Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011

The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education

Defining Conflict-Affected Countries

Håvard Strand and Marianne Dahl

2010

This paper was commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2011 report. It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education” For further information, please contact efareport@unesco.org
DEFINING CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
Håvard Strand and Marianne Dahl

This document is a Background Paper for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 (hereafter EfA). The purpose of this paper is to explain how the EfA conflict categories are defined, and how these definitions are operationalized using various data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

OVERVIEW
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has produced conflict data for over 20 years, and provides a wide range of data concerning different aspects of armed conflicts. UCDP datasets are widely used in both academic studies and policy-oriented reports, most prominently the Human Security Report and the upcoming 2011 World Development Report. PRIO, and its Centre for the Study of Civil War, has enjoyed a long-term partnership with UCDP. We have worked with UCDP in several data collection projects and we have used UCDP data in various settings for more than 15 years.

This background paper describes how three different UCDP datasets and one PRIO dataset, largely based on the UCDP conflict definition, are utilized to provide valid classifications that enable the EfA team to make meaningful comparisons between peaceful, conflict and post-conflict countries.

UCDP DEFINITION OF CONFLICT
The UCDP definition of conflict was first published in Lindgren et al. (1991) and slightly amended in Heldt (1992). It did initially not feature any requirements of fatalities, but this was later added to increase reliability (Wallensteen and Axell 1994, 344). The UCDP focuses primarily on the political incompatibility at the core of the conflict and the organized parties that use violent means. This in stark contrast to the then established standard, the Correlates of War Dataset (c.f. Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 36f), which primarily defined conflict as a function of fatalities. The much broader focus on political actors and their behavior allow the UCDP to differentiate between conflicts at a much lower level than the existing alternatives.

The UCDP Armed Conflicts data were first published in 1988 (Wilson & Wallensteen 1988), later in the SIPRI Yearbook and then more detailed in Journal of Peace Research from 1993 and onwards. More recently, UCDP has expanded their collection outside of the original definition, by relaxing the need for an organized opposition movement, as the One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007):

1 See Wallensteen (2002) for a historical review of the project.
and relaxing the need for a government party, as the Non-State Conflict Dataset (Kreutz 2008)

The focus on a more theory-driven definition of conflict allows UCDP to distinguish between various forms of organized violence at a greater level of precision than previously thought possible. Also, the revolution in information search that we have seen over the last 10 years has also largely improved the ability to pinpoint violence in space and time. The majority of researchers utilizing these data have been interested in the causes of conflict onset, longevity and termination. Relatively little work has focused on the consequences of conflicts. What make a valid conflict dataset for a dependent variable are not necessarily the same factors that are important for an independent variable.

CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT

Counting the number of dead persons resulting from a disease would not be a very helpful in trying to understand the causes of this disease, and ultimately find a cure. However, counting the victims of the disease is very important for understanding the effect of the disease. The same logic is valid for the study of conflicts. Research on the consequence of conflict must consider the magnitude of conflict. A conflict with 25 persons killed will most likely be less consequential than a war with 2,500,000 persons killed.

How does conflict affect society? First, there are health consequences. People are killed and seriously injured, both physically and mentally (Iqbal 2010). Then there are economic consequences. War causes destruction of infrastructure, production tools and capital, in addition to loss of labor (Collier 1999). There are also political consequences. Internal armed conflict is a very present treat to the state’s monopoly of power, and will very often lead to a securitization of society. Arguments based on ‘national security’ becomes more important, and anyone arguing against ‘national security’ is by definition ‘terrorists’ or ‘rebels’.

In consequence, the political landscape in a post-conflict society is likely to see economic resources shifted from public goods to security provision, in a period of decreasing public budgets. This rearrangement of public goods is again likely to provoke public reactions – sometimes violently – which again will further shift resources towards security provision.

How do we measure conflict so that we can empirically investigate its consequences? First and foremost, it is important to mind the magnitude of conflicts. Second, it is important to mind the political framework of the conflict.
MAGNITUDE OF CONFLICT
How do we measure the magnitude of conflicts? How many persons are killed? How many wounded? How many families have lost the primary provider? How many starve? How much property have been destroyed or damaged?

