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*Education for All 2000-2015: achievements and challenges*

**The role of China as an education aid donor**

James Reilly

2015

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The role of China as an education aid donor

James Reilly¹

Abstract

China’s education aid includes higher education, vocational training, Chinese language instruction in developing countries, school construction, and collaboration with multilateral organizations. In recent years, China’s university scholarships and vocational training programs have grown sharply, as has Chinese-language instruction. Responsibility for China’s education aid is spread across a number of government ministries and agencies, which impedes the articulation of a coherent strategy and may constrain Beijing’s engagement with planning for the post-2015 EFA framework. China’s standards for program evaluation and transparency also vary from more established donors, which may feed misperceptions of China’s aid program. Looking forward, collaboration with China on education aid could be expanded in school construction, technical and vocational training, and teacher training.

¹ This report was also researched and co-written by Wuna Reilly.
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<td>ASEAN-China Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIBO</td>
<td>Academy for International Business Officials</td>
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<td>CAEMF</td>
<td>China–Africa Education Minister Forum</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Confucius Classrooms</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Development of Cambodia</td>
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<td>CEC</td>
<td>Culture and Education Counselor</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Confucius Institutes</td>
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<td>CICETE</td>
<td>China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Chinese Scholarships Council</td>
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<td>CTVP</td>
<td>Chinese Volunteer Teachers Plan</td>
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<td>CYVA</td>
<td>China Youth Volunteer Association</td>
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<td>CYVOSP</td>
<td>Chinese Youth Volunteers Overseas Service Plan</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Aid to Foreign Countries</td>
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<td>DICE</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial Counselor</td>
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<td>ECPC</td>
<td>Ethio-China Polytechnic College</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>FASSC</td>
<td>Foreign Students’ Study in China</td>
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<td>IECB</td>
<td>International Economic Cooperation Bureau</td>
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<td>IPCRC</td>
<td>International Poverty Reduction Center in China</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOFCOM</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
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<td>NAU</td>
<td>Nanjing Agricultural University</td>
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<td>SPSF</td>
<td>Special Program for Food Security</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUTE</td>
<td>Tianjin University of Technology and Education</td>
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<td>YIU</td>
<td>Yaounde I University</td>
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<td>ZNU</td>
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1. Introduction

China’s education aid includes five areas: higher education—primarily scholarships and university partnerships; vocational training, including teacher training; Chinese-language instruction in developing countries through institutional support and volunteer teachers; school construction and educational materials; and collaboration with multilateral organizations on education and training. In recent years, China’s university scholarships and vocational training programs have grown sharply, as has Chinese-language instruction in developing countries. These three are the largest elements in China’s education aid.

Responsibility for China’s education aid is spread across a number of government ministries and agencies, which impedes the articulation of a coherent strategy and may limit Beijing’s engagement with planning for the post-2015 EFA framework. Standards for program evaluation and transparency that vary from more established donors may feed misperceptions of China’s aid program. Looking forward, collaboration with China on education aid could be expanded in several areas: school construction, technical and vocational training, and teacher training.

2. Context

2.1 China’s Approach to Foreign Aid

A. China as a developing country

China’s self-identification as a developing country leads Chinese officials and experts to ‘emphasize equality and mutual benefit,’ the first of eight principles of foreign aid articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. This identity also explains Beijing’s preference for South-South cooperation over traditional donor models.

B. Prioritize economic development

As a developing country, China’s aid program emphasizes short-term practical outcomes that contribute directly to economic development. Chinese leaders insist that achieving economic growth should be the core objective for assistance programs. This priority drives China’s emphasis upon training programs and higher education, which Chinese experts describe as an effective means of promoting economic development. The underlying assumption is that once economic development is achieved, countries can make their own decisions in allocating resources, such as ensuring equal access to basic education.

C. Avoid prescriptions

China’s aid program is grounded in an assumption that each country’s leaders understand best how to develop their economy and society. China’s reluctance to prescribe specific policies for aid recipients also coheres with its defense of state sovereignty. As President Hu Jintao stated in 2005: ‘The path to successful development lies in a country’s independent choice of the path and mode of development suited to its national conditions.’
D. Request driven

China’s aid projects generally originate with a request from aid recipients, which is then incorporated into China’s domestic policymaking process (as discussed below). Chinese officials emphasize that this approach ensures that their aid program is responsive to local needs and priorities. China’s request driven model is one reason that Chinese aid tends to emphasize infrastructure projects, as these are often requested by developing country governments. However, China also has several longstanding educational programs that it generally makes available to all recipients, namely university scholarships and professional training programs.

E. Respect national sovereignty

China’s principle of non-interference in domestic affairs leads to a preference for working with national governments rather than civil society groups, and for providing most assistance bilaterally rather than multilaterally. China also rejects the imposition of political or economic conditions (with the exception of non-recognition of Taiwan) as interference in recipients’ domestic affairs. Indeed, the second of eight principles of foreign aid declared by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 and reiterated in China’s 2011 White Paper on foreign aid, was to ‘respect sovereignty and never attach conditions.’

2.2 China’s Approach to Educational Aid

In addition to the preceding characteristics, two specifics elements also influence China’s approach to educational aid.

A. Linking education and culture

China’s domestic governing system is structured, in part, by grouping similar functional areas under a common ‘system’ (xitong). Education and culture are part of the same system (wenjiao xitong), which means that they often have common policy initiatives and priorities. This contributes to the close integration between China’s education aid and cultural promotion, particularly via Chinese language instruction overseas. It also explains why a single counselor office in Chinese embassies has responsibility for both education and culture but not responsibility for China’s professional and vocational training programs, which are under the Ministry of Commerce (as discussed below).

B. Learning from China’s experience

Chinese experts and officials believe that China’s developmental experience provides valuable lessons—both positive and negative—for other developing countries. As one expert explained in a 2011 interview, ‘Chinese aid is based on China’s own experience. For instance, Chinese aid focuses on agriculture—which was very important for China’s own developmental process. China is not really promoting its own approach, but naturally Chinese experts and officials prioritise programs and issues which they think will be useful for developing countries.’ This perspective helps explain the value placed on exposure to China through vocational trainings and university scholarships.
2.3 A Comparative Perspective

China is hardly alone in emphasising cultural promotion and language training; indeed China’s Confucius Institutes are partially modeled upon Germany’s Goethe Institute, France’s Alliance Françoise, and the British Council. Moreover, China’s emphasis upon exposure to its own system, vocational training provided by Chinese experts, and university scholarships to China are all similarities shared to some degree by countries such as Germany, Japan, and France.

