. Total	Insufficient data on teacher salaries. Total salary costs are unacceptably high and trending in the wrong direction.

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
salaries are no more than 75% of total (capital and current) expenditure.	
There are few salary payment arrears. There are never systemic arrears, occasional individual or sub-regional arrears.	There appear to be relatively few problems in this area.
Salaries and payroll are well-controlled. There appear to be few ghost teachers or students. The payroll system is unique (relative to basic decentralization legislation), fully computerized, and linked or linkable to human resource management systems.	There has been great progress in this area in recent times. A unique payroll system is being finalized. There are still problems with unauthorized and unbudgeted appointments in decentralized units (district offices and executing agencies). Payroll does not link to human resource management systems, e.g., promotion and evaluation systems. (Partly because the latter are almost non-existent.)
Teacher pay is appropriate and well-researched. It is a multiple of GDP somewhere between 2 and 4, depending on level of development. It is set high enough to attract a profile of teachers that is based on a clear consensus of the types of teacher that are desired, and a thorough study of the labor market.	Largely no. There have been few recent studies of teacher pay relative to the labor market, and policy so far is not based on a thorough understanding of these issues. There is a promising process of drafting of a new Teacher's Career Structure, but the specifics are thus far insufficiently linked to an understanding of how the overall labor market works.
There is a fiscal decentralization based on transparent, clear, simple formulae that create appropriate incentives, that allow sub-national units to choose among sectors or inputs, and that force sub-national units to face tradeoffs and make decisions. Expenditure is audited and results are known quickly.	Largely no. Fiscal transfer systems and approaches are under-designed. On the other hand, fiscal control systems are greatly improved in recent years, through the State Financial Information and Accountability System. However, this system does not allow tracking down to school level, and there are no systems that allow this.
There has been, within the last 5 years, an analysis of the efficiency of public expenditure, with regard to duplication, waste, expenditure efficiency, etc. These results have been taken into account in policy and program design.	Yes. The World Bank itself, and many in-country organizations, have done such studies. And generally they have been taken into account. For example, there are serious efforts to improve payroll management, and to rationalize teacher deployment.
School efficiency, with regards to output/cost ratios, and in particular in a value-added sense, is known and used as a management and policy tool.	No such studies have been systematically performed or used to influence policy and management.
Personnel management	
There are job descriptions of key jobs in the sector at school and administrative levels. They contain an adequate level of specificity.	Unclear.
All key jobs are filled via competitive selection including objective criteria.	No, but things are moving very positively in this direction with regards to key administrative posts and eventually teaching posts.
High-level managers have performance contracts.	No.
Periodic performance reviews exist, are effective, and are keyed to job descriptions.	No real system of performance review exists. Good proposals exist and are in draft legislation. Teacher surveys welcome job reviews.
Salaries are tied to performance review in an adequate manner, well-researched and justified.	No. Salaries are among the flattest in the world, and are not tied to any observable behavior or even degrees and studies. Teacher surveys welcome tying salaries to productivity.
Parents and school directors have influence over salary and career	No. However, draft regulation gives parents and directors considerable say.

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
<p>progression of teachers.</p> <p>There is a policy for rationalization of posts. Processes for deployment and re-deployment are clear, fair, and consistently applied. There is minimal if any corruption and influence peddling in deployment and re-deployment. Policy balances individual and community preferences with state priorities.</p>	<p>Policy is unclear, and inconsistently applied. Reports of corruption in redeployment are very common.</p>
General administration	
<p>Ministers change, in general, only with changes in government. Changes in personnel in the executive branch with new ministers reach only the first two levels below the Minister.</p>	<p>Ministerial tenure has tended to be very short for years (eight months on average). Changes often reach more than one or two levels below the Minister.</p>
<p>The government keeps measurement of standards of achievement and efficiency (achievement/cost) and value-added (output relative to clientele) in general annually, and at school level periodically if not annually.</p>	<p>Learning is tracked via periodic surveys. No census-type measurement exists. No school-level comparative data on performance over cost, or performance relative to schools with similar clientele exists.</p>
<p>There is a clear vision, well-based on research, on what a well-functioning school package consists of, appropriate to various communities if the country is heterogeneous. This vision of a well-functioning school and input package is embodied in standards, input supplies, and informs pedagogical support systems.</p>	<p>No. There is no effective packaging of effective sets of inputs into effective schools that are known to work, or packages available for specific clienteles. In particular there is no widespread adoption or use-to-standard of effective models of bilingual education for clientele groups whose first language is not the dominant language.</p>
<p>District-level officials visit schools and provide effective pedagogical support on a frequent basis. There is no lack of fuel and transport for deployment as district level personnel expenditure is rationalized. District official visits emphasize pedagogical aspects.</p>	<p>There are no standards of support and most support is not of a pedagogical nature. Most school principals of teachers do not rely on district offices for systematic pedagogical or management advice. Principals seem to visit district offices mostly to get district offices to clarify bureaucratic procedures generated by the offices themselves or the Ministry.</p>
<p>District officials visit mostly schools that are not doing as well as expected according to goals and standards, and leave well-performing schools alone. The results of visits are reported and follow-up takes place.</p>	<p>No.</p>
<p>Systems are optimized so as to minimize bureaucratic paperwork for school principals and to allow them to become pedagogical leaders. School principals have freedom to assign resources with low paper work cost and can manage at least petty cash. They can purchase basic inputs in the free market even with state resources, in a framework of audits and using good procurement processes.</p>	<p>No. Directors are mostly seen by their own teachers as the interface between district bureaucracy and the school. Directors are not able to devote time to pedagogical leadership. In schools where a sub-Director is budgeted (due to size) the sub-Director takes pedagogical leadership. Teachers in general do not look to Directors for pedagogical leadership.</p>
<p>Educational statistics are reported in at least 98% of schools, with less than 12 months arrears, and are easily available to the public.</p>	<p>Largely yes. There seems to be considerable progress with information systems in recent years. Web site contains considerable data resources, including typical EMIS data as well as very detailed school performance data (albeit with scrambled school identifiers in the latter case).</p>