A fundamental principle of comparative studies is that data collected from one case must be of standards comparable to data collected from a different case. Thus perfect information from one conflict is of little use if similar information from another case is a random guess. Comparing good data with bad data yields bad comparison.

Among the consequences of conflict is often a poor environment for data collections. Politicians might object for security reasons, and the strategic incentives of other actors might also bias the result. In addition, post-conflict countries are often inaccessible.²

Another obstacle is the question of the counter-factual (Murray et al. 2002). In effect, the concept we are operationalizing is ‘What would the situation be like if the war had not happened’. That is the cost of conflict. But how do we estimate this counterfactual? If the counterfactual estimate is wrong, the cost estimate is equally wrong, regardless of the quality of the conflict dataset.

Indeed, the more valid an indicator appears, the less reliable it probably is. A dataset consisting of very detailed data of direct and indirect economic, social and human costs of war is a tempting proposition, but such a dataset is likely to yield good data for the US post 9/11, fairly good data for Spain and the UK, and horribly bad data for Sierra Leone. The difference in data quality between different cases makes comparisons difficult. Furthermore, the more complex the data are, the less certain is the counterfactual.

This bias tends to exacerbate the costs of conflict in information-poor societies. For a number of reasons the most extreme figures have a tendency to be disseminated whereas the moderate estimates are ignored.

Thus it makes sense to opt for the most reliable measure, which quite often is not the measure with the best conceptual validity. How much value would the factory destroyed in the war have produced? Difficult to say. Would the Spanish flu epidemic have killed as many if there had been no World War I? Probably not. Would the person with a bullet in chest be alive if there had not been a war? Very likely yes. The closer we move towards an observable direct consequence of the war, the more reliable is the counter-factual, and therefore also the cost estimate.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF CONFLICT
The use of violence in political disputes occurs in very different settings. In reviewing this variance, we must keep in mind that the problem addressed by the

² See Pedersen (2009) for a thorough review.
EfA team is the provision of a specific public good, namely education. Although the government often has a central role in either providing or regulating the provision of education, non-governmental organizations are also relevant actors in this sector.

Organized violence is another field where the government has a central role but where other actors are important. Theoretically, the involvement of governments is hugely important. When two governments are at war with each other, the matter is regulated by international law. For the larger part of our recent history, this form of warfare has been at the centre stage of political and academic debate (Lacina 2004). However, the most frequent and arguably most disruptive form of conflict after WWII has been fought between a government and a non-state rebel group. Labeled civil war or internal armed conflict, these conflicts come in many different versions, from short coup d’états to large and long-lasting wars between well-organized armies.

We also observe armed conflicts between two or more non-state organizations. Most of these occur in weak and fragile states, where the government is unable to exercise power in its periphery, but gang wars in western cities can also be viewed as a form of non-state conflict. These tend to be local, low-intensity conflicts and their effect on society as a whole remains unclear. The fact that the state is unable to provide minimum levels of security should also question its ability to provide public services.

The final category is violence committed by a government against unorganized civilians, which is labeled one-sided conflict, and in some cases politicide or even genocide. This type of conflict can often be parallel to other forms of conflict. Holocaust happened during WWII and should be seen as a distinct phenomenon, just as the events in Rwanda must be divided into an internal armed conflict on the one side and a genocide on the other. Yet, many one-sided conflicts occur in isolation.

The different types of conflict are partly caused by idiosyncratic factors and their effect on public goods provisions are also likely to be different, both for countries in conflict and during the post-conflict phase.

**Battle Deaths vs. Total Fatalities**

Estimates of the human costs of war have been divided between battle related fatalities and total fatalities. The estimate of total fatalities is defined as everyone that would have been alive if there had not been a war.

The Iraq war has spurred a heated debate over how the latter should be estimated. According to Burnham *et al.* (2006) the war following the innovation of Iraq in 2003 had by July 2006 led to 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths. The International Rescue Committee (2006) estimate the death toll of the Congolese Civil war (1998-2006) to 4.5 million. Both reports are based on different variants of cluster sampling.
surveys. Johnson et al. (2008), Pedersen (2009) and Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2009) claim that method biasness have led to an over-estimation of numbers.