3. Data

3.1 Scope

This study defines China’s educational aid as government-funded activities within or oriented toward the education sector in developing countries. This encompasses funding for educational institutions and activities, including vocational trainings, scholarships, and language instruction in developing countries. We exclude funding and activities by non-government actors such as Chinese corporations and social organizations, as well as self-funded overseas students in China. Chinese universities’ partnerships and volunteer Chinese language teachers in developing countries are included, as the Chinese government largely funds these activities.

3.2 Sources

Research derives primarily from Chinese government sources, including official websites, publications, databases, and policy statements; augmented by media coverage, scholarly writing, and interviews conducted in Beijing in 2011 and 2014.

3.3 Limitations

Comprehensive, reliable quantitative data on China’s educational aid remains scarce. We report Chinese government official data wherever possible. Analysis or extrapolation of the data relies primarily upon supporting government data, augmented by Chinese experts’ advice in interviews. Given the scarcity of quantitative data, this report emphasizes the structure, processes, and content of China’s educational aid.

4. Characteristics of Chinese Aid to Education

4.1 Agencies Involved in China’s Educational Aid Program

Four government agencies design and implement most of China’s education aid: the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Education.\(^2\) Other ministries providing trainings include the ministries of agriculture, health, science and technology, and environmental protection, with coordination though the Foreign Aid Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism.

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\(^2\) The following section draws from: China’s Foreign Aid (2011), various ministry websites, and interviews in Beijing (2011; 2014).
A. Ministry of Finance (MOF)

MOF manages the foreign aid budget. It issues funds to ministries for implementation, receives and assesses financial reports, helps set foreign aid policies, and issues funding for multilateral aid overseas.

B. Export-Import Bank

The Export-Import Bank provides the concessional loans within China’s foreign aid. However, China’s education aid includes few concessional loans, as most school construction projects are funded by grants.

C. Provincial Governments

Province and city-level governments provide some dedicated scholarship funds, and help oversee training programs, identify and support volunteers, and support universities in their region. Some border provinces also fund and implement training programs for officials from neighboring countries.

D. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

MOFA helps set aid policy, particularly as it relates to foreign policy, and plays a lead role in determining aid levels for individual countries and programs. MOFA oversees embassies and consulates, which help administer university scholarships, training, and volunteer programs within recipient countries. Specifically, the ambassador supervises the embassy’s Economic and Commercial Counselor (ECC) and the Culture and Education Counselor (CEC), though both also have responsibilities to their home ministries of Commerce and Education.

E. Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)

MOFCOM is responsible for helping set foreign aid policy and is the lead agency for most of China’s aid programs. Within education aid, MOFCOM is responsible for most non-degree training programs, all school construction and most material donations, and co-manages China’s youth volunteer program. Several MOFCOM agencies are involved with education aid.

E.1. Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (DFA)

As China’s lead aid agency, DFA heads the Foreign Aid Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism, and plays a central role in shaping aid policy. It is responsible for overseeing China’s entire foreign aid program, coordinating among various ministries and implementing agencies, negotiating aid agreements, and approving expenditure of most aid funds. Within MOFCOM, DFA coordinates among four implementing agencies.

E.2. Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO)

AIBO is MOFCOM’s lead training center. It is responsible for either directly implementing or allocating most of China’s vocational trainings. AIBO generally sets
the topic for trainings, specifies the type of participants, and coordinates with Chinese embassy staff overseas and implementing agencies in China. AIBO also facilitates China’s primary overseas volunteer program, the Chinese Youth Volunteers Overseas Service Plan (CYVOSP). This project is also affiliated with the Communist Youth League’s China Youth Volunteer Association (CYVA), which is responsible for volunteer recruitment through local youth associations. AIBO also funds some Masters-level university scholarships.

E.3. International Economic Cooperation Bureau (IECB)

IECB is responsible for most infrastructure projects funded by Chinese aid, including school construction. IECB designs projects, manages budgets, oversees tendering by Chinese companies, and monitors implementation.

E.4. China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange (CICETE)

CICETE oversees the provision of educational equipment. It directly engages with international counterparts on aid policy, conducts research, and provides policy analysis within China.

E.5. Economic and Commercial Counselor (ECC)

ECC offices in Chinese embassies have a functional responsibility to MOFCOM and administrative responsibility to the ambassador. The ECC is responsible for facilitating selecting participants for training, supporting volunteers, overseeing school construction, and ensuring equipment delivery within the host country.

F. Ministry of Education (MOE)

MOE is responsible for China’s scholarship programs across four levels: PhD, Masters, Undergraduate, and short-term education programs. It participates in aid policy design, oversees universities’ involvement in aid programs, and supports vocational trainings on education-related matters (such as teacher trainings). Three MOE institutions play central roles in education aid.

F.1. Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges (DICE)

DICE sets policy for China’s scholarship programs, oversees universities’ international collaborations, and directly administers several smaller scholarship programs, including: Honor Student Scholarship, HSK Scholarship, Chinese Culture Research Projects, and Foreign Chinese Language Teachers short-term study project.

F.2. Chinese Scholarships Council (CSC)

The CSC is responsible for the vast majority of China’s higher education scholarship programs, including: Chinese Government Scholarship Fund, Confucius Institute Scholarships Fund, Province and City Level Scholarship Fund, Foreign Government Scholarship Fund, University Scholarship Fund and Enterprises Scholarship Fund.

Like the CSC, Hanban is a ‘social organisation’ under MOE. It is responsible for promoting Chinese language instruction abroad, implemented primarily through the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, and through the Chinese Volunteer Teachers Plan (CTVP).
Chart 1: Institutions Involved in China’s Education Aid

- **State Council**
  - Ministry of Finance
    - AIBO
      - Training institutions
    - CYVO
  - Ministry of Commerce
    - IECB
    - CICETE
    - Supply companies
  - Ministry of Education
    - ECC
    - CSC
    - Chinese Universities
    - Chinese Volunteer Teachers
  - Hanban/CIs
  - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    - CEE
    - ECC
    - CEE
5. Modes of Education Aid

5.1 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)

A. Content

As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao explained in 2010, China’s training programs are aimed at ‘managerial and technical personnel in various professions’ to develop ‘human resources that are more valuable than gold.’ They include policy trainings for government officials and technical trainings for experts. Policy trainings include: social security, public health, public administration, poverty alleviation, and cultural promotion. Technical trainings also cover a wide range, including agriculture, medical, engineering, energy management, and environmental protection.

Most training sessions last for two to three weeks, though some can last up to six months. They generally include 20-25 participants. Most sessions combine participants from multiple countries from a common region and sharing a common language, though some programs are bilateral. Most programs are held in China. They generally combine classroom sessions with field visits, including exposure to both advanced and less-advanced regions of China.