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
School materials distribution is agile. In 98% of schools materials arrive within 2 weeks of school starting date. Most children have textbooks at least in the key areas.	No and yes. Materials seem to arrive one and a half months after the start of the school year in significant numbers of schools. On the other hand, textbook provision in the key subject areas is widespread.
Textbooks are evaluated continuously and systematically with regards to utility and convenience. There is a continuous process of textbook analysis, not an occasional one.	Textbook system seems to work fairly well. (More data needed.)
School construction and addition plans are made on the basis of solid population trends and analysis, rather than reactive. Schools are analyzed for small size, and rationalization takes place if necessary. There is a stock of plans ready to be used for investment.	Unclear. Needs to be analyzed further. Many schools seem sub-optimally small and there is unnecessary distrust of small, multi-grade, teaching models that may be optimal in de-populated areas or areas that are very sparsely populated.
Learner assessment	
There are clear learning standards linked to the curriculum. The curriculum contains indications regarding how to measure competencies and skills. Indicators focus on the most important skills.	No. The curriculum is under-specified under the assumption that it can be specified at school level because of cultural and regional heterogeneity. But there are few guidelines. This makes it difficult to develop knowledge assessment approaches.
The curriculum is implementable and not overloaded.	The curriculum does not seem as overloaded as in many other countries, and appears reasonably rationalized.
There is universal measurement of basic skills in particular in the early grades. There are batteries of assessment systems and approaches that can be used both occasionally to formulate policy, and continuously for managing and supporting schools. There are item banks and other approaches teachers can use, that are linked to occasional accountability testing.	There is sample-based testing. There is little support to schools or district offices on how to measure and access achievement.
Measurement is used effectively as a way to provide feedback to schools on their weaknesses on a school-specific basis.	No, because assessment is not universal.
There are exit exams at least from the secondary level.	No.
The country participates regularly in international assessments and these results are distributed calmly and professionally. The press are educated.	The country has participated in two international assessments, PISA and a regional assessment. PISA seems to have generated considerable controversy. The handling and reaction was not as professional and calm as it could have been.
Exam results are known at the school level, available in the media, etc. Reporting takes place for the levels and administrative units that have capacity to respond (school, municipality, etc.)	No.
Teacher professionalism and management	
Teacher pay is similar to that of other professionals with similar education quality. Pay is somewhere between 2 and 4 times GDP per capita.	No. Salaries seem a little low.