The use of surveys to estimate excess mortality related to conflict is associated with several problems. Both Burnham et al. (2006) and IRC (2006) are criticized for surveying households with higher risk of being exposed to violence, without controlling for this in their analysis (see: Johnson et al. 2008; Pedersen 2009). If this is correct, their estimates are likely to be too high. To estimate the total excess death IRC have estimated the Crude Mortality Rate (CDR) for Congo, and subtracted the average CDR for Sub-Saharan Africa. The IRC study has been heavily criticized for using the average CDR for Sub-Saharan Africa. In an unpublished paper, Lambert and Lohlé-Tart (2009) claim that a four million excess death estimate presupposes unrealistically high life expectancy level. By using alternative sources and methods they estimate the death toll of the Congolese Civil war to 200,000.

**PRESENTATION**

Armed conflicts come in many different shapes and forms. Some are durable, others are short. Some are intense, others are intermittent. Some are very local, others are almost global. In order to convey a meaningful message to the general public we must to a large extent ignore these differences and concentrate on the main difference between war and peace.

Understanding the consequences of conflict is quite similar in many ways to understanding the effect of a drug on a population of ill people. We have a number of patients, and we administer a drug. Not everyone that receives the drug will get better, likewise not everyone that get better have received drugs. Nonetheless if the drug is effective, the proportion that gets better will be higher in the group that received the drug than in the control group. The quantity we are interested in is the proportion difference between the two groups. This effect is sometimes called Average Treatment Effect.

Trying to understand the effect of conflict on society, we are interested in the same quantity, but in this setting, the treatment is most likely having a profound negative effect. To best capture the effect of conflict, we should group all observations into three groups: countries in conflict, post-conflict countries and peaceful countries. With these categories, we can then proceed to extract meaningful Average Treatment Effects. If the categories are fairly homogenous with regard to their conflict experience, the differences between them can be seen as a good indicator of the consequence of conflict, particularly when controlling for the set of
factors that both affect the provision of public goods and the overall propensity of conflict.\textsuperscript{3}

One might ask why it is better to cluster information (together) rather when reliable casualty data are available. Would it not be better to calculate the marginal effect of battle-deaths? There are several reasons why clustering makes sense. First, as discussed above, the battle-deaths data should only be seen as proxy for the overall impact of a conflict – it is not by itself a valid operationalization of that concept. Thus, the marginal effect of battle-deaths is not a very good proxy for the marginal effect of conflict magnitude at large. Next, the marginal effect of battle-deaths is probably contingent on a number of factors. Given the relative small number of countries in conflict, we simply do not have enough data available to compute reliable estimates of the contingent marginal effect. Thus, by utilizing more information, the conclusions drawn become more precise but less reliable.

**DEFINING CONFLICT**
The crucial element is then to operationalize the three categories so that they become internally consistent and externally contrastive. As there in no inherently ‘right’ way to do this, we have implemented a number of operationalizations, each addressing known problems. We briefly explain the rationale for each of these and argue why a combination of two of them make the best solution for this implementation.

The Excel file accompanying this document has six sheets. These sheets are:

1. Armed Conflict 25+5
2. Armed Conflict 1000_3
3. Armed Conflict 1000_10
4. Armed Conflict 1000
5. Non-state
6. One-sided

Sheets 1–4 provide an overview of conflict-affected countries, covering the period 1990 to 2008. The columns represent alternative time-spans. All data are collected from the Armed Conflict Dataset or the Battle Death Dataset.

**Sheet 1: Internal Armed Conflict, Five Consecutive Years**
The first definition is that a country is in conflict if there has been five consecutive years of internal conflict that have matched the UCDP criteria, with more than 25 battle-related deaths within the preceding ten-year period. Columns C to L show the product of this definition for ten different years. Column C is coded 1 if there at any point in the time period 1990–1999 have been five consecutive years of conflict,

\textsuperscript{3} In clinical trials a technique called Matching has been developed to pair together very similar cases, that only differ with respect to treatment. This approach has so far largely failed to show its validity in conflict studies.
Column D lists the same quantity for the period 1991–2000, and so on until Column L finally lists the most recent ten-year period, 1999–2008. The year in the label identifies the final year in the period.