B. Implementation

Participants are generally identified by the embassy’s ECC office in consultation with the host country. The ECC then facilitates participants’ travel to China. In 2013, MOFCOM’s training center (AIBO) carried out or allocated 522 trainings for an estimated 13,500 participants (Ministry of Commerce, 2013a). AIBO allocates some training programs to other government ministries, universities, and various institutions according to their relevant expertise. For instance, agricultural universities or research institutions under the Ministry of Agriculture might host agricultural programs, while a normal university or the Ministry of Education would implement teacher trainings.

Trainings have emerged as a major activity for many Chinese institutions. For instance, the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRC) has already trained 1200 individuals from 99 countries on various aspects of poverty reduction (interview, 2014). Jilin University (2011) alone has hosted 27 training programs for experts from the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). MOFCOM also maintains a national aid training information network, where approved training institutions can obtain information regarding previous trainings, trainers, and trainees.

C. Assessment

Each training session concludes with a questionnaire for the trainees. While these results remain unpublished, a recent joint China-Africa study (Li and Funeka, 2013, 2-4) concludes that China’s training is promoting ‘sustainable development’ in Africa as well as ‘strengthening relations through a cultural focus’ while bolstering China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa. Noting the centrality of training and educational exchanges in the China-Africa relationship, they praise China’s ‘unique donor strategy’ as having ‘a positive impact on capacity building on the continent,’ and urge an expansion in
research collaboration and economic-oriented trainings.

D. Funding and Scale

Funding for the training programs comes from China’s foreign aid budget. For each training session, the Chinese government covers participants’ round trip transportation, room and board in China, a small stipend and insurance, as well as providing training fees to the host institution. A typical budget for a three-week training course for 20 people in 2013 is $129,840 ($6,492 per person) (See Appendix B for calculations).

China’s 2011 White Paper explains that from 1981 through 2009, China offered more than 4,000 training sessions for over 120,000 people covering 20 fields. By 2015, China will have trained 75,000 people from Africa. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged at the UN that China would train 80,000 professionals over the next five years, including 3,000 medical experts, 5,000 agricultural experts, and 3,000 educators (graph 1). As Kenneth King (2013, p. 49) notes, China now hosts one of the world’s largest short-term training programs.

While no clear breakdown of the distribution of trainees by country, area of expertise, or official status is available, Chinese government documents suggest that trainees are either government officials, technical experts, or specialized post-graduate students (MOFCOM 2007). China’s education-oriented training programs serve education policymakers, administrators, and teachers. For instance, the AIBO website lists thirteen education-related training programs conducted in 2013. Of these thirteen programs, four are for elementary school principals, two for university and vocational principals, four for education policymakers, and three for training teachers (AIBO 2014).

E. Snapshot: ZNU’s education training program

In 2004, China’s Zhejiang Normal University (ZNU) was appointed by the Ministry of Education as one of four Bases for Education Aid and Development (Li, 2010). By 2008, ZNU had conducted 16 training programs on education management for African educators: 11 on higher education, three on secondary education, and one each on basic education and pre-school education. Among the 300 participants from 43 African countries were 45 education officials at vice-director level or above, 83 university presidents or vice-presidents, 135 ‘senior officials,’ and 45 secondary school principals. Program content focused upon the Chinese system and experience, augmented by ‘trends of international higher education management,’ delivered through lectures, workshops and field visits in China. Objectives included: understand China’s educational experience and ‘lessons learned,’ provide a ‘mirror’ for participants to consider educational reform and development in their own country, facilitate educational cooperation and exchange between China and Africa, and promote ‘mutual [economic] development’ (Li, 2010).

Graph 1: Training Participants, 2004-2013
5.2 Higher Education: Scholarships and Partnerships

A. University Scholarships

The majority of China’s aid-supported scholarships are administered by the Chinese Scholarships Council (CSC) and funded through the China Government Scholarship Fund, under the category of Foreign Students’ Study in China (FSSC). All CSC scholarships cover tuition, living expenses and health care during the duration of the degree program. They include four levels: PhD, Masters, Undergraduate, and Non-degree (short-term) studies. From 2000-2013, some 197,926 government scholarships have been awarded through the CSC (graph 2). The CSC covers seven different scholarship programs, including bilateral agreements with specific countries, regional agreements for Southeast Asian, Pacific Island students, and EU students, as well as the ‘Great Wall Scholarship,’ conducted in partnership with UNESCO.

Scholarship students apply through the local Chinese embassy or consulate. There are 252 Chinese universities approved to receive scholarship students from overseas. Most degree programs are conducted in Chinese; students are expected to learn Chinese as part of their studies. Scholarship applicants are evaluated primarily on the basis of their academic excellence. There are no economic specifications for scholarship students, and no economic criteria are mentioned on CSC application materials. However, most CSC applicants do apparently come from developing countries (CSC, 2014).

Similar to the training programs, a number of Chinese universities have established new programs to train scholarship students, such as the masters program for officials from developing countries offered by Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management and the China-Africa International Business School established at Zhejiang Normal University.
Graph 2: Foreign Students Receiving Chinese Government Scholarships

Sources: CAFSA (2014); Xinhua (2007)

B. University Partnerships

A number of Chinese universities have established partnerships with counterpart universities in developing countries. These projects are essentially education aid, as they result in a net transfer of resources from China’s Ministry of Education to recipient country institutions. Two examples illustrate how such partnerships integrate a range of elements across China’s education aid.

B.1. Ethiopia

Throughout the early 2000s, some 400 Chinese teachers were sent to Ethiopia’s agricultural and vocational colleges, many from the Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE). In 2003, TUTE established the first Centre for African Vocational Educational Studies in China to provide trainings. In 2009 the Ethio-China Polytechnic College (ECPC) was opened in Ethiopia, supported by a one-time provision of $15 million from China’s aid budget (King 2010b). TUTE then helped staff the ECPC, providing 11 heads of department training 60 ECPC staff members using China Scholarship Council (CSC) funds. Volunteer teachers arrived via the Young Volunteers Serving Africa program. In 2010, a Confucius Institute was opened at ECPC, in partnership with TUTE (King 2013, p. 39).

B.2. Cameroon

In a similar partnership, Zhejiang Normal University (ZNU) provided Cameroon’s Yaounde I University (YIU) with the following assistance (King 2013, p. 40):
1. Send teachers to YIU
2. Build language laboratory in YIU
3. Host YIU staff for short and long-term training programs at ZNU
4. Receive YIU scholarship students
5. Establish Confucius Institute at YIU
6. Fund joint research and exchange programs.

5.3 Volunteer Programs and Language Teaching

A. Chinese Youth Volunteers Overseas Service Plan (CYVOSP)

CYVOSP is China’s primary overseas volunteer program. It is funded through China’s aid budget and administered by MOFCOM’s lead training center, AIBO, with support from the China Youth Volunteer Association. From 2002 through 2009, the program placed 405 volunteers overseas. Volunteers with relevant professional skills work for one year in developing countries in one of six areas: teaching Chinese, Chinese traditional medicine, agriculture technology, sports training, computer training and humanitarian assistance (AIBO, 2014). This program is clearly an aid project, though the scale remains limited.