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
Teaching as a profession is chosen by at least the median high-school student. Points on entrance tests to university for teaching areas are monitored and are not much lower than the average in other areas.	These data are not frequently monitored, but teacher training students are some of the worst in the country.
Teacher attendance at school is well-managed.	No, though attendance problems are not nearly as worrying as in other countries.
There is a well-articulated teacher career that takes into account pre-service training, status and rewards, in-service training, productivity incentives, and professional development, and has been developed in consultation with teachers and teacher organizations.	No, but there are very promising trends in the draft of a new teacher law that promises to institute many changes in this direction.
Teacher organizations are oriented towards professionalism and collegiation rather than towards traditional industrial and bread-and-butter concerns.	No. Teacher organizations in seem almost exclusively concerned with salaries, and seem little concerned with professional issues. Teacher unionism is extremely partisan and tied to political party struggles.
Policies and methods to attract and retain teachers are clear and effective.	No. Teaching is very much an occupation of last resource for many youth.
There are effective methods for supporting teachers with continuous training that specify specific pedagogical skills. There is effective feedback between measurement and teacher support systems.	No. There is some teacher training, and it has improved, but it has tended to be donor-driven, lacks in quality, and still is focused largely on mass training rather than supporting specific skills on a measured and individualized basis.
Pre-service training is based on the curriculum and on measured deficiencies in current teaching. Training emphasizes practical issues related to effective pedagogy and classroom management, including practical evaluation techniques. Teacher training programs are evaluated on the basis of results produced by teachers and are otherwise accredited.	There is little of practical value in pre-service training. The training appears relatively unconnected with the curriculum. Principals complain that teachers have to be taught most practical skills at the school.
Teacher training institutions function according to quality control methods based on results and evaluation of graduate teachers. Where there is university autonomy, other methods are used to ensure that university teaching is relevant to the curriculum and practical school needs.	There are useful proposals in this area but thus far no concrete evaluation systems to evaluate teacher training programs. There are very large numbers of extremely poor teacher training institutes.
Teachers receive training on the management of time and the school day, classroom organization, the use of varied pedagogical techniques, training on specific pedagogical packages, the identification of children with special needs, particularly for specific clientele such as children who do not speak the dominant languages.	Training generally emphasizes theory, though some improvement in in-service teacher training has taken place.
School principals understand that the best teachers should be in grades 1 or 2. This policy is effective and enforced.	No.
Teacher reallocation happens largely at the beginning of the school year. At	Unknown.

Ideal situation	Description of situation in hypothetical country
<p>most 2% of teacher reassignments take place during the school year.</p>	
<p>Teacher leave is managed so as to minimize turnover in classrooms. Most teacher training takes place during off hours or vacation time for teachers. Minimal classroom time is lost to training.</p>	<p>Unclear.</p>

Box 6: Decentralization and Accountability for District Service Delivery in Madagascar

Though Madagascar's ethnic diversity makes it a good candidate for decentralization, there has been limited decentralization to the district level, as the central government earmarks funds for health and education. Not only are the allocated funds earmarked, but the aggregate amount of those funds is small and the reporting requirements are large. In addition to limited decentralization, there has been devolution of social sector ministries to the district level. In education, 31 percent of recurrent expenditure is centralized, 56 percent is spent by provinces, and 13 percent by districts. Yet the study discovered that district-level ministries have limited authority and complain that mayors are not releasing earmarked funds. Further, civil society groups are deferential to elected officials. Therefore, the lines for accountability between civil society, sectoral ministries and elected officials are weak.

In assessing the most appropriate targeting scheme, the study finds a correlation between distance from the central governing authority and quality of service delivery. More remote facilities receive less supervision and fewer resources, have heavier workloads, and rely more on community participation. Also, they are more likely to be understaffed and to have a higher percentage of staff who are either voluntary or paid by the community.

The study found that facility staff spend much time away from their posts every month to attend meetings, collect paychecks, pick up supplies, etc. Education staff also face weak incentives for innovation, discretionary decision-making, and outcomes-based management, since they are noticed in cases of errors, problems, or complaints. There is no independent monitoring of education services. Although, district facility education staff face strong pressures for upward accountability to the sectoral bureaucracies, civil service personnel management system offers little support to accountability. The use of performance output indicators as accountability tools is weak and chaotic.

The current governance setting impedes increased local accountability, due to its endemic corruption, lack of transparency, few and weak Civil Service Organizations, low citizen expectations, and centralized control. The establishment of effective accountability mechanisms will be a long-term process requiring new incentives, civic education, pilot programs, and capacity-building. Capacity for demand-driven accountability is weak, for there is insufficient education staff, and people are unlikely to press for removal or transfer if they cannot get a replacement. Moreover, local people tend to focus only on physical facilities, and not look at outcomes, lacking criteria to assess service quality. The non-confrontational behavior that characterizes the Malagasy culture coupled with low expectations for service quality and availability restricts public demand on service providers.

The study recommends targeting resource transfers using remoteness and distance criteria rather than poverty; increasing supervision and oversight visits to remote facilities; improving staff living conditions in remote facilities; modifying accountability criteria to include positive recognition of and positive sanctions for performance and innovation; piloting service satisfaction surveys; increasing transparency and information dissemination, e.g., publicize resources allocated to education; and reinforcing community organizations related to social services.

Source: Derick Brinkerhoff, presentation at the International Conference on *Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization*. World Bank, Washington, D.C., 18-19 February 2004.

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