Very short conflicts can be destructive, but they tend to be short because a military outcome is found rather quickly. Typically, these conflicts concern the control over the capital, and they are often characterized as coup d’états. Such conflicts can have dire consequences but these are more likely to be caused by politics rather than the conflict itself.

The fact that no party to the conflict can force a military outcome is very informative, as we can assume that both sides to the conflict prioritize security spending. As a conflict becomes entrenched, other sectors in society is likely to feel the consequence.

A significant problem with this definition of conflict is that it is not retrospective. If a country experiences an active conflict for five consecutive years, only the final year will be regarded as in conflict.

**Sheet 2: Internal Armed Conflict, Three Years of At Least 1000 BRD**

The second sheet lists conflict according to a definition where a country is affected by conflict if the grand total of battle-deaths for any consecutive three-year period is above 1000 within a given ten-year period. This criterion can be met either by a single year of intense warfare or a total of more than one. As with Sheet 1, the definition of the relevant ten-year period is changed from 1990–1999 in Column C incrementally to 1999–2008 for Column L.

The definition of conflict in Sheet 1 will capture situations where a government is unwilling to commit large resources to counter-insurgency and where a conflict therefore becomes durable due to the government’s unwillingness and the rebel’s inability. These conflicts are often fought in the periphery, and often in more liberal countries. Both IRA and ETA have been able to run a violent campaign for decades mostly due to liberal constraints on their counterparty’s policy space. Neither organization would have made it very long in China.

The definition described here will avoid these very low-level conflicts and concentrate on the more violent conflicts. A conflict that claims more than 1000 in a three-year period is bound to provoke a very serious response from any type of government, and is likely to have both economic and political effect on the society in which they are fought.

**Sheet 3: Internal Armed Conflict, Ten Years of At Least 1000 BRD**

The third sheet lists all countries that have had at least 1000 BRD in total over a given ten-year period. This criterion is conceptually similar to that of the previous
sheet, apart from the temporal parameter. Again the definition of the ten-year period in question is changed from 1990–1999 in Column C incrementally to 1999–2008 for Column L.

The difference between the three-year and the ten-year version of the cumulative criterion (Sheets 2 & 3) is very small. In fact the only case that differs between the two thresholds in the 1999–2008 period is Burma. In fact, almost all inclusions are included because they have had a single year of more than 1000 BRD. Philippines, Ethiopia, Turkey and Indonesia, in addition to Burma, are included on a cumulative threshold.

This finding underscores a position that is gaining popularity – there is a clear difference in the nature of low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts. That is not to say that a conflict in one category cannot be transformed to another, just that the theoretical construct of a conflict that claims 100 deaths each year in ten years is rarely seen. Low-intensity conflicts claim much less than 100 direct deaths per year, and high-intensity conflicts typically claim more than 100 direct deaths per year, and often more than 1000.

Sheet 4: Internal Armed Conflict, At Least One Year of 1000 BRD Over a 10-Year Period.

The fourth sheet is included to support the statement made above regarding the distinction between low- and high-intensity conflicts. In this sheet, we have only included the conflicts that actually see at least one year of more than 1000 BRD over a ten-year period. As with the other cases we report the results for different ten-year periods, starting with 1990–1999 in Column C and ending with 1999–2008 for Column L.

This definition of conflict is conceptually easier. The focus is on the most elevated conflict episodes, and one can argue that the effect of these episodes is very different from lower-level conflict episodes. The literature on the relationship between conflict and economic performance is in agreement that low-level conflict has very little effect on economic performance, whereas high-intensity conflict has a strong, negative effect (c.f. Gates et al. 2010).
However, this definition is less conceptually clear when it comes to what post-conflict is or is not. For many high-intensity conflicts the annual fatality level fluctuates around 1000 persons killed, and it would be very misleading to apply a definition of conflict that periodically reclassified countries as conflict or post-conflict countries merely on the basis of an arbitrary threshold.

Figure 1 shows a comparison of the four different definitions of conflict hitherto presented. The Y-axis is the number of conflicts recorded through each definition, and the X-axis is the last year in the ten-year period in question, so the figures for 2008 represents the period 1999–2008.