B. Chinese Teacher Volunteer Plan (CTVP)

CTVP was established by the Ministry of Education in 2004, and placed under the authority of the Office of the Chinese Language Council (Hanban). By 2012, Hanban had sent over 18,000 volunteer Chinese language teachers to 101 countries. While most teachers are placed in universities, many do teach in secondary or primary schools. Teachers often either teach in, or are affiliated with, a local Confucius Institute or Classroom. The teachers are paid a small stipend by Hanban, and generally are provided without cost to host countries or institutions. Recruited by Hanban, volunteers are usually recent university graduates. The education and cultural counselor in China’s embassy facilitates the program within the host country.

C. Confucius Institutes (CI) and Confucius Classrooms (CC)

According to Hanban’s website (2014), there are 440 CIs and 646 CCs worldwide. Only 117 of CIs are based in developing countries; the largest number is in the United States and in Europe. CIs are responsible for promoting cultural exchange through Chinese language instruction and cultural activities. Most CI’s are established as a partnership between a Chinese university and a host university. In general, the host university provides the premises, China provides the staff, and the staff are paid and housed by the host partner. However, all CI’s receive a subsidy from Hanban.

D. Assessing CIs and CTVP

Most CIs are in developed countries, as are a large number of CTVP teachers. Such projects are best understood as cultural promotion. However, many CIs in developing countries do provide a net transfer of economic and educational benefits. Similarly, many CTVP teachers are sent to rural schools in developing countries. Such projects should be seen as de facto education aid. However, China does not include CTVP or the CI funding under its foreign aid budget; both are funded through Hanban’s budget.

5.4 School Construction and Donation of Materials
China has built a number of elementary schools, technical training centers, and university facilities in developing countries. Such projects are generally overseen by MOFCOM’s International Economic Cooperation Bureau (IECB), built by Chinese firms under contract, and funded by grants from China’s foreign aid budget. Since 2009, major university projects funded by China include: the Ethio-China Polytechnic College (Ethiopia) (estimated cost: $15 million), the Fendell Campus of the University of Liberia (estimated cost: $21.8 million), the Science and Technology University of Malawi (supported by an $80 million loan), and a training center within Zimbabwe’s Gwebi Agricultural College (Xinhua 2012a; King 2010b).

China has built several hundred elementary schools, primarily in Africa and Asia. Through the FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) process, China pledged to build 150 rural elementary schools in Africa from 2006 through 2012. China’s 2011 White Paper reported construction of 100 elementary schools between 2007-2009. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiaobao announced that China would build 200 elementary schools in developing countries from 2010-2015. MOFCOM’s website (2014a) mentions 34 schools built from 2009 to 2011 (32 elementary schools). However, the costs of school construction vary widely. For instance, in 2011, IECB built an elementary school for 880 students in South Sudan at a cost of $1.32 million (China Embassy, Sudan, 2011). The following year in Kenya, the China Youth Development Foundation constructed four primary schools at an estimated cost of $400,000 (Nzengu, 2012).

China also donates educational materials. CICETE’s website (2014) describes 22 donations of education materials from 2009 through 2012. The Chinese embassy in each country also provides educational materials, often related to Chinese language or culture.

5.5 Contributions to Multilateral Organizations

China provides both regular dues and specialized funds to UNESCO for education. In 2007, China donated $1 million for UNESCO’s International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa based in Ethiopia, and the International Center for Girls and Women’s Education in Burkina Faso. In March 2012, China and UNESCO established a joint initiative entitled: ‘Enhancing Teacher Education for Bridging the Education Quality Gap in Africa.’ This $8 million initiative was supported by the UNESCO-China Funds-in-Trust project (Xinhua 2012b).

China has also provided specialized funds and support for training programs across the UN system. For instance, since 1996 China has signed ten training agreements with recipient countries under the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Special Program for Food Security (SPSF)—more than any other country. In 2006 China and the FAO established a ‘strategic alliance’ through which China pledged to contribute at least 3,000 technicians through the SPSF framework. In 2009, China established a $30 million trust fund under the FAO for developing countries. The fund also helped establish a joint China-FAO agricultural training centre (FAO 2014).

5.6 Summary
As Chart 2 demonstrates, a number of government agencies have overlapping responsibilities in implementing China’s education aid.

Chart 2: Implementing Agencies In China’s Education Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Agency</th>
<th>University scholarships</th>
<th>Trainings (incl. teacher training)</th>
<th>School construction and/or educational materials</th>
<th>Volunteer teachers</th>
<th>Funding to multilateral organisations on education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- AIBO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CICTE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IECB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ECC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hanban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Gov’ts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates responsibility for implementation in this area*

6. Funding Levels and Distribution

6.1 China’s Overall Foreign Aid Budget

The *Finance Yearbook of China* lists China’s official foreign aid amounts, under ‘diplomatic expenditures.’ These figures, reported in chart 3, indicate that China’s official overseas aid rose from $387 million in 1996 to $2.8 billion by 2012. Kobayashi and Shimomura (2013) revised these figures to match OECD-DAC methods for calculating foreign aid (see Appendix A for their calculation mechanisms). Their data suggests that China’s bilateral aid rose from $512 million in 1996 to $7.8 billion in 2012.

Chart 3: China’s Overall Foreign Aid Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>‘Foreign aid’ in <em>Finance Yearbook</em> (million USD)</th>
<th>Estimated gross bilateral disbursement using DAC methods (million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2820.8</td>
<td>7813.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>6485.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chart 4 (below) compares China’s projected aid levels from 2012 through 2016 against other major donors. This suggests that by 2016, China is likely to be the world’s second largest aid donor, based on OECD-DAC calculation mechanisms (see Appendix A for calculation details).

Chart 4: Projecting China’s Aid: 2012-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average annual change (%)</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3055.59</td>
<td>3197.86</td>
<td>3484</td>
<td>3997</td>
<td>4338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2737.13</td>
<td>3252.64</td>
<td>3220</td>
<td>3188</td>
<td>3156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5402.7</td>
<td>4851.05</td>
<td>5481</td>
<td>6193</td>
<td>6998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5650.26</td>
<td>4911.14</td>
<td>5009</td>
<td>5109</td>
<td>5211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5239.79</td>
<td>5831.2</td>
<td>6122</td>
<td>6428</td>
<td>6749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>5522.84</td>
<td>5435.28</td>
<td>5164</td>
<td>4906</td>
<td>4661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12028.27</td>
<td>11376</td>
<td>11489</td>
<td>11603</td>
<td>11719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10604.51</td>
<td>11786.11</td>
<td>12375</td>
<td>12993</td>
<td>13642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12939.49</td>
<td>14059.45</td>
<td>14143</td>
<td>14226</td>
<td>14308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13891.44</td>
<td>17881.48</td>
<td>18775</td>
<td>20277</td>
<td>21899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>30686.96</td>
<td>31545.25</td>
<td>32680</td>
<td>33856</td>
<td>35074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7813</td>
<td>10158</td>
<td>13205</td>
<td>17167</td>
<td>22317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China rank</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: China statistics from Kobayashi and Shimomura, 2013; all others from OECD-DAC statistics at: [http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm)

6.2 China’s Educational Aid Expenditures

China does not release quantitative data on its education aid. We have calculated an
approximate figure for the two largest elements: government scholarships for higher education, and vocational trainings (including teacher training) (chart 5). For calculation methods, see Appendix B.

Chart 5: China’s Education Aid Expenses: Trainings and Government Scholarships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Training Program Expenses (million USD)</th>
<th>Government Scholarship Expenses (million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23.583</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28.283</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>38.34</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>53.481</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>60.857</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>61.308</td>
<td>118.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>63.173</td>
<td>144.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>64.153</td>
<td>247.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.78</td>
<td>415.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: MOFCOM (2011a); MOF (2014a; 2014b).

6.3 Distribution by Recipients

According to China’s 2011 White Paper, in 2009, 45.7 percent of China’s foreign aid went to Africa; 32.8 percent went to Asia, 12.7 percent to Latin America and the Caribbean, and 4 percent to Oceana. 39.7 percent went to least-developed countries, 23.4 percent to low-income countries, 19.9 percent to low and medium-income countries, and 11 percent to medium and high-income countries. No information is available on the distribution of China’s educational aid.

6.4 Educational Aid through FOCAC

One instructive set of data on the distribution of China’s educational aid comes from the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Since the first FOCAC in 2000, Chinese leaders have used the forum to announce major aid pledges to African countries. Chart 5 details the pledges in the educational sector.

Chart 5: China’s FOCAC Pledges of Educational Aid, 2000-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Basic education</th>
<th>Human resource development</th>
<th>Univ. scholarships (to China)</th>
<th>Volunteers and Chinese language training</th>
<th>Multilateral cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Establish African Human Resources Development Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Train 10,000 professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Build 100 rural schools;</th>
<th>Train 15,000 professionals; establish 10 agriculture demonstration centres; send 100 agricultural experts</th>
<th>Increase annual scholarships from 2,000 to 4,000 by 2009</th>
<th>Send 300 young Chinese volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Build 50 rural schools; train 1,500 principals &amp; teachers</td>
<td>Train 20,000 professionals (incl.'s: 3,000 medical; 2,000 agricultural)</td>
<td>Provide 5,500 scholarships; fund 100 post-doctoral researchers &amp; 200 professional MPA students</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Train 30,000 professionals</td>
<td>Provide 18,000 scholarships</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8 million for UNESCO Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FOCAC (2014). Note: each pledge is to be implemented over the subsequent three years, unless otherwise noted. All pledges are only for Africa/Africans. Programs not listed if no specific figure was announced.

China’s FOCAC pledges provide several insights into China’s overall education aid. First, the chart shows a broad increase in both the amount of assistance and the diversity of areas supported, particularly the inclusion of funding to UNESCO’s Trust Fund in 2012. Secondly, the chart points to China’s growing levels of transparency. For instance, the 2000 FOCAC statement merely pledged to ‘Grant more scholarships to African students to study in China, continue to send teachers to Africa…and set up channels of communications.’ Subsequent FOCAC statements provided specific data for these areas, though China still prefers to announce the number of people or programs involved rather than a financial amount. Finally, the chart shows that China’s educational funding in Africa is heavily weighted toward professional trainings and university scholarships.

7. CASE STUDIES

7.1 Cambodia

A. Overall Aid

China has long been a major aid provider to Cambodia, though aid levels rose rapidly after 1997. In 1999, China gave Cambodia $218.3 million (with $200 million in interest-free loans), one of the largest aid packages that it had ever given to any country at the time (Heng 2012). Over the next few years, China’s aid levels to Cambodia continued to expand (graph 3).

Graph 3: China’s Annual Aid Pledges to Cambodia
By 2009, China had become Cambodia’s single-largest donor, pledging $257 million, as compared to $214 million from the EU, and $113 million from Japan (Heng 2012). By the end of 2013, China’s loans and grants to Cambodia reached US$2.6 billion, making it the country’s second-largest donor after Japan, according to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC, 2014).

B. Distribution

Since 2004, China has provided aid to Cambodia across nine sectors. Transportation is by far the largest, with twenty-six projects in total costing $1.6 billion (62 per cent of all Chinese aid to Cambodia). Agriculture is the second-largest sector, with ten projects costing a total of $560 million, followed by Community and Social Welfare ($280 million for two projects) and Energy, Power, and Electricity ($131 million for two projects). China only reported one project within the Education sector, an $80,000 project providing an electronic library to the Royal Academy of Cambodia. Education is thus the second-smallest sector of China’s official aid to Cambodia since 2004, ahead of only Environment and Conservation (CDC, 2014).

Graph 4: Distribution of China’s Aid to Cambodia
One reason for China’s emphasis on transportation, agriculture, and energy, as opposed to formal education, is that these areas have been labelled as priorities by the Cambodian government. As noted above, China’s aid is primarily request driven. The Cambodian government’s own priorities are in these areas. One recent report (Sato, et al. 2011) praises China’s priorities in Cambodia, noting that unlike China, most donors’ ‘aid allocations [to Cambodia] are often not aligned with the government’s intentions. The infrastructure sector, for example, is currently experiencing a serious financing shortage, while, such sectors as health and government/administration are receiving excessive funds from numerous traditional donors.’ In contrast, Chinese contributions represented over half of all donor contributions to Cambodia’s transportation sector from 2005-2008.

C. Collaboration

In 2007, China became an official observer of the annual Cambodia Development Cooperation (CDC) Forum, and began providing annual public reports via the CDC website on every aid project it supports in Cambodia. China has also partnered with Cambodia and the UNDP for a series of training programs in agriculture (Ministry of Commerce 2013).

D. A Comparative Perspective

International donors (bilateral and multilateral) combined provided $1.4 billion in educational assistance to Cambodia since 2001. Other major donors such as the EU, Japan, Korea, and France all dwarf China’s nominal contribution in the education sector of $80,000 (based on China’s own reports to the CDC).