It is interesting to note that the red line starts out with only one conflict not included based on a single year, a number that grows to 6 by the end of the period. As we have discussed earlier, the 3-year and 10-year cumulative criteria converge towards the end of the graph, and the definition of conflict does not differ very much between them. The purple line stands out, which is interesting. Protracted conflicts remain fairly stable over the period in question, the number decreases from 25 to 19. Of the 19 that are present at the end, 11 of them were coded as protracted over the entire period.
**Sheet 5: Non-State Conflicts**

Column C to L refers to non-state conflicts occurring between 2002 and 2008. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has defined a non-state armed conflict as “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (Kreutz and Eck 2008: 2).

The non-state conflict dataset is currently not covering the period prior to 2002, and utilizing this resource creates some problems. Given the short time span, conflict therefore defined as more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during one single year. The year in the variable name refers to one specific year, and not a time-span.

There are only two countries where more than 1000 persons are killed per year in non-state conflict, Nigeria and DRC. DRC is included as conflictual using the state-based conflict data, while Nigeria is not. Both countries are included in 2008, so we therefore add Nigeria to the list of conflict countries based on the Non-state conflict data.

**Sheet 6: One-Sided Conflicts**

Column C to J refers to one-sided violence. UCDP defines one-sided violence as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year” (Eck and Hultman 2007: 235). (Kreutz and Eck 2008: 2). We have only included the third intensity threshold of more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during one year. The year in the variable name refers to one specific year, and not a time-span.

The one-sided conflict dataset is not covering the period 2007–8, which means that it is difficult to use in this context. Furthermore, all large-scale politicides and genocides have occurred during high-intensity conflicts, which means that the One-Sided conflict dataset does not add to the list of conflictual countries. This sheet is therefore not used.

**Defining Conflict-Affected**

In the end, what particular features differentiate conflict-affected countries from peaceful countries? Conflict-affected means two things: The problems caused by an ongoing or very recent conflict and the problems that associated with a post-conflict country.

It is our clear recommendation that the problem at hand is not seen as a distinction between war and peace, but as one between severely disruptive conflict and the lack of any such. The effects of conflicts can come about both through explosive and protracted series of events. As elaborated above, we are unable to single out a definition that provides a valid operationalization by itself.

We find that a criterion of 1000 battle-related deaths over a 10-year period is a reasonable definition of severely disruptive. This criterion should be able to
identify the protracted conflicts that have a significant effect from those that do not. However, a recent, short and intense conflict might also have caused significant damage, so we add to this that a criterion that a conflict is active if it has produced more than 200 BRD in any single year within the last three years.

While it is a potent separator of conflict-affected and not, it is in need of an additional paragraph to meaningfully separate between active conflict and post-conflict.

**Defining Post-Conflict**

The term “post-conflict” is difficult to conceptualize and difficult to operationalize. In a European discourse, post-conflict brings about images of post-WWII, with an utterly beaten enemy and a full military victory. This is not often the case. Indeed, a large number of battle-related fatalities occur after the signing of a formal peace settlement or a cease-fire agreement.

For the final period in this dataset, a conflict defined as active will have produced more than 1000 BRD for the period 1999–2008 in addition to more than 200 BRD in any of the years 2006, 2007 or 2008. If a conflict meets the former criterion but not the latter we classify it as a post-conflict country.

While these decisions can be criticized as misleading based on individual cases, it is our opinion that this definition, better than any other alternative, captures the overall difference between Active Conflicts, Post-Conflict Societies and Peaceful Societies.

There is, in our opinion, no single case that is grossly misrepresented by this coding effort. However, we still believe that some minor readjustments are needed.