Chart 6: Comparison of Education Aid to Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Education Aid (million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Korea</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CDC (2014)

However, the official numbers reported by China to the CDC underestimate China’s actual educational contribution. For instance, China does not report its scholarship assistance to Cambodia as assistance through the CDC, unlike other major donors. In contrast, Australia’s educational assistance to Cambodia ($54 million) is entirely university scholarships. China also does not include its training programs or volunteer programs in its formal reporting to the CDC. Chart 7 (below), comparing our estimated expenses for China’s training and volunteer programs in Cambodia with the Korean and Japanese programs, shows that China’s program is of similar scale with the two top education donors to Cambodia.

Chart 7: China, Japan, and Korea: Volunteers and Trainings in Cambodia 2010-2012 USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>421,335,000</td>
<td>117,193,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainings</td>
<td>313,341,000</td>
<td>399,379,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>3,072,993</td>
<td>2,585,000</td>
<td>3,153,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainings</td>
<td>1,120,097</td>
<td>714,000</td>
<td>449,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>577,600</td>
<td>729,600</td>
<td>881,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainings</td>
<td>582,445</td>
<td>1,288,668</td>
<td>1,250,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japan and ROK from CDC (2014). For calculations of Chinese data, see Appendix B

E. Types of Educational Aid

*Infrastructure*

China’s only educational project reported to the CDC (2014) was the provision of an ‘Electronic Library’ to the Royal Academy of Cambodia in 2009, via an $80,810 grant. A 2013 grant to the Preah Leap Agriculture Training Centre funded new laboratory buildings, experts’ apartments, and scientific equipment, with all construction completed by Chinese companies (Ministry of Commerce 2013b).

*Training Programs*
From 1993 to 2005, China provided training for 260 Cambodian officials in China, and sent 35 Chinese experts to Cambodia to conduct trainings. These figures soon began to grow. By 2010, 95 Cambodian experts joined 27 training programs in China across a range of sectors. The following year, 204 Cambodian experts attended 59 training programs in China. In 2012, 195 experts joined 51 different programs (Chinese embassy in Cambodia, 2014).

China provides a wide range of training programs for Cambodian professionals. The most common approach is for a group of 15-30 mid-level professionals from a sector with developmental implications to attend trainings in China from one week to three months. China’s training programs range from combating corruption to mine detection to accounting, though agriculture is the most common. Most programs are bilateral, though Cambodians also join multilateral programs under the ASEAN-China Centre (ACC, 2014).

*University Scholarships*

China provides at least 50 scholarships annually for Cambodian students to study in China (Xinghua, 2012c). Since 2010, Guangxi Province’s Zhuang Autonomous Region (near the Cambodian border) has funded ten Cambodian students annually to study at the Guangxi University for Nationalities (SICAS, 2014).

*Chinese Language*

In 1997, China sent its first four youth volunteers to Cambodia. The first group of 38 volunteer language teachers arrived in Cambodia in 2010, working within local universities and high schools. By 2012, the program had grown to 58 teachers annually (Chinese embassy in Cambodia, 2014; Xinhua, 2010a).

In August 2009, the first Confucius Institute in Cambodia was established as a partnership between the Royal Academy of Cambodia and China’s Jiujiang University. In 2010, they opened their first Chinese-language class, enrolling 50 students from various government ministries and universities (Xinhua, 2010). Two years later, the Institute helped launch a new Department of Chinese Studies within Cambodia’s Asia Euro University (ACC, 2012). The Hanban office, which oversees all Confucius Institutes, also invited mid-level Cambodian officials to China for study tours on Chinese language and culture (Chinese embassy in Cambodia, 2014).

F. Assessments and Prospects

Chinese officials generally do not conduct assessments of the impact of their aid programs. They do, however, hold regular consultations with Cambodian counterparts to discuss their assessments. Chinese officials also frequently inspect their aid infrastructure projects for their timeliness, expenses, and quality. As part of the 2013 ‘China-Cambodia Friendship Year,’ then-President Hu Jintao pledged to expand China’s educational programs. China is thus likely to continue to expand its trainings, university scholarships, and Chinese-language programs in Cambodia.

7.2 KENYA
A. Overview

According to the UNDP in Kenya, in 2003, China provided only 1.23 percent of all loans and grants provided to Kenya. The figure remained low in 2004 (1.15 per cent) before climbing to 8.25 percent by 2005, rendering China the second-largest donor to Kenya. The two largest components of this new level of support in 2005 were rural telecommunications and power distribution (Mwega, 2009).

News reports of substantial Chinese assistance to Kenya’s educational sector occasionally surface, such as Politburo member Li Changchun’s 2011 pledge that China would provide $113 million of preferential loans to Kenya in higher education and scientific research (BBC, 2011). However, the most comprehensive collection of data on China’s aid to Kenya comes from the AidData website (2014), which collects various news reports on Chinese aid programs across Africa. AidData’s figures suggest that China’s funded only four education-related projects, at a total value of $546,000. This represents a small percentage of China’s total aid programs in Kenya (chart 7).

Chart 8: China’s Development Assistance to Kenya, 2001-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Value (USD million)</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Storage</td>
<td>640.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Generation and Supply</td>
<td>285.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>270.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Civil Society</td>
<td>150.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Social infrastructure and services</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated / Unspecified</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking and Financial Services</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Relating to Debt</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Tourism</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Education                                   | 0.546               | 4                  |
| Population Policies / Reproductive Health   | 0.546               | 3                  |
| Non-food commodity assistance               | 0.023               | 1                  |
| Water supply and sanitation                 | 0                   | 1                  |
| Industry, Mining, Construction              | 0                   | 1                  |

Source: Aid Data (2014)

While China’s formal educational aid appears to be a small percentage of China’s overall aid program, China’s training programs, university scholarships, and language training programs are not included. The chart below provides estimates on China’s volunteer and training programs from 2008 through 2010 (reliable estimates are not possible for scholarship costs).

Chart 9: China’s Volunteer and Training Estimated Program Expenses in Kenya, 2008-2010
It is also instructive to note that for other major donors to Kenya, education is also a small component of their overall aid program. Aside from Germany, none of other major donors to Kenya dedicate more than five per cent of their total aid budget to education. Within their educational aid, Germany and the US dedicate the bulk to basic education, while Japan and the UK have a wider distribution across the education sector (chart 8, below).

Chart 8: OECD-DAC Donors to Kenya’s Education Sector, 2008-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total aid to Kenya (USD million)</th>
<th>Education (as % of total aid)</th>
<th>Basic education (% of all education)</th>
<th>Secondary education (% of all education)</th>
<th>Post-secondary education (% of all education)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1364</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD-DAC, International Development Assistance database

B. Types of Educational Aid

Infrastructure

China’s bilateral assistance has funded the construction of at least two rural schools in Kenya. Chinese companies within Kenya have funded additional school construction, such as the completion in 2011 of the St. Francis Sivo Primary School by a Chinese construction firm (CAMC, 2011). The 2012 construction of four primary schools (estimated cost: $400,000) was funded by the Kenya Hope Schools Project, a semi-private foundation supported by the China Youth Development Foundation, as part of its Project Hope for Africa (Nzengu, 2012). The Chinese embassy also provides education-related materials, such as office equipment worth $25,000 for the Kenya National Youth Service (Xinhua, 2004).

Yet ‘in terms of scale,’ Kenneth King (2010) explains, ‘China’s support to formal education in Kenya per se is very slight.’ Instead, China’s educational assistance to Kenya, as to other developing countries, focuses upon supporting university scholarships, vocational and professional training programs, and volunteer programs, particularly for Chinese language teachers. Chinese priorities most likely reflect both recipient preferences and the existence of well-established Chinese capacities in these areas.

University Linkages
The first significant university linkage began in 1994, between China’s Nanjing Agricultural University (NAU) and Egerton University in Kenya. The China-Kenya Horticultural Technology Center was established the following year at Egerton University (EU). In 1998, NAU began to provide Chinese language teachers, leading to the establishment of EU’s Chinese Teaching Center. The Chinese embassy also provided Chinese language materials (NAU, 2011).

The partnership has spawned ‘spin-off’ educational programs. For instance, NAU has established a number of scholarships and fellowships for EU teachers and students to study and work in Nanjing, and sent NAU teachers to EU (King, 2010). Using NAU’s status as a training center under China’s Agriculture Ministry, by 2012, EU and NAU had jointly trained over 200 senior agricultural technicians and experts from ten East African countries (Chinafrica, 2012). In 2012, the first-ever Agricultural Confucius Institute was established at EU (King, 2013, p. 42).

Training Programs

China, along with Japan, has ‘provided by far the largest component of Kenya’s short-term grant-aided training provision’ (King, 2010). From 1983 to 2003, China trained just 63 Kenyans. Following the onset of FOCAC in 2003, the numbers began to rise sharply. From 2004 to 2008, some 697 Kenyans participated in China’s training courses. In 2008, there were 134 participants; in 2009, 130 participants, and in 2010, 198 Kenyans participated in 135 different seminars (King, 2010; Onjala, 2008). Trainings focused primarily upon practical agricultural technology. Sessions on formal education covered: Vocational education in developing countries; university presidents in African countries; modern distance education; primary school masters in African countries; and high school management for African Anglophone countries. Most trainings were implemented in China by Chinese universities (King, 2010).

University Scholarships

China’s provision of scholarships for Kenyans to undertake higher education in China has also expanded. Since 1982, China had annually provided approximately ten university scholarships to Kenyans. This figure rose to 40 annual scholarships in 2007, following Beijing’s 2006 FOCAC pledge to double its long-term training programs for Africans (King, 2010). By 2011, CSC scholarships for Kenyans reached 64 annually (BBC, 2011). By 2013, over 300 Kenyan students were studying in Chinese universities (Ochieng, 2013).

Chinese Language Training

Since 2009, MOFCOM has annually provided several Chinese language teachers to Kenyan universities (Chinese embassy in Kenya, 2009). The embassy has also established a pilot project to support Chinese language instruction in a Kenyan primary school. Kenya also hosts Chinese language teachers under China’s ‘Young Volunteers Serving Africa’ program (Li and Yazini, 2013).

The first Confucius Institute (CI) in Kenya was established in 2005 at the University of Nairobi, in collaboration with Tianjin Normal University. The Chinese government provided construction and start-up costs, estimated at $380,000 (Chinese embassy in
Kenya, 2005). Through its support for infrastructure and equipment, the CI provides approximately US$150,000 annually to the University of Nairobi. Plans are now afoot for a new building to be built to house the University’s new Centre for Chinese Studies (King, 2010).

In 2008, a second CI was established at Kenyatta University, in partnership with China’s Shandong Normal University. Both CI’s support Chinese-language instruction and cultural exposure at their host universities through the provision of language teachers from China, donation of teaching materials, and training of Kenya’s Chinese-language teachers in China. They also provide scholarships for Chinese-language study in China. Kenneth King (2010) identified the following scholarships for language study in China provided by the Nairobi-based CI:

- Chinese National Scholarship (1);
- Masters Degree (5);
- Undergraduate Degree (3)
- One year training course (14 participants)
- One month training course (12 participants)

C. Impact Assessments and Prospects

While objective assessments of China’s educational aid in Kenya remain scarce, Kenneth King conducted extensive interviews with Kenyan trainees and students in China. The interviewees expressed appreciation for the programs’ quality and transmission of practical technical knowledge. Participants also praised their ‘exposure to a very powerful and influential work and study ethic’ in China. As one participant explained: ‘The training courses were of absolute importance in terms of understanding China by an outsider, and appreciating the challenges this country has encountered, and how it has overcome them’ (King, 2010, p. 189).

Cultural exposure indeed appears to be an important Chinese objective. As Politburo member Li Changchun explained on a 2011 visit to Kenya, ‘We will encourage more Chinese students to study in Africa, and offer more government scholarships for African youth, so as to make them envoys to promote our bilateral exchanges and traditional friendship’ (BBC, 2011). It thus seems likely that China’s technical trainings, university scholarships, and Chinese-language instruction will continue to expand in Kenya. One promising development is the increase in regional training programs being held in Kenya.

8. Conclusion

8.1. Trends in China’s Education Aid

China’s levels of education aid have risen sharply in recent years, a trend that is likely to continue. China continues to place strong emphasis upon provision of university scholarships and vocational and professional training—both of which are primarily conducted within China and led by Chinese experts. Funding for Chinese language instruction, including the provision of volunteer Chinese language teachers, appears to be rising sharply, though only a minority of these programs are in developing countries. Finally, China’s cooperation with multilateral institutions is likely to continue to expand, particularly in training programs.
8.2. Challenges Facing China’s Educational Aid

A. Multiple lines of authority

China’s educational aid primarily involves two government ministries: Commerce and Education, each of which depend upon a number of subordinate implementation agencies. With limits on resources and capacities, occasionally divergent priorities, and distinct mandates, these different actors may not always collaborate closely in policy design or implementation. As a result, China’s educational aid can lack a coherent strategy, which in turn might impede Beijing’s deeper engagement with planning around the post-2015 EFA framework.

B. Program Evaluation

While most international assessments measure project impact, China measures only project implementation, such as the number of schools built or teachers provided. Assessments of school construction projects identify that schools were completed according to specifications, rather than weighing their impact on local educational outcomes. Furthermore, China’s emphasis upon recipient requests and its reluctance to set conditions on its aid program has translated into a skeptical approach toward mechanisms that could allow aid donors to expect recipients to achieve a specific developmental outcome (such as a percentage of girls completing primary education). China’s distinctive approach toward assessment could influence its engagement with the post-2015 EFA process.