**Common Sense vs Scientific Ideals**

The late J. David Singer is famously quoted “Live by your coding criteria, die by your coding criteria!” As one of the pioneers of quantitative conflict research, Singer led the Correlates of War project for several decades. According to this project, the Second World War was a war between Poland and Germany that Poland started and won, with the help of some other parties. We can laugh at this, but Singer’s point is that for a definition of conflict to be useful, it must be able to effectively describe the majority of cases while being sufficiently simple to be universal. World War II is an extreme outlier, a unique situation in the history of mankind, and holds as such not much useful information to shed light on other cases. It is therefore not too worrisome if the definition does not fully represent this case, as long as it offers a valid representation of the majority of cases, instances of which we are more likely to see in the future.
The data described here has a similar problem. Some cases are not well represented when they are coded according to the UCDP criteria:

- **USA post 9/11.** More than 12000 were killed by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. These actions are interpreted as battle-related as they sought to disrupt US policies by targeting buildings of vital importance. Yet, al-Qaeda is not a US organization, and the vast majority of the battle events that has taken place in this conflict have been located outside the US. What impact the events of 9/11 have had on the provision of public goods in the US is not known to us, but the mechanisms that have brought about these changes are most likely largely idiosyncratic.

- **The invasion of Israel into Lebanon in 2006.** The conflict was motivated by the 12 July abduction of two IDF soldiers. The conflict that followed was one between Israel and Hezbollah, but it was mainly fought on the territory of another sovereign country, Lebanon. However, the government of Lebanon was not a party to the conflict. This exemplifies an important aspect of the UCDP coding criteria. The theoretical focus is on the actors, and the conflict is coded as an intrastate conflict because only one of the actors is a recognized government.

- **The conflict between the government of Israel and various Palestinian armed groups.** This conflict is listed as an intrastate armed conflict over the territory of Palestine, or what is often referred to as the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. This conflict saw very few casualties during the 1990s, but from 2001 and onwards, the figures have been several hundred per year.

- **The West Bank and Gaza.** The conflict between the government of Israel and various Palestinian armed groups is listed as an intrastate armed conflict over the territory of Palestine, or what is often referred to as the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. However, Israel will still be included as in conflict due to the war with Hezbollah.

4 Personal communication with UCDP Researchers Lotta Harbom and Ralph Sundberg.
• Yemen has seen extensive violence over the last years, on several fronts. These violent episodes are, however, not included in this dataset, due to several factors. None of the organized opposition groups have made public any incompatibility with the government. It is therefore a conceptual stretch to label these groups oppositional in the militant sense. It is as such not a political conflict. For instance, the statements made by the al-Houti are that it supports the Yemeni government but opposes aspects of its foreign policy. The so-called ‘southern movement’ has a clear incompatibility, but this conflict is not included since the organizational aspect of these demonstrations is unclear. The southern movement appears to be an ad hoc organization without internal cohesion or persistence.

• East Timor has seen extensive violence after its independence, but this violence has so far been deemed outside the UCDP definition of violence as the adversaries have mostly been different factions of the armed forces pitted against each other over charges of discrimination. These factions have not been named, and their objectives are very narrow, falling outside of the concepts of government or territory.

• The case of the Central African Republic is more complex. The country is located in between Chad, Sudan Congo, and DRC, and the conflicts in these countries have crossed the border into CAR on numerous occasions. There has also been an intermittently ongoing armed conflict in the country during the past decade. Together, these actions have led to a large number of people fleeing their homes. The number of people killed is usually quite low, and has not reached the 1000 BRD threshold over the decade. In the shadow of the political conflict, there has been a string of quite serious one-sided incidents. If we add together the total burden of conflict laid upon CAR for the last decade, the border incursions, the internal conflict and the one-sided violence, the total number of casualties is most likely above 1000.
## Table 1: List of Countries in Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Armed Conflict</th>
<th>Non-State</th>
<th>Extra-definitional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Serbia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX: UCDP DEFINITION OF CONFLICT

An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. The separate elements of the definition are operationalized as follows:

i) Use of armed force: use of arms in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in deaths.
   (1) Arms: any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water, etc.

ii) 25 deaths: a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility.

iii) Party: a government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of opposition organizations.
   (1) Government: the party controlling the capital of the state.
   (2) Opposition organization: any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force.

iv) State: a state is
   (1) an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or
   (2) an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory.

v) Incompatibility concerning government and/or territory the incompatibility, as stated by the parties, must concern government and/or territory.
   (1) Incompatibility: the stated generally incompatible positions.
   (2) Incompatibility concerning government: incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition.
   (3) Incompatibility concerning territory: incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (intrastate conflict).

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010),
REFERENCES