C. Transparency

As this report demonstrates, information on China’s educational aid is far richer than widely assumed. However, most data is not easily accessible to non-Chinese speakers or professional researchers, due in part to the bureaucratic divisions noted above. Most importantly, reliable quantitative data on Chinese aid still falls far short of the information made available by OECD-DAC members. By obscuring the actual scale and nature of China’s education aid, this information scarcity may feed misperceptions of Chinese aid.

D. Preference for Bilateral Programs

China’s education aid remains overwhelmingly bilateral and driven by recipients’ requests. Even China’s aid to Africa is essentially a set of bilateral aid agreements whose aggregate numbers are then reported through the FOCAC process and weighed against previous FOCAC pledges. China’s reluctance to be seen as an aid donor, similar to OECD-DAC donors, further limits its willingness to collaborate in identifying shared education aid priorities or establishing joint aid projects.

8.3. Potential Collaboration: UNESCO and China’s Educational Aid

A. Basic Education
Unlike most of the EFA framework, China’s education assistance is oriented toward vocational training programs and higher education, which Chinese experts describe as most effective for promoting economic development. Therefore, China’s school construction program represents only a small part of the infrastructure projects within China’s aid program. In comparison to Japan’s construction of 2,600 primary and secondary schools in Africa 22 countries between 1985 and 2008, China’s program remains quite small (King, 2010b). Yet given China’s capacity, a school-building program could be easily implemented on a broad scale. If the international aid community was seen as strongly prioritizing this objective, and if recipient countries also strongly indicated they shared this priority, Chinese leaders would be more likely to adopt such a program. The most likely model would be to replicate the FOCAC approach, in which Beijing announced its intent to build a certain number of rural elementary schools with a certain region (such as Africa or Southeast Asia), and then allocated school projects to individual countries on a bilateral basis.

B. TVET

Having its training program administered by MOFCOM, rather than the Ministry of Education, highlights China’s pragmatic, developmental orientation. Since participants in China’s trainings primarily come from professional institutions, China’s programs are aimed primarily at building technical or sector-specific skills, rather than general capacity building or preparing individuals for future employment opportunities.

However, one area of potential expansion might be for China to invest further into regional vocational training facilities and programs. Instead of bringing thousands of trainees to China, training facilities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America could provide localised trainings to a greater number of participants at reduced costs. This approach could be augmented by partnerships between Chinese institutions and training institutions in recipient countries.

While China has recently established partnership programs across Africa at the level of elite universities (the ‘20+20’ program) and think-tanks (‘10+10’ program), no such program exists for training facilities. Adopting a partnership framework would also facilitate integration with other elements of China’s education aid: infrastructure construction, Chinese-language education, university scholarships, and volunteer programs.

C. Teacher training

Teacher training represents a relatively small share of China’s burgeoning training programs. This could easily be scaled up. Agriculture and health offer useful models. In both sectors, China combines infrastructure projects with expansive training programs and volunteer service projects. To date, education training has not received the same scale of support, perhaps in part because primary education has not been seen as central to economic development.

China’s Ministry of Education would likely to be interested in new teacher-training programs, as it would expand their role within China’s vocational training programs. This approach could meet both the EFA emphasis upon supporting primary education
and China’s priority upon vocational training. China has extensive programs that send university graduates to teach in rural regions of China for a fixed period. Such projects could easily be extended overseas, perhaps linked with China’s volunteer teacher program. These projects could also be built around a series of partnerships between Chinese normal universities and counterpart institutions in recipient countries, and possibly integrated with school construction projects, as China has begun to do in Africa.

D. Multilateral cooperation

China’s collaboration with UN institutions in overseas development assistance has been growing rapidly in recent years, including with UNESCO. In considering expansion possibilities, recent collaborations with China offer several instructive ‘lessons learned.’

First, multilateral collaboration is attractive to Beijing in part for its utility in demonstrating China’s international responsibility while blunting criticism of its bilateral aid program. Secondly, nuance matters. Program descriptions that enable China to present its aid program as South-South cooperation while acknowledging China’s variation from poorer developing nations are easiest to accept. Projects that help alleviate the heavy workload facing Chinese aid agencies are also more likely to be welcomed by officials responsible for program implementation.

Most importantly, leaders can make a difference. For instance, in November 2009 UNDP Administrator Helen Clark directly proposed to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao a new mode of three-way partnerships linking UNDP, China, and development partners. The UNDP and China soon established an “ Entirely New Strategic Partnership for South-South Cooperation,” and since 2012 have held several joint training programs in Cambodia. This examples shows that bold initiatives from multilateral partners, if carefully designed, can spark new collaborative ventures with China.
Appendices

Appendix A: Calculating Foreign Aid Expenditures

According to Article 7 of The Guideline of Foreign Aid Budget Management (cited in Kobayashi and Shimomura, 2013), foreign aid expenditures are composed of the following five items:
(a) Expenses for plants, goods and materials (for general and military purposes), and cash to be provided to recipient countries;
(b) Expenses for technical cooperation: the costs of training trainees from recipient countries and dispatching experts and administrators to aid recipient countries;
(c) Subsidies for filling the gap between the benchmark interest rate of the People’s Bank of China and the interest rate of the EXIM Bank’s concessional loan;
(d) Legitimate expenditures of firms responsible for foreign aid projects on a joint venture basis; and
(e) Legitimate expenditures of firms working on commission in charge of foreign aid projects.

To match OECD-DAC accounting methods, Kobayashi and Shimomura (2013) incorporate an estimated share of China’s concessional loans provided by the EXIM Bank, while excluding estimated state subsidies to the EXIM Bank. Their figure does not exclude ‘goods and materials and training services for military purposes,’ though they expect that their “estimation would not be affected significantly by this particular item. See their article for details. To calculate projected aid levels (chart 4), we first calculated the average annual change in ODA flows from 2008 through 2013 (2006-2012 for China), and then used this figure to project likely aid levels.

Appendix B: Calculating China’s Expenses for Trainings, Scholarships, and Volunteer Programs

The total annual scholarship expenses are available from the Ministry of Finance website (2014b). Data on the training programs comes primarily from MOFCOM 2011a and MOF 2014a and 2014b. These sources provide information on the number of participants and costs for individual participants. Using this data, we calculated a minimal cost per individual participant. The cost of training one participant in a typical program to ranged from $6,030 in 2008 to $6,415 in 2012 (due to exchange rate variations). We then used this data to estimate a total annual expenditure for all training programs.

The estimated cost of one Chinese volunteer for a year is $15,200, based upon the provisions provided to each volunteer from the Chinese government (Hanban, 2014b). The Chinese government provides a monthly stipend, a one-time arrival fund, and covers international travel. The annual number of volunteers and trainees in Cambodia from 2010-2012 was available from the Chinese embassy website. Data for Kenya is from King (2010).
